Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Blue wave presages a defense-spending showdown

 

at 11/6/26 2:24pm

The blue wave will have a sweeping effect on the Pentagon, from budgets to leadership to defense policy. The biggest near-term issue is the fate of the proposed reconciliation bill, which the Trump administration is counting on for $350 billion of its plans to spend $1.5 trillion on defense spending in fiscal 2027. Even before the election, some Republican lawmakers doubted their ability to pass a bill through the reconciliation process, which is rarely used for defense funding. A lame-duck effort is unlikely to succeed, and Januarys seating of the new Democrat-controlled Congress is expected to kill the bill for good. Defense spending The administration pushed many top priorities into the unusual reconciliation bill, including: • Munitions funding. The bill is a major conduit for money that would nearly double munitions spending to $76.3 billion to help rebuild stockpiles following several years of equipment transfers to Ukraine and a depletion of inventories during the war with Iran. It was meant to underwrite a production surge for air and missile defense munitions such as Patriot, THAAD, SM-3, and SM-6; plus strike weapons such as hypersonic missiles. Munitions funding is also included in a proposed Iran supplemental that faces resistance from Democrats who oppose the war. • Golden Dome homeland missile defense system. The proposal includes $17 billion for a new Golden Dome for America Fund plus investment for related programs such as a Space-Based Air Moving Target Indicator capability and a revamped Space Data Network that would serve as the communications layer of the defense system. • Unmanned systems. The bill includes nearly $54 billion for the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group. • Aircraft: several F-35s and KC-130Js for the Air Force. • Warships: The Medium Landing Ship and some investment in the Virginia-class submarine. If the reconciliation bill is dead, lawmakers will have to decide whether to move any of those items into the defense appropriations bill. The Pentagon’s $1.1 trillion base budget request—thats $242.4 billion, or 28 percent, over the FY26 defense appropriations bill enacted by Congress—will face more resistance. Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., who is expected to once again lead the House Armed Services Committee after two years as its ranking member, said this week that he wants to keep total defense spending to $1 trillion in fiscal 2027. The administration proposed to offset the Pentagon increase with reductions in domestic non-defense discretionary spending. The guns-versus-butter debate will be reignited, and it is unclear whether base budgets will stay above $1 trillion.  Political headwinds  Several programs are likely to face increased scrutiny in the new Congress. Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors are a likely target for Democratic opposition. The Pentagon initially selected a dozen companies to work on SBIs, including Anduril, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and SpaceX. SpaceX, which has received $6.5 billion for the Space-Based Air Moving Target Indicator and Space Data Network programs, could face new roadblocks.  Also at risk: the Navy’s Trump-class battleship, the signature component of the proposed Golden Fleet. This author has already raised concerns about the practicality and affordability of the battleship, and Democrats are likely to push back on the program’s rapid development and construction plans. The Navy has chose General Dynamics Bath Iron Works and Huntington Ingalls Industries to build the ships, which would use a distributed construction approach. Leidos’ Gibbs & Cox was tasked with supporting ship design and engineering. If this program falls through, the Navy may revisit plans for the DDG(X) destroyer, which had been shelved in favor of the battleship. The next Congress will also push the administration to end the war with Iran, which continues to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Democrats have been unwilling to act on the Iran-war supplemental request without establishing guardrails or an exit strategy. At the same time, Democratic majorities in the House and Senate are more likely to push for greater support for Ukraine, which could include more money, faster arms transfers, and pressure on the White House to avoid actions that could harm Kyiv. Areas of alignment   The new Democratic minority is expected to continue to fund replenishing munitions stockpiles depleted during operations against Iran, despite Democratic opposition to the war itself. Counter-unmanned aircraft systems investment will remain a priority, from low-cost munitions to directed energy. Congress, which has long supported Navy shipbuilding, can be expected to add money for it, even if lawmakers disagree about specific platforms. There will also be continued support for developing autonomous gear and the networks that support them.  More budget delays expected  Congress failed to pass most budget legislation before the 2027 fiscal year began on Oct. 1, and the government is currently operating under a continuing resolution through December 11. Thats not enough time to finalize a full spending plan, so the lame-duck Congress will likely pass another CR that extends into the next calendar year. Under the new Congress, passage of a final spending bill could be hindered by negotiations over the status of the Iran war, topline spending levels, the debt ceiling, or other policy issues. Lawmakers might also pass a long-term CR, covering several months or even the rest of fiscal year. These stopgap spending bills typically restrict new start programs and production rate increases. Although lawmakers can provide workarounds for these limitations, as they did in fiscal 2025, a long-term CR could put a hold on dozens of new programs. The Army could see delays in starting procurement of the MV-75 tiltrotor aircraft and the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle. Funding would also be limited for its new High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System surveillance platform, Next-Generation Command and Control, and procurement of new Common Tactical Trucks. The Navy would face funding gaps for its new FF(X) frigate program and procurement of new submarine tenders. Production of hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike missiles and planned funding increases for MQ-25 development would also be blocked. A long-term CR would affect several Air Force missile programs, including procurement of hypersonic AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapons (ARRW), Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missiles (HACM), and the Family of Affordable Mass Missiles (FAMM). The Air Force’s plan to start procurement of new Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) would be delayed without an FY27 spending bill, as would investment in new technologies to defend aerial tankers and a new aircraft to conduct the Looking Glass mission currently performed by the Navy’s E-6B Mercury. ]]

[Category: Policy]

— State Department's push to cancel hundreds of contracts left behind a trail of mistakes, watchdog finds

 

at 11/6/26 2:00pm

Widespread errors in State Department efforts to terminate contracts may have wasted money and exposed the agency to lawsuits, its inspector general said in a report published on Monday.  Within a month of Donald Trump taking office for the second time, the department began reviewing some contracts for termination, particularly ones regarding foreign aid and diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives. Then Trump issued an executive order directing agencies to review their contracts and grants for cancellation or modification “to reduce overall federal spending or reallocate spending to promote efficiency and advance the policies of my administration.” This led State workers to review nearly 5,600 contracts worth a total of about $65 billion. From Jan. 20 to June 15, 2025, the department terminated almost 400 contracts, totaling roughly $360 million. But auditors found several instances where employees didn’t rescind obligated funds.  Across at least six terminated contracts, there was about $8.1 million that still had not been deobligated as of August 2026, the IG reported.  “Because [contracting officers] did not take timely action to deobligate excess funds, the department’s ability to redirect those resources to other mission priorities was limited and the risk that the funds would expire before they could be used increased,” auditors wrote.  The watchdog recommended that officials repurpose the $8.1 million, which the department agreed to do, except for nearly $50,000 that it determined was owed to the contractor as part of the termination settlement.  Auditors also found that, out of a sample of 30 terminated contracts, 25 lacked adequate written termination notices. For example, the paperwork for 10 of the cancellations listed two different termination dates, which increases “the risk of disputed costs, administrative delays or contractor claims.”  The IG also highlighted four terminated contracts in which State employees didn’t ensure that contractors returned their government-issued laptops and phones. Similarly, the IG for the IRS reported in August that the agency could not account for nearly 600 agency electronic devices valued at more than $270,000 from employees who separated in spring 2025.  Auditors acknowledged that State, while undergoing the contract review, also was dealing with the Trump administration’s reductions to the civil service, a department reorganization and taking over the U.S. Agency for International Development’s operations. But they also emphasized that the agency did not standardize contract cancelation procedures and that some contracting officers had never terminated a contract before.  The IG recommended that State specify steps for returning government-issued property due to a contract termination, set procedures for reviewing unused funds from a canceled contract and establish a process for tracking deobligation actions. Officials concurred with all three.  The Government Accountability Office recently criticized State for entering inaccurate information into its grant management system following significant cuts to foreign assistance grants, contracts and cooperative agreements. For example, more than 4,000 awards (out of around 10,000) were categorized as both active and terminated.  The IG for the Veterans Affairs Department in September similarly reported on the VA’s contract cancellations, finding that employees generally complied with termination requirements but that, in some cases, they had “only a few hours” to complete reviews. ]]

[Category: Policy]

— 'Permanent, serious' dialogue needed with China on AI: tech-focused lawmaker

 

at 11/6/26 11:00am

Rep. James Walkinshaw’s vision for artificial intelligence regulation includes maintaining “permanent, serious” dialogue with China to mitigate the risk that powerful AI models pose. That won’t be easy, but if the U.S. was able to maintain nuclear-disarmament dialogue with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, then the same can be said for communications with its top technology and economic competitor today, the Virginia Democrat argued Thursday at a GovExec event. Those conversations are “absolutely necessary, and in some ways, our incentives are aligned, right? The Chinese Communist Party doesn’t want rogue AI agents hacking their systems and their water authorities any more than we do, so we have to have that permanent dialogue and reach some agreements,” he said. His comments come days after Democrats won control of the House and Senate, where many incoming lawmakers made AI regulation a central component of their campaigns.  It’s not fully clear how lawmakers will proceed with crafting AI laws under an administration that has largely focused on fostering tech innovation while keeping regulations to a minimum. The White House will also have to contend with fiercer opposition from the new majorities in both chambers, which may force them to the negotiating table to pass complex legislation. Walkinshaw is hardly the first member of Congress to advocate for U.S.-China AI dialogue, though his position gives the comments added weight. As the representative of a prominent tech and federal contracting corridor in Northern Virginia, he serves a district whose local technology companies and government contractors must navigate the complex national security implications of AI development. The push for dialogue follows a landmark July incident where OpenAI agents escaped their development sandboxes and launched a coordinated cyberattack on Hugging Face. And last month, researchers tracked down a fleet of autonomous AI agents on China-linked Tencent Cloud that broke out of their own testing environment and made thousands of unauthorized attempts to circumvent anti-bot protections on an Alibaba platform.  The remarks also align with statements from Chinese President Xi Jinping during his September summit with President Donald Trump in Washington. Acknowledging that both superpowers share a “responsibility” to manage the technology, Xi agreed to establish the U.S.-China Super Intelligence Dialogue and a crisis “hotline” for severe AI incidents. Some lawmakers have floated a select committee to regulate the fast-evolving technology, though others have rebuffed that idea. Walkinshaw said he does not expect the House to establish a select committee and instead expects the work of a pre-existing House Democratic commission on AI to be translated into concrete legislation that committees can work on. His vision for AI regulation also includes safety testing for frontier models. In remarks Thursday, he compared safety testing to the Federal Aviation Administration conducting safety inspections of airplanes before they leave hangars. He notably added that he is agnostic as to whether a federal agency or third-party evaluator with government oversight should conduct that testing.  ]]

[Category: Policy]

— Defense Business Brief: The DIB vs. 2027’s Democrat-led Congress

 

at 11/6/26 12:41am

Newer defense companies should prepare for potential Congressional anti-corruption probes and examine ties to the Trump administration before the new Democrat-led Congress goes into session next year, said Kristina Moore, a partner with Womble Bond Dickinson law firm in Washington, D.C. Companies should take stock of their board and think about “preparedness,” which means “understanding what oversight is and is not,” Moore, who was previously a Congressional investigator and has advised clients undergoing such probes, told Defense One. “There is a lot of uniqueness to this space.” How Congress handles privileged communications can be a common surprise, she said. “Congresss position is that common law privileges, attorney-client privilege, work product privilege—they recognize that at their discretion. And so thats going to be surprising, where a lot of general counsels might be under the operating assumption that ‘thats a privileged conversation [because] I was in the room, outside counsel was in the room. Thats privileged, right?’ That might not be the case,” Moore said, adding that it’s important for companies to understand how Congress works, what they’re looking for, and the tools they use. “If you get a letter from Congress, generally theres a two week timeline—and thats actually if Congress is being generous. Thats a very short clock to respond to before pressure goes up in terms of threatening the compulsory process or actually implementing the compulsory process.” Moore said the hot topics ripe for Congressional investigation are Iran, Venezuela—including boat strikes to curb alleged drug imports to the U.S.—and AI policy and use. “That is in the zone of great interest. And then the question is: Are you in that zone? Do you have any interesting information? Were there any talks with the president?” she said. “Definitely now is a time to take and assess what your risk is and how do you organize the business around that risk in order to navigate what may come.” Welcome You’ve reached the Defense Business Brief, where we dig into what the Pentagon buys, who they’re buying from, and why. Send along your tips, feedback, and song recommendations to lwilliams@defenseone.com. Check out the Defense Business Brief archive here, and tell your friends to subscribe! Zooming in on foreign military sales. The Trump administration has pushed for more foreign military sales, and ushered in reforms last year. That could lead to more scrutiny in 2027 with Democrats leading Congress, said Shaun McDougall, lead defense analyst for Forecast International, a sister brand of Defense One.  “The administration has been very open with trying to push or get sales as high as possible. And so you have maybe more controversial deals with places like Saudi Arabia or Turkey, where Democrats might try to put up some roadblocks,” he said.  “Those are things that could also impact U.S. companies…from high-end stuff like the F-35, to munitions, to smaller components.” Could demand for some military equipment stay relatively level? It’s possible, McDougall said: “Things like the Iran war, aid to Ukraine—theres some overlapping requirements with both of those that could impact acquisition and contractors.” “Demand for missile defense, [counterdrone] capabilities, low-cost interceptors, low-cost munitions. Theres demand for that type of stuff…but depending on how those conflicts proceed and how the U.S. approaches it could impact near-term demand.” One company’s ‘blue wave’ outlook: Bipartisan work on the Hill should prevail.  “The push to modernize and equip the military has support on both sides of the aisle. The next Congress can continue making headway to find new defense technology,” Ben Kesling, Chariot Defense’s government relations head, told Defense One via email.  “A unit operating at the edge still needs weaponry, comms, sensors, [command and control], and power, whoever chairs the committee in January. The next Congress will have hard debates over budgets and policy, but getting affordable, durable capabilities into the hands of American troops has already drawn support from both parties…That work should carry forward.” In Hawaii last week, the Defense Information Systems Agency completed its Olympus Fires exercise alongside foreign partners and military components in the Pacific, with the goal of everyone using the same digital environment to share the data needed to find and precisely shoot a target.  “To bring those teams together in a common environment with common data to deliver those capabilities—that was the demonstration we were able to deliver. No swivel chair,” said Col. Michael Hlad, commander of DISA’s Pacific regional field command.  For example, a Marine Corps Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, or ANGLICO, team was able to locate and pinpoint a target that could then be “executed by a Canadian shooter,” Hlad told Defense One following his TechNet Indo-Pacific session.  Being able to take data, share it to locate and track and fire on a target “all in the same environment, is something we havent been able to demonstrate before,” he said.  A full analysis is pending, but one early takeaway was “a clear understanding of whats capable from a coalition environment” and a plan to expand the series to evaluate other areas, including logistics and maneuver, Hlad said.  Related: GDIT’s Vion Edge was also tested during the exercise to demonstrate “a tactical kit that provides all of your core [mission partner environment] services…when a network may go down temporarily,” Jason Myers, vice president of defense agencies for GDIT, told Defense One. For example: “We had one military service [where] their network had gone down. They moved all their logs onto our platform and used our AI capability to diagnose and identify what needed to be fixed…to be able to get it back up within a matter of hours.” Making moves + other news Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker will be the Navy’s program acquisition executive for maritime.  Shield AI unveiled its X-BAT prototype and plans to buy radar-maker Echodyne for $5.3 billion.  Oshkosh Defense, known for making military trucks, is teaming up with Grid Aero to build aerial drones. ]]

[Category: Business]

— The war on Iran is stripping the western Pacific of US naval forces

 

at 11/5/26 2:45pm

Half of the U.S. Navy’s Japan-based destroyers are currently supporting the war on Iran, belying Trump-administration strategy documents that called the Pacific theater a top priority and undermining relations with Western Pacific allies. Five of the 10 destroyers homeported in Yokosuka, along with the Yokosuka-based aircraft carrier George Washington, are deployed to U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility to help fight a war of choice. Navy officials have told the crews of at least some of those destroyers they won’t return home until 2027. “It’s really a big problem. It’s a problem for credibility. It’s a problem for our allies in the Far East…who, in a lot of cases, have been planning months in advance for carrier visits and for carrier battle group visits,” said Ralph Cossa, chairman and WSD-Handa chair in peace studies for the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum. And aircraft carriers deploy with several other types of ships, he pointed out. “That’s all assets that normally would be in the Pacific, that normally would be showing the flag, that normally would be reminding our allies of our commitment. And they’re nowhere to be found.” This is not what is prescribed by the National Security Strategy, which was released less than a year ago. “Preventing conflict requires a vigilant posture in the Indo-Pacific,” the NSS says. “The days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are thankfully over.” This was echoed in January by the National Defense Strategy, which declared that its top priorities were the U.S. homeland and deterring China. But five weeks later, President Trump launched a war against Iran. And although Operation Epic Fury officially concluded in June, the Pentagon is keeping a large force in the region, making occasional attacks, and waiting to see whether Trump will order more. [[Related Posts]] U.S. Pacific Command officials pushed back on the suggestion that they are scaling back the China-deterrence mission. “Our commitment to the security of the Indo-Pacific and to our allies and partners remains steadfast,” a PACOM spokesperson said, adding that the command “remains focused on deterring aggression and maintaining the readiness required to execute our assigned missions. We continually assess operational requirements and coordinate with the Department of War to ensure our forces have the capabilities and support necessary to meet them.” Highlighting the recent Keen Sword military exercise, which included participation from the California-based Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group, the spokesperson said “continuous training and exercises across the Indo-Pacific strengthen readiness and interoperability, while demonstrating our ability to respond to regional contingencies.” Last week, at the TechNet Indo-Pacific conference in Honolulu, PACOM’s deputy commander, Lt. Gen. George Rowell, underscored that message in a keynote speech. “Our mandate at U.S. Pacific Command is very clear: deterrence is our highest duty, and our guiding framework is to establish denial defense in the first island chain. We aim to prove that military aggressions will be infeasible, escalation will be catastrophic, and the costs of conflict far outweigh any gains.” [[Related Posts]] But, said Katherine Kuzminski, vice president of studies at the Center for a New American Security, sending so many of the U.S. Navy warships that are earmarked for patrolling the Pacific to the Middle East—and keeping them there for much longer than traditional Navy deployments—indicates “that our operations currently are not aligning with the administration’s stated national security strategy and national defense strategy, and that makes it really difficult at the service level or at the combatant command level to determine what the requirements are going to be.”   The military must be ready to respond, Kuzminski said, so “if there was some sort of incident that happens in the Indo-Pacific, we would want to be able to shift all of our resources there. But right now we’re kind of treating the [U.S. Central Command area of responsibility] in that way when we’ve committed to not be bogged down in the CENTCOM AOR.” It’s not the first time the U.S. pivoted on the Pacific. In 2012, under President Barack Obama, the Pentagon called for a “rebalance to the Indo-Pacific region,” including moving more troops and ships to the area. In 2016, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter said the rebalance was not transient, but “enduring.” One year later, during the first Trump administration, a State Department official declared the rebalance officially dead. Chinese president Xi Jinping has reportedly told his military to be prepared to take Taiwan by 2027. Cossa, like other experts, said he doesn’t believe “for a minute” that the Chinese will actually attack Taiwan next year, “but certainly, part of deterrence is convincing Xi that the U.S. has a commitment in this area and that we are going to respond. And when we have a third of our operational fleet out in the Middle East, that just sends the wrong signal.” Keeping 7th Fleet sailors in the U.S. Navy Central region “for a year is going to be really poor for morale aboard ship and at home,” a Navy officer and expert on Pacific security told Defense One. “Trying to hide the cost by pulling [7th Fleet] away from home is just accounting fraud, and is hurting the fleet’s ability to show up for exercises in the Pacific, which will create its own hangover of damaged credibility, and contributes to the perception that the U.S. isn’t living up to its commitments on security in the region. I’ve heard that the fleet has been told to expect a 17 DDG requirement [in the Middle East] until 2029, which is insane. In terms of deterrent capability, most people I know think this is China’s clearest operational window for action against Taiwan, if the military balance were its only consideration.” The good news from a Chinese standpoint, Cossa said, “is it continues to show how unpredictable our president is.” “At this point, no Chinese planner in their right mind is going to factor the U.S. out. If you’re doing war gaming and practicing for an invasion, you have to factor the U.S. in.” The question is, he said, “what do they think we can do if we’re there?” ]]

[Category: Threats]

— Hackers are targeting refrigerators worldwide, US agencies warn

 

at 11/5/26 12:00pm

Federal agencies warned Thursday that hackers are targeting refrigeration systems worldwide, urging operators to secure equipment whose recent failures have spoiled food and created fire hazards. CISA, the FBI, and the departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Transportation issued joint warnings that attackers are targeting electronic temperature controls at grocery stores and cold storage facilities.  The warning follows Nextgov/FCW’s report last week that U.S. officials suspect Iran-linked hackers were behind freezer malfunctions at military bases across the country. Those incidents began around late August and have affected roughly six commissaries, the on-base grocery stores that serve military personnel. Reuters initially reported that the Pentagon was treating the freezer incidents as possible cyberattacks. In France, hackers targeted refrigeration systems at three regional blood banks overnight Sunday into Monday. And this week, a new wave of supermarket attacks raised fridge temperatures at stores in Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg and elsewhere, forcing retailers to discard food. The incidents followed attacks at hundreds of French establishments in October.  The U.S. notice does not name who is responsible for the cyber sabotage.  Hackers could force refrigerators and freezers into continuous heating or defrost cycles, the agencies said. They could also prevent operators from seeing current temperatures, making it harder to monitor conditions inside the units. Beyond spoiled inventory and damaged equipment, the agencies warned of fire hazards and potential harm to consumers who use products kept at unsafe temperatures. Such hacks are possible because various digital vulnerabilities tied to refrigeration controls can expose their underlying equipment to hacking and sabotage, including devices connected to the internet that are used to remotely monitor or control temperatures. “Every organization that depends on refrigeration and monitoring systems should assume it could be a target,” said Chris Butera, CISA’s acting executive assistant director for cybersecurity. Hospitals, pharmaceutical suppliers, chemical companies and transportation providers also depend on these systems. “We are seeing these systems targeted across critical infrastructure sectors globally, putting inventory and equipment at risk,” said Brett Leatherman, the FBI’s cyber branch operations director. The agencies urged operators to remove control systems from the public internet and secure any remote access they still need. They also recommended separating refrigeration controls from business networks, replacing default passwords, installing security updates and retiring equipment that manufacturers no longer support. The hacks follow a pattern closely aligned with Iranian hackers, said Nahman Khayet‏, the co-founder and CEO at Alt Security. “They’ve been playing this game for many years,” he said in an interview. “Think about how hard it is to replace those refrigerators, right? They’re huge things. It’s very costly. And also you don’t want to do any disruption to those because they probably hold a lot of items which are important, like food.” That dynamic means that it’s unlikely the devices are getting the latest security updates, which Iranian cyber operators have often leveraged to get inside systems, including various types of critical infrastructure, he added. European authorities issued their own joint warning Wednesday, calling for immediate action to secure exposed equipment. The European Commission, cybersecurity agency ENISA, Europol and national authorities are coordinating their response and sharing information about the incidents. ]]

[Category: Threats]

— It’s easier to buy new amphibious ships than fix old ones faster, say Navy, Marines

 

at 11/5/26 11:35am

The Marine Corps thinks it will need 40 amphibious ships—up from the Navy’s current 31—to achieve its long-sought goal of keeping three Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units deployed at all times. Its a shift in strategy that reflects the Navy’s struggle to reduce the amount of time its ships and submarines spend under repair. Few U.S. warships meet the service’s goal of being ready to go 80 percent of the time, and, on average, amphibious ships are out of service more often than not. “If Im sitting at 31 today, the only way for me to realistically increase that inventory is for me to build new ships and do a service-life extension on some of the ships that I currently have in the inventory, so that I am able to keep to maintain an inventory while Im building new ships,” Shon Brodie, the Marine Corps’s deputy director of Maritime Expeditionary Warfare, told reporters Wednesday. Brodie said the vice chief of naval operations and the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps have drawn up a plan that would increase the number of amphibious ships by about 25 percent, which would theoretically fill the gap while readiness levels are below 80 percent. This larger amphib fleet would include 13 big-deck amphibious assault ships and 27 smaller dock ships, up from today’s nine and 22, he said. The Navy and Marine Corps are to sit down with lawmakers this month to discuss how to fund the project, Brodie said. That may not be realistic, said Bryan Clark, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, just because of the massive expense it would require to operate and maintain 40 amphibs.  “And because maintenance costs grow, the Navy cant do all the work it needs to do on a ship, some of which is also deferred to a future availability,” Clark said. “The result is a readiness spiral where ships decline in material condition.” A new Hudson Institute fleet design study suggests 35 amphibs, taking into consideration that those ships are vulnerable to a near-peer adversary and probably not a self-contained solution once the shooting starts.  “Larger surface combatants need to devote nearly all their weapons capacity to defense once the shooting starts, which necessitates them defending carriers that can conduct offensive operations at range and scale,” he said. At the same time, the Navy isn’t giving up on doing a better job maintaining the ships it has. “Were marginally better than we were before, and the expectation is that we can increase beyond marginally better here over the next couple of maintenance cycles,” Brodie said.   But the kicker is that not everything is within their control. If ARG deployments get extended, as they have been quite frequently recently, that increases wear-and-tear on the ships and loads down already delayed maintenance periods. “So youve got to bring the ship back on time, get it in maintenance on time,” to make the plan work, Brodie said. The aim is to enable the services to keep deployed three Amphibious Ready Groups-Marine Expeditionary Units, the three-ship formations that carry more than 2,000 Marines and their aircraft and weapons.  Commandant Gen. Eric Smith laid out his case for a 3.0 MEU-ARG presence in a 2025 oped in Defense One. Smith argued that national security required “one from the East Coast, one from the West, and one patrolling from Okinawa, Japan. (If you ask our combatant commanders what they need, the answer isn’t a total of three ARG/MEUs; it’s closer to five or six.) 3.0 is the minimum required to provide our nation and the Joint Force with a capability that can serve as both a warfighting formation and a cross-service integrator.  “It’s what keeps pressure on our adversaries, supports the maritime fight, and gives combatant commanders and national decision makers scalable options they can employ without delay to buy time, create decision-space, and if required to do so, be first to fight.“ ]]

[Category: Policy]

— Dem lawmakers vow inquest into CISA cuts, intel policy

 

at 11/4/26 3:00pm

House Democrats plan to investigate how the Trump administration’s cuts to the nation’s cyberdefense agency affected its ability to protect federal networks and help states secure elections, while their Senate counterparts vow to scrutinize whether intelligence agencies can deliver findings that contradict the president without putting analysts’ jobs at risk. Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., who is in line to chair the House Homeland Security Committee when Democrats take both houses of Congress in January, said he and his colleagues would examine the department’s use of its powers against Americans, its immigration enforcement practices, and its dealings with contractors.  The party’s wins in both chambers mean Democrats will decide which officials to call before Congress and what records to seek, under subpoena authorities given to whichever party has the majority in a given chamber. If a permanent director for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is nominated again, Senate Democrats will also have a say in who leads the agency. The same can be said for a nominee to lead the National Counterterrorism Center, whose previous leader resigned earlier this year. “We will investigate the administration weaponizing DHS against Americans, its out of control immigration policies, and its blatantly corrupt self-dealing,” Thompson told Nextgov/FCW. “The American people expect nothing less, and we will deliver.” The panel also plans to examine the department’s surveillance of Americans engaged in protected speech, its handling of whistleblowers and whether federal officials steered contracts to political allies. On cybersecurity, they want to know how DHS is preparing for attacks aided by artificial intelligence and what became of services the department scaled back. What CISA lost in the cuts Thompson and Rep. Delia Ramirez, D-Ill., who is positioned to chair the Homeland Security cyber subcommittee, have already asked Congress’ watchdog to assess the impact of staffing cuts at CISA, which helps defend civilian federal networks and other frequent hacker targets like water systems and telecom networks. CISA lost roughly a third of its workforce after Trump retook office, though the agency has made efforts to refill its roster. By September, about 250 prospective hires had tentative offers and were waiting for clearances, acting Director Nick Andersen said, as part of an effort under DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin to recant some of the cuts made to the cyberdefense agency over the last two years. Ramirez, in a June interview with Nextgov/FCW, said she was planning a significant DHS overhaul bill for next year. She also gave positive feedback on CISA’s rehiring plans, though she added it may not be enough. In a post on X after the election, she had a message for Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin, White House aide Stephen Miller and others involved in immigration enforcement: “Clear your schedule.” In the Senate, the retirement of Michigan Democrat Gary Peters puts Sen. Maggie Hassan, D-N.H., next in seniority among Democrats on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Hassan and Peters have already asked DHS to preserve records belonging to former Secretary Kristi Noem and her adviser Corey Lewandowski.  Hassan has also pressed CISA on its own security practices after reports that a contractor left agency account information and passwords in a public database. One issue facing both homeland security panels could come due before Democrats take over. A law protecting companies from lawsuits when they share information about cyber threats is operating under a temporary extension through Dec. 11. Without a longer renewal planted this year, the incoming chairs could inherit a fight over the legal protections companies rely on when communicating with the government about cyberattacks. When intelligence findings conflict with the White House Rep. Jim Himes, D-Conn., and Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., are in line to chair the intelligence committees in their respective chambers after two years of disputes over whether spy agencies can deliver findings that contradict the president without putting analysts’ jobs at risk. One major dispute centered on Tren de Aragua, the Venezuelan gang Trump said was carrying out an invasion at the direction of Nicolás Maduro’s government.  Most U.S. intelligence agencies assessed that Maduro was not directing the gang’s operations in the United States. Then-Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard subsequently fired the two leaders of the National Intelligence Council, which produced the assessment.  Warner also challenged Gabbard directly over Iran. At a Senate hearing in March, weeks after the U.S. and Israel went to war, he pressed her on a passage in her written testimony that she skipped in her opening remarks. It said Iran had made no effort to rebuild its uranium enrichment capability after U.S. strikes the previous June, a finding that bore on President Donald Trump’s claim that Iran posed an imminent threat.  A day earlier, Joe Kent, Trump’s director of the National Counterterrorism Center, had resigned over the war, saying he did not believe Iran posed such a threat. Last June, after Trump said U.S. strikes had “obliterated” three Iranian nuclear sites, a preliminary Defense Intelligence Agency assessment suggested the attacks could have set the program back only a few months.  When Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired DIA Director Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kruse that August without explanation, Warner pointed to the dispute in accusing the administration of “treating intelligence as a loyalty test.” Himes has already signaled one investigation he wants to pursue. In September, he alerted an association representing intelligence contractors that lawmakers could seek records and testimony about donations to Trump’s White House ballroom. He wants to know who solicited the contributions and whether companies believed giving money would help them secure government work or access to senior officials. At least a third of the Republicans on the House intelligence panel won’t return to Congress in January. Missouri Rep. Ann Wagner and Pennsylvania Reps. Brian Fitzpatrick and Scott Perry lost reelection Tuesday. New York Rep. Elise Stefanik didn’t seek another term, and Texas Rep. Dan Crenshaw lost his primary.  Himes and Warner also face a decision about the government’s own surveillance powers should lawmakers leave it unresolved this year, namely Section 702 authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Those authorities let spy agencies compel internet and telecom providers for contents of phone calls, emails and text messages of foreigners located abroad without a warrant, but, in doing so, agencies can also collect Americans’ data if they are communicating with a foreign target. The controversial program expired in June, though certain collection procedures can continue through this spring under court approvals issued in March. Who oversees military cyber operations Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., and Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., are positioned to lead the Armed Services committees, which help write the annual defense policy bill.  Smith told The Washington Post he wants to investigate military operations, politicization of the armed forces and possible corruption in defense contracting. Both lawmakers challenged the administration over the firing of Gen. Timothy Haugh, who led the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command.  Much of the detailed oversight of military hacking and network defense would fall to Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., and Sen. Jacky Rosen, D-Nev., if they move up from their current posts as ranking members. Khanna is the top Democrat on the House Armed Services cyber subcommittee, which also oversees Pentagon software purchases and AI programs.  Rosen is his counterpart on the Senate Armed Services cybersecurity subcommittee, where lawmakers have examined how the military recruits and trains its cyber forces. A major Defense Department Cyber Strategy was planned for release in September but has been sitting in limbo for sometime. Khanna could also lead the House select committee on competition with China. That role would give him another avenue to scrutinize AI security. In October, he asked leading U.S. developers what they knew about Chinese efforts to obtain their code or use their models’ answers to train competing systems. He has also called for the U.S. and China to agree on when to shut down AI systems judged too dangerous to operate. Morgan Adamski, a former executive director of U.S. Cyber Command and now PwC’s Cyber, Data & Tech Risk Platform Leader, said she will be watching how lawmakers approach CISA’s readiness and what federal agencies ask companies to report when they are hacked.  Hearings could give stakeholders a clearer picture of where federal defenses have fallen short, even if the rules they operate under stay the same. “But greater oversight doesnt necessarily mean immediate legislative or regulatory change,” Adamski added. “The administration will continue to play a significant role in shaping federal priorities, so businesses should be prepared for continued policy uncertainty.” ]]

[Category: Policy]

— Cancellations, investigations, and even impeachment could be ahead under Democratic Congress

 

at 11/4/26 2:30pm

The Defense Department was already in Congress’s bipartisan bad graces before the midterm elections. In the wake of the Democrats’ overwhelming victory, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and the Trump administration are likely to face even more pushback for their handling of the Iran war and their plans for pricey initiatives like Golden Dome, Golden Fleet and Autonomous Warfare Command.  And that’s if Hegseth sticks around. Some lawmakers have voiced an intention to impeach him, while rumors swirl that he is angling to be appointed to Tennessee Governor-Elect Marsha Blackburn’s vacated Senate seat. “My read is that nearly all Democrats and an increasing number of Republicans still want to remove Hegseth,” Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, told Defense One. “He has done nothing to improve his position with members of Congress since the House adjourned over this issue back in September, and it will be at the top of the docket when they get back next week.” In the meantime, it doesn’t appear that Donald Trump intends to fire him. On Wednesday, the president told reporters that he thinks Hegseth is “doing a very good job.” Trump said he hadn’t heard that Hegseth was being considered for the Senate job, but said he’d be “very popular” in the office.  If Trump does change his mind, Harrison said, now would be the time to push him out and still have time to get a replacement nominated and confirmed. Once the new Congress is seated in the new year, he added, “they will have a hard time getting anyone confirmed.” Lawmakers will likely face pressure to investigate Hegseth and his administration for their handling of the Iran war, Harrison said, as well as “potentially improper access and contract awards for Trump’s political allies” like Elon Musk and Palmer Luckey.  Whether Hegseth stays or goes, much of his work reshaping the Defense Department is unlikely to stick, Harrison said. Anything that requires new funding is likely to hit a brick wall, and even initiatives that don’t cost anything may be undone by law. “I think AUTOWARCOM is something they can do without Congress, but I would not expect it to receive any significant funding of its own,” he said. “The Golden Fleet definitely requires Congress for funding, so that is a dead idea—the battleship in particular.” Democrats will also have the chance to roll back Hegseth’s culture-war pet projects, by passing laws allowing transgender troops to serve openly, re-renaming Army bases to follow the determinations of a congressionally mandated commission and perhaps even enshrining women’s right to serve in combat roles. “In general, if it is a Hegseth initiative that requires congressional authorization or funding, it is likely not going to happen,” Harrison said. “If it is something the administration can do on its own, they will probably still try and then the new Congress may try to pass statutes that undo these changes.” There may also be roadblocks for anything that the administration aimed to fund via a proposed 2027 reconciliation bill, such as billions for autonomous capabilities and critical munitions procurement.  “Assuming the huge increase in munitions funding requested through reconciliation does not pass in the lame duck, that is something the next Congress will have to deal with,” Harrison said. The jettisoning of a reconciliation bill would also shrink the Trump administration’s $1.5 trillion defense proposal down to a “still substantial” $1.1 trillion, Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Defense One.  “Many of the major defense initiatives have bipartisan support — drones, munitions, shipbuilding, and missile defense,” Cancian said. “There will be some drone organization, though it may not be a combatant command.” A rebranding of Trump’s Golden Dome and the Boeing F-47, the Air Force’s six-generation fighter named for Trump’s position in the line of U.S. presidents, could also be expected, he said. The Defense Department could also face pressure from some familiar faces, including Representative-elect Elaine Luria, D-Va., a retired Navy commander who won back her former House of Representatives seat, and who previously held a seat on the House Armed Services Committee. In South Carolina, Nancy Lacore, a former Navy admiral that Hegseth forced to retire last year, flipped former Rep. Nancy Mace’s House seat, leaving open another HASC position. “At this point, I don’t think they have the votes for removal in the Senate,” Harrison said of a Hegseth impeachment. “But it could be enough of an embarrassment to the administration if a decent number of Republicans in the House vote to impeach that they push Hegseth out.” ]]

[Category: Policy]

— Unraveling the Pentagon’s quantum problem

 

at 11/4/26 3:28am

HONOLULU—Preparing for a quantum computer attack means two things: knowing exactly which systems will need to be upgraded and making sure everyone understands how serious the risk is to sensitive data protected by standard encryption. “Our adversaries are using quantum. How advanced are their capabilities? We dont totally know. But the reality is that that presents some threats, and the challenge with, you know, post-quantum cryptography is this idea of ‘harvest now, decrypt later,’” said Matt McFadden, vice president of cyber for GDIT, during a panel discussion at the TechNet Info-Pacific conference here. “The reality is, with ‘harvest now, decrypt later,’ our adversaries can be harvesting data for a really, really long time,” and eventually a quantum computer will be able to break the standard encryption used today.  Post-quantum cryptography, or the mathematical algorithms needed to secure networks and systems from attacks using quantum computers, is a challenge each military service must tackle. But the White House put a timeline on it for federal agencies—by Dec. 31, 2030—for high value assets and high-impact systems “to use PQC for key establishment” in an executive order issued June 22. The deadline “to use PQC for digital signatures” is 2031. “It’s just this one more threat vector that we have to be concerned about as we develop our resilient architecture,” said Col. Tassika Davis, Pacific Air Forces Command’s director of cyber operations and warfighter communications. “Now, we need to make sure that our architectures are cryptographically agile, so that we can shift and move and continue, and not degrade mission capability, while we are also providing the most current defense capabilities.” To do that takes mapping the whole IT ecosystem as it is, “looking at it from the entire threat picture, and then planning against that,” she said.  It sounds simple but just knowing what exactly needs to be protected is a key, yet challenging first step, GDIT’s McFadden said during the panel.  “Its hard to migrate when you dont know what you have. So, really, the first step in this process is really having a comprehensive inventory,” he said, including certifications for apps, devices, and networks. “One of the things you realize pretty fast is like youre very reliant on third-party providers…you’ve got to really work together with the system owners, the third-party suppliers, your supply chains, and basically build that governance team to help drive” compliance and crypto agility, or the ability to combat quantum cyber threats.  Securing systems for a post-quantum threat becomes more complicated when the platforms that need to be upgraded don’t stay in one place for long.  “Ships are being extended more than they have been. There are crises that are popping up everywhere. And we used to be in a period of [maintenance] availabilities, which means we had about nine months to a year to do modernization. Now you’ve got 45 days,” said Capt. Victor Taylor, Pacific Fleet’s director of communications and information systems, during the panel. “So, how do I break up these big pieces of modernization into modular…shorter windows? How do I execute the configuration management? How do I have the teams to do it at scale at multiple locations? And then how do I schedule it with all the dynamic changes that are occurring? And so, if we think were going to do that with our old processes, thats not the case.” And part of the Pentagon and military services upgrading their high-value systems to withstand a quantum attack will be making sure individuals are aware of the quantum threat.  “The first thing is to acknowledge that its a real problem. Like Q-Day isnt a thing thats going to be beyond our retirement. Q-Day is going to be a thing that happens…definitely within the next five years,” Peter O’Donoghue, Quantum Sky’s chief technology officer, told Defense One after the panel. “So, then you need to plan for it. You need to actually fund it.” The Pentagon released a post-quantum cryptography strategy earlier this year. And its implementation “could be added to the Pentagon’s existing network modernization,” O’Donoghue said. But how organizations upgrade their systems will vary—and take awareness, he said. “Theres no one-size-fits-all [solution], but I think each department, each agency needs to actually understand what the risk is and start buying it down and taking action. Like sitting on your hands and going into a kind of analysis paralysis is not the answer. Denying it is definitely not the answer either,” O’Donoghue said. ]]

[Category: Science & Tech]

— Pentagon is beginning to follow Ukraine into wider use of ground robots

 

at 11/3/26 2:21pm

When it comes to wide adoption of ground robots, the U.S. military is starting to walk the road pioneered by Ukraine. The Pentagon isn’t yet close to buying unmanned ground vehicles, or UGVs, at Ukrainian scale. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense says it ordered more than 22,000 in the first seven months of this year, which is about as many as it ordered in all of 2025. But the U.S. Defense Department committed more than $115 million to UGV projects in fiscal 2026, per public records and GovTribe, a Defense One sister brand that tracks government contracts. Still, the number of ground robots on Ukrainian battlefields is dwarfed by that of aerial drones. In 2025, Ukraine made some 4 million quadcopters and other flying drones, and ministry officials say 2026 deliveries are moving 3.7 times faster. Russia is also producing armed drones faster, and both sides’ increasing ability to target anything that moves on the battlefield has spurred manufacturers to keep their UGV designs relatively small and cheap. “What Ukraine says they need, and obviously it’s the same for the Russians, more or less, is something that’s not very expensive, something that is attritable, something that if lost could be easily replaced,” Samuel Bendett, a drone analyst at CNA, CNAS, and CSIS, said in an interview. “These are not overly complicated UGVs. They’re relatively simple. They have a lot of commercial components.” Ukraine’s UGVs are often used for logistics, casualty evacuation and related duties. Its TERMIT UGV can carry up to 300 kg of supplies or wounded soldiers. But increasingly, they are being armed for combat. In the summer of 2025, Ukraine used a Droid TW 12.7 UGV armed with a .50-caliber machine gun to defend a key intersection from repeated attacks, Defense One reported earlier this year. Russia employs similar vehicles, one of which was used as an explosive kamikaze as early as November 2024. The U.S. military, which envisions fighting in a wider range of environments than does Kyiv, has more diverse UGV projects under development. Last month, for example, the Marine Corps converted an artillery unit into its first Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or  NMESIS, battalion. NMESIS uses UGVs equipped to fire two Naval Strike Missiles at ground and naval targets more than 100 nautical miles away. The system is intended for use in sea-denial missions in the Pacific. It uses a modified Oshkosh Joint Light Tactical Vehicle with autonomy packages provided by Forterra and Kodiak AI. The program is part of roughly $92 million in USMC ROGUE Fires orders this year. Meanwhile, the Marines and the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment are spending nearly $25 million to buy more than a dozen IBEX UGVs made by Overland AI for logistics and counter-UAV defense missions, company officials said last month. The company also received two contract awards totaling more than $34 million for autonomous breaching capabilities in August and September. Compared to Ukraine’s focus on cheap, attritable systems which are typically remote-controlled, the U.S. ecosystem, with the affordances of peacetime research and development, is shooting for more capable autonomous UGVs.  “Soldiers train for and are expected to complete the mission in these types of environments, cut off from consistent communications and data networks,” Byron Boots, Overland AI’s co-founder and CEO, said in a statement. “Overland AI believes that autonomous systems should be held to the same standard.”  Time will tell which approach proves more successful. ]]

[Category: Defense Systems]

— Industry groups want cyber threat-sharing law renewed through defense authorization bill

 

at 11/2/26 4:00pm

A coalition of 35 industry groups is urging Congress to use the annual defense policy bill to renew a law that gives companies legal protections when they share information about cyber threats with the federal government. In a Nov. 1 letter to the leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services committees, the groups asked negotiators to keep a provision in the House bill that would extend the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 through 2035. The law lapsed during last year’s record government shutdown and has since stayed in place through a series of spending bills. Its current extension expires Dec. 11. The signers include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Business Software Alliance, American Bankers Association, Airlines for America, the American Public Power Association and the National Rural Water Association.  “In this environment, the speed and breadth with which defenders share information determines whether they keep pace with adversaries,” the groups wrote. “That speed depends on the legal certainty CISA 2015 provides.” The key liability protections in the law are designed to shield firms from lawsuits and regulatory penalties when sharing threat information with federal partners like the FBI or National Security Agency. That data often includes personal or proprietary information tied to individuals and companies affected in cyber intrusions. Industry groups have consistently warned lawmakers that allowing the measure to lapse would create legal risks for companies sharing breach data, leading to a drop in private sector threat disclosures. On the first day of the shutdown last year, cybersecurity attorneys were already fielding calls from clients about whether their existing agreements still protected them.  Congress restored the law through January 2026, when it reopened the government in November 2025. Lawmakers extended it again in February of this year, this time through Sept. 30, then moved the deadline to December in a stopgap funding bill. A sticking point in the Senate reauthorization process has been what else to put in a longer renewal. Sens. Gary Peters, D-Mich., and Mike Rounds, R-S.D., pushed for a 10-year extension during last year’s shutdown.  But Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Rand Paul, R-Ky., told Roll Call last month that he wanted a provision barring federal officials from pressuring social media companies to restrict speech. Paul — who has routinely pushed back on clean extensions of the law — said he and Peters had discussed the amendment several times without reaching an agreement. ]]

[Category: Policy]

— Officials suspect Iran of cyberattacks on military base freezers

 

at 11/2/26 7:00am

U.S. officials suspect Iran-linked hackers are behind a series of cyberattacks that have targeted freezers at military bases around the country and caused them to malfunction, according to two people familiar with the matter.  The outages have affected around six commissaries, the on-base grocery stores serving military personnel. The people spoke on the condition of anonymity to communicate sensitive knowledge about the intrusions, which began around late August. It’s not clear how exactly the cyberintruders may have accessed the freezer systems, though various digital vulnerabilities tied to freezer controls can expose the equipment to hacking and sabotage. It’s possible the assessments may change as investigators learn more about the hacks. The attacks, if fully confirmed to be tied to Iran, would demonstrate the nation’s ability to disrupt certain military-related equipment inside the United States through cyber means, and comes as the Trump administration is reportedly planning follow-up strikes on Iran after the U.S. midterm elections next week. The attribution would also fit a broader pattern of suspected Iranian activity against equipment controlling water treatment processes in recent months.  Iran has previously combined hacking in lead-ups to elections. During the 2024 presidential campaign, U.S. officials attributed the theft of Trump campaign material to Tehran⁠.  Cyber Command and various Defense Department law enforcement units are probing the freezer incidents. French authorities are also working with officials examining the matter. Earlier this month, hackers overrode temperature controls on commercial refrigeration equipment at some 350 French establishments, which forced supermarkets to discard spoiled food.  The investigation draws attention to the computers that control everyday equipment used to store and handle food, an often overlooked area of cybersecurity where a hack can spoil supplies or interrupt distribution of goods. The Food and Agriculture Information Sharing and Analysis Center, an industry group that shares cyber threat intelligence on the nations food supply, has warned that attackers can target internet-accessible industrial controls that may not have optimal cyberdefenses in place. ]]

[Category: Threats]

— The Pentagon’s IT agency wants to bridge network gaps in the Pacific

 

at 11/1/26 9:37pm

HONOLULU—Lags in communication could undermine even the most advanced technology available, the deputy chief of Indo-Pacific Command warned Thursday.  “If we field cutting-edge compute and advanced software applications, but retain rigid, multi-layered bureaucracies requiring hours to authorize time-sensitive engagements, then weve negated our technological overmatch,” Lt. Gen. George Rowell, deputy commander of INDOPACOM, told attendees at TechNet Indo-Pacific. “No competitor on Earth can match Americas network of capable allies and partners. That network is our greatest advantage. It is our strategic center of gravity. But the old ways of connecting with partners are simply no longer sufficient.”  Upgrading military networks in the Pacific so the U.S. can quickly share battle details with allies has been a key priority in recent years. The command recently deployed the Pacific mission partner network, a unified version of a series of bespoke networks for individual allied or partner nations in the region. Throughout the year, the command has tested the network in military exercises, where it has shown progress and allowed better coordination, with fewer devices to toggle between.  Still, there are still gaps that need to be addressed to improve communications with allies and partners.  “Were in the middle of a transition right now,” said Col. Michael Hlad, who leads the Defense Information Systems Agency’s regional field command in the Pacific. “We are migrating to a data-centric environment, helping our partners understand what does it mean to be zero trust? What are the key items that we need to agree on, lets say, from an identity standpoint, a data standardization standpoint?”  While some nations are more technologically aligned, such as the Five Eye partners, the plan is to build a data-sharing environment malleable enough to bring in other nations as well. “I dont know what the coalition of the future necessarily looks like,” Hlad said. “So how are we, DISA, building a coalition environment that is agile and common enough that we can bring in those partners instead of making it brittle…where its just bilateral or just multilateral? Weve got to bring that agility to [Indo-Pacific Command] as well as our partners, so theyre able to integrate for an [humanitarian assistance and disaster relief] scenario as well as a high-conflict scenario of the future.” Getting to that common digital ground means agreeing on what tools and methods to use.  There must be “clear standardization of what that common architecture looks like,” Hlad said. “This only works if we get the data right. And we are still siloed.”  In addition to improving communication with allies and partners, one of DISA Pacifics top priorities is to improve data transfer, speed, and security in the region.  “How do we have better transport resiliency in the Pacific so that we can make sure that the critical feeds and data are where we need them?…How do we deliver those for the warfighters in the Pacific so the data is closer to the operational need?” Hlad said. The field command recently unveiled the Regional Network Operations Security Center Pacific—which aims to increase network support for INDOPACOM’s headquarters.  “Thats an enhanced [network operations center]. Thats an enhanced [security operations center]. Thats a regional service support desk, and thats some data fusion capabilities that were not resident in this theater to synchronize,” Hlad said.  The idea is for the center to respond to connectivity challenges, including when undersea cables cut out and during electromagnetic spectrum or application disruptions.  The center has yielded a 20 percent personnel increase to assist in solving those connectivity problems, Hlad said. ]]

[Category: Science & Tech]

— Across the line

 

at 10/31/26 4:00am

The future of ground warfare will fuse old and new. AI and robotic hardware will fight alongside heavy tanks and armored fighting vehicles. New capabilities will enable ground units to reach into and shape operations in other domains. Meshed sensors will distribute data and imagery while the tempo of observation, orientation, decision, and action will increase toward machine-speed. Modular digitized tanks, more mobile and survivable, will support forces well beyond line of sight, likely launching drones for reconnaissance and targeting. This transformation will enable soldiers to conduct missions once impossible for units of their size.    “The national bird of Lithuania is Ciconia ciconia, better known as the white stork,” U.S. Army Lt. Col. Michael Wynn said into his mic. “This is an obviously better choice than their other native birds: the pigeon and the common cuckoo.” Wynn’s mother had been an avid bird watcher, a “twitcher” who turned family vacations into quests for new avian species to add to her life list. While he had hated every part of it in his younger days, he had lately begun to see the appeal. And as often happened with those who develop a hobby later in life, he had become an evangelist—somewhat to the chagrin of the two enlisted soldiers who shared their battalion commander’s M1A3 Abrams tank. “Now, Poland’s national bird also has ‘white’ in its name, but a white-tailed eagle is actually mostly brown. The Haliaetus albicilla is known as the ‘king of the skies’ in these parts, which I am sure you can see might be of added meaning tonight.” As Wynn continued to declaim on avian matters, he watched the digital lines of their departure point grow closer in his augmented-reality goggles. His view of the grassy plain ahead was lit almost to daylight by the vehicle’s night-vision system. It was as if he were riding in an open cupola. But in fact, he was sitting under the tank’s unmanned turret with his driver and gunner, using the goggles to “see” through the new-generation multilayer armor. An overlay told him the status of his unit’s various components. His own tank, HQ66, had a fully charged battery, although the hybrid-electric propulsion system was currently running on fossil fuel in its race to the border. “Unfortunately, we’ll have to postpone this discussion until after the mission,” Wynn said to his crew’s silent relief.  They did not realize that he spoke less to convert them to his hobby than to calm them before their combat debut. For all his focus on the more delicate aviary aspects of the natural world, he saw the tank itself as a living thing — the apex predator of the 21st-century battlefield. “Until then, let’s keep an eye out. We’re crossing ORACLE in 3, 2, 1…” The tank crunched over the barbed wire marking the border between Poland and Lithuania –– or what the region’s new rulers called the Rus-Republic of Lithuania.  It had all started with a lie, or rather a series of them. Russian intelligence and paramilitary forces had carried out false-flag attacks, seeking to convince the Russian-speaking population that the Lithuanian government was attacking its own citizens. Real images of Russian speakers being murdered by masked men in government uniforms had been driven viral, followed by AI-driven deepfakes of government round-ups, jailings, and beatings of men, women, and even children. Citing the misinformation as justification, Russia’s paramilitary forces seized a series of local government buildings and declared the RRL a new republic for Russian speakers. An armored division dashed from its garrison in Belarus with uniforms and vehicles already flying the RRL flag, a two-headed eagle in black rather than Russia’s gold version. In a matter of hours, NATO had a new self-claimed republic in its midst. And Russian surface-to-air missiles, radar, and land-based antiship missiles had created a bubble of anti-access/area-denial weapons not just on NATO’s Eastern frontier, but now within it.   Wynn took a quick pull of his “battle juice,” a blend of caffeine, electrolytes, and protein. It was always a good time to hydrate, and he had a sense he’d need his hands free soon. The Article V vote had been quick and unanimous, and Wynn’s armored unit was the vanguard of the manifestation of the long-contemplated moment when NATO would actually have to go to war: Operation Baltic Protector. “Are they going to ask to stamp our passports?” grinned Cpl. Arnold Glover, the tank’s driver, who sat at Wynn’s left elbow.  Glover always had a smile on his face—the more stressed out he was, the bigger. It had made basic training a nightmare but had led to his selection to drive the command tank. Command was tough enough; the least you could do was to surround yourself with people who seemed like they were having a good time.  “I’d be happy to provide a stamp for them in return,” said Sgt. Margaret Butarski, in the kind of awkward banter that always sounded funnier inside the tank than outside. The gunner had grown up in Lansing, Michigan, in a family of auto workers; she’d taken a high-school robotics class trip to the Detroit Arsenal, seen the equipment they got to play with, and decided right then and there to enlist when she graduated.  “Let’s hope they come to their senses and you don’t have to do that.…But my sense is you’ll get your chance,” Wynn weighed in.  The battalion commander toggled his AR goggles to display the full battlespace. His formation consisted of a tank company of M1A3s, including his own; a human-machine integrated company of Robotic Combat Vehicles and their human controllers in Armored Multipurpose Vehicles; and a company of mechanized infantry in M-30 combat vehicles. Behind them moved his battalion headquarters: M-30 command vehicles and AMPVs tooled for comms and electronic warfare.  In the distance, the map showed Lithuanian forces that had been driven from their country in the initial attack, as well as the Croat, Romanian, and British units that had been joined with Wynn’s unit in the multinational battle group hubbed out of the joint NATO-Polish base in Elblag, Poland. Rattling and scratching under the M1A3’s hull caught Wynn’s attention. What had they hit? “Got some concertina wire caught up in the tracks,” said Butarski, who also monitored the tank’s health system and its datalinks to support forces. “Its already been flagged for repairs with the maintenance folks, but I’m guessing we’ll just grind out before it comes to that.” Wynn hoped that a few errant yards of steel wire wouldn’t undo his central role in this historic armored operation. Even more, he hoped it would be the only thing needing repairs when this was all over.  The next digital line in the terrain was just ahead, TROPICANA, marking their estimates of the enemy’s engagement range. The new vehicles had masking capabilities to reduce their thermal and electromagnetic signature, which had allowed them to sneak up to the border without detection, but at some point, there was no way to completely hide a column of armored vehicles, especially from a watchful human eye.  His concerns were quickly validated when his AR rig lit red with notices of incoming air and artillery fires. Alarms sounded inside the tank.  Surrounded by advanced armor, Wynn could feel the hull vibrate as a Russian top-attack artillery round missed and detonated behind them. Without being commanded, Glover began to zig the tank slightly to the right and zag to the left, erratic movements that wouldnt cost much speed, but could perhaps complicate the spotting job of whoever or whatever was targeting them.  While the fires could mostly be evaded by speeding out of the kill zone, there was no way a tank could outrun the swarm of more than 300 drones that had gathered and rapidly flown toward the NATO unit. Wynn’s battle management software quickly sorted the threats in his AR feed.  Micro-drones that were essentially aerial versions of a 73-mm Grom shell. Commercially derived quadcopters armed with downward-firing missiles, designed to penetrate a tank or IFV’s thinner upper armor. A formation of 4-foot Russian Lancet IV and Eaglet drones, cruise-missile-like systems that skimmed just a few meters above the ground. Stacks of heterogeneous swarms, controlled by different types of software, coming in from multiple directions and speeds, swirling around a battlegroup itself dodging and weaving through complex terrain as fast as it could go.  How quaint it must have been back when all this drone stuff started, thought Wynn. How simple it must have been, to have to deal with the threat of a solitary FPV quadcopter or even a swarm of homogeneous drones, all just following the same algorithms, going after just one fixed target.  Set on auto-mode, the battlegroup’s defensive systems responded almost as quickly as the swarm had appeared. Counterdrones began leaping into the air, disrupting the swarm and crashing into targets. The M-30s’ 50-mm cannons fired off guided rounds that chased their quarries. Wynn’s M1A3 opened up with a sound like a chainsaw as they each fired hundreds of rounds that might have been “dumb” but could saturate a target.  The fast-moving red digital dots layered over the drones in Wynn’s AR were woven with a webwork of tracer lines and fiery explosions, some tiny and some large. Unseen, another battle played out in the electromagnetic spectrum as EW jammers and counterjammers fought for momentary dominance at machine speed. Trying to make sense of it all, Wynns brain unconsciously rendered it almost like a fireworks display, while the conscious part knew it to be a far more lethal dance of hardware, software, and networks.  An explosion marked the loss of a tank in the allied unit racing alongside. He knew that this was the expected price to pay, then felt guilty for being glad it had first happened to another unit. He toggled back to paternalistically check on his two human crew members, who jostled in their seats as Glover took more evasive action. The formation plowed ahead, soon leaving the fighting behind, the robotic systems’ munitions or batteries expended. The quiet lasted only moments, just a few meters past the map line marked BUSCH, when a salvo of antitank missiles was detected coming at them. Three Russian unmanned ground vehicles that had been hiding on the second floor of a parking garage adjacent to a small apartment building now revealed their position as they fired on the American armor. Seconds later, Wynn heard a slapping sound and then a rattling of shrapnel on the turret as the tank’s Integrated Active Protection System fired a few feet above his head, taking out a missile.  Then robot turned against robot with counterfire coming from one of his unit’s RCVs, which had sped ahead to screen the force. Its anti-armor missile slammed into a cement pillar and collapsed the whole parking garage on top of the enemy UGVs. “Three-for-one special on aisle nine!” screamed Butarski joyfully.  The task force moved on and minutes later another digital line marked they had reached their second waypoint on the way to Kaunas, Lithuania’s second-largest city. “We’re making good time, sir,” observed Butarski, as Glover and each of the vehicle drivers in the formation steered to the northwest in a staggered move.  “Yep. As long as we don’t get any more traffic congestion like that, we should make it.” A mission clock ticked down in the lower corner of Wynn’s combat AR view, as it did for every other officer and senior enlisted member of the task force.  The task force had less than two hours to cover the 45 kilometers to the southern outskirts of Kaunas in south-central Lithuania. With no opposition, it would be an easy drive. But if anything slowed them down, the armored force would miss its window. And literally hundreds of lives depended on them making it to their objective on time. Wynn was confident they could ultimately find and destroy the mobile S-1000 air-defense system hidden in Kaunas that had turned the airspace above Lithuania into a no-go zone for NATO aircraft. The key was to do it at just the right point in the larger operation they were supporting: not so soon as to tip their hand and let the adversary figure out how to fill in the hole that would open up in their A2AD bubble, but not too late for the flight of NATO C-17s and escorting F-35s that needed to fly safely through that hole.  The S-1000 had created an aerial kill zone above not just the breakaway RRL, but also extended out to the Lithuania-based battlegroup that had originally responded to the crisis. Air losses had been steep, while the force of German, Belgian, Dutch, and Norwegian ground units that were now surrounded by Russian and aligned forces outside of Kaunas, running low on plasma, blood, and painkillers — to say nothing of munitions. And the only way that the airdrop resupply — and hopefully a CAS mission — could reach them was if the complex air defenses were taken out from the ground. Modern multidomain warfare had evolved well beyond what the writers of AirLand Battle had contemplated back in his grandfather’s day. • • • For Master Sgt. Andre Washington, it was shaping up to be his second “war.” He’d been at the Battle of Chi Ma on the Vietnam-China border. He’d been a platoon leader at the time, gripping his rifle so tight he doubted he could have hit anything he aimed at if not for the high-speed fire control system on his trusty M7.  Though he’d spent a lifetime in the Army now, his stomach was still tight as his M-30 moved forward, but he at least knew what they were getting into. Inside the M-30s following Abrams tanks, he and the other infantry soldiers used helmet-mounted AR displays that allowed them to “see through” the armor that protected them. The soldiers could swap between tracking the formation’s movement through the lightly forested region and following the fight up-close.  Washington had come up in the Army in an era when the infantry had referred to the old M2 Bradleys as “teleportation devices” –– as soon as the rear ramp of the Bradley clicked closed you lost all sense of what was happening outside the vehicle until you were teleported to your destination. On arrival, a similar click indicated the ramp was opening and you were about to dismount into a whole new world with no clue what was happening around you.  What he saw on his AR feeds only made him more nervous. Not that would let his soldiers know it. He willed himself to be the picture of calm for the other five soldiers in the back of the M-30 who kept discretely glancing at him hoping to gauge his disposition. And Washington knew, for all the technology and the firepower of today’s modern combat vehicles, it was still the infantry that ultimately won battles. And he made sure his troops –– and their commanders –– never forgot it.  Amid the building tension, Washington knew his troops were doing all right. The soldiers’ biometric sensors monitoring their vitals would alert him and the platoon’s doc if anyone was in a bad way. Washington didn’t yet know exactly when or where the M-30 would stop to let out its lethal cargo and move into a support-by-fire position, but he did know this: When the ramp went down, it would be he and his soldiers who ultimately destroyed the targets in Kaunas. • • • Pillars of smoke curled skyward above the southern outskirts of Kaunas and rendered the bleak night sky a blank, starless void. Burning buildings at the intersection of the 130 roadway spoke to recent fighting, likely an operation by stay-behind Lithuanian military units or even NATO Special Operations Forces conducting a behind-the-lines operation, details which would be above Wynn’s clearance.  He took a moment to check the software update for the M1A3’s traction-control system as they were going to be moving from a high-speed run across highways and grass fields to the rubble-strewn confines of Kaunas’ densest neighborhoods. Another scan showed him the status of the rest of the force’s software updates for the traction control. One of the M-30s had not completed the download; that happened from time to time. While moving fast in tight urban environments, inches of positioning or clearance could matter for these massive, armored vehicles and you had to seek every advantage you could. As the task force came to a fork in the highway, Wynn’s unit moved towards the digital line marked YANKEE, while the allied units went towards CITI. They had originally been labeled the opposite, but Wynn had made sure they were renamed during the op-plan meeting. It was meaningless to the other nationalities, but he knew his own unit would have been made superstitious by following the path of the cursed Mets –– New York’s second-best baseball team, only because there was no third choice.  The split would allow the two elements to make a pincer-like approach to the regular and irregular forces defending Kaunas. The other part of the NATO battlegroup would head west and then hook northeast while the American element would push east and then hook back to the west.  In a world where you had to assume everything was observed, this would allow a deception. The embattled NATO elements who first responded to the Russian invasion were now encircled at the civilian airfield south of the city along the Nemunas River, which would be the obvious target of the forces. But Wynn’s force was actually going to have to drive right by them, bypassing the encircled forces to their west by following the Europos highway to cross the sole undamaged bridge into the city’s southeastern area. This would give them a run straight at the S-1000 air-defense system that they knew by EM emissions to be moving about somewhere in the Centras district, also near the river.  The deception was based not just on direction and speed, but also weight, of all things. The old Abrams and even Russias new Armata were a good 10 tons heavier than the new M1A3s, enabling the newest generation U.S. tanks to move faster and go places the heavier tanks could not. The more survivable M-30s also allowed the infantry who would be essential in this urban fight to finally keep up during the sustained race toward the densely populated target area.  At a four-way intersection centered around a six-story office building with a facade of shattered green glass and torn rebar, Wynn watched two young boys, not more than 10, run across the street holding hands. They wore matching blue and white school uniforms smeared with dirt. One was missing his left shoe. Before Wynn could remark, they disappeared from view beneath a half-open garage door. He wondered if he was so tired now that he was seeing things, but he knew this sort of tragedy was present throughout the city. Placing a mark on his tactical map indicating “civilians in need” was all he could do for the moment. A rocket raced toward the tank from behind before exploding when it was downed by the APS system. Classified as an older RPG-9, Wynn wondered why someone had taken the pot shot at the tank and then he hoped the shrapnel from the strike didn’t jeopardize the two kids he’d seen. They needed to get this mission done as fast as possible, for everyone’s sake. “Pushing Kilo One and Two ahead to BUSCH,” he messaged the command group. Two small drones, including one launched from Wynn’s tank, launched to scout ahead to the next waypoint, the bridge leading deeper into the city. The visuals beamed back showed no defenders on it, which was suspicious enough. Their EM sensors then confirmed what was now obvious, picking up signals from explosives rigged on the bridge.  Speed didn’t just kill now, it was life. There was no time for sending infantry ahead to secure the bridge, and so one of the RCVs moved to the front of the column. It had an extensive electronic warfare package onboard that would jam the detonators. Hopefully.  “One minute to the bridge,” said Glover. It was an oddly calm moment in the skies above them, perhaps because they were closing in on the Russian positions. The intelligence specialists in the 2-shop had said that the Russian EW systems were so powerful that they often interfered with the very drones designed to protect them, a classic problem of electronic deconfliction that continued even in this AI era.  The first American RCV crossed the bridge, but as soon as it reached the north side, a missile slammed into the unmanned vehicle, disabling it in a cloud of shrapnel. Responding to the loss of the RCV –– and the data provided by the platform on the missile that destroyed it –– a second, following RCV took evasive action and pushed the location of the missile’s shooter to the rest of Wynn’s force.  A red icon appeared on Wynn’s screen, indicating a recoilless rifle team firing from the inside of a 4th floor condo, rapidly trying to reload. A missile streaked out from the M-30 that was in the best firing angle and destroyed the threat. The column then raced across the bridge, but as they made it to the other side, the location of FENWAY changed in the digital map display.  “Sir, you seeing that?” asked Glover. Updated intel must have found that the S-1000 was on the move again, not surprising given what was coming at them. “Should I go towards the new route?” “As fast as you can,” replied Wynn, and braced for a swerving slalom turn around a smoldering municipal bus that passed in a white-hot blur in his thermal-vision overlay.  Wynn began tapping out a series of commands to redirect the rest of his unit along the new route and opened up a voice channel with the Romanian colonel leading the other half of the pincer movement. A generation ago this kind of shift in route and target would have forced them to slow or stop outright and regroup. Now his commands raced through the formation at machine speed –– ground robots talking to M-30 mission computers talking to drones, all the while keeping headquarters updated. It once would have been the work of half a dozen soldiers but instead, it happened automatically –– almost seamlessly. A glance at the mission clock in the corner of his vision, which he confirmed with the 11-year-old Casio G-Shock he bought during his Armor Basic Officer Leader Course at Fort Moore, Georgia, indicated they might just have enough time.  • • • On his AR, Wynn cued the latest intel that informed the shift. A drone’s-eye view, as well as a fusion model based on social media from Lithuanian civilians who had not evacuated the city, showed six mobile Russian S-1000 mobile launchers along with a command vehicle, long-range radar vehicle, and engagement radar vehicle, distributed in the courtyard of a large multiblock apartment complex just off of the ordinarily busy Karaliaus Mindaugo road that followed the Nemunas River. It made sense. The original FENWAY positions they had held to the north at the technical university had provided better angles to target approaching aircraft. The new FENWAY would try to take advantage of cover from the residential buildings ringing the area. The OSINT also reported at least three enemy Armata tanks were somewhere in the area, likely concealed in an underground garage or covered alleyway.  Approaching the target from the east, three of Wynn’s RCVs advanced in a bumper-to-bumper line, accompanied by two flights of EW and small strike drones. Simultaneously, British robotic ground vehicles approached from the west, the vanguard of the rest of the NATO task force. “Someone’s ground radar is lighting us up,” said Butarski. “There’s no hiding, at least not for long,” said Wynn. “Push the RCVs forward, I want to force the Russians into revealing where those Armatas are.”  The RCVs distanced themselves from each other and switched up their thermal and electronic signatures to appear to the Russian AI battle systems as if they were two M1A3s and an M-30. It was a simple ruse, but it would be enough to provoke the autonomous responses in the Armata’s defensive systems to pinpoint where the three tanks hid.  At the same time, the other M-30s quietly approached on electric drive from the north, stopping two blocks away to dismount their infantry squads. One of the M-30s continued on ahead in its semi-autonomous mode, guided by a crewman who took shelter in an abandoned storefront bakery. Using a glove-like controller and AR goggles, he steered it to the corner of a shuttered high-end women’s dress store, where it set up to provide covering fire. A mesh network linked the M-30s, the soldiers, and the tank, allowing them to keep up local communications in spite of the Russian jamming that intensified the closer they got to FENWAY.  Master Sgt. Washington and his team took up positions along the storefronts of the city, lashed into Wynn and the M-30 operators via an earpiece and other hardware. Machine-gun fire rang out from the east, and Washington saw one of his soldiers fall and spin to the right, the rifle flying from his hands. Washington felt as if the round had hit him, even as he barked out commands. An instant later, two soldiers sprinted to the wounded comrade and dragged him to cover, the soldier dazed from the rounds that had slammed into his body armor. Wynn’s AR feed lit up with automated biometric and human-driven message traffic as the master sergeant called for support. On Wynn’s map and then with a drone’s-eye view, he watched two of the nearby M-30s moving into a protective posture while a specially equipped RCV dashed forward to retrieve the wounded soldier. Once the soldier was evacuated to a casualty collection point on the other side of the river, Washington’s squad continued to work its way towards the next intersection. They launched a handheld drone the size of a hummingbird, which silently hovered just a few inches off the ground before disappearing around the corner.  “You see that, sir?” Washington asked, the words immediately sounding in Wynn’s ear, as they each watched the feed of what the micro-UAS was beaming back. It showed the barrel of an Armata tank sticking out from a pile of rubble and furniture.  “Nasty,” said Butarski, who watching the same feed. “Looks like they intentionally brought a house or something down around themselves as cover.” “That one’s ours,” Wynn said. “Claim it, Butarski.” Glover inched their Abrams forward, now advancing using its silent-drive electric mode, past the friendly infantry. The American tank would slew around the corner and find the target on their left. It would be a snap shot with their 120-mm cannon, but Butarski was ready. She still had not actually “seen” the Armata tank with her own eyes, but her Next Generation Intelligence Fire Control System, using data feeds from their own systems and existing geospatial data, already effectively had, while also modeling the ballistics of the shot even before laying the main gun on target. “Nice and quiet,” muttered Wynn, talking not to his crew but to his tank itself. “Tank, sabot.” “50 meters until the turn,” said Glover, speaking in a whisper, as if the Russians might somehow be able to hear inside the tank.  “Copy, copy,” said Butarski, in a normal voice.  Wynn felt the autoloader powering up, a humming vibration in the seat of his pants. Yet part of his attention was already elsewhere, managing the machine-driven targeting process for the Russian S-1000 batteries. He was that confident in his crew. Or maybe just that consumed by the larger mission goals. “Twenty meters,” said Glover, still whispering.  Butarski grunted acknowledgment, all her focus now on the micro-drone’s view of the dug-in tank. “IDENTIFIED TANK!” Butarski barked the instant she confirmed the target with her optics. “FIRE!” ordered Wynn as the tank reached the intersection and Glover gunned it forward. As crossed into the open, its turret automatically spun to the left, guided by the fire-control system. The main gun roared,  rocking the turret. Displayed both in the drone’s view and their own, the Armata in the rubble exploded, its turret ripping open and belching fire into the hull of the destroyed tank. “TARGET!” Butarski said as the autoloader whined. Glover braked the tank hard, then spun it around on its axis to burst through the now-cleared street. Small-arms fire poured down from damaged storefronts and apartment windows onto HQ66, the M-30s, and the Army infantry. The dismounted enemy troops, now bereft of the key to their ambush plans, were unwilling to give up the fight. HQ66’s APS automatically unleashed its protective explosive umbrella to strike down an incoming antitank missile fired from a nearby balcony by a group of men in red tracksuits. Before Butarski could lay the main gun across to fire at the Russian paramilitary position, the balcony was evaporated by a spray of 50-mm fire as the American M-30s and Washington and his infantry surged into the street.  “APS is Winchester,” said Butarski, reporting that they had taken so much incoming fire their defensive system was now out of rounds. “Butarski, I’ll do the reload for a Ranger pudding,” Glover shouted. The gelatinous concoction of MRE coffee, creamer, cocoa beverage powder, sugar, and crackers, mixed together in a mess tin, had become the tank crew’s unofficial currency for any arduous chores. “Make it two and you have a deal … Designating target, a sniper –– two windows to the right of that big red sign. “Sniper, delay detonate,” said Wynn. Butarski quickly responded with “Identified” and Wynn with “Fire!” and the main gun again roared. This seamless verbal coordination kept the “human in the loop” for these lethal engagements. Nothing could compare to this, Wynn thought. Between the ear-splitting sounds of combat and the hard driving, it was unlikely he’d have all his hearing by the time he retired. No protective helmet could prevent that. But these kinds of moments made it all worth it. That moment of reflection –– reveling in the action –– was interrupted when an M1A3 one street over from them took a direct hit from a top-attack shoulder-fired missile. The turret exploded in a geyser of fire and sparks as its upper layer peeled back like the top of a can. Wynn heard the explosion as a faint sharp bang but watched it all happen from a drone’s eye view. “Come on, come on,” he said, willing the crew to safety from the tank. The turret’s fire suppression system prevented any secondary explosions but still nobody stirred. The tank’s feeds were all down. It wasn’t until a squad of Washington’s soldiers pulled the crew out of the hull and Wynn saw that they were only slightly injured that the battalion commander got his focus back on the mission.  Feeling sweat run down his back, Wynn forced himself to remain focused on situational awareness for HQ66 and also the mission itself. Rather than a rallying flurry of orders over the radio, he tapped out a set of commands and confirmed the Russians who fired that missile no longer threatened Wynn’s force. “Let’s continue mission,” was all he said to Butarski and Glover.  Having cleared the initial ambush, the tanks and fighting vehicles raced faster down the street, the infantry running alongside, using the cover the M1A3s and M-30s provided. The adrenaline from the combat around him kept Washington moving like a young private, not the 41-year-old he had become. When a swarm of eight loitering drones charged toward the tank from a launch box hidden in a smoldering municipal bus tipped onto its side, Washington’s soldiers accompanying the tank engaged the swarm with their M7s and M250s. Guided by AI software built into their optics, the soldiers’ burst fire downed the simple drones in moments. Three more blocks and the team’s sensors finally picked up FENWAY. Peeking over the roofline were the large radar, antennae, and launch tubes of the S-1000 vehicles, which couldn’t be hidden under camouflage or rubble.  The firing computer found a location that afforded the tank a position to engage the Russian target and Glover edged the vehicle over. For urban operations, it was a long-range shot and an unusual one, the kind that only a tank with the most modern sensors, precise targeting, and main gun could make. In the past, it would have been an unorthodox use of an armored vehicle, but experience everywhere from Iraq to Ukraine to Gaza had shown them the 120-mm cannon could be a precision weapon akin to a massive sniper rifle. “Butarski, I’m on the main gun,” Wynn said. “Sabot for all targets.” Wynn quickly worked through the firing solution and sequence of which elements of the S-1000 complex he wanted to hit first. He would start with destroying the command vehicles and move on from there. “Acknowledged,” Butarski said. “Slightly unorthodox firing solution, sir.” “Noted. Stand by,” said Wynn. “ON THE WAY!” The main gun roared again. Butarski had fired the armor-defeating sabot round through the deserted apartments on the corner of the compound. Designed to defeat layers of advanced armor, the rounds passed easily through wood and plaster to then smash into the lightly armored truck-like command vehicle.  Immediately after the vehicle’s destruction, the task force’s sensors showed the end of the aerial threat, but also that the jamming in the area had dropped precipitously with the destruction of the S-1000’s sophisticated EW systems. Seven more shots over the next minute and Wynn ordered the HQ66 to dash to a new location near the infantry to their south as the NATO forces began to withdraw. “And now the sky is clear,” said Wynn, despite the low gray clouds starting to appear in the early morning light. “Time to go.”  They could have kept fighting by pressing deeper into Kaunas, but there was no need for further engagement in close, urban combat. Instead, now the beleaguered NATO battlegroup could now be easily reinforced, and the combined three NATO units would be able to encircle the remaining Russian units. If the Russian-backed insurrectionists wanted to fight on, they would have to do so without air defenses. NATO’s ground forces, on the other hand, would now be reinforced by the alliance’s full suite of close air support, surveillance, and resupply. Washington and his fellow infantrymen readily passed their defensive positions to the fresh friendly troops now pouring into the area. His soldiers fell back to re-supply and recover, offering a moment for the veteran soldier to take stock. One minor casualty and a rattled Abrams crew while seizing a significant city. Amazing what the Army could accomplish nowadays. Still, he thought, two battles and two different conflicts were enough for him. His next official action would be to fill out some retirement papers.  Meanwhile, Wynn’s group of armored vehicles pulled back along the same cleared route, this time at a much slower pace. Wynn’s tank was the last to cross the same bridge over the Nemuras they had dashed across earlier, the explosives having been removed by EOD in the interim. As HQ66 reached the other side, an update pulsed across his AR rig, showing the incoming dots of the NATO strike fighters followed by a flight of six C-17s. “Hey, sir, look down at the riverbank,” Glover said. “Youre going to want to see this.” Wynn slewed his AR around and the display filled with the white of a Ciconia ciconia. He took advantage of the respite and opened his hatch. The air stank of smoke, burning plastic, and explosives, but as he added another bird to his own life list, he felt a rare moment of calm.  P.W. Singer is Strategist at New America and the author of multiple books on technology and security. August Cole is associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. They are co-founders of Useful Fiction. ]]

[Category: Ideas]

— Six military freezers went bad in August. Was it a cyber attack?

 

at 10/29/26 3:00pm

The Pentagon is investigating a suspected cyberattack behind freezer malfunctions that spoiled food at military bases across the United States in August, according to a U.S. official familiar with the matter. The outages affected some six commissaries — the on-base grocery stores serving military personnel — per the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the situation. At Fort Huachuca in Arizona, officials reported that a freezer had entered defrost mode and heated its contents, leaving food spoiled. Reuters first reported Thursday that investigators were treating the incidents as a possible hack. It’s unclear who might be responsible or whether investigators have conclusively determined what caused the failures. Cyber Command and various Defense Department law-enforcement units are probing the incident. French authorities are also working with officials examining the matter. Earlier this month, hackers overrode temperature controls on commercial refrigeration equipment at more than 350 French establishments, forcing supermarkets to discard spoiled food.  The investigation draws attention to the computers that control everyday equipment used to store and handle food, an often overlooked area of cybersecurity where a hack can spoil supplies or interrupt distribution of goods. The unusual U.S. outages and the possibility of hacking were initially flagged in August by the Signal and Silence blog. Stars and Stripes subsequently reported the involvement of military investigators, and The Telegraph also reported officials’ contact with French authorities. A 2021 DHS assessment of threats to food and agriculture specifically identified refrigeration failures and shipping delays as cybersecurity risks that could cause spoilage and shortages. The Food and Agriculture Information Sharing and Analysis Center, an industry group that shares cyber threat intelligence on the nations food supply, has warned that attackers are targeting internet-accessible industrial controls that may not have optimal cyberdefenses in place. The agri-food sector’s sensitivity to downtime often gives ransomware groups leverage to demand payment, the organization said in a separate report. Lawmakers have sought to improve federal protections. A bipartisan group reintroduced the Farm and Food Cybersecurity Act in 2025, following an earlier proposal introduced in 2024. ]]

[Category: Threats]

— Army pilots are trying virtual reality to stay more alert in flight

 

at 10/29/26 12:23pm

The 101st Combat Aviation Brigade is testing a virtual-reality headset to see if it can make helicopter pilots more alert. For the next eight months, the unit will incorporate the Oculus-based NeuroTrainer into their flight-training regimen, to measure whether pilots’ reaction times improve. “In the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, our pilots operate in unpredictable environments where split-second decisions dictate mission success,” Col. Anthony Marston, the unit’s commander, told Defense One. “By putting our aviators through the targeted exercises using the NeuroTrainer, we want to see if it can measurably improve their processing abilities.” Pilots will do three headset sessions a week, playing two games for at least six minutes. One game requires them to catch orange balls while dodging projectiles, and the other challenges them to identify a robot teammate outside of their immediate field of view, then swat a ball in that teammate’s direction. “All the VR-based exercises are designed to challenge and improve reaction time, situational awareness, and quick-decision making,” said Capt. Drew Lightsey, a spokesman for the 101st CAB. During the initial phase of the program, unit pilots will do a round on the NeuroTrainer and then get in a helicopter simulator to measure their cognition, a news release said.   “It had a little bit of a learning curve to start,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Eric Low, a CH-47 Chinook maintenance test pilot. “Once you start to get the hang of it, it felt like a video game. I like how it challenged different aspects of hand-eye coordination and the ability to track multiple objects at the same time.” The second phase begins at week 15, when 70 pilots will be evaluated on their long-term results. “Evaluators will consider the speed at which aircrews perform emergency procedures in the simulator and a qualitative assessment asking open-ended survey questions on how participants felt they improved after using the system over time,” Lightsey said. Down the line, the NeuroTrainer could become a tool for pilots to use on days when they aren’t flying, or for staff pilots who don’t fly frequently but need to keep their skills sharp. “I think this device could bring awareness to some of the underlying issues affecting our pilots,” said Victor Rodriguez, cognitive performance specialist for the 101st CAB’s Holistic Health and Fitness program. “The performance results could help us recognize when to discuss stress, oversaturation, or emotional regulation with them to help them improve.” The press release said that similar headset tests are taking place at Navy Fighter Weapons School, Air Force Special Operations Command, and the 75th Ranger Regiment.  ]]

[Category: Science & Tech]

— Can inertial navigation make ground-robot swarms real?

 

at 10/29/26 11:30am

Two startups, working together for just under a week, may have found a way around the biggest obstacle to deploying swarms of ground robots: the need for GPS-free navigation in a small package.  Swarmbotics AI, which makes 100-pound autonomous robots, is teaming up with TERN, whose navigation software doesn’t need GPS, the companies announced Wednesday. The Army has been seeking alternatives to the spoofable, jammable satellite-based system for years. “The current environment has taught us that GPS is the first thing that gets canned on the battle space,” William Shuart, a program manager for the Army’s Pathfinder3D program, told Army magazine in January. So the service is fielding jam-resistant GPS cards for munitions and is also working on ALTNAV, which uses a different satellite constellation. But its plans for a robot-forward ground force require a position-navigation-timing system that can get by without a satellite signal at all. The self-driving car industry, with its reliance on GPS and unstealthy LiDAR, hasn’t been much help. Enter TERN, whose PNT system needs no signals from space, and Swarmbotics AI, an Arizona robotics company whose four-wheeled FireAnts fit roughly into a two-foot cube.  “Our teams integrated the TERN system on site here in Phoenix into the FireAnt in less than a week, which I think is really impressive. So we went from never having really spoken to these guys on a technical level at least to having the system fielded in a week,” said Drew Watson, co-founder and CTO of Swarmbotics AI. TERN’s Independently Derived Positioning System, or IDPS, combines input from the vehicle’s own sensors, including “wheel speed, steering angle, and 3D motion data,” with onboard map data. “We’re using the motion of that vehicle all the way down to something as as compact as a FireAnt, and through that successive motion, were able to output latitude and longitude at the same rate that GPS could, or twice a second,” said Shaun Moore, co-founder and CEO of TERN. Next up: sharing that information, which Watson described as “a building block to something else.” The team wants to move toward coordinated swarm maneuvering, with teams of robots sharing data with one another in a mesh network. If each member of the swarm understands where it is and where its teammates are, that data can add value to other sensor data, such as camera or radar feeds about threats. “The way thats working is that each one of these FireAnts is giving a line of bearing to an enemy tank, for instance. Those are triangulated into a position of that enemy tank via multiple firings. The quality of that identification, the position of that enemy tank, is based on the position of the firings…It improves the automatic target recognition,” said Watson. Both companies have already drawn Army attention. TERN received a $11.26 million contract in September, and both have participated in the service’s Operation Jailbreak tech demonstrations. ]]

[Category: Defense Systems]

— Defense Business Brief: Tech at the edge; PACFLEET talks cyber; and more

 

at 10/29/26 4:53am

HONOLULU—Soldiers in the Pacific need technology that works when networks are attacked and connectivity isn’t guaranteed, said Gen. Xavier Brunson, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea.  “If the service tells you who they are and what theyre going to do, and you choose not to try to meet the requirements of how theyre going to fight—thats going to be a problem. Because in the future, our networks will be fully under attack. I think in the future well have to operate disaggregated and distributed. I think in the future, things will happen so fast, theyll happen so fast that we wont know sometimes whats happening to us,” Brunson warned during a keynote Tuesday at the TechNet Indo-Pacific conference here. “There will be plans that will change before we even get in the theater…And if your product cant operate on the edge, then its not a product thats going to be able to help the Army fight the way the Armys going to fight, much less the joint force.”  Brunson’s comments come as what’s known as the Davidson window, a 2027 timeline for when China’s leader has told its military it must be ready to invade Taiwan, draws near.  But while there’s no expectation of a war with China next year, it’s something the military is still preparing for, Gen. Ronald Clark, commander of U.S. Army Pacific Command, said in his keynote address.  “There are 157 days between today and 2 April. So that mark on the wall for us in our headquarters is to ensure that we are in position, postured forward to deter war in a window in which our adversary may find it to their advantage to attack Taiwan. But again, its not a date that we think that conflict will happen…But well continue to prepare. Well continue to modernize. Well continue to posture ourselves for the business of deterred war well beyond [2027].” Congress and the lack of a 2027 budget could stymie some of those modernization efforts unless lawmakers pass a full budget by December.  Working under stopgap funding is the “biggest challenge” that affects “plans for new starts and being able to fund some of the programs that we know are going to yield benefit to the soldier,” Clark told reporters earlier this month.  Examples include experimentation and some efforts to improve the mission partner network, he said: “You cant start that contract if you dont have new money. So its a challenge that, again, we have to overcome…we have more experience operating under a [continuing resolution] than we do with an appropriation.” Aloha! You’ve reached the Defense Business Brief, where we dig into what the Pentagon buys, who they’re buying from, and why. Send along your tips, feedback, and mai tai recommendations to lwilliams@defenseone.com. I live here now. Check out the Defense Business Brief archive here, and tell your friends to subscribe! PACFLEET’s cyber needs. The Navy needs more continuous monitoring solutions for systems on ships and ashore, including products that scan for vulnerabilities, Richard Williams, who manages command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence platforms for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said Tuesday.  “I would offer that we are in a zero day today. We do need more continuous monitoring, both at the shore and our ship nodes,” Williams said during a panel discussion. “We struggle with scanning and patching vulnerabilities within our networks, and having that partnership with industry and academia on how we can move quicker to do that, I think will really help us.”  Adding to that complexity is the need to tailor cybersecurity to different ships: Destroyers and aircraft carriers “have very various mission sets. So we need to be cognizant of what those missions are and how we can support them with cybersecurity,” he said. “So I think from industry and enterprise level, with regards to cyber, helping us with supporting us with technology to do continuous monitoring, patches and scanning, and allowing us to move quicker to keep pace with our adversaries.” Allies + AI. Each nation has a different approach to large language models, or LLMs, which adds another layer of complexity to the work required for the U.S. military to be on the same page as allies and partners.   “Weve got different approaches to LLMs in our respective countries,” including planning with a different ecosystem and decision-making process, said Australian army Brig. Chris Alder, the vice director for intelligence at Indo-Pacific Command.  The first challenge is engaging with partners, he said during a panel Wednesday: “Understanding how [an ally’s] respective partners are approaching their own challenges is a key start point. So working through our liaisons that weve got within PACOM to get the right points of contact to have those discussions has been really important. And to be frank, knowing which industry partnerships countries are pursuing has often been accommodating for discussions.”  A little more: Nations in the Pacific have varying levels of AI adoption and implementation—and many are not using frontier models, said Scott Brunstetter, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s chief AI officer.  “There are some exceptions to that,” where some are building “their own smaller capabilities. So each journey has been a little bit different…it comes back to starting with foundations and how do we understand everything from governance and workforce training, things like that,” Brunstetter said.  He requested that companies proactively help bridge the divide to help the U.S. understand where partner nations are, technologically: “You all have some very interesting and insightful tools, and as you engage with partners out there, circle back with us. Help us understand where that partner was. Because the other side of this is partners dont have a whole lot of money in some cases, and so theyre looking for…cheaper options. So theres a wide open opportunity there.” A related, haunting thought: When it comes to AI, there’s a lingering concern around data security. And there’s one question senior leaders should be asking themselves more: “How would they know if the models and AI systems that they are using have been poisoned? And its giving them subtle and incorrect answers over time—how would you detect that?” Brad Christ, the University of Hawai’i’s chief information officer, said in a separate panel. “And I dont think that theres an answer.” Making moves + other news The Army expands testing sites for commercial drone use.  SAIC has a quantum portfolio. General Atomics completed flight testing with Saab’s LoyalEye, an advanced early warning system, on the MQ-9B Reaper drone.   Energetics and propulsion startup Firehawk is now valued at more than $1.4 billion after closing a Series D funding round of $150 million. The round was led by Advent and Rochefort Asset Management. Beacon AI’s autonomous pilot tech took flight with KC-46 tankers. ]]

[Category: Business]

— The US space industry will suffer for Ukraine’s Starlink outage, experts say

 

at 10/28/26 3:09pm

Elon Musk’s decision to hobble satellite services to Ukraine’s military, and his shifting explanations for doing so, have undermined the U.S. space industry and the country’s diplomatic and intelligence partnerships, say lawmakers, foreign officials, and former senior members of the U.S. military. “Im an American. Youre an American. We want American companies to be the most competitive,” said one former senior military official who worked in space policy, operations, and acquisitions. Episodes like the Starlink scandal “create an environment where you make more competitors.” On Oct. 14, amid a Russian missile barrage, military operators across Ukraine found themselves unable to direct drones traveling faster than 100 mph, causing “the failure of several missions,” Ukrainian presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov wrote on Facebook. Without warning, Musk’s SpaceX had imposed limitations on Ukraine’s use of Starshield, the military-grade data network that runs on the company’s Starlink constellation. The service reduction, which lasted ten days, reduced Ukraine’s ability to fend off Russian missiles and jet-powered drones. “People were killed because [there was] not enough destruction, not enough interceptors, including interceptors with Starlink, which didnt work, of course," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said later on Oct. 14. It’s not clear why SpaceX reduced service to Ukraine. Musk and President Donald Trump have been increasingly critical of Zelenskyy in recent weeks. Trump, who has reversed war-related sanctions on Russia and sought Moscow’s help to bring down domestic fuel prices, has complained about Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy plants. Musk, whose relationship with Kyiv has soured since the departure of former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, has asked for sympathy for Russian conscripts. Musk, who promised last year that “Starlink will never turn off its terminals” in Ukraine, blamed Trump for the slowdown.   “Starshield systems are owned and controlled by the US government. Any limits on speed or usage are decided by the US military and ultimately POTUS,” he tweeted on Oct. 14. That didn’t smell right to at least one former U.S. general.   “I honestly believe Musk thought he was acting in line with what the White House wanted. I can’t prove that, of course. But all the actions and everything people say tell me this was intentional,” said Ben Hodges, a retired general and former commander of U.S. Army Europe.  The inability to rely on SpaceX is sure to affect military decisionmaking, the former senior military official who worked in space policy said. “From a planner perspective, obviously, you need to have confidence in your kill-chain capabilities, and so that introduces doubt, which must be incredibly difficult for the planners of the Ukrainian military.” Congress’ concerns In letters to SpaceX and the Pentagon, U.S. lawmakers expressed several concerns about the interruption of service, including its effects on allies. On Oct. 19, a group of senators reminded SpaceX officials of their “contract obligations with the Federal Republic of Germany, which funds Ukraine’s access to Starlink,” and asked: “When did you notify the German government of the decision to degrade Starlink capabilities?”  Representatives from their offices did not respond to questions regarding any answer they may have received. In an Oct. 22 letter to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, another group of senators noted that Ukraine relies on Starlink for intelligence-sharing. They urged the Pentagon to “expand its existing Starshield contract to ensure Ukraine has the satellite communications capacity, coverage, and reliability necessary to sustain its military operations and renew Starshield’s unlimited-speed service.”  Pentagon officials did not respond to questions about the letter. Allied government officials also expressed alarm. "I search for the right adjective to describe whoever took this decision or group of people took this decision against a country that is literally fighting for the lives of the citizens against naked aggression," Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said on Oct. 23. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul on Oct. 16 put the issue plainly: "Germany is paying SpaceX and thats why we naturally insist that it works if were paying for it." Facing mounting pressure, Trump called Musk on Oct. 23 to ask him to lift the restrictions.  On Friday, Trump said, “If there’s a problem, Ill get it straightened out.” That same day, Musk admitted that SpaceX had put a speed restriction in place but he blamed Ukraine, which he said had used the satellite network for offensive drone strikes and thereby “violated Starlink terms of service and [the military] used it for offensive drone strikes to kill people.” Ukrainian leaders have denied this. But as the Oct. 19 letter points out, any real or imagined Starlink terms-of-service violation should not affect the Starshield service, which is under the control of the U.S. government. Like many, the senators were confused.  “SpaceX owns and operates the underlying Starlink network and infrastructure upon which certain Starshield services rely. These circumstances raise important questions...” By Oct. 24, Ukrainian leaders said, full Starlink service had been restored. What next? For Ukrainian operators, the issue is resolved for now. But one former senior military official who worked in space systems acquisition told Defense One that the episode will undermine trust in U.S. satellite capabilities.  “Flipping the switches over a combat operation, it’s definitely a significant data point… The question is: Are we making the right decisions?” U.S. dominance in space-based imaging and satellite communications, both military and commercial, is real. Europe does not have either a private or public satellite communications system capable of replacing Starlink overnight. Starlink’s importance in helping Ukraine achieve battlefield gains is also beyond dispute.  But Musk’s actions will accelerate the development of foreign alternatives to Starlink, said the formal official. More established, smaller competitors to Starlink, such as Eutelsat OneWeb, SES, Iridium and others, could also see increased government business or support. It’s not the first time that a U.S. decision to withhold satellite services has convinced a security partner to reduce its reliance on Washington. In 1999, India was denied access to GPS during its Kargil conflict with Pakistan. “The request that was denied to India drove them to build their own GNSS [global navigation satellite system] capability,” the former official said. The European Union launched its own quest for a navigation system that same year, and the Galileo navigation system went operational in 2016.  From the perspective of U.S. space firms, “You risk your momentum by giving other competitors a reason to go build their own Galileo GPS system,” the former official said.  The urgent need for sovereign satellite capability led Kyiv to sign a development agreement with Denmark’s GomSpace in April and, on Oct. 22, a letter of intent with Finnish space technology company ICEYE and Nokia.  For U.S. military operations, that’s not all bad news, the official said, as it means a more resilient network with more providers of services such as global positioning and communications. But the United States will never again enjoy a position of near-dominance in space, they said.  “Your Apple iPhone right now takes in GPS, Russian GNSS, and Chinese GNSS, yeah. So, in one way, it makes your system more resilient. In other ways your little phone is reliant on other things, systems that probably we would not have planned to be reliant on many years ago.” ]]

[Category: Business]

— The port-call situation is wearing out Navy warships

 

at 10/27/26 9:19pm

A few years ago, a port call in the Middle East might mean bottomless-mojito brunches in Bahrain, hitting the indoor ski slopes in a Dubai megamall, or a desert safari in Qatar. But since Operation Epic Fury began eight months ago, U.S. warships in the theater have basically had just one option: Diego Garcia, some 2,500 miles away. It’s not great for morale, but the consequences go beyond disgruntled sailors who tire of fishing off the British island in the Indian Ocean. The remote coral atoll lacks the pierside infrastructure that many Gulf, Mediterranean, and Pacific ports can offer. As the Navy stretches its fleet with longer deployments and fewer port calls, warships are losing the ability to do crucial mid-cruise maintenance. “When a ship is deployed overseas for longer than the nominal seven-month deployment period, that increases the amount of time for equipment on the ship to break, get worn down, or worn out. As a result, when the ship finally does make it back to the United States, it might need more maintenance and repair work than it would have needed if the deployment had not exceeded seven months,” said Ron O’Rourke, who retired this year after more than 40 years as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service. “That can increase the time and cost to do the maintenance and repair work, and an increased time needed to do the work could prevent other ships from entering maintenance and overhaul as scheduled. This can lead to a cascading effect in delaying maintenance on other ships.” A Navy officer with expertise in maritime security agreed, noting that “even deployed ships need time alongside”—that is, moored directly to a pier or tender vessel for what’s called voyage repair availability—“to fix broken things, remediate rust, paint, etc. If these ships are kept out for 10 to 12 months, they’ll be missing other scheduled maintenance events and be much more broken than they should be when they get home.” The Navy itself nodded to the problem in a recent press release about the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, which is changing homeports to receive overdue depot-level maintenance after a nearly 11-month deployment. “Regularly scheduled depot-level maintenance maximizes the lifespan of our Navy vessels and keeps our fleets lethal, modern, and ready to defend the nation.” [[Related Posts]] The Lincoln’s 321-day deployment—and the carrier Gerald R. Ford’s 326-day deployment before it—set records for consecutive days at sea and length of deployment, respectively. But a few Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers are on track to far surpass those numbers. And Navy officials recently told families in Yokosuka, Japan, that for the foreseeable future they should expect all ships to deploy for 10 to 12 months. A Navy spokesperson said they would “not discuss specific readiness rates, operational requirements, force-allocation deliberations, or future force movements. However, we remain committed to regular maintenance to maximize the lifespan of our Navy vessels and keep our fleets lethal and ready to defend our nation.” ‘It’s empty’ Instead of the luxury hotels and hundreds of restaurants sailors can visit in ports like Dubai and Bahrain, Diego Garcia has a military supply base and a small town with a handful of restaurants. And since virtually every ship deployed in the region is using the island for port calls and resupply, store shelves don’t always stay stocked. The guided-missile destroyer John Finn, which left Japan in January, pulled into Diego Garcia after months at sea. “Everybody’s going to the ship store and it’s empty,” a sailor’s spouse told Defense One. “You can find ice cream, but you’re not going to find your necessities that you need to function.” The ship had pulled in because it was “empty,” the spouse said, after having spent all of its weapons in the campaign against Iran. “So they had to spend that week resupplying.” The spouse of a sailor on the Mustin, another guided-missile destroyer, said her husband was able to get socks but not shoe polish at the exchange on base during the only port call the ship has made since leaving Japan in April. “He got off like, preparing to be able to get the stuff that he needed right now, and he goes, ‘They don’t have shit,’” she said. “They didn’t have anything.” For the Mustin crew, the port call seemed like a welcome respite from their months at sea, until they were told just before getting off the ship that they would not return in August as originally planned, but stay deployed until April 2027, the spouse told Defense One. “The sad part is, they were actually in good spirits,” she said. “And then I know things went really rowdy in Diego Garcia because they were given the bad news literally the day before they pulled in. … There was one of the nights in Diego Garcia that two sailors ended up in the ER with alcohol poisoning. And so then they lost their last night of liberty because of it.” O’Rourke said the British island “can provide an opportunity to be on land for a while, and to engage in certain R&R activities. But the options for doing R&R things at Diego Garcia are a lot more limited than they are at other ports, such as Singapore or somewhere in the Mediterranean.”  Ralph Cossa, chairman of the Pacific Forum, was less diplomatic. “Please shoot me if that’s the only R&R I’m going to get in 10 months,” he said. Mail delays Sailors have asked their families and friends to send them supplies, but mail is taking three to six months to reach the destroyers, the spouses said. The Mustin spouse sent her husband several boxes at the start of the summer; all but one took four months to arrive. The John Finn spouse said it also took four months for a few packages to reach her sailor, and some that “took even longer than six months to get out there.” “I think I’ve sent my husband the same thing three different times now, and I’m like, well, hopefully one of these gets to you in the next two or three months, and whenever the other ones show up, you’re just gonna have an abundance. Share it with somebody else.” Both spouses expressed concern about the sailors’ ability to vote in the upcoming elections, given the mail delays. The John Finn spouse said her husband, who has done multiple deployments in the past, said, “There has been no conversation about voting because we don’t have time for it. We don’t have time to even have conversations because we are busy doing all of this other crap that nobody wants to be doing to begin with.” By contrast, sailors aboard the George Washington aircraft carrier generally “can expect to receive mail shipped from the states within weeks,” Lt. Cmdr. Bobby Dixon, a ship spokesperson, told Defense One. “However, this can take longer when deployed overseas. We work with our U.S. military logistics teammates to minimize mail delays and we are committed to ensuring all service members can exercise their right to vote.” Maintenance Navy ships, like any other vehicles, require a certain amount of maintenance to continue working. There are three levels of repairs: basic, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance.  Deployed ships are under stress from the salt water and sea air, and more things are likely to wear down or break when they’re being used frequently for long periods of time. And the forward-deployed destroyers based in Yokosuka—including the John Finn and the Mustin—are usually in a cycle in which they spend just a few months at sea before heading back home for a few months of maintenance. Now those two destroyers are slated to be at sea for a year or more, which will mean they will miss the beginning of their planned five-month shipyard maintenance periods. And the Mustin spouse said there were already some maintenance problems on that ship when it shifted homeports from San Diego, Calif., to Yokosuka, just before it left for deployment. “Their maintenance log was 100 percent not empty,” and there were a lot of things “that they should have been turned around for,” she said. The ship was told to head to Japan anyway.  And though the sailors were told their lone port call was planned so they could perform maintenance, “they never got anything fixed when they went to Diego Garcia. … They didn’t actually go up pierside.” O’Rourke said there are consequences for delays to the intermediate and depot levels of maintenance. “If you have a period where the total fraction of the Navy being on deployment overseas is elevated above what the notional model calls for, there will be a period downstream where you have to pay the piper, where the fraction of the Navy that will be available for deployment will be less than what the notional model called for because youre making up for that earlier period,” he said. It’s not a new problem. “Years ago, the Navy got itself into a hole on conventional surface ship maintenance due in part to what turned out to be underestimates in planning, scheduling, and funding that work. Since then, the Navy has been working for years to dig itself out of that conventional surface ship maintenance hole. Perturbations in ship maintenance and repair schedules caused by ships being used for extended deployments can add to the Navy’s challenge of digging itself out of that hole,” O’Rourke said. So the service needs to give its ships the maintenance they need. But that’s unlikely to happen while the Navy is keeping so many ships in theater, a second Navy expert said. “The end result is that deferred maintenance becomes more and more problematic, causing knock-on effects like parts and equipment wearing out or breaking before they should. In the end, these ships will reach their end of service life well before their scheduled date.” ]]

[Category: Threats]

As of 11/8/26 2:26am. Last new 11/6/26 2:29pm.