- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 3, 2025
![[*]](img/ib-star_nm.png "mark favorite")
![[-]](img/ib-mark_nm.png "mark as read")
![[-]](img/ib-markold_nm.png "mark older as read")
![[x]](img/ib-delete_nm.png "delete article")
![[A+]](img/ib-fontbg_nm.png "larger font")
![[a-]](img/ib-fontsm_nm.png "smaller font")
![[l]](img/ib-link_nm.png "direct link")
at 1/12/25 7:19pmGrace Mappes, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. KaganJanuary 3, 2025, 6:50 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on January 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace." Zelensky stated on January 2 that achieving a "just peace" in future negotiations – a concept Zelensky highlighted in his December 31 New Year’s address – requires a strong Ukrainian military, security guarantees from Western allies, and Ukraine's future membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) in order to deter Russia from renewed aggression against Ukraine.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukraine cannot achieve a just peace with a small military, such as "40,000 or 50,000 soldiers" – a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial demand during the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Spring 2022 that Ukraine demilitarize and only maintain a force of roughly 50,000 personnel.[2] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded conditions for ending the war that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation, including the removal of the legitimate Ukrainian government and Ukraine's demilitarization.[3] These demands have not changed since 2021.Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal. Zelensky stated on December 31 that Ukrainian missiles and drones are Ukraine's "arguments for a just peace."[4] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to produce about 3,000 cruise missiles and "drone-missiles" and at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025.[5] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) will also increase production capacity to about $30 billion worth of goods and attract $1 billion in foreign investment in 2025. The Telegraph reported on January 2 that Ukraine is working to mass produce the "Trembita" cruise missile, which has a 90-mile range, a 40-pound payload, and costs $10,000 per missile to produce.[6]Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.[7] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities will be able to consider lifting martial law when the "hot phase" of the war comes to an end and when Ukraine is in a "strong position" with a "strong army, a strong package of weapons, [and] security guarantees." Ukraine's law, "On the legal regime of martial law," originally passed in 2000, states that Ukrainian authorities can end martial law "provided that the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity has been eliminated."[8] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly used deliberate misreadings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president of Ukraine after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[9] The Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya. The GUR reported on January 3 that the Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship, the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, and the Sparta cargo ship are scheduled to arrive at Tartus on January 5 while the Sparta II cargo ship and the Ivan Skobelev tanker are scheduled to arrive on January 8 to transfer Russian military assets to an unspecified location in Libya.[10] The GUR previously reported in mid-December 2024 that Russia had deployed the Ivan Gren, Alexander Otrakovsky, Sparta, and Sparta II from northern Russia to Syria.[11]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace."Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal.Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya.Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to support its official “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination software package despite Russian soldiers’ continued reliance on other ad hoc communications systems.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian and Russian forces continued combat engagements in Ukraine's salient in Kursk Oblast on January 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to northeastern Leonidovo and northern Aleksandriya (both southeast of Korenevo).[12] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing southeast of Korenevo near Leonidovo, Aleksandriya, Viktorovka, Nikolaevo-Darino, and Kruglenkoye and south of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[13] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not been able to fully seize the initiative in Kursk Oblast.[14] Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), elements of the "Tigr" Volunteer Detachment (Russian Army Combat Reserve [BARS]), reconnaissance elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment), and elements of the "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[15]A Russian court recently ordered Russian internet technology and telecommunications company Yandex to remove or blur maps and photographs of one of Russia's largest oil refineries due to Ukrainian drone strikes on the facility.[16] Russian opposition outlets Astra and Mediazona reported that the facility, which the court documents mentioned only by address, is Rosneft's Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast.[17] Ukrainian forces struck the Ryazan facility, which supplies the Russian military, in March, May, and July 2024, with one source reporting a strike in August that ISW has been unable to confirm.[18] The court's order represents the first judicial move to obfuscate information about strategically important defense industry facilities after successful Ukrainian strikes.[19]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on January 2 and 3 but did not make any confirmed advances.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 3 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked four times near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[21] Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk reported on January 3 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are mostly operating during poor weather conditions in the border areas of northern Ukraine with drone and artillery support.[22] Mysnyk added that the Russian sabotage groups operating in the area have significantly reduced levels of training.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 3 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger continued to claim on January 3 that Russian forces crossed the Zherebets River and advanced to Ivanivka (northwest of Kreminna), but ISW has still not observed confirmation of this claim.[23] Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Dvorichna; southeast of Kupyansk near Zahryzove and Lozova; west of Svatove near Nadiya and Kruhlyakivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Terny, and Cherneshchyna; and southwest of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and in the Serebryanske forest area on January 2 and 3.[24]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on January 2 and 3 but did not make any confirmed advances.[25]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 3 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked within and near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Stupochky on January 2 and 3.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 3 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[27] Drone operators of the Russian 7th Military Base (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[28]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on January 3 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked within Toretsk, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and south of Toretsk near Niu York on January 2 and 3.[29] The commander of a Ukrainian mortar battery operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces are disguising themselves using civilian clothing in order to bypass Ukrainian frontline positions – a war crime, if confirmed.[30] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces are using infantry groups comprised of two to 20 soldiers and are increasing the use of drones with fiber optic cables that are resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures.[31] The officer stated that Russian forces are improving and increasing the ranges of the fiber optic cable drones and that the drones currently have a range of over 10 kilometers. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces are mostly using infantry to conduct assault operations and prefer to attack in bad weather.[32] Drone operators of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[33]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 3. Geolocated footage published on January 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and along the T-05-15 Pokrovsk-Novotroitske highway northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to Zvirove (southeast of Pokrovsk), northwest of Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), one kilometer north of Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk), and towards Nadezhdynka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[35] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Baranivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Shevchenko, Zelene, and Novyi Trud; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Zvirove, Solone, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, and Novovasylivka on January 2 and 3.[36] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[37]Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) from east of Pokrovsk to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 2nd CAA (CMD) south and southwest of Pokrovsk.[38] Mashovets stated that elements of the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) and elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are attacking towards Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) in order to cut the T-04-06 Pokrovsk-Mezhove highway. Mashovets stated that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA) are concentrated south of Pokrovsk, with elements of its 80th and 239th tank regiments and 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment attacking along the Novovasylivka-Novoyelizavetivka line towards Uspenivka (west of Novovasylivka) and Nadezhdynka (west of Novoyelizavetivka). Mashovets' statements suggest that the Russian military command is focusing on the areas south and southwest of Pokrovsk, as opposed to east of Pokrovsk. This is consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces may be at least temporarily shifting their focus from the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the east and west to making opportunistic advances west towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[39]Russian forces reportedly recently advanced near Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 3. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces likely recently completely withdrew from the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) west of Kurakhove and that Russian forces have seized Shevchenko (northwest of Kurakhove).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[41] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka, Petropavlivka and Shevchenko; and west of Kurakhove near Dachne on January 2 and 3.[42] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both 51st CAA, SMD), 6th Tank Regiment, 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division) are attacking north of the Vovcha River in the Shevchenko-Andriivka, Sontsivka-Petropavlivka, and Zorya-Slovyanka directions (all northwest of Kurakhove).[43] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both 8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Maksymilyanivka (east of Kurakhove), Dalne (south of Kurakhove), and Uspenivka (south of Kurakhove). Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) are also operating near Dalne. Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove), and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[44]Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 3. Geolocated footage published on January 2 shows that Russian forces recently advanced in fields south of Rozlyv (northwest of Vuhledar).[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 600 meters towards Andriivka (northwest of Vuhledar and west of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[46] Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Vuhledar near Yantarne, Kostyantynopil, Kostyantynopolske, and Rozlyv on January 2 and 3.[47] Mashovets stated that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], EMD), reinforced by elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD), are attacking near the Sukhi Yaly River.[48] Assault elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 150th Motorized Rifle Division, supported by artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade, are reportedly operating near Ulakly (northwest of Vuhledar and west of Kurakhove).[49]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on January 3 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka itself, southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 2 and 3.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 3 that Ukrainian forces periodically conduct counterattacks near Velyka Novosilka.[51] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vremivka direction reported on January 3 that Russian forces are primarily focused on disrupting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying forces in the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka directions.[52] The spokesperson added that small Russian infantry groups are entering contested "gray zones" to try to advance to Ukrainian positions.Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on January 3. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Robotyne near Bilohirya and northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka on January 2 and 3.[53] Geolocated footage published on January 3 reportedly shows drone operators of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Bilohirya.[54] Drone operators of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Division (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[55]Russian forces continued attacks in the Dnipro direction including near Kozatskyi Island (east of Kherson City) on January 2 and 3.[56] Drone operators of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[57]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 93 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Bryansk and Oryol oblasts.[58] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 60 Shahed and other drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that Ukrainian countermeasures caused 26 decoy drones to become "locally lost" and that one drone remained in Ukrainian airspace as of 0900 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian drones struck several private enterprises and residential complexes in Donetsk and Chernihiv oblasts and that debris from downed drones damaged residential homes and civilian vehicles in Kyiv Oblast. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes also damaged residential areas on the outskirts of Chernihiv City and the private sector of Sumy City.[59] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk reported that the Russian strike against Kyiv City on January 1 damaged administrative buildings of the Verkhovna Rada.[60]The Hajun Project, an independent Belarusian monitoring group, reported on January 3 that a total of 395 Russian drones entered Belarusian airspace in 2024.[61] The Hajun Project stated that 145 Russian drones entered Belarusian airspace during December 2024 alone, of which 36 returned to Ukrainian and Russian airspace and 109 went missing. The Hajun Project added that air defenses downed 10 Shahed drones over Latvian and Belarusian airspace in 2024.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to support its official “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination software package despite Russian soldiers’ continued reliance on other ad hoc communications systems. Russian MoD-run television network TV Zvezda broadcasted Russian soldiers at the Mikhailovsky Military Artillery Academy in St. Petersburg training on the “Glaz/Groza” combat operations coordination software, which provides organized command and control (C2) functions to Russian units on the frontline.[62] Russian forces have largely relied on ad hoc communications systems to coordinate combat operations in Ukraine via social media messaging applications, and a former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger previously claimed that the Russian MoD has not introduced its official "Glaz/Groza" application at a wide enough scale for Russian forces to adopt.[63]Russian soldiers continue to complain that Russian military commanders are abusing soldiers and hiding high casualty rates. Russian opposition outlets Astra and Mobilization News reported on January 3 that Russian officers of military unit 29593 (either the 1440th Motorized Rifle Regiment or the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment [reportedly of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps]) are confiscating the personal phones of soldiers and forcing injured soldiers to pay their platoon commanders 20,000 to 50,000 rubles (about $181 to $452) in order to receive treatment at hospitals.[64] The opposition outlets reported that the Russian command of the unit may have transferred injured soldiers to "unit 44744" – which may be a fake unit – in order to hide the high casualty rates of unit 29593.[65] ISW has observed prior reports of Russian officers physically abusing subordinates and extorting them for money, likely due to poor command training and discipline.[66]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://suspilne dot media/916671-pro-trampa-mir-nato-ta-es-golovni-tezi-zelenskogo-v-intervu-telemarafonu/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025[2] https://suspilne dot media/916671-pro-trampa-mir-nato-ta-es-golovni-tezi-zelenskogo-v-intervu-telemarafonu/; https://www.rferl dot org/a/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-putin-draft-treaty/33183664.html; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121924[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025[5] https://suspilne dot media/917099-smigal-rozpoviv-pro-virobnictvo-ozbroen-zaplanovane-na-najblizcij-cas/ ; https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/9296[6] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/01/02/ukraine-moscow-missile-trembita-long-range-strike-trump/[7] https://suspilne dot media/916671-pro-trampa-mir-nato-ta-es-golovni-tezi-zelenskogo-v-intervu-telemarafonu/; https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-zelensky-vybory-hariacha-stadia-viiny/33261549.html[8] https://zakon.rada dot gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#Text[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624[10] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5151; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/iz-syrii-v-liviiu-rosiiany-planuiut-perekynuty-chastynu-viiskovoi-tekhniky-v-afryku.html ;[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2024[12] https://t.me/dva_majors/61753[13] https://t.me/rusich_army/19830 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21908 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19828 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61753 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61737[14] https://t.me/wargonzo/24080[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2024 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83793 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150073 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150030 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19833[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/294471 ; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/22816221 ; https://t.me/severrealii/29040 ; https://t.me/astrapress/71639; https://t.me/sotaproject/92156[17] https://zona dot media/news/2025/01/03/rnpk ; https://t.me/astrapress/71648[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2024 ; https://t.me/mediazona_exclusive/2734 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/74922[19] https://therecord dot media/yandex-refinery-russia-censor-images[20]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3356 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3912 [21] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12204[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/03/vony-ne-vstygayut-gotuvaty-lyudej-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-rosijskyh-dyversantiv/[23] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83811; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3912; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3912 [25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3912 ;[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/24080 [28] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13213[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3912 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61737[30] ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/917187-rosijski-vijska-u-torecku-perevdagautsa-u-civilnih-ta-obhodat-peredovi-pozicii-zsu/[31] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/03/u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-vykorystannya-vorogom-optovolokonnyh-droniv-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/[32] https://t.me/ombr_28/1614[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150008 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13214[34] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875181963801436560; https://t.me/fifthbrUA/698; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1875135637449551875; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1875135643892019465 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1874848206003298319; https://t.me/shershni68/399[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61174; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61184; https://t.me/rybar/66877; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61174; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61185; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21902[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3912; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83800; https://t.me/dva_majors/61737; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21902[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83810; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21901[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2465[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2466[41] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61179[42] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3912; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl; https://t.me/dva_majors/61737; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61175; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61186[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2466[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83797; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13211; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150045; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150077[45] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1874958219530956974; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1874958222823678007; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7996; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3346[46] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61175[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3912;[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2466[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83797; https://t.me/voin_dv/12594; https://t.me/yuzhny_front_ZOV/11892[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3912[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/24080[52] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/03/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-taktyku-i-osnovne-zavdannya-rosiyan-na-vremivskomu-napryamku/[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l; https://t.me/wargonzo/24080 [54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150014 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/139094 ; https://t.me/lost_armour/4122[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21880 [56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tqw3eJnR6TWuTtN6LAwAxmTBtT88B4baRmZkXL8CQJDj4mYuGN1yjJimA2swrg4kl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038FQ6Ps6tKWeas5QrKZNa48fewdxJ48Q5MXHuASTMw7xbMV3jNPDexRgqtQDWyq6Gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028rtniBvuK1xPrAn8xHMcgv6AyzoXPf5CLQKyDFu5MMHozqiWmEu7NTnC43Qrh7j5l; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11926 [57] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42740[58] https://t.me/kpszsu/26101[59] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/17389 ; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/2852%20 ; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/2856 ; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/2859 ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/917333-u-cernigovi-buli-cutni-vibuhi-so-vidomo/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/71663 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/10376 ; https://t.me/severrealii/29042 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/32616 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/03/vorozha-aviacziya-zavdala-udaru-po-sumah/[60] https://www.facebook.com/stefanchuk.official/posts/pfbid038GpQwGGrYeQuFjro1WBtvJn6Ly1rwFY4ehDfVa3eKXxcA1KegxjF7DoanJj7VX48l ;[61] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8306 ; https://suspilne dot media/917353-za-2024-rik-do-bilorusi-zaletilo-395-rosijskih-droniv-belaruski-gaun/[62] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/rosijska-armiya-vprovadzhuye-taktychnu-systemu-glaz-groza/; https://tvzvezda dot ru/video/films-online/202412141059-2LC72.html/202412201151-MCD4Q.html; https://t.me/milinfolive/139054[63] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1570[64] https://t.me/astrapress/71650; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21580; https://vk dot com/wall-119368900_246954; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2023; https://glavcom dot ua/ru/think/boi-ukrainskoj-armii-protiv-rossijan-na-vostoke-novye-vyzovy-i-uhrozy-989459.html[65] https://t.me/astrapress/71650[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2024- — Iran Update, January 12, 2025
- at 1/12/25 6:47pmKatherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran conducted an air defense exercise for the second time in recent days. This activity reflects Iranian concerns about possible airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, as Tehran has continued to expand its nuclear program. The Artesh—the conventional Iranian military—conducted the latest air defense exercise across northern and western Iran on January 12.[1] This exercise notably covered the Iranian nuclear facilities around Arak and Fordow.[2] Though Iran typically conducts air defense exercises around this time of year, this activity nonetheless probably reflects Iranian leaders’ assumption that they will face airstrikes against their nuclear program in the near term. This assumption has no bearing on the likelihood that the United States or Israel would actually conduct such a strike, however.The Artesh exercises tested the manned and unmanned aircraft as well as the following air defense systems, according to Iranian state media:[3]Rad missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, anti-tank missile designed for T-72 tanks, fired from a 125 millimeters (mm) caliber barrel, and with a target distance of four kilometers (km).[4]Majid missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired, electro-optical-guided missile with a maximum target range of 15 km.[5]Talash missile. An Iranian-made, long-range, mobile surface-to-air air defense missile system, capable of hitting all altitude targets with a a maximum range of 200km.[6]Misagh-3 missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired system with a laser fuse and a maximum range of five km and flight altitude of 3,500 meters (m).[7]Khordad-15 system. An Iranian-made, long-range air defense system with a detection range of 85 km and target range of 45 km.[8]Shahid Jalilvand radar system. An Iranian-made, medium-range, phased array radar system able to detect small flying targets with low cross-sections in three dimensions and a 24-hour operational continuity.[9]Samavat radar-controlled artillery system. A short-range Iranian version of the Swiss low-altitude Skyguard radar system with a range of 4 km and uses an anti-aircraft 35mm Oerlikon caliber barrel gun.[10]Seraj radar-controlled air defense artillery system. Iranian-made artillery system with a 35mm caliber barrel gun, radar, and a new optical system.[11]This activity comes after the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted an air defense exercise around the other major Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz on January 7.[12] This flurry of air defense activity is part of the larger military exercise that the Iranian armed forces are holding across Iran until March 2025.[13] This exercise includes the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is unlikely that Iran could repel a US or Israeli airstrike given the inferiority of the Iranian systems that have been used in these exercises relative to the modern US and Israeli capabilities. This is especially the case given that Israel neutralized Iran’s S-300s—its most advanced air defense platform—in October 2024.Iran could use part of its exercises to prepare for an attack on US or Israeli targets, though CTP-ISW assesses that this possibility is relatively unlikely at this time. Iran previously conducted exercises ahead of its Operation True Promise and Operation True Promise II attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 respectively.[14] And Iranian officials have yet to fulfill their vow to conduct a third missile attack on Israel.Fatah released a statement on January 11 affirming that the PA will prevent any Hamas effort to stoke conflict in the West Bank.[15] Fatah stated that Hamas is responsible for the destruction of the Gaza Strip because Hamas ”gambled with the interests and resources of the Palestinian people for Iran’s benefit.” PA forces have been operating in Jenin Governorate, northern West Bank, since early December 2024 to degrade Palestinian militia networks there.Key Takeaways:Iran: Iran conducted an air defense exercise for the second time in recent days. This activity reflects Iranian concerns about a possible US or Israeli airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilities.West Bank: Fatah released a statement affirming that it will prevent any Hamas effort to stoke conflict against Israel in the West Bank.SyriaAxis of Resistance objectives:Reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria to LebanonReestablish Iranian influence in SyriaInterim Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Arab and Western foreign ministers in Riyadh on January 12.[16] Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhan promised aid to Syria and emphasized the importance of lifting sanctions in his meeting with Shaibani.[17] Shaibani held separate meetings with Bahraini Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al Zayani, British Foreign Affairs Minister David Lamy, and UN envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen.[18] Shaibani also met with Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan.Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan called on the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to dissolve while speaking at the Riyadh summit on January 12.[19] Fidan said that the SDF must declare its dissolution if it is ”sincere” in its efforts to integrate into the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.[20] Fidan emphasized that Turkey is prepared to take ”more responsibility” in managing the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-controlled camps in SDF-held territory in northeastern Syria.[21] Fidan’s remarks come amid recent Turkish and HTS coordination to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened to launch a military operation to “destroy” the SDF if it fails to disarm.[22]Turkey attacked SDF elements along the eastern frontline amid indications of a possible Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) offensive against the SDF. Local, anti-SDF media reported on January 12 that Turkey conducted a drone strike targeting an SDF position on Mount Abdulaziz, south of Tal Tamr.[23]Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate SDF elements along the Euphrates River since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on January 11. Local media reported that Turkish fighter jets struck several SDF positions near Sarrin, east of Qara Qozak bridge.[24] The SDF stated that one of the Turkish airstrikes killed three civilians.[25]The SDF has continued to engage the SNA west of Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on January 11.[26] Geolocated footage posted by the SDF on January 11 showed the SDF engaging SNA fighters in Mahshiyat al Tawahin about 3.5 kilometers northwest of the dam.[27] The SDF also launched drones targeting SNA fighters along the frontlines.[28] Syrian media reported that seven SDF members were killed in clashes with the SNA.[29] Local, anti-SDF media reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the Tishreen Dam frontlines.[30]HTS-led forces arrested unspecified fighters with an explosively rigged motorcycle outside of al Bab City, northeast of Aleppo, on January 12.[31] Geolocated photos posted by local media on January 12 showed the seized motorcycle and explosives.[32] This incident is the second attempted motorcycle attack in SNA-controlled territory since January 1.[33]HTS-led forces released around 360 former regime members from detention centers in Homs Province on January 12.[34] The HTS-led General Security Department stated that its initial investigation confirmed that the detainees had no weapons nor intend to ”carry out any action” against the HTS-led interim government.[35] The HTS-led forces previously arrested the former regime members during ”combing operations” in Homs Province between January 2 and 6.[36]The Jordanian armed forces stated that it engaged several armed smugglers who were trying to enter Jordan from Syria on January 12.[37] The Jordanian forces killed one of the smugglers and confiscated two Kalashnikov rifles, a pistol, and ”large quantities” of narcotics.[38] One Jordanian border guard was injured.[39] This incident is the second that CTP-ISW has observed on the Jordan-Syria border since the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime.[40] Jordan and the HTS-led Syrian interim government agreed on January 7 to form a joint security committee to combat drug and weapons smuggling on their border.[41]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentNothing significant to report.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripThe Houthis claimed that they conducted a drone and missile attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea on January 11.[42] The Houthis claimed that they attacked the carrier and its accompanying naval vessels for over nine hours.[43] The Houthis last claimed to attack the carrier on January 9.[44]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripSenior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officials said that the IDF clearing operations in Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip are aimed at preventing Palestinian militias from conducting indirect fire attacks toward southern Israel.[45] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent, citing senior IDF southern command officials, reported on January 12 that IDF ground operations in Beit Hanoun are meant to destroy militia infrastructure along the ridge line that overlooks civilian centers in southern Israel.[46] The officials added that preventing Gazans from returning to these areas in Beit Hanoun will remove the threat of indirect fire attacks toward southern Israel given that Palestinian militias use civilian infrastructure and residential areas to position rocket launchers. The IDF has so far cleared 40 percent of militia infrastructure in Beit Hanoun, according to the correspondent, and will require a “few more weeks” to fully clear the area.[47] Palestinian militias have claimed almost daily indirect fire attacks toward southern Israel in the past two weeks.[48]Senior IDF officials assessed that Palestinian militias avoid direct engagements in the northern Gaza Strip and prefer other approaches to attacking the IDF there.[49] Palestinian militias capture houses and rig them with explosives to use against the IDF. The IDF has so far located around 30 such explosively rigged buildings in the northern Gaza Strip.The IDF reported on January 12 that its 933rd Infantry Brigade (143rd Division) has destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure in Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip in recent weeks.[50] The IDF located weapons, including explosives and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), during raids there. The IDF also destroyed Hamas militia sites using artillery fire. Israeli Army Radio reported on January 12 that Palestinian militias detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting an IDF armored personnel carrier, killing four Israeli soldiers and injuring two others in Beit Hanoun.[51] Palestinian militias killed 10 Israeli soldiers in Beit Hanoun last week, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[52]Palestinian militias claimed two rocket attacks targeting the IDF around the Netzarim Corridor since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on January 11.[53]The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued an evacuation order for part of Nuseirat refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip on January 12.[54] The IDF reported that Palestinian militias are using this area to fire rockets toward southern Israel and instructed Gazans to immediately relocate to the IDF-designated humanitarian zone.Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Hamas in Doha during a phone call with US President Joe Biden on January 12.[55] Biden and Netanyahu also discussed ”the fundamentally changed” developments in the Middle East following the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire and the fall of Bashar al Assad regime in Syria.[56]LebanonThe IDF Air Force struck three "suspects” in the Mount Dov area along the Israel-Lebanon border on January 11.[57] Lebanese media separately reported that the IDF conducted an airstrike around Jabal al Batm, Tyre district in southwestern Lebanon on January 12.[58]The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson re-issued warnings for residents of 61 villages in southern Lebanon on January 12.[59] The IDF instructed residents of these villages to avoid the area until further notice.Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that the IDF operated around Aita al Shaab in southeastern Lebanon on January 12.[60] Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that an Israeli bulldozer, two IDF tanks, and an armored personnel carrier entered the town of Aita al Shaab.[61] Lebanese media separately reported the detonation of buildings in Aita al Shaab.[62]Lebanese media reported that the IDF operated around Bint Jbeil district in southern Lebanon on January 12. Lebanese media reported Israeli tank fire in Aitaroun.[63] These Israeli operations coincided with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) deployment to several towns in Bint Jbeil district, including Aitaroun.[64]West BankIsraeli forces foiled an “imminent” shooting attack near Nablus, northern West Bank, on January 12.[65] Israeli forces arrested two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters who were driving from Jenin to Nablus to conduct a shooting attack with M16 assault rifles and a ”large amount” of ammunition.[66]The PIJ Tulkarm Battalion published a statement on January 12 claiming that Palestinian Authority (PA) forces ambushed PIJ fighters in Tulkarm.[67] PA forces have been operating against Palestinian militias in Jenin since early December 2024.[68] The PA has not commented on the alleged ambush at the time of this writing.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicySee topline section.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/23/3236527; https://iranpress dot com/eqtedar-1403-drills--iran-flexes-air-defense-muscles-in-qom; https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/irans-nuclear-program-overview#:~:text=Khondab%20Heavy%20Water%20Production%20Plant,currently%20under%20construction%20in%20Arak.[2] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/irans-nuclear-program-overview#:~:text=Khondab%20Heavy%20Water%20Production%20Plant,currently%20under%20construction%20in%20Arak.[3] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/23/3236981[4] https://www.qudsonline dot ir/news/690968[5] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1400/07/25/2590967; https://english.iswnews dot com/30345/military-knowledge-majid-short-range-air-defense-system/[6] https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2017/iranian-army-deploys-new-talash-3-air-defence-system-to-western-iran[7] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/690787; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/296389[8] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2019/06/09/2028057/iran-unveils-new-air-defense-missile-system-video[9] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/11/2965805[10] https://jangaavaran dot ir/oerlikon-35mm/[11] https://www.isna dot ir/news/97081406800[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-6-2025[14]https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-11-2024;https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-10-2024;https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-22-2024;[15] https://x.com/IhabHassane/status/1878150025311621588[16] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132820 ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/156[17] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/156 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1878435040197034403[18] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/157 ; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1878459728721805533 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132820 ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/162[19] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/الدول-العربية/فيدان-مستعدون-لتسهيل-الطريق-الصعب-أمام-الشعب-السوري/3448194[20] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/الدول-العربية/فيدان-مستعدون-لتسهيل-الطريق-الصعب-أمام-الشعب-السوري/3448194 [21] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/الدول-العربية/فيدان-مستعدون-لتسهيل-الطريق-الصعب-أمام-الشعب-السوري/3448194 [22] https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537; https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/تركيا/فيدان-توجيه-إنذار-نهائي-لتنظيم-واي-بي-جي-الإرهابي/3444290 ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiye-pkk-deasi-sahada-bozguna-ugratan-tek-ulkedir/3426593 ; https://x.com/alaraby_ar/status/1869690521846997114 ; https://www.france24.com/en/video/20241220-en-wb-tete-a-tete-hakan-fidan ; https://www dot aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/our-sole-aim-is-to-ensure-peace-tranquility-stability-throughout-region-turkish-president-erdogan/3433935[23] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1878454157297799464[24] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132800; https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1878180121548394624; https://x.com/3buTishren/status/1878426758736716244[25] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1878161012777513420[26] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1878173927119220804[27] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1878161948006662466; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1878163591867650477[28] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1878511322330988701;[29] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1878407393580577276 ; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1878370468123554194; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1878370686487433575;[30] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132777[31] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1878490587621380215 ; https://x.com/obretix/status/1878509772170780733[32] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1878490587621380215; https://x.com/obretix/status/1878509772170780733[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-2-2025[34] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1878405847883067658[35] https://t.me/The_Free_City_of_Homs/652[36] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1876255100160844107 ; https://t.me/The_Free_City_of_Homs/483 ; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1874886880023683155[37] www dot petra.gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.jsp?ID=96537&lang=ar&name=local_news&cat=news[38] www dot petra.gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.jsp?ID=96537&lang=ar&name=local_news&cat=news [39] www dot petra.gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.jsp?ID=96537&lang=ar&name=local_news&cat=news [40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2025[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-syria-combat-arms-drugs-smuggling-resurgence-islamic-state-2025-01-07; https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1876607914351157605; https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1876660900222115908[42] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1878171929514758604[43] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1878171929514758604[44] ttps://x.com/army21ye/status/1877705708075917346[45] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1878356543940293007 ; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1878404830953120100[46] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1878356543940293007[47] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1878404830953120100[48] data available upon request[49] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1878404830953120100[50] https://www.idf dot il/263783[51] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1878167216966795587 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1878160826575577415[52] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1878169971232006499[53] https://t.me/sarayaps/19038 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5459[54] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1878314053887520887[55] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/12/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-call-with-prime-minister-netanyahu-of-israel-11/[56] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/12/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-call-with-prime-minister-netanyahu-of-israel-11/[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1878193398550552577[58] https://t.me/Aytaalshaabmediawebsite/17206[59] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1878432129672970401[60] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13003 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12996[61] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13003[62] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/127064[63] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13003[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-11-2025[65] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18242[66] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18242[67] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/926[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/security-operations-jenin-put-spotlight-palestinian-authority-2025-01-09/
- — Iran Update, January 3, 2025
- at 1/12/25 6:47pmAlexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempted to justify Iran’s sacrifices in Syria and emphasized resilience amid setbacks during a speech on January 1 that commemorated the death of former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Qassem Soleimani. Khamenei praised Soleimani’s leadership and defended Iran’s regional interests.[1] Khamenei asserted that the sacrifices of “Defenders of the Shrine” in Syria were meaningful and essential, dismissing claims that their efforts were in vain. Iran refers to all of the Iranian and allied personnel who fought in Syria as “defenders of the shrines.” This speech adopted a notably defensive tone by attempting to justify Iran’s efforts rather than lashing out against the United States for the strike that killed Soleimani. Khamenei has previously said that Iran would seek revenge for the killing of Soleimani by attacking the United States and its partners.[2]The speech also omitted references to current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, who some in Iran hold responsible for the rapid unraveling of Iran’s project in Syria and the defeat of Hezbollah and Hamas. This is the second time Khamenei has discussed Soleimani publicly while eschewing any mention of Ghaani.[3] An unspecified Iranian official claimed in early December that many officials in Iran blamed Ghaani for the fall of Assad and were calling for his removal as IRGC Quds Force commander.[4]Khamenei continued to advance a hard line on Syria, however, emphasizing that Syrian youth will resist “foreign occupation” in Syria, comparing the “Syrian youth” to Iraqi militias mobilized by Soleimani in the mid-2000s against the United States. These militias, which continue to operate in Iraq and today control many government institutions, formed death squads to kill Sunnis and contributed to the ethno-sectarian civil war in Iraq that al Qaeda in Iraq launched in the mid-2000s.[5] Khamenei emphasized that Syrian youth will expel ”foreign occupiers,” which presumably include the United States, Turkey, and possibly HTS.[6] Khamenei previously emphasized the role of Syrian youth in a December 11, 2024 speech, again likening their efforts to Iraqi militias.[7]Lebanese Airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah, which is in line with Lebanese obligations under the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement. The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement requires the Lebanese government to "monitor and enforce" the entry of arms and related materiel to prevent the rearming of Hezbollah.[8] Lebanese media reported that Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport increased security measures following leaks to the media on January 2 that Iran was planning to transfer “millions of dollars” to Hezbollah via a Mahan Air flight.[9] Mahan Air has frequently transported Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force funds, weapons, and operatives in support of Iranian proxy activities abroad and to support Hezbollah directly.[10] The airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight that landed at Rafic Hariri International Airport on January 2.[11] An Iranian delegation refused to allow Lebanese security forces to inspect a diplomatic bag containing funds for embassy operations.[12] Iranian media claimed that the security forces did not find suspicious cash transfers for Hezbollah during their searches.[13] Lebanese media posted videos on X (Twitter) on January 2 showing a small group of pro-Hezbollah supporters protesting the inspection of the Mahan Air flight.[14]The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to clash in villages west of Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on January 2.[15] The SDF claimed its forces had killed 72 SNA fighters between January 2 and January 3.[16] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA advanced into or seized two towns west of Tishreen Dam on January 2 after clashing with the SDF in the area.[17] Anti-SDF media also reported that the SNA set up north-facing defensive lines in front of the village Shash al Bubna, a town on the southern end of the SDF advance.[18] Well-prepared SNA defensive lines in this area could prevent the SDF from linking forces with the SDF’s southern advance further south along the west bank of the Euphrates River. SDF supply lines currently flow across the dam itself. The SDF claimed on January 3 that SNA attacks have caused “significant damage” to parts of Tishreen Dam which poses risks to its stability, and connecting the two SDF advances would presumably strengthen supply lines in the event of critical damage to or destruction of the Dam.[19]Anti-SDF media reported that Turkey conducted an airstrike targeting an SDF position in al Hurriya, northwest of Raqqa.[20] Al Hurriya is located along an SDF supply line between the Manbij frontlines and Raqqa City.[21]Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said that the US has no plans to establish a base in Kobani and dismissed local Syrian reports as “inaccurate.”[22] Syrian media posted footage of a convoy of trucks entering Kobani, northern Syria, on January 2 and unloading concrete T-walls in a suburban square in a western neighborhood of the city.[23] One of the trucks in the convoy bore a US flag. There were no obvious US military vehicles in the convoy.Key Takeaways:Khamenei Commemorates Soleimani: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempted to justify Iran’s sacrifices in Syria and emphasized resilience amid setbacks during a speech on January 1 that commemorated the death of former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Qassem Soleimani. The speech also omitted references to current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, who some in Iran hold responsible for the rapid unraveling of Iran’s project in Syria and the defeat of Hezbollah and Hamas.Khamenei on Syria: Khamenei continued to advance a hard line on Syria by emphasizing that Syrian youth will resist “foreign occupation” in Syria and comparing the “Syrian youth” to Iraqi militias mobilized by Soleimani in the mid-2000s against the United States.Lebanese Security Forces Search Iranian Flight: Lebanese Airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah, which is in line with Lebanese obligations under the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement.Fighting Continues in Northern Syria: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to clash in villages west of Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on January 2. The SDF claimed on January 3 that SNA attacks have caused “significant damage” to parts of Tishreen Dam which poses risks to its stability, and connecting the two SDF advances would presumably strengthen supply lines in the event of critical damage to or destruction of the Dam.US Presence in Syria: Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said that the US has no plans to establish a base in Kobani and dismissed local Syrian reports as “inaccurate.”SyriaAxis of Resistance objectives: Reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria to LebanonReestablish Iranian influence in SyriaHayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led forces continued clearing operations in Homs City on January 3 in search of former Assad regime members who failed to register with the interim Syrian government.[24] A Homs security official speaking to Syrian state news reported that security forces operated in the al Sabil, al Abbasiyeh, al Muhajireen, and al Zahraa neighborhoods. The al Zahraa neighborhood is reportedly a stronghold for former pro-regime militias recruited and armed by the Assad regime (also known as Shabiha) that targeted demonstrators and conducted sectarian attacks.[25] The al Abbasiyah neighborhood, adjacent to al Zahraa, is a Shia-majority neighborhood with reported ties to Iranian-backed militias.[26] HTS-led security forces began clearing operations in Homs City on January 2.[27]French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock met with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 3.[28] Shara has previously called for Western nations to lift sanctions on Syria.[29] Baerbock stated that the delegation traveled to Syria to express its support for a peaceful transition of power and convey clear expectations that a new Syria includes Syrians of all ethnicities and religions in its political process.[30] Barrot and Baerbock are expected to meet with representatives of Syrian civil society during their trip.[31] The European Union’s (EU) Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas stated that the EU will not lift sanctions on Syria until a unified government guaranteeing the protection of rights for minorities and women is formed.[32]The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued operations in Daraa province on January 3. Syrian media reported that the IDF advanced westward from Maariyah, approximately one kilometer from the Israel-Syria disengagement zone, towards the al Jazeera barracks, near Maariyah in the Yarmouk Basin.[33]The IDF Air Force conducted strikes targeting former Assad regime weapons production facilities and weapons warehouses in Aleppo Province. Syrian media and Syria-focused analysts reported that the IDF struck near the Safira Defense Factories, southeast of Aleppo.[34] Syrian and Israeli media reported on January 3 that the IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting a separate weapons warehouse in the Aleppo countryside.[35] Israeli media reported that the weapons manufacturing factory did not produce advanced weapons such as missiles.[36]The Jordanian Armed Forces said it engaged and killed several drug smugglers attempting to enter Jordanian territory from Syria on January 1.[37] Southern Syrian media reported that Jordanian forces killed five Syrian smugglers and destroyed three vehicles.[38] The smugglers were reportedly from the Syrian Badia and were affiliated with former pro-regime smuggling groups.[39] Syrian media reported that this is the first cross-border smuggling incident on the Jordan-Syria border since the fall of the Assad regime.[40] The Jordanian army has conducted numerous raids and airstrikes since 2023 to disrupt Iranian-backed smuggling attempts.[41] It is not clear how intact these networks remain following the withdrawal or settlement of former Iranian-affiliated elements in Syria. The Syrian report claimed that smuggling networks in the Syrian Badia had seized former regime positions when the regime fell.[42] CTP-ISW cannot verify local reporting.The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) reported on January 3 that unspecified fighters on the Syrian side of the Syria-Lebanon border attempted to use a bulldozer to open the closed border crossing in the Maarboun-Baalbek area.[43] The LAF fired warning shots into the air, and the unspecified Syrian "militants” subsequently opened fire on the LAF.[44] The LAF later reengaged the fighters in the same area later on January 3. The fighters wounded four LAF soldiers.[45] Lebanese Interior Minister Bassem Malawi told Saudi-owned al Arabiya that the Syrian gunmen who clashed with the LAF were not members of the new HTS-led Syrian interim government.[46] Lebanese and Syrian media reported that the clashes ceased after the HTS-led interim government sent forces to Serghaya, a town opposite Maarboun on the Syrian side of the border, and contacted the Lebanese side to express their desire to end the clashes.[47]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentIranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds claimed on January 2 that US and Israeli bases, barracks, and “espionage dens” are valid targets.[48] “Espionage dens” is frequently used by Iraqi militias to refer to the US Embassy in Baghdad. Kataib Sarkhat al Quds issued the statement to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the US airstrike that killed former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and former Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff and Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Mahdi al Muhandis in January 2020. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah also released a statement on January 3 denouncing the deaths of Soleimani and Muhandis.[49]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripThe Houthis conducted a drone and missile attack targeting a power plant and an unspecified military target in central Israel on January 3, but the IDF intercepted both attacks.[50] Houthi media reported that the group launched a Palestine-2 ballistic missile at a power plant in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area and conducted a separate drone attack targeting an unspecified military location in the same area.[51] The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it intercepted both the missile and the drone launched from Yemen.[52] The IDF intercepted the drone before it entered Israeli airspace. The Palestine-2 missile entered Israeli territory before the IDF intercepted it and missile fragments fell in the Modi’in area.[53]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and Reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripThe IDF Air Force struck over 40 Hamas “concentration points” and command-and-control sites throughout the Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on January 2.[54] The strikes killed dozens of Hamas fighters. Concentration points could refer to staging areas for attacks, but it is otherwise unclear what the IDF means by “concentration points.”The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on January 3.[55] Israeli forces located weapons, destroyed militia infrastructure, and killed Palestinian fighters in Jabalia in the past week. Israeli forces located large quantities of weapons in former schools. The IAF also struck and killed militia fighters planting an improvised explosive device (IED) near Israeli forces in Jabalia. The National Resistance Brigades and Hamas conducted separate mortar and IED attacks targeting Israeli forces and armor east of Jabalia on January 3.[56] Hamas also detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli armor west of Jabalia camp on January 3.[57]The IDF 162nd Division killed Palestinian fighter cells during clearing operating in Beit Hanoun, northern Gaza Strip, in the past week.[58] Israeli forces also destroyed underground infrastructure and weapons including rocket launchers, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), uniforms, explosives, and a booby-trapped shaft. The IDF Air Force struck a rocket launcher that Palestinian militias used to target Israeli territory.The IDF re-issued evacuation orders for areas of al Bureij refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip on January 3 after Palestinian fighters fired a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile from the area.[59] Hamas and the National Resistance Brigades targeted an Israeli helicopter with the surface-to-air missile.[60] The IDF previously issued evacuation orders for the same areas of al Bureij on December 31.[61]Palestinian militias claimed one indirect fire attack targeting southern Israel on January 3.[62] Unidentified Palestinian militias launched three rockets targeting southern Israel from the northern Gaza Strip.[63] Two of the rockets fell in southern Israel and one malfunctioned and fell within the Gaza Strip. No Palestinian militia has claimed these attacks as of the time of this writing.The IDF said on January 3 that Israeli forces recently intercepted several smuggling attempts from Israeli territory to the Gaza Strip via drones.[64] Israeli forces intercepted a smuggling attempt on January 2 and arrested the smuggler.[65] The IDF located another drone carrying drugs in the smuggler’s car.[66] Hamas and other Palestinian militias may sell drugs to finance a future rebuilding effort or to pay current fighters and new recruits. An Israeli media correspondent reported on January 3 that unspecified individuals conducted 10 successful smuggling operations from Israel into the Gaza Strip this week.[67]LebanonIsraeli forces resumed operations in Bani Hayyan, southeastern Lebanon, on January 3.[68] Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces detonated explosives in Bani Hayyan, southeastern Lebanon.[69] Geolocated footage posted by Lebanese media showed Israeli forces raising barriers at the town’s entrance near Wadi al Saluqi.[70] Lebanese media also reported that Israeli forces conducted large-scale combing operations in the area between Bani Hayyan and Tallouseh.[71] The IDF previously operated in Bani Hayyan on December 31, according to local reports.[72]Hezbollah-owned media reported that Israeli forces advanced towards Burj al Muluk from Kfar Kila, Marjaayoun District, on January 3.[73] Lebanese and Hezbollah-owned media reported that Israeli forces and vehicles advanced towards Burj al Muluk and placed roadblocks before leaving the area.[74] Hezbollah-owned media previously reported Israeli forces operating in Burj al Muluk on December 11.[75] Lebanese media also reported, prior to reporting the advance to Burj al Muluk, that Israeli forces detonated explosives in Kfar Kila, south of Burj al Muluk.[76] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson republished warnings to Lebanese citizens to avoid entering towns in southern Lebanon, including Kfar Kila.[77]West BankUnspecified armed individuals shot and killed two Palestinian men in Jenin refugee camp on January 3.[78] The Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces—who have been operating in the Jenin refugee camp for nearly one month to reestablish control from Palestinian militias—denied that its forces killed the two men.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyTehran interim Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami expressed concern over Iran’s worsening economic crisis by citing the soaring dollar exchange rate and the national currency's devaluation during his sermon on January 3.[79] Other Iranian Friday Prayer Leaders echoed similar sentiments, criticizing the government inaction and emphasized "resistance economy" policies to stabilize the currency.[80] The Iranian rial free market rate, reflecting the true value of transactions, has depreciated from approximately 60,000 tomans per USD in September 2024 to 81,000 tomans in January 2025.[81]Iranian Artesh Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Habibollah Sayyari announced on January 3 the deployment of several Artesh Ground Force brigades along Iran's western and southeastern borders.[82] Sayyari emphasized that securing borders helps maintain social stability, prevents unauthorized crossings and smuggling, and safeguards Iran's territorial integrity.[83] This deployment comes amid escalating instability and anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran over the past year. Groups such as Jaish al Adl, a Baluch Salafi-Jihadi organization, have increased attacks targeting Iranian security forces in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since late 2023.[84]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58831[2] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=51259 ;https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/video-content?id=51643 ;https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=46940;[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-11-2024[4] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/09/iran-armed-forces-at-war-with-themselves-fall-assad-syria/[5] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58831[6] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58831[7] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58551[8] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/full-text-the-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-deal/[9] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1874962277843050517 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110502[10] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1098[11] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1874905309279313923 ; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1874922046603317321[12] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/14/3231308/ ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110521 ; https://x.com/AlArabiya/status/1875237812896727070[13] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/14/3231308/[14] https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/1875077604811911341 ; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1875066545849733368[15] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1874999135012638775[16] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1875163224271986770[17] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1874936109328900119 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875198112534270300[18] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875198112534270300[19] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1875163224271986770[20] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131851 ; https://t.me/sohebb1993/20764[21] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131851 ; https://t.me/sohebb1993/20764[22] https://x.com/jm_szuba/status/1875244817481109711?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q[23] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1875131950605943143 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1874765639237419398; https://x.com/NPA_Arabic/status/1874784167969657229; https://x.com/NPA_Arabic/status/1874767685495705897; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEhzfkqsIcA[24] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1875110605033709795[25] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/108427/%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%91-%D8%AE%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD/ ; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14482968[26] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/108427/%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%91-%D8%AE%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD/[27] www dot npasyria.com/201913[28] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/03/world/middleeast/syria-damascus-visit-foreign-ministers.html ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/03/israel-syria-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine/[29] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/03/world/middleeast/syria-damascus-visit-foreign-ministers.html ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/03/israel-syria-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine/[30] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/03/world/middleeast/syria-damascus-visit-foreign-ministers.html ; https://www.auswaertiges-amt dot de/de/newsroom/baerbock-damaskus-2692368[31] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/03/israel-syria-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine/[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-sanctions-relief-premature-now-top-eu-official-says-2024-12-15/[33] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875165353673908294[34] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1875125519630631233 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1874930046370255033 ;https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1874945397380046879[35] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1874925846290723210 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/17943 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-said-to-hit-defense-facility-scientific-research-center-near-syrias-aleppo/ ; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1875125519630631233[36] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17943[37] www dot petra dot gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.jsp?ID=96339&lang=ar&name=local_news&cat=news [38] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1874497617813733516[39] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1874497617813733516[40] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1874497617813733516[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-24-2024[42] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1874497617813733516[43] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1875138738444992811[44] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1875138738444992811[45] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1875217279899877837[46] https://x.com/AlArabiya/status/1875241645588766820[47] https://x.com/LBCI_NEWS/status/1875227828800909679 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875201275849068759[48] https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/247[49] https://t.me/centerkaf/4773[50] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1875170485241360790https://x.com/AmeenHa2024yan/status/1875170878939701367[51] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1875170485241360790[52] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875071044966580362https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875014374676664750[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875014374676664750[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875130867758301456[55] https://www dot idf.il/262333[56] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4507 ; alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20135/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-455-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-4-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE-%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA[57] alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20135/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-455-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-4-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE-%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA[58] https://www.idf dot il/262289[59] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1875131558534799781[60] https://t.me/alwya2000/7239[61] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1874230679648780348[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17951[63] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17951[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875224877789303089[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875224877789303089[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875224880670765354[67] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17958[68] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1875121898742218953; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110542[69] https://x.com/NNALeb/status/1875065261038174548; https://x.com/LBCI_NEWS/status/1875065476637950281; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110542[70] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1875139027441258843; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1875121898742218953[71] https://x.com/LBCI_NEWS/status/1875083476799782990; https://x.com/NNALeb/status/1875080090041938083; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110542[72] https://english dot almanar.com.lb/2294987; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-31-2024[73] https://t.me/almanarnews/189341; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12939; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110557[74] https://t.me/almanarnews/189341; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12939; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110557[75] https://x.com/TVManar1/status/1866858563299311760[76] https://x.com/NNALeb/status/1875065261038174548; https://x.com/LBCI_NEWS/status/1875065476637950281[77] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1875173821692473509[78] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-palestinians-killed-standoff-with-security-forces-west-bank-2025-01-03/[79] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/14/3231306/[80] https://snn dot ir/fa/news/1211854/ ;https://www.imna dot ir/news/825981/[81] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202412308901https://alanchand dot com/en/currencies-price/usd-hav[82] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/717215/[83] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/717215/[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-31-2024https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-11-2024https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-20-2024
- — China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 9, 2025
- at 1/12/25 6:07pmAuthors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, Frank Mattimoe and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise InstituteEditors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise InstituteData Cutoff: January 7, 2025The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.Key Takeaways The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People's Party (TPP) pushed through new requirements on the Constitutional Court that will make it impossible for the court to carry out constitutional review until it fills some of its vacant seats. The KMT rejected all 7 of the ruling DPP’s judicial nominees to fill the vacancies, however, which makes it impossible for Lai to block legislation as long as the seats are unfilled.The KMT and TPP passed a budget allocation reform that would require Taiwan to reallocate more of its revenue to local governments. The bill would benefit the KMT by redirecting money to KMT constituencies and forcing President Lai to choose between cutting defense spending or cutting funding for other programs.Taiwan’s Presidential Office conducted its first tabletop wargame simulating PRC warfare against Taiwan. ROC President William Lai presided over the second meeting of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee on the same day in a move consistent with broader efforts to bolster Taiwan’s civil defense resilience.The ROC Coast Guard Administration (CGA) intercepted a likely PRC ship suspected of damaging an undersea cable north of Taiwan on January 4. The CGA drove away a different PRC ship as it approached an area with undersea cables on January 6. Cutting undersea cables is a way for the PRC to isolate Taiwan or disrupt Taiwanese society. Instability in the highest echelons of the PLA’s political commissars likely signals Xi Jinping’s dissatisfaction with their effectiveness in instilling his ideals of political loyalty.Naturalized US citizen Chen Jinping pled guilty to charges of operating an illegal police station in New York at the behest of the PRC.Sources close to the Japanese government assess the PLAN and CCG likely conducted a joint maritime blockade drill in the Miyako Strait for the first time on December 22.Relations between the PRC and North Korea (DPRK) likely deteriorated in 2024 despite the year being dubbed the PRC-DPRK "Year of Friendship” in January 2024.Cross-Strait RelationsTaiwanTaiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed three controversial amendments following protests and a brawl among legislators. The amendments will likely restrict the power of the ruling Lai Ching-te administration and politically benefit the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). The KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) passed three amendments on December 20 despite opposition from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which holds a minority of seats in the LY. The amendments target the Public Officials Election and Recall Act, the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, and the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures. They will increase the difficulty of recalling public officials, raise the requirements for the Constitutional Court to rule on and strike down laws, and require the government to allocate more of its revenue to local governments. DPP lawmakers physically brawled with opposition lawmakers in the legislative chamber to prevent the passage of the bills. DPP-aligned civic groups including the Taiwan Economic Democracy Union (EDU) and Taiwan Citizen Front organized a rally of over 7,000 people, including some DPP lawmakers, to protest in front of the LY. The EDU argued that the amendments would “take away the people’s right to recall” officials and “paralyze” the Constitutional Court.[1]All three amendments are likely to politically benefit the KMT. The recall amendments make it more difficult to recall elected officials, which benefits the KMT because the KMT controls most local governments in Taiwan. The KMT mayor of Keelung recently thwarted a recall motion against him.[2] The Constitutional Court amendments combined with the KMT’s rejection of the DPP’s new judicial nominees would paralyze the court in the short term, making it unable to carry out constitutional review of laws that the KMT-dominated legislature passes, and make the review process more difficult in the long term after the court’s vacant seats are filled. The budget reallocation bill will divert government funds to predominantly KMT constituencies and force Lai to make potentially unpopular national budget cuts that may hurt his approval rating.The power struggles between Taiwan’s legislative, executive, and judicial branches as well as the brawl in the LY are emblematic of an unusually high level of disunity in Taiwanese politics. This partisan rancor hampers the functioning of the Taiwanese government and has the potential to seriously impact Taiwan’s national security.The KMT and TPP pushed through new requirements on the Constitutional Court that will make it impossible for the court to carry out constitutional review until it fills some of its vacant seats. The KMT rejected all 7 of the ruling DPP’s judicial nominees to fill the vacancies, however, which makes it impossible for Lai to block legislation as long as the seats are unfilled. The opposition parties passed amendments in the LY on December 20 that will make it more difficult for Taiwan’s Constitutional Court to hear cases and issue rulings on the constitutionality of laws. The amendments include a requirement that a supermajority of 10 justices (out of a total of 15 on the court) be present to hear a case and a provision that at least nine justices must vote to rule a law unconstitutional. The court currently has only eight sitting justices, the fewest since the introduction of constitutional interpretation in 1947, because the eight-year terms of the other seven expired on October 31. The KMT and TPP voted on December 24 to reject all seven of the Lai administration’s judicial nominees, along with nominees for president and vice president of the judicial branch.[3] The reforms mean that the court cannot hear any cases until at least two of the vacant seats are filled.Taiwanese law does not currently specify a minimum number of justices required to hear a case. It simply mandates the presence of two-thirds of sitting justices to hear a case and allows rulings to be determined by a simple majority of those present.[4] The court’s current makeup of eight justices means that as few as four justices could decide the constitutionality of a law under current rules, even though there are 15 seats on the court. The ROC Presidential Office expressed regret over the LY’s rejection of judicial nominees and said that President Lai would submit new nominations.[5]The LY’s court reforms and rejection of the DPP’s judicial nominees could obstruct the DPP’s final institutional means of blocking KMT legislation because the president cannot veto laws the LY passes. The KMT and the much smaller TPP jointly hold a majority in the LY, though no one party has a majority by itself. The Lai administration requested that the LY carry out a second review of the amendments to the constitutional court procedure, citing “obstacles and difficulties” in implementing them.[6] This measure will likely only delay and not stop the bill’s passage, however, because the LY can pass the bill again unchanged with a simple majority vote. The president must then sign the bill. Submitting a law for constitutional review is the executive branch’s final recourse to prevent its implementation.[7] If the law goes into effect following constitutional review, the outcome of which is unclear, then the KMT and TPP will be able to pass any law they want as long as the court remains paralyzed, including further limitations on the executive branch or new cuts to defense programs.Secretary-General of the DPP legislative caucus Rosalia Wu Szu-yao said that if the LY passes the amendment again on the second vote, the DPP legislative caucus would request a Constitutional interpretation and an injunction to halt the bill's implementation.[8] This effort would be the DPP’s last resort to prevent the court from being paralyzed, but the court would have to violate the new amendment simply to hear and adjudicate the case concerning its own powers. The dilemma could trigger a constitutional crisis in Taiwan. It will also increase government dysfunction, creating an opportunity for the PRC to undermine faith in the Lai administration and in Taiwan’s political system.Wu called the opposition-backed amendments "an act of retaliation" to paralyze the Constitutional Court after recent rulings that favored the DPP.[9] The DPP successfully used the constitutional review process to prevent the implementation of a controversial series of legislative reforms that the LY first passed in May, which would have given the opposition-controlled legislature more power over the executive branch.[10]The KMT and TPP passed a budget allocation reform that would require Taiwan to reallocate more of its revenue to local governments. The bill would benefit the KMT by redirecting money to KMT constituencies and forcing President Lai to choose between cutting defense spending or cutting funding for popular domestic programs. The amendment requires the government to reallocate NT$375.3 billion of revenue to local governments, accounting for 9% of Taiwan’s total government revenue. Director-General of Taiwan’s Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) Chen Shu-tzu said that NT$1.81 trillion (about 58%) of the government’s NT$3.13 trillion budget for 2025 cannot be reduced by law, which means that the reallocated funds must come at the expense of discretionary spending items such as defense. Chen estimated that the defense budget may have to be reduced by 28% (about NT$80 billion or US$2.45 billion), or else cuts would be made to already approved or ongoing projects.[11]The KMT dismissed concerns that the budget bill would require large defense cuts, however. It said the purpose of the bill is to make the central government cut wasteful spending and redirect those funds to local governments, and that the budget reallocation would not affect defense spending unless the Lai administration chooses to make cuts to defense over other budget items. It called on the Lai administration not to spread “lies” and “conspiracies.” [12] Reallocating more funding to local governments would disproportionately benefit KMT constituencies and help the KMT in future elections, as the KMT controls most local-level governments and retains strong local patronage networks.[13] The new law would also force Lai to make difficult decisions about where to make spending cuts, which may hurt him and his party politically. Lai could choose to cut defense spending, which would constrain the progress of one of the administration’s top priorities and expose Taiwan to narratives that it is unserious about defending itself. He could alternatively choose to cut other government programs, which may negatively impact the material well-being of Taiwanese citizens and thus reduce satisfaction with his government, while amplifying opposition narratives that Lai is a warmonger who would choose building up the military over the welfare of his people. The political consequences of this bill will depend not only on Lai’s decisions but also on whom voters blame for the spending cuts.Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) and Coast Guard Administration (CGA) both warned that defense budget cuts would have a serious impact on their preparedness and development plans. The MND said major cuts would prevent the military from upgrading major weapons equipment and make it difficult to make payments for purchased items, resulting in delays or cancellations. The ministry said the defense budget for 2025 accounted for approximately 2.4% of Taiwan's GDP, but the possible cut of 28%, as estimated by the budget office, will take it down to below 2%. [14] The CGA estimated it would have to cut over NT$2.9 billion (US$88.49 million) of its 2025 budget if the estimated budget cuts are made. It said the cut would significantly affect its ability to counter PRC gray-zone tactics, manage the delivery of newly built vessels, and maintain its fleet.[15]Taiwan President Lai Ching-te said he would sign the bill into law when it reaches his desk.[16] However, he also said in his New Year’s Day Speech that Taiwan must keep expanding its defense budget to ensure Taiwan’s security.[17] Lai and his party have very little ability to block the implementation of the legislation.The Taipei district court indicted TPP founder Ko Wen-je on corruption charges that could carry a sentence of 28 and half years in prison. TPP leadership has accused the prosecution of being politically motivated and lacking substantial evidence. The Taipei District Prosecutors Office announced on December 26 that former TPP chair Ko Wen-je had been indicted on charges of bribery, profiteering, embezzlement, and breach of trust in violation of the Criminal Code and the Anti-Corruption Act.[18] Ko was briefly released on bail on December 30, during which period he resigned as TPP chair and approved TPP legislative caucus whip Huang Kuo-chang as acting chair. The Taiwan High Court revoked Ko’s bail on January 3. The prosecution emphasized that Ko’s alleged behavior, the mishandling of a real estate project and misreporting of campaign finances, netted him almost NT $100 million ($3 million) in illegal proceeds, undermined public trust in the ROC government and suggested that Taiwanese politicians are susceptible to bribery and interference from corporations and other outside actors.[19]The TPP has stood behind Ko throughout the indictment, characterizing the investigation as being “politically motivated” to serve the interests of the ruling DPP.[20] The TPP accused the DPP of persecuting a political rival and “silencing” the 3.69 million Taiwanese people who voted for Ko in the 2024 presidential election.[21] TPP supporters claimed that Ko’s initial arrest was an act of “Green Terror” by the DPP.[22] “Green Terror” is a reference to the DPP’s official color, green, and the 1949–1987 “White Terror” period, when tens of thousands of people were murdered and imprisoned by the state. The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) has also used the phrase “Green Terror” on multiple occasions, including after Ko’s initial arrest in September 2024.[23] The PRC’s use of this phrase is likely intended to sow divisions between Taiwanese political parties and instill doubt in the Taiwanese public over the legitimacy of the DPP government. The TPP’s continued use of “Green Terror” rhetoric following Ko’s indictment could be repeated by the TAO, giving the PRC another opportunity for political and cognitive warfare against the Taiwanese public. The Taiwanese Legislative Yuan has no clear majority party, with the DPP holding 51 seats and the KMT holding 54 (including two KMT-aligned independents). 57 seats are needed for a majority. The TPP is the only other party in the LY, with 8 seats. It therefore serves as a swing vote and has significant leverage in Taiwanese legislative politics. The current tensions between the TPP and DPP combined with the TPP’s adoption of the KMT “Green Terror” rhetoric will likely lead to a solidification of the TPP-KMT alliance, which will make it even more difficult for DPP-backed legislation to pass.Taiwan’s Presidential Office conducted its first tabletop wargame simulating PRC warfare against Taiwan. ROC President William Lai presided over the second meeting of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee on the same day in a move consistent with broader efforts to bolster Taiwan’s civil defense resilience. ROC Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim and National Security Council Secretary-general Joseph Wu held the three-hour tabletop exercise simulating a PRC attack on Taiwan as well as high-intensity “gray-zone” scenarios.[24] The exercise featured a PRC adversary cooperating with Iran, North Korea, and Russia.[25] An unnamed Taiwanese security official told Nikkei Asia that the wargame included “China's increasingly clear ambition to control the first island chain, including recent actions in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.” The official added that “Beijing has also demonstrated its ability to project power at sea. We used this as a hypothetical scenario to test if Taiwan is able to cope with an attack or blockade.”[26] Unnamed defense officials also specified that the exercise explored the possibility of an “internet blackout caused by the severing of undersea cables.”[27] PRC state-owned news outlet Global Times decried the tabletop exercise and accused the DPP of trying to undermine cross-strait relations.[28]ROC President William Lai said that the tabletop exercise illustrated the need for government agencies to establish standard operating procedures for wartime contingencies. He also said that civil society must bolster its resilience and that the ROC government would work to improve interoperability between government ministries.[29] The tabletop exercise incorporated both central and local government officials; the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee brought together government and civil society leaders to discuss bolstering Taiwan’s resilience. Lai said that the committee’s five goals included civilian training, material consolidation, energy and infrastructure maintenance, welfare and medical facilities, and network security.[30]Lai’s efforts to boost civil society emergency preparedness are part of a broader push for societal resilience amid PRC coercion and harassment campaigns. Lai announced the creation of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee in June 2024.[31] The committee met for the first time in September 2024. National Security Council Deputy-Secretary General Hsu Szu-chien noted Lai’s focus on “action with real operations in the field” over “theoretical discussions on paper.”[32] Lai also made defense resilience a key component of his National Day speech on October 10 and his New Year’s address. Lai called upon Taiwan on January 1 to “pool every ounce of our strength to improve the defense resilience of the whole society, build capabilities that can respond to large-scale disasters and deter threats and invasions, and strengthen counter-information warfare and counter-cognition.”[33] Lai also announced that Taiwan will combine its two nonmilitary exercises, the Wanan and Minan drills, into an Urban Resilience Drill starting in 2025.[34] Taiwan will reconvene the resilience committee in March and again in June 2025 to coincide with its Han Kuang defense drills.[35]The Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior (MOI) sent a request to the Constitutional Court to formally dissolve the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP). The CUPP is a minor far-right, pro-PRC political party that has ties to CCP officials and organized crime. The CUPP is a minor political party established in 2005 whose platform is based on support for unification with the PRC and the One China Principle, which recognizes the PRC as the legitimate representative of China and Taiwan as a part of that China. The MOI request follows months of claims by the ministry that the CUPP is involved in organized crime and that it harbors core members who have repeatedly violated the National Security Act, Anti-Infiltration Act, Cross-Strait Act, and election laws.[36] The MOI first announced on November 6 that it would petition for the disbandment of the CUPP for electoral interference on behalf of the PRC.[37]The ministry’s allegations stem from years of investigations that directly connected CUPP member activity with illegal acts. The High Prosecutor’s Office charged three CUPP members in August with “developing a spy network to infiltrate the Taiwanese military.”[38] A Taiwanese couple was charged in November for making “radio and digital propaganda” for the PRC government “in exchange for NT$74 million (US$2.32 million).[39] Both were members of the CUPP. In total, Taiwanese law enforcement has “linked 134 CUPP members to serious crimes such as murder, robbery, transnational human trafficking, and gang violence.[40] CUPP founder Chang An-lo is a former mobster nicknamed the White Wolf who previously acknowledged the prevalence of criminals within the organization.[41] Chang founded the party while in the PRC and has previously called on Taiwan to not resist a possible PRC invasion.[42] ROC investigations of CUPP activities determined the party to be a PRC proxy organization that is focused on breeding subversive agents within Taiwan’s military and political institutions.[43] The MOI reiterated its support for political speech but stressed that it could not tolerate “repeated national security violations and acts of violence by party members.”[44]The PRC sanctioned seven firms in response to a new US military aid package and equipment sale for Taiwan in a move consistent with past sanctions. It also added 28 US firms to an export control list. The United States announced a new $571.3 million drawdown of “defense articles and services” as well as “military education and training” on December 20 to assist Taiwan.[45] The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) also said that the State Department approved the possible sale of “Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Modernization and related equipment for an estimated cost of $265 million” on December 20. The DCSA said that this sale would speed Taiwan’s development of the Advanced Tactical Datalink System.[46] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded on December 27 by announcing that it would sanction Hudson Technologies, Raytheon Canada, Raytheon Australia, Saronic Technologies, Alcon, Insitu, and International Marine Engineering, as well as senior executives of these entities. These sanctions will freeze the companies’ assets within the PRC and prohibit entities within the PRC “prohibited from engaging in transactions, cooperation and other activities” with the sanctioned parties.[47] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and Defense Ministry also condemned the sales as a signal to “Taiwan independence.”[48]The PRC also added 28 US entities to its export control list on January 2. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) added defense contractors including General Dynamics, Anduril Industries, Lockheed Martin Corporation, and Raytheon to an export control list “in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation.”[49] MOFCOM stipulated that the “export of dual-use items to the above-mentioned 28 US entities is prohibited; any related export activities currently underway should be stopped immediately.” The report added that export operators may apply to MOFCOM for exceptions under “special circumstances.”[50] RAND expert Raymond Kuo told Voice of America (VOA) that these export controls will likely have very little economic impact as these US defense contractors had no business with the PRC, however.[51]These sanctions and export control listings are consistent with past PRC sanctions against Western firms in response to US support for Taiwan, even if their effect is more symbolic than economic. The PRC frequently uses sanctions to attempt to undermine and delegitimize US aid to the ROC and often targets the same US defense contractors. The PRC sanctioned Raytheon multiple times following announcements of aid to Taiwan in 2024.[52] The PRC’s decision to target Australian and Canadian branches of Raytheon signals its willingness to act against branches of firms in third countries as part of its punishment of US defense contractors. The sanctions against Raytheon Canada also come shortly after the PRC froze the assets of two Canadian groups, the Uyghur Human Rights Advocacy Project and the Canadian Tibet Committee, on December 21.[53]The ROC Coast Guard Administration (CGA) intercepted a likely PRC ship suspected of damaging an undersea cable north of Taiwan on January 4. The CGA drove away a different PRC ship as it approached an area with undersea cables on January 6. Cutting undersea cables is a way for the PRC to isolate Taiwan or disrupt Taiwanese society. Taiwanese telecommunications company Chunghwa Telecom identified the Cameroon-flagged cargo ship Shun Xing 39, also listed as the Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39, as it passed near Yehliu, Taiwan on January 4.[54] Chunghwa accused the ship of damaging an undersea cable but said that the damage had not affected domestic communications. The CGA intercepted the ship and sent it for an investigation near Keelung, Taiwan.[55] Investigators could not board the ship due to weather conditions but collected records, including radar data, to send to prosecutors as the ship continued its planned journey to Busan, South Korea.[56] The ROC has requested help from South Korea in investigating the incident; investigations remain ongoing at time of writing.[57] The CGA found that the ship used two different AIS systems and had an all-Chinese crew of seven.[58] Chunghwa said that the cable damaged on January 4 would likely be repaired by late January.[59] The CGA later drove away the Bao Shun, a Mongolian-flagged freighter that had approached the shore while loitering off the coast of Shimen District in New Taipei, on January 6.[60] Taiwan did not report damage to nearby cables following this encounter.[61]PRC-affiliated ships have severed undersea cables near Taiwan and elsewhere several times in the past few years. Taiwan’s National Communications Commission accused two PRC ships of damaging cables connecting Taiwan and its outlying Matsu Islands in 2023, causing internet outages on Matsu for over a month. Taiwan’s government refrained from accusing the PRC of orchestrating intentional sabotage at the time, however.[62] European authorities have also suspected PRC ships of damaging cables in the Baltic Sea, including the Yi Peng 3, a vessel suspected of cutting two undersea cables in November 2024. Finland investigated a PRC ship suspected of cutting an undersea gas line and a communications cable between Finland and Estonia in 2023.[63] The PRC is likely setting conditions to isolate Taiwan informationally. ROC deputy digital ministry head Herming Chiueh said that cable-cutting incidents are unlikely to be unintentional, as they would require a ship to drop its anchor on a cable, turn the ship’s engine on with the anchor in position, and move until the cable broke.[64] Attempted and successful cable-cutting stretches CGA resources and forces the ROC to expend effort investigating suspicious vessels and repairing damage. Even “unsuccessful” or easily repaired cable cuts inconvenience ROC authorities and contribute to an atmosphere of discontent in Taiwan. Intentional sabotage of undersea cables could provide the PRC with an ostensibly deniable means of isolating Taiwan, including cutting off Taiwan’s critical communications during a blockade or invasion. ISW-AEI research has identified cable cutting as a short-of-war technique that could isolate Taiwan from its outlying islands as well as from international partners.[65] Seemingly isolated incidents of cable cutting in a non-military context illustrate the PRC’s capability to isolate Taiwan at will and may represent PRC efforts to “practice” or test means of cutting off Taiwan’s communications.PRC efforts to isolate Taiwan informationally will likely prompt commensurate ROC efforts to protect and diversify its means of information access. The ROC has initiated efforts to shore up its digital resilience amid natural and manmade threats to its cables. ROC National Security Bureau (NSB) Director-General Tsai Ming-yen called upon Taiwan’s legislators to “harden” the ROC’s undersea cables in a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee in May 2024. Tsai said that Taiwan’s undersea cables had been cut 20 times — a higher number than normal — in 2023; he could not definitively attribute these cuts to sabotage, however.[66] Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs has called the ROC “highly dependent” on submarine internet cables but stated that “We plan to build additional international submarine cable landing stations, strengthen submarine cable safety protection mechanisms and increase backup to ensure the safety of submarine cables and external networks.”[67] Taiwan’s December 2024 civil defense wargame included a cable-cutting scenario and resulting “internet blackout,” according to unnamed defense officials.[68]Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) said that the average daily number of cyberattacks against Taiwan’s government network doubled in 2024, with most originating from the PRC. The NSB said in a report that the average daily number of cyber intrusions reached 2.4 million in 2024 compared to 1.2 million in 2023. The NSB said that most of the cyberattacks were detected and blocked. The government service network supports electronic communication between government agencies and provides online government services to the public. Taiwan’s intelligence community reported a total of 906 cyberattack cases in 2024, an increase of more than 20 percent from the 752 cases in 2023. More than 80 percent of the cases in 2024 targeted government agencies. The report said that PRC cyberattacks in the field of communications rose 650 percent in 2024, the highest increase of any field. Cyberattacks on transportation targets increased by 70 percent and attacks on the defense supply chain increased by 57 percent. The PRC also launched denial-of-service attacks on the financial and transportation sectors when conducting military drills.[69] The increase in PRC cyberattacks in 2024 was very likely in part a response to Taiwan’s election of Lai Ching-te as its president. The PRC considers Lai a dangerous separatist. cyberattacks offer the PRC a low-cost means of harassing Lai’s administration and Taiwan as a whole.A Taiwanese NSB report revealed that the amount of disinformation circulating on Taiwanese social media more than doubled in 2024, with most of it originating in the PRC. Pieces of disinformation that the NSB identified increased by 60% in total.[70] The disinformation appeared to target social media applications that are predominantly used by younger people. In total, the NSB said the PRC spread 2.16 million pieces of disinformation, which were largely geared toward increasing skepticism about the reliability of US assistance to Taiwan, the competence of President Lai Ching-te’s administration, and the efficacy of the Taiwanese military.[71] The increase in disinformation follows a larger trend of PRC attempts to use disinformation and fake accounts to mass-produce pro-PRC sentiment in Taiwan.[72]The most common method of disinformation used fake accounts or bots to spread manipulated memes, pictures, and videos.[73] Hacking operations also targeted Taiwanese citizens and military personnel in attempts to disseminate disinformation from their social media accounts. The PRC also used artificial intelligence (AI) to mass-produce fake content and deepfakes of Taiwanese political figures.[74]The platform most affected by the rise in disinformation was Facebook, experiencing a 40% increase in traffic and over 900,000 pieces of reported disinformation in 2024. Other outlets experienced more substantial jumps, with a 244% increase in Taiwan-targeted disinformation on X and a 664% increase on three popular online forums, though the overall amount of such disinformation was still lower than on Facebook. The NSB also discovered a total of 28,216 fraudulent accounts, more than double the number that were discovered in 2023. [75]The China Coast Guard (CCG) carried out three incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen in the final days of 2024. Kinmen is an ROC archipelago located just two miles from the PRC mainland. Four CCG vessels simultaneously sailed into Kinmen’s southern restricted waters on December 27, 30, and 31 and stayed for two hours each time. The ships on December 27 and 31 sailed in two two-ship formations, while the one on December 30 involved the four ships entering at four different locations and patrolling independently.[76] Taiwan does not claim territorial waters or a contiguous zone around its outlying Kinmen and Matsu Islands due to the island chains’ proximity to the PRC but maintains concentric prohibited and restricted zones around the islands that are roughly equivalent. The PRC has normalized CCG incursions into the restricted waters around Kinmen in 2024 to assert its law enforcement jurisdiction in the waters. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) said that the CCG deliberately entered restricted waters around Kinmen 52 times since February.[77] It entered restricted waters around the Matsu Islands at least four times in the same period, all during the Joint Sword 2024-series military exercises.[78] These numbers include only deliberate “law enforcement patrols” in the waters and not “innocent passage” through restricted zones.[79] The PRC began these incursions after two PRC fishermen died when their speedboat capsized while fleeing a CGA ship in Kinmen’s prohibited waters. It increased the number of patrols and varied the patrol patterns around the time of Lai Ching-te’s inauguration in May, likely as a gray-zone tactic to assert PRC jurisdiction and strain Taiwan’s resources. The incursion pattern has become more regular since then: groups of four CCG ships have carried out “law enforcement patrols” three or four times each month for two hours at a time. None of the ships have patrolled in the prohibited waters around Kinmen or Matsu since May. The PLA’s monthly total air incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in December was 211, the lowest since before Taiwan President William Lai Ching-te’s inauguration in May 2024, even though major PLA naval drills occurred around Taiwan in mid-December. The monthly total is still much higher than pre-2024 averages, however. The ADIZ incursion numbers do not include aerial activities near Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen and Matsu Islands, which are west of the median line of the Taiwan Strait. The normalization of PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ wears down Taiwan’s response readiness and forces Taiwan to continually expend resources monitoring and responding to these instances. The ROC Ministry of National Defense also detected four Chinese balloons in Taiwan's ADIZ: three on December 20 (including two directly over Taiwan) and one on December 25.[80] PRC balloons also flew into Taiwan’s ADIZ last winter in the lead up to the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, increasing to daily frequency in January 2024 and gradually tapering off in the months after the election. Taiwan’s MND again began to report occasional PRC balloon overflights in its ADIZ reports beginning in November 2024, but the balloon incursions remain much less frequent than they were at the same time the previous year. ChinaInstability in the highest echelons of the PLA’s political commissars likely signals Xi Jinping’s dissatisfaction with their effectiveness in instilling his ideals of political loyalty. The Central Military Commission (CMC) confirmed its appointment of General Chen Hui as the new political commissar of the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) on December 23.[81] Chen’s predecessor, General Qin Shutong, and other PLA generals and admirals were conspicuously absent from the ceremony, including Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi, Army Commander Li Qiaoming, and People’s Armed Police Commander Wang Chunning—all of whose whereabouts are unknown. Qin’s replacement follows the PRC Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) announcement on November 28 that it had suspended Director of the Political Work Department of the CMC Miao Hua amid his investigation for suspected “serious violations of discipline.”[82] The CMC is the PRC’s highest military decision-making body. The Political Work Department of the CMC is responsible for instilling ideological discipline and loyalty to the CCP in the PLA by controlling propaganda, political education, and organization.[83] The Director of the CMC’s Political Work Department is the highest-ranking political commissar in the CCP. Miao’s suspension and Qin’s replacement are likely due to their perceived failure to instill Xi’s version of political loyalty in the military, which revolves around upholding Xi’s absolute leadership and authority.The official CCP theoretical journal Qiushi publicized a January 2024 speech by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on December 15 that called for upholding centralized party leadership and “turning the knife inward” to eliminate sources of weakness that degrade the party’s integrity. The timing of the speech’s release by Qiushi, which disseminates high-level CCP policy directives and governing philosophy throughout the CCP’s rank and file, points to a re-emphasis on political education amid perceived failures to achieve loyalty.Recent signals from the PLA military establishment indicate possible resistance to Xi’s agenda for governance of the military. The Central Theater Command Political Work Department published an article on December 1 about the 83rd Group Army’s “study session” to implement the spirit of the Political Work Conference of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which displayed a political slogan that emphasizes tenets of collective leadership and intra-party democracy.[84] The political work conference in question was a rare meeting in June that Xi Jinping himself convened, during which he urged strengthening the military’s loyalty to the CCP, commitment to a centralized hierarchy, and continued efforts to root out corruption.[85] PLA Daily, the military’s official newspaper, published two articles on December 9 and 11 that called for upholding collective leadership and intra-party democracy as the guiding principles of the party’s governance of the military.[86] All three of the articles uncharacteristically omitted mention of Xi, whose name is almost always invoked alongside themes of political education.One of the PLA Daily’s articles highlighted the need to pursue “correct” centralization on the basis of democracy.[87] The article clarified the meaning of so-called democratic centralism as “democracy first and then centralization,” and that under the party’s organization, a secretary, deputy secretary, and committee members have an equal say in making decisions.[88] The essence of this definition is divergent from Xi’s doctrine, which emphasizes a hierarchical authority structure.[89]The principles of collective leadership and intra-party democracy featured prominently in the CCP’s ideological messaging in the years before Xi took power and even appear in the PRC’s constitution.[90] The phrases became increasingly rare after Xi assumed leadership of the CCP, however, and were gradually replaced by tenets that affirm Xi’s centrality within the party and insist on upholding his centralized leadership over it.[91] Xi has not explicitly condemned the principles of collective leadership and intra-party democracy as incompatible with his doctrine of centralized hierarchy. These tenets still coexist in party governance parlance alongside Xi’s newer dogma but are often minimized or glossed over in comparison. The lack of harmony and the divergent emphasis between these doctrines possibly signals competing priorities for party-military relations among Xi and certain segments of the military establishment, however.The US Department of Defense (DoD)’s 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) reported that the PLA is continuing to enhance its overall military power, including its nuclear arsenal, but faces widespread corruption and other challenges. The CMPR is an annual report that provides a detailed overview of the structure, capabilities, and strategy of the PLA. Xi Jinping, who is also the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), remains committed to transforming the PLA into a “world-class military” by 2049. Sweeping modernization plans involving all branches of the PLA have resulted in continued growth and technological advancements. The CMPR reported that the PRC spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defense budget, approximately $330 billion–$450 billion in 2024. These investments have allowed the PRC to enhance its military power projection, particularly in the nuclear and maritime domains. The DOD reported that the PLA likely possesses over 600 operational nuclear warheads, a stockpile increase of 100 since 2023. The CMPR estimated that the PRC will have the ability to deploy more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.[92] The PRC’s investments in its nuclear arsenal are likely intended to increase the credibility of the PRC’s nuclear deterrent and send a message to the United States and its allies about the potential risks of engaging in a conflict with the PLA. The CMPR also highlighted developments within the PLA Navy (PLAN), including investments in a new class of amphibious assault ships, nuclear-powered submarines, and advanced auxiliary vehicles, which would greatly enhance the PLA’s ability to carry out an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian accused the DoD of disseminating false information as a way to justify continued American military hegemony. Lin urged the US to stop publishing such “irresponsible” reports and instead focus its efforts on working towards peace and stability.[93]A PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor breached US Department of Treasury workstations on December 8 in an espionage operation that targeted the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Office of the Treasury Secretary.[94] The incident became public knowledge after Assistant Treasury Secretary Aditi Hardikar informed the Senate Banking Committee on December 30 that an assessed PRC state-sponsored advanced persistent threat actor (APT) gained control of Treasury Department workstations and accessed unclassified documents on them.[95] The Treasury Department has not disclosed the number of workstations accessed or the nature of the documents potentially obtained by the threat actor. It is not yet clear which PRC-based APT is responsible for the operation. Treasury stated that it was working with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), FBI, and other investigators in the intelligence community to determine the impact of the hack. CISA stated on January 6 that there is currently no indication that the breach affected other federal agencies.[96]Unnamed US officials stated that the incident affected OFAC, which is responsible for administering economic sanctions, according to the Washington Post.[97] The PRC’s targeting of OFAC signifies its motivation to gather intelligence on US decision making regarding sanctions, possibly including OFAC’s evidence collection methods, its designation criteria, or entities that the United States is scrutinizing.The hack comes amid the United States’ ongoing investigation into a separate extensive cyber espionage operation attributed to a PRC state-sponsored APT, which breached at least eight US telecommunications firms and affected dozens of countries.[98] Investigators are calling the unprecedented campaign Salt Typhoon, following the Microsoft naming convention for cyber threat actors attributed to the PRC government.[99] Salt Typhoon targeted the private communications of 100 known individuals, including former President Donald Trump, members of his family, his running mate JD Vance, members of the Harris campaign, and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.[100] Investigators also confirmed that Salt Typhoon compromised systems that contain court orders for wiretapping requests, which could potentially subvert US counterintelligence efforts.[101] The scale of the PRC’s recent malicious cyber activity demonstrates how aggressively the PRC is using cyber tools to undermine the United States and advance its own interests, especially intelligence collection.Two new Chinese “6th generation” stealth planes from Shenyang Air Corporation and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group made their first public appearance, signaling that the PRC is claiming to make rapid advancements in aviation technology and Air Force modernization. The Chengdu fighter features a diamond-delta wing planform with five trailing edge flaps to reduce radar signature and increase maneuverability, and it has three engines.[102] The Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s design is a smaller aircraft by comparison and appears to be a twin-engine aircraft design with a sharply-swept wing shape without a vertical stabilizer.[103] Forbes noted this plane resembles the Sukhoi Su-27.[104] Tailless aircraft offer many stealth advantages such as reducing radar signature from sight and rear perspectives and improving broadband low-observability against a wider variety of radar types, but the design may reduce maneuverability.[105] Stealth plays a critical role in increasing the odds of aircraft avoiding radar detection and evading radar guided weapons, and this announcement follows the J-35 stealth jet debut in November 2024 and the J-20 stealth jet debut in 2016.[106] The appearance of another two stealth planes in development is a signal from the PRC to the rest of the world on their advancements in aviation technology. The operational capabilities of these stealth planes in practice remain unclear, however.The PRC launched its Type 076 amphibious assault class ship Sichuan, the first of its kind. This “miniature aircraft carrier” could increase the PRC’s at-sea power projection capabilities. The Sichuan is significantly larger and more technologically advanced than previous generations of PRC amphibious assault ships. The vessel displaces 40,000 tons and is wider than both the preceding Type 075 and its closest U.S. counterpart, the America-class amphibious assault ship. The Sichuan hosts an electromagnetic catapult to launch fixed-wing aircraft, the first amphibious assault ship possessing this technology in the world. The ship can accommodate dozens fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, 1,000 marines, and landing craft. [107] A report from CSIS, a US think tank, from August 2024 assessed that the ship could be used as a massive platform to carry the PRC‘s growing UAV fleet, including the GJ-11 Sharp Sword UCAV, mockups of which CSIS sighted near the Sichuan’s construction site.[108] PRC state media reported that the Sichuan will significantly increase the PRC’s power projection capabilities at sea and support the PRC’s goals to possess a capable blue-water navy.Naturalized US citizen Chen Jinping pled guilty to charges of operating an illegal police station in New York at the behest of the PRC. US authorities arrested Chen for operating the police station in 2023.[109] The US Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that Chen and co-conspirator Lu Jianwang “worked together to establish the first overseas police station in the United States on behalf of the Fuzhou branch of the [PRC Ministry of Public Security (MPS)].”[110] Chen and Lu also destroyed evidence of their involvement with MPS. DOJ reported that the overseas police station occupied an entire floor of an office building in Chinatown, Manhattan and was searched by the FBI in October 2022.[111] Chen pled guilty to acting as an illegal agent of the PRC on December 18.[112]The charges Chen faces are consistent with past PRC influence and coercion campaigns within the US. US authorities charged three people in two separate cases for operating as unregistered PRC agents to harass Chinese dissidents and fugitives in the United States in July 2023.[113] New York authorities also convicted three men for participating in “Operation Fox Hunt,” a campaign to induce PRC nationals living within the US to return to the PRC, in June 2023.[114] FBI director Christopher Wray gave a statement describing Fox Hunt as “a sweeping bid by General Secretary Xi and the Chinese Communist Party to target Chinese nationals here in the United States and across the world who are viewed as threats to the regime” during a press conference in 2020.[115] Fox Hunt, which the PRC describes as an anti-corruption campaign, has existed since 2014.[116]US officials have tracked reports of the PRC police stations for several years. Wray expressed concern over the reports of PRC overseas police stations in 2022.[117] European research group Safeguard Defenders reported in 2022 that the PRC maintains a global network of such overseas police stations. Over a dozen countries launched investigations of PRC police stations within their borders following the release of the Safeguard Defenders report.[118]The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied reports of overseas police stations in response to Chen’s guilty plea in a regular press conference on December 19.[119] The PRC has regularly denied such accusations. PRC officials have maintained that these stations exist for administrative purposes, are operated by volunteers, and serve no policing function. Former MFA spokesman Wang Wenbin said that the “activities of the relevant institutions are to assist Chinese citizens who are unable to return to China during the COVID-19 pandemic to handle the medical examination services for the renewal of Chinese driver's licenses” in a May 2023 press conference.[120]California authorities charged a local government campaign manager with acting as an illegal agent of the PRC. A US Department of Justice (DOJ) report said that Yaoning “Mike” Sun served as the “campaign manager and close personal confidante” of councilwoman Eileen Wang, who ran for the city council of Arcadia, California in 2022 and won.[121] Wang and Sun also served as co-officers of a nonprofit to support Chinese-American businesses.[122] The DOJ reported that Sun had worked with co-conspirator Jun “John” Chen, who acted as a handler and served as an intermediary between Sun and PRC officials, in order to influence politics in the PRC’s favor.[123] Sun prepared reports on Wang’s election and sent them to PRC officials in 2022 and 2023. He also traveled to the PRC with Wang in 2023, communicated with Chen proposing actions against “anti-China forces” in the US and “proposed that the PRC government provide an $80,000 budget to support his and Chen’s efforts in the United States.”[124]This incident is not the first in which John Chen attempted to orchestrate actions in the PRC’s interests within the United States. New York authorities charged Chen and an accomplice, PRC citizen Lin Feng, with conspiring to bribe a government official to participate in transnational repression of Falun Gong in 2023.[125] Chen was sentenced to 20 months in prison “for acting as unregistered agents of the PRC and bribing an IRS agent in connection with a plot to target U.S.-based practitioners of Falun Gong,” a spiritual practice banned in the PRC, in November 2024.[126]The FBI investigated Eileen Wang’s role in the incident. The City of Arcadia released a statement saying that both Wang and the city government cooperated with the investigation, that Sun has “no affiliation” with the City of Arcadia, and that “Sun had no involvement whatsoever with City of Arcadia business or decision-making.”[127] The City of Arcadia’s statement added that Sun made his initial appearance at United States District Court for the Central District of California.[128] Wang has not been charged with any crimes.[129] The New York Times reported that “it is not clear from the complaint that Ms. Wang was aware of the conversations Mr. Sun and Mr. Chen were allegedly having between themselves and with Chinese government officials about her candidacy. Nor is it obvious from Ms. Wang’s social media posts or the criminal complaint against Mr. Sun that Ms. Wang is pro-Beijing.”[130]Northeast AsiaJapanSources close to the Japanese government assess that the PLAN and CCG likely conducted a joint maritime blockade drill in the Miyako Strait for the first time on December 22. The drill involved three PLAN vessels and three CCG vessels. The Japanese Joint Staff identified the PLAN vessels to be two Jiangkai II-class frigates and a Jiangkai I-class frigate.[131] The CCG ships included the 2901 vessel, one of the largest law enforcement vessels in the world with a displacement of 12,000 tons. Two CCG ships were equipped with 76mm cannons, which are typically reserved for military vessels.[132] The PLAN ships circumnavigated the southern tip of Taiwan and Japan’s Sakishima islands before entering the strait, which is located between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako in Japan’s Ryukyu island chain. [133] The ships then sailed through the Miyako Strait toward the East China Sea.[134] The CCG vessels turned off their transponders in the strait according to Automatic Identification System (AIS) data.[135] A PLAN Dongdiao-class intelligence gathering vessel sailed northwest through the same waters between Okinawa and Miyako island toward the East China Sea the following day.[136]This joint drill between the PLAN and CCG follows a pattern of increasing cooperation and coordination between military and ostensibly law enforcement forces. The PLAN and CCG also operated together in the May 23–24 Joint Sword-2024A drills, October 14 Joint Sword-2024B drills and the December 9-11 naval exercises off the coast of Taiwan.[137] The PRC has heavily armed its coast guard ships, as the 76mm cannons are typically used by navies around the world. The Japanese Coast Guard, by contrast, utilizes 40mm cannons, which only has approximately a third of the firing range of to the 76 millimeter cannons.[138] The joint blockade drill is the first time the PRC has conducted such activities in the Miyako Strait, and it indicates the PRC is making preparations to block the chokepoint between Taiwan and the Japanese archipelago in a variety of situations. The Miyako Strait is strategically important as one of the international waterways connecting the Pacific Ocean with the East China Sea and one of the widest gaps in the First Island Chain.[139] Okinawa Island is situated on one side of the strait and is home to a major U.S. military base. Cutting off Western and Japanese access to the strait would make it significantly harder for Taiwan to receive aid in the event of an PRC invasion or blockade of Taiwan. North KoreaRelations between the PRC and North Korea (DPRK) likely deteriorated in 2024 despite the fact that the year was supposed to be the PRC-DPRK "Year of Friendship” according to January 2024 statements. Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong Un and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping declared in January 2024 that 2024 would be a PRC-DPRK “year of friendship” to mark the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties. Both leaders promised to hold joint celebrations in “all fields” to “inject fresh vitality into the development” of their relationship.[140] Chairman of the PRC National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee Zhao Leji, the PRC’s third-highest ranking official, visited Pyongyang in April to attend the opening ceremony for the friendship year and held high-level talks to discuss promoting bilateral exchange and cooperation.[141] Diplomatic exchanges between the PRC and North Korea, communication between leadership, and bilateral trade all declined in 2024, however, despite earlier commitments to enhance relations in multiple areas.[142]The 63rd anniversary of the PRC-DPRK Treaty of Friendship on July 11 passed with a minimal ceremony, and neither the North Korean state newspaper Rodong Sinmun nor the PRC state-run press covered the event. The PRC embassy in Pyongyang hosted a reception to mark the anniversary which was attended by lower-level officials than in the previous year.[143] PRC representatives appeared to be absent from North Korea’s July 27th "Victory Day" celebration, which marked the end of the Korean War. The PRC Ambassador to North Korea, Wang Yajun, also did not attend the ceremony, the first time the PRC ambassador has ever skipped the event.[144] The celebration in 2023 included a high-profile visit by a Chinese delegation that had high-level talks with Kim Jong Un, by contrast. Kim and Xi exchanged only three leader-to-leader letters in 2024, down from 10 in 2023.[145] North Korean state media reported on January 1 that Kim Jong Un received New Year's greetings from Xi Jinping, including it in a brief mention alongside messages from other friendly nations, in contrast to the more prominent coverage of greetings to and from Russian President Vladimir Putin.[146] There have been 11 delegation visits between the PRC and DPRK since the DPRK border reopened in July 2023. No visits occurred after April 2024, however.[147] North Korea’s trade with the PRC in November reached nearly $220 million in 2024 but still fell short of the trade levels seen before the pandemic, likely due to the DPRK’s increased trade with Russia.[148]The decline in DPRK-PRC relations comes as the PRC reaches out to South Korea and seeks to manage its relationship with Japan, while the DPRK dramatically deepens its alliance with Russia. South Korea, Japan, and China held a trilateral summit in May for the first time in five years calling for a “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”[149] Pyongyang protested by stating that “anyone who preaches denuclearization...will be regarded as engaging in the most serious act of sovereignty infringement.”[150] North Korea launched a military reconnaissance satellite on May 28 in protest of the summit. Putin and Kim signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership treaty" in June 2024 that included mutual defense commitments, after which North Korea sent over 10,000 troops to Russia.[151] PRC officials repeatedly declined to comment on the deployment, stating that the PRC "is not involved in the Russia-DPRK development."[152] The PRC historically has been North Korea's strongest ally and economic partner, but this shift in the DPRK's alignment suggests that the PRC may hold less influence over North Korea than it once did.The DPRK-PRC relationship is likely in decline at least for now. Several factors may contribute to this decline, including the PRC’s reluctance to become deeply entangled in the growing Russia-DPRK alliance for fear of alienating Europe and drawing increased pressure from the United States. The PRC is no longer the DPRK’s sole economic patron, diminishing its diplomatic leverage, although Russia is unlikely to be able fully to replace the PRC in this role. The PRC has a strategic interest in maintaining control over the Kim regime, and the transactional nature of the Russia-DPRK relationship may prove disruptive to PRC objectives in the long term. The PRC is likely to continue maintaining functioning ties with both nations, however, despite the decline in diplomatic exchanges with North Korea over the past year.Kim may seek to further reduce economic reliance on China to enhance his diplomatic independence. Kim probably hopes to secure international recognition as a nuclear-armed state by strengthening his position against the United States and its allies.[153] This effort includes expanding the DPRK’s weapons portfolio through technology transfers from Russia and increasing North Korea’s global influence, enhancing negotiating power with both the United States and PRC on denuclearization and sanctions. [154] Kim is likely to continue realigning toward stronger ties with Russia at the expense of the PRC.Southeast AsiaPhilippinesThe PLA carried out combat readiness patrols around Scarborough Shoal on December 29, a final act of coercion in a year of heightened tensions between the Philippines and PRC in the South China Sea. The PRC Ministry of National Defense reported that these exercises, carried out by the PLA Southern Theater Command, were intended to defend PRC national sovereignty and “continuously strengthen maritime and airspace patrols around China’s territorial waters” around Scarborough Shoal.[155] The CCG strengthened its presence around Scarborough Shoal on January 2 by deploying the CCG 5901, the world’s largest coastguard vessel, joining at least three other CCG vessels and seven maritime militia ships already present near Scarborough Shoal.[156] This is the first deployment of the CCG 5901 to Scarborough Shoal since May 2024, another period of high tensions between the PRC and the Philippines.These patrols and deployments follow a December 19 incident in which the China Coast Guard (CCG) warned and “drove away” a Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources aircraft flying over Scarborough Shoal.[157] CCG spokesperson Liu Dejun said that the CCG vessel warned the civilian plane that it was “illegally intruding” into PRC territorial airspace, monitored the aircraft, and expelled it from PRC territory.[158]ISW has reported on multiple CCG patrols around Scarborough Shoal over the past five months, noting that these patrols serve the dual purpose of showcasing PLA military capabilities to the Philippines and reinforcing PRC territorial claims over Scarborough Shoal.[159] The Scarborough Shoal has been under PRC control since a standoff between the Philippines and the PRC in 2012, though the PRC has not built infrastructure on the shoal. Scarborough Shoal is one of the disputed areas of the South China Sea that has been the site of significant tensions and aggressive behavior by the PRC throughout 2024. While there have been periods of relative calm between the PRC and the Philippines, current trends in behavior indicate that tensions in the South China Sea will continue into the new year. EuropeThe PRC did not fully cooperate with a European investigation of a PRC commercial ship that likely severed two subsea cables in the Baltic Sea. The investigation concluded with no arrests. Danish and Swedish ships detained the PRC-flagged cargo ship Yi Peng 3 for a month in the Kattegat Strait, just outside Danish territorial waters, as European authorities investigated whether the ship deliberately severed two undersea communications cables on November 17–18. Investigators determined that the ship dropped its anchor on November 17, severed the first cable, and continued to drag the anchor over 100 miles. They said the ship then turned off its transponder and cut the second cable at 3 a.m. the next day.[160] Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Finland attempted to carry out an investigation but were unable to board the ship without the PRC’s permission or to make arrests, as the ship was anchored in international waters. The PRC ultimately dispatched its own team to investigate. The PRC team boarded the ship to inspect it on December 19 and allowed European personnel to participate as observers. PRC authorities did not allow Sweden’s chief prosecutor for the case to board, however. The ship was allowed to leave on December 21.[161] Swedish foreign minister Maria Malmer Stenergard criticized the PRC for
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2025
- at 1/12/25 5:37pmGrace Mappes, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter,Olivia Gibson, William Runkel, and George BarrosJanuary 2, 2025, 8:10pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on January 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary. Russian and Ukrainian authorities confirmed that Russian gas ceased flowing through Ukrainian territory as of the morning of January 1, and Russian officials and media largely projected confidence that the cessation of gas supplies through Ukraine will harm Europe but not Russia.[1] The loss of gas revenue will likely negatively affect Russian state energy operator Gazprom, which has been struggling with decreasing gas revenue from Europe since 2022.[2] Bloomberg estimated on January 2 that Gazprom will likely lose $6 billion in gas revenues per year due to the cessation of gas transports through Ukraine.[3] The BBC Russian Service noted on January 1 that Gazprom's main source of income in 2021 came from Russia's 45 percent share of the European gas market at the time but that Russia now has only one remaining route to export gas to Europe — the TurkStream pipeline bypassing Ukraine through the Black Sea to Turkey — and that Russian gas currently only accounts for five percent of the European market.[4] The BBC noted that Slovakia and Austria — the final destinations of the blocked Russian gas through Ukraine — have both fully met their energy needs through alternative sources. The Kremlin's efforts to project confidence about the cessation of gas transit through Ukraine mirrors its efforts to coerce Europe into authorizing Russian gas transit to Europe through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in Winter 2021–2022, and the Kremlin's renewed posturing in Winter 2024–2025 likely aim to extract economic or diplomatic concessions from Europe, undermine unity within the European Union (EU), and drive a wedge between the US and EU.[5]Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova. Gazprom shut off gas supplies to Transnistria via Ukraine on January 1, claiming that Moldova failed to pay a debt worth $709 million.[6] An audit by British and Norwegian audit firms, however, found in 2022 that Moldova owed Gazprom only $8.6 million.[7] Moldova recently held talks with Gazprom about transporting gas to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey, but Gazprom refused and did not make the arrangements to do so by the deadline on December 16.[8] Free Gazprom gas has long powered Transnistria's Cuciurgan power station, which exported a significant amount of electricity to Moldova and used the profits from these sales to support Transnistria's budget.[9] The Cuciurgan power station switched to coal reserves on January 1, which reportedly can last about 50 days.[10] Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz stopped gas supplies to most consumers in Transnistria and shut off most of the hot water and heat on January 1.[11] Moldova increased its electricity imports from Romania to make up for lost supplies from Transnistria.[12] Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz and Moldovan state electricity company Energocom offered on January 1 to provide Tiraspoltransgaz technical and commercial assistance to obtain gas from European markets after successful tests on December 31, 2024 to supply Moldova with gas through Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine.[13]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations. Zelensky stated in his New Years Eve address on December 31, 2024, that Ukraine seeks to accomplish a "just peace" in the war and announced that Ukraine is once again building its own missiles and produced over one million drones in 2024.[14] Zelensky noted that Ukraine is producing large quantities of "Palyanytsya," "Peklo," "Ruta," "Neptune," and "Sapsan" missiles, some of which Ukrainian forces have yet to use. Zelensky emphasized that the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) produced 30 percent of all military equipment that Ukrainian forces used on the frontlines in 2024. Zelensky described Ukrainian missiles and drones as Ukrainian "arguments for a just peace" and noted that Ukraine can only accomplish such a peace if it is strong.Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies. ZNPP occupation director Yuriy Chernichuk announced on January 1 that Russian occupation officials intend to obtain licenses from Moscow to operate all six of the ZNPP's nuclear reactors by 2028, obtaining a license for the operation of the first reactor by the end of 2025.[15] Ukrainian licenses for the first ZNPP reactor will expire in December 2025, and the Kremlin claimed in 2022 that all licenses would be valid until their expiration or until the ZNPP received Russian licenses.[16] Chernichuk also announced on January 2 that occupation officials plan to replace the ZNPP's foreign-sourced equipment with Russian-made equipment, that Russia will use the ZNPP reactors to supply energy to all of occupied Ukraine, and that Russia will also use the ZNPP to generate power for Russian regions west of the Ural mountains.[17] Chernichuk's stated goal of acquiring licenses for Russia to operate ZNPP's nuclear reactors signals Moscow's long-term territorial intentions and aligns with Russia's broader efforts to de facto legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and further steal Ukraine's critical energy supply.Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post. Geolocated footage published on January 2 showed a damaged building and Russian military vehicles after a Ukrainian missile strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast.[18] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike, possibly with HIMARS, against the command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in the settlement, while Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that the strike damaged the House of Culture in the area.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was holding an award ceremony at the House of Culture.[20]Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea. The GUR reported on January 2 that a Ukrainian Magura V5 naval drone used missiles to destroy two Russian Mi-8 helicopters and damage one in the Black Sea on December 31.[21] The GUR previously reported that the naval drone strike only destroyed one helicopter and damaged another.[22] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk doubted Russian reports that there were eight crewmembers aboard the helicopters but noted that the loss of highly trained helicopter crews is significant.[23] Pletenchuk also noted that Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea have deprived Russian forces of sustainable logistics in the area, including by damaging the railway on the Kerch Strait Bridge and ferries that transported railway cars and fuel tankers.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian military vessels are trying to hide from Ukrainian naval strikes in bays and ports and that Russian forces will only be able to repel Ukrainian naval drones equipped with missiles with jet and fighter aircraft.[25] ISW assesses that increased Ukrainian offensive capabilities in the Black Sea will most likely threaten Russian control over occupied Crimea.[26]Key Takeaways:Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary. Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations.Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies.Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post.Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea.Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to inadequately supply Russian military personnel with basic equipment and ammunition, forcing soldiers to provide their own materiel.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian and Russian forces continued combat engagements in Ukraine's salient in Kursk Oblast on January 1 and 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked in the forest areas of Sudzhansky Raion and near Leonidovo (southeast of Korenevo) and Kurilovka (south of Sudzha) on January 1 and 2.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled six Ukrainian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast on January 1.[29] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces have retaken about 40 to 50 percent of Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces control around 500 to 600 square kilometers.[30] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces are operating in roughly 585 square kilometers in Kursk Oblast and that Russian forces are confirmed to have recaptured roughly 483 square kilometers of territory - roughly 39 percent of the Ukrainian salient in the area. The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces have contained Russian advances near Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha).[31] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 2 that North Korean forces are continuing to suffer casualties in combat operations in Kursk Oblast and that the Russian military command transferred North Korean forces to positions near Ulanok, Fantasiyevka, and Cherkasskaya Konopelka (all southeast of Sudzha).[32] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) and 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[33]Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on December 31 through January 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.[34] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on January 1 that Ukrainian forces are repelling Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that are attempting to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in Vovchansk.[35]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces reportedly advanced northwest of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 1 and 2. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces crossed the Zherebets River and advanced in fields west of Ivanivka (northwest of Kreminna).[36] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Terny (northwest of Kreminna), and one milblogger noted that Russian forces have not yet completely seized Terny.[37] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Dvorichna; southeast of Kupyansk near Zahryzove, Lozova, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Kolisnykivka; west of Svatove near Pershotravneve, Kopanky, Zeleny Hai, and Nadiya; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Novoserhiivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Ivanivka,, Yampolivka, Druzhelyubivka, Hrekivka, and Cherneshchyna; west of Kreminna near Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova and in the Serebryanske forest area on December 31 to January 2.[38] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are operating drones with fiber optic cables but that Ukrainian forces are cutting the fiber optic cables or shooting down the drones with small arms.[39] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk; elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) are reportedly operating near Zahryzove; and elements of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA), including a TOS thermobaric artillery system, are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[40]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 1 and 2. Geolocated footage published on January 2 indicates that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) recently advanced in central Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[41] Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Serebryanka on December 31 to January 2.[42]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction but did not make any confirmed advances on January 1 and 2. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced in northern Chasiv Yar and near the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar, and one milblogger claimed that Russian forces control most of Pivnichnyi Microraion in northern Chasiv Yar.[43] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 2 that Russian forces conducted heavy glide bomb and drone strikes against Ukrainian positions in the Chasiv Yar Refractory Plant in order to prepare for future ground assaults.[44] Russian forces continued ground attacks within Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on December 31 to January 2.[45] Ukrainian military officials reported on January 1 that Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction are mostly conducting infantry assaults and only conduct limited mechanized assaults in order to surprise Ukrainian forces.[46] Ukrainian military officials also stated that Russian forces are using the cover of fog and smoke grenades to conceal their ground attacks in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk. Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar, and elements of the Russian 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly recently operating near Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[47]Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on January 1 and 2. Geolocated footage published on January 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern and western Toretsk following a reduced-platoon sized mechanized assault.[48] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on December 31 that Russian forces control roughly 60 percent of Toretsk, and ISW currently assesses that Russian forces occupy roughly 65 percent of the settlement.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to Volohodska Street in western Toretsk, along 3 Hirskyi Street and Kachalova Street in northwestern Toretsk, and in northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) conducted drone strikes on Ukrainian vehicles near Toretsk, which enabled elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) to advance in the area.[51] Russian forces attacked within Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on December 31 to January 2.[52] Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[53]Russian forces recently advanced east and south of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 1 and 2. Geolocated footage published on January 2 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), confirming several Russian milblogger claims on January 1 that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) seized the settlement.[54] Additional geolocated footage published on January 2 shows that Russian forces recently advanced west of Zelene (south of Pokrovsk) and north of Novotroitske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55] Geolocated footage published on January 1 and geolocated on January 2 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk and just west of Novotroitske).[56] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 1 that Russian forces are advancing towards Udachne (west of Pokrovsk along the T0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova road), and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces have intensified offensive actions east of Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk).[57] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking and advancing in the area directly south of the T0406 road southwest of Pokrovsk, particularly around Solone, Vovkove, and Pishchane.[58] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Solone around January 1, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[59] The apparent intensification of Russian attacks both southwest of Pokrovsk towards Udachne and east of Pokrovsk in the Vozdvyzhenka area suggest that Russian forces may intend to envelop Pokrovsk from its western and eastern flanks, as opposed to attacking the town with frontal assaults from the south. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 1 that Russian forces are trying to bypass Pokrovsk because they lack resources for direct frontal assaults on the town's more urbanized areas.[60] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that fighting continued east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Promin, Barankivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Vovkove, Pishchane, Uspenivka, Solone, Kotlyne, Novovasylivka, and Novoolenivka on December 31 and January 1 and 2.[61] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[62]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 1 and 2. Geolocated footage published on December 31 and January 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and east of Petropavlivka (just east of Sontsivka), indicating that Russian forces seized Sontsivka.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) west of Kurakhove and advanced south and southwest of Kurakhove and west of Shevchenko (northwest of Kurakhove).[64] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) advanced in Kurakhove's industrial zone.[65] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entirely seized Kurakhove, but others claimed that Russian forces have not seized the entirety of the town.[66] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have only seized roughly 80 percent of Kurakhove.[67] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kurakhove itself, northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka and Shevchenko, and west of Kurakhove near Dachne on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[68] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 2 that Russian forces are trying to advance to the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway and have slightly reduced the intensity of their assaults.[69] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using armored vehicles less after significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024 and are constantly bringing in reserves, including new recruits, who have minimal training. Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction; elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove; elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Kurakhove; and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[70]Russian forces recently advanced in the Vuhledar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 1 and 2. Geolocated footage published on December 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar).[71] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Vuhledar near Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, Yantarne, Kostyantynopolske, and Rozlyv on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[72] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Uspenivka (north of Vuhledar), and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Ulakly (northwest of Vuhledar).[73]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on January 1 and 2 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka itself, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, south of Velyka Novosilka near Neskychne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[74] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Velyka Novosilka.[75] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Velyka Novosilka stated on December 31 that Russian forces are using mostly infantry and little mechanized equipment during assaults.[76]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian and Ukrainian forces did not report fighting in the Hulyaipole (far eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) direction on January 1 and 2. Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[77]Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 1 to 2. Geolocated footage published on January 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Bilohirya (northeast of Robotyne).[78] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 2 that elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) raised a flag in central Bilohirya but then withdrew to their previous positions.[79] The milblogger claimed that Bilohirya is a contested "gray zone" but that the Russian raid in the settlement indicates that Russian forces seized Luhivske (just east of Bilohirya). Another Russian milblogger claimed that it is too early to claim that Russian forces control Bilohirya.[80] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on January 1 and 2.[81] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Orikhiv (north of Robotyne) and Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne) on December 31.[82]Russian forces continued attacks in the Dnipro direction and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[83] Drone operators of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[84]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 31 to January 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 111 Shahed and other strike drones from Bryansk and Oryol oblasts; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Crimea.[85] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 63 Shahed and other drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zaporizhia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, and Mykolaiv oblasts; that 46 decoy drones were "locally lost" without negative consequences, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that two decoys flew back over Belarusian and Russian airspace. Ukrainian officials reported that debris from downed Russian drones damaged residential infrastructure in Pecherskyi Raion and transportation infrastructure in Svyatoshynskyi Raion in Kyiv City.[86] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian drone debris damaged the roof of Ukraine's National Bank, residential buildings, and unspecified military infrastructure in Kyiv and that a Shahed drone fell near the Ukrainian Presidential Office in Kyiv.[87] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck Odesa Oblast with a cruise missile on the afternoon of December 31, damaging an administration building.[88] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that 10 Shahed drones flew over Zaporizhia Oblast, five of which Ukrainian forces downed.[89] Khmelnytskyi Oblast Head Serhii Tyurin reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Shaheds over Khmelnytskyi Oblast.[90]Russian forces also conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 72 Shahed and other strike drones from Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[91] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 47 Shahed and other drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts; that 24 decoy drones were "locally lost", likely due to Ukrainian EW interference; and that one drone remained in the air as of 0800 local time. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven Shahed drones over southern Ukraine.[92] Mykolaiv Oblast Administration Head Vitaly Kim reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Shaheds overnight and that Russian forces launched ballistic missiles, possibly S-400s, on January 1 against Mykolaiv Oblast.[93] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched an Iskander ballistic missile strike on an unspecified Ukrainian facility in Dnipro City on January 2.[94] Fedorov reported that Russian forces struck Stepnohirsk, Zaporizhia Oblast with 11 KAB glide bombs on January 2, destroying a five-story residential apartment building.[95]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported during his New Year's national address on December 31 that Ukrainian forces shot down 1,310 cruise and ballistic missiles and 7,800 Iranian Shahed drones in 2024.[96] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on January 1 that Russian strikes targeting Kharkiv City were less intense in December 2024 than in previous months and that Russian forces struck the city 318 times with missiles, drones, and aerial bombs in 2024.[97] Kremlin newswire TASS claimed, citing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) data, that Russian forces conducted over 1,500 strikes with high precision weapons and drones against targets in Ukraine in 2024.[98]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to inadequately supply Russian military personnel with basic equipment and ammunition, forcing soldiers to provide their own materiel. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 1 that Russian forces are currently suffering from a widespread shortage of smoothbore small arms, such as 12-guage shotguns, commonly used to defend against first-person view (FPV) drones on the frontlines.[99] The milbloggers claimed that Russian evacuation teams regularly have only one or no smoothbore guns when evacuating wounded personnel and that Russian forces are forced to purchase their own small arms and ammunition despite the Russian MoD's previous efforts to address the small arms shortage on the frontlines. Another Russian milblogger, citing sources inside Rosgvardia, claimed that a previous effort to send hundreds of thousands of small arms that Russian authorities had confiscated from Russian civilians to Russian military units fighting in Ukraine did not solve the arms shortage issue.[100] The milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD and Rosgvardia did not cooperate and coordinate so neither entity transferred the arms to front line units en masse.[101] Another Russian milblogger disputed these claims, alleging that Russian servicemembers stated that they have received many confiscated smoothbore small arms.[102] Russian opposition media outlet Mobilization News posted footage on January 2 showing Russian servicemembers complaining about ongoing shortages of basic supplies and armaments[103] The Russian servicemembers stated that Russian personnel are regularly forced to purchase their own food and military equipment to make up for shortages.Russia and Iran will likely sign a strategic partnership agreement that includes defense and military technological provisions in mid-January 2025. Russian state news outlet Izvestia reported on December 26 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is expected to sign a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Russia in Moscow on January 17, and the Iranian Embassy in Moscow and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed on January 2 that the visit will occur.[104] Israeli news outlet Ynet reported that the deal likely includes provisions for Russia to supply Iran with Su-35 fighter jets, technology transfers for missile and military satellites production, and advanced defense systems like the S-400.[105] Ynet reported that Iran likely plans to send shipments of upgraded Iranian strike drone models to Russia in return. A Russian milblogger speculated on January 2 that Iran is preparing to transfer Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles and Arman or Ababil air defense missile systems to Russia from the Bandar Anzali port on the Caspian Sea.[106] One milblogger claimed that Russia presumably purchased the missile and air defense systems from Iran, but another milblogger claimed that the images of the alleged preparations for these missile transfers do not fully resemble the Iranian Fath-360 and dismissed the speculation.[107]The Russian government continues to increase financial benefits for Russian military veterans as part of ongoing efforts to incentivize voluntary military service. Russian sources reported on January 1 that the Russian government indexed insurance payments paid to Russian military servicemembers at 4.5 percent - in line with the Russian government’s inflation projections.[108] The move increases insurance payouts to Russian military personnel who were wounded or disabled while serving in the military.Open-source reporting confirmed that at least 90,000 Russian military personnel have been killed in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) Telegram channel reported on January 1 that it identified over 90,050 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine.[109] Russian opposition outlet Mediazona and the BBC Russian Service jointly reported on November 29 that they have used open-source data to confirm at least 80,973 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine.[110] The number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine is likely significantly higher than the 80,000 to 90,000 figure that OSINT sources have identified thus far. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered an average daily casualty rate of 1,585 killed and wounded servicemembers in December 2024.[111]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Russia continues to innovate its drone capabilities, including naval drones and electronic warfare (EW) resistance. A Ukrainian source reported on January 1 that recently examined Russian Shahed drones contained Chinese-manufactured satellite navigation Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPA), which increase the drones' resistance to Ukrainian EW.[112] The Ukrainian source stated that the Chinese CRPA are cheaper than similar Iranian- and Russian-produced components and that Russia may have begun using the Chinese antennas due to supply shortages or the Russian and Iranian antennas' inability to provide adequate protection from Ukrainian EW systems. Russian milbloggers claimed on December 31 and January 2 that Russian forces completed a successful second test of a new domestically produced naval drone model capable of carrying a 150 kilogram payload.[113]Russia's primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod reported on December 30 that a recently manufactured batch of Russian T-90M Proryv and modernized T-72B3 tanks contained over 100 modifications and adaptations as compared to earlier models produced prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[114] Uralvagonzavod stated that the adaptations include anti-drone nets; reinforced rubber armor; additional protections on the stern, engine, and engine-transmission compartments; integrated EW systems; and improved camouflage capabilities.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Belarus assumed the presidency of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) on January 1 and will hold the office until January 1, 2026.[115]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/294256 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294265 ; https://t.me/gazprom/1819 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/74841; https://t.me/energyofukraine/3464; https://t.me/tass_agency/294374; https://t.me/tass_agency/294375 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/50380; https://ria dot ru/20250102/gaz-1992301580.html; https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1989826/; https://t.me/tass_agency/294310; https://t.me/tass_agency/294306;[2] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/gazprom-loss-shows-struggle-fill-eu-gas-sales-gap-with-china-2024-05-13/[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-01/russia-and-ukraine-end-five-decades-of-gas-transit-to-europe?srnd=homepage-europe[4] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0kvm86xdx6o[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/nord-stream-2-poses-long-term-national-security-challenge-us-and-its-allies; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end[6] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/gazprom-lasa-fara-gaze-naturale-regiunea-transnistreana-concernul-rus-anunta-ca-opreste-livrarile-din-1-ianuarie/ ; https://apnews.com/article/russia-moldova-gas-energy-supplies-power-blackout-0104db5be40e473308457e2657d15daa[7] https://www.osw.waw dot pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-09-14/moldova-reduction-russian-influence-gas-sector; https://apnews.com/article/russia-moldova-gas-energy-supplies-power-blackout-0104db5be40e473308457e2657d15daa[8] https://www.zdg dot md/stiri/watchdog-gazprom-nu-a-rezervat-capacitati-de-transport-a-gazelor-naturale-pentru-regiunea-transnistreana-din-ianuarie-2025-ce-urmeaza/ ; https://www.facebook.com/MinisterulEnergieiRM/posts/pfbid02YRkttNUpUVoCsZgwuwDU3fiD7KdMcXpQ9AK9cdwMTN3y3PsH2raDaFttDrwSf5yyl ; https://www.digi24 dot ro/stiri/externe/moldova/doua-companii-care-furnizeaza-energie-electrica-in-republica-moldova-cer-dublarea-preturilor-dupa-ce-gazprom-a-taiat-gazul-3066475 ; https://newsmaker dot md/ro/krasnoselski-dupa-oprirea-livrarilor-de-gaz-in-transnistria-acesta-sa-fie-cel-mai-dificil-moment-al-anului-curent/[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections[10] https://novostipmr dot com/ru/news/25-01-01/prezident-pmr-provel-zasedanie-opershtaba-po-preodoleniyu[11] https://www.interfax dot ru/world/1001465[12] https://gov dot md/ro/content/celula-de-criza-de-la-guvern-consumul-de-energie-electrica-continua-sa-fie-asigurat-pe[13] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/chisinaul-spune-ca-poate-ajuta-tiraspolul-sa-procure-gaze-naturale-de-pe-piata-europeana/33261244.html[14] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/novorichne-privitannya-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelens-95297[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/294252 ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22810013[16] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/bank/48370 ; https://old.energoatom dot com.ua/app-eng/history-zaes.html[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/294356 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294360 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18546 ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22810013 ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22813231 [18] https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1874796333909033048; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1874796670627754250; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1874801030384570423; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1874801805328351499; https://t.me/astrapress/71604; https://t.me/BaluHUB777/16494 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1874804287886536993; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M8Hes8disQUKhviH3QdK3j4Xbau4yhqYat86vn4rkcvzAWWJBUKogGSp721LfaQPl[19] https://t.me/Hinshtein/8952; https://t.me/tass_agency/294414; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/02/vsu-nanesli-raketnyy-udar-po-domu-kultury-v-kurskom-sele; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/16315; https://t.me/tass_agency/294429; https://t.me/tass_agency/294432; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31533[20] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21862[21] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5145; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rekord-onovleno-raketni-magury-u-chornomu-mori-urazyly-try-helikoptery-rf-dva-znyshcheno-ta-odyn-poshkodzheno.html; https://t.me/bbcrussian/74891[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/02/vony-otrymaly-vidpovid-na-svoyu-taktyku-rechnyk-vms-prokomentuvav-zbyttya-rosijskogo-gelikoptera/[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/02/vms-zsu-u-rosiyan-faktychno-vidsutnya-vijskovo-morska-logistyka-v-chornomu-mori/[25] https://t.me/fighter_bomber/19439 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1874800072334229846[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/24052[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/61671; https://t.me/wargonzo/24071; https://t.me/rybar/66824[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/47520[30] https://t.me/rybar/66824[31] https://t.me/rybar/66824[32] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/pryhody-zelenoho-zmiia-na-kurshchyni-soldaty-armii-kndr-ponapyvalys-u-novorichnu-nich.html; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5144[33] https://t.me/rusich_army/19800; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/16320 [34] https://t.me/otukharkiv/3328 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3897 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wVvDxqKYFripjckHR8oAoFG8m2HgFuRiAWFgnXnddZYPjoJPsVNc2qJ6Knshps44l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3909[35] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/01/u-sylah-oborony-poyasnyly-yaki-czili-peresliduye-vorog-shturmuyuchy-vovchansk/[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149972; https://t.me/dva_majors/61671; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30349; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61157[37] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149972; https://t.me/dva_majors/61671; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30349; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61157[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EEgqkLRG8G4ddAhRT5bFN3ifqJCqUq4sNQPyH1V6yisekUd4jyJPAKU9UxSoMN7Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3897; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wVvDxqKYFripjckHR8oAoFG8m2HgFuRiAWFgnXnddZYPjoJPsVNc2qJ6Knshps44l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0238293zDdxYgt2gouDLtmbLnrEK3g4KtrEC7c68Vsfdv1yQTv5hgrapxq994aZ3Esl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3905; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3909[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/12/31/konczert-kobzona-zamist-salatu-olivye-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-pryvitaly-pivtora-desyatky-okupantiv/[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83750; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149916; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83682[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7990; https://t.me/kozakgyluntv/20383; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20207;[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3897; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0238293zDdxYgt2gouDLtmbLnrEK3g4KtrEC7c68Vsfdv1yQTv5hgrapxq994aZ3Esl[43] https://t.me/rybar/66846; https://t.me/wargonzo/24052; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30369[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21847[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EEgqkLRG8G4ddAhRT5bFN3ifqJCqUq4sNQPyH1V6yisekUd4jyJPAKU9UxSoMN7Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wVvDxqKYFripjckHR8oAoFG8m2HgFuRiAWFgnXnddZYPjoJPsVNc2qJ6Knshps44l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0238293zDdxYgt2gouDLtmbLnrEK3g4KtrEC7c68Vsfdv1yQTv5hgrapxq994aZ3Esl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3905; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3909; https://t.me/wargonzo/24071[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/01/vorog-posylyuye-tysk-na-chasiv-yar-ale-stavka-na-zhyvu-sylu-ne-spraczovuye/; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3897[47] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/01/vorog-posylyuye-tysk-na-chasiv-yar-ale-stavka-na-zhyvu-sylu-ne-spraczovuye/; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21842; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/16263 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1874712127556272358[48] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24202; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/336; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1874407833816772857; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1874160262791782520; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30352; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149814[49] https://t.me/rybar/66826[50] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24202; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/336; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1874407833816772857; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1874160262791782520; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30352; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149814; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30366; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61144[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13210[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EEgqkLRG8G4ddAhRT5bFN3ifqJCqUq4sNQPyH1V6yisekUd4jyJPAKU9UxSoMN7Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl; https://t.me/wargonzo/24052; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wVvDxqKYFripjckHR8oAoFG8m2HgFuRiAWFgnXnddZYPjoJPsVNc2qJ6Knshps44l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0238293zDdxYgt2gouDLtmbLnrEK3g4KtrEC7c68Vsfdv1yQTv5hgrapxq994aZ3Esl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3905[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149835[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7988?single; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12188; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61150; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12188; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30355 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18541; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83720; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12188 [55] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1874835794156020211; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1874846616471113745; https://t.me/ok_pivnich1/11924; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7995[56] https://t.me/stanislav_osman/7924; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7980; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7994; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1953829355116761[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149945; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149860; https://t.me/rybar/66841[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149945; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149945; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61151; https://t.me/dva_majors/61647[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61151; https://t.me/dva_majors/61647[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/01/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-yak-u-rosiyan-zryvayutsya-plany-obijty-pokrovsk/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/02/najgaryachishyj-z-usih-nashyh-napryamkiv-okupanty-namagayutsya-vzyaty-pokrovsk-u-napivotochennya/[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EEgqkLRG8G4ddAhRT5bFN3ifqJCqUq4sNQPyH1V6yisekUd4jyJPAKU9UxSoMN7Cl; . https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wVvDxqKYFripjckHR8oAoFG8m2HgFuRiAWFgnXnddZYPjoJPsVNc2qJ6Knshps44l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0238293zDdxYgt2gouDLtmbLnrEK3g4KtrEC7c68Vsfdv1yQTv5hgrapxq994aZ3Esl[62] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83690; https://t.me/sashakots/51034[63] https://t.me/TIMURSOCHI23/8420; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7982; ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7981; https://t.me/robert_magyar/1002[64] https://t.me/rybar/66840; https://t.me/dnrdonetsk/128855; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12186 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12187; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149814 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149972; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149945[65] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30327; https://t.me/SolovievLive/306365 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83679 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83689; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21814; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149807[66] https://t.me/dnrdonetsk/128855; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12186 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12187 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24050; https://t.me/wargonzo/24052 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61140; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21796; https://t.me/milinfolive/138975[67] https://t.me/rybar/66827[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EEgqkLRG8G4ddAhRT5bFN3ifqJCqUq4sNQPyH1V6yisekUd4jyJPAKU9UxSoMN7Cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3897; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wVvDxqKYFripjckHR8oAoFG8m2HgFuRiAWFgnXnddZYPjoJPsVNc2qJ6Knshps44l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0238293zDdxYgt2gouDLtmbLnrEK3g4KtrEC7c68Vsfdv1yQTv5hgrapxq994aZ3Esl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3905 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3909[69] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/02/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-velychezni-vtraty-rosiyan-u-tehniczi-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku/[70] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83678; https://t.me/dva_majors/61614; https://t.me/wargonzo/24050; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13209[71] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7991; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=937926917911336[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EEgqkLRG8G4ddAhRT5bFN3ifqJCqUq4sNQPyH1V6yisekUd4jyJPAKU9UxSoMN7Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3897; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61167[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149849; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149850[74] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61156; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EEgqkLRG8G4ddAhRT5bFN3ifqJCqUq4sNQPyH1V6yisekUd4jyJPAKU9UxSoMN7Cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3897; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wVvDxqKYFripjckHR8oAoFG8m2HgFuRiAWFgnXnddZYPjoJPsVNc2qJ6Knshps44l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0238293zDdxYgt2gouDLtmbLnrEK3g4KtrEC7c68Vsfdv1yQTv5hgrapxq994aZ3Esl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3905; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3909[75] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61156[76] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/12/31/pomyrayut-ale-ne-zakinchuyutsya-okupanty-vlashtovuyut-na-vremivskomu-napryamku-zombi-apokalipsys/[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/12571[78] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7984; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/1881[79] https://t.me/rybar/66869[80] https://t.me/dva_majors/61690[81] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EEgqkLRG8G4ddAhRT5bFN3ifqJCqUq4sNQPyH1V6yisekUd4jyJPAKU9UxSoMN7Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0238293zDdxYgt2gouDLtmbLnrEK3g4KtrEC7c68Vsfdv1yQTv5hgrapxq994aZ3Esl[82] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21813; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21797[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EEgqkLRG8G4ddAhRT5bFN3ifqJCqUq4sNQPyH1V6yisekUd4jyJPAKU9UxSoMN7Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y8wbG3N3pmpk6LPJCosBBctDKkgTT8WScEgB1fsQJAH3f6WR3hQfvbxGoDGbVVEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09QM3ZJuxRz3juLtoaomsmC1MwcAuiT5nPN7GoLCPoEQG24ZhGHVwfBBhuoe9HjQBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wVvDxqKYFripjckHR8oAoFG8m2HgFuRiAWFgnXnddZYPjoJPsVNc2qJ6Knshps44l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0238293zDdxYgt2gouDLtmbLnrEK3g4KtrEC7c68Vsfdv1yQTv5hgrapxq994aZ3Esl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11922[84] https://t.me/dva_majors/61689[85] https://t.me/kpszsu/25915[86] https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/915377-e-zagibli-u-persij-den-novogo-roku-rosia-atakuvala-kiiv-bezpilotnikami/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/10353; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1874363469040148847 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/3968 ; https://t.me/radiosvoboda/74337 ; https://t.me/severrealii/29012 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/708[87] https://t.me/rybar/66835 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21829 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61638 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61623 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83718 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83723 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61644 ; https://t.me/stalins_sokol/54; https://t.me/karaulny_accountant/48611 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19788 ;[88] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11920[89] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/14774[90] https://www.facebook.com/sergii.tiurin.public/posts/pfbid02RoTPVtMvL8CTULbx5JkHAqEemVS1fvT4TXd76nKZmSkoCeoh6DB7QFCSZ2Ay9KDpl?rdid=uE6UjE1EB777ss55#[91] https://t.me/kpszsu/26037[92] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11923[93] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/12702[94] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83785 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21867[95] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/14791[96] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/novorichne-privitannya-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelens-95297[97] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2040 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2041[98] https://t.me/tass_agency/294351[99] https://t.me/bayraktar1070/3238 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61656[100] https://t.me/DmitriySteshin/12457[101] https://t.me/DmitriySteshin/12457[102] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12191 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12192[103] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21578[104] https://iz dot ru/1814543/2024-12-26/prezident-irana-17-ianvaria-planiruet-posetit-rf-dlia-podpisaniia-dogovora-o-sotrudnichestve[105] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83677 ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/h1vqyteuyl[106] https://t.me/milinfolive/139027 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/139036 ; https://t.me/ImpNavigator/9579[107] https://t.me/milinfolive/139027 ; https://t.me/ImpNavigator/9579[108] https://t.me/rusich_army/19786 ; https://www.pnp dot ru/social/vyplaty-uchastnikam-svo-vyrastut-v-2025-godu.html ; https://www.garant dot ru/news/1776856/[109] https://t.me/pechalbeda200/141961[110] https://meduza dot io/en/news/2024/11/29/more-than-80-000-russian-servicemen-confirmed-killed-in-ukraine-majority-of-whom-were-civilians-before-full-scale-war-bbc-and-mediazona[111] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024[112] https://t.me/serhii_flash/4621 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1874500190918639691[113] https://t.me/potapov_npp/623 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/139023[114] https://t.me/epoddubny/22067 ; https://t.me/uvznews/2812?single[115] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/287139
- — Iran Update, January 2, 2025
- at 1/12/25 5:04pmKelly Campa, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman,Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThis update covers information for the 48-hour period between December 31, 2024, at 2:00pm ET to January 2, 2025, at 2:00pm ET.The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) delegation met with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 30.[1] There were no specific, public reports of meaningful or tangible progress toward an agreement between Shara and the SDF, despite an unspecified official’s statement to AFP that the meeting was “positive.”[2] This is the first reported meeting between the HTS-led interim government and the SDF since the former assumed power over Damascus, though Shara acknowledged that the government was negotiating with the SDF in an al Arabiya interview on December 29.[3] Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) official Bassem Ishak told Asharq al Awsat on January 2 that the parties only discussed “military issues” at the meeting, suggesting that the two parties discussed HTS’s demands that the SDF subordinate itself to the HTS-organized military.[4] This military is—at present—dominated by HTS-affiliated commanders. It does not appear that HTS and the SDF came to an agreement on or even discussed the political requirements of integrating the Kurdish-controlled autonomous zone into HTS territory and governance. The unspecified official told AFP that this was a “preliminary meeting” that would set the stage for future HTS-SDF dialogue.[5] It remains unclear how high of a priority negotiating with the SDF is to Shara, however, as HTS continues to formalize and deepen its relations with Turkey.[6]The SDF is almost certainly both unable and unwilling to subordinate itself to the HTS-organized Defense Ministry at this time, given the organizational tasks implicit in that effort. The Kurdish-led SDF is still actively engaging the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and continues to face an existential threat from a potential Turkish offensive in Syria.[7] Reorganizing SDF formations under the HTS-organized Defense Ministry, regardless of whether or not the SDF formations are reflagged or reorganized, would probably require the SDF to break contact with the SNA. The SDF would presumably need to receive certain assurances that the SNA would not continue to attempt to destroy the SDF, especially given that the various SNA formations would make a large portion of the future Syrian army.The SDF has reportedly widened its salient on the western bank of the Euphrates River around the Tishreen Dam southwards since December 31. The SDF claimed to engage the SNA in Khirbet Zamala, al Atshana, and several other villages between five and ten kilometers south of Tishreen Dam on January 2.[8] Anti-SDF media also reported clashes in the area.[9] Geolocated footage posted on January 1 showed the SDF conducting a drone strike on an SNA vehicle in mountainous terrain in Khirbet Zamala, south of Tishreen Dam.[10] The SDF said it destroyed six armored SNA vehicles in engagements in the area.[11] The SDF may seek to link its forces around Tishreen Dam with the forces moving northwards from Highway Route 4. A link-up between these two advances would presumably strengthen SDF supply lines around the dam, which currently flow across the dam itself and could be more easily disrupted.The SDF and SNA forces continued fighting west of Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak bridge since December 31. Geolocated footage posted on January 2 showed the SDF conducting drone strikes targeting SNA vehicles and an M113 armored vehicle along a highway west of Tishreen Dam.[12] The SDF also claimed that it shot down a Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone near Qara Qozak bridge on January 1.[13] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the frontlines near the Tishreen Dam on January 2.[14]Unspecified fighters have detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) in two separate attacks in SNA-controlled territory since December 31. An unspecified fighter detonated a possible car bomb in central Tal Rifaat, north of Aleppo, on December 31.[15] Six people were injured. The low casualty count in a popular market makes it more likely that the culprit used a relatively rudimentary car bomb and not a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).[16] This is the third car bomb or VBIED attack in SNA-controlled territory since December 24.[17] An unspecified suspect also detonated a motorcycle in the nearby town of Deir Jamal on January 1.[18] There were no injuries.[19] The SDF condemned the recent IED attacks in Tal Rifaat, Deir Jamal, and Manbij in a statement on January 2.[20]The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Military Operations Department continued to conduct raids to detain former Regime members that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm on January 1 and 2. The interim government-run media reported that the Military Operations Department detained at least 28 former regime members in Homs, including those accused of perpetrating atrocities in the early Syrian Civil War.[21] A telegram channel claiming to represent an armed group opposed to the HTS-led government spread claims that the raids targeting former regime members had sectarian motivations.[22] CTP-ISW cannot verify the exact nature and origin of this group and will not at this time report specific claims to avoid amplifying the group’s attempts to foment sectarian violence in Syria. These sectarian narratives can create a dangerous cycle of groups refusing to disarm because they fear for their safety, which then causes HTS-affiliated forces to target those groups that don’t disarm, thereby causing the groups to continue to accuse HTS of sectarianism. This dynamic could easily spiral out of control into larger armed conflict if left unchecked. The HTS-led government has a requirement to assuage the concerns of former regime loyalists and minorities, part of which requires controlling these sectarian narratives as and if they spread.Interim government forces also engaged “remnants of an Iranian-backed militia” in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on January 1.[23] HTS-led authorities have targeted Iran-affiliated groups over the past several days in Deir ez Zor and Aleppo Provinces.[24] A local correspondent reported that that only a quarter of the estimated 2000 Iranian-backed fighters in Albu Kamal have completed the settlement process with the interim government.[25] Iran had deeply penetrated pro-regime militias in Deir ez Zor Province before the fall of the Assad regime, making it possible that the interim government will encounter greater challenges consolidating security control over the former militia members than in other parts of Syria.The HTS-led interim Syrian government appears to be taking initial steps to secure cooperation with minority religious communities ahead of the Syrian National Dialogue Conference. A Damascus-based news outlet reported that the Syrian National Dialogue Conference has been delayed until the interim government has extended invitations to all relevant groups.[26] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with a Christian clergy from the Damascus area on December 31.[27] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara stated on December 29 that the National Dialogue Conference would represent the breadth of Syria’s diversity.[28]Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al Shaibani, Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Head of General Intelligence Anas Khattab traveled to Saudi Arabia on January 2 and met with senior Saudi officials.[29] The Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman reported that he discussed ways that Saudi Arabia could support the Syrian government’s transitional process.[30] Shaibani held a separate meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan.[31] Shaibani also visited the Syrian Embassy in Riyadh.[32]The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in Quneitra province since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on December 31. Geolocated footage from January 2 showed Israeli bulldozers operating at the Mantara dam on the outskirts of Quneitra, southern Syria.[33] A Syria-focused analyst reported that the IDF seized a former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) base in Hader village, Quneitra province.[34] Syrian media reported that the IDF deployed bulldozers and excavation machinery on a nearby hilltop, likely to construct an observation post.[35] The IDF is paving a road to connect the military base to the hilltop. The IDF separately conducted airstrikes targeting a former Assad regime military base in western Damascus.[36]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior advisor, Ali Larijani, justified Iran’s actions in Syria, reaffirmed support of the Axis of Resistance, and linked future Iran-Syria relations to the conduct of new Syrian leaders. Larijani highlighted Soleimani’s fundamental role in the Axis of Resistance.[37] Larijani dismissed claims that the resistance has been weakened and emphasized the resilience of movements such as Hezbollah, which he claimed had rebuilt itself after significant setbacks.[38] Larijani’s speech takes a more defensive tone by framing recent setbacks as temporary and reaffirming Iran’s commitment to its regional objectives. It is notable, however, that Larijani linked future Iran-Syria relations to the conduct of the new Syrian leaders. Other Iranian officials and ex-officials, such as former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei, have advocated for Iran to support resistance movements in Syria against HTS.[39]Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media in Iran claimed that the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in southern Damascus lacked the power to turn on its lights due to fuel supply issues under HTS.[40] The HTS-led government resumed the shrine’s custodianship on 15 December.[41] Local Syrian reporting did not confirm the Iranian outlet’s claim. Iranian media outlets have previously made false claims about the shrine and the security around it.[42] Iran intends to ignite unrest against the HTS-led interim government in pursuit of regaining a foothold in Syria.[43]Key Takeaways:Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) negotiations: An SDF delegation met with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 30. A Syrian Democratic Council official said the meeting only included “military issues.” The SDF is almost certainly both unable and unwilling to subordinate itself to the HTS-organized Defense Ministry at this time, given the organizational tasks implicit in that effort. The SDF continues to face an existential threat from Turkish-backed forces.Fighting in Northern Syria: The SDF has reportedly widened its salient on the western bank of the Euphrates River around the Tishreen Dam southwards since December 31. The SDF may seek to link its forces around Tishreen Dam with the forces moving northwards from Highway Route 4. A link-up between these two advances would presumably strengthen SDF supply lines around the dam, which currently flow across the dam itself and could be more easily disrupted.HTS Operations Against Former Regime Members: The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Military Operations Department continued to conduct raids to detain former Regime members that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm on January 1 and 2. Interim government forces also engaged “remnants of an Iranian-backed militia” in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on January 1.Negotiations with Minorities in Syria: The HTS-led interim Syrian government appears to be taking initial steps to secure cooperation with minority religious communities ahead of the Syrian National Dialogue Conference.HTS-backed Officials Visit to Saudi Arabia: Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al Shaibani, Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Head of General Intelligence Anas Khattab traveled to Saudi Arabia on January 2 and met with senior Saudi officials.Iranian-Syrian Relations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior advisor, Ali Larijani, justified Iran’s actions in Syria, reaffirmed support of the Axis of Resistance, and linked future Iran-Syria relations to the conduct of new Syrian leaders.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a Hamas sniper unit in Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip on December 31.[44] The airstrike killed five Gazans, according to the Palestinian Civil Defense.Palestinian militias claimed three mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor since CTP-ISW’s last data cut off on December 31.[45] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli soldiers in eastern Gaza City on January 2.[46]The IDF conducted an airstrike that killed Hamas head of internal security in the southern Gaza Strip Hussam Shawan in Khan Younis on January 2.[47] The IDF stated that Shawan was hiding among civilians in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone in Khan Younis at the time of the strike. The IDF separately struck a Hamas headquarters located in a municipality building in the Mawasi humanitarian zone.[48] The IDF stated that Hamas used this headquarters to conduct attacks targeting Israeli positions in the Gaza Strip and in Israeli territory.[49] The IDF stated that it took steps to reduce the risk of civilian casualties by using precision munitions and analyzing aerial imagery before the airstrikes.[50]The IDF 4th Armored Brigade (162nd Division) destroyed a rocket manufacturing facility during raids in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 1.[51] The facility produced medium- and long-range rockets, according to the IDF. The IDF also killed an unspecified number of Hamas fighters during the raids.The IDF issued evacuation orders for areas in Jabalia and Bureij refugee camps in the northern and central Gaza Strip on January 1.[52] Palestinian fighters had previously launched rockets from these areas into Israel. The rocket attacks spurred the evacuation orders. The evacuation orders instructed Gazans to immediately move towards IDF-declared humanitarian zones and civilian shelters. Palestinian militias claimed two rocket attacks targeting southern Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cut off on December 31.[53] Hamas fired rockets targeting Netivot in southern Israel.[54] Palestinian militias fired two rockets from the central Gaza Strip. The IDF intercepted one rocket while the other fell in an open area.[55] PIJ fired rockets targeting Holit in southern Israel on January 2.[56] The IDF Air Force intercepted one launch that crossed into Israel from the southern Gaza Strip.[57]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelUnspecified Palestinian fighters conducted a car-ramming attack targeting IDF soldiers operating near Deir Qaddis, near the Israeli settlement of Modin Illit, on January 1.[58] The fighter lightly wounded one IDF soldier before the IDF ”neutralized” the attacker.[59] No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for this attack at the time of this writing.Undercover Israeli Border Police officers arrested an unnamed but presumably Palestinian “senior suspect” in Kasbah, Nablus Governorate, on January 1.[60] Palestinian fighters fired shots and threw explosive devices, Molotov cocktails, and stones at the police forces while they were withdrawing from Nablus.[61]The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—conducted small arms attacks targeting two Israeli settlements and two IDF checkpoints in the northern West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 31.[62] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting the IDF Awarta checkpoint, south of Nablus City, and the Elon Moreh settlement, a small Orthodox Jewish settlement northeast of Nablus City.[63] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately fired small arms at the IDF Dotan checkpoint, Jenin Governorate, and the Bakaot settlement, southeast of Tubas city.[64]The Palestinian Authority (PA) continued to operate in the Jenin refugee camp to “restore [PA] control” there since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 31.[65] This operation has continued for nearly one month. PA security forces spokesperson Brigadier General Anwar Rajab stated that the PA killed at least six Palestinian militia fighters, arrested dozens more suspected fighters, and defused "dozens" of IEDs and car bombs inside the Jenin refugee camp throughout the operation.[66] The PA officially banned Al Jazeera from operating within PA-controlled areas on January 2 due to its negative coverage of the PA and the operation in Jenin.[67] Israel previously banned Al Jazeera from operating within Israeli territory in May 2024.[68] Rajab stated that the goal of the PA’s operation is to ”restore [PA] control of the Jenin Camp.”[69] It is unclear how the PA is defining ”control” at this time. There are some definitions of ”control” that would be a significant military undertaking that is probably beyond the capability of the PA security forces. Palestinian militias are very strong in Jenin and the northern West Bank more broadly.Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonIsraeli forces withdrew from Chama, southwestern Lebanon, on January 1.[70] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 5th Brigade backfilled the IDF and returned to the 5th Brigade headquarters in al Bayada, adjacent to Chama.[71] The IDF advanced into Chama in mid-November 2024.[72]Lebanese media separately reported on January 2 that the IDF withdrew from neighborhoods in Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon, towards Ras al Naqoura and Alma al Shaab.[73]The IDF advanced towards Beit Lif from Ramyeh, Bint Jbeil, on January 2. Geolocated images showed IDF armored military vehicles advancing towards Beit Lif. Hezbollah-affiliated media and geolocated images posted to X (Twitter) reported that IDF military vehicles advanced from Ramyeh towards al Qawzah, southeast of Beit Lif, and Salhaneh, southwest of Beit Lif.[74]The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting tactical-level Hezbollah weapons transfers and rocket launchers in at least three locations in Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 31.[75] The IDF conducted a strike targeting Hezbollah operatives transferring weapons from a weapons depot in Bani Hayyan, southern Lebanon, on December 31.[76] The IDF destroyed the weapons depot and the Hezbollah vehicle transporting weapons. The IDF separately destroyed a Hezbollah medium-range rocket launcher in Mount Rihan, 15 kilometers north of Metula, Israel, on January 2.[77] The IDF destroyed Hezbollah rocket launchers near an unspecified military site in Jbaa village, Nabatieh Governorate, on January 2.[78] The IDF specified that it only targeted the Hezbollah launchers after the LAF failed to secure or destroy the launchers.[79] The IDF previously conducted airstrikes in Jbaa and Jabal al Rihan on December 2.[80]Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem stated on January 1 that now is an opportunity for the Lebanese government to “prove itself” through political action in a video message that aired during an international conference honoring a Shia scholar in Tehran.[81] Qassem said that Hezbollah is allowing the Lebanese state and the international community to assume the responsibility of implementing the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[82] Qassem stated that Hezbollah is being ”patient at this stage” and allowing the Lebanese state to assume the responsibility of ceasefire implementation rather than Hezbollah itself. Qassem stated that the ”resistance will continue” and Hezbollah will become stronger. Qassem stated that Hezbollah will work with its partners in Lebanon to elect a president on January 9 to rebuild the country. Leader of the Lebanese Forces Party Samir Geagea responded to his message stating that Qassem ”is“ the Lebanese state as Hezbollah controls a large majority of the government and urged him to ”take the appropriate position.”[83]Iran and the Axis of ResistancePopular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Anbar Operations Commander Qasimm Mulih, who has links to Kataib Hezbollah, announced on January 1 that a large [number of] PMF enforcements arrived in Anbar Province to secure the Syria-Iraq border.[84] Footage posted on January 1 purportedly shows PMF armor moving within Anbar Province.[85] This deployment follows PMF Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz Muhammadawi's inspection of combat units in Anbar Province along the Iraq-Syria border on December 29.[86]An Iraqi military source told UK-based media on December 29 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that had recently withdrawn from Syria to Iraq would soon begin moving “significant distances” from the Iraq-Syria border.[87] The militias are reportedly currently stationed near the al Qaim-Albu Kamal border crossing in Anbar Province.[88] The source added that Iraq is under unspecified regional and international pressure to remove the Iranian-backed militias from the Syrian border and to show support to the HTS-led interim government in Syria.[89]The Houthis claimed on January 1 that they shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Marib Governorate, Yemen.[90] Houthi military spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea claimed that was the second US drone the Houthis intercepted in 72 hours. This is the fourteenth time that the Houthis have claimed to have intercepted a US MQ-9 Reaper drone since the start of the October 7 war. Houthi media published footage of drone debris in Marib Governorate on January 2.[91] CTP-ISW cannot verify the Houthi claim.Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on January 2 that the Houthis are in an “open war” with Israel and will continue to intensify attacks on Israel.[92] Abdulmalik said that the United States and Israel have not deterred the Houthis and that the group has used the war to develop its capabilities. Abdulmalik claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom have conducted a total of 931 airstrikes and naval strikes against the Houthis over the past year, killing at least 106 Houthi fighters and wounding 314 others. Abdulmalik stressed that it is the Houthis’ faith that unites them with Iran against a common enemy and condemned Israel’s actions in Gaza and Syria. Abdulmalik also called out the Palestinian Authority (PA) for “shedding Palestinian blood” and questioned the PA’s why the PA was fighting the Palestinian people. Abdulmalik also noted that the Israeli Knesset will not allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.barrons.com/news/syria-s-de-facto-leader-holds-talks-with-kurds-official-2638ce42[2] https://www.barrons.com/news/syria-s-de-facto-leader-holds-talks-with-kurds-official-2638ce42[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2024[4] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5097278-sharaa’s-meeting-sdf-leadership-focused-solely-military-matters[5] https://www.barrons.com/news/syria-s-de-facto-leader-holds-talks-with-kurds-official-2638ce42[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2024[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-31-2024[8] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1874735276154576947; https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1874857306074329398[9] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1874437263540834629[10] https://x.com/ghost_watcher1/status/1874571551020069335; https://x.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1874524575452860698[11] https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1874857306074329398[12] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1874849103135543583; https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1874857306074329398[13] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1874544820380914005[14] https://t.me/sohebb1993/20751[15] https://x.com/AlarabyTV/status/1874150537735680316; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1874153837650743395[16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-8udxiVmYI[17] https://www.barrons.com/news/car-bombing-in-flashpoint-north-syria-town-monitor-6b66d699; https://www.dailysabah dot com/politics/pkkypg-car-bomb-attack-kills-2-in-syria/news[18] https://x.com/skynewsarabia/status/1874583938087440692 ; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1874476356593172804; https://x.com/AlarabyTV/status/1874515150419464510[19] https://x.com/skynewsarabia/status/1874583938087440692[20] www.sdf-press dot com/?p=44102[21] https://t.me/mzmgr_syria/26672 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1874796503082099104 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1874823499552051533 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1874861757451407602 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1874910449705377823[22] GRAHPIC: https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5042 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5037 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5041 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5027 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate123124[23] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131669[24] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1874796503082099104[25] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131665[26] https://t.me/damascusv011/27215[27] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1874183971455840334[28] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/syria/2024/12/29/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%B1%D9%82-4-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-[29] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1874544269345886478 ; https://x.com/Asaad_Shaibani/status/1874568251281387917[30] https://t.me/damascusv011/27282[31] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/61 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1874889339471290703[32] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/65[33] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1874811373856669748 ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1874876205792674001[34] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1874530050332307669[35] https://t.me/damascusv011/27251[36] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1874812101950414866 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1874813034499297425[37] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6335014[38] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6335014[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2024 ; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/226048/Syrian-resistance-will-be-revived-in-less-than-a-year-Rezaei; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-22-2024 ;[40] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/12/3230282/[41] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-15-2024[42] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-15-2024 ;https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/12/iran-update-december-13-2024.html;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024;[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-30-2024[44] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/01/israel-gaza-strikes-new-year-2025/[45] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8095 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4503 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4603[46] https://t.me/sarayaps/19020[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874755789661057250[48] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874780098865541493[49] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874780102388801778[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874755804144062914 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874780102388801778[51] https://www.idf dot il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%99-%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA%D7%99-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95-%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%97%D7%9D-%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%A8%D7%A7%D7%98%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%9C-%D7%97/[52] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1874230679648780348 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1874480682493489272[53] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8383/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%B1%D8%B4%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/19021[54] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8383/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%B1%D8%B4%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86[55] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1874217217379942892 ;[56] https://t.me/sarayaps/19021[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874758449642504247[58] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1874515945462628677[59] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-835738[60] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-835796[61] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1874699040870506926 ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-835796[62] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8087 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4598[63] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8087 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4598[64] https://t.me/nedalps/4598[65] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-palestinian-authority-takes-on-hamas-militants-in-west-bank-power-struggle-f2da23d2?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1[66] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-palestinian-authority-takes-on-hamas-militants-in-west-bank-power-struggle-f2da23d2?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1[67] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-authority-bans-al-jazeera-in-west-bank-a5c7729d[68] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-palestinian-authority-takes-on-hamas-militants-in-west-bank-power-struggle-f2da23d2?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1[69] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-palestinian-authority-takes-on-hamas-militants-in-west-bank-power-struggle-f2da23d2?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1[70] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1874502393817149633; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1874542973213708562[71] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1874538532326522965; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1874524603210465425[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-24-2024 ; https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/16/middleeast/israel-beirut-strikes-ceasefire-lebanon-intl/index.html ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-15-2024[73] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126185 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110448 ; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1874756501627170918[74] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1874788142961807568 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12932[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874879603938038082[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874320924012667236; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1874413443480232190; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1874394142509539344[77] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17935[78] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17934[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874879608283419034[80] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/107850 https://t.me/channelnabatieh/107851[81] https://almanar.com dot lb/12980519 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6334256/[82] https://almanar.com dot lb/12980519[83] https://x.com/DrSamirGeagea/status/1874736466196308416[84] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/108055 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces[85] https://x.com/falc313/status/1874426902179627249[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2024[87] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9[88] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9[89] https://www.newarab.com/news/exclusive-iraqi-factions-push-back-syrian-border[90] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1874346731112132705[91] https://x.com/ShahidAlmasirah/status/1874751110084190620[92] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3418189.htm
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2025
- at 1/12/25 4:32pmDavit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. KaganJanuary 12, 2025, 2:30 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on January 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the operation is part of a broader series of Ukrainian strikes targeting command posts of Russian forces operating in the Donetsk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 8 and 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 8th CAA (Southern Military District) in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast, and the 3rd Army Corps [AC] (Central Military District) in occupied Svitlodarsk, Donetsk Oblast, respectively.[2] Ukrainian strikes on tactical command posts and positions located near the frontline, such as the strike against Novohrodivka, are likely intended to disrupt Russian tactical activity and directly complicate Russian command and control (C2) on the battlefield. Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear, such as the January 8 strike on the Russian 8th CAA post, are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could have impacts on Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed that the 2nd CAA is currently leading Russian operations south of Pokrovsk, that the 3rd AC is operating near Chasiv Yar, and that the 8th CAA is leading Russian efforts near Kurakhove.[3]South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9.[4] The NIS told Agence-France-Presse (AFP) on January 12 that one of the captured North Korean soldiers initially believed that North Korean authorities had sent him to Russia for training but that he realized upon arrival that he would be engaged in combat - in line with recent statements from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[5] One of the captured North Korean soldiers also stated that they suffered food and water shortages for several days before their capture and that North Korean forces have suffered significant losses.[6]Key Takeaways:The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9.Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently crossed into northern Sumy Oblast as part of their ongoing efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on January 10 indicates that Russian forces recently crossed the international border and advanced west of Zhuravka (north of Sumy City along the international border).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed into Sumy Oblast as part of their efforts to bypass Nikolayevo-Darino (east of Sudzha) from the south.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced into northern Sumy Oblast near Prokhody (northeast of Sumy City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[9]Russian forces continued offensive operations within the main Ukrainian salient on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha) despite recent claims that Russian forces seized the settlement.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Sudzha near Nikolskiy, Novaya Sorochina, Kruglenkoye, and Malaya Loknya; north of Sudzha near Kositsa, Russkoye Porechnoye, and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; and south of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[11] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) repelled a Ukrainian attack near Russkoye Porechnoye.[12] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki, and elements of the 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[13]Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin stated on January 12 that Russian authorities are continuing efforts to put out the fire at Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of January 7 to 8.[14] A Russian insider source claimed that the fire has destroyed three fuel tanks holding 120,000 cubic meters of fuel and damaged six additional fuel tanks.[15]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City towards Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 11 and 12.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[17] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Yevheniy Romanov stated that Russian forces are constantly replenishing supplies and losses in the Kharkiv direction.[18]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northwestern Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 12 that Russian forces seized Kalynove (north of Kupyansk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that the settlement had a population of fewer than 10 people before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[20] Russian forces continued attacking north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Dvorichna; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on January 11 and 12.[21]Russian forces recently conducted two reinforced company-sized mechanized assaults northeast of Borova but did not make any confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault west of Vyshneve (northeast of Borova).[22] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the attack reported that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) attacked Ukrainian positions twice from four directions on January 8 and 9 and that Ukrainian artillery, anti-tank mines, and drones repelled the attack.[23] The brigade reported that it destroyed 20 Russian tanks and armored vehicles, but did not specify the total number of vehicles that Russian forces used in the assault. The brigade's spokesperson stated that Russian forces have not conducted a large mechanized assault in the area for several months and noted that Russian forces used T-72 and T-80 tanks during the assault.[24] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces attempted to protect the tanks and armored vehicles with electronic warfare (EW) systems, but that Ukrainian forces were able to use anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems to strike the vehicles and other unspecified "solutions" to bypass Russian EW interference. Russian forces continued assaults north of Borova near Zahryzove; northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Pershotravneve, Kopanky, and Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka on January 11 and 12.[25]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest and west of Ivanivka and west of Novosadove (both northeast of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[26] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Terny, Zarichne, and the Serebryanske forest area on January 11 and 12.[27] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) reportedly continue operating in the Lyman direction.[28]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka (both northeast of Siversk) on January 11 and 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.[29]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations within and near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on January 11 and 12.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Chasiv Yar.[31] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in Pivnichnyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar) and occupy about 20 percent of the refractory plant in central Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[32] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces used an unspecified number of armored vehicles to support offensive operations in Chasiv Yar and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one armored vehicle.[33]Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk.[34] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 11 and 12.[35] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in Shcherbynivka.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting has shifted to western and northwestern Toretsk, where Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups.[37] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command recently transferred reserves to Toretsk, doubling the number of Russian maneuver groups involved in assaults. A Ukrainian brigade operating near Toretsk posted pictures showing Russian forces dressed in civilian clothing in the settlement – a war crime if confirmed.[38] Elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 109th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating within Toretsk.[39]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zelene (south of Pokrovsk) and advanced south of Novovasylivka, to within one kilometer of Udachne, and northwest of Solone (all southwest of Pokrovsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[41] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 12 that Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault near Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank and two armored vehicles.[42] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Baranivka and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud and Zelene; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, Sribne, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 11 and 12.[43] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Pokrovsk by advancing through small settlements south of Pokrovsk and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs).[44]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Yantarne (southwest of Kurakhove).[45] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 12 that Russian forces seized Yantarne, and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 10th Tank Regiment and 33rd and 225th motorized rifle regiments (all 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the seizure.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[47] Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne, Kostyantynopolske, and Kostyantynopil on January 11 and 12.[48] Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating west of Kurakhove; elements of the 68th Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction; and elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating on the eastern outskirts of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[49]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking near Velyka Novosilka itself; southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 11 and 12.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka).[51]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 12. Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[52]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on January 11 and 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.[53] Ukrainian Volunteer Army's Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk stated that Russian forces, including elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), most often try to attack Kozatskyi, Velikiy Potemkin, and Zabych islands (east, south, and southwest of Kherson City, respectively) in order to establish bridgeheads for future attacks against right (west) bank Kherson Oblast.[54]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 94 Shahed drones along with other strike and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[55] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 60 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Donetsk oblasts and that 34 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.[56] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on January 12 that a Russian Shahed drone struck a residence in Vlasivka, Kharkiv Oblast.[57]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 12 that Russian forces launched almost 700 glide bombs and over 600 strike drones against Ukraine during the week of January 6 to 12.[58]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Nothing significant to report.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0D7pjvTxhrtXDz4wAEws5ukKHvsgcybH6xuPhYVXv7usVUSqexLTbmD49pihdRX3gl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19931 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/12/zsu-zavdaly-udaru-po-komandnomu-punktu-armiyi-rf-u-novogrodivczi/[2] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19859; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2024[4] https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20250112-seoul-confirms-ukraine-captured-two-north-korean-soldiers; https://www.foxnews.com/world/ukraine-captured-north-korean-soldiers-south-koreas-intelligence-service-says; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75213; https://www.businessinsider.com/zelenskyy-says-ukraine-captured-2-wounded-north-korean-soldiers-2025-1; https://www.rfa dot org/korean/in_focus/011225dh1-01112025233740.html; https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250112000651315; https://news.kbs.co dot kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8150143; https://www.koreaherald dot com/article/10388459[5] https://t.me/SBUkr/13742; https://t.me/ukr_sof/1369; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12949; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2025[6] https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20250112-seoul-confirms-ukraine-captured-two-north-korean-soldiers[7] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1878198585868599302; https://t.me/OMBr67/2122[8] https://t.me/yurasumy/20484[9] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30500[10] https://x.com/Brokenarrow42/status/1878198841041711266; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84295 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025[11] https://t.me/dva_majors/62300 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22253 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30494 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30497 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20039 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61367[12] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22253[13] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84327 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84295 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84304[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010825 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295626 ; https://suspilne dot media/923253-pisla-udaru-sil-oboroni-naftobaza-u-rosijskomu-engelsi-palae-5-den-pospil/ ; https://t.me/idelrealii/39485 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/12/v-engelse-pyatyy-den-gorit-neftebaza-posle-ataki-vsu-gubernator-prodolzhaetsya-kontroliruemoe-vygoranie-topliva ; https://t.me/astrapress/72244 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75212[15] https://t.me/vchkogpu/53936[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGuHJS6t3yY2ymZ3DpccJ8HKQNoSyDwr1iS4AzNsCJzSMqW8M69rqhVG187vfQXLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3559[17] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12259[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/12/fahivczi-vyazni-strokovyky-na-harkivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-postijno-popovnyuyut-vtraty/[19] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/5576[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/47814 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51232[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62300 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20491[22] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24526; https://t.me/ab3army/5081 [23] https://t.me/ab3army/5081[24] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/12/vtratyly-20-tankiv-i-bmp-detali-ridkisnogo-mehanizovanogo-shturmu-rosiyan-na-harkivshhyni/[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGuHJS6t3yY2ymZ3DpccJ8HKQNoSyDwr1iS4AzNsCJzSMqW8M69rqhVG187vfQXLl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30487[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGuHJS6t3yY2ymZ3DpccJ8HKQNoSyDwr1iS4AzNsCJzSMqW8M69rqhVG187vfQXLl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918[28] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18539[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/24213[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151008; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213[33] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4049[34] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24542; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8090; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3542528342855047759/[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84315[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84315[38] https://www.facebook.com/28mechanizedbrigade/posts/pfbid0237NTQq1JJWajuPdcERGzcE3kMjKVxcgXiSXxWXpVhTiLSb3buCTbdw4AscEft8Jol?rdid=vNxR5KOx6stXz2EW[39] https://t.me/rybar/67099 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22258[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8091; https://www.facebook.com/61563003013214/videos/1645249229404642/[41] https://t.me/yurasumy/20479 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151110 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61368 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61359 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61365[42] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4049[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61368 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61363 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20479 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20480 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/12/u-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-hochut-obijty-pokrovsk-ta-myrnograd/[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8087; https://t.me/SolovievLive/308298; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30490[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/47814 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62304 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62298[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151110[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61360 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84297 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20477[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84305 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13252 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20477[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62300 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61362 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12737 [51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61362[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84336[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl[54] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wyKewVkUlEs; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/12/tam-navit-raby-pidijmayut-golos-rosiyany-vidmovlyayutsya-jty-na-shturmy-a-najmudrishi-zdayutsya-v-polon/[55] https://t.me/kpszsu/26687[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/26687[57] https://t.me/synegubov/12683[58] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12959 ; https://suspilne dot media/923203-sotni-aviabomb-i-droniv-zelenskij-ozvuciv-kilkist-ozbroen-akimi-rf-protagom-tizna-bila-po-ukraini/
- — Iran Update, January 8, 2025
-
![[+]](img/ib-marked_nm.png "mark as new")
at 1/10/25 10:26pmKelly Campa, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 7 that Turkey would conduct a “military operation” against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria if the YPG does not disband and integrate into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[1] Turkey frequently conflates the YPG with the SDF and uses the YPG to refer to the entire SDF. Fidan’s comment is one of the most explicit statements by a senior Turkish official threatening military action against the SDF. The SDF is currently negotiating the terms of its potential integration into the future Syrian armed forces with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus, but it remains unclear if Turkey would wait for these negotiations to conclude before launching an operation.[2]SNA forces have reportedly deployed and mobilized along SDF-SNA frontlines, which suggests that the SNA is preparing to launch a potential offensive against the SDF from the SNA-controlled Peace Spring area. The Peace Spring area is an SNA-controlled enclave between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr and north of the M4 Highway. Turkish state-run media reported on January 8 that the SNA sent “heavy weapons” to SDF frontlines in the Peace Spring area.[3] A commander in the Joint Force, an SNA formation that includes the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade, said that the SNA sent fighters, tanks, and other vehicles to the frontlines overlooking the SDF-controlled towns of Kobani in Aleppo Province, Ain Issa in Raqqa Province, and Tal Tamr in Hasakah Province.[4] The US Treasury Department has sanctioned the commanders of the Suleiman Shah Brigade and Hamza Division for human rights abuses against Kurds.[5] Syrian media circulated footage on January 7 of a small convoy of T-series tanks and vehicles moving through Ras al Ain, a city in northern SNA-controlled territory along the Syria-Turkey border.[6] CTP-ISW can neither confirm local reports about SNA deployments nor comment on their size and scale. The reports of SNA mobilization are consistent with recent Turkish and Turkish-backed airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting SDF positions and assets along the Peace Spring line of control.[7] A Kurdish journalist separately reported that the SNA sent “significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus, which is north of the Qara Qozak Bridge on the western bank of the Euphrates River.[8]The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River provide contours of a potential future SNA offensive. Deployments to the “frontlines” of Kobani, Ain Issa, and Tal Tamr suggest that the SNA could launch a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. One objective of this advance may be to capture Kobani or fix SDF forces around Kobani while a second prong advances west and southwards from the Ain Issa area towards the rear of the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge positions. Some interim objectives could include cutting the M4 Highway to block any SDF reinforcements to the Qara Qozak Bridge from areas to the east. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to the Tal Tamr frontlines suggest that the SNA could advance east toward al Hasakah and attempt to isolate the northernmost Kurdish-controlled territory. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to Jarabulus could advance southwards toward the SDF bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The timeline of a potential SNA operation from Peace Spring territory is unclear, however.It remains unclear if Turkey will pursue a military operation into northern Syria at the same time as a potential SNA assault on the SDF. It is unlikely that the SNA’s reported deployments are happening without Turkish approval and support. Turkey is currently conducting airstrikes to interdict SDF supplies in support of SNA operations, but these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed and –approved SNA operation. Turkey has also conducted drone strikes deeper into SDF-controlled territory, which could be part of Turkish efforts to set conditions prior to a Turkish operation. Syrian media reported on January 8 that Turkey conducted a drone strike targeting a vehicle in al Malikiya, in northeast Hasakah Province.[9] The strike likely targeted an SDF commander, given that the strike targeted only one vehicle.Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8.[10] The SDF and SNA have fought near the Tishreen Dam, east of Aleppo, since mid-December 2024. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.[11] Local media reported that the SDF called on employees and teachers in Raqqa and Tabqa to attend the protest.[12] Videos posted on social media show that the convoy included around 100 vehicles, and a Kurdish social media user claimed that thousands of people “answered the call” to participate in the convoy.[13] Photo and video evidence from the site of the attack shows that a single strike targeted the road and a car in the convoy, causing at least two deaths.[14] The SDF said that a Turkish combat drone conducted the strike.[15]The drone strike targeted an SDF supply line that Turkish forces have targeted since late December 2024 to try to isolate the SDF around the Tishreen Dam.[16] Turkish airstrikes reportedly killed four SDF fighters along the supply line, which flows across the dam, on January 6.[17] Turkish backed-SNA forces continued to advance against several SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River on January 8 as the civilian convoy approached the dam. The SDF reported intense fighting between the SDF Manbij Military Council and SNA forces in several villages north of Tishreen Dam.[18] The Turkish air campaign to cut off SDF resupply lines to the dam could weaken the SDF’s ability to defend against SNA attacks on the western bank. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian media reported that Sudani would likely discuss “suspending the activities” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, during his visit to Tehran.[19] Sudani’s visit to Tehran comes after Iraqi media reports that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[20] Iraqi National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim stated on January 4 that the incoming Trump administration has warned the Iraqi federal government that it will “target” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[21] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[22] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[23] Sudani’s visit to Iraq also follows Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad on January 5.[24]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Khamenei stated during a meeting with Sudani that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved.”[25]Sudani separately discussed decreased Iranian gas exports to Iraq.[26] Iran typically supplies approximately 40 percent of Iraq’s gas supply but has reportedly ceased gas exports to Iraq in the past two months.[27] Iran is currently facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages, which has presumably caused it to reduce gas exports to Iraq.[28] Iraq and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in October 2024 for Iraq to import Turkmen gas via Iran to reduce Iraqi dependence on Iranian gas exports.[29] Iranian media reported on January 8 that the agreement has not come into effect, however.[30] It is unclear why Iraq and Turkmenistan have not implemented the agreement, given that there are existing gas pipelines between Iran and Turkmenistan and Iran and Iraq.Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties[31] Aliyev thanked Iran for supporting Azerbaijani “territorial integrity” and congratulated Azerbaijan on the “liberation of its land” after the September 2023 Azerbaijani military offensive into the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[32] Aliyev’s praise for Iran is notable given the recent tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia after Russian air defense likely shot an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane on December 25, causing it to crash in Kazakhstan.[33] Ahmadian separately emphasized the need to strengthen energy and transportation cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran, including by completing the International North-South Transport Corridor.[34] Ahmadian will visit Armenia after his visit to Azerbaijan.The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.[35] The IDF also found traces of another hostage in the tunnel. The IDF could not confirm the status of the second hostage. Israeli media reported that these hostages were previously thought to be alive.[36] The IDF also located the bodies of two or three militia fighters in the tunnel who were likely the captors of the hostages.[37] The IDF launched an investigation into the death of the hostage.[38]Key Takeaways:Northern Syria: Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. An SNA commander said that the SNA deployed forces to the line of control between the SNA and SDF in northern Syria. The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River suggest the SNA may launch a three-pronged offensive designed to collapse SDF units along the eastern bank of the Euphrates.Tishreen Dam Airstrike: Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.Iraqi Prime Minister in Iran: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iran-Azerbaijan Ties: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties.Hamas-Held Hostages in the Gaza Strip: The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.SyriaAxis of Resistance objectives: Reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria to LebanonReestablish Iranian influence in SyriaA Southern Operations Room (SOR) spokesperson stated that the SOR seeks to integrate into the new Syrian army as a “pre-organized entity.”[39] The spokesperson, Naseem Abu Orra, told AFP on January 8 that the SOR opposes HTS leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara’s plan to disarm and dissolve armed groups into the new Syrian armed forces.[40] Orra, like many commanders in the Southern Operations Room, was a Syrian opposition commander who later reconciled with the regime and then, as the Assad regime fell, joined the SOR.[41] Orra said that the SOR would prefer to join the HTS-led Defense Ministry as a “pre-organized entity” with its own weapons and heavy equipment. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that HTS will likely absorb the various armed groups and functionally reflag them as new Syrian army units to ameliorate concerns about losing power among local leaders.[42] HTS has not yet presented a coherent plan for how it will structure the future armed forces.The HTS-led interim government demanded that residents of al Sanamayn, northern Daraa Province, hand over weapons to security forces on January 8.[43] Interim government forces previously negotiated a ceasefire in al Sanamayn on January 5 between the Mohsen al Haymad faction and local factions affiliated with the SOR that allowed local fighters to retain personal weapons.[44] A delegation of government security forces met with al Sanamayn officials following demonstrations demanding accountability against the Mohsen al Haymad faction on January 6.[45] The interim government later ordered all city residents to bring weapons to a designated building within 24 hours or face “harsh measures.”[46] The order did not include exemptions for the SOR-affiliated locals. The SOR spokesperson indicated on January 8 that the SOR may be unwilling to disarm, as noted above.Syrian media reported that the IDF advanced eastward into Abu Ghara and al Hiran, Quneitra Province, on January 8.[47] These towns are less than two kilometers from the disengagement zone. A Syria-focused journalist reported that Israeli forces raided and bulldozed an abandoned Syrian Arab Army (SAA) base near al Hiran before withdrawing. Syrian media reported that Israeli forces and tanks simultaneously advanced into al Asha, Quneitra Province, to search former SAA barracks before withdrawing from the area.[48]The US Embassy in Damascus announced that unspecified US officials met with HTS-led interim government officials in Damascus on January 8 to reaffirm US support for “an inclusive and representative political transition.”[49] Syrian media, citing al Jazeera, reported that HTS leader and interim government head of state Ahmed al Shara met with a US State Department delegation, including incoming Donald Trump administration officials.[50] Axios reported that the delegation included former US Special Envoy to Syria Daniel Rubinstein.[51] A US State Department spokesperson stated that the United States seeks “tangible progress” on counterterrorism efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and efforts to reduce Iranian and Russian influence in Syria.[52] The US and Syrian officials also discussed easing US sanctions on Syria, which is consistent with the Syrian interim government’s repeated calls for Western nations to lift sanctions on Syria. The US Treasury Department issued a general license for energy sales and personal remittances to Syria on January 6.[53] US State Department officials previously met with Shara in Damascus on December 20.[54]HTS-led forces continued a security operation in western Rif Dimashq targeting former Assad regime members on January 8. An Interior Ministry source told state-run media that interim government forces clashed with “remnants” of pro-Assad militias in Zabadani, western Rif Dimashq. The source reported that HTS-led forces seized over 120,000 Captagon pills and over 50 pounds of hashish from the militias in the town, which is near the Lebanon-Syria border.[55] This operation follows the interim government’s completion of a four-day-long operation against pro-Assad remnants in Homs on January 6.[56]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentFive notable Iraqi Sunni politicians announced the formation of the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” on January 8.[57] The politicians include:Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani,Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar,Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai,Al Jamaheer Party leader Ahmed al Jubouri (Abu Mazen), andInitiative Bloc leader Ziad al Janabi.The politicians said that the coalition will focus on humanitarian, human rights, legal, and political issues facing Iraqi Sunnis, especially in northern and western Iraq. Mashhadani notably issued a statement, along with five other Sunni politicians, in mid-December 2024 calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[58] The formation of this Sunni political coalition comes around nine months before the Iraqi Parliamentary elections take place in October 2025.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple airstrikes targeting two underground Houthi weapons storage facilities in Yemen on January 8.[59] Houthi media reported that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in the Jarban area, Sanaa Governorate, and five airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Harf Sufyan District, Amran Governorate.[60] These airstrikes come after US CENTCOM Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper met with Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Major General Amir Baram in Israel on January 7 to discuss efforts to address the Houthi threat.[61] The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and Reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripAn IDF helicopter struck a Hamas headquarters in a school in Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip on January 8.[62] The IDF said that Hamas used the school complex to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces and territory.[63] Unspecified Palestinian fighters separately detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) that killed three Israeli soldiers and wounded three others in Beit Hanoun, northern Gaza Strip.[64] Palestinian militias mortared the IDF along the Netzarim Corridor on January 8.[65]The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hamas fighters in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on January 8.[66] The IDF said that the fighters participated in the Hamas-led October 7 attacks.The IDF Air Force intercepted a rocket that crossed into Israeli territory from the southern Gaza Strip on January 8.[67] No Palestinian militia has claimed the attack at the time of this writing.LebanonThe IDF 300th Territorial Brigade (146th Division) destroyed five Hezbollah weapons depots in southern Lebanon on January 8.[68] The weapons depots contained loaded rocket launchers and over 200 mortars.[69] Israeli forces also destroyed three medium-range missile launchers in southern Lebanon.[70]Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces and vehicles advanced northeastward from Aita al Shaab toward Debel, Nabatieh Governorate, on January 8.[71] Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces detonated explosives targeting unspecified infrastructure in Aita al Shaab.[72] Hezbollah-affiliated media claimed that an Israeli tank shelled a house in Aita al Shaab prior to the IDF advance toward Debel.[73] The IDF has operated in Aita al Shaab since early October 2024.[74]Geolocated footage posted on January 8 showed an IDF tank shelling a house near Bint Jbeil.[75] Lebanese media claimed on January 8 that the IDF “retreated” from Bint Jbeil toward Maroun al Ras.[76]West BankThe IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting three fighters who were planting improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting IDF soldiers near Tamun, Tubas Governorate, in the northern West Bank, on January 8.[77] The IDF is investigating reports that the strike killed two children.[78]The IDF clashed with Hamas gunmen near Talluza, Nablus Governorate, on January 7.[79] The IDF killed a Hamas “leader” in close-quarters combat.[80]Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyIranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei signaled opposition to negotiations with the United States during a speech to Iranians from Qom Province on January 8. Khamenei stated that Iranian "decision-makers must focus solely on the interests of the Iranian nation...and disregard the interests of America and [Israel] entirely." Khamenei may have directed this statement toward Masoud Pezeshkian administration officials who support resuming nuclear negotiations with the West.[81] Khamenei's statement marks a slight shift from some of his previous rhetoric in which he signaled his openness to nuclear negotiations with the West.[82]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-it-will-mount-offensive-against-kurdish-ypg-if-group-does-not-meet-2025-01-07/ ; https://x.com/TC_Disisleri/status/1876690246630318549[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-2-2025[3] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/دولي/الجيش-الوطني-السوري-يرسل-أسلحة-ثقيلة-لجبهات-نبع-السلام/3444283 [4] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/دولي/الجيش-الوطني-السوري-يرسل-أسلحة-ثقيلة-لجبهات-نبع-السلام/3444283 [5] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699[6] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1876736904655159676; https://x.com/AJA_Syria/status/1876884112784621786 [7] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1873370931885990238 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1873019434060923014 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869385902985732192 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132402 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1874767828651479186 [8] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1876736904655159676[9] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132354 [10] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1877007188473852164 ; https://x.com/enhawarnews/status/1877019485728567624 ; GRAPHIC https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1876977331174084698[11] https://x.com/aanes__official/status/1876666423894069720[12] https://t.me/nahermedia/43776 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1876956772621017568[13] https://x.com/2_egid/status/1876929929494806709 ; https://x.com/hawarhebo99/status/1876944743755612431 ; https://x.com/enhawarnews/status/1877019485728567624[14] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1877007188473852164 ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1876977728366256260 ; https://x.com/enhawarnews/status/1877019485728567624 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1877002550165074268[15] GRAPHIC https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1876977331174084698[16] https://t.me/sohebb1993/20764 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1874785806705197448 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1874827626059309187 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1874785806705197448 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1873285400514695276[17] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1876539573376893239/photo/1[18] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1876940146257322432 ; https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1877021983386534208 ; https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1877000659356070224[19] https://irannewspaper dot ir/8649/6/110907[20] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/[21] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5097823-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces[24] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501059679[25] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27900[26] https://irannewspaper dot ir/8649/6/110907[27] https://irannewspaper dot ir/8649/6/110907 ;https://thenewregion.com/posts/1176/iraq-to-lose-5-500-mw-amid-temporary-iranian-gas-supply-shutdown[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-23-2024[29] https://mfa.gov dot tm/en/news/4181[30] https://irannewspaper dot ir/8649/6/110907[31] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/19/3234799/[32] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/19/3234799/[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2024[34] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/19/3234799/[35] https://x.com/IDF/status/1877028599070335198[36] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/bodies-of-father-and-son-hostages-youssef-and-hamza-ziyadne-found-in-strip-says-family/[37] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18114[38] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1877024089988022391[39] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250108-south-syria-fighters-reluctant-to-give-up-weapons-spokesman [40] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250108-south-syria-fighters-reluctant-to-give-up-weapons-spokesman[41] https://daraa24 dot org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A/[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2024[43] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1876989516642197714; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1876995452425445750 [44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2025; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937[45] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1876927077741367548; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-6-2025[46] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1876989516642197714[47] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1876846329084666267 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1876850339397157111[48] https://t.me/damascusv011/27483 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1876846329084666267 ; www dot npasyria.com/202379[49] https://x.com/USEmbassySyria/status/1876977031939821989[50] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1877010306934747483; https://t.me/damascusv011/27554[51] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1877048975041376486;https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/248960.htm[52] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1877048975041376486[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-20-2024; https://www.axios.com/2024/12/20/us-syria-diplomats-meet-hts-leader[55] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/120742[56] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1876255100160844107[57] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025[59] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1876956279127597185[60] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1876964945482371103 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1876964901467361513[61] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-836490[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876950279876231297[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876950282862547072[64] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/3-idf-soldiers-killed-during-fighting-in-northern-gaza-says-idf/[65] https://t.me/abualiajel/562[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876741573523763228[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876958670107398190[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876947254759588300[69] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1877026273844658509; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1876946975469240396[70] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1877026273844658509; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1876946975469240396[71] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110822; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126704; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews[72] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877020187729211442; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877028523245809944; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877011560683430042; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126704; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110822[73] https://t.me/almanarnews/189955[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-15-2024[75] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1876900807389430006 ; https://x.com/N12News/status/1876909623174631756[76] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126656[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876901496333201761 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1876915293403922533[78] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1876929215347441877[79] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/katz-deadly-west-bank-terror-attack-was-act-of-war-that-will-be-answered-in-kind/[80] https://hamasinfo dot info/2025/01/07/5010/ ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8391/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A9[81] https://english.khamenei dot ir/news/11381/Why-don-t-we-negotiate-with-the-US-Since-US-has-been-defeated ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/14/3231569 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-16-2024[82] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-27-2024 - — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2025
- at 1/10/25 9:48pmNicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. KaganJanuary 8, 2025, 5pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on January 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast on the night of January 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the Unmanned Systems Forces struck the oil storage facility and caused a large fire.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility provides fuel for the Russian military's Engels-2 Air Base and noted that strike will create logistical issues for Russia's strategic aircraft based at the airfield. Geolocated footage published on January 8 shows a large fire at the storage facility, and Russian sources noted that the fire continued to burn into the morning of January 8.[2] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that debris from a falling drone struck an unspecified industrial facility near Engels but later acknowledged that the strike caused a fire in the area.[3]Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) on January 8 in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 8th CAA used this command post to coordinate operations in Kurakhove.[5] Russian sources amplified reports on January 8 that a Ukrainian purported Storm Shadow strike against Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 killed at least one serviceman in the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and three servicemen in the 76th VDV Division.[6]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast on the night of January 7 to 8.Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) on January 8 in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast.Russian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast, in Toretsk, and near Kurakhove.Russian forces are increasingly using drones attached to fiber optic cables in Ukraine.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 8. Geolocated footage published on January 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced into western Nikolaevka (northwest of Sudzha) and marginally advanced in Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[7] Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on January 8 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, Nikolayevka, Staraya Sorochina, Orlovka, and Nikolayevo-Darino; northeast of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; east of Sudzha near Bondarevka; and southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kositsa (northeast of Sudzha) and that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are clearing Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha).[10] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of any of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pogrebki.[11] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the direction of Sverdlikhovo (northwest of Sudzha).[12]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on January 7 and 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.[13]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) marginally advanced south of Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces advanced along the Dvorichna-Kupyansk highway towards Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna and northwest of Kupyansk).[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Dvorichna, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[15] Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and northeast of Kupyansk near Topoli (along the international border) and Petropavlivka on January 7 and 8.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drone operators are able to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Dvorichna.[17] The milblogger also claimed that Russian air strikes destroyed a river crossing near Kupyansk.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian mechanized units seized two forested areas and cleared Ukrainian forces from positions between Zahryzove and Lozova (both northeast of Borova) and advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[18] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are five kilometers from Borova, but ISW assesses that Russian forces have advanced roughly 12 kilometers from Borova as of January 8.[19] Geolocated footage published on January 7 shows a lone Ukrainian armored vehicle temporarily advancing into and then retreating from Kolisnykivka (northeast of Borova) without encountering Russian forces, indicating that Russian forces may not hold positions throughout the settlement.[20] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division and the 47th Tank Division (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are advancing on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River, most likely referring to the section of the bank of the Oskil River near Kolisnykiva.[21] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya, Kopanky, Novoyehorivka, and Pershotravneve; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Cherneshchyna, and Makiivka on January 7 and 8.[22] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Raihorodka (east of Borova).[23]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced towards Kolodyazi and Myrne (both northeast of Lyman) along the west (right) bank of the Zherebets River.[24] ISW currently assesses that Russian forces are about 3.5 kilometers from Kolodyazi and has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Ivanivka, Kolodyazi, Terny, and Zarichne on January 7 and 8.[25]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) on January 7 and 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 8 that Russian forces are gradually advancing south of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[27] The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Siversk direction reported on January 8 that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes against Siversk and nearby areas, sometimes striking one street with three-to-four glide bombs at a time.[28] The commander stated that Russian forces are conducting small infantry assaults during periods of freezing temperatures and bad weather at dawn and dusk. The commander added that Russian forces use motorcycles, buggies, armored vehicles, and tanks to transport infantry to frontline positions.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) advanced to the intersection of Dniprovska and Kovalevskoho streets in central Chasiv Yar and that Russian forces advanced south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[29] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued attacking near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka and Bondarne; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on January 7 and 8.[30] Element of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[31]Russian forces continued to advance in northern and northwestern Toretsk amid ongoing offensive operations in the area on January 8. Geolocated footage published on January 7 and 8 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern and northwestern Toretsk.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the Toretsk Mine in northern Toretsk, are clearing Ukrainian forces from Dachne (north of Toretsk), and are attacking towards Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) along the railway line.[33] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Another Russian milblogger noted that the Ukrainian force grouping in Toretsk has relied on drone operations and limited mobile assault groups to deny Russian advances in large parts of the contested "gray zone" in Toretsk in recent months but that Russian forces are now advancing more rapidly in the settlement.[34] Russian forces continued offensive operations in Toretsk itself and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka on January 7 and 8.[35] Elements of the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades and 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (all 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[36]Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently interdicted the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway northeast of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive operations near Pokrovsk on January 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces with armored vehicle support and elements of an unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) unit interdicted the highway near Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) on January 7, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[37] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the northwestern outskirts of Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) and that the Russian military command transferred additional forces to support assaults on Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) but characterized Russian advances in this area as "crawling."[38] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command recently introduced elements of the 55th, 35th, 137th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) into combat south of Pokrovsk under the command of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA) and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD).[39] Mashovets stated that Russian forces also recently introduced an unspecified motorized rifle regiment into combat near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk). The staff sergeant of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces recently intensified offensive operations south of Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk), transferred fresh forces to this area, and are using civilian vehicles to transport infantry to frontline positions for assaults.[40] A Ukrainian source stated that Russian forces are transferring unspecified units from the Kurakhove direction to the vicinity of Myrnohrad.[41] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Baranivka, Yelyzavetivka, Tarasivka, and Vodyane Druhe; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene, Novyi Trud, and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Nadezhdynka, Novovasylivka, and Yasenove on January 7 and 8.[42] Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) and the 907th Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[43]Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 8. Geolocated footage published on January 7 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[44] Russian forces continued attacking near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko, Petropavlivka, Slovyanka, and Sribne; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Ulakly; and southwest of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopolske, Yantarne, and Rozlyv on January 7 and 8.[45] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 6th and 80th tank regiments and 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) continue operating in the Slovyanka-Petropavlivka area.[46] Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[47]Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 8 but did not make confirmed advances in the area.[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking Velyka Novosilka from the southwest and are trying to advance along the Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole road.[49]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on January 8 that Russian forces are conducting small infantry assaults several times per day in an attempt to identify weaknesses in Ukrainian defensive lines.[50] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are largely not using armored vehicles in assaults in this area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that elements of the Russian BARS-11 "Kuban" Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are training in a rear area in the Zaporizhia direction to prepare for future combat operations near Orikhiv.[51] Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kamyanske direction (northwest of Robotyne).[52]Ukrainian and Russian sources stated on January 8 that Ukrainian forces launched a missile strike against an empty oil storage facility near the port in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[53] ISW has not observed footage of the strike.Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction, including near Kozatskyi Island (northeast of Kherson City near Nova Kakhovka) and Velykyi Potomkin Island (south of Kherson City) on January 7 and 8 but did not make any confirmed advances in the area.[54] Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[55]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 8 that Russian forces launched 64 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[56] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 41 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Kirovohrad oblasts; that 22 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; that three drones returned to Russian airspace; and that one drone flew towards Belarusian airspace as of 0900 local time (adding up to 67 drones). The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported on January 8 that debris from downed Russian drones caused minor damage to houses in Kyiv Oblast.[57]Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on January 8 that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against an industrial infrastructure object in Zaporizhzhia City, killing 13 people and injuring at least 63 people.[58]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Nothing significant to report.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian forces are increasingly using drones attached to fiber optic cables in Ukraine. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on January 8 that Russian forces are increasingly using drones attached to fiber optic cables that are resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference in strikes against Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline.[59] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are not yet systematically employing fiber-optic drones and noted that fiber-optic drones are slower and less maneuverable than first-person view (FPV) drones, making fiber-optic drones more vulnerable to small-arms fire. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 8 that Russian forces were the first to successfully develop and integrate fiber-optic drones into combat operations in Ukraine but cautioned that Ukrainian would soon develop similar innovations.[60] The milbloggers added that Russian forces will need to develop new means of downing Ukrainian fiber-optic drones.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that Belarusian territorial troops are conducting exercises from January 8 to 31.[61] ISW assess that these exercises do not threaten Ukraine.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vt6otEtGTzVuA2H3HBphTHXMs7FX4NYxY4Eb9VToLMEecUhTyo6ruXqefq7pRETtl[2] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10909; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24425; https://x.com/kromark/status/1876891135529890183; https://t.me/astrapress/71902; https://t.me/supernova_plus/35046; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1876820317563244883; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1876922687760519258 ; https://t.me/engels24/15281; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75078 ; https://t.me/rybar/66989[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/295044 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295050 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295053[4] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19859[5] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19859[6] https://www.instagram.com/news_time_ing/ ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1876744884918395062 ; https://t.me/fortangaorg/19017 ; https://t.me/astrapress/71487 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024[7] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24439; https://t.me/kryvyirih17otbr/4079; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8055; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1876950494788059632; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1876972421204312342; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1876938606696185994[8] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84125[9] https://t.me/dva_majors/62036 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150534 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61287 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22110 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20388 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19969[10] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84125 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20374[11] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22110[12] https://t.me/rusich_army/19953[13]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3466[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2481[15] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21345[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965 [17] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22082[18] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22082; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21345 [19] https://t.me/yurasumy/20371[20] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8051; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21043 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1876971442211832203; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1876973081803022661; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1876950837689295317; https://t.me/ngu_3027/3559[21] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2481[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl[23] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/4871[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/62036; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21345; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22072; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61272; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84098 [25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21345; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61279; https://t.me/yurasumy/20385 [26]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965[27] https://t.me/yurasumy/20384[28] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/08/atakuyut-yak-u-radyanski-chasy-koly-i-yak-grupy-rosiyan-nastupayut-na-siverskomu-napryamku/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/920351-tri-cotiri-kabi-na-odnu-vulicu-vorog-ne-zalie-aka-taktika-rosijskoi-armii-na-siverskomu-fronti/[29] https://t.me/rusich_army/19967 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20384[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19967 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19967[31] https://t.me/rusich_army/19967[32] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1876765731179651411; https://t.me/blackhawkteam5/12 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1876701087480066224; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3539302776203038428/[33] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61292 ; https://t.me/rybar/66992[34] https://t.me/yurasumy/20369[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2481 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13226 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13231 [37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61290 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84124[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61275 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61274[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2479[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/08/vorog-aktyvizuvavsya-v-napryamku-myrnograda-zamist-bronetehniky-obyrayut-bagi-ta-golf-kary/[41] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21044[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20378[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84076[44] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24432; https://t.me/MOLOT_4_46/25; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8052; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1876717797268414558; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1876916934396055691[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61288 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61275[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2480[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84095[48] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2481[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/08/u-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-okupanty-ne-mozhut-dijty-do-robotynogo/[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/47726[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/62093[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/295071 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295072 ; https://t.me/bmvabrzo/474 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31802 ; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/4595[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02nkCnnWg6yur5fjNTXTqCHP2rk5B8s1LojAebSJyReS7xLuRK17JPRHXoiabX1JQul[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31203 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42878[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/26447[57] https://t.me/kyivoda/24221 [58]https://t.me/kyivoda/24221 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/37274 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/14988 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/15007 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/92360 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12920 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/08/svidomyj-udar-po-mistu-prezydent-oprylyudnyv-vrazhayuchi-kadry-z-zaporizhzhya/ ; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/28164 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/14979 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-strike-kills-13-ukrainian-city-zaporizhzhia-2025-01-08/#:~:text=ZAPORIZHZHIA%2C%20Ukraine%2C%20Jan%208%20(,also%20damaged%20in%20the%20strike. ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/14986[59] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/08/letyuchi-zmiyi-vijny-u-zsu-rozpovily-yak-protydiyut-dronam-na-optyczi/[60] https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/14026 ; https://t.me/rybar/66981[61] https://t.me/modmilby/44325
- — Iran Update, January 6, 2025
- at 1/10/25 9:48pmAndie Parry, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran appears to be feeling more vulnerable after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli military action against Iranian air defenses and missile production, and the defeats suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini told the Financial Times that Iran has doubled the number of military drills this year “in response to the evolving threat landscape” and they have “expanded participation of brigades engaged in realistic operations.”[1] These increases in the scope and quantity of Iranian military exercises indicate that Iran feels increasingly vulnerable after the setbacks it suffered in the October 7 War and after the fall of the Assad regime. Naieini also announced that the IRGC and Artesh will conduct 30 joint land, air, and naval exercises in six western and southern provinces until the end of the Iranian year in mid-March. Naini specified that maritime exercises will start at the end of this week with a large naval parade in the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February, to unveil new equipment.[2] Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ghadir Rahimzadeh separately stated that there will be a nationwide joint air defense exercise in the vicinity of sensitive centers “with new and unknown systems” in the next few days.[3]The Syrian Resistance Movement, which announced its existence in December 2024, is likely a pro-Assad armed group and has begun to frame its operations in Assadist language. The Syrian Resistance Movement acknowledged that Sunni fighters conducted an attack on January 5 (see below for details), and added that it is a multi-sectarian movement.[4] It also framed itself as a protector of the ”Syrian people” against ”terrorist gangs” and ”foreign mercenaries,” which is similar to the language employed by Assadist propaganda outlets before the fall of the regime.[5] The group also uses the flag of the Assad regime. The group has employed sectarian narratives in an attempt to undermine the HTS-led coalition, but this is also consistent with the Assad regime’s propaganda strategy, which sought to portray the HTS and other majority Sunni opposition forces as inherently sectarian.[6] CTP-ISW previously noted that growing conflict between HTS and minority and opposition groups would fuel sectarian tensions, drive an escalation cycle, and risk destabilizing Syria further.[7]The Syrian Resistance Movement also claimed its first attack targeting HTS-led interim government forces in coastal Syria on January 5, marking the first time that an organized group has claimed an attack against the HTS-led government.[8] The Syria Resistance Movement claimed that it ambushed interim government forces conducting security patrols in al Awaina, Latakia City.[9] This is the first attack claimed by the Syrian Resistance Movement since the group announced its armed opposition to the interim government on December 29.[10] Interim government forces have clashed with pro-Assad remnants in other parts of the country, but this is the first attack claimed by an organized opposition group.[11] Local sources reported that former pro-regime militias recruited and armed by the Assad regime (also known as Shabiha) targeted the forces with an improvised explosive device.[12] The attack killed two interim government forces, including a Jaysh al Izza battalion commander.[13] Jaysh al Izza is subordinated to HTS as part of the Fateh Mubin operations room that overthrew the Assad regime.[14] The Syrian Resistance Movement said its attack was a response to the interim government’s clearing operations in Homs City, which have gone on for four days.[15] The interim government announced that the Homs operations had ended after achieving their goals on January 6.[16] The Syrian Resistance Movement had accused HTS-led forces of sectarian targeting during the operations in Homs and in other cities.[17]The SNA and Turkey continued offensive operations against the SDF in northern Syria on January 6. The SDF conducted a series of drone strikes targeting SNA vehicles and positions along the frontline northeast of the Tishreen Dam on January 5 and January 6.[18] The drone strikes likely supported the SDF Manbij Military Council as it engaged SNA forces north of the Tishreen Dam. The head of the SDF media center reported that Turkish forces supported the SNA with artillery shelling and drone strikes.[19] SNA artillery also shelled SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River near Jaada, which is approximately 4km north of the eastern side of the Qara Qozak Bridge.[20] Local Arab anti-SDF social media accounts said that the SDF still controlled the Tishreen Dam on the Euphrates River, and Maskanah, in Aleppo Province, on January 6.[21]Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent” during a joint press conference with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi on January 6.[22] Turkish officials have repeatedly emphasized that it will destroy the “YPG“ militia, which is a euphemism for the SDF.[23] Turkey has been shelling SDF positions throughout northeastern Syria since the fall of the regime.[24] Turkey more recently increased airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting likely SDF supply lines closer to the battlefields along the Euphrates River.[25] Turkish drones struck SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam on January 6, for example.[26]Key Takeaways:Armed Pro-Assad Opposition to the HTS-led Government: The Syrian Resistance Movement, which announced its existence in December 2024, is likely a pro-Assad armed group and has begun to frame its operations in Assadist language. The group also claimed its first attack targeting HTS-led interim government forces in coastal Syria on January 5, marking the first time that an organized group has claimed an attack against the HTS-led government.Iranian Regional Policy: Iran appears to be feeling more vulnerable after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli military action against Iranian air defenses and missile production, and the defeats suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah. An IRGC spokesperson said that Iran doubled the number of military drills this year “in response to the evolving threat landscape” and they have “expanded participation of brigades engaged in realistic operations.”Northern Syria: The SNA and Turkey continued offensive operations against the SDF in northern Syria on January 6. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent” amid increasing Turkish interdiction strikes against the SDF.SyriaAxis of Resistance objectives:Reestablish ground lines of communication from Syria to LebanonReestablish Iranian influence in SyriaSyrian interim government officials continued their second regional tour and traveled to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on January 6.[27] Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asad al Shaibani, Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Interim Intelligence head Anas Khattab met with Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed. Zayed expressed support for Syria during the meeting.[28]Iranian media recirculated Iraqi reports that the HTS-led government took action against misconduct by pro-HTS forces near Sayyida Zeinab shrine in southern Damascus. Iraqi media outlet Baghdad Today reported on January 6 that HTS withdrew 90 international fighters from the Sayyida Zeinab shrine due to misconduct and an increase in complaints against the fighters.[29] A regime-affiliated Iranian outlet recirculated the report. The Syrian sources stated that HTS withdrew these forces following a published video with “sectarian content.” The sources added that HTS has “strictly ordered that no images or videos from inside the holy sites be published” because of their negative impact on sectarian tensions.Local Syrian media posted the footage to X (Twitter) on January 6 purportedly showed Syrians in al Sanamayn City, northern Daraa Province, calling for the HTS-led government to hold a local group led by Mohsen al Haymad “accountable for committing violations against them” during a protest.[30] A reportedly former regime-affiliated militia led by Mohsen al Haymad clashed with other unspecified local factions in al Sanamayn City between January 2 and 4.[31] Haymad’s group and the other unspecified local factions agreed to a ceasefire and to hand over heavy weapons to HTS forces, following the HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployment to the area on January 5.[32] HTS-controlled forces will remain in al Sanamayn to set up checkpoints and maintain security within the city following this agreed-upon ceasefire.[33]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentIraqi media reported on January 6 that the Iraqi government redeployed unidentified Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigades from the Syria-Iraq border.[34] An ”informed source” told an Iraqi media outlet that the PMF brigades and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will be “fully redeployed” to the border following the “tactical measure,” which could refer to any number of military activities, including reorganization or military activity elsewhere in Iraq. This reported PMF redeployment follows Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani’s meetings with senior Iraqi officials and militia commanders to discuss “restructuring” the PMF on January 5.[35] An informed source based in Anbar Province separately told Iraqi media that unidentified Iraqi police backfilled the PMF units and took control of security checkpoints in al Qaim, along the Syria-Iraq border, after the Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated PMF 13th Brigade (Liwa al Tufuf) withdrew.[36] The Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated PMF 19th Brigade (Ansar Allah al Awfiya) remains in al Qaim.[37]Ghaani told the Iraqi prime minister that Iran does not want Iraq to become involved in any conflict with Syria, according to an “informed source” speaking to Iraqi media. Ghaani’s position is unsurprising due to the reality that many of the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia formations that were in Syria will need to reorganize and re-equip after a very rapid and presumably hectic withdrawal from Syria.[38] [39] This reorganization and re-equipping process may take significant time to accomplish, and it cannot be undertaken if Iraqi militias engage in even low-level border skirmishes with HTS-led units. Iran is presently concerned with the threat of instability in Iraq, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are key to Iranian efforts to maintain stability in Iraq.[40][41] It is nonetheless notable that Iranian officials appear willing to stoke instability in Syria to weaken the HTS-led interim government. This suggests that Iran’s desire to prevent Iraqi militias from antagonizing the new HTS-led government is not necessarily permanent.[42]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripHouthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on January 6 that the Houthis tried to preempt alleged US airstrikes by firing four drones and two cruise missiles at the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea.[43] US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not confirmed the attack at the time of this writing.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and Reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripThe IDF conducted clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on January 6. A video posted by a Palestinian journalist showed an Israeli bulldozer demolishing infrastructure in Jabalia refugee camp.[44]Hamas claimed that it detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) and an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting two Israeli tanks in western Jabalia refugee camp on January 6.[45] The IDF said that Palestinian militias separately injured two Israeli soldiers from the 933rd Infantry Brigade (162nd Division) in the northern Gaza Strip on January 6.[46]The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting the IDF along the Netzarim Corridor on January 6.[47]Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired rockets targeting Sderot in southern Israel on January 6.[48] The IDF detected three rockets and intercepted one. The other two rockets struck Sderot and caused minor damage to a house.[49] PIJ fired the rockets from Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[50] Palestinian militias have conducted almost daily indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel from the Gaza Strip over the past two weeks.[51]Hamas leaked the names of 34 Israeli hostages that Israel demanded as part of a ceasefire agreement but has not yet shared the status of these hostages with Israeli officials.[52] A senior Hamas official leaked the list, which includes women, elderly men, and young children.[53] Hamas indicated that it would release these 34 hostages as part of the ceasefire agreement, according to a Hamas representative speaking to The New York Times.[54] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office reported on January 6 that Israeli officials sent an updated list of 34 hostages to the mediators and demanded that Hamas disclose their status.[55] Hamas refused to provide any status updates on the hostages, saying it would not do so “without getting something in return.”[56] It remains unclear whether all 34 hostages on the leaked list are alive.LebanonThe Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) continued deploying to southeastern Lebanon on January 6. Lebanese media reported on January 5 that a UNIFIL patrol removed an earthly berm placed by the IDF at the southern entrance to Burj al Muluk.[57] The LAF reported on January 5 that an LAF patrol re-opened roads that the IDF had closed near Taybeh.[58]Lebanese media reported that the IDF shelled a house in Ainata and demolished unidentified buildings in Aitaroun, southeastern Lebanon on January 6.[59] Lebanese media reported that the IDF demolished infrastructure east of Tyre Harfa, southwestern Lebanon, on January 6.[60] Israeli forces demolished infrastructure in Tayr Harfa on January 5.[61]The LAF and UNIFIL backfilled IDF forces in Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon, on January 6.[62] Lebanese media reported that the LAF backfilled the IDF in Naqoura and nearby Hamoul following the IDF’s withdrawal.[63] Lebanese media reported that the IDF demolished unidentified buildings in Naqoura on January 6 before the LAF-UNIFIL deployment.[64] Israeli media reported on January 5 that the IDF would soon withdraw from Naqoura in advance of an LAF deployment.[65]US special envoy Amos Hochstein discussed ceasefire implementation mechanisms with LAF Army Commander General Joseph Aoun and ceasefire supervisory committee head US Army Major General Jasper Jeffers in Lebanon on January 6.[66] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Hochstein aimed to extend the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire by 30 more days to enable the LAF to fully backfill departing Israeli forces.[67] Hochstein said on January 6 that the IDF will continue to withdraw from southern Lebanon until the IDF completely withdraws from Lebanon.[68] Senior Israeli officials indicated on January 5 that the IDF will extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met by January 26.[69]West BankThree unspecified Palestinian fighters from Jenin killed three Israelis and wounded eight others in a shooting attack targeting vehicles on Route 55 in Qalqilya Governorate, northern West Bank, on January 6.[70] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved new, unspecified ”offensive and defensive” security measures in the West Bank following a security assessment after the attack with senior Israeli defense officials.[71] Netanyahu also approved operations to ”apprehend” the three fighters involved in the attack. Israeli media reported that Israeli security forces sought to detain two of the fighters on suspicion of involvement in previous terrorist activity, but the third fighter was not known to Israeli authorities.[72] No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at this time of writing.The Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces continued their operation to regain security control of the Jenin refugee camp from Palestinian militias on January 6. This operation has lasted for over one month.[73] Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) Jenin Battalion fired small arms and detonated an IED targeting “enemy forces” withdrawing from the entrance of Jenin city on January 6.[74] The IDF operated in Meithulan, approximately 12 kilometers south of Jenin refugee camp, on January 5.[75] Barrons reported on January 6 that militia fighters put up metal barricades to block PA forces from entering the camp. PA forces are stationed outside the entrance to Jenin camp.[76]Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyIranian Parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee member Ali Asghar Nakhairad announced on January 6 that Parliament has halted its impeachment of the oil minister Mohsen Paknejad.[77] Parliament began Paknejad’s impeachment process on January 4.[78] Nakhairad stated that Parliament’s Energy Commission is still conducting an interagency investigation over violations regarding power plant fuel shortages and will present its findings to Parliament.[79] President Masoud Pezeshkian separately issued an order on January 4 to establish an Energy Optimization and Strategic Management Organization to accelerate the implementation of the National Plan to Improve Energy Imbalance.[80] Pezeshkian’s government continues to prioritize fuel shortages.[81]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.ft.com/content/a027684f-50cf-454f-af8d-97c092cc886d[2] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/17/3233406[3] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/17/3233093[4] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5126[5] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5126 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5141[6] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate010225 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-31-2024[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-31-2024[8] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5136[9] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5141[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-31-2024[11] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1875451712917663989 ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/12/26/syrian-security-personnel-killed-in-ambush-by-former-regime-forces[12] https://www dot aljazeera.net/news/2025/1/6/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1875985649637187882 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1876000153578184876[13] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5134 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5136[14] https://x.com/jamelalsaleh0/status/1864719920677654776[15] https://www dot aljazeera.net/news/2025/1/6/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5141[16] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1876255100160844107[17] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5141[18] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1875997779530797331; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1876036034913615920; https://x.com/ghost_watcher1/status/1876309124595716193;[19] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1876213551737528768[20] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1876264190446542862; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1876264462996627784; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132198[21] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1876199159029485718;https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1876166328899223904 ;https://t.me/nahermedia/43745[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-eradication-kurdish-ypg-militia-syria-imminent-2025-01-06/[23] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/12/25/erdogan-says-ypg-will-be-buried-in-syria-if-it-doesnt-lay-down-arms[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2024[25] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875967939481833898 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-5-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-4-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-3-2025[26] ; https://t.me/sohebb1993/20915 ; https://t.me/sohebb1993/20927[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/emirati-syrian-foreign-ministers-discuss-bolstering-ties-uae-visit-2025-01-06/[28] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1876291258605343211 ; https://x.com/OFMUAE/status/1876266154387480925[29] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6339337 ;https://baghdadtoday dot news/265362-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84.html[30] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1876234257930260987[31] www dot npasyria.com/en/120576 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1874903503405215901[32] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937[33] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937; www dot npasyria.com/en/120620[34] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%82-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9---%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9[35] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9[36] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%88%D9%81 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-liwa-al-tafuf-13th-pmf-brigade[37] https://t.me/hhhho19/4190 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-ansar-allah-al-awfiya-19th-pmf-brigade[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2025 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B6%D9%88-%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%B6%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84[39] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B6%D9%88-%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%B6%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84[40] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate123124[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2025[42] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate123124[43] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1876340614658416870[44] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1876018220102303898[45] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8388/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B8-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7[46] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876296914951618744[47] https://t.me/nedalps/4611[48] https://t.me/sarayaps/19029[49] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1876199842642276819 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876203529901367410[50] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18054[51] Data available upon request[52] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0kv0y1vd6mo ; https://www.gov dot il/en/pages/spoke-list060125[53] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0kv0y1vd6mo[54] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/06/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-hostage-list-cease-fire.html[55] https://www.gov dot il/en/pages/spoke-list060125 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/06/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-hostage-list-cease-fire.html[56] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/06/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-hostage-list-cease-fire.html[57] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126456[58] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1875964823369875556[59] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1876267009962394056 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110721[60] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1876256965409554652[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2025[62] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1876299055883595960[63] https://nna-leb.gov dot lb/en/security-law/750191/lebanese-army-completes-deployment-in-naqoura[64] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126472[65] (https://news.walla dot co.il/item/3716991[66] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1876279243765629311[67] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18058[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-envoy-hochstein-says-israeli-army-withdrawals-western-lebanon-continue-until-2025-01-06/[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2025[70] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/3-israelis-killed-8-wounded-in-west-bank-terror-shooting-idf-hunting-for-gunmen/ ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1876179523235905953[71] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-836320[72] https://www.timesofisrael.com/3-israelis-killed-8-wounded-in-west-bank-terror-shooting-idf-hunting-for-gunmen/[73] https://www.barrons.com/news/west-bank-camp-under-fire-as-palestinian-forces-face-off-militants-6a896a15[74] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1960[75] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/police-say-wanted-palestinian-killed-during-arrest-raid-near-jenin/[76] https://www.barrons.com/news/west-bank-camp-under-fire-as-palestinian-forces-face-off-militants-6a896a15[77] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/17/3233299[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-4-2025[79] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/17/3233299[80] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/17/3233299[81] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/15/3232212
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 10, 2025
- at 1/10/25 8:43pmGrace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. KaganJanuary 10, 2025, 7:30 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on January 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlets Suspline and ArmyTV that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military warehouse near Chaltyr, Rostov Oblast with drones and Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles.[1] The sources stated that Ukrainian forces used the drones to overwhelm and exhaust Russian air defenses in the area before launching Neptune missiles at the warehouse. The sources stated that Russian forces use reconnaissance drones from this warehouse to correct Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities and frontline positions. Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar stated that Russian forces downed 16 Ukrainian drones over the oblast and that the strike caused a fire at an industrial enterprise just north of Chaltyr.[2] Russian opposition outlet Astra assessed that the fire occurred at a plastic coating production plant in the area.[3]The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on January 10 to a Trump statement about arranging a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and stated that Putin is open to contact with international leaders and that "no conditions are required for this [contact]."[4] Peskov reiterated, however, that the Kremlin maintains its "repeatedly voiced" position on Ukraine that Putin explicitly defined in June 2024 and repeated in his December 19 Direct Line presentation.[5] Putin demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his government under the guise of "denazification," demilitarize, and cede significant swaths of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia, including areas of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy -- all effectively amounting to Ukraine's full capitulation.[6] No negotiations will result in a meaningful or sustainable peace as long as Putin remains committed to these demands -- regardless of the Kremlin's "willingness" to hold talks with Western leaders.[7]The United States, United Kingdom, and Japan announced new sanctions against Russia on January 10. The US Treasury Department announced on January 10 that the United States imposed sanctions against Russian state-owned Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, 183 Russian-connected vessels – many of which are part of Russia's shadow fleet – and dozens of oil traders, oilfield service providers, insurance companies, and Russian energy officials.[8] The United Kingdom announced that it also sanctioned Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas on January 10.[9] Japan announced additional sanctions against Russia, including asset freeze measures against 33 organizations and 12 individuals and export bans and other measures against 53 organizations from countries including Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in order to strengthen Japan's response to North Korean support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[10]The EU recently transferred three billion euros (about $3.07 billion) to Ukraine, the first tranche of EU funding from the profits of frozen Russian assets. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced the transfer on January 10 and stated that Ukraine will use the funds for priority expenditures.[11] The G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans initiative will provide a total of $50 billion to Ukraine from the profits of seized Russian assets, including a total of $20 billion from the EU.[12]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10.The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged.The United States, United Kingdom, and Japan announced new sanctions against Russia on January 10.The EU recently transferred three billion euros (about $3.07 billion) to Ukraine, the first tranche of EU funding from the profits of frozen Russian assets.Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.The BBC Russian Service reported on January 10 that a joint investigation conducted with Russian opposition outlet Medizona using open-source data has confirmed that at least 88,055 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine since February 2022.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces advanced amid continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 and 10 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced within southern Makhnovka (east of Sudzha) and advanced in southern Russkoye Porechnoye and northern Kositsa (both northeast of Sudzha).[13] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces encircled some Ukrainian positions near Guyevo and Kurilivka (both south of Sudzha).[14] A Russian milblogger continued to claim that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Pogrebki (north of Sudzha), but other Russian milbloggers refuted this claim and stated that the situation in Pogrebki is unclear.[15] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. Russian milbloggers widely refuted claims that Russian forces encircled Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha) and entered Sudzha.[16] Russian forces continued attacking throughout the salient, including near Sudzha itself; northwest of Sudzha near Novaya Sorochina, Staraya Sorochina, Nikolayevka, Viktorovka, and Nikolskiy; northeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Russkoye Porechnoye; and east of Sudzha near Zamoste and Makhnovka on January 9 and 10.[17] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing their main efforts on the area northwest of Sudzha from positions west of Novoivanovka, through Leonidovo and Alexandriya, and between Lebedevka and Malaya Loknya towards the Sudzha-Lgov highway.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Berdin (northeast of Sudzha) and in Kruglenkoye (northwest of Sudzha).[19] Drone elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kursk direction.[20]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya and Vovchansk on January 9 and 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 10 that Russian forces marginally advanced near Vovchansk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[22] Drone operators of the ”Canada” Group of the Chechen 204th ”Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment reportedly operating north of Kharkiv City near Alisivka and Strilecha.[23]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced amid continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk).[24] Russian milbloggers and a source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence claimed on January 10 that Russian forces are advancing northeast of Kupyansk in eastern Dvorichna and near Zapadne.[25] The source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of their manpower advantage in the Kupyansk direction and are exclusively conducting infantry assaults.[26] The source stated that Russian forces are transporting infantry across the Oskil River for these assaults in light, inflatable watercraft but that the Oskil River is too deep to transport armored vehicles across without an established crossing. Russian forces also continued assaults north of Kupyansk near Zapadne; northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka on January 9 and 10.[27]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced from Zahryzove towards Bohuslavka (both northeast of Borova) and west of Nadiya and near Serhiivka (both east of Borova).[28] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Zahryzove, Zelenyi Hai, Borivska Andriivka, and Lozova; east of Borova near Pershotravneve and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Hrekivka on January 9 and 10.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 10 that Ukrainian forces advanced to the center of Kolisnykivka (northeast of Borova) and that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack in Zahryzove.[30]Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Lyman direction on January 10 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Ivanivka and Terny and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 9 and 10.[31] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated on January 10 that Russian forces advanced in the Lyman direction and that small groups of Russian infantry conduct assaults from multiple different directions at once, making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to fire on the attacking soldiers.[32] The battalion commander also stated that Russian forces have stopped fielding armored vehicles in the Lyman direction due to heavy vehicle losses. Assault elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating with drone support near Terny.[33]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) on January 9 and 10 but did not advance.[34]Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[35] A Russian source claimed on January 10 that Russian forces advanced to the third and fourth workshops of the Chasiv Yar Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[36] Russian forces attacked within Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Stupochky, and Predtechyne on January 9 and 10.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference is preventing Russian forces from conducting constant drone aerial reconnaissance over Chasiv Yar and that constant shelling and close combat are making it difficult for Russian forces to distinguish enemy targets from friendly forces, causing friendly fire incidents in the area.[38] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command needs to address unspecified issues and commit more manpower to the area in order to set conditions to seize Chasiv Yar but expressed doubt that the frontline military command would be able to accomplish these goals in the near term.[39] Snipers and drone operators of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue striking targets near Chasiv Yar and drone operators of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[40]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Murmanska and Korolenka streets in northwestern Toretsk and along Oleksandra Dovzhenka and Anharska streets in northern Toretsk.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Niu York up to Sukha Balka (both south of Toretsk) and further along Berehova Street in southern Petrivka (west of Toretsk).[42] Russian forces attacked near Toretsk, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and south of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on January 9 and 10.[43] Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Petrivka and providing drone support for Russian forces assaulting Toretsk and west of Krymske (northeast of Toretsk).[44] Drone operators of the Russian 80th ”Sparta” Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces near Toretsk.[45]The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 3rd Army Corps command post in occupied Svitlodarsk (east of Toretsk and southeast of Bakhmut) on January 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have conducted a series of strikes against Russian military facilities in occupied Donetsk Oblast over the past week (since about January 3).[46] Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast on January 8.[47]Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of and in western Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk).[48] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces recently conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Yelyzavetivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank and four armored vehicles during the assault.[49] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces recently intensified shelling and glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk.[50] A Ukrainian intelligence officer supporting a brigade operating near Pokrovsk stated that Russian forces are using armored vehicles to transport infantry and support infantry assaults more frequently in the area.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have seized most of Baranivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), are advancing towards Tarasivka (north of Baranivka), seized a section of the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva highway, advanced to the outskirts of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and are advancing towards Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[52] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger suggested that Russian forces will likely attempt to seize positions along the T-04-06 Pokrovsk-Mezheva highway to complicate Ukrainian logistics before Russian forces begin to attack Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad directly.[53] Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Baranivka, Myrolyubivka, and Yelyzavetivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Novyi Trud, and Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Vovkove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, and Yasenove on January 9 and 10.[54] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz detachment (24th Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[55]Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kurakhove amid ongoing offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the fields northeast of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove).[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Andriivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are attacking towards Andriivka.[57] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking on the outskirts of Yantarne (southwest of Kurakhove).[58] Russian forces also continued assaults near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka, Petropavlivka, Sribne, and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne, Zelenivka, Ulakly, Kostyatynopil, and Rozlyv on January 9 and 10.[59] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Ulakly, and a motorized platoon of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) is reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[60]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on January 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 10 that Russian forces advanced on the northern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka and that there are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces seized Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and advanced northwest of the settlement.[61] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces attacked near Velyka Novosilka, south of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne on January 9 and 10.[62]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited positional fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 9 and 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.[63] Drone operators of the Russian “Nemets” Group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian targets near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[64]Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction, including near Kozatskyi and Zabych islands (east and southwest of Kherson City, respectively) on January 9 and 10 but did not advance.[65] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on January 10 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Buk-M2 air defense systems, one Zu-23-2 air defense system, and five Starlink terminals in southern Ukraine in the past day.[66]Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on January 10 that recent Ukrainian naval drone operations may have prompted Russian forces to reduce rotary-wing aviation operations over the Black Sea.[67] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces decreased helicopter operations in the Black Sea, especially on January 9, and noted that this decrease may be due to poor weather conditions in the Black Sea, but that the weather has not been bad enough to force Russian forces to cease flying helicopters in the area altogether.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 72 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol and Bryansk oblasts overnight.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 33 Russian drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia and Kherson oblasts; that 34 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that one drone flew towards Russian airspace. The Mayor of Semenivka, Chernihiv Oblast, Serhiy Dedenko, reported the Russian forces struck the border settlement of Semenivka with five Shahed drones.[69] Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that debris from a downed Russian drone damaged a high-rise building in Solomyanskyi Urban Raion, Kyiv City.[70]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The BBC Russian Service reported on January 10 that a joint investigation conducted with Russian opposition outlet Medizona using open-source data has confirmed that at least 88,055 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine since February 2022.[71] The BBC Russian Service reported that a minimum of 6,083 elite Russian military personnel, who were either members of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) or underwent lengthy training either at military universities or specialized military centers, have been killed in Ukraine since February 2022.[72] The BBC Russian Service estimated that the Russian military spent millions of dollars and years training these elite personnel. ISW has previously noted that the quality of personnel within many elite Russian units has decreased over the course of the war as the Russian military command has increasingly used elite VDV and naval infantry units to conduct the same type of attritional, infantry-led assaults as regular Russian units.[73]Russian opposition media outlet Mobilization News reported on January 10 that Russian law enforcement authorities raided the Chelyabinsk airport and unspecified commerce centers in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai over the holidays and issued military summons to migrants who entered Russia illegally and to naturalized Russian citizens.[74] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in late December 2024 stating that migrants who entered Russia illegally must apply for legal status, leave Russia, or sign a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[75] ISW previously assessed that a decision to enforce this decree would indicate that the Russian government is prioritizing Russia's force generation requirements over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages.[76]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)A Russian milblogger claimed on January 10 that Russian forces may not be fielding more advanced naval drones because the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) refuses to fund the development of naval drones.[77]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not covering activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Belarusian Assistant to the Head of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Department of International Military Cooperation Major General Valery Revenko announced on January 10 that at least 13,000 personnel will participate in the "Zapad-2025" (West-2025) military exercise with Russia, but did not announce the dates of the exercise.[78] The specific allocation of Russian and Belarusian personnel who will participate in the exercise remains unclear. The last Zapad exercises – which have historically occurred every four years – took place in September 2021, and the Russian (MoD) notably canceled the planned 'Zapad-2023' exercises scheduled for September 2023.[79]Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 10 that Belarusian internet providers temporarily blocked YouTube, Telegram, TikTok, and several other unspecified social media platforms on the night of January 9 to 10.[80] Residents reported that the internet disruptions began around 0130 local time and that they were able to access the sites a few hours later. Belarusian Internet providers stated that the disruptions were part of "scheduled work." Belarusian opposition outlet Nasha Niva noted that Belarusian authorities are likely preparing to block the internet during the upcoming presidential election on January 26.[81]The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reported on January 10 that Belarus has not invited OSCE observers to the January 26 Belarusian presidential election, a clear violation of Belarus's obligations as a signatory of the 1990 Copenhagen Document.[82]The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on January 10 that foreigners will be able to travel between Russia and Belarus upon receipt of a visa from one of the two countries beginning on January 11 in yet another display of deeper Union State integration.[83] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://suspilne dot media/922131-droni-sbu-i-raketa-neptun-vrazili-sklad-zbroi-v-rostovskij-oblasti-rf-dzerela/[2] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/1737 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295280 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295291[3] https://t.me/astrapress/72116 ; https://t.me/astrapress/72109[4] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1002252[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024[6] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7429519; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6771879; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122424[8] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2777[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/support-for-ukraine-is-unwavering-as-uk-announces-new-sanctions-on-russian-oil-giants[10] https://www.mofa.go dot jp/erp/c_see/ua/pageite_000001_00740.html ; https://www.japantimes.co dot jp/news/2025/01/10/japan/politics/japan-sanctions-russia/[11] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/9321[12] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/9321; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/10/25/g7-leaders-statement-on-extraordinary-revenue-acceleration-era-loans/[13] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1877423399493849189; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1877433351805587756; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24478; https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/674; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8075; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1877671344088699094; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1877664024705310837[14] https://t.me/dva_majors/62165[15] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22164; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22150; https://t.me/dva_majors/62151; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42919; https://t.me/mig41/39486; https://t.me/wargonzo/24174; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84201; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84215[16] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84201; https://t.me/wargonzo/24174; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42919; https://t.me/mig41/39486; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42919[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/62165; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84201; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84215; https://t.me/dva_majors/62151; https://t.me/wargonzo/24174; https://t.me/yurasumy/20429; https://t.me/mig41/39486; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42919[18] https://t.me/yurasumy/20429[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/62151; https://t.me/dva_majors/62165[20] https://t.me/sashakots/51209[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19880 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3504[22] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12244[23] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5409[24] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3985 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8077[25] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/922045-rosia-zahopila-shidnu-castinu-dvoricnoi-na-harkivsini-i-mae-zmogu-hovatisa-u-budinkah-ta-pidvalah-deepstate/ ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61314; https://t.me/dva_majors/62165; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84193; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12244[26] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/922045-rosia-zahopila-shidnu-castinu-dvoricnoi-na-harkivsini-i-mae-zmogu-hovatisa-u-budinkah-ta-pidvalah-deepstate/[27]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19880 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4019[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22167; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12244 [29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19880; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4019 [30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22181 [31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19880 [32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/10/myasa-u-nyh-vystachaye-bilshe-nizh-zalizyak-u-zsu-prokomentuvaly-zmenshennya-kilkosti-rosijskoyi-bronetehniky/[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84202 [34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4019 [35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8068; https://t.me/Phoenix_ORKOhub/147[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/295310 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295313 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295336 [37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19880; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4019 [38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22166[39] https://t.me/rusich_army/20015[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22155 [41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24477; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1877493418076549398; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1877499284469244214; https://t.me/The_life_of_Predova/4061; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8071[42] https://t.me/rybar/67057; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150894; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150884 [43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19880; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4019; https://t.me/dva_majors/62165; https://t.me/wargonzo/24174; https://t.me/rybar/67057 [44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61329; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13237 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84226; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22182 [45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84220 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31260; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13235 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150853 [46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022eis8ua66wFJ556PPCmSp7KCQN9jYtSCsAYyDgBz2fZwDMFyjRSHuTuh1RDMkiMJl[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025[48] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1877468997496566217; https://t.me/robert_magyar/1009’ https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8067 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8072; https://t.me/ZSU_32_OMBR/260[49] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4019[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/09/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-chomu-rosiyany-pochaly-menshe-vykorystovuvaty-tehniku-i-mali-shturmovi-grupy/[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/10/shturm-pokrovska-ne-prypynyayetsya-vorog-kydaye-novi-rezervy/[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61312 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61323 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150884 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22185 [53] https://t.me/rybar/67030[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19880 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4019 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61312 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62165 [55] https://t.me/sashakots/51202[56] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24482; https://t.me/hydra_subdivision137/75[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61313 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61324[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61325[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19880 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4019 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62165 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61325[60] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13236 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47776[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/24174; https://t.me/voin_dv/12709; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61335 [62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qKH4er4qKTp41J7Ju1FovZonnXZS8AUpJFW7uYNAcZZ81otR8fSdFqtC3JE3gAeKl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4019 [63] https://t.me/wargonzo/24174[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/24196 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62176[65]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19880 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0315rmB4jSGQ8yKHfck11NczaNkS7N7NDApUpKY5Nfq9DUsTDSQALok54c7CmYPRhdl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11951[66]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0315rmB4jSGQ8yKHfck11NczaNkS7N7NDApUpKY5Nfq9DUsTDSQALok54c7CmYPRhdl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11951[67] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/10/znyshhennya-rosijskyh-mi-8-aktyvnist-vorozhyh-vertolotiv-nad-chornym-morem-deshho-znyzylasya-vms/ ;[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/26605[69] https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/921627-rosijski-sahedi-atakuvali-prikordonnu-semenivku/[70] https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/726; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/921695-ulamki-bezpilotnika-vlucili-u-bagatopoverhivku-naslidki-rosijskoi-ataki-kieva/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/10/u-kyyevi-dron-vluchyv-u-bagatopoverhivku-ryatuvalnyky-pokazaly-naslidky-ataky/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/72065[71] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21629 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75152[72] https://t.me/bbcrussian/75152[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine[74] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21631 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21635[75] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123024[76] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123024[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/62230[78] https://t.me/modmilby/44360[79] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2024[80] https://t.me/astrapress/72137[81] https://t.me/nashaniva/93935[82] https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/584445[83] https://t.me/MID_Russia/50525 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1991117/
- — Iran Update, January 10, 2025
- at 1/10/25 8:43pmAnnika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. There are early indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Such an alliance would challenge the Iranian-backed Shia parties in these elections. A prominent Sunni politician, Khamis al Khanjar, met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masoud Barzani on January 9 to discuss the upcoming parliamentary elections and “the formation of alliances that can guarantee the rights of their people and regions.”[1] This meeting comes as Khanjar helped form a political coalition—the United Sunni Leadership Coalition—with other prominent Sunni leaders on January 7.[2] The leader of the Shammari tribe in northwestern Iraq separately praised Barzani and emphasized the need for Arab-Kurdish unity in a statement on January 8, suggesting that the Shammari tribe is aligned with Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).[3]Khanjar has been vocal about the need to address Sunni grievances in recent weeks. Khanjar said in an interview with Kurdish media in December 2024 that Sunnis in western Iraq are upset about the injustices they face.[4] Khanjar added that Sunnis would turn to “other parties” that oppose dialogue and negotiation if the federal government fails to defend them.[5] Khanjar’s remarks are consistent with a recent statement from Sunni politicians calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[6] The KRG similarly threatened to boycott the Iraqi federal government if the latter failed to regularly pay public sector salaries.[7] The payment of public sector salaries is a common point of tension between the Iraqi federal government and the KRG, but the KRG threat is still notable given the current discussions between Barzani and the newly formed Sunni political alliance.[8]The newly formed Sunni political coalition could align with national Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr as well. Sadr emphasized in early December 2024 that the Iraqi federal government and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias must avoid interfering in Syria.[9] Khanjar subsequently called on Iraqi political parties to “adopt” Sadr’s position of non-interference.[10] The alignment of Sadr’s and the Sunni positions here could provide a foundation for political collaboration in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The United Sunni Leadership Coalition’s outreach to the KDP and possible alignment with Sadr is noteworthy given that these factions previously allied following the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary elections.[11]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly rejected plans to postpone the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq during his meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in Tehran on January 8.[12] Khamenei told Sudani that there is “no justification” for postponing the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, according to an unspecified source close to the Iranian presidency speaking to Iraqi media on January 9.[13] An Iraqi official told the Washington Post in December 2024 that the Iraqi federal government was reconsidering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026 because it is concerned that the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria threatens Iraqi security.[14] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[15]Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 10 that the HTS-led interim Syrian government should be given the opportunity to address Kurdish militants' presence within the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) before Turkey takes military action.[16] Fidan said that the HTS-led interim government has an “agenda” to address the “PKK/YPG” but promised that “Turkey will” take action if others—presumably HTS—fail to do so.[17] HTS and Turkey have coordinated in recent weeks to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. HTS leader Ahmed al Shara recently met with the SDF but there have been no specific reports of tangible progress toward an agreement, despite SDF commander Mazloum Abdi’s claim on January 9 that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unity.[18] It remains unclear if Turkey would be satisfied by the SDF merely being re-flagged under the new Syrian Defense Ministry.Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened to launch a military operation to “destroy” the SDF if it fails to disarm.[19] Fidan said on January 10 that Turkey has the objective of “cleans[ing]” Syria of “terrorism” in 2025.[20] Turkey rejected on January 10 a proposal to deploy US and French troops to secure the Syria-Turkey border.[21] The deployment of US and French forces would likely preclude Turkey from conducting its offensive. Local Syrian media reported on January 10 that Turkey sent reinforcements to the Syrian border and posted footage of a convoy of heavy equipment transporters carrying 155-mm self-propelled howitzers.[22]The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) reportedly shelled SDF positions along the eastern Peace Spring frontlines on January 10 amid a possible SNA offensive against the SDF. Local, anti-SDF media reported that the SNA shelled several SDF positions in the Tal Tamr countryside and east of Ras al Ain.[23] The reported SNA shelling comes amid possible SNA deployments and preparations for an offensive into SDF-controlled territory. CTP-ISW cannot verify the local reporting about shelling along the frontline, however.Turkey continued to support SNA operations to isolate SDF elements along the Euphrates River ahead of the possible offensive. Turkey conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions in several villages near Sarrin and along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, according to local media.[24] The SDF accuses Turkey of striking Sarrin’s grain silos.[25] Turkey also reportedly struck at least three SDF targets in northern Hasakah Province along the Qamishli-Faysh Khabur road.[26] Local media reported that one of the strikes killed an SDF commander with two others in a vehicle in Khan Jabal.[27] These strikes are likely meant to undermine SDF defenses against the SNA along the Euphrates River and the SDF's ability to defend against a potential SNA offensive from Peace Spring territory.The SNA continued to engage the SDF northwest of Tishreen Dam on January 10. Commander of the Suleiman Shah Brigades—a faction affiliated with the SNA—Abu Amsha claimed on January 10 that the SNA seized two hills northwest of the Tishreen Dam.[28] Geolocated footage posted on January 10 showed SNA and SDF drone strikes about three kilometers northwest of Tishreen Dam.[29] Geolocated footage showed the SDF conducting a drone strike targeting SNA fighters north of Deir Hafer, east of Aleppo City.[30]The HTS-led interim government located and dismantled a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the Aleppo countryside on January 10.[31] Syrian state media reported that the VBIED was headed to Aleppo from SDF-controlled territory, citing a source in the Interior Ministry.[32] Unspecified fighters have detonated three other car bombs or VBIEDs in SNA-controlled territory since December 24.[33]Key Takeaways:Iraq: There are early indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Such an alliance would challenge the political influence of the Iranian-backed Shia parties.Iraq: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly rejected any plans to postpone the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq during his meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in Tehran.Syria: Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan said that the HTS-led interim government in Syria should have the opportunity to address Turkish concerns vis-a-vis the SDF before Turkey launches a major military operation into northern Syria.SyriaAxis of Resistance objectives:Reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria to LebanonReestablish Iranian influence in SyriaThe HTS-led interim government has continued its campaign to destroy Assad regime remnants across Syria since January 9. HTS-led forces conducted clearing operations in al Salihin, Aleppo City, on January 10.[34] The interim government established positions and collected weapons in Tafas and Lajat, Daraa Province on January 10, after negotiating with local leaders.[35] HTS-led forces began searching homes and military sites for weapons in northern Daraa Province on January 9.[36] HTS-led forces also searched for regime remnants in Jaba, northern Quneitra, on January 10.[37]Unknown actors executed former regime official Mazen Kneneh in Dummar, Damascus, on January 10.[38] Kneneh was reportedly affiliated with former regime military intelligence.[39] A pro-Assad social media account blamed HTS for Kneneh’s death.[40]Several European countries are discussing lifting sanctions on Syria.[41] The Italian foreign minister said that he is “optimistic” about discussions with the United States and other European countries to lift sanctions on Syria during a visit to Damascus on January 10.[42] The EU high representative for foreign affairs separately said on January 10 that the European Union could lift sanctions on Syria if “tangible progress is made.”[43]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentOne hundred and ninety-one families of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) members relocated from the SDF-controlled al Hol camp in Hasakah Province, northeastern Syria, to the al Jadaa camp in Ninewa Province, Iraq, on January 9.[44] The families entered Iraq via the Rabia border crossing and will undergo a “security check” at al Jadaa camp.[45] The relocation marked the 18th time that Iraqi families in al Hol have returned to Iraq. A member of the Iraqi Parliamentary Migration and Displacement Committee claimed on January 9 that Iraqis returning from al Hol are “saturated with extremist, barbaric, and terrorist ideas” and called for rehabilitating them in “special institutions.”[46]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripThe IDF Air Force and the US-UK coalition conducted strikes targeting Houthi sites in Yemen on January 10 in response to repeated Houthi attacks on Israel and commercial ships in the Red Sea.[47] Targets included infrastructure at Hezyaz power station near Sanaa and military infrastructure around Hudaydah and Ras Isa ports.[48]The Houthis conducted a drone attack targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on January 9.[49] The IDF intercepted a drone launched from Yemen over the Mediterranean Sea.[50]The Houthis claimed that they conducted a cruise missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea on January 9.[51] The Houthis claimed that they targeted the carrier and its accompanying naval vessels.[52]An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF Air Force destroyed a Houthi ballistic missile seconds before its launch toward Israeli territory on January 10.[53] The IDF intercepted the missile on its launcher during a strike, preventing the Houthis from immediately responding to ongoing Israeli operations in Yemen.[54]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripCommercially available satellite imagery showed that the IDF has expanded clearing operations northwest of the Nuseirat refugee camp in recent days.Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mortared the IDF south of Rafah City on January 10.[55]The IDF announced on January 10 that it recovered the remnants of a second dead Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah City, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.[56] The IDF recovered a body in the tunnel but could not confirm the status of the second hostage until now.[57]A senior Hamas official told al Jazeera on January 10 that most Israeli hostages held in the northern Gaza Strip are “now missing.”[58] This claim follows Hamas denying Israel’s request for the status of Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip during recent ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[59]LebanonLebanese media, including Lebanese Hezbollah media, reported that the IDF continued operations in the Marjaayoun district, southern Lebanon, on January 10. The IDF reportedly detonated explosives in Bani Hayyan and Kfar Kila.[60] The IDF also reportedly moved between two towns northeast of Kfar Kila.[61] Hezbollah media reported that the IDF advanced into Taybeh before detonating explosives and conducting intensive searches in the area.[62] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) stated that an LAF patrol entered Taybeh to reopen roads that the IDF had closed on January 6.[63] The IDF reportedly detonated explosives in Taybeh on January 8.[64]Lebanese media reported that the IDF detonated explosives in Yaroun, southeastern Lebanon, on January 10.[65]The LAF began to deploy to Aitaroun and Aita al Shaab, southern Lebanon, on January 10. Lebanese media reported that LAF armor entered Aitaroun.[66] The IDF last reportedly operated in Aitaroun on January 6.[67] Lebanese media also reported that the LAF approached the outskirts of Aita al Shaab after the IDF fired artillery around Aita al Shaab and detonated multiple explosives in the area earlier in the day.[68]The IDF Air Force struck unspecified weaponry in a Hezbollah vehicle in Tayr Dibba, southwestern Lebanon, on January 10.[69] Lebanese media reported that the Israeli airstrike killed at least five individuals and wounded four.[70]Israeli officials told Axios on January 9 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz want to keep the IDF in three unspecified locations in southern Lebanon beyond the ceasefire’s required withdrawal date.[71] A US official told Axios that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s victory on January 9 will add more pressure from the United States and other Western and Arab countries on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon by the deadline, which is January 26.[72] This report follows senior Israeli officials indicating on January 5 that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreements are not implemented fully by the time that the IDF must withdraw.[73]West BankIsraeli settlers set fire to a building and vandalized other buildings near Ramallah in the West Bank on January 9.[74] Israeli settlers also set fire to a Palestinian vehicle near Bethlehem overnight.[75] CTP-ISW previously reported that Israeli settlers set fire to cars and damaged homes in Hajjah and Immatain, Qalqilya Governorate, on January 6.[76] Palestinian militia fighters killed three Israelis and wounded eight others in a shooting attack targeting vehicles on Route 55 in Qalqilya Governorate on January 6, which caused the recent uptick in settler violence.[77]The IDF conducted a counterterrorism operation near Jenin in the West Bank on January 10.[78] The IDF reported that it arrested eight suspects and plans to continue efforts to locate the fighters who are responsible for the shooting attack that killed three Israelis in Qalqilya Governorate on January 6.[79]Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyIranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan, Armenia, on January 9.[80] Ahmadian said that Iran is ready to share expertise in industrial, agricultural, and technological fields. Pashinyan expressed interest in collaborating on the International North-South Transport Corridor and reaffirmed the goal of achieving three billion US dollars in trade between Armenia and Iran.[81]The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile depot on January 10, as IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Aerospace Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh visited the site.[82] The facility reportedly played a role in the Iranian missile attacks against Israel in April and October 2024.[83] The IRGC claimed that the facility contains medium-range Emad and Ghadr ballistic missiles and short-range Qiam ballistic missiles.[84]The IRGC held the Rahiyan-eh Ghods exercise in Tehran on January 10, likely as a show of force aimed at deterring both internal dissent and external threats.[85] The Fatehin, Imam Ali, and Imam Hossein battalions, which are the Basij’s most elite and loyal units, participated in the exercise. These units are notably responsible for protest suppression and have previously been deployed abroad to deal with external security threats.[86] Commander of the IRGC Tehran Provincial Corps Brigadier General Hassan Hassan Zadeh said that the exercise was meant to showcase the Basij’s readiness to counter threats.[87] Iranian state media claimed that 110,000 Basij members participated and displayed military equipment, likely to signal that Iran has a large force to deal with any threats. The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/090120253[2] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF[3] https://worldcrunch dot com/syria-crisis-1/the-shammar-the-tribe-fighting-isis-on-the-front-lines ;https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/080120258[4] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/191220242[5] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/191220242[6] https://almadapaper dot net/388798/[7] https://baghdadtoday dot news/265508-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%91%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8.html[8] https://www.barrons.com/news/baghdad-to-pay-iraqi-kurdistan-public-servants-court-rules-949fc7a4[9] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/051220245[10] https://www.rudawarabia.net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/051220246[11] https://www.middleeasteye dot net/news/iraq-iran-pressure-sunni-kurdish-leaders-crack-sadr-alliance[12] https://baghdadtoday dot news/265588-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82.html[13] https://baghdadtoday dot news/265588-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82.html[14] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/23/syria-us-troops-trump-hts-turkey/[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/[16] https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537[17] https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-2-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-9-2025[19] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/تركيا/فيدان-توجيه-إنذار-نهائي-لتنظيم-واي-بي-جي-الإرهابي/3444290 ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiye-pkk-deasi-sahada-bozguna-ugratan-tek-ulkedir/3426593 ; https://x.com/alaraby_ar/status/1869690521846997114 ; https://www.france24.com/en/video/20241220-en-wb-tete-a-tete-hakan-fidan ; https://www dot aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/our-sole-aim-is-to-ensure-peace-tranquility-stability-throughout-region-turkish-president-erdogan/3433935[20] https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-french-troops-could-secure-syrias-northern-border-syrian-kurdish-official-2025-01-08/; https://www.middleeasteye dot net/news/turkey-angered-possible-french-presence-syrian-border[22] https://t.me/sohebb1993/21080; https://x.com/clashreport/status/1877689901044355182[23] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132597; https://t.me/sohebb1993/21072; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132604[24] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1877654500829217120; https://t.me/sohebb1993/21061; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1877689234368197004; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132545; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132547; https://t.me/sohebb1993/21065[25] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1877630370767597739[26] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132596; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132515 ; https://t.me/sohebb1993/21084[27] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1877750460737572932; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119142; https://t.me/nahermedia/43854[28] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1877688892238770491[29] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1877725023479247083; https://x.com/ghost_watcher1/status/1877432367221989524[30] https://x.com/ghost_watcher1/status/1877476686012227912;https://x.com/ghost_watcher1/status/1877478601018298693[31] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/120922 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/120920; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1877716362094653635[32] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/120919[33] https://x.com/AlarabyTV/status/1874150537735680316; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1874153837650743395; https://x.com/skynewsarabia/status/1874583938087440692; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1874476356593172804; https://x.com/AlarabyTV/status/1874515150419464510; https://www.barrons.com/news/car-bombing-in-flashpoint-north-syria-town-monitor-6b66d699[34] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1877676153235751198[35] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1877448472304992275[36] https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/578 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1877367637560136011[37] https://t.me/Free_Kenitra_city/192[38] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1877675647805341822; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/01/10/assad-loyalist-shot-in-head-public-execution-damascus-syria/?msockid=31724c4845486561027c583141486b0b[39] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1877675647805341822[40] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5270[41] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119115[42] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119115[43] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119118[44] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%84-191-%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82[45] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%84-191-%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82[46] https://almadapaper dot net/392067/[47] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-836977 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1877728504495686005[48] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877710790137884730[49] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1877712786886652034https://x.com/army21ye/status/1877705708075917346[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877455515246031152[51] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1877705708075917346[52] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1877712786886652034[53] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18197[54] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18197[55] https://t.me/sarayaps/19037[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877612102958960819[57] https://x.com/IDF/status/1877028599070335198[58] https://aje.io/mifpdn?update=3434207[59] https://www.gov dot il/en/pages/spoke-list060125 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/06/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-hostage-list-cease-fire.html[60] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126974 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111040[61] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126909[62] https://t.me/almanarnews/190198 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/190201[63] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1875964823369875556[64] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110810[65] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111053[66] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111026[67] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110721[68] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126965 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126910 ; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877683905379049625 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12993[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877748466933276850; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1877764405842059610 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/190234 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12992[70] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111060; https://nna-leb.gov dot lb/ar/justice-law/751223/%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%89%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA[71] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/09/trump-biden-coordinate-lebanese-president-joseph-aoun[72] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/09/trump-biden-coordinate-lebanese-president-joseph-aoun[73] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate010525[74] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18158[75] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/settlers-riot-in-west-bank-village-for-3rd-time-in-days-after-terror-shooting/[76] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-7-2025#_edn97f3449950090fd9bdc786bfdbffbe1092[77] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1876179523235905953[78] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877781996925014402[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877781996925014402 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1876179523235905953[80] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6342512[81] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6342512[82] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718877[83] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718877 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-13-2024 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024[84] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718877[85] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718820/[86] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-takes-to-end-it.pdf?x85095[87] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718810/
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2025
- at 1/9/25 10:37pmNicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson,and George BarrosJanuary 6, 2025, 7pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on January 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances amid continued intensified offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 5 and 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Berdin, central Russkoye Porechnoye, and central Novosotnitsky (all northeast of Sudzha).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian roughly reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Berdin and that Russian forces, including elements of Rosgvardia's "Talib" Group, repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novosotnitsky.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and Akhmat Spetsnaz units cleared areas near Berdin and Novosotnitsky.[3] One Russian milblogger characterized recent Ukrainian attacks in Kursk Oblast as enhanced reconnaissance in force operations that could be a diversionary effort for unspecified future operations.[4] Increased Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast may be the beginning stages of a concerted Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere in the theater, though ISW is unprepared to offer any specific forecast.Russian forces attempted to leverage Ukrainian attacks northeast of Sudzha to attack elsewhere in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[5] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), seized Leonidovo (northwest of Sudzha) and that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Russkoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha).[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (both southeast of Sudzha).[7] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), attacked toward Malaya Loknya and near Novoivanovka, Viktorovka, and Nikolskiy (all northwest of Sudzha).[8] The Russian MoD claimed that "Caspian naval infantry" drone units, likely referring to drone units of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), are operating in Kursk Oblast, indicating that the Russian military command likely redeployed elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast.[9]Ukrainian forces may be continuing to conduct long-range strikes against Russian rear areas in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to use integrated strike capabilities to support ground operations. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that there were audible explosions near the Russian 3754th Central Aviation Technical Base (military unit 13830) in Kursk City.[10] ISW cannot independently confirm if Ukrainian forces successfully struck the base. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 6 that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian forward and rear positions in Kursk Oblast with missiles several times.[11] The Russian Kursk Oblast Operational Headquarters claimed on January 6 that Russian forces destroyed two Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast.[12] ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range precision strike capabilities and electronic warfare (EW) systems activity to support ground operations.[13]Russian forces reportedly executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on January 3. A geolocated image published on January 6 shows the aftermath of a reported Russian execution of three bound Ukrainian POWs near Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on January 3, and Ukrainian officials announced an investigation into the reported executions.[14] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published a purported audio interception on January 6 reportedly of a unit commander of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) issuing an order to execute a Ukrainian POW.[15] ISW continues to assess that Russian commanders are either complacent or enabling their subordinates to execute POWs in clear violation of international law.[16]Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced that Ukraine and Russia have reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025. Lyubinets indicated on January 6 that the exchanges will include both military POWs and civilian prisoners and stated that Ukraine will prioritize returning prisoners who are seriously ill or wounded.[17] Lyubinets did not provide further details about the preliminary agreement but noted that it remains to be seen "whether the Russian side will keep its word." Ukraine and Russia conducted one of the largest POW exchanges in 2024 on December 30. Russia had consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to engage in POW exchanges before the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024, during which Ukrainian forces took many Russians prisoners.[18]The leaders of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces and the far-right paramilitary unit "Rusich" Russian Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group met on January 6 and promoted a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony. Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander Apty Alaudinov published a video of his meeting with Rusich Group deputy commander (call sign "Medved") and the self-declared Nazi and the leader of the Rusich Group Alexei Milchakov on January 6.[19] Alaudinov stated that he has no issue with Russian nationalists who love their "nation" (natsiya) and want it to be better, as long as they do not claim that their "nation" is superior to all others. Alaudinov stated that he realized that Milchakov loves his country and that there is a lot of work ahead to make Russia "great, powerful, and united." Alaudinov stated that he and Milchakov agreed that they have a "common enemy" and "common goals" and that they need to prevent anyone from "stirring up interethnic and interfaith" tensions, presumably among Russian citizens. Milchakov stated that the meeting was "friendly" and that they discussed possible "interaction" in the war in Ukraine and the development of their "personal relationships."[20] The administration of the Rusich Telegram channel responded to criticisms of the meeting, claiming that Alaudinov invited Milchakov to the meeting, has "never fought against Russia and the Russians," and never spoke against Milchakov's views.[21] The Rusich Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group previously criticized Wagner Group commander Alexander Kuznetsov (call sign "Ratibor") for joining the Akhmat Spetsnaz in April 2024, and Russian milbloggers, including those in Russia's ultranationalist community, have previously criticized Chechen "Akhmat" forces for not contributing to Russian military operations.[22] Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly attempted to portray Russia as an ethnically and religiously harmonious and inclusive society as he balances against xenophobic demands from Russia's pro-war ultranationalist community.[23]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances amid continued intensified offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6.Russian forces attempted to leverage Ukrainian attacks northeast of Sudzha to attack elsewhere in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6.Ukrainian forces may be continuing to conduct long-range strikes against Russian rear areas in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to use integrated strike capabilities to support ground operations.Russian forces reportedly executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on January 3.Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced that Ukraine and Russia have reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025.The leaders of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces and the far-right paramilitary unit "Rusich" Russian Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group met on January 6 and promoted a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony.Russian forces advanced in the Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Kurakhove.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview published on January 5 that 3,800 North Korean personnel have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationSee topline text for updates on Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast.Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on January 6 that sources in Ukraine's Special Services (SBU) confirmed that Ukrainian drones struck and damaged a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4.[24] The SBU sources stated that the drone strikes severely damaged one gas container and shattered three others.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 5 and 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.[25] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on January 6 that Ukraine's renewed offensive operations in Kursk Oblast have already reduced the number of Russian ground attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[26]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Note: ISW is now orienting Russian activity along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions to reflect Russian forces' priority operational goals in these areas.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 6 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Synkivka on January 5 and 6.[27] The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 5 that Russian forces are using armored vehicle columns to transport infantry to the frontline, with mine-clearing vehicles, followed by tanks leading the column to provide fire support, and with infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) carrying five to seven personnel each in the rear.[28] The drone battalion commander reported that Russian forces use more infantry in assaults when they are unable to use armored vehicles and that dismounted infantry sometimes have to walk up to 10 kilometers on foot to reach the frontline. The spokesperson and unit commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction noted that poor weather sometimes prevents Russian forces from fielding armored vehicles, aircraft, or drones and that Russian forces will send infantry to conduct assaults without reconnaissance support in these conditions.[29] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on January 6 that Russian forces conducted strikes targeting crossings over the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction on the night of January 5 to 6.[30]Russia forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 6 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields east of Zahryzove and west of Lozova (both northeast of Borova) on January 5.[31] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows that Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault east of Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) but did not make any confirmed advances.[32] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya and Pershotravneve; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Makiivka on January 5 and 6.[33]Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 5 and 6 indicates that Russian forces, reportedly elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), likely seized Ivanivka and advanced southwest of the settlement as well as in fields northwest of Terny (both northwest of Kreminna).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 6 that Russian forces advanced further in fields southwest of Ivanivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces advanced to the extent of the milblogger's claim.[35] Russian forces also continued ground attacks northwest of Kreminna near Terny and west of Kreminna near Zarichne on January 5 and 6.[36]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Note: ISW will be incorporating data previously reported as the Vuhledar direction as part of the Kurakhove direction moving forward to reflect the shifting operational situation in this area.Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) on January 5 and 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.[37] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor published footage on January 6 showing Russian forces unsuccessfully attacking in the Siversk direction with fireteams consisting of two-to-four personnel.[38]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 6 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Chervonoflotskyi Street in central Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[39] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near and within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Stupochky, and Predtechyne on January 5 and 6.[40] A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces have increasingly been using armored vehicles in the past few weeks, particularly during bad weather, but that Russian forces have not significantly changed their tactics of assaulting in small infantry groups.[41] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[42]Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Heroiv Chornobylia and Darhomyzhskoho streets in northwestern Toretsk.[43] Additional geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along 3 Hirskyi and 4 Hirskyi streets in northern Toretsk.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made additional gains in northern, northeastern, and southwestern Toretsk and west of Krymske (northeast of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[45] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 6 that Russian forces conducted an assault with an unspecified number of armored vehicles toward Shcherbynivka (southwest of Toretsk).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 6 that Russian forces occupy 85 percent of Toretsk, although ISW assesses that Russian forces have occupied 69.4 percent of the settlement as of January 6.[47] Russian forces continued attacking within and near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske; and southwest of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 5 and 6.[48]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced on the northwestern outskirts of Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[49] Additional geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[50] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 6 that Russian forces seized Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk), which ISW assesses Russian forces seized as of December 22.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Vozdvyzhenka, into Baranivka (just northeast of Vozdvyzhenka), near Yelyzavetivka (west of Vozdvyzhenka), into eastern Zelene (south of Pokrovsk), south of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk), and north of Vovkove, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[52] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka, Yelyzavetivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Novyi Trud; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Solone, Novovasylivka, Novoyelizavetivka, and Yasenove on January 5 and 6.[53] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) reportedly continue operating near Vozdvyzhenka, and elements of the "Maxim Krivonos" volunteer detachment, allegedly formed by former members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who defected to fight for Russia, are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized all of Kurakhove amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 6. The Russian MoD claimed on January 6 that elements of the Russian 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigade (51st CAA) seized all of Kurakhove.[55] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that there was ongoing fighting within Kurakhove as of the morning of January 6.[56] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 6 that sources within unspecified Russian security agencies stated that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces out of part of the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) west of Kurakhove and that fighting is ongoing for the administrative buildings at the TPP.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Shevchenko (northwest of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[58] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka and Slovyanka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne and Kostyantynopil; southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka on January 5 and 6.[59] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Petropavlivka and Shevchenko (northwest of Kurakhove), and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[60]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on January 6 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on January 6.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 5th CAA (EMD) are attempting to encircle Ukrainian forces in Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[62] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are more frequently using armored vehicles in the Vremivka direction since there are fewer buildings in the area.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces should prioritize the seizure of Velyka Novosilka after having seized Kurakhove in order to free up Russian forces for redeployment to other sectors of the frontline, including to the Pokrovsk or Zaporizhia direction.[64]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) on January 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian counterattacks in the Zaporizhia direction on January 5.[66]Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 5 and 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.[67] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on January 6 that Russian forces are attempting to seize a bridgehead in the island zone in the Dnipro River Delta.[68] Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[69]Ukrainian forces continue to conduct strikes against Russian air defense systems in southern Ukraine and reportedly destroyed five air defense systems in a single day. The Ukrainian Navy published footage on January 6 showing Ukrainian forces conducting a drone strike that destroyed two Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems and stated that Ukrainian forces also destroyed or damaged an Osa air defense system in occupied Kherson Oblast.[70] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on January 6 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian S-300 air defense systems in the past day.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 6 that Ukrainian forces destroyed one of the Pantsir systems by launching a first-person view (FPV) aerial drone from a sea-launched drone carrier.[72] The milblogger complained that Russian forces are not developing protections against Ukrainian drone innovations.Ukrainian drone strikes continue to affect Russian operations in the Black Sea. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on January 6 that Russian forces have saturated the Kerch Strait Bridge with echeloned air defenses and increased the number of fuel tanker trucks crossing the bridge, indicating that Russian forces are using the bridge for fuel supply after Ukrainian strikes damaged Russian ferries.[73] Pletenchuk reported on January 5 that Russian forces have only deployed one submarine in the Black Sea to guard a Russian base (likely the Russian naval base in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea) and that Russian forces have been using aviation to protect the Black Sea area due to the threat of Ukrainian naval and aerial drone strikes against Russian ships.[74] Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian drone strikes against ships docked for repairs have forced Russian forces to stop trying to repair vessels in occupied Crimea.[75] Pletenchuk stated that the Russian base in Russian-occupied Ochamchire, Abkhazia lacks a harbor that would allow Russian forces to dock ships safely or expand their naval capabilities.[76] ISW previously reported that the existing port in Ochamchire is unsuitable to become a primary base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) as the sandy beaches and surrounding terrain is largely inconducive for the construction of deepwater naval infrastructure.[77]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the south and 128 Shahed and other drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol and Kursk oblasts.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed both Kh-59 missiles and 79 drones over Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad and Vinnytsia oblasts and that 49 drones became "lost."[79] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the drones and missiles did not hit any targets but that falling debris damaged enterprises, institutions, and residential areas in Chernihiv, Sumy, Cherkasy, Poltava, and Kyiv oblasts. Ukrainian train operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that the strikes damaged the railway network and temporarily stopped operations in Kyiv Oblast on January 6, but that Ukrzaliznytsia has since restored operations.[80]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview published on January 5 that 3,800 North Korean personnel have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast.[81] Zelensky warned that North Korea could deploy additional military personnel to support Russian aggression against Ukraine.Russian machine guns and small arms manufacturer Degtyaryev Plant recently filed its second multimillion-ruble lawsuit against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian state news outlet TASS reviewed case materials showing that the Degtyaryev Plant filed a lawsuit against the Russian MoD for over 100 million rubles (about $930,000) for an unspecified reason.[82] TASS noted that the Degtyaryev Plant won a case against the Russian MoD for about 100.5 million rubles (about $934,000) in December 2024 in its first lawsuit but that the details are unknown.[83] Russian authorities have arrested multiple high-ranking Russian MoD officials, including those responsible for defense procurement and logistics, on charges of bribery and embezzlement in recent months.[84]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview published on January 5 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko apologized a few days after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Russian forces had launched the invasion from Belarus.[85] Zelensky stated that Lukashenko claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin launched missiles from Belarusian territory without Lukashenko's permission. Lukashenko's Press Secretary Natalia Eismont claimed on January 6 that Lukashenko did not apologize to Zelensky because Belarus "has nothing to apologize for" and that the phone call occurred due to Lukashenko's son Nikolai Lukashenko's "emotional reaction," presumably to Russia's full-scale invasion.[86]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1876291174476239032 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1876299075521519655; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1875993159869817022; https://t [dot] me/motopatriot78/31123 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19913[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/47663 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83945 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83947 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/47375 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61914 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83973 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31148 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31165 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24130 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24131 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20348 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22031[3] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83988 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31160 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150364 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20247 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22105 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61957[4] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150328[5] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24379; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/72761[6] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22011; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61241 ; https://t [dot] me/NgP_raZVedka/20247 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83974[7] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83974 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61919 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19913 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61957 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22007[8] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31156 ; https://t.me/TOF_VMF/4073; https://t.me/voin_dv/12645 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21310[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/47647 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024[10] https://x.com/Dmojavensis/status/1876183019851248072; https://x.com/prm_ua/status/1875975806322979108 ; https://x.com/Dmojavensis/status/1876185954580594776[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/24127[12] https://t.me/gubernator_46/11477; https://t.me/gubernator_46/11469[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2025[14] Warningr: graphic content https://t.me/ButusovPlus/16403; https://t.me/censor_net/63107; https://x.com/Deepstate_UA/status/1876240479014019570 ; https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/7617; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/06/okupanty-jmovirno-rozstrilyaly-troh-ukrayinskyh-vijskovopolonenyh-dmytro-lubinecz/[15] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5170[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2024[17] https://suspilne dot media/919157-lubinec-zaaviv-so-z-rf-e-poperedna-domovlenist-sodo-sistematicnosti-obminiv-polonenimi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNFBDk372e0&ab_channel=%D0%9E%D0%BC%D0%B1%D1%83%D0%B4%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%94%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%9B%D1%83%D0%B1%D1%96%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%86%D1%8C[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2024[19] https://zona dot media/news/2025/01/06/ahmat_rusich; https://t.me/AptiAlaudinovAKHMAT/7342; https://t.me/dshrg2/2752; https://theins dot ru/news/277701; https://www.rferl dot org/a/russian-neo-nazis-fighting-ukraine/31871760.html[20] https://t.me/dshrg2/2752[21] https://t.me/dshrg2/2757[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024; https://t.me/dshrg2/1746; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2023 [23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar103023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0[24] https://suspilne dot media/919057-droni-sbu-vrazili-najbilsij-u-rf-torgovij-port-ust-luga-u-leningradskij-oblasti/; https://t.me/suspilnenews/43546 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75003 ; https://www.rbc dot a/ukr/news/naybilshiy-rf-torgoviy-port-ust-luga-atakuvali-1736175505.html ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2025[25] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3947; https://t.me/synegubov/12650; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3401; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0od6UuEiqg8J7BdpRgRpLCzjuvHk4e7wqfYJ6kZTsbBTgQUEnp2BNW8HFTe21m2tbl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l[26] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/918977-na-kupansini-situacia-bils-zagrozliva-niz-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-sinegubov/[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l ; https://t.me/synegubov/12650[28] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/shturmuyut-pihotoyu-ta-bronetehnikoyu-vorog-ne-prypynyaye-atakuvaty-na-kupyanshhyni/[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/06/vony-jdut-hvylya-za-hvyleyu-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-shhodenno-vidpravlyaye-na-shturmy-po-100-pihotyncziv/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/06/na-harkivshhyni-vorog-zastosovuye-antygumannu-systemu-pihotnyh-shturmiv/[30] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/918977-na-kupansini-situacia-bils-zagrozliva-niz-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-sinegubov/[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30403 ;[32] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24381 ; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/875[33] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3947 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0od6UuEiqg8J7BdpRgRpLCzjuvHk4e7wqfYJ6kZTsbBTgQUEnp2BNW8HFTe21m2tbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l[34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8029 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18474 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18484; https://x.com/SibirPrizrak/status/1876305293078098139 ; https://x.com/EerikMatero/status/1876037238582305228 ; https://x.com/EerikMatero/status/1876037495068221872 ; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/768 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18484 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51120[35] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31157[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0od6UuEiqg8J7BdpRgRpLCzjuvHk4e7wqfYJ6kZTsbBTgQUEnp2BNW8HFTe21m2tbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3947[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3947[38] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/23849[39] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30406[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0od6UuEiqg8J7BdpRgRpLCzjuvHk4e7wqfYJ6kZTsbBTgQUEnp2BNW8HFTe21m2tbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3947; https://t.me/wargonzo/24127[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/06/vorog-tysne-na-chasiv-yar-masoyu-ale-vtrachaye-i-soldativ-i-tehniku/ [42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31117[43] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24373; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1875905772368101649; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFwAKtGYUEY; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-_dYqQPj2s; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3539302114207597892/; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3539302776203038428/’ https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8035[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8038; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/363; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1876288241055485965[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150409[46] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3947[47] https://t.me/basurin_e/16371[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0od6UuEiqg8J7BdpRgRpLCzjuvHk4e7wqfYJ6kZTsbBTgQUEnp2BNW8HFTe21m2tbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31138[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8037; https://t.me/freeukrainianrepublic/838[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8034; https://t.me/groupPUMA/95[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/47657; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61238; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61243; https://t.me/wargonzo/24127; https://t.me/dva_majors/61919; https://t.me/yurasumy/20335; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30414[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0od6UuEiqg8J7BdpRgRpLCzjuvHk4e7wqfYJ6kZTsbBTgQUEnp2BNW8HFTe21m2tbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61238; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3947 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61919; https://t.me/yurasumy/20335[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83955; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83983[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/47655 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47670; https://t.me/mod_russia/47665[56] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/918967-misto-napivzrujnovane-ci-zahopili-vijskovi-rf-kurahove-na-doneccini/[57] https://t.me/tass_agency/294832[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31139[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0od6UuEiqg8J7BdpRgRpLCzjuvHk4e7wqfYJ6kZTsbBTgQUEnp2BNW8HFTe21m2tbl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31139; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22026[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/20334; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83998[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0od6UuEiqg8J7BdpRgRpLCzjuvHk4e7wqfYJ6kZTsbBTgQUEnp2BNW8HFTe21m2tbl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3947; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61244[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61244[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/06/optovi-znyshhennya-okupantiv-miski-boyi-hovanky-rosiyan-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-na-shodi/[64] https://t.me/sashakots/51125[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22016[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wXT5y4z3t6CXN5tK8S9b4hnYUeHrtLyiVf4AYWDNt7HtmGyMmkBZtN5kHFrnxUURl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0od6UuEiqg8J7BdpRgRpLCzjuvHk4e7wqfYJ6kZTsbBTgQUEnp2BNW8HFTe21m2tbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLaaFts6J3WqCpsBp9JnvrutkwrgfL58mAfTn4gF18XwNuAYmVq6WShfJsgjkTp2l[68] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11937[69] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42825[70] https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/10648 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/vmsu-urazyly-dronom-rosijskyj-pantsyr-s1/ ; https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/10649[71] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11938[72] https://t.me/milinfolive/139272[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/06/pogoda-dovoli-burhlyva-shtorm-rozkydav-zahysni-sporudy-bilya-kerchenskogo-mostu/[74] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/chorne-more-rosiyany-kontrolyuyut-aviacziyeyu-pislya-dvoh-zbytyh-gelikopteriv-cze-mozhe-zminytysya/[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/okupanty-perestaly-remontuvaty-vijskovi-korabli-v-krymu-boyatsya-urazhen/[76] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/u-vms-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyanam-ne-dopomozhe-nova-baza-v-abhaziyi/[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2023[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/26359[79] https://t.me/kpszsu/26359[80] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6458; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6457[81] https://lexfridman.com/volodymyr-zelenskyy-transcript#chapter3_world_war_ii[82] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/22826989[83] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/22826989https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024[85] https://lexfridman.com/volodymyr-zelenskyy-transcript#chapter3_world_war_ii[86] https://t.me/pul_1/15111 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/287831 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/01/2025/677bd0ab9a7947332fc7e93a
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 31, 2024
- at 1/9/25 10:03pmAngelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. KaganDecember 31, 2024, 7:15 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on December 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW and CTP will not publish a campaign assessment (or maps) tomorrow, January 1, in observance of the New Year holiday. Coverage will resume on January 2.Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers, largely comprised of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, at a reported cost of over 420,000 casualties in 2024. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on December 30 that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024.[1] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced 4,168 square kilometers in 2024, indicating that Russian forces have suffered approximately 102 casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized. ISW previously observed that Russian forces gained 2,356 square kilometers in exchange for an estimated 125,800 casualties during a period of intensified Russian offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024.[2] Russian forces made 56.5 percent of their 2024 territorial gains during the September through November 2024 period. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on December 24 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024, suggesting that Russia is likely recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recently high casualty rates one for one.[3]Russian advances have slowed in December 2024, however. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained 593 square kilometers or 18.1 square kilometers per day in December 2024, while the number of daily Russian casualties in December 2024 remained similar to the estimated daily casualty rate in November 2024. The Ukrainian General Staff reported a daily Russian personnel casualty average of 1,585 in December 2024, marking a fourth all-time high of Russia's daily casualty rate following reports that Russia's average daily Russian personnel casualty reached a new all-time high of 1,523 casualties per day in November 2024.[4] Russian forces were advancing at the notably higher rate of 27.96 square kilometers per day in November 2024.[5] Syrskyi stated on December 30 that Russian forces have suffered 1,700 casualties per day over the past week (since December 23), indicating the Russian forces may have suffered an even higher casualty rate in the last few weeks of 2024 even as Russian advances slowed.[6] The Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear if the Russian military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to decline as Russian forces continue to advance on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in 2024 but failed to accomplish these goals. Intensified Russian offensive operations in early 2024 resulted in the seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024 and subsequent Russian advances west of Avdiivka in the directions of Pokrovsk and Selydove throughout spring, summer, and fall 2024.[7] Russian forces also launched a largely unsuccessful offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast aimed at creating an unspecified "buffer zone" to defend Belgorod City from Ukrainian shelling in May 2024 and renewed offensive operations near Toretsk and west and southwest of Donetsk City in June and July 2024.[8] Western and Ukrainian sources assessed in 2023 and 2024 that Russia intended to seize the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk by the end of 2024, but Russia's slow advances in early and mid-2024 likely prompted the Russian military command to reassess and identify the seizure of Pokrovsk as Russian forces' primary offensive effort for the remainder of 2024.[9]Russian forces thus turned back to the Pokrovsk direction in late Summer and early Fall 2024 amid a surprise Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and successfully exploited the seizure of Selydove and Vuhledar to make further advances around Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and later Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently seized Kurakhove and are attempting to envelop Velyka Novosilka from the north and south.[10] Russian forces heavily relied on platoon-, company-, and battalion-sized mechanized assaults to advance in the open fields in the Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions in recent months but consistently incurred significant armored vehicles losses during these assaults.[11] Russian forces are currently attempting to envelop Pokrovsk from the south and northeast but have thus far failed to make significant recent progress in this effort.[12] Russian forces may also at least temporarily be shifting their focus from the envelopment of Pokrovsk to making opportunistic advances due west towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border during a critical moment of Russia's ongoing efforts to undermine Western support for Ukraine.[13]Russian forces have seized four mid-sized settlements - Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove - in all of 2024, the largest of which had a pre-war population of just over 31,000 people. Russian forces' rate of advance largely stalled around the few more urban settlements that Russian forces sought to take in 2024. Russian forces expended roughly four months in seizing Avdiivka in late 2023 and early 2024 and two months each on efforts to seize and envelop Selydove and Kurakhove in 2024. Russian forces also incurred significant personnel losses during efforts to take these settlements, and Ukrainian officials have recently estimated that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two weeks in mid-December 2024.[14] ISW has not assessed that any of the settlements that Russian forces seized in 2024 are operationally significant, as seizing these settlements has not allowed Russian forces to threaten any notable Ukrainian defensive nodes, and Russian forces have failed to conduct the kind of rapid, mechanized maneuver necessary to convert these tactical gains into deep penetrations of Ukraine's rear. ISW currently assesses that Russian forces must capture approximately 8,559 square kilometers, which include significant Ukrainian defensive positions and large cities along Ukraine's fortress belt, to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces would require just over two years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at their 2024 rates of advance, assuming that all their advances were confined to Donetsk, that they can seize large urban areas as easily as small villages and fields, and that the Ukrainians do not conduct any significant counterattacks in Donetsk.Ukrainian forces have yet to stop Russian forces from advancing in their priority sectors, however, and Western aid remains critical to Ukraine's ability to stabilize the frontline in 2025. Ukrainian defenders have largely stalled Russian advances near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, but Russian forces continue to make gradual, grinding advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions. Ongoing Ukrainian manpower constraints and morale issues are also creating vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive lines, and Ukrainian officials must address these issues and steel defenders against Russian infantry assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine.[15] Russian forces, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, are currently operating under a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces can indefinitely advance in Ukraine but fails to account for the possibility that Ukrainian forces could inflict losses sufficient to stall or stop future Russian offensive operations.[16] Ukrainian forces, with support from Ukraine's Western allies, must therefore work to integrate Ukrainian drone operations, sufficiently resourced artillery and long-range strike capabilities, and committed Ukrainian infantry units to defend against Russian advances and undermine Putin's theory of victory in 2025.Russian President Vladimir Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" during his New Year's address on December 31 - signaling the Kremlin's continued efforts to militarize Russian society and maintain regime stability by appeasing the growing Russian veteran community.[17] Putin claimed that the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" will honor current Russian servicemen, the 80th Anniversary of the Second World War, and other veterans who fought for Russia. Putin approved a list of instructions for the Russian government on December 20 that aims to expand Russia's network of military-patriotic educational programs as part of his "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" policies.[18] Putin will likely also continue to expand and institutionalize additional support programs for veterans as part of the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," many of which the Kremlin began in 2023 and 2024 likely out of a concern that an ever-growing number of dissatisfied Russian veterans could threaten the stability of Putin's regime. Putin notably created and significantly expanded the functions of Russia's Defenders of Fatherland State Fund in 2023 and 2024, which pledges to support Russian veterans who fought in Ukraine.[19] Putin also introduced the "Time of Heroes" state-wide initiative in Spring 2024, which aims to install Kremlin-selected Russian veterans into positions of power within the Russian government and business sector, and Russian authorities have already appointed two participants of this program to lead two major Russian military-patriotic institutions.[20] Putin also passed numerous decrees offering veterans subsidies and benefits throughout 2024 and will likely continue to do so in 2025 - despite the increasing costs of such policies - to ensure that the veteran community does not harbor grievances against the Kremlin and its war effort in Ukraine.[21] Putin's commitment to initiatives such as the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" and other support efforts for veterans are increasingly committing Russia to long-term financial obligations.Ukrainian naval drones reportedly downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea, reportedly marking the first time that a naval drone has shot down an air target. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 31 that it destroyed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter using the R-73 "Sea Dragon" missiles launched from a Magura V5 naval strike drone in the Black Sea.[22] The GUR noted that Ukrainian naval drones damaged another Russian Mi-8 helicopter but that the damaged helicopter eventually landed at an airfield. The GUR stated that the naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters marked the historic first destruction of an aerial target with a naval drone. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhayev claimed that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian aerial drones and two naval drones over and in the Black Sea overnight on December 31, but did not acknowledge the downing of the Mi-8 helicopter.[23] Russian milbloggers expressed concerns that Ukraine's ability to incorporate Ukrainian naval drones as part of Ukraine's air defense capabilities will complicate Russia's efforts to destroy Ukrainian naval drones, as Russia relies on helicopters and Su-30SM fighter jets to target naval drones that are far from Crimea's shore.[24] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces also destroyed a Russian Tor air defense system in southern Ukraine, and a local Crimean source claimed that Ukrainian forces may have struck a Tor air defense system near occupied Kozacha Bay (southwest of Sevastopol).[25]Ukrainian forces struck the Yarsevskaya oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and a building used by the Russian military in Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 and 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 31 that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) launched drone strikes against the Yarsevskaya oil depot, resulting in a series of intense explosions, heavy smoke, and oil tanks catching on fire near the depot.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the nearby oil refinery supplied the Russian war effort. Russian authorities confirmed that Ukrainian drones struck the oil refinery in Yarsevsky Raion, resulting in an oil spill and fire at the refinery.[27] Yartsevsky Raion Head Roman Zakharov confirmed the Ukrainian drone strike on social media but later deleted the post and amplified Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin's claim that the debris from downed Ukrainian drones resulted in a fire at the oil refinery.[28] Russian opposition outlet Astra, citing unnamed sources, reported that Ukrainian forces launched at least six Storm Shadow missile against a building used by Russian forces in Lgov on December 30.[29] Astra reported that the strike killed eight Russian servicemembers, wounded several Russian servicemembers, and wounded one civilian. Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an apartment building in Lgov.[30]Key Takeaways:Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers, largely comprised of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, at a reported cost of over 420,000 casualties in 2024.The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in 2024 but failed to accomplish these goals.Russian forces have seized four mid-sized settlements - Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove - in all of 2024, the largest of which had a pre-war population of just over 31,000 people.Russian forces would require just over two years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at their 2024 rates of advance, assuming that all their advances were confined to Donetsk, that they can seize large urban areas as easily as small villages and fields, and that the Ukrainians do not conduct any significant counterattacks in Donetsk.Ukrainian forces have yet to stop Russian forces from advancing in their priority sectors, however, and Western aid remains critical to Ukraine's ability to stabilize the frontline in 2025.Russian President Vladimir Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" during his New Years' address on December 31 - signaling the Kremlin's continued efforts to militarize Russian society and maintain regime stability by appeasing the growing Russian veteran community.Ukrainian naval drones reportedly downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea, reportedly marking the first time that a naval drone has shot down an air target.Ukrainian forces struck the Yarsevskaya oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and a building used by the Russian military in Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 and 31.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.The Russian government will deprive prisoners who volunteer to fight in Ukraine of the one-time enlistment bonus starting January 1, 2025, marking another instance of Russia trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of war.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in Ukraine's salient on December 31. Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) published later geolocated footage on December 31 that indicates that Ukrainian forces seized Kruglenkoye (southeast of Korenevo) and reported that Ukrainian forces established positions in a settlement previously held by North Korean and Russian forces in Kursk Oblast, likely referring to Kruglenkoye.[31] Geolocated footage published on December 30 shows that Ukrainian forces also advanced east of Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha) along the 38K-024 highway.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced from Russkaya Konopelka to Agronom (both east of Sudzha), where Russian forces are currently attacking, and to the outskirts of Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are 2.5 kilometers away from Sudzha.[34] Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[35] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Korenevsky Raion.[36]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued ground attacks along the international border north of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan, north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi, and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on December 30 and 31 but did make any confirmed advances.[37]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kreminna amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 31. Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[38] Additional geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Terny.[39] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces currently control 90 percent of Terny.[40] The Ukrainian Khortytsya Group of Forces reported on December 31 that Russian forces conducted a roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Nova Kruhlyakivka (west of Svatove).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that poor weather conditions, including rain and fog, are complicating Russian operations along both banks of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction.[42] Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Zahryzove, Lozova, Stepova Novoselivka, and Kruhlyakivka; west of Svatove near Zeleny Hai, Kopanky, Pershotravneve, Novoyehorivka, and Nadiya; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Ivanivka, Druzhelyubivka, Cherneshchyna, Novoserhiivka, and Terny; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova and Hryhorivka; and west of Kreminna near Yampolivka on December 30 and 31.[43] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Hrekivka (northwest of Kreminna).[44]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk amid continued offensive operations in the area on December 31. Geolocated footage published on December 24 indicates that Russian forces likely seized Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 31 that Russian forces are advancing towards a water reservoir just east of Siversk and that Russian forces advanced 900 meters along a railway south of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[46] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on December 30 and 31.[47]Russian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on December 31. Geolocated footage published on December 27 indicates that Russian forces advanced to Lermontova Street in northern Chasiv Yar.[48] Russian forces attacked within Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on December 30 and 31.[49] Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on December 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked within Toretsk and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on December 30 and 31.[51] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on December 31 that Russian forces conducted a roughly company-sized mechanized assault in the direction of Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk).[52] Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[53]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on December 31. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on December 31 that Russian forces seized Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and a Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.[54] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized Vozdvyzhenka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced along the railway line toward Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[55] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Myrolyubivka, Zelene Pole, and Promin; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Vovkove, Kotlyne, Solone, Pishchane, Novovasylivka, Novoolenivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, Novovasylivka, and Ukrainka on December 30 and 31.[56] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 329th and 80th tank regiments, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD), and 74th and 55th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA, CMD) are operating in the Pishchane-Kotlyne area and Novoolenivka-Novoyelyzavetivka area.[57]Russian forces recently advanced into the western outskirts of the Kurakhivska Thermal Power Plant (TPP) just west of Kurakhove but it is unlikely that Russian forces have seized the entire TPP. Geolocated footage published on December 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into the western outskirts of the TPP.[58] ISW assesses that Russian forces likely advanced into the western outskirts of the TPP from positions in Stari Terny (northwest of Kurakhove and the TPP), as it is unlikely that Ukrainian forces held significantly fortified positions along the western shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir. A Russian source claimed on December 31 that Russian forces have encircled the Ukrainian grouping in the TPP and nearby industrial zone and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the western shore of the reservoir, further indicating that Russian forces likely advanced along the western shore of the reservoir and hold positions in both the eastern and western outskirts of the TPP.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) participated in the advance into the TPP and insinuated that Russian forces advanced to the western outskirts of the TPP from the outskirts of Kurakhove and have seized most of the TPP.[60] Ukrainian forces may maintain positions in the central areas of the TPP, however, as the industrial area may provide sufficient defensible positions for Ukraine to maintain a limited defense in the area. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may attempt to outflank Ukrainian positions at the TPP by advancing south from Stari Terny, and such an advance may complicate Ukraine's ability to supply positions at the TPP and complicate future Ukrainian withdrawals from the TPP.[61]Russian forces continued offensive operations in other areas of the Kurakhove direction on December 31. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th and 5th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) recently advanced from Stari Terny towards Shevchenko (both northwest of Kurakhove) and either partially or completely seized Shevchenko.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kurakhove and have seized most of Shevchenko.[63] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kurakhove direction reported that Russian forces have been using civilian vehicles to transport infantry to frontline positions over the last month and that Russian forces are removing the doors and rooves from these vehicles in order to transport more infantry and supplies.[64] Russian forces continued assaults in Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka, Ukrainka, Shevchenko, and Slovyanka; and west of Kurakhove near Dachne on December 30 and 31.[65] Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[66]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on December 31 but did not make any confirmed gains. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on December 31 that Russian forces conducted offensive operations with an unspecified number of armored vehicles near Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar).[67] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th and 5th motorized rifle brigades, 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are attempting to advance on Ulakly (northwest of Vuhledar) from Shevchenko in the north and Zelenivka from the south.[68] Russian forces continued attacking north of Vuhledar near Uspenivka and northwest of Vuhledar near Kostyantynopolske, Yantarne, Uspenivka, and Kostyantynopil on December 30 and 31.[69] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Ulakly (northwest of Vuhledar).[70]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on December 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka itself, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozlyv, southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Neskuchne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka and Novosilka on December 30 and 31.[71] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka.[72]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 30 and 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 30 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[73] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on December 30 and 31.[74] Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction, and elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Orikhiv.[75]Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on December 30 and 31 but did not make any confirmed advances.[76]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on December 31 that Russian forces launched six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; one Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile and eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tula Oblast; six Kh-69 cruise missiles from Belgorod Oblast; and 40 Shaheds and decoy drones from Bryansk and Rostov oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile, five Kh-69 cruise missiles, and 16 Shaheds; that 24 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Russian ballistic missiles struck targets in Kyiv and Sumy oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported on December 31 that Russian forces launched overnight missile and drone strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast, resulting in debris from downed drones damaging residential buildings.[78] Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Artyukh reported on December 31 that Russian forces launched a morning strike involving 13 missiles against Shostka, Sumy Oblast that damaged infrastructure and three boiler rooms.[79]The Ukrainian Air Force reported on December 31 that Ukrainian forces downed a total of 1,300 Russian missiles of various types, 11,200 strike drones, 3,200 reconnaissance drones, 40 fixed-wing aircraft, and six helicopters in 2024.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian military increased its production and use of ballistic missiles against Ukraine in 2024.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian government will deprive prisoners who volunteer to fight in Ukraine of a one-time enlistment bonus starting January 1, 2025, marking another instance of Russia trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of war.[81] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on December 28 that removed the right to a one-time enlistment bonus for Russian prisoners who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Some Russian federal subjects (regions) increased one-time enlistment payments to prisoners up to 505,000 rubles ($4,786) in Fall 2024, and Russian authorities have increased such monetary incentives in hopes of recruiting additional troops to serve in Ukraine.[82] The decree notably follows Russian President Vladimir Putin's controversial decision to change Russian policy in November 2024 guaranteeing a one-time payment of three million rubles ($28,434) to all Russian servicemen who have been wounded in combat in Ukraine since March 2022 and instead offering only an enhanced compensation of four million rubles ($37,912) to servicemen officially deemed "heavily wounded" in combat.[83] The Russian government originally introduced high enlistment bonuses for prisoners and compensation for all wounded servicemen to incentivize military recruitment after Putin decided against declaring general mobilization in Spring 2022. Financial incentives became the key pillar of the Russian military's recruitment campaign and personnel retention efforts over the past nearly three years, and ISW continues to assess that the reversal of such incentives indicates that this system is becoming economically unsustainable for the Kremlin.[84]The Russian MoD's Main Directorate of Combat Training is reportedly failing to properly train new recruits, likely because the Russian military command urgently needs reinforcements to support grinding assaults in eastern Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that the MoD's Main Directorate of Combat Training offers a recruit training program for less than 30 days instead of the recommended 45 days.[85] The milblogger observed that the training program and its timeframes are not mandatory and that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov has not issued a decree formalizing a training program for recruits in order to avoid launching new bureaucratic processes. The milblogger noted that the lack of a formalized training program creates an environment in which training varies based on the orders of individual grouping of forces (GOF) commanders. The milblogger added that on average Russian servicemen receive about 14 to 16 days of training and that the amount of time allocated for training depends on the military command's deadline for reconstituting units and preparations for offensives. The milblogger noted that Russian units along the frontline typically look like a combination of poorly trained infantry, heavily damaged equipment, a lack of junior commanders, and greatly reduced planning capabilities.The milblogger's account differs dramatically from the Russian MoD's description of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's naval infantry training program, which Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov inspected on December 31.[86] Belousov visited an unspecified Southern Military District (SMD) training ground where Russian recruits supposedly receive tactical fire, medical, engineering, and combat coordination training under the leadership of Russian officers with prior combat experience in Ukraine. BSF Commander Vice-Admiral Sergei Pinchuk told Belousov that recruits also receive specialized training such as using and repelling unmanned aerial systems (UAVs). Belousov also toured a UAV lab located at the training ground used for training UAV crews and testing new equipment.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/osirskiy/1012[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2024[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1864580705948184870 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19018 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19032 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19056 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19100 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19114 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19141 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19160 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19179 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19196 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19232 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19246 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19258 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19282 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19308 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19332 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19351 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19379 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19389 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19425 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19445 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19483 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19507 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19521 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19555 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19592 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19617 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19636 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19651 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19675 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19700[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024[6] https://t.me/osirskiy/1012[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024 ;[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024[17] https://www.ural56 dot ru/news/736043/ ; https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27649/5032481/ ; https://expert dot ru/news/vladimir-putin-v-novogodnem-obrashchenii-zayavil-chto-vse-budet-khorosho/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294220 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/12/31/putin-vystupil-s-novogodnim-obrascheniem[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2024[19] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73775; http://www.en.kremlinru/cata dot log/persons/632/events/70823[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2024; http://www.en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/74292; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/administration/75579; https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2024/12/11/heroes-of-their-time-en[21] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/66b5083e9a7947500d70e9cb; https://nao24 dot ru/obshestvo/43175-prezident-rossii-podpisal-ukaz-o-vyplatah-uchastnikam-svo.html; https://realnoevremya dot ru/news/314559-putin-podpisal-zakon-o-zaschite-vyplat-za-uchastie-v-svo-pri-bankrotstve[22] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5127 ; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/istorychnyi-udar-voiny-hur-vpershe-u-sviti-znyshchyly-povitrianu-tsil-za-dopomohoiu-morskoho-drona-magura-v5.html ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1874003631730811084 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1873991746255716425[23] https://t.me/razvozhaev/9464[24] https://t.me/rybar/66809; https://t.me/rybar/66811; https://t.me/rusich_army/19743[25] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0hmLex6GGe9g3JHR27W77rghCrCehe6p8rruPAA4Jmzd3oFcfsRU1fohaTvnUTfrjl; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/72467[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19715[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/294167 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294168[28] https://suspilne dot media/914753-ukrainski-droni-atakuvali-naftobazu-v-smolenskij-oblasti-rf/; https://t.me/anohin67/4838 ; https://www.severreal dot org/a/neftebaza-zagorelas-v-smolenskoy-oblasti-iz-za-ataki-bpla/33258877.html[29] https://t.me/astrapress/71487[30] https://t.me/Hinshtein/8926[31] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10866; https://t.me/ukr_sof/1334; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24180[32] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1873878181914304693; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1873878184065953873; https://t.me/BoogeYmanZ/173[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21787; https://t.me/dva_majors/61486 [34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21787[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/47492; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/66356 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1874041361634406515; https://t.me/rusich_army/19744 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149747; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/47144 https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42682 [36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21771[37] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12183 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3320 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885[38] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1873835253967839582; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1873818727994835060[39] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1873836298127237573; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1873818727994835060; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7972[40] https://t.me/rybar/66806; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149730 [41] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/61486; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12183 [43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885; https://t.me/dva_majors/61486 [44] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/4695[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7973; https://t.me/rubpak54/237; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61138[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21780[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl [48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7976; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1874125554938724459; https://t.me/slovianskbrigade/518[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885; https://t.me/wargonzo/24034 [50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21771 [51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885 [52] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83668; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13199 [54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2459 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61134[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61134; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149649 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61130[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21782[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2458[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7977; https://t.me/SolovievLive/306365[59] https://t.me/vrogov/18500 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83635[60] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30327[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2458 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02Zr7LnehoR4XjbuAfqU5XqfxoxvrV5zJrwN4B6Q5FBPGuxmSHtNhqa4ZfVsJrjowal[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21785 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83635 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61132[64] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/30/pid-kurahovym-vorog-vlashtovuye-shturmy-v-styli-bozhevilnyj-vanka/[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885[66] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83629 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83628[67] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2458 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02Zr7LnehoR4XjbuAfqU5XqfxoxvrV5zJrwN4B6Q5FBPGuxmSHtNhqa4ZfVsJrjowal[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149730 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149659 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21785 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83635[70] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13198[71]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0hmLex6GGe9g3JHR27W77rghCrCehe6p8rruPAA4Jmzd3oFcfsRU1fohaTvnUTfrjl[72] https://t.me/voin_dv/12556[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/61486 [74]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0hmLex6GGe9g3JHR27W77rghCrCehe6p8rruPAA4Jmzd3oFcfsRU1fohaTvnUTfrjl[75] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6587 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83634 [76]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0hmLex6GGe9g3JHR27W77rghCrCehe6p8rruPAA4Jmzd3oFcfsRU1fohaTvnUTfrjl [77] https://t.me/kpszsu/25836[78] https://t.me/kyivoda/23985[79] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/31/udar-po-shostczi-rosiyany-zastosuvaly-13-raket/[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/25847[81] http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202412300021 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/amp/7420623 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/12/31/pravitelstvo-rf-otmenilo-edinovremennye-vyplaty-zaklyuchennym-podpisavshim-kontrakt-s-minoborony-rf; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/12/31/24753260.shtml; https://t.me/idelrealii/39334 ; https://t.me/severrealii/29005; https://t.me/astrapress/71493; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21561 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/92044 [82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2024[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024[85] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1852[86] https://t.me/mod_russia/47447
- — Iran Update, December 31, 2024
- at 1/9/25 10:03pmJohanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A new group announced its opposition to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.[1] Armed opposition by the group—named the Syrian Popular Resistance—would likely exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and even risk driving fissures in the HTS-led coalition. The Syrian Popular Resistance in a statement on December 29 threatened to attack HTS and HTS-affiliated leaders purportedly in response to the killing of Christians, Shia, and Sunnis since overthrowing the Bashar al Assad regime.[2] The Syrian Popular Resistance labeled the HTS-led coalition as “Kharijites,” which derogatorily frames the coalition as heretical. The statement by the Syrian Popular Resistance comes as nascent opposition against HTS has appeared, especially along the Syrian coast, which is predominantly populated by the Alawite minority.[3] It is possible that the Syrian Popular Resistance is affiliated with this activity, though CTP-ISW cannot verify the exact nature and origin of the group. Growing conflict between HTS and minority and opposition groups would fuel sectarian tensions, drive an escalation cycle, and risk destabilizing Syria further. Although HTS leader Ahmed al Shara has repeatedly used tempered and inclusive rhetoric in recent weeks, he would struggle to contain such a cycle of violence given some of the extreme Salafi-jihadi and sectarian actors that constitute his coalition.There are growing indications that Iran is trying to stoke and exploit sectarian violence in Syria. Doing so would weaken the HTS-led interim government and help reestablish the Axis of Resistance in Syria. The main outlet of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) called on December 31 for a counter-revolution in Syria, framing it as a response to the "occupation" of Syria by "takfiri terrorists."[4] This term refers to apostates and is commonly used by Iran to refer to the so-called “Islamic State” and other armed Sunni organizations. The IRGC report added that the liberation of Syria is “imminent.” This rhetoric from the IRGC marks the first time that CTP-ISW has observed Iran appearing to call for a revolt against the HTS-led interim government. Rhetoric from Iranian leaders and state media has until this point ambiguously called for the formation of armed resistance in Syria but would often mention resistance to Israeli ground operations in southwestern Syria in the same breath. That the main outlet of the IRGC made these remarks is especially noteworthy given that regional sources have claimed that the IRGC is planning to organize, direct, and support new proxy and partner militia networks in Syria. It is also noteworthy that the IRGC report comes around the same time that the Syrian Popular Resistance announced its formation and opposition to the HTS-led interim government. Iranian state media has previously reported on the formation of armed resistance against HTS in positive terms.[5] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately stated on December 31 that "a new resistance has been born [in Syria] that will manifest itself in the coming years" during a meeting with the Omani foreign affairs minister.[6]The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to clash in northern and northeastern Syria on December 31. The SDF mourned a fighter that died in clashes near Qara Qozak bridge on December 31, indicating that fighting has persisted there.[7] Anti-SDF media claimed that the SDF and SNA continued to clash west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[8] An SDF media official reported that SNA forces in Manbij City attacked the SDF with heavy artillery near a town that is 15 km southwest of Manbij City on December 30.[9] Anti-SDF media also claimed that the SNA fired artillery at SDF positions near Kobani on December 31.[10] US Defense Department deputy press secretary said on December 30 that the ceasefire between Turkey and SDF continued to hold around Kobani, where Turkish forces have reportedly massed along the Syria-Turkey border.[11]The HTS-led Military Operations Department continued to clash with pro-Assad elements that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm. Syrian media reported small arms fire during a Military Operations Room raid in northern Damascus that is generally considered loyal to the former Assad regime on December 31.[12] Other sources disputed the account of clashes and said that the HTS-affiliated forces only entered the suburb to detain three gunmen when called by neighborhood officials.[13] HTS-affiliated forces operated against former regime elements in other Damascus neighborhoods without reports of small arms fire as well.[14] The Damascus clashes appear to have been isolated and minor, if they even occurred at all, especially compared to the interim government’s deployment to coastal Syria during which it used attack helicopters against pro-regime fighters.[15] The HTS-led Military Operations Department additionally imposed a curfew in Talbiseh, north of Homs City, during an operation to detain former regime fighters.[16]An unspecified Israeli official speaking to Israeli media expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the US-led international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen.[17] The official emphasized the threat that the Houthis pose to international security and shipping and that the international coalition should ”confront and eliminate this threat.” The Israeli official also emphasized that the Houthis should not be underestimated due to their advanced technologies and intent to threaten Israel, international shipping, and other regional targets, including Saudi Arabia.These Israeli comments come amid continued US airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed US airstrikes targeting Houthi command-and-control sites and military infrastructure on December 30 and 31.[18] Houthi media confirmed two US airstrikes hit around al Tuhayta, south of Hudaydah on December 30, 10 airstrikes hit the 22nd May military complex and two airstrikes hit al Arad military complex, both in Sanaa.[19] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis tried to preempt the US airstrikes by firing a drone and seven cruise missiles at the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier.[20] CENTCOM intercepted these projectiles and destroyed a Houthi coastal radar site.[21]Sarea also claimed the Houthis fired two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion airport and a power station south of Jerusalem in central Israel on December 31.[22] An Israeli war correspondent confirmed that a Houthi ballistic missile fragment crashed in Beit Shemesh, near Jerusalem, late on December 30 but did not cause any major damage.[23] The IDF intercepted a missile from Yemen before it entered Israeli airspace, and sirens sounded across central Israel to warn of falling debris.[24]Key Takeaways:Syria: A new group announced its opposition to the HTS-led interim government. Armed opposition by the group—named the Syrian Popular Resistance—would likely exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and even risk driving fissures in the HTS-led coalition. There are growing indications that Iran is trying to stoke and exploit sectarian violence in Syria. Doing so would weaken the HTS-led interim government and help reestablish the Axis of Resistance in Syria.Yemen: An unspecified Israeli official speaking to Israeli media expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the US-led international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. These comments come amid continued US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force killed a Hamas special operations forces (SOF) commander in the humanitarian area of Khan Younis on December 31. Palestinian fighters returned to their regular tempo and method of attacks in Jabalia refugee camp on December 31.Lebanon: Lebanese and Lebanese Hezbollah media reported IDF shelling around Chebaa, southeastern Lebanon, on December 31. The IDF 91st Division continued to operate in southeastern Lebanon on December 31. A senior IDF Northern Command officer told Israeli media on December 31 that Israel is prepared for all possibilities in Lebanon, including extending the presence of the IDF beyond the ceasefire’s stipulations.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF Air Force killed a Hamas special operations forces (SOF) commander in the humanitarian area of Khan Younis on December 31. The IDF stated that Abdalhadi Sabbah commanded Hamas Nukhba SOF fighters in the Western Khan Younis Battalion.[25] Sabbah participated in the October 7, 2023, attack into Israel and continued to attack the IDF in the Gaza Strip.[26] The IDF stated that it took steps to minimize collateral damage from the strike within the humanitarian zone.[27] The IDF Air Force separately confirmed that it killed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) rocket commander who was responsible for the northern Gaza Strip in early December 2024.[28]Palestinian fighters returned to their regular tempo and method of attacks in Jabalia refugee camp on December 31. Hamas and PIJ attacked IDF 162nd Division armor in Jabalia on December 31 in two small-scale, isolated incidents.[29] The militias used explosively formed penetrators, rocket-propelled grenades and other high-powered improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack the IDF.[30] These attacks come after Palestinian fighters conducted a relatively large multi-wave attack targeting the IDF around Jabalia refugee camp in groups that ranged from six to 30 fighters on December 30.[31] This attack was noteworthy given it was significantly larger than most other militia operations in the Gaza Strip in recent months; fighters have typically operated in small squads rather than as a small company.Three Palestinian militia mortared the IDF around the Netzarim Corridor, south of Gaza City, on December 31.[32]Palestinian militias conducted a rocket attack into southern Israel on December 31. The IDF announced that it intercepted a single rocket that crossed from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.[33] No militia has claimed the attack at the time of this writing.West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonLebanese and Lebanese Hezbollah media reported IDF shelling around Chebaa, southeastern Lebanon, on December 31.[34] The IDF began operating in the area in early November 2024. [35]The IDF 91st Division continued to operate in southeastern Lebanon on December 31.[36] The IDF 769th Brigade located a warehouse in Wadi al Saluqi, containing a significant number of weapons, including unspecified launchers, missiles, and IEDs. The IDF also located rocket launchers, IEDs, small arms, missiles, observation devices, and tactical combat equipment in nearby buildings. IDF 769th Brigade Commander Avraham Marciano noted that a 120-mm mortar was ready target Israeli villages along Ramim ridge. The IDF last operated around Wadi al Saluqi on December 19, according to local reports.[37] Lebanese media reported on December 31 that the IDF detonated explosives and conducted a drone strike in Bani Hayyan, southeastern Lebanon.[38] Hezbollah media reported on December 20 that the IDF withdrew from Bani Hayyan after entering the town on December 11.[39]Hezbollah media reported on December 31 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL deployed to Chama, southwestern Lebanon, after the IDF withdrew from the town.[40] The LAF reported that the next phase of deployment will include specialized units conducting an engineering survey of the town to remove unexploded ordinances.[41] A senior IDF Northern Command officer told Israeli media on December 31 that Israel is prepared for all possibilities in Lebanon, including extending the presence of the IDF beyond the ceasefire’s stipulations.[42] The officer added that the LAF will face “significant challenges” in deploying forces to meet the ceasefire’s requirements. The LAF and UNIFIL have already deployed to multiple towns in southern Lebanon to backfill the IDF since the ceasefire went into effect on November 27.[43] A Hezbollah politician and a Hezbollah-affiliated journalist separately threatened on December 31 that Hezbollah would act if the IDF extended its presence in Lebanon beyond the ceasefire’s terms.[44]The IDF is required to withdraw from Lebanon by January 25, 2025.[45]Lebanese media reported on December 31 that Hezbollah politician Ihab Hamadeh threatened that Hezbollah will “exercise its national duty” if Israel uses its ground operations into Syria to threaten Lebanon from the east.[46] Israel first began operations within the Israel-Syria disengagement zone on December 8 to protect Israel from possible instability in Syria amid the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime.[47]Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on December 31 that the LAF has arrested over 300 Syrians who entered Lebanon illegally.[48] The LAF reportedly arrested 314 Syrians in the north and 15 Syrians in Bekaa Valley. The LAF separately arrested 60 individuals and an unspecified number of Palestinians and Syrian individuals for various drug and weapons-related charges throughout northern Lebanon, Beruit’s southern suburbs, and Bekaa Valley.Iran and the Axis of ResistanceIraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Faud Hussein and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Assad al Shaibani agreed to bolster Iraqi-Syrian coordination against the so-called “Islamic State” during a phone call on December 30.[49] Hussein also expressed interest in resuming the operations of the Iraqi embassy in Damascus. Iraqi embassy staff left Damascus in early December for Lebanon due to insecurity in Syria.[50]Lebanese Hezbollah Central Council member Hassan al Baghdadi met with unspecified Iranian-backed Afghan Fatemiyoun Division commanders in Mashhad in northeastern Iran.[51] Baghdadi emphasized that Israel is ”increasingly powerless” against the Axis of Resistance and reaffirmed the Axis of Resistance‘s commitment to continue fighting to destroy Israel.[52]Iranian Law Enforcement Command Border Guard Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Ali Goudarzi met with Iraqi Border Forces Commander Lieutenant General Mohammed Abdul Wahab Sekr in Marivan in northwestern Iran on December 31.[53] Goudarzi highlighted agreements reached on enhanced intelligence exchanges, sharing expertise, coordinated patrols, and conducting joint exercises, aimed at preventing drug trafficking, illegal migration, arms smuggling, and terrorist activities.[54]Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi paid an official visit to Iran on December 30. Busaidi met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in Tehran.[55] All three Iranian officials told al Busaidi that, according to the orders of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran has refrained from changing its policy of prohibiting the production and use of nuclear weapons. These meetings come as Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program and senior Iranian officials have discussed the possibility of reversing this policy.[56]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on December 31 to discuss efforts to address inflation, the devaluation of the Iranian currency, and energy shortages.[57] Pezeshkian stated that discussions included using subsidies to help consumers, fostering economic cooperation with neighboring countries, and energy conservation efforts.[58]The United States sanctioned IRGC subsidiary Cognitive Design Production Center (CDPC), which specializes in influence operations, for trying to interfere in the 2024 US presidential election.[59] CDPC has specifically tried inciting political tensions among US voters since 2023.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/4918[2] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/4918[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-28-2024[4] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/22592[5] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/716172[6] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85705540/[7] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1874043118372139448[8] https://t.me/sohebb1993/20657 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131554[9] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1873835888045863175 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1873840861307691129[10] https://t.me/sohebb1993/20656[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-fears-military-buildup-by-turkey-signals-preparations-for-incursion-into-syria-1c2e88e9 ; https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4018066/pentagon-deputy-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-hosts-press-gaggle/[12] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131555 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1874016196107845874 ; https://www.instagram.com/asharqnews/reel/DEQFRD8CxsN/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B2/743219/[13] https://t.me/damascusv011/27150[14] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1874092552909169149 ; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1874111877586051432[15] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate122824[16] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1873996556933968137[17] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/israel-pushing-international-coalition-as-solution-to-houthi-threat-official-says/[18] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1874089194030567561[19] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1873832533340918020; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1874077114376532414[20] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1873982038560436696 ;https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1874089194030567561[21] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1874089194030567561[22] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1873982038560436696[23] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1873844685673775265[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1873841368285798869 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1873844685673775265[25] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874146665206345734[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874146669312508323[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874146669312508323[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874013236594696317[29] https://t.me/sarayaps/19012 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/19013[30] https://t.me/sarayaps/19012 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/19013[31] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1873743642063495644[32] https://t.me/sarayaps/19008 ; https://t.me/alwya2000/7232[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874043992897429762[34] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126077 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/188925[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-9-2024[36] https://www dot idf.il/261457[37] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/109593[38] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110368 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126096 ; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1874118706801864774[39] https://english dot almanar.com.lb/2294987[40] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/12978462?s=tg[41] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1874083943546224793[42] https://www.israelhayom dot com/2024/12/31/top-idf-commander-strategic-positions-in-lebanon-vital-for-northern-israels-defense/[43] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/12978462?s=tg ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2024[44] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110383 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110314[45] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1861789420564709573[46] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110383[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-8-2024[48] https://al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/817986[49] https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81-%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AB%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82[50] https://www.barrons.com/news/iraq-evacuates-damascus-embassy-staff-to-lebanon-diplomatic-source-44ed68e4[51] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/716412[52] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/716412[53] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4419678[54] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4419678[55] https://president dot ir/fa/156308;https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/75904;https://tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/10/3229243[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-8-2024 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-16-2024[57] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58808[58] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58808[59] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2766
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 5, 2025
- at 1/9/25 9:28pmNicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, and George BarrosJanuary 5, 2025, 7:30 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on January 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple roughly company-sized mechanized assaults in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky direction (northeast of Sudzha) in three waves of attack using roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also intensified offensive operations in the direction of Leonidovo (southeast of Korenevo) and conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Pushkarnoye (east of Sudzha).[2] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in fields southwest and south of Berdin and entered the southern part of the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers published updated maps of the Kursk area of operations that indicate that Ukrainian forces also occupy Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka (all northeast of Sudzha and southwest of Berdin) as of January 5 and reported that Ukrainian forces recently entered Novosotnitsky (just east of Berdin); and advanced in fields west of Yamskaya Step (immediately northwest of Berdin) and west of Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha and northwest of Berdin).[4] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nikolskiy and Alexandriya (east and southeast of Leonidovo, respectively) and north of Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha) towards Pushkarnoye in small infantry groups but did not provide details about the extent of any possible Ukrainian advances in these areas.[5] Russian milbloggers largely expressed concern that the renewed Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast may be a diversionary effort and claimed that it is too early to determine whether these operations in Kursk could be part of a future main effort.[6]Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows that Russian forces advanced in western and southern Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) elements pushed Ukrainian forces from Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (immediately northeast of Makhnovka).[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced into Makhnovka "some time ago, however.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 4 that Russian and North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka on January 3 and 4.[10] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Makhnovka and along a road into southeastern Kurilovka (immediately southwest of Makhnovka).[11] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced during counterattacks against Ukrainian assaults east of Leonidovo towards Nikolskiy and in the direction of Malaya Loknya (northeast of Sudzha) on January 5.[12] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian mechanized column unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Malaya Loknya, however.[13] The milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces destroy most Russian mechanized columns in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz group, former Wagner Group personnel, and unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units reportedly defended against the Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast.[14]Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 5 that Ukrainian EW interference during Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from operating drones in the area, degrading Russian forces’ ability to defend against Ukrainian mechanized attacks.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that drones with fiber optic cables are one of the few Russian drone variants that consistently resist Ukrainian EW countermeasures, although some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were able to use some first-person view (FPV) and Lancet drones.[16] Russian officials claimed on January 5 that Russian forces downed three unspecified Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range strike capabilities with ground operations and tactical EW systems.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes near Bolshoye Soldatskoye and other unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian forces from deploying reinforcements, artillery systems, and drone operators.[18] Widespread Russian concern over Russia's ability to respond to improved Ukrainian EW technology and long-range strike capabilities indicates that Russian forces may be struggling to quickly adapt to Ukrainian battlefield innovations. Reports that Ukrainian forces are using long-range fires to interdict Russian rear areas and EW to degrade Russian drones in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances indicate that Ukrainian forces operating in Kursk are employing more effective combined arms tactics.Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast. The tempo of Russian offensive operations has remained low east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, along the Hrodivka-Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) line, and further east near Novooleksandrivka and Arkhanhelske since September 2024 when Russian military command reprioritized offensive operations aimed at seizing Selydove (southwest of Pokrovsk), Kurakhove, and Vuhledar over efforts to seize Pokrovsk.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 29 that Russian forces began intensifying offensive operations east of Pokrovsk, and geolocated footage published on January 1 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[20] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces have likely also seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (both east of Pokrovsk) in recent days and advanced into southeastern Yelyzavetivka (south of Pokrovsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units consolidated positions north of Tymofiivka and along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and that Russian forces advanced north of Vozdvyzhenka toward Baranivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Zelene Pole.[22] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 5 that Russian forces recently resumed attacks in the Mykolaivka-Promin and Mykolaivka-Myrnohrad areas (both east of Pokrovsk) and reinforced the Russian grouping in this area with elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and the 137 Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly subordinated to the 41st CAA, CMD).[23]The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 5 that Russian forces intensified offensive operations east of Pokrovsk over the last week (since December 29), and ISW started observing reports of renewed Russian activity in the area on December 27.[24] Recent Russian advances near Vozdvyzhenka and Yelyzavetivka and claims that Russian forces are advancing further north towards Vodyane Druhe and Baranivka indicate that Russian forces may be forming a salient that they intend to leverage to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Elements of the Russian 41st CAA have reportedly been regrouping and reconstituting in this area for several months, and Mashovets assessed in late December 2024 that the Russian military command was preparing to activate elements of the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will have to make significant and rapid advances toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) or towards and into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) if Russian forces intend to envelop Pokrovsk from both the northeast and southwest in the near future.[26] The Russian military command may assess that advancing through the fields and small settlements along the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line will be an easier path of advance than attempting to fight through the more urban and heavily defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to Pokrovsk.Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance. ISW previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary.[27] Russian advances east of Pokrovsk may be opportunistic, aimed at seizing additional territory regardless of its tactical significance, and the beginning of a concerted Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Russian advances towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary may also be part of an opportunistic exploitation of weaker Ukrainian positions south of Pokrovsk, while also contributing to Russia's long-term objective of advancing to the administrative boundaries of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[28] The Russian military command likely intends to exploit opportunities to advance east and south of Pokrovsk so long as such advances remain expedient and Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attacks immediately near and into Pokrovsk itself.Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently advanced to southeastern Yelyazavetivka and seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (all east of Pokrovsk).[29] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade also reportedly participated in the seizure of Vozdvyzhenka as of January 2.[30] The 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly also participated in the seizure of Kurakhove and the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) and is conducting clearing operations within the settlement, indicting that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently split between at least two sectors of the frontline.[31] ISW has not observed reports of other elements of the Russian 51st CAA operating east of Pokrovsk in the 41st CAA's AoR within the past month. The Russian military's decision to split the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade along two prioritized sectors of the frontline and reports of their participation in the seizure of several settlements indicates that the Russian military may be using elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade as a tactical penetration force.Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5.Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5.Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations.Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast.The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area.Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance.Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline.Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient and regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationSee topline text for updates on Ukrainian ground operations in Kursk Oblast.Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Taganrog and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast on the night of January 4 to 5. Russian and Ukrainian sources published footage of Russian air defenses activating near Taganrog and Millerovo and reported that Ukrainian forces may have targeted nearby airfields.[32] Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed that Russian forces intercepted 37 Ukrainian drones over Rostov Oblast overnight and that falling drone debris damaged residential areas.[33]A Russian source claimed on January 5 that a Ukrainian missile strike near Lgov, Kursk Oblast killed Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division's Communications Head Lieutenant Colonel Valery Tereschchenko on December 30.[34] A Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian forces launched an unspecified number of Storm Shadow missiles at a 76th VDV Division command post and killed eight senior commanders and wounded 20 personnel.[35]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya and Vovchansk on January 4 and 5.[36] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 5 that Russian forces are attacking and consolidating positions in small groups near Vovchansk.[37]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Note: ISW is now orienting Russian activity along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions to reflect Russian forces' priority operational goals in these areas.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this.[38] Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 4 and 5.[39] Ukrainian Kupyansk City Administration Head Andriy Besedin stated on January 4 that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), and drone strikes on Kupyansk and that the frontline is approximately two kilometers from the city's center.[40]Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields northwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova) during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault.[41] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 5 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon near Zahryzove (north of Borova) and that Ukrainian forces damaged two armored vehicles while repelling the assault.[42] Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya, Pershotravneve, Novoserhiivka, Novoyehorivka, and Tverdokhlibove; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka on January 4 and 5.[43]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 5 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked northwest of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny, west of Kreminna near Zarichne, and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on January 4 and 5.[44]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Note: ISW will be incorporating data previously reported as the Vuhledar direction as part of the Kurakhove direction moving forward to reflect the shifting operational situation in this area.Russian forces attacked in the Siversk direction on January 5 but did not advance.[45]Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Chasiv Yar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 2 shows that Ukrainian forces recaptured positions along a section of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal southeast of Chasiv Yar.[46] Russian forces conducted offensive operations within and near Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on January 4 and 5.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 5 that Russian forces may intensify efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the Chasiv Yar Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar in the coming days.[48] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[49]Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 3 and 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced along Kutuzova Street in western Toretsk, Saratovksa Street in northern Toretsk, and Kosmonavtiv Street in southwestern Toretsk.[50] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 4 and 5.[51] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces are now attacking in platoons of up to 20 soldiers after previously attacking in teams of roughly five personnel.[52] The Ukrainian officer reported that Russian forces are attempting to attacking under fog cover and that poor weather is inhibiting Russian logistics in the Toretsk direction.See topline for Russian advances east of Pokrovsk.Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Pokrovsk on January 5. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Pokrovsk towards Novooleksandrivka, along the Sribne-Novoandriivka line from Novoyelyzavetivka, and towards Yasenove from Ukrainka.[53] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim, however. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced within one kilometer of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and are attempting to interdict the T-04-06 Pokrovsk-Mezhove highway.[54] Fighting continued near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Myrne, Yelyzavetivka, and Tymofiivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Novooleksandrivka, Vozdvyzhenka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene, Novyi Trud, Shevchenko, and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Solone, Novoolenivka, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, and Novoyelyzavetivka on January 4 and 5.[55] A Ukrainian intelligence officer serving in a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are suffering up to 400 personnel casualties per day in the Pokrovsk direction but are not decreasing their tempo of assaults, noting that Russian forces are conducting these assaults with personnel who received only a few weeks of training.[56] The Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces are conducting heavy artillery and air strikes against infrastructure and residential buildings in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk).[57] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 5 that windy and snowy weather is complicating Russian drone operations and that Russian forces are actively using fiber optic drones in the area.[58]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 showing elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) raising a flag in central Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove) indicates that Russian forces likely recently seized the settlement.[59] Additional geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the fields southeast of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[60] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kurakhove itself, northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka and Slovyanka, west of Kurakhove near Dachne and in the direction of Kostyantynopil, south of Kurakhove towards Yantarne, and southwest of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopolske and Zelenivka on January 4 and 5.[61] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 5 that Russian forces are only using armored vehicles in the Vuhledar and Kurakhove directions to transport infantry and are not using such vehicles in assault operations or for fire support.[62] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated that Russian forces are using fiber-optic drones in the area.[63] Elements of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly clearing the westernmost outskirts of Kurakhove.[64] Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction. [65]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on January 5 but did not make confirmed advances. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 218th Tank Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking along the Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole road.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[67] Russian forces also continued assaults north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on January 5.[68]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 5 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[69] Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Bilohirya (northwest of Robotyne) and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on January 4 and 5.[70] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 5 that a GUR drone strike killed Sergey Melnikov, Chief of Staff of the North Ossetian "Storm Ossetia" volunteer battalion (reportedly of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) while driving on the Vasylivka-Tokmak highway on December 29, 2024.[71] The Storm Ossetia volunteer battalion confirmed on December 30 that Melnikov was killed in action.[72]Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction near the Zabych and Kozatskyi islands (southwest and east of Kherson City, respectively) on January 4 and 5 but did not advance.[73] Elements of the Russian 81st Artillery Regiment and drone elements of the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[74]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the afternoon and evening on January 4 and overnight on January 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 30 Shahed and decoy drones from the northeastern direction during the afternoon and evening on January 4.[75] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 14 drones and that 16 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, as of 2000 local time. The Ukrainian National Police reported on January 5 that a Russian drone strike damaged an infrastructure facility in Zaporizkyi Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast during the day on January 4.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 5 that Russian forces launched 103 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk and Oryol oblasts and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast overnight on January 4 to 5.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts and that 42 drones were ”lost” as of 0900 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that debris from downed drones damaged several houses in Kharkiv Oblast overnight.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Nothing significant to report.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/yurasumy/20300; https://t.me/yurasumy/20304; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31109; https://t.me/sashakots/51107; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61223; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150255; https://t.me/iamsniper/9786; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20229; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20230; https://t.me/dva_majors/61882 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9792; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21978; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21980; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21981; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20228; https://t.me/voenacher/76341 ; https://t.me/rybar/66918; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61224; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150246 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9777; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150248; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150262; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150257; https://t.me/iamsniper/9788[2] https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/yurasumy/20300; https://t.me/yurasumy/20304; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31109; https://t.me/sashakots/51107; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61223; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150255; https://t.me/iamsniper/9786; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20229; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20230; https://t.me/dva_majors/61882 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9792; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21978; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21980; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21981; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20228; https://t.me/voenacher/76341 ; https://t.me/rybar/66918; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61224; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150246 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9777; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150248; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150262; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150257; https://t.me/iamsniper/9788[3] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1875880843513934279; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83924; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875949210413224109; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1875947064149819772; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875987969469018405 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31123[4] https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/dva_majors/61851; https://t.me/dva_majors/61881; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21987; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21978[5] https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61223; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21987; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31082[6] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21298 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21299 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21300; https://t.me/rusich_army/19869 ; https://t.me/rybar/66916; https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150247; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150270; https://t.me/rusich_army/19878 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18470; https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/yurasumy/20304; https://t.me/rybar/66929[7] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24346; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8026; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/236; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/237[8] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31101; https://t.me/rusich_army/19882; https://t.me/rusich_army/19877 [9] https://t.me/rybar/66926[10] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2025/01/4/7492051/; https://suspilne dot media/917979-u-kurskij-oblasti-za-dva-dni-rf-vtratila-do-bataljonu-pihoti-zelenskij/[11] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31104[12] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21971; https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150250; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31101 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31104 [13] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1875873948942139747 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31099[14] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/47358 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61885; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83929; https://t.me/dva_majors/61882 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9792; https://t.me/rusich_army/19869 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18464[15] https://t.me/rybar/66922 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83908 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61851 ; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/12692 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21974 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20297 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18468 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/14006 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61228[16] https://t.me/rybar/66922 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61228 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/139205[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/294755 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294759[18] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18467[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12188[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8020 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12216 [22] https://t.me/yurasumy/20296 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20311 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61222 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21964[23] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2473 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02BgVUTVSbXTfUGwaKvwVXP97n3K6ynkBGZNAdF8tXqgKE7bWqGwrDrJoJDLgbh6dZl [24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8020; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12216[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025[31] https://t.me/vrogov/18604 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83905 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61220 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150245 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12627 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22091 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024[32] https://t.me/andriyshTime/31623; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31623; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31634; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31641; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31633 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31639; https://t.me/severrealii/29058; https://t.me/vchkogpu/53768 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/139173[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/294698 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294699 ; https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/1730 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294711[34] https://t.me/ohliga/11154[35] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/16372[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/boyi-na-shodi-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-vidminnosti-v-taktyczi-voroga-na-riznyh-napryamkah/[38] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30400[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl[40] https://www.youtube.com/live/j5TqaWCCdUg?si=91fF0E-yrfaQl69C ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/909821-linia-frontu-prohodit-za-dva-kilometri-vid-centru-kupanska-nacalnik-mva/[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24320 ; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/873 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8016 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875630388774891556 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/zgority-pid-zagryzovym-rosiyany-dvichi-atakuvaly-na-kupyanshhyni/[42] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl [44] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8017; https://t.me/mobilizirovan2022/5380[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/24112[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21969[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8027; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFwAKtGYUEY; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1875681559061393726; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DEYbyaqI7lP/[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937; https://t.me/wargonzo/24112 [52] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/918133-aku-taktiku-zastosovue-armia-rf-na-toreckomu-napramku/[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61218[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2473; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02BgVUTVSbXTfUGwaKvwVXP97n3K6ynkBGZNAdF8tXqgKE7bWqGwrDrJoJDLgbh6dZl[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61218 [56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/shturmovyky-za-try-tyzhni-yak-rosiya-navchaye-soldat-za-prynczypom-trymaj-zbroyu-i-jdy/[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/pokrovskyj-napryamok-pid-tyskom-rosiyany-shturmuyut-malymy-grupamy-j-haotychno-byut-po-mistah/[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/918061-rf-nakopicue-vijska-na-okolicah-pokrovska/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/vorog-robyt-stavku-na-motoczyklistiv-ta-fpv-drony-sytuacziya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8024; https://t.me/mo114rf/86 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83921 [60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8028; https://t.me/mechanized33/699[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61218[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/boyi-na-shodi-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-vidminnosti-v-taktyczi-voroga-na-riznyh-napryamkah/[63] https://suspilne dot media/918015-ssa-tiho-peredavali-ukraini-zbrou-ataka-gur-na-rosijski-servisi-1047-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1736094340&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83905 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61220 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150245 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12627 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22091[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83886 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83892 ;[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2472 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02BgVUTVSbXTfUGwaKvwVXP97n3K6ynkBGZNAdF8tXqgKE7bWqGwrDrJoJDLgbh6dZl[67] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30397[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21982[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21982; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21964;[71] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/fpv-zasidka-rozvidnyky-likviduvaly-nachalnyka-shtabu-batalionu-okupantiv-shtorm-osietiia.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5161[72] https://t.me/batalyon15/5227[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02mZHo4TEoyyRTpWZaLLXhtDc6fQVetbgomdPyym2PoeZkQv6omnDs1LfDr8SDFEnml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/61826; https://t.me/dva_majors/61848[75] https://t.me/kpszsu/26239[76] https://suspilne dot media/918015-ssa-tiho-peredavali-ukraini-zbrou-ataka-gur-na-rosijski-servisi-1047-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1736082659&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/police_zp_news/18707[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/26301
- — Iran Update, January 5, 2025
- at 1/9/25 9:28pmKatherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran is likely taking a series of steps to prevent instability in Iraq after the fall of the Assad Regime. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani arrived in Baghdad on January 5 for covert meetings with senior Iraqi officials and militia commanders to discuss “restructuring” an informed source told Iraqi media.[1] Ghaani will reportedly meet with the Iraqi prime minister, leaders in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and the Iraqi “armed forces commander.” Ghaani and the IRGC very likely also discuss the fall of the Assad Regime with these key Iraqi leaders. The many militia elements that withdrew from Syria will presumably also need to be reorganized. IRGC Ground Forces Special Forces Brigade also recently conducted military exercises in the western Kermanshah province and the Iranian Artesh Ground Forces deployed several brigades in western Iran to confront hostile groups aimed to create instability on Iran’s western border with Iraq, illustrating Iran‘s preoccupation with the threat posed by insecurity in Iraq.[2]IRGC-affiliated media separately published an op-ed that highlights some of the probable concerns that Iran has after the fall of Syria. The op-ed claimed that political insecurity in Syria could be transported to Iraq by terrorists who assassinate key Iraqi officials to cause insecurity and destabilize the country. [3]Tasnim‘s Salman al Maliki claimed that other powers, such as the United States and Israel, would try to exploit a power vacuum in Iraq for their own interests. Iran regularly holds the United States and Israel responsible for the formation of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and could conclude that ISIS attacks targeting Iraqi military officers and officials are encouraged by the United States and Israel.[4] Maliki could also be referring to retaliatory Israeli or US strikes against militia targets in response to future attacks targeting Israel or US bases. Maliki urged Iraq to create a joint political and military council for addressing these security threats, sharing intelligence, and responding to terrorism in the op-ed.[5]Iranian media outlets continue to stoke sectarian conflict over the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus. Tabnak reported on January 4 that an HTS-linked commander entered the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus and repeated “sectarian and sarcastic sentences.”[6] Tabnak claimed that the provocative video could lead the Shiites and Alawites in Syria to respond with “harsh actions.” Tabnak has previously claimed that HTS fighters have threatened the security of the sacred Shia shrine.[7]Syrian Popular Resistance, which is a purportedly Syrian telegram channel espousing sectarian narratives, accused the HTS-led government of killing six Sayyida Zeinab Shrine workers after six dead bodies were reportedly found on January 5.[8] The channel provided no evidence of the deaths or whether the killings were motivated by sectarian violence. This is also the first time the channel has discussed Sayyida Zeinab, which is notable given that most of the claims about the shrine have come from the Iranian information space.Senior Israeli officials indicated on January 5 that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met by January 26. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that if the first condition of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement–the complete withdrawal of Hezbollah and dismantling of Hezbollah weapons and infrastructure by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)–is not met, Israel will be “forced to act on its own.”[9] Katz specified that if Hezbollah does not withdraw there is “no agreement.” The outgoing IDF 91st Division Commander Brigadier General Shai Klepper similarly stated in an interview published on January 5 that the IDF is ”not expected” to leave southern Lebanon after the 60-day ceasefire period concludes if the IDF’s objectives are not fulfilled.[10] The 91st Division is responsible for Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. Israeli media reported that the United States and Israel are making unspecified efforts to extend the 60-day ceasefire with Hezbollah to prevent a ”premature withdrawal” or a return to full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah.[11]The LAF likely does not have the organizational capability or willingness to meet the conditions of the ceasefire by January 26. Israeli media reported the IDF still controls most of the Lebanese territory as it did in November 2024, when the ceasefire deal was signed.[12] The Washington Post similarly reported that the IDF has withdrawn and allowed the LAF to backfill in only two of the over 60 IDF-controlled areas in southern Lebanon.[13] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that Hezbollah fighters and weapons have not yet moved north of the Litani River, as required by the deal.[14] CTP-ISW has previously noted that it is extremely unlikely that the LAF or UNIFIL would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006.[15]Recent skirmishes in southwestern Syria demonstrate the HTS does not yet have full control over terrain in the south. A reportedly former regime-affiliated militia led by Mohsen al Haymad engaged other local factions with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms in al Sanamayn City, northern Daraa Province, on January 4.[16] Syrian sources suggested that Haymad‘s faction clashed with local groups affiliated with the Southern Operations Room, but it is not clear what started the fighting.[17] Haymad’s faction has operated in al Sanamayn since at least 2018 when the group reconciled with the Assad regime and began collaborating with regime Military Intelligence, according to Syrian opposition media.[18] Many Southern Operations Room commanders—including Ahmed al Awda, a key commander in the group—were also former opposition groups that reconciled with the regime in 2018 under a Russian reconciliation plan.[19] The HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployed reinforcements to al Sanamayn City and convened the factions to negotiate a ceasefire.[20] Haymad’s group and other unspecified local factions agreed to a ceasefire and to hand over heavy weapons to HTS forces.[21] HTS reportedly allowed the local groups to retain their individual weapons, however, which contradicts HTS’s policy of requiring the disarmament of all armed groups within Syria.[22] Short-term arrangements to ensure temporary security in al Sanamyan may present problems in the future as HTS continues its mission to disarm and dissolve armed factions into the Syrian Defense Ministry. This incident also highlights that the Southern Operation Room has not yet been fully folded into HTS’s forces. HTS-controlled forces will remain in al Sanamayn to set up checkpoints and maintain security within the city.[23] The necessity of HTS forces and checkpoints in the city underscores HTS’s lack of control over armed factions in the Daraa and other southern provinces, which regularly sees fighting between local groups.Key Takeaways:Iranian Regional Policy: Iran is taking a series of steps to prevent instability in Iraq after the fall of the Assad Regime. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani arrived in Baghdad on January 5.Iranian Information Space: Iranian media outlets continue to stoke sectarian conflict over the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus.Lebanon: Senior Israeli officials indicated on January 5 that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met by January 26. The Lebanese Armed Forces likely do not have the organizational capability or willingness to meet the conditions of the ceasefire by January 26.Southwestern Syria: Recent skirmishes in southwestern Syria demonstrate the HTS does not yet have full control over terrain in the south.SyriaAxis of Resistance objectives: Reestablish ground lines of communication from Syria to LebanonReestablish Iranian influence in SyriaThe Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) outflanked the southern advance of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway. Several anti-SDF media outlets and users reported that the SNA seized control of several villages in the desert south of Maskanah and advanced up to the train tracks south of the city.[24] This would place SNA forces within about five kilometers of Maskanah. Anti-SDF media posted a photo of SNA fighters observing Maskanah from a position in the desert.[25] Maskanah sits along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway and its capture would cut off the westernmost SDF advances along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway from Raqqa and Tabqa cities to the east. The SDF previously seized Maskanah during its southern advance towards Deir Hafer and Khafseh between December 23 and 24.[26] An anti-SDF social media user claimed that the SDF remains in Deir Hafer as of January 5.[27] Anti-SDF media reported that the SDF prepared defenses in Maskanah on January 5 ahead of a potential SNA assault on the city.[28]The SNA’s advance threatens the SDF’s control of the Aleppo-Raqqa highway and its ability to provide reinforcements and logistical support to SDF fighters deployed in Deir Hafer and along the Khafseh axis. A potential SNA capture of Maskanah would make the SDF counteroffensive much more difficult, if not impossible. Capturing Maskanah would also threaten SDF strongholds Tabqa and Raqqa, located further east along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway. Threats to Tabqa and Raqqa would force the SDF to decide between prioritizing the Euphrates River crossings or Raqqa City.The SNA and Turkey continued to pressure the SDF's ability to sustain operations west of Tishreen Dam through air and artillery on January 5.[29] The SDF said it continued to repel SNA attacks supported by Turkish air support in the Manbij countryside and near the Tishreen Dam on January 4.[30] Local media reported that Turkey conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions near the Dam and along supply lines from Raqqa to the frontlines, including on SDF logistics in al Jarniya District and an SDF position near Sarrin.[31] The SNA also reportedly shelled the entrances to Tishreen Dam and an SDF position in Ain Issa.[32] The SDF announced the death of 12 of its fighters on January 5.[33]Syrian interim government officials traveled to Doha, Qatar, on January 5 in Doha, Qatar, on January 5.[34] Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asad al Shaibani, Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Interim Intelligence head Anas Khattab met with Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad al Thani and Qatari Minister of State Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al Khulaifi.[35] Shaibani thanked al Thani for providing humanitarian aid to Syria.[36] Shaibani said that the delegation discussed “all basic and strategic issues” with al Thani.[37] Shaibani and interim head of government Ahmed al Shara previously met with Khulaifi to discuss Syria’s impending “broad strategic cooperation” with Qatar, particularly in the energy sector and in rebuilding Syrian ports in Damascus on December 23.[38] Qatar, which never normalized relations with the Assad regime, was among the first states to open contact with HTS after the fall of Assad.The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on January 5 that the IDF 810th Mountain Brigade (210th Division) completed a brigade-level operation in the Syrian Mt. Hermon area in recent weeks.[39] The IDF seized the Syrian side of Mt. Hermon on December 8 following the fall of the Assad regime.[40] The 810th Brigade raided ”control points” and searched military buildings in the Mt. Hermon area.[41] The brigade destroyed intelligence equipment and weapons including anti-tank missiles, rockets, launchers, and IEDs.The IDF likely conducted an airstrike targeting former Assad regime ammunition warehouses near Damascus on January 5. Syrian media posted footage purportedly showing explosions in former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 58th Brigade weapons warehouses that contained rockets and other unspecified ammunition in Sahia village, Rif Dimashq Province.[42] A separate Syrian outlet posted footage to X (Twitter) showing explosions in a weapons storage facility for an SAA air defense battalion near al Kiswah, south of Damascus.[43]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentNothing significant to report.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripThe Houthis launched a ballistic missile attack targeting the Orot Rabin power station in Hadera, central Israel on January 5. xlvi The IDF intercepted the missile before it entered Israeli territory on January 4. xlviiHouthi media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted three airstrikes east of Saada City, northern Yemen, on January 4. xlviiiThe Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and Reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza Strip The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade (99th Division) concluded its deployment in the northern Gaza Strip on January 5.[44] The 900th Infantry Brigade conducted clearing operations in Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, and Jabalia refugee camps during its two-month-long deployment in the northern Gaza Strip. Palestinian militias killed 13 Israeli soldiers from the 900th Infantry Brigade during this time, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[45] There are three IDF maneuver brigades active in the Gaza Strip.The IDF 84th Infantry Brigade (162nd Division) killed a PIJ rocket unit commander in the northern Gaza Strip last week.[46] Footage posted by the IDF showed the PIJ commander and his subordinate attempting to approach the Israeli forces.[47] The IDF encircled them, killed the commander, and detained his subordinate.[48] The IDF said that the PIJ commander participated in the October 7 attacks and conducted attacks targeting Israeli forces conducting operations in Beit Lahia.Palestinian militias claimed three attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on January 5.[49] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed that they fired small arms and three hand grenades at IDF infantry in western Beit Lahia.[50] PIJ and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement claimed two attacks targeting the IDF in the Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip.[51] The IDF stated that Palestinian militia gunfire seriously injured an IDF soldier from the 84th Infantry Brigade in the northern Gaza Strip on January 5.[52]The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Palestinian militia infrastructure and fighters in the central and southern Gaza Strip on January 5.[53] The IDF conducted an airstrike that killed a PIJ fighter in the al Mawasi Humanitarian Zone in Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip. [54] The IDF Air Force separately struck and destroyed a Hamas headquarters in the al Mawasi Humanitarian Zone in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip.[55] The IDF Air Force struck more than 100 Palestinian militia targets across the Gaza Strip on January 3 and 4.[56] The IDF stated that it took steps to reduce the risk of civilian casualties by using precision munitions and analyzing aerial imagery before these airstrikes.[57]LebanonSenior Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa told reporters on January 5 that former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah will be buried on January 25, which is the 60th day of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon.[58] Israel killed Nasrallah in an airstrike on September 27, 2024.Israeli and Lebanese media reported on January 4 that the IDF conducted a controlled demolition of infrastructure in Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon, and Tyre Harfa, southwestern Lebanon.[59] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that both these Lebanese towns are located in the ”second line” of Lebanese towns, located several kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border.[60] The ”second line“ of towns refers to towns located approximately 6-8 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border which falls within the range that Hezbollah could use to launch drones and rockets at Israel.[61] The Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that it is noteworthy that the IDF is still operating in this ”second line” of towns and has not yet withdrawn to the first line which could indicate that the IDF does not intend to withdraw at the end of the month. The IDF would be required to withdraw if Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) uphold their end of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.Lebanese media separately reported on January 4 that the IDF fired artillery in Kfarchouba, southeastern Lebanon.[62] Lebanese media reported that an IDF mechanized infantry unit operated on the outskirts of Kfarchouba, on January 4.[63]Lebanon Artillery mapWest BankThe IDF conducted raids in the town of Meithalun in Jenin Governorate, northern West Bank, and killed a local al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades commander on January 5.[64] The IDF also confiscated weapons, destroyed an IED manufacturing facility, and seized tens of thousands of Israeli shekels in “terrorist funds” during the raids.[65] PIJ fired small arms targeting Israeli forces conducting raids in Meithalun.[66]Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyNothing significant to report.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. [1] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-4-2025[3] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/16/3232253[4] https://time.com/3720081/isis-iran-us-creation/[5] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/16/3232253[6] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1281599 ; https://vista dot ir/n/arshehonline-151y7[7] https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/12/iran-update-december-16-2024.html[8] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5119 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-31-2024[9] https://news.walla dot co.il/item/3716991 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/full-text-the-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-deal/[10] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1875829513868734835[11] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-836212[12] https://news.walla dot co.il/item/3716991[13] https://wapo.st/3DJkQQL[14] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/05/israel-war-news-lebanon-syria-hamas-gaza-palestine/?pwapi_token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJyZWFzb24iOiJnaWZ0IiwibmJmIjoxNzM2MDUzMjAwLCJpc3MiOiJzdWJzY3JpcHRpb25zIiwiZXhwIjoxNzM3NDM1NTk5LCJpYXQiOjE3MzYwNTMyMDAsImp0aSI6IjQ5YzJiMGVkLTg5NDQtNDhiNS1iMDFmLThjYmRmZTk0MTBhZSIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vd3d3Lndhc2hpbmd0b25wb3N0LmNvbS93b3JsZC8yMDI1LzAxLzA1L2lzcmFlbC13YXItbmV3cy1sZWJhbm9uLXN5cmlhLWhhbWFzLWdhemEtcGFsZXN0aW5lLyJ9._ifnHTNippywyH_okdb-DZHldGfHri_gW1V-Gi7QcUA[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-19-2024[16] www dot npasyria.com/en/120576[17] https://x.com/Omar_Madaniah/status/1875556225389379806; www dot npasyria.com/en/120576[18] www dot npasyria.com/en/120576[19] https://www.elwatannews dot com/news/details/7725423[20] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937; https://x.com/abdulrahmanpho/status/1875864787839791475; https://x.com/NPA_Arabic/status/1875812942232613362; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1875830520699142411[21] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937[22] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937[23] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937; www dot npasyria.com/en/120620[24] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875967939481833898; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132011; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132026; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1875993213502427161[25] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132059[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2024[27] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875967939481833898[28] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132026 ;https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875967939481833898; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1875777871316131887; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1875861385839874065[29] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875967939481833898[30] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1875587747299406199[31] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1875968645677093216; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132074; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1875872085677113827; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875967939481833898[32] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1875967939481833898; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1875942916482638155[33] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1875933261131870329[34] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/74[35] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/85[36] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/85[37] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1875876903099486708[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-23-2024 ; https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1871167063986675897[39] https://www dot idf.il/262668[40] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-832540[41] https://www dot idf.il/262668[42] https://t.me/damascusv011/27367 ; www dot npasyria.com/202154[43] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1875900027958386827[44] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18008[45] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18008[46] https://www.idf dot il/262841[47] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18029 ; https://www.idf dot il/262841[48] https://www.idf dot il/262841[49] https://t.me/sarayaps/19026 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5451 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/19027[50] https://t.me/sarayaps/19027[51] https://t.me/sarayaps/19026 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5451[52] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1875941286752202913 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875940902004498740[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875955985548009535 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875955988601397462[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875955988601397462[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875955985548009535[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875770693276823763[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875770696691019793 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875955988601397462[58] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110659 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/nasrallah-to-be-buried-after-end-of-initial-60-day-ceasefire/[59] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18014 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126428; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12940[60] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18014[61] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/aiming-to-enable-return-of-displaced-israelis-idf-pushes-deeper-into-south-lebanon/[62] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110650[63] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126342[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875858455162245597 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8122[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1875858455162245597[66] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1954
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 30, 2024
- at 1/9/25 8:54pmNicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Olivia Gibson, William Runkel, and George BarrosDecember 30, 2024, 6:50pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:20pm ET on December 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine renounce its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a precondition to start peace talks, indicating that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations. Lavrov stated in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on December 30 that Russia will not participate in any negotiations to end its war in Ukraine unless Ukraine renounces its right and objective of liberating its territory up to its internationally recognized 1991 borders.[1] Lavrov added that Russia considers Ukraine's objective of liberating its territory to its internationally recognized 1991 borders an "ultimatum." The Kremlin is likely attempting to impose unrealistic demands on Ukraine that violate international law to stymie legitimate good faith negotiations. Russia is also likely attempting to force the West into coercing Ukraine into acknowledging and accepting territorial concessions that will benefit Russia in the long term. Lavrov and other Russian officials have previously dismissed Ukraine's right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a legitimate negotiating position.[2] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations with Ukraine and will continue to pursue Ukraine's total capitulation.[3]The Kremlin appears to be prioritizing Russia's force generation requirements and domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages going into 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on December 30 stating that migrants who entered Russia illegally must apply for legal status or leave Russia by April 30, 2025.[4] Migrants can obtain legal status by submitting to a series of health screenings; a Russian language, history, and legal exam; and by paying off all debts, or by signing a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russia is reportedly suffering a labor shortage of 1.5 million people, and Putin's decree will likely further exacerbate Russia's ongoing labor shortages if a significant number of migrants who work in food service, transportation, and other low-skilled industries either leave Russia or forcibly join the Russian military.[5] It remains unclear if Russian authorities will enforce this decree, although their decision whether to enforce this decree will likely indicate how Russian authorities are prioritizing responding to political, force generation, and economic labor market challenges. A decision to enforce this decree and begin deporting migrants would indicate that Russian authorities are prioritizing placating complaints among Russian pro-war ultra-nationalists and addressing possible regime security issues associated with ongoing reports of migrants committing crimes and terrorist acts in Russia than addressing Russia's economic issues. A decision not to enforce the decree would indicate that Russian authorities are more concerned with utilizing migrant labor to overcome Russia's economic issues and labor shortages than messaging to the Kremlin's ultranationalist constituency.US President Joe Biden announced an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $2.5 billion on December 30.[6] The package is funded by a combined $1.25 billion from the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) and $1.22 billion from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and will include thousands of artillery rounds, thousands of rockets, and hundreds of armored vehicles. The US Department of Defense (DoD) reported that the package also includes: munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); HAWK air defense munitions; Stinger missiles; counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) munitions; ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs); Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; Tube-launched, Optically-guided, Wire-tracked (TOW) missiles; and other materiel.[7]Russia and Ukraine conducted one of the largest prisoners of war (POW) exchanges in 2024 on December 30, resulting in the return of 189 Ukrainian POWs — some of whom spent over two years in Russian captivity since early 2022. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on December 30 that Ukraine returned 189 Ukrainians, some of whom defended Ukrainian positions at the Azovstal Steel Plant, Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), and Snake Island in early 2022.[8] Zelensky added that Ukraine also returned two civilians whom Russian forces captured during the siege of Mariupol. Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that this POW exchange was one of the largest POWs exchanges since the January 3, 2024, and that Ukraine returned 173 privates and sergeants and 14 officers: 87 servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, 43 of Ukraine's National Guard, 33 of Ukraine's Border Guards Service, and 24 of the Ukrainian Navy.[9] The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs added that some of the servicemen also participated in combat operations in Kursk, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs noted that in total 3,956 Ukrainian POWs returned to Ukraine, of which 1,358 returned in 2024. The Russian MoD announced on December 30 that Russia exchanged 150 Ukrainian POWs for 150 Russian POWs.[10]Russian border guards withdrew from the Agarak border checkpoint on the Armenia-Iran border on December 30 after controlling the checkpoint for over 30 years. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenian border troops began solely patrolling the Agarak checkpoint without Russian forces on December 30, indicating that Russian border guards likely withdrew from the area in accordance with the October 2024 agreement that Armenian border guards will regain control of the checkpoint starting January 1, 2025.[11] Pashinyan added that Russian border guards have been operating at the Agarak checkpoint since 1991. Russia's withdrawal from Agarak checkpoint comes five months after Russian border guards completed withdrew from Yerevan's Zvartnots International Airport and further showcases Armenia's commitment to reducing bilateral security relations with Russia.[12]Key Takeaways:Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine renounce its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a precondition to start peace talks, indicating that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations.The Kremlin appears to be prioritizing Russia's force generation requirements and domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages going into 2025.US President Joe Biden announced an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $2.5 billion on December 30.Russia and Ukraine conducted one of the largest prisoners of war (POW) exchanges in 2024 on December 30, resulting in the return of 189 Ukrainian POWs - some of whom spent over two years in Russian captivity since early 2022.Russia and Ukraine conducted one of the largest prisoners of war (POW) exchanges in 2024 on December 30, resulting in the return of 189 Ukrainian POWs - some of whom spent over two years in Russian captivity since early 2022.Russian border guards withdrew from the Agarak border checkpoint on the Armenia-Iran border on December 30 after controlling the checkpoint for over 30 years.Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka.A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian veteran issues claimed that Russian forces have significantly strengthened the Russian international border with Ukraine since 2022 and no longer overwhelmingly rely on conscripts and alleged deserters as border security.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on December 30. Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and seized Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha), although likely not within the past day.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, seized Agronom (east of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[14] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast.[15] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces are reportedly operating near Sudzha, and elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in Korenevsky Raion.[16]Kursk Oblast Operational Headquarters claimed on December 30 that Russian air defenses shot down three Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast.[17]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Hatyshche and Vovchansk on December 29 and 30 but did make any confirmed advances.[18]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 30 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces seized Ivanivka and almost seized Terny (both northwest of Kreminna), but one Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are still fighting for Ivanivka and described claims of Russia's seizure of Terny as premature.[19] ISW has not observed confirmation of Russian forces seizing Terny or Ivanivka. Ukrainian Khortytsya Group of Forces reported on December 30 that Russian forces attacked Terny with armored vehicles on December 29.[20] The Ukrainian Border Guards Service's department responsible for the defense of Ukraine's northern border reported on December 29 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon in the Kupyansk direction during which over 30 Russian servicemen attacked Ukrainian positions in waves at dusk.[21] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor published footage on December 30 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction.[22] A Ukrainian Border Guards Service unit published footage on December 30 showing Ukrainian forces damaging and destroying 15 Russian armored vehicles near Kreminna and in Serebryanske forest area over past last week (since December 23).[23] Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Zahryzove, Lozova, Stepova Novoselivka, and Kruhlyakivka; southwest of Svatove near Hrekivka; west of Svatove near Zeleny Hai, Kopanky, Pershotravneve, and Nadiya; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Ivanivka, and Terny; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka; and southwest of Kreminna near Plantonivka on December 29 and 30.[24]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 30 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Zolotarivka on December 29 and 30.[25] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly continuing to operate in the Siversk direction.[26]Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in central Chasiv Yar amid Russian forces continued offensive operations in the surrounding area on December 30. Geolocated footage published on December 30 shows elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division targeting Ukrainian forces in central Chasiv Yar, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to Heorhiia Dubrovskoho Street in central Chasiv Yar.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Desyata Microraion in northern Chasiv Yar and seized the railway station in northwestern Chasiv Yar on December 30.[28] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces attacked within Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on December 29 and 30.[29] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Viktor Trehubov reported on December 30 that Russian forces are attacking Chasiv Yar's urban areas, crossing the Siverskyi Donets Donbas (SDD) Canal, and then attempting to attack the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar – a key Ukrainian defensive position in the settlement.[30] Trehubov noted that Ukrainian forces continue to control the tactically significant Refractory Plant and that the intensity of Russian attacks on the facility have slightly decreased. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to establish positions along Chernyshevskoho Street in Pivnichnyi Microraion (northern Chasiv Yar) and that Ukrainian forces conducted two counterattacks.[31]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction on December 30. Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions along Hryhoriia Skovorody street in northwestern Toretsk.[32] Geolocated footage published on December 26, 29, and 30 indicates that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Toretsk along 1 Hirskyi Street and in western Toretsk along 2 Travnevyi, Istorychna, Koksova, and Zhytomyrskyi streets.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 900 meters toward the waste heaps in western Toretsk on December 30, and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing in Zabalka Microraion (southeastern Toretsk).[34] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces reportedly attacked within Toretsk and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on December 29 and 30.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed fighting is ongoing near waste heaps No.1 and No.10 near the Toretsk mine in northern Toretsk.[36] Trehubov stated on December 29 that street fighting continues within Toretsk and that lightly armored Russian forces pick up anti-tank mines and then throw the anti-tank mines at buildings in the Toretsk direction.[37] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), including drone operators, reportedly continue to operate in Toretsk.[38]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid ongoing Russian offensive operations in the area on December 30. Geolocated footage published on December 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook positions east of Pishchane (south of Pokrovsk).[39] Additional geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk) and west of Pishchane.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Pokrovsk towards Baranivka, are advancing west of Vovkove and attacking toward Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk) and seized most of Novoyelyzavetivka (south of Vovkove).[41] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Novolenivka (just northeast of Novoyelyzavetivka), although ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of December 27.[42] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Porkovsk near Zelene and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Vovkove, Kotlyne, Solone, Novovasylivka, Novolenivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, and Ukrainka on December 29 and 30.[43]Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in this direction on December 30. Geolocated footage published on December 29 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove).[44] Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Shevchenko and Petropavlivka (both northwest of Kurakhove) and seized a covered parking lot west of Kurakhove.[45] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove posted footage on December 29 showing Ukrainian drone operators striking two Russian armored vehicles in the Kurakhove direction.[46] Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka, Sloyvanka, and Shevchenko; within Kurakhove itself; and west of Kurakhove near the Kurakhivska Thermal Power Plant (TPP) and in the direction of Dachne on December 29 and 30.[47]Russian forces recently advanced in the Vuhledar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on December 30. Geolocated footage published on December 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Yantarne (northwest of Vuhledar) during a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced further in the fields northwest of Uspenivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[49] Russian forces continued attacking north of Vuhledar near Uspenivka and northwest of Vuhledar near Kostyantynopolske, Yantarne, and Kostyantynopil on December 29 and 30.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) repelled a Ukrainian attack north of Kostyantynopolske.[51] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Uspenivka.[52]Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka amid continued offensive operations in the area on December 30. Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Velyka Novosilka.[53] Russian forces continued attacking west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka and Novosilka; northwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Neskuchne on December 29 and 30.[54] A representative of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Velyka Novosilka stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass and seize Velyka Novosilka and reach the junction of Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[55]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 30. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 30 that Russian forces recently repelled a Ukrainian attack near Russian positions in Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne and south of Zaporizhzhia City).[56]Official Ukrainian sources reported on December 30 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck a Russian headquarters with a missile in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[57] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance discovered the location of the Russian headquarters and that the Ukrainian strike killed six Russian personnel and wounded three.[58] Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on December 30 that Ukrainian forces destroyed the self-propelled firing installation of a Russian Buk-M1-2 air defense system in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[59]Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on December 29 and 30 but did not make any confirmed advances.[60]Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on December 30 that many of the Russian barriers, including sunken barges, protecting the Kerch Strait Bridge from Ukrainian naval drones are likely not functional due to bad weather conditions.[61] Pletenchuk added that the remaining two-to-three months of the storm season might further damage or destroy the barriers.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 43 Shaheds and other strike drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[62] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 21 Shahed and other decoy drone types over Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Odesa, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that 22 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that falling drone debris damaged residential homes in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported on December 29 and 30 that falling debris from downed Russian drones fell in a forested area near Lyubotyn, Kharkiv Oblast and damaged residential homes in Odesa City.[63]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian veteran issues claimed that Russian forces have significantly strengthened the Russian international border with Ukraine since 2022 and no longer overwhelmingly rely on conscripts and alleged deserters as border security.[64] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces deployed "serious" forces to defend the border and have formed a separate grouping for border security. ISW cannot independently verify these claims. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the Russian volunteer recruitment increased since the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast and noted that there are many convicts, including former Wagner Group fighters, are fighting near Sudzha, Kursk Oblast.[65] The milblogger added that Russian prisoners are fighting on the frontlines as part of the Russian "K" Project but did not specify the details of this project.A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) claimed on December 30 that Russian forces reformed the Russian 214th "Opfor" Separate Special Battalion into a separate assault battalion.[66] The milblogger noted that the 214th "Opfor" Separate Special Battalion had been fighting in Ukraine since 2022 and underwent several force reconstitutions, especially after fighting in Bakhmut direction in 2023. The milblogger noted that the battalion performed largely informational role throughout 2024 by filming videos of its combat operations.Russian field commanders are reportedly continuing to brutally punish Russians who refuse to fight in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that a Russian assault detachment commander deliberately mined fields near Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk) to prevent elements of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Guards Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA]) from withdrawing from forward positions in September 2024.[67] Astra reported that the commander ordered a Russian serviceman to shoot Russian personnel who that withdrew from their positions.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on December 30 that Belarus plans to expand drone pilot training capabilities by creating specialized classrooms at 16 educational institutions across Belarus by September 1, 2025 and will begin training students in mid-September 2025.[68]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://tass dot ru/interviews/22799503[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2023[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024[4] http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202412300002 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/22804289 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/society/30/12/2024/6772b1b19a7947bb09655667[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024[6] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/12/30/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-u-s-support-for-ukraines-defense/[7] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4017714/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/[8] https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/posts/pfbid02AkeXFhEu8BdwZwH1KcW8t368bckFPwrUPUt49X6LSyBXm77BKC36v7oJPeCwUaewl[9] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5117; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/9982 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31394[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/47429 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18491 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16279[11] https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/33258197.html ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/33258387.html ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/rus-sahmanapahnery-hunvari-1-its-kheranan-hayastan-iran-sahmani-hskich-ketits/33151186.html[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2024 ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/33058188.html[13] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7971; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/195[14] https://t.me/voin_dv/12531[15] https://t.me/dva_majors/61420 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24023[16] https://t.me/wargonzo/24030 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47426[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/294123[18]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5HbnPhoMhAScfqTdfGtAizszZZYMSWJSj2HEeQ8JvsZkVBHzQXEqtxWa8w8vxZal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3307 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3876[19] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21710 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21752 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61112[20] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3876[21] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1141366134661437&id=100063641830042&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=dlJg6YWcjMnxuY8W# ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/913705-cotiri-bijci-cernigivskogo-prikordonnogo-zagonu-vidbili-nastup-30-rosian-na-kupanskomu-napramku/[22] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/23724[23] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1593754821244227[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5HbnPhoMhAScfqTdfGtAizszZZYMSWJSj2HEeQ8JvsZkVBHzQXEqtxWa8w8vxZal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3876 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5HbnPhoMhAScfqTdfGtAizszZZYMSWJSj2HEeQ8JvsZkVBHzQXEqtxWa8w8vxZal[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5HbnPhoMhAScfqTdfGtAizszZZYMSWJSj2HEeQ8JvsZkVBHzQXEqtxWa8w8vxZal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21720[27] https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/218 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1873754729379233968[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/24023 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149595[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5HbnPhoMhAScfqTdfGtAizszZZYMSWJSj2HEeQ8JvsZkVBHzQXEqtxWa8w8vxZal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3876 ;[30] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/913987-ukrainski-vijskovi-kontroluut-vognetrivkij-zavod-u-casovomu-aru-recnik-osuv-hortica/ ; https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/913817-dinamicna-situacia-u-kurahovomu-j-nezvicna-taktika-u-torecku-recnik-osuv-hortica-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21750[32] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1873382551181816204 ; https://t.me/voron1OO/106[33] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1873671701189542135 ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/329 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7969 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24132 ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/315 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1873382551181816204 ; https://t.me/voron1OO/106[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21735 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61420[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3876[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/61420[37] https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/913817-dinamicna-situacia-u-kurahovomu-j-nezvicna-taktika-u-torecku-recnik-osuv-hortica-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/[38] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13194 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1873748561399304531 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13192[39] https://youtu.be/JyyoJdSQP4o?si=zg6oz1Syjn8DgOeR; https://x.com/Playfra0/status/1873453010963312821[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7968; https://t.me/egeriaznauri/30 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7970; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rDeCGg901lY&ab_channel=%D0%91%D1%83%D1%82%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%9F%D0%BB%D1%8E%D1%81[41] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61115 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61106 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149544 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61422[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/47421 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3876 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5HbnPhoMhAScfqTdfGtAizszZZYMSWJSj2HEeQ8JvsZkVBHzQXEqtxWa8w8vxZal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl ; https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/913817-dinamicna-situacia-u-kurahovomu-j-nezvicna-taktika-u-torecku-recnik-osuv-hortica-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7965; https://t.me/yokaiUA/209[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61111 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149590 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24023 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61420 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61434 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21742[46] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1499510734314071 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/dronari-37-yi-brygady-vidbyly-chergovyj-shturm-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku/[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5HbnPhoMhAScfqTdfGtAizszZZYMSWJSj2HEeQ8JvsZkVBHzQXEqtxWa8w8vxZal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61111 ; https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/913817-dinamicna-situacia-u-kurahovomu-j-nezvicna-taktika-u-torecku-recnik-osuv-hortica-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/ ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3876[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7964; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1499510734314071[49] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30311[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5HbnPhoMhAScfqTdfGtAizszZZYMSWJSj2HEeQ8JvsZkVBHzQXEqtxWa8w8vxZal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61111[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83564[52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13193[53] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1873702559908769940; https://t.me/rubpak/245[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5HbnPhoMhAScfqTdfGtAizszZZYMSWJSj2HEeQ8JvsZkVBHzQXEqtxWa8w8vxZal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11918 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12527 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18487[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/29/kolonamy-bronetehniky-ta-natovpamy-pihoty-okupanty-namagayutsya-prorvatysya-do-kordoniv-dniprovshhyny/[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61114[57] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11919 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5115[58] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5115[59] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/914359-sili-bezpilotnih-sistem-znisili-vognevu-ustanovku-zrk-buk-armii-rf-na-zaporizkomu-napramku/ ; https://t.me/usf_army/319[60]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02akkPs6r53teT4YhVVNgk5GakNggCFwhyUSd7c45j1T9LvG9re6EsDumVe9B7ymMLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hmZDNobTPKvP2rhgVkrANo6652KgtVAVyhT8Mb6bydW5upkWJtgPdbaSCjky4LgFl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11918 ;[61] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/12/29/shtorm-v-dopomogu-vms-prokomentuvaly-informacziyu-pro-rujnuvannya-zahysnyh-zagorodzhen-krymskogo-mostu/[62] https://t.me/kpszsu/25773[63] https://t.me/synegubov/12605 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8062 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/913929-unoci-rf-atakuvala-odesinu-udarnimi-bpla-e-poskodzenna-zitlovih-budinkiv/[64] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21244[65] https://t.me/wargonzo/24028; https://t.me/wargonzo/24026[66] https://t.me/rusich_army/19721[67] https://t.me/astrapress/71417[68] https://t.me/modmilby/44261 ; https://t.me/modmilby/44260
- — Iran Update, December 30, 2024
- at 1/9/25 8:54pmKatherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran appears increasingly as though it seeks to foment sectarian conflict in Syria, which it could then exploit to establish proxy and partner militias there. Outlets affiliated with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Armed Forces General Staff published reports on December 30 to this end. One outlet reported on HTS-affiliated elements committing violence against Syrian Alawites.[1] Another outlet reported that armed “resistance” has formed against the HTS-led interim government in response to its offenses against the Syrian people.[2] CTP-ISW has independently observed anti-HTS elements appearing in predominantly Alawite areas in recent days. That the Iranian outlet framed these elements as “resistance” is noteworthy given that the term has an overwhelmingly positive connotation in Iranian regime discourse.[3] Other Iranian outlets that have no obvious affiliation with the Iranian security establishment have published reports emphasizing sectarian tensions in recent days as well. For instance, one outlet reported on purported HTS efforts to achieve the “de-Shia-ization of Syria.”[4] A Middle Eastern source separately told a Western analyst that regional countries have shared intelligence with HTS in recent days that the IRGC is planning to “foster, direct, and support an insurgency” in Syria, presumably by exploiting the sectarian tension that Iran is currently trying to stoke.[5] Another source told the Western analyst that HTS-led forces detained two former Syrian regime operatives with IRGC identification cards and at least three Lebanese nationals.[6] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports, but it is consistent with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, suggesting in recent days that Syrian youth should arm and mobilize against the interim government.[7]Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara promoted loyalists to the senior levels of the new Syrian security establishment that he is currently forming. Shara promoted these individuals even though the exact organization and structure of the new Syrian armed forces remains unclear. Shara promoted two individuals to major general, five individuals to brigadier general, and over forty individuals to colonel, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[8] The two major generals—Marhaf Ahmed Abu Qasra and Ali Nour al Din—are the interim defense minister and armed forces chief of staff, respectively. The individuals whom Shara promoted to brigadier general all appear to have close ties to HTS, and in some cases, personal relations with Shara. These individuals include:Mohammad Khair Hassan Shuaib (also known as Abu al Khair Taftanaz). Shuaib is a military leader in HTS.[9] Shuaib previously headed a military council that was comprised of HTS and the National Liberation Front.[10] Shuaib also reportedly founded the Syrian Salvation Government Military College.[11]Abdul Rahman Hussein al Khatib (also known as Abu Hussein al Urduni). Khatib is a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian origin.[12] Khatib went to Syria in late 2013 and is deeply loyal to HTS leader Ahmed al Shara.[13] Khatib is reportedly a member of the HTS Shura Council.[14] Jordanian media reported that Khatib is known for his “Salafi-jihadi approach.”[15]Abdul Aziz Dawoud Khodaberdi (also known as Abu Muhammad Turkistan). Khodaberdi commands the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) forces in Syria. The TIP is an al Qaeda-affiliated Uyghur jihadist group.[16] China has labeled the TIP as a terrorist organization and accused it of “gravely threaten[ing]” Chinese interests.[17] The TIP announced that Shara promoted two other Uyghur fighters to the rank of colonel.[18]Abdo Mohammad Sarhan. Sarhan previously commanded Jabhat al Nusra in the Eastern Ghouta.[19]Omar Mohammad Ciftci (also known as Mukhtar al Turki). Ciftci is a Turkish citizen who previously commander a unit called the Omar Brigade.[20] Ciftci reportedly led the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation room to overthrow the Bashar al Assad regime.[21]HTS-led interim government officials are continuing to meet with military commanders affiliated with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Ahmed Abu Qasra met with the leaders of the SNA-affiliated Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade on December 30.[22] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara previously met with these commanders on December 16.[23] The United States sanctioned the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade in August 2023 for committing “serious human rights abuses against those residing in the Afrin region of northern Syria.”[24] The HTS-led interim government’s frequent and publicized meetings with SNA-affiliated commanders signals that HTS is continuing to heavily favor the SNA and pursuing “strategic relations” with Turkey, both of which have stated their intent to “eliminate” the SDF.[25]The SDF and SNA have continued to clash in northern and northeastern Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff. The SDF published footage showing its forces destroying SNA portable radar systems, a radar-jamming system, and an armored vehicle at SNA positions west of Qara Qozak bridge.[26] Anti-SDF media claimed that the SDF and SNA continued to clash west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[27] Anti-SDF media also claimed that Turkey conducted drone strikes targeting SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam in Aleppo Province and at a security point in Raqqa Province on December 30.[28]The SDF likely advanced north of Deir Hafer, east of Aleppo City, and led SNA forces to withdraw at least four kilometers from Highway 4. An SNA field commander told a local outlet on December 29 that the SNA had withdrawn from towns near Deir Hafer north to Rasm al Harmal al Imam, a town seven kilometers north of Highway 4.[29] The field commander said that the SDF controlled all territory south of an east-west water canal that connects Lake Assad to Aleppo City.[30] The SNA field commander’s statement is consistent with recent local reports about SDF operations in Deir Hafer and nearby towns.[31] The SDF does not appear to have advanced further west than Deir Hafer as of this writing.HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with senior Ukranian officials in Damascus on December 30.[32] A delegation led by Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Andrii Sybiha met with Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Assad al Shaibani and Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab.[33] Shaibani said that there will be a “strategic partnership” between Ukraine and Syria during a press conference after the meeting.[34]HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with Kuwaiti Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Ali al Yahya and Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council Jassam Mohammed al Badawi in Damascus on December 30.[35] Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Assad al Shaibani and Syrian Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab attended the meeting as well.[36] Shaibani said that Kuwait and Syria will establish political, economic, and humanitarian cooperation during a press conference after the meeting.[37]The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued operations within the Israel-Syria disengagement zone on December 30.[38] Syrian media reported that the IDF advanced into al Baath and entered government buildings to search for weapons.[39] The IDF previously entered al Baath and met with local officials to negotiate weapons collection efforts in the area on December 22.[40] Local media reported on December 30 that the IDF remain near Maariyah and Jamleh villages, Daraa Province.[41] The IDF first began operations within the disengagement zone on December 8.[42] Palestinian fighters conducted a relatively large attack targeting the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip.[43]The fighters conducted a multi-wave attack targeting the IDF around Jabalia refugee camp with small arms and in groups that ranged from six to 30 fighters. The IDF has been clearing the area since October 2024.[44] The IDF engaged the attacking Palestinian fighters with drone strikes and tank fire and killed around 106 fighters. This attack is noteworthy given it was significantly larger than most other militia operations in the Gaza Strip in recent months; fighters have typically operated in small squads rather than as a small company. The IDF assesses that around 100-200 fighters remain around Jabalia at this time.[45] The IDF stated on December 3 that it would conclude its clearing operation in Jabalia “in the coming weeks.”[46]Key Takeaways:Iran: Iran appears increasingly as though it seeks to foment sectarian conflict in Syria, which it could then exploit to establish proxy and partner militias there.Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to the senior levels of the new Syrian security establishment that he is currently forming.Syria: HTS-interim government officials have continued to meet with military commanders affiliated with the Turkish-backed SNA.Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters conducted a relatively large attack targeting the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripUnidentified Palestinian militias fired an anti-tank guided missile at a building in Beit Hanoun, northern Gaza Strip, on December 30, killing a reservist in the IDF 900th Brigade (162nd Division).[47] The IDF began a brigade-sized clearing operation in Beit Hanoun on December 28.[48]The IDF 162nd Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on December 30. The IDF has operated around Indonesian Hospital in recent days, detaining and killing Palestinian fighters and destroying booby-trapped areas nearby.[49] The IDF also located footage of Hamas fighters planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) about 45 meters from the hospital. Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees conducted a combined mortar attack targeting the IDF west of Jabalia refugee camp on December 30.[50]The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted separate rocket attacks targeting the IDF around the Netzarim Corridor on December 30.[51]The National Resistance Brigades mortared the IDF south of Rafah City on December 30.[52]Palestinian militias conducted two rocket attacks into southern Israel on December 30.[53] Palestinian militias launched a rocket from the central Gaza Strip that landed in an open area in southern Israel.[54] No militia has claimed the attack at the time of this writing. Palestinian Islamic Jihad separately fired rockets from the northern Gaza Strip at a town in southern Israel.[55] The IDF intercepted the rockets.[56]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonThe Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) reported on December 30 that it raided the homes of wanted individuals throughout the Bekaa Valley, arresting 15 citizens for weapons trading and firing guns.[57] The LAF seized a large number of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment during the raids.[58] The LAF also reported that it arrested four Lebanese citizens and three Palestinians near Beirut for firing their weapons.[59] The LAF seized the individuals’ weapons, ammunition, and military equipment.[60]Lebanese and Lebanese Hezbollah media reported on December 30 that the IDF detonated explosives between Taybeh and Rab el Thalathine, southeastern Lebanon.[61] Lebanese media previously reported that the IDF detonated explosives to demolish homes in Taybeh on December 28.[62]Hezbollah Political Council Deputy Chairman Hajj Mahmoud Qamati said on December 30 that Hezbollah will “deal” with any remaining Israeli forces in Lebanon following the 60-day period that Israel has to withdrawal under the ceasefire deal.[63] Qamati added that Hezbollah is strong and prepared and that its capabilities and missile stockpile are “still there.”[64] Qamati’s comments follow multiple accusations of Israel violating the ceasefire by Hezbollah and Lebanese officials.[65] The IDF said on December 25 that it has destroyed 80 percent of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities, seized over 85,000 weapons in Lebanon, and killed a total of 3,800 Hezbollah fighters since the October 7 war began.[66]Hezbollah Executive Council Deputy Chairman Sheikh Ali Damosh announced Hezbollah’s plan for reconstructing Lebanon.[67] Damosh said that Secretary General Naim Qassem formed a committee to supervise reconstruction. Damosh said that specialized technical bodies are surveying the damage in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon. Damosh added that Hezbollah has secured funding from Iran [for reconstruction] and that every person in need will soon receive aid. Damosh’s comments follow UK-based media reporting on December 24 that delayed war compensation to non-Hezbollah members and those injured in Israeli operations in Lebanon has caused growing unrest among Hezbollah’s support base.[68]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceIraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi inspected combat units in Anbar Province along the Iraq-Syria border for the second day in a row on December 30.[69] Muhammadawi emphasized the need to enhance cooperation among Iraqi security forces and to increase intelligence efforts, patrols, and border fortification maintenance.[70]Iraqi Army Commander Major General Hassan Jawad al Silawi was appointed as the Iraqi military intelligence director on December 30.[71] Silawi replaced Major General Zaid Hoshi, who had served in the position since December 2022.[72] Silawi previously served as the commander of the Iraqi Army 7th Infantry Division in al Qaim, Anbar Province.[73] His appointment notably comes after Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri visited the 7th Infantry Division on December 27.[74] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani appointed Hoshi as the Iraqi military intelligence operations director on December 30.[75] It is unclear why Hoshi was removed from his post as the director of Iraqi military intelligence.Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi highlighted the need for closer consultations with China to address Iran's nuclear program and sanctions relief during his visit to Beijing on December 27.[76] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi previously met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu in Beijing on December 5 to discuss similar matters.[77] Araghchi’s visit comes as Iranian oil tankers watchers observed a significant decline in Iranian oil exports to China as result of US Treasury sanctions on vessels since October 2024.[78] CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/10/3228867[2] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/716172[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2024 ;https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/12/iran-update-december-28-2024.html[4] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1025956[5] https://www.syriaweekly.com/p/make-or-break-syrias-transition-approaches?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=2700786&post_id=153766571&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=false&r=15l15z&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email[6] https://www.syriaweekly.com/p/make-or-break-syrias-transition-approaches?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=2700786&post_id=153766571&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=false&r=15l15z&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2024 ; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/226048/Syrian-resistance-will-be-revived-in-less-than-a-year-Rezaei; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-22-2024 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024[9] https://x.com/aabnour/status/1873581380451635623[10] https://www.almejas dot net/details.aspx?id=56[11] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B4-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%B3%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9[12] https://alqalahnews dot net/article/389030 ; https://thecradle dot co/articles-id/28275[13] https://alqalahnews dot net/article/389030 ; https://thecradle dot co/articles-id/28275[14] https://alqalahnews dot net/article/389030[15] https://alqalahnews dot net/article/389030[16] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/12/hayat-tahrir-al-shams-terror-network-in-syria.php[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-appoints-some-foreign-islamist-fighters-its-military-sources-say-2024-12-30/[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-appoints-some-foreign-islamist-fighters-its-military-sources-say-2024-12-30/[19] https://x.com/aabnour/status/1873581380451635623[20] https://x.com/mahfildijital/status/1873654562063876267[21] https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/181385/%D9%87%D8%A4%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B8%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A[22] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1873438433177485646[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-17-2024[24] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-21-2024[26] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1873672099098734771[27] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1873478539712041320[28] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1873674851061531062; https://t.me/sohebb1993/20646[29] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1873625721580786030[30] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1873625721580786030[31] https://x.com/hawarhebo99/status/1872691907874406843; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1872270039145120134[32] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/167[33] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1873724221337043030; https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/167 [34] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/35[35] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1873739481855262848; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1873770821837348911[36] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1873770821837348911[37] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1873799698232074260; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/120116[38] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1873665807743349040[39] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1873679163414183986; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1873665807743349040; www.npasyria dot com/201675; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1873794113004540087[40] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1870825717019168771 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/26771[41] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1873665807743349040[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-8-2024[43] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1873743642063495644[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-6-2024[45] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1873743642063495644[46] https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/12/iran-update-december-3-2024.html[47] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17861 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1873760070812803171[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-28-2024[49] https://www dot idf.il/261209[50] https://t.me/alwya2000/7229[51] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14952 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4597[52] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4501[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1873763907354959895 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/19007[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1873763907354959895[55] https://t.me/sarayaps/19007[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1873802258724643175[57] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1873686960499277991[58] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1873686960499277991[59] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1873686960499277991[60] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1873686960499277991[61] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126015; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110292; https://t.me/almanarnews/188750[62] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110188; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110189[63] https://t.me/almanarnews/188830[64] https://t.me/almanarnews/188831 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/188833[65] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/109903 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/188794[66] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17779; https://t.me/moriahdoron/17780[67] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/12974117?s=tg[68] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5094983-rising-discontent-within-hezbollah%E2%80%99s-support-base-over-delayed-war-compensation[69] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/107955 ; https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/12/iran-update-december-29-2024.html[70] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/107955[71] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9[72] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9[73] https://www.facebook.com/rag.iraq/posts/pfbid0YrEFwDxJyLM1mZngGn1WMsgbttzZaBLDYfbsYYRt2Kz6k3GdvZkR97BsJgMpftLDl[74] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2024[75] https://baghdadtoday dot news/264938-%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%86-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA.html[76] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/715561;https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/758813[77] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-5-2024[78] https://www.kpler.com/blog/us-push-to-cripple-iranian-oil-flows-begins-to-show-some-serious-effects;https://www.iranintl.com/202412307331 ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-16-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024;https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/12/iran-update-december-3-2024.html
- — Iran Update, January 9, 2025
- at 1/9/25 8:19pmAnnika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens,and Nicholas Carl Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Fighting reportedly erupted along parts of the frontline between the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in northern Syria amid indications of an upcoming SNA offensive against the SDF. Local, anti-SDF media reported on January 9 that the SDF and SNA exchanged artillery fire and “clashed” near the Balikh River, north of SDF-controlled Ain Issa.[1] Three SNA-affiliated fighters were reportedly injured in the fighting.[2] Local media reported artillery shelling and fighting along the M4 highway, west of Tal Tamr as well.[3] The SNA has reportedly sent units to the frontlines in recent days, indicating that the SNA is preparing to attack the SDF.[4] Such an attack would be part of the Turkish and SNA effort to coerce the SDF into disarming and disbanding. CTP-ISW cannot verify the local reporting about fighting along the frontline. Although it is unclear which side initiated the reported fighting, the SNA may nevertheless exploit the recent shelling to set conditions for further attacks on the SDF.The SNA continued offensive operations against the SDF around Tishreen Dam on January 8, possibly in order to fix the SDF units there and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline. The SNA launched a “large-scale” attack against the SDF about five kilometers northwest of the dam.[5] The SNA also ambushed SDF fighters around Tal al Zamalah, south of the dam.[6] The SDF accused Turkey of providing air support to the SNA attacks.[7] A Kurdish journalist reported that the SNA launched the attacks after receiving reinforcements from al Bab, Mare, and Jarabulus.[8] The journalist previously reported that the SNA had sent ”significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus.[9] SNA forces likely advanced within three kilometers of Tishreen Dam, given that geolocated footage posted on January 8 showed the SDF conducting drone strikes on SNA fighters in Khirbet Tueni, which is 2.8 kilometers northwest of the dam.[10] It is unclear whether the SNA has retained any territorial gains from its attacks, however. The SNA has continued to conduct artillery and drone strikes targeting the SDF around Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge.[11] Fixing the SDF to these locations could impede any SDF effort to reinforce its positions elsewhere along the frontline.Turkey conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River near the SDF-SNA frontline on January 9. Local media reported that Turkey struck an SDF rocket launcher near al Jarniyah, which is along an SDF supply line.[12] Turkish artillery and aircraft also struck SDF positions near Qara Qozak Bridge and north of the bridge.[13] CTP-ISW has noted that Turkey is conducting airstrikes targeting SDF in support of SNA offensive operations but that these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed operation.SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi told Agence France-Presse that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unity with the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government on December 30, 2024.[14] HTS and Turkey have coordinated in recent weeks to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. Turkish officials have called for destroying the SDF as well—a step farther than HTS leaders have gone.[15] The report of an agreement between the SDF and HTS raises the question of whether HTS may accept a lesser objective, such as the integration of coherent SDF units into the new Syrian armed forces, which would presumably fall short of the desired Turkish end state in Syria. The SDF may seek to integrate into the larger Syrian Defense Ministry apparatus by simply reflagging as opposed to fully dismantling its command structures. This type of absorption and reflagging often results in armed group leaders failing to observe the actual chain of command, however.Abdi separately said that the interim government has the responsibility to intervene and achieve a ceasefire throughout Syria, likely as an implicit call for HTS to negotiate with Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA to cease offensive operations against the SDF.[16] Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan has threatened that both the HTS-led interim government and Turkish armed forces could begin “military operations” against the SDF if the organization fails to disarm.[17]Behrouz Esbati, one of the seniormost Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Syria, discussed in a leaked video Iranian plans to rebuild proxy and partner militia networks in Syria that would oppose the HTS-led interim government.[18] These remarks are consistent with CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit it to rebuild the Axis of Resistance there. Esbati claimed to command over 10,000 Syrian fighters before the fall of Bashar al Assad.[19] Esbati said that Iran can “activate all the networks” that it has developed over the years in Syria and use social media to “form resistance cells.”[20] Esbati made these comments during a speech to military members at the Vali-ye Asr mosque in Tehran. An unspecified IRGC official—likely a member of the IRGC Quds Force—told the New York Times that Esbati’s comments about recruiting militia fighters were aspirational rather than reflective of discrete IRGC plans.[21] This denial is likely meant to suppress the narrative that the IRGC is trying to subvert the new Syrian government. The unspecified IRGC official also said that Iran would have a better chance at securing its interests in the Middle East if Syria descended into chaos, which is consistent with CTP-ISW‘s assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Iran.Esbati also notably said candidly that Iran "was defeated very badly, [and] took a very big blow and it's been very difficult.”[22] Esbati’s statements are a stark contrast from the formal Iranian regime line that has aimed to downplay the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran.[23] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer the resources needed to recuperate other actors within its Axis of Resistance namely Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah.[24]The Iraqi federal government is considering integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi armed forces, which would facilitate Iranian capture the Iraqi security sector. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba has reportedly agreed to such integration, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on January 9.[25] The source added that the Iraqi federal government seeks to integrate Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada into the armed forces as well.[26] This report comes after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly agreed to preserve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[27] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada all control brigades in the PMF.[28] Khamenei opposes dissolving the PMF outright but may support the integration of the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi federal government could reflag PMF brigades as new units, which would largely retain the units’ composition and structure. Integrating the PMF and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment would more entrench the militias into the Iraqi security sector more thoroughly, which would enable deeper Iranian infiltration.The Anbar Province Police Command will reportedly assume responsibility for security in Anbar Province, Iraq, from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[29] The Anbar Police Command, which is headed by Adel Hamid al Alwani, will reportedly control border areas and checkpoints that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously controlled.[30] This report comes after the Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 13th Brigade (Liwa al Tafuf) withdrew from security checkpoints in al Qaim, along the Iraq-Syria border, on January 5.[31] The Iraqi Federal Police operates under the Iraqi Interior Ministry, which is headed by Abdul Amir al Shammari.[32] Shammari is a Shia whom Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s al Furatain Movement nominated as interior minister in late 2022.[33] Major General Saleh Nasser al Ameri has commanded the Iraqi Federal Police since January 2021.[34]Prominent Iraqi Sunni politician and former Ninewa Province Governor Atheel al Nujaifi said that the newly formed “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” will likely oppose former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi.[35] Five prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians, including current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, established the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” on January 7.[36] The establishment of the coalition came after Mashhadani and five other Sunni politicians called for a “comprehensive national dialogue” in mid-December 2024.[37] Halbousi notably did not sign the statement calling for a national dialogue and has not joined the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition.” Iraqi media reported on January 9 that Halbousi has recently formed an “alliance” with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali.[38] Halbousi reportedly contacted Khazali in March 2024 to try to secure the victory of his preferred candidate in the Iraqi parliament speaker elections.[39] An Iraqi researcher separately observed in October 2024 that an Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated Iraqi media outlet had begun “present[ing] [Halbousi] in a beautiful light.”[40]Key Takeaways:Fighting reportedly erupted along parts of the frontline between the US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed SNA in northern Syria amid indications of an upcoming SNA offensive against the SDF.The SNA continued offensive operations against the SDF around Tishreen Dam in northern Syria, possibly in order to fix SDF units there and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline.SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unit with HTS, raising the question of whether HTS would accept a lesser objective than the Turkish one of destroying the SDF outright.One of the seniormost IRGC commanders in Syria discussed in a leaked video plans to rebuild Iranian-backed proxy and partner militia networks in Syria that would oppose the HTS-led interim government.The Iraqi federal government is considering integrating Iranian-backed militias into the Iraqi armed forces, which would facilitate Iranian infiltration and capture of the Iraqi security sector.SyriaAxis of Resistance objectives:Reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria to LebanonReestablish Iranian influence in SyriaThe HTS-led interim government began searching homes and military sites for weapons in al Sanamayn City, northern Daraa Province.[41] The interim government ordered all city residents on January 8 to bring weapons to a designated building within 24 hours or face “harsh measures.”[42] HTS-led forces collected light and medium weapons during the searches in al Sanamayn.[43] Local sources reported that fighters affiliated with the Mohsen al Hamid group illegally kept some of their weapons, including those seized from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 9th Division during the fall of Assad.[44] The interim government collected weapons from other towns in Daraa Province as well.[45]The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued operations in Quneitra Province, southwestern Syria, on January 9. The IDF 474th Brigade (210th Division) located and destroyed former SAA infrastructure, including an armored personnel carrier that contained weapons, anti-tank missiles, and improvised explosive devices (IED).[46] Geolocated imagery posted on January 9 shows the IDF in a building in central Quneitra City.[47]The HTS-led Defense Ministry appointed HTS commander Ali Nour al Din al Nassan to chief of staff of the Syrian armed forces on January 9.[48] HTS promoted Nassan to the position of major general on December 29.[49] The appointment of HTS loyalists within the interim government allows HTS to further consolidate its rule. Nassan and other Defense Ministry officials met with Syrian militia leaders on January 9 to continue discussions on HTS leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara’s plan to disarm and dissolve armed groups into the new Syrian armed forces.[50]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentIraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with US-sanctioned Astan Quds Razavi Custodian Ahmad Marvi at the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad in northeastern Iran on January 9.[51] Astan Quds Razavi is a parastatal economic conglomerate that has ties to the IRGC and controls a vast network of commercial interests active in agriculture, energy, financial services, information technology, and manufacturing.[52] Marvi is a close associate of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and has headed Astan Quds Razavi since March 2019.[53] Marvi said that Iran, Iraq, and the Middle East are in a ”sensitive situation” but expressed certainty that Iran and Iraq can turn ”threats into opportunities.”[54] Sudani and Marvi also discussed the role of Astan Quds Razavi in facilitating the passage of Iraqi religious pilgrims to Iran.[55] Sudani previously met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in Tehran on January 8 to discuss the role of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces and Iranian energy transfers to Iraq among other items.[56]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripThe IDF intercepted a drone that was approaching Israeli airspace from the east and another two drones over the Mediterranea Sea on January 9.[57] The Houthis have not claimed responsibility for these attacks at the time of this writing.Houthi media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted further airstrikes in Yemen after CTP-ISW’s last data cut off on January 8. Houthi media reported two airstrikes around Jarban in Sanaa Province, three airstrikes around Harf Sufyan, Amran Province, and an airstrike around Luhayyah, Hudaydah Province.[58] These reports came after US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple airstrikes targeting two underground Houthi weapons storage facilities in Jabran and Harf Sufyan earlier on January 8.[59] CENTCOM airstrikes aim to degrade Houthi efforts to threaten US regional partners and commercial and naval traffic around Yemen.[60] Houthi Foreign Affairs Minister Jamal Amer told UN Special Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg on January 9 that the Houthis will deescalate tensions in the Red Sea only after Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi commands it.[61] Abdulmalik said on January 9 that the Houthis would continue to fight and that they would continue their attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.[62]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripCommercially available satellite imagery showed the IDF increased clearing operations in Beit Hanoun in recent days.Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed that it fired a sniper rifle targeting an IDF soldier east of Gaza City on January 9.[63]A Palestinian militia conducted a mortar attack targeting the IDF south of the Netzarim Corridor on January 9.[64]The IDF Air Force announced on January 9 that it has killed four Hamas fighters, including the Hamas ”Sabra” Battalion commander under the Gaza City Brigade, in airstrikes in unspecified locations of the Gaza Strip in recent days.[65] LebanonLebanese media reported that the IDF continued advancing northeastward from Aita al Shaab toward Debel, Nabatieh Province, on January 8.[66] Lebanese and Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that the IDF detonated explosives and demolished homes in Aita al Shaab.[67]The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting likely Hezbollah fighters who were loading weapons from Hezbollah military sites onto vehicles in southern Lebanon on January 9.[68]Lebanese media reported that the IDF advanced from Maroun al Ras to outside Bint Jbeil City, Nabatieh Province, on January 9.[69]The Lebanese Parliament elected Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Joseph Aoun as president on January 9.[70] Hezbollah’s preferred candidate Suleiman Franjieh withdrew in support of Aoun on January 8.[71] Aoun promised in his acceptance speech that the Lebanese state will have a ”monopoly” over weapons, implying that Aoun will work to disarm Hezbollah and enforce the ceasefire agreement with Israel.[72] Aoun further promised that the Lebanese state—and therefore not Hezbollah—will end the IDF presence in Lebanon.[73]West BankThe Palestinian Authority (PA) recently handed over a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) to the IDF that PA security forces reportedly seized during their ongoing operation against militias in Jenin in the West Bank.[74] The handoff occurred after local social media footage posted on December 23 showed PA security forces holding an RPG in Jenin.[75] The PA claimed that it seized the RPG from Palestinian militias operating in Jenin refugee camp.[76] CTP-ISW has not previously observed militias in the West Bank using RPGs.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe IRGC Ground Forces' Mirza Kuchek Khan Special Forces Brigade and Saberin Special Forces Brigade concluded part of the annual Great Prophet exercise in Kermanshah Province on January 9.[77] The IRGC Ground Forces revealed a new loitering munition drone named “Rezvan,” which reportedly has a range of 20 kilometers and 20 minutes of flight endurance.[78] Iranian state media claimed that the Rezvanmulti-role Mohajer-6 drones with Ghaem guided glide bombs and used laser- and infrared-guided anti-tank Almas and Dehlaviyeh missiles to destroy mock vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.[79]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://t.me/nahermedia/43830; https://t.me/sohebb1993/21020[2] https://t.me/nahermedia/43830[3] https://t.me/sohebb1993/21021; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132443; https://x.com/syria7ra/status/1877184506379063549[4] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/دولي/الجيش-الوطني-السوري-يرسل-أسلحة-ثقيلة-لجبهات-نبع-السلام/3444283 ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1876736904655159676[5] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1877097220186554560; https://t.me/sohebb1993/21031; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1877316606319055280[6] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1877097220186554560[7] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1877097220186554560; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119097[8] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1877316606319055280[9] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1876736904655159676[10] 36°24'06"N 38°09'28"E[11] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1877107226655047847; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132459; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119096; https://www.facebook.com/Gunde.Elecaxe/posts/1022690023209146[12] https://t.me/sohebb1993/21046; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132458; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1877321252488040958[13] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119097; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1877321252488040958[14] https://www.france24.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7/20250109-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85[15] https://en dot apa.az/asia/pkk-elements-in-syria-must-leave-country-turkish-fm-455547 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-eradication-kurdish-ypg-militia-syria-imminent-2025-01-06/[16] https://www.france24.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7/20250109-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85[17] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/تركيا/فيدان-توجيه-إنذار-نهائي-لتنظيم-واي-بي-جي-الإرهابي/3444290[18] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-general-syria-defeat.html[19]https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-general-syria-defeat.html ; https://shows.acast dot com/abdimedia/episodes/677c3ff3539aba773dff650a[20] https://shows.acast dot com/abdimedia/episodes/677c3ff3539aba773dff650a[21] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-general-syria-defeat.html[22] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-general-syria-defeat.html[23] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-20-2024[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reshaping-iran%E2%80%99s-axis-resistance[25] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9[26] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9[27] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF--%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86[28] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-sayyid-al-shuhada ;https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kataib-hezbollah-part-iraqs-pmf ;https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-harakat-hezbollah-al-nujaba[29] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9[30] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9 ;https://alsharqiya dot com/en/news/anbar-police-takes-over-the-security-file-of-the-province[31] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%88%D9%81[32] https://media.defense.gov/2023/Feb/07/2003157209/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20GENERAL%20FOR%20OIR.PDF[33] https://media.defense.gov/2023/Feb/07/2003157209/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20GENERAL%20FOR%20OIR.PDF ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/10/28/iraqi-parliament-approves-new-national-unity-cabinet/[34] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus170KnightsAlmeidawithIndex.pdf[35] https://almadapaper dot net/391980/[36] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF[37] https://almadapaper dot net/388798/[38] https://almadapaper dot net/391980/[39] https://alrafidain dot tv/76796/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B8-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B5/[40] https://x.com/shahokurdy/status/1851712801028608178?mx=2[41] https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/578 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1877367637560136011[42] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1876989516642197714[43] https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/555 ; https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/559 ; https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/562 ; https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/563 ; https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/564[44] https://daraa24 dot org/?p=47565[45] https://t.me/Free_Kenitra_city/186 ; https://t.me/Free_Kenitra_city/185[46] https://www.idf dot il/263369[47] https://x.com/adler_zvi/status/1877323267482005803[48] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119082[49] https://x.com/Al7khalidi/status/1873410734346178715[50] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1877419281643667865[51] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718587/[52] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/supreme-leadership-iran/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-november-30[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-november-30[54] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718588/[55] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718588/[56] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/19/3234865/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/19/3234717/ ; https://farsnews dot ir/miladmaniee/1736339425108631725[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877419049149141119; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877427212057513986; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877441595231932566[58] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1877145879301279856;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1877146165923234161;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1877146948349620386[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025[60] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1876956279127597185[61] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1877418802721312914[62] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3421502.htm[63] https://t.me/sarayaps/19034[64] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4509[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877410849570087238[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877360934965985290[67] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877360934965985290; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877378843008184532; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110987; https://t.me/almanarnews/190127; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110994[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1877333429164909011[69] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877321522798322013; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110936[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanese-lawmakers-start-voting-new-president-2025-01-09/[71] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126710[72] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-elects-new-president-in-sign-of-hezbollahs-waning-influence-d60fd7a1[73] https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/09/middleeast/joseph-aoun-elected-lebanon-president-intl/index.html[74] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18151[75] https://www.alalam dot ir/news/7135853[76] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5094796-%D8%A2%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%8A%D8%B1[77] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/20/3234118; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-4-2025 ;https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf[78] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718737/[79] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/20/3235137/;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/20/3235113
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2025
- at 1/9/25 8:19pmGrace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward,William Runkel,|and Frederick W. KaganJanuary 9, 2025, 7:15pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on January 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 9. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for all participants of the group to sign bilateral security agreements with Ukraine in order to strengthen Ukrainian forces and protect Ukraine's energy sector.[1] Zelensky emphasized the importance of providing Ukraine with more air defense systems and stated that Ukraine wants to supply Ukrainian forces with a record number of domestically produced and internationally procured drones in 2025. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group approved eight roadmap documents that outline the Ukrainian forces' objectives through 2027 in key areas for international cooperation, including air defense, artillery, armored vehicles, drones, air force, and maritime security.[2] Umerov stated that the roadmaps aim to ensure that the Ukrainian military is compatible with NATO and serve as the basis for medium- and long-term support for Ukraine. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told Bloomberg ahead of the January 8 Ramstein meeting that Russia has some advantages in the war but is also facing challenges, as evidenced by Russia's turn to North Korea and Iran for assistance in its war against Ukraine.[3]Ukraine's Western partners announced additional military aid packages at Ramstein Air Base on January 9. Austin announced a new US military aid package for Ukraine under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) valued at approximately $500 million.[4] The package includes AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M air defense missiles; air-to-ground munitions; F-16 support equipment; and small-arms ammunition.[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that Germany will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of IRIS-T air defense missiles.[6] Polish Deputy Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz announced that Poland is also preparing a new aid package for Ukraine.[7] UK Defense Secretary John Healey and Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds jointly announced that the drone coalition, including the UK, Latvia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, will provide Ukraine with 30,000 drones at an unspecified future time after the coalition signed contracts worth 45 million pounds ($55.4 million).[8]Russian elites and high-ranking security officials are reportedly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to wage a full-scale war in Ukraine with half measures and are increasingly concerned with Putin's timeline to end the war. Sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and wider Russian federal government and regional governments told Russian opposition media outlet Meduza that Russian elites are increasingly "disappointed" and "tired" of waiting for the war to end and are growing increasingly concerned about the long-term impact of Western sanctions on Russia's economy.[9] Two sources close to the presidential administration noted that the Russian government currently lacks a clear vision for post-war Russia and that an end to the war could be "critical" for the presidential administration if the administration cannot identify a clear narrative and political framework for Russian society after the war. A source in the Russian presidential administration told Meduza that Russian elites, primarily high-ranking security officials, are increasingly frustrated with not having "enough" manpower and materiel to conduct the war and assess that Putin needs to conduct "mobilization" and completely transition Russian society and the Russian economy to a wartime footing.High-ranking Russian security officials appear to be assessing that Russia needs to intensify its war in Ukraine rather than seek an exit via negotiations. Meduza's report suggests that Russian security and military officials may recognize that the Russian military is not accomplishing significant territorial gains proportionate to the manpower and materiel losses they are incurring in Ukraine. The Russian military command has, thus far, tolerated taking exorbitant personnel losses in exchange for tactically but not operationally significant advances, and Putin's theory of victory is predicated on accepting such losses so long as Russian forces continue to grind forward in Ukraine.[10] Average daily Russian advances slowed by roughly nine square kilometers in December 2024 after three straight months of increasing territorial gains and personnel losses in September, October, and November 2024, however, and the Russian military command may be less willing than Putin to incur such high casualty rates if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to slow.[11] Russian security and military officials do not appear prepared to abandon the war as a result of these losses, however, but are reportedly instead advocating for Putin to intensify Russia's war effort by calling for additional partial reserve callups and a formal decision to transition to a wartime footing, likely in hopes of flooding the battlefield with manpower and materiel. ISW continues to assess that Putin is resistant to conducting a partial involuntary reserve callup or further mobilizing the Russian economy, as such decisions would be deeply unpopular among Russians and would further strain Russia's labor shortages and economy.[12] It remains unclear if this group of Russian security and military officials calling for further manpower and economic mobilization will succeed in convincing Putin to take more dramatic measures to meet the Russian military's needs in Ukraine, although mounting personnel losses and increasing challenges in meeting voluntary recruitment targets may cause Putin to conduct an involuntary partial reserve callup in the near future.Russian elites' reported diagnosis of the main problem with Russia's conduct of the war is inaccurate, as Russia's failure to restore maneuver to the battlefield — not a shortage of manpower — is the main factor causing Russia's relatively slow rate of advance. Russian elites' reported focus on mobilizing more Russian personnel indicates that the Russian elites likely view a lack of manpower as Russia's largest constraint to achieving rapid success on the battlefield rather than the ineffectiveness of frontline Russian forces, poor campaign-planning abilities of Russian commanders, and significant armored vehicle shortages that Russian forces are currently suffering.[13] Russian forces have recently demonstrated that they are able to make slow, grinding gains through infantry assaults in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions, but their inability to conduct rapid, mechanized maneuver has prevented Russian forces from converting these tactical gains into deep penetrations into Ukrainian rear areas.[14]Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are struggling to restore maneuver to an increasingly transparent battlefield, but the Russian military will also have to address critical shortcomings in its ability to train frontline commanders and plan military operations if Russian forces aspire to conduct the type of rapid, mechanized maneuver that characterized the first few months of the full-scale invasion in early 2022.[15] Ukrainian military officials recently reported that Russian forces are fielding fewer armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — the two operational directions with the highest intensity of fighting and where Russia has the densest concentrations of its forces — in favor of highly attritional, infantry-led assaults.[16] Russian forces have suffered high and unsustainable armored vehicle losses and have struggled to protect these vehicles from Ukrainian drones on the frontline over the last year, forcing Russian forces to increasingly limit and prioritize where and when to field armored vehicles and conduct mechanized assaults.[17] Dedicating a significant amount of additional Russian manpower to infantry assaults on critical areas of the frontline would likely allow Russian forces to at least sustain or possibly slightly increase their current pace of advance, but only as fast as Russian infantry can travel on foot — far short of the rapid gains, deep penetrations, and significant battlefield victories that the Russian elites likely desire.Meduza's report indicates that Russia's security elite — like Putin himself — is uninterested in a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the war in the near future. Several sources told Meduza that Russian elites were concerned about Putin's ability to extract his territorial demands — the formal recognition of Russian control over the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, including the parts Russia currently does not occupy — in possible future negotiations and are focused on creating an "image of victory" in post-war Russia.[18] This focus on Russian victory in tandem with the elites' reported desire to intensify the war further indicates that Russian elites support Putin's desire to negotiate only on terms dictated by Russia and to achieve a significant victory to justify the war to Russian society. Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly indicated that Russia is unwilling to engage in good-faith negotiations or participate in a meaningful peace negotiation except on terms that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, and the Russian elite will most likely continue to support Putin's demands over engaging in meaningful negotiations.[19]A Russian opposition investigative outlet reported that Russian authorities have turned a pretrial detention center (SIZO) in Taganrog, Voronezh Oblast into a torture center for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and imprisoned Ukrainian civilians.[20] Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that Russian authorities have been torturing Ukrainian POWs and civilians at the SIZO-2 in Taganrog and reported several accounts from Ukrainian POWs detailing the extent and high frequency of the physical and sexual abuse that the Russian guards inflict on the Ukrainian prisoners. The Ukrainian POWs reported that the Russian guards torture Ukrainian POWs, particularly defenders of Mariupol, to coerce them into pleading guilty to extremism charges in sham trials intended to falsely portray Russia as the liberator of Ukraine and justify its occupation of Ukrainian territories. Ukrainian POWs also told Mediazona that Russian authorities use the SIZO-2 facility's reputation for torture to threaten Ukrainian prisoners at other facilities and that these Ukrainians are often willing to do "anything" to avoid being transferred to SIZO-2. Mediazona also cited various human rights experts' and lawyers' statements that Russian authorities frequently detain Ukrainian civilians and journalists in occupied Ukraine for even slight suspicion of assisting the Ukrainian military or opposing the Russian war and refuse to release them, provide access to lawyers, or provide medical care. Mediazona noted that it is unclear who runs the Taganrog facility, as lawyers for the detained Ukrainians assume that employees of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service run the facility. The Russian Memorial Center for Human Rights — the successor of the Memorial Human Rights Center that focused on human rights abuses in the Soviet era — reported in October 2024 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) had assumed control over the SIZO-2 facility.[21] The UN has consistently reported on Russian forces' "widespread and systematic torture" of Ukrainian forces as nearly all interviewed Ukrainian POWs describe consistent experiences of torture while in Russian detention.[22]The UN condemned the recent surge in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs. UN Deputy Human Rights Chief Nada Al-Nashif called on Russian authorities on January 8 to halt the summary executions of Ukrainian POWs and prosecute those who engage in these executions following a recent surge in credible reports of more executions.[23] Al-Nashif noted that the UN has verified 68 cases of Russian forces conducting summary executions of Ukrainian POWs since the start of the war. ISW has frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions.[24]The Armenian government approved a draft law on January 9, beginning Armenia's accession process into the EU.[25] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on January 9 that the Armenian government does not object to the law's adoption and noted that the Armenian population must approve the decision on Armenia's possible future EU membership through a referendum.[26]Key Takeaways:Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 9.Ukraine's Western partners announced additional military aid packages at Ramstein Air Base on January 9.Russian elites and high-ranking security officials are reportedly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to wage a full-scale war in Ukraine with half measures and are increasingly concerned with Putin's timeline to end the war.High-ranking Russian security officials appear to be assessing that Russia needs to intensify its war in Ukraine rather than seek an exit via negotiations.Russian elites' reported diagnosis of the main problem with Russia's conduct of the war is inaccurate, as Russia's failure to restore maneuver to the battlefield — not a shortage of manpower — is the main factor causing Russia's relatively slow rate of advance.Meduza's report indicates that Russia's security elite — like Putin himself — is uninterested in a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the war in the near future.A Russian opposition investigative outlet reported that Russian authorities have turned a pretrial detention center (SIZO) in Taganrog, Voronezh Oblast into a torture center for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and imprisoned Ukrainian civilians.The UN condemned the recent surge in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.The Armenian government approved a draft law on January 9, beginning Armenia's accession process into the EU.Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Sudzha.Russian officials continue to indicate that the Kremlin intends to further militarize the Russian government and Russian society in the long term.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently intensified offensive operations aimed at retaking the remainder of Kursk Oblast and advanced during a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault northwest of Sudzha on January 9. Geolocated footage published by a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast on January 9 indicates that Russian forces seized Leonidovo and Aleksandriya and advanced northwest of Nikolskyi and west of Vikotorovka (all northwest of Sudzha) during a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault.[27] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the attack reported that Russian forces conducted the assault in six waves and that Russian forces used 50 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), armored personnel carriers (APCs), and civilian vehicles in the attack.[28] The brigade reported that it destroyed an unspecified number of Russian vehicles during the assault. Additional geolocated footage published on January 8 and 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced in Pogrebki (northeast of Sudzha at the northernmost point of the Ukrainian salient) and marginally advanced in Makhnovka (east of Sudzha).[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pogrebki and advanced further south, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these more maximalist claims.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking throughout the salient, including near Sudzha itself; northeast of Sudzha near Staraya Sorochina; northeast of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; east of Sudzha near Bondarevka and Makhnovka; and southeast of Sudzha near Guyevo and Kurilovka.[31] Russian forces reintensified assaults in Kursk Oblast on January 5 and have conducted assaults throughout the salient over the last four days after mainly focusing on advancing east of Sudzha in recent months.[32] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Sverdlikovo (east of Sudzha).[33] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the Chechen Akhmat "Kashtana" Spetsnaz detachment are reportedly operating near Berdin and elements of the Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz detachment are reportedly operating near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye.[34]Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Nikolayevka (further northwest of Sudzha).[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Pogrebki, Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha), Staraya Sorochina, and Nikolayevka.[36]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 9 that 4,000 North Korean military personnel have been killed or wounded during the war to date, presumably in Kursk Oblast.[37] North Korea deployed roughly 12,000 troops to support Russia's war effort in 2024, and Zelensky's statement indicates that Ukrainian forces have killed or wounded roughly one-third of the North Korean troops deployed to Russia.[38] Zelensky stated in late December 2024 that over 3,000 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast.[39]Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya and Vovchansk on January 8 and 9 but did not make any confirmed advances.[40] Drone operators of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Vovchansk direction.[41]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 9 but did not make further advances. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced up to five kilometers south of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[42] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to seize on poor weather conditions to advance in squad-sized infantry groups in this direction.[43] Russian forces continued assaults north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Holubivka and northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 8 and 9.[44]Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Borova amid ongoing offensive operations in the Borova direction January 9. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced west and northwest of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[45] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Borova near Koliznykvika, Zahryzove, Zelenyi Hai, Borisovka Andriivka, and Kopanky; east of Borova near Novoyehorivka, and Tverdokhlibove; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka and Hrekivka on January 8 and 9.[46]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 9 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced up to and are attacking a tactical height near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[47] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Ivanivka and Terny on January 8 and 9.[48] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Terny.[49]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) on January 8 and 9.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 9 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer south of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and occupied the tactical heights south and west of the settlement, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[51] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Verknokamyanske and are trying to counterattack from Serebryanka (north of Siversk).Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 9 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 9 that Russian forces advanced northwestward and southeastward near a forested area in Chasiv Yar and along the T-05-04 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway northeast of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[52] Russian forces attacked within Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on January 8 and 9.[53] The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction stated on January 8 that Russian forces are conducting assaults in small infantry groups and with armored vehicle support, using buggies, and trying to penetrate the Ukrainian rear with sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[54]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on January 9 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked near Toretsk, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 8 and 9.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 8 that Russian forces have almost fully pushed Ukrainian forces to the outskirts of Toretsk.[56] Drone elements of the Russian 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) reportedly continue to operate in the Toretsk direction.[57]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 9. Geolocated footage published on January 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Yasenove (south of Pokrovsk).[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk), to Yasenove, near Vovkove, on the outskirts of Zvirove (all southwest of Pokrovsk), two kilometers wide and 500 meters deep south of Baranivka, within Baranivka, 700 meters near Vozdvyzhenka (both east of Pokrovsk), and 500 meters within Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Novyi Trud; southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Zvirove, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Nadiivka, Solone, and Novoyelyzavetivka; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 8 and 9.[60] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are attempting to bypass central Pishchane from the north and that one of the Russian military's main goals in the Pokrovsk direction is to advance to Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), from which the milblogger claimed Russian forces are 1.5 kilometers.[61] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces are roughly four kilometers from Udachne. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in western Novovasylivka.[62] An acting spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are attacking almost all day and night in the area but do not have sufficient forces and means to attack Pokrovsk in head-on frontal assaults and are attempting to bypass the town.[63] The spokesperson stating that Russian forces are not using much equipment in the area and are mostly moving on foot.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer deep near Slovyanka, 400 meters deep near Petropavlivka (both northwest of Kurakhove), and 2.5 kilometers south of Kurakhove.[64] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Sribne, Shevchenko, Petropavlivka, and Slovyanka; west of Kurakhove towards Kostyantynopil and Andriivka; south of Kurkahove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopolske, and Yantarne on January 8 and 9.[65] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Petropavlivka and on the C-051122 Yantarne-Dachne road.[66] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces are still present near and Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) west of Kurakhove and are repelling Russian attacks in the area.[67] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Kurakhove; elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating south of Kurakhove; elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dachne; elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil; and elements of the "Grachi" Spetsnaz detachment are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[68]Geolocated footage published on January 8 confirms that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD) in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast on January 8.[69]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on January 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka), towards Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka), northeast of Rivnopil, and west and northwest of Neskuchne (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[70] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces attacked west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on January 8 and 9.[71]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast including near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on January 9 but did not make any confirmed advances.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[73] Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[74]Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction and on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta, including near Kozatskyi Island (northeast of Kherson City), on January 8 and 9 but did not make any confirmed advances.[75]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 8 to 9 and on the afternoon of January 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 70 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of January 8 to 9.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 46 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts; that 24 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that falling debris from downed Russian drones damaged residential homes in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Cherkasy oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Russian Iskander-K cruise missiles targeting Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the afternoon of January 9.[77] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against a civilian enterprise in Nemyshlianskyi Urban Raion, Kharkiv City during the afternoon of January 9.[78]Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on January 9 that the Russian glide bomb strike against Zaporizhzhia City on January 8 killed 13 and injured at least 116, an increase from the 63 injured reported on January 8.[79]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian officials continue to indicate that the Kremlin intends to further militarize the Russian government and Russian society in the long term. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 9, citing various Russian federal government sources, that the Kremlin's vision for after the war in Ukraine includes electing an unspecified "certain proportion" of Russian military veterans to the Russian State Duma.[80] Meduza's sources characterized such an election as only a "superficial proposal" to "somehow distract [Russian] politicians and people" from Russia's poor conduct of the war in Ukraine, but such an election would likely see a large number of radicalized veterans placed in government positions and would contribute to militarizing a significant portion of the Russian federal government in the medium- to long-term. The Kremlin has been using its Time of Heroes veteran program to appoint Kremlin-selected veterans of the war in Ukraine to various positions within Russian local, regional, and federal government as it continues to set conditions to prepare for a possible future military conflict against NATO.[81]Russian federal subjects continue offering financial incentives to encourage Russians to sign contracts to fight in Ukraine. A Ukrainian source posted an image of a Tula Oblast advertisement promising a five million-ruble (about $48,898) annual salary (or a 416.6 thousand ruble-monthly salary) to Russians who sign contracts with the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) by March 1, 2025.[82]Russian authorities continue to force Ukrainians living under Russian occupation to serve in the Russian military. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian occupation authorities forced 300 Ukrainian citizens living in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to serve in the Russian military between October 1 and December 31, 2024.[83] The GUR reported that Russian authorities are also attempting to coerce residents of occupied Luhansk Oblast into signing Russian military contracts and promised one-time payments of 2.5 million rubles (about $24,450) to any recruits from occupied Luhansk Oblast.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that the Kremlin may be considering reviving a pre-war plan to effectively assume complete control over Belarus after the end of the war in Ukraine. Meduza reported on January 9 that an unnamed insider source close to the Russian presidential administration claimed that the Russian government is considering plans to "annex" Belarus and frame this annexation as a “deeper integration” of Belarus with Russia by establishing a common government, likely referring to the Union State framework.[84] The source claimed that the Kremlin’s ability to annex Belarus ultimately depends upon the cooperation of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko but that Lukashenko “clearly wants to remain a full-fledged ruler” separate from the Kremlin. The Kremlin has maintained steady pressure to integrate Belarus under Russian control through the Union State framework even during the war in Ukraine and is reportedly planning to completely subsume Belarus by 2030.[85]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://suspilne dot media/921295-zelenskij-vistupiv-na-ramstajni-govoriv-zokrema-pro-bezpekovi-ugodi-obicanki-nato-ta-zahidni-vijska-v-ukraini/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nrhR5IMQkfE[2] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02sgfPKLz3wARFRWBcFbaVo46w7hhfF2a4qVczZgg2z2fsWoWQvNUvenk1ZrNvmz1Al; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/09/rustem-umyerov-ukrayina-i-soyuznyky-zatverdyly-visim-dorozhnih-kart-z-klyuchovymy-czilyamy-syl-oborony-do-2027-roku/; https://suspilne dot media/921211-na-ramstajni-zatverdili-8-doroznih-kart-z-pidtrimki-ukraini-do-2027-roku/ ; https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/11432[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-08/russia-doesn-t-hold-all-the-cards-in-ukraine-austin-says[4] https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4025037/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-at-the-25th-ukraine/[5] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4025039/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/[6] https://suspilne dot media/921425-nimeccina-peredast-ukraini-kerovani-raketi-dla-iris-t/; https://www.n-tv dot de/politik/15-16-Insider-Biden-plant-neue-Russland-Sanktionen-vor-Trumps-Amtsantritt--article23143824.html[7] https://x.com/MON_GOV_PL/status/1877352786628681729 ; https://suspilne dot media/920799-zasidanna-ramstajnu-v-nimeccini-udar-po-stabu-rosian-na-doneccini-1051-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1736439719&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ;[8] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/30000-new-drones-for-ukraine-in-boost-to-european-security[9] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/01/09/zhdali-chto-voyna-zakonchitsya[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120724[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010425;l https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2024[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignApr16; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignMay26; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust21; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct5; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJuly25; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122422[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010425[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010425;l https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2024[18] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/01/09/zhdali-chto-voyna-zakonchitsya[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024[20] Warning: disturbing and graphic contenthttps://zona dot media/article/2025/01/09/taganrog[21] https://memorialcenter dot org/ru/news/v-taganroge-pytayut-zaklyuchennyh[22] https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/10/1155491; https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1148026; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/03/ukraine-un-commission-concerned-continuing-patterns-violations-human-rights;[23] https://www.barrons.com/news/un-denounces-spike-in-russian-executions-of-ukrainian-pows-02666198?refsec=topics_afp-news[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120324; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2024[25] https://t.me/istories_media/8706 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/armenian-government-approves-bill-launch-eu-accession-bid-2025-01-09/ https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/01/09/armenia-takes-first-step-to-eu-accession-as-government-approves-bill; https://news dot am/arm/news/860664.html[26] https://news dot am/arm/news/860685.html[27] https://t.me/brygada47/1134; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24460; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1877285524332806283; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8066; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1877144265924448428; https://t.me/ukr_sof/1366; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1877334798328377740[28] https://t.me/brygada47/1134[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22131; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1877330746861310073 ; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/270; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24452 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1877312469657374833; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1877315917438214385; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/275[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22131 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31241[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/62100 ; https://t.me/rybar/67015 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20405 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19981 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62148 ; https://t.me/russian_airborne/8716 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84142 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24166[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010625 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010825[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150721[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84166 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150690 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150701[35] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1877309256694694284; https://t.me/simargl_1_22/34[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/62115 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20405[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/09/volodymyr-zelenskyj-nazvav-kilkist-zagyblyh-soldativ-kndr-u-vijni-z-ukrayinoyu/; https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/videos/2630270757159268/[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110124[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724[40]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3981 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3476[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150765[42] https://t.me/tass_agency/295139[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/09/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-zaryvayetsya-u-nory-ta-namagayetsya-perty-pid-prykryttyam-snigu/[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3981[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8065; https://t.me/skarlatop/4332; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8064[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3981[47] https://t.me/tass_agency/295144[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62100 ; https://t.me/rybar/67015[49] https://t.me/epoddubny/22122; https://t.me/mod_russia/47754 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16427[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22132[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150757[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24154[54] https://youtu.be/m12QF4Wb1eo; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/08/zupynyly-rozmotaly-dystanczijne-minuvannya-dopomagaye-nashym-bijczyam-vidbyvaty-vorozhi-shturmy/[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil[56] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21352[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150803 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13232[58] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/videos/535953729601330/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8059;[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61298; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30438; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61300; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84169[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl ; https://t.me/s/Khortytsky_wind ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61298; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84169; https://t.me/yurasumy/20402[61] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84169; https://t.me/yurasumy/20402[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61298[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/09/u-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-ne-namagayutsya-shturmuvaty-pokrovsk-v-lob/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84169; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22143[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl; https://t.me/s/Khortytsky_wind; https://t.me/dva_majors/62100 ; https://t.me/rybar/67015; https://t.me/yurasumy/20400; https://t.me/yurasumy/20401[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22143[67] https://youtu.be/m12QF4Wb1eo; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/08/u-kurahovomu-boyi-idut-na-zahidnij-okolyczi-mista/[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22122; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22143; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61306; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150763; https://t.me/voin_dv/12688; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84177[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2025 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19859; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10920 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p5dnfRgUdMocRZjnYeryRcywWujX82CWPx26AkprsuMtmuNawgEj1QZ3yKnDmsVEl ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/zsu-urazyly-komandnyj-punkt-8-yi-gvardijskoyi-zagalnovijskovoyi-armiyi-rf-genshtab/[70] https://t.me/rybar/67002 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62100 ; https://t.me/rybar/67015 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61295 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18670 ; https://ria dot ru/20250108/rogov-1992835168.html utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch[71] https://t.me/s/Khortytsky_wind ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62100 ; https://t.me/rybar/67015 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24154[72] https://t.me/wargonzo/24154 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22146[73] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22146[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/24169[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032pfC4tiKK7rGHaw3DukTqZ7RgGQwZbMxFNgh6Wnn4cXYkE8D2CuWAZRWNchJj7c8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024C4BQDfXq4c7C44PRpkpKn81LbLCLhVRCu9yNbzyZ16u5xW7wW1nDvYnm2t8hHSil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M5zosXGAFSrpMAeYHvYBeCwDsps54AhC8Mdrz3dJcHT8znCo9PthpFk8skMMr4iwl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11946[76] https://t.me/kpszsu/26534[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/26563[78]https://t.me/synegubov/12675 ; https://t.me/synegubov/12671 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2047 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2048[79] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/920827-uprodovz-dobi-armia-rf-zavdala-333-udari-po-12-naselenih-punktah-zaporizkoi-oblasti-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/15015 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/15016 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/15029[80] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/01/09/zhdali-chto-voyna-zakonchitsya[81] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2024[82] https://t.me/andriyshTime/31844[83] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5184[84] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2025/01/09/kreml-zadumal-prisoedinit-belarus-posle-okonchaniya-voini-a151933 ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/01/09/zhdali-chto-voyna-zakonchitsya[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-pressures-lukashenko-implement-his-previous-integration; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2023; https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2023/02/21/v-kremle-razrabotali-plan-zahvata-belarusi-do-2030-goda-a34670; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-forced-integration-russia%E2%80%94not-protest-movement%E2%80%94-lukashenko%E2%80%99s; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2023
As of 1/12/25 9:06pm. Last new 1/12/25 7:19pm.
- Next feed in category: Janes