Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 20, 2025

 

at 5/20/25 7:34pm

 Daria Novikov, Nicole Wolkov, Anna Harvey, Angelica Evans, and Karolina Hird with William RunkelMay 20, 2025, 5:00 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on May 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Senior Russian officials continue to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent efforts to feign interest in peace negotiations to end the war. Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev claimed during the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum on May 20 that there are currently no Ukrainian officials with the authority to conclude a peace treaty with Russia and that Russia may need to consult Ukraine’s Constitution to identify authorized negotiation partners.[1] Medvedev questioned Ukraine's sovereignty and claimed that Ukraine is a "failed state" whose leaders’ lack of legitimacy raises "serious questions" about who Russia can negotiate with during future peace negotiations.[2] Medvedev‘s claims directly contradict Putin’s reported agreement with US President Donald Trump to immediately begin bilateral negotiations with Ukraine.[3] Medvedev’s statements indicate that Russia is, in fact, not interested in engaging with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian government officials who are key to bilateral negotiations to end the war.Russian officials have repeatedly promoted the false narrative that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are illegitimate to justify Russia’s refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and further Russia's long-standing war goal of establishing a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv.[4] Ukraine's Constitution and Ukrainian law explicitly state that Ukraine cannot hold elections while martial law is in place and that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[5] Zelensky also recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude him from negotiating with Putin.[6] Chairperson of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee Oleksandr Merezhko recently stated that Ukraine’s Constitution "clearly" specifies Zelensky as Ukraine’s chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky’s constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees.[7] ISW continues to assess that any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia’s explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and the Ukrainian Constitution.[8]Medvedev also reiterated long-standing Russian demands tantamount to Ukraine’s complete capitulation. Medvedev falsely claimed that Russia’s illegal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea was legitimate under international law, underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make any concessions in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[9] Medvedev also demanded that Ukraine demilitarize the current frontline, refuse foreign military aid, and reject European peacekeeping deployments to Ukraine.[10] Medvedev stated that Russia would consider the deployment of European forces to be a military threat and categorize future deployments of European forces in Ukraine as legitimate military targets.[11] Medvedev’s statements indicate that Russia has not abandoned its original goals in Ukraine, which include the "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine, securing international recognition of large parts of southern and eastern Ukraine as Russian territory, and a permanent non-aligned status for Ukraine.[12] Medvedev's threats against future European peacekeepers are also part of an ongoing effort to frame the current war in Ukraine as an existential conflict between Russia and the West.[13] Medvedev’s statements indicate that Putin has not ordered Russian officials to abandon ongoing narrative efforts to discredit Ukraine in response to promises that Putin allegedly made to Trump and that Putin likely does not intend to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and support Ukraine's defense industry. Italian media reported in mid-May 2025 that Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto announced that Italy approved an eleventh military aid package for Ukraine, which will include one SAMP/T air and missile defense system, 400 M-113 armored personnel carriers, and ammunition.[14] Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom reported on May 20 that it signed a memorandum of cooperation with Belgian ammunition manufacturer KNDS Belgium to coordinate the joint assembly of medium-caliber ammunition for automatic cannons.[15]The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced several sanctions packages against Russia on May 20.[16] The package is the EU's largest targeting Russia's shadow fleet and the Russian energy and military-industrial sector.[17] The EU also sanctioned the Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops; the 27th Scientific Center; and the Russian Ministry of Defense's 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute for Russia's use of chemical weapons in Ukraine.[18] The UK also announced new sanctions against Russia's military, energy, and financial sectors on May 20.[19]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk's recent appointment as Central Military District (CMD) commander on May 20.[20] Solodchuk most recently served as commander of the Kursk Grouping of Forces and led Russia's efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.[21] Solodchuk is replacing Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev, who reportedly recently replaced General Oleg Salyukov as Russian Ground Forces Commander.[22]Key Takeaways:Senior Russian officials continue to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent efforts to feign interest in peace negotiations to end the war.Medvedev also reiterated long-standing Russian demands tantamount to Ukraine’s complete capitulation.Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and support Ukraine's defense industry.The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced several sanctions packages against Russia on May 20.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk's recent appointment as Central Military District (CMD) commander on May 20.Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, and in the Zaporizhia direction.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces reportedly continued limited ground attacks in Kursk Oblast on May 20 but did not advance.Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited attacks near Tetkino and Volfino (east of Tetkino).[23]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces remain unable to consolidate positions within Tetkino and that the situation near Gornal (southwest of Sudzha) is covered in the "fog of war."[24]Fighting continued in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 20.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 19 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from Demidovka and Popovka (both northwest of Belgorod City) and advanced west of Prilesye (south of Demidovka).[25]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Demidovka and Popovka.[26]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 19 shows that Russian forces advanced within southwestern Loknya (northeast of Sumy City) and seized the fields west of the settlement.[27]Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized all of Loknya and advanced across the international border near Turia (east of Sumy City).[28]Russian forces continued attacks within Loknya and near Bilovody (northwest of Loknya) and Vodolahy (west of Loknya) on May 19 and 20.[29]Order of Battle: A reconnaissance company of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) is reportedly operating near Bilovody and Vodolahy.[30]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced across the Vovcha River in northwestern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), but it is unclear if Russian forces maintain positions in this area.[31]Russian forces continued assaults near Vovchansk on May 19 and 20.[32]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 20 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed on May 20 that Russian forces advanced in the forest and along the railroad line near Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[33]Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka and along the international border near Stroivka and southwest of Kupyansk toward Pishchane on May 19 and 20.[34]Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen "Sheikh Mansur" volunteer battalion are reportedly operating in the international border area near Stroivka.[35]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 20.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on May 19 and 20.[36]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 20 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, Hlushchenkove, and Zelena Dolyna, and toward Olhivka and Karpivka, and northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Torske on May 19 and 20.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Torske.[38]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 20 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 600 meters deep along windbreaks southeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) and north of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[39]Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, Hryhorivka, and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 19 and 20.[40]Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 20 shows that Russian forces recently advanced north of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[41]Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and toward Predtechyne, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 19 and 20.[42]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces have been accumulating forces in Chasiv Yar for an unspecified period of time and are now leveraging this larger force grouping to attempt to break out of the settlement.[43] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are actively attempting to raze buildings in central Chasiv Yar in order to facilitate further advances.Ukrainian Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported that Russian forces struck central Slovyansk with a long-range Geran-2 (Shahed variant) drone, which Russian forces typically use against targets in deep rear areas of Ukraine.[44]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Toretsk and east of Nova Poltavka (west of Toretsk) along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[45] Additional geolocated footage published on May 20 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Toretsk.[46]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further north of Toretsk and near Romanivka (west of Toretsk), reached the southern outskirts of Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Poltavka (west of Toretsk), and entered eastern Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[47]Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk toward Ivanopillya and Pleshchiivka; northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba and Dachne and toward Dyliivka; southwest of Toretsk near Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, and toward Zorya; and west of Toretsk near Yablunivka and toward Popiv Yar on May 19 and 20.[48]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces are attempting to advance near Dyliivka and Dachne and toward Romanivka on the flanks of Toretsk to bypass more urban areas in the Toretsk direction.[49]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 255th and 33rd motorized rifle regiments (both 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[50] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are also reportedly fighting near Nova Poltavka.[51]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 20 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently advanced to the outskirts of Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk) and are trying to advance further north of Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[52]Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Yelyzavetivka and toward Shevchenko Pershe; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Hrodivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Dachenske, Shevchenko, and Zvirove and toward Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Zelenivka and Pershe Travnya on May 19 and 20.[53]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are leveraging poor weather conditions to attack this part of the front.[54]Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian "Maxim Krivonos" volunteer detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoukrainka and Udachne.[55]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 20 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and towards Novomykolaivka, and east of Novopavlivka near Troitske and Kotlyarivka on May 19 and 20.[56]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 20 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and north of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[57]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr, and southwest of Kurakhove toward Odradne on May 19 and 20.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Odradne.[59]Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian "Maxim Krivonos" volunteer detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksiivka.[60]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 20 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[61]Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole, Privilne, Burlatske, and Vesele, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Rivnopil.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelene Pole, Novopil, and Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[63]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[64]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces recently advanced in the Zaporizhia direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv).[65] Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka, and Stepove on May 19 and 20.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[67]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 19 and 20 but did not advance.[68]A Russian milblogger claimed on May 20 that Russian forces are only able to resupply units operating on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta using daily drone drops.[69]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on May 19 and 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 108 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 35 Shahed drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine and that 58 drones were "lost." Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure and commercial infrastructure objects in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[71]Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on May 19 that Russian forces are continuing to innovate their long-range strike tactics and recently began massing Shahed strike drones at high altitudes before striking targets in Ukraine, complicating Ukraine's ability to intercept the drones.[72] Ihnat reported that Russian forces are also complicating the work of Ukrainian mobile air defense units by using decoy drones in combination with Shahed drones during strikes.[73]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/315911 ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/05/20/1111411-ne-upolnomochen ; https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018088039.html; https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018104972.html; https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018109226.html[2] https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018104972.html; https://riadot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018108209.html; https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018109226.html[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225[9] https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018100151.html; https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018101709.html[10] https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018096051.html; https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018098030.html[11] https://ria dot ru/20250520/medvedev-2018098030.html[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025[14] https://www.today dot it/mondo/aiuti-ucraina-italia-nuovo-pacchetto-armi.html ; https://www.ilgiornale dot it/news/politica-estera/ancora-aiuti-allucraina-litalia-pronta-inviare-m-113-2476001.html ; https://formiche dot net/2025/05/ucraina-pacchetto-2-per-cento-pil-difesa/#content; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/italy-to-send-another-samp-t-air-defense-system-to-ukraine-media/; https://www.ilmessaggero dot it/politica/carri_armati_italia_m_113_come_funzionano_guerra_vietnam-8821690.htm; https://www.today dot it/mondo/aiuti-ucraina-italia-nuovo-pacchetto-armi.html; https://it.insideover dot com/difesa/trasporti-missili-e-munizioni-lundicesimo-pacchetto-italiano-per-lucraina.html;[15] https://t.me/UOP_Official/1422; https://ukroboronprom dot com.ua/news/ukroboronprom-domovivsya-pro-bojepripasi-z-knds; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-defense-industry-signs-memorandum-with-knds-belgium-on-medium-caliber-ammunition/ ;[16] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/20/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-agrees-17th-package-of-sanctions/[17] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/20/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-agrees-17th-package-of-sanctions/[18] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/20/chemical-weapons-eu-sanctions-three-entities-in-the-russian-armed-forces-over-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-ukraine/[19] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-major-sanctions-in-support-of-ukraine[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/52913[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025[23] https://t.me/rybar/70529; 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https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71527[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/71527[39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64413[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64413[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9196; https://t.me/kateniata56rubak/216[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24475; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/20/taktyka-vypalenogo-mista-u-chasovomu-yaru-vorog-styraye-budynky-do-fundamentiv/[44] https://www.facebook.com/Vadymlyakh/posts/pfbid02hj88WD58PsLgVqc2z99QQP9AdgwaAY8jJBG6jZYu48Wmr2V9sPHu5wbB1VNu8StQl[45] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1924431267107356930;https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1924374996987592965; https://t.me/ombr_155/282; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1924533648969064855; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1924591087143866834; https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/949[46] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1924822565530255716; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1119[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165345; https://t.me/dva_majors/71527; https://t.me/yurasumy/23058; https://t.me/yurasumy/23058[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24475; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441; https://t.me/dva_majors/71527; https://t.me/rusich_army/23614; https://t.me/yurasumy/23058;[49] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/20/obhodyt-tu-chastynu-de-u-nogo-ne-vyhodyt-vorog-namagayetsya-ohopyty-toreczk-z-flangiv/[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/71536; https://t.me/dva_majors/71567; https://t.me/dva_majors/71570[51] https://t.me/yurasumy/23058[52] https://t.me/yurasumy/23058[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24475; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64423[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64423[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165330[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24475; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/15061; https://t.me/rybar/70540[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24475; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441; https://t.me/voin_dv/15061; https://t.me/dva_majors/71527[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/15061[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165330[61] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165345 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15061[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24475 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15061 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71527[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/15061 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71527 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26647[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/15042[65] https://t.me/intelligencecompany/103; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1924547747882971534[66]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24475 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64415[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24441[69] https://t.me/rusich_army/23610[70] https://t.me/kpszsu/34656[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/34656 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35679 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1022147-vogon-se-dosi-gasat-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-misci-udaru-dronom-po-sinelnikivskomu-rajonu-dnipropetrovsini/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/14350[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/19/ataka-z-velykoyi-vysoty-u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-nichnu-ataku-shahedamy/[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/20/u-povitryanyh-sylah-povidomyly-yak-rosiyany-udoskonalyuyut-shahedy-i-zminyuyut-taktyku-udariv/

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, May 20, 2025

 

at 5/20/25 7:34pm

 Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed pessimism about the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and explicitly rejected the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.[1] Khamenei’s statements are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that disagreements between Iran and the United States about the issue of zero uranium enrichment may stall the negotiations or delay a deal.[2] Khamenei explicitly rejected the US demand for zero uranium enrichment during a speech on May 20.[3] This speech marked the first time that Khamenei had publicly discussed the US-Iran negotiations since they started on April 12.[4] Khamenei stated that the US demand for zero uranium enrichment is "very wrong” and emphasized that Iran will "follow its own policy and method” regarding this issue."[5] Khamenei's stated position is consistent with recent statements from other senior Iranian officials.[6] Khamenei also compared the current US-Iran negotiations to previous negotiations under former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, stating that negotiations under Raisi never reached a conclusion and that the regime "do[es] not think they will reach a conclusion now."[7] An unspecified Iranian political insider told a UK-based outlet that there is an internal discussion in Iran "over the utility of attending further talks at this time," given the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.[8] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister and lead negotiator Abbas Araghchi stated on May 20 that Iran has not yet accepted a proposed date for the fifth round of the US-Iran negotiations.[9]Khamenei may have framed the US-Iran nuclear negotiations negatively to lower public expectations for a deal and imminent economic relief. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that the main goal of the US-Iran negotiations is to lift sanctions on Iran.[10] Iran is facing a severe economic and energy crisis amid international sanctions. Iran's economic situation has fueled public frustration, which may stoke protests that could threaten regime stability.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States will improve Iranian economic conditions.[12] The Iranian rial appreciated from a near-record low of 1,0005,500 rials to one US dollar on April 11 to 879,000 rials to one US dollar on April 14 after the first round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations on April 12.[13] Khamenei's messaging may aim to manage domestic expectations about the possibility of a nuclear deal in an effort to protect the regime from potential internal backlash if the talks fail and Iran does not secure sanctions relief.The Iranian Passive Defense Organization Supreme Council met on May 20, likely to coordinate preparations to protect critical infrastructure ahead of a potential US or Israeli strike.[14] The Passive Defense Organization is a government body that is responsible for planning, coordinating, and directing activities to protect civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from military, chemical, cyber, or economic threats.[15] The Passive Defense Organization Supreme Council is chaired by Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri.[16] Senior Iranian defense officials, including Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh and Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, attended the meeting.[17] Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad notably also attended the meeting, which suggests that Iran is concerned about a potential strike on its energy infrastructure. Israeli officials reportedly considered striking Iranian oil production facilities in response to the Iranian attack on Israel in October 2024.[18]The Houthis announced on May 19 that they will target Haifa Port in Israel in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes on Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen. Attacks on Haifa Port would support the Houthis’ October 7 War objective to economically isolate Israel.[19] The Houthis announced on May 19 that they will impose a “naval blockade” on Haifa Port in northern Israel in response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and Israeli airstrikes in Yemen.[20] The most recent Israeli airstrikes in Yemen on May 16 targeted the Houthi-controlled Hudaydah and Salif ports, damaging berths and cargo loading infrastructure, which impeded the Houthis' ability to receive supplies through these ports.[21] The Houthi military spokesperson, Yahya Sarea, warned all shipping companies with vessels present or heading to Haifa Port that the Houthis will target the port.[22] The Houthis have conducted drone and missile attacks on Israel since October 2023 as part of a campaign to economically blockade Israel in response to its operations in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis conducted at least four joint drone and missile attacks on Haifa Port with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq in June 2024.[23] Haifa Port is an important economic gateway to the Mediterranean Sea for Israel and hosts an Israeli naval base.[24]The Houthis are attempting to enforce this economic blockade while adhering to the terms of the US-Houthi ceasefire. The Houthis agreed on May 5 to not attack “US vessels” in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in exchange for the United States halting its airstrike campaign on the Houthis.[25] The US-Houthi ceasefire did not require the Houthis to stop attacks on Israel or non-US-flagged or owned merchant vessels, however.[26] The Houthis likely warned vessels near and heading to Haifa Port that the group will target the port in order to avoid striking a “US vessel” and thereby breaking the US-Houthi ceasefire agreement.International airlines have suspended flights to Israel due to concerns about Houthi drone and missile attacks targeting Ben Gurion Airport. The suspension of flights will likely hurt the Israeli economy. At least 10 international airlines have suspended flights to Israel until mid-June 2025, according to Israeli media.[27] Several of the airlines suspended flights after Israeli air defense systems failed to intercept a Houthi missile near the airport on May 4.[28] Flight suspensions to Israel in 2024 contributed to a decline in tourism, the closure of tens of thousands of businesses, and a decrease in Israel’s GDP growth forecast by half by the third quarter of 2024.[29] Flight suspensions in 2025 will likely have similar effects on the Israeli economy.Iran is deepening high-level defense cooperation with Armenia, likely as part of a broader strategy to counter Israeli, Turkish, and Western influence in the South Caucasus. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan in Yerevan, Armenia, on May 20.[30] The Iranian Defense Ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements. Nasir Zadeh expressed support for peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, stating that Iran is ready to help accelerate the peace process between the two countries. Nasir Zadeh and Papikyan signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) between their respective defense ministries. Nasir Zadeh’s visit likely reflects advanced defense talks rather than initial Iranian outreach to Armenia, given Nasir Zadeh’s seniority in the Iranian regime.[31] Iran has historically maintained close ties to Armenia and has reportedly provided security assistance to Armenia in recent years. Israeli media claimed in July 2023, for example, that Armenia had used Iranian Shahed drones in its conflict with Azerbaijan.[32] Iran and Armenia recently conducted their first-ever joint military exercise in northwestern Iran on April 9 and 10 to bolster border security and counter-terrorism coordination.[33] Iran may seek to increase military and defense cooperation with Armenia in the coming months, particularly as Iran appears to be growing increasingly concerned about Israeli, Turkish, and Western influence in the South Caucasus.Iran is simultaneously maintaining military, political, and economic ties with Azerbaijan to counter external influences in the South Caucasus. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Mirza Kuchak Khan Special Forces Brigade and Azerbaijani Special Forces began joint exercises along the Iran-Azerbaijan border on May 17. The exercises will continue until May 21.[34] The exercises included coordinated tactical drills and simulated counter-terrorism operations. Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media framed the exercises as a strategic show of force aimed at enhancing combat readiness, expanding bilateral defense cooperation, countering Israeli “military movements,” and reinforcing Iran’s role in shaping regional security and stability in the South Caucasus.[35] This exercise follows a series of high-level Israeli-Azerbaijani engagements in recent weeks. Israeli government officials have recently called for including Azerbaijan in the Abraham Accords and increasing “trilateral cooperation” between Azerbaijan, Israel, and the United States.[36] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff visited Baku on March 14 to discuss US-Israel-Azerbaijan trilateral coordination and strengthen ties between the three countries under the Abraham Accords framework.[37] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz separately met with his Azerbaijani counterpart in Israel on May 19 to discuss bolstering defense cooperation.[38] The Iranian regime has historically accused Baku of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory to launch operations against Iran.[39] IRGC-affiliated media in February 2025 called the Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance a direct threat to Iranian national security and warned that Israel uses Azerbaijani territory for intelligence operations and exploiting ethnic tensions inside Iran.[40]The European Union’s (EU) and the United States’ plan to lift economic sanctions on Syria in the coming weeks will help stabilize the Syrian economy, but will not address other sources of potential instability in Syria. The EU Council of Ministers lifted economic sanctions on Syria on May 20 to “help the Syrian people rebuild a new, inclusive and peaceful Syria.”[41] EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas acknowledged that “there can be no peace [in Syria] without the path to economic recovery” but noted that the EU retains the ability to reimpose sanctions if the transitional government does not make “progress."[42] The EU can immediately lift economic sanctions on Syria, but there are several legal obstacles that the Trump administration must overcome before it can remove “all” sanctions on Syria.[43] The complicated legislative environment in the United States and decades of US sanctions targeting Syria means that it will take time for the United States to fully lift sanctions on Syria.[44] A previous temporary US sanctions waiver issued in January 2025 did not lead to significant investment in Syrian industries, partly due to confusion over what activities were included in the waiver.[45] Internal instability and uncertainty regarding Syria's future may similarly deter investment in the short- to medium-term. It will therefore likely take weeks or months before the removal of sanctions generates visible and tangible economic effects throughout the country. Some key state functions, such as the provision of salaries to government employees, will have an immediate and important impact on parts of the Syrian population, however. [46]Sanctions relief does not preclude the possibility of renewed internal conflict in Syria caused by other factors. Renewed internal conflict could be driven by sectarian and ethnic fears caused by the civil war. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to refuse to disarm because they are concerned that elements of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) that have previously perpetrated human rights abuses against Kurds could attack Kurdish communities.[47] Druze militia members have separately negotiated with the transitional government to keep their arms due to distrust of the transitional government’s ability to protect their communities.[48] These fears can lead to renewed conflicts, such as fighting along SNA-SDF contact lines in eastern Aleppo Province or violence in Druze areas of southern Syria. These geographically limited conflicts can spread to other parts of Syria if the transitional government does not quickly and adequately address them.The EU and the United States can continue to impose targeted individual sanctions to encourage the Syrian government to rein in the most extreme elements of its security services. Targeted sanctions could assuage minority groups’ concerns about extreme elements committing abuses against their communities. The EU decided to retain its arms embargo and may impose additional targeted sanctions on individuals accused of human rights abuses.[49] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has included some individuals in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) structure who have previously committed human rights abuses, likely because he calculates that he needs the support and cooperation of these groups to extend his control over Syria. Shara has appointed SNA commanders accused of human rights abuses, including Suleiman Shah Commander Abu Amsha and Hamza Division Commander Sayf Abu Bakr, to lead divisions of the Syrian Army.[50] Sultan Murad Commander Fahim Issa holds an even more prominent role as deputy defense minister.[51] Shara likely recognizes that ignoring these factions or attempting to subordinate them by force is too difficult for his relatively meager armed forces. Targeted sanctions may incentivize Shara to remove these powerful faction leaders or give him the political cover required to do so. The removal of destabilizing elements within the transitional government’s security force could reduce the risk of renewed major internal conflict.Key Takeaways:US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed pessimism about the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and explicitly rejected the US demand for zero uranium enrichment. Khamenei’s statements are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that disagreements between Iran and the United States about the issue of zero uranium enrichment may stall the negotiations or delay a deal. Khamenei may have framed the US-Iran nuclear negotiations negatively to lower public expectations for a deal and imminent economic relief.Iranian Preparations for a Potential US or Israeli Strike: The Iranian Passive Defense Organization Supreme Council met on May 20, likely to coordinate preparations to protect critical infrastructure ahead of a potential US or Israeli strike. The Passive Defense Organization is a government body that is responsible for planning, coordinating, and directing activities to protect civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from military, chemical, cyber, or economic threats. Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad notably also attended the meeting, which suggests that Iran is concerned about a potential strike on its energy infrastructure.Houthi Campaign Against Israel: The Houthis announced on May 19 that they will target Haifa Port in Israel in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes on Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen. Attacks on Haifa Port would support the Houthis’ October 7 War objective to economically isolate Israel. The Houthis are attempting to enforce this economic blockade while adhering to the terms of the US-Houthi ceasefire.Iranian Strategy in the Caucasus: Iran is deepening high-level defense cooperation with Armenia, likely as part of a broader strategy to counter Israeli, Turkish, and Western influence in the South Caucasus. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan in Yerevan, Armenia, on May 20. The Iranian Defense Ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements. Iran has historically maintained close ties to Armenia and has reportedly provided security assistance to Armenia in recent years. Israeli media claimed in July 2023, for example, that Armenia had used Iranian Shahed drones in its conflict with Azerbaijan. Iran is simultaneously maintaining military, political, and economic ties with Azerbaijan to counter external influences in the South Caucasus. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Mirza Kuchak Khan Special Forces Brigade and Azerbaijani Special Forces began joint exercises along the Iran-Azerbaijan border on May 17.Sanctions Relief in Syria: The European Union’s (EU) and United States’ plan to lift economic sanctions on Syria in the coming weeks will help stabilize the Syrian economy, but will not address other sources of potential instability in Syria. Sanctions relief does not preclude the possibility of renewed internal conflict in Syria caused by other factors. The EU and the United States can continue to impose targeted individual sanctions to encourage the Syrian government to rein in the most extreme elements of its security services. Targeted sanctions could assuage minority groups’ concerns about extreme elements committing abuses against their communities. Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyFour unspecified armed individuals kidnapped a Shia cleric in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on May 20.[52] The individuals kidnapped the cleric outside of the Amir al Momenin Seminary where the cleric worked.[53] The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) began an investigation to locate the cleric and arrest the kidnappers. No group has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping at the time of this writing.The Iranian rial depreciated from 820,000 rials to one US dollar on May 19 to 843,000 rials to one US dollar on May 20.[54]SyriaSyrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with a high-level Western defense delegation for the first time on May 15, possibly to try to obtain military assistance.[55] Qasra met with UK Defense Ministry official Charles Smith in Damascus to discuss the development of the Syrian armed forces.[56] Qasra and Smith’s meeting comes after the United Kingdom decided on April 24 to lift asset freezes on the Syrian Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, and General Intelligence Directorate.[57]Defense Minister Qasra met with the Turkish Defense Ministry’s General Director for Defense, Ilkay Altindag, in Damascus on May 20.[58] Qasra and Altindag discussed enhancing military cooperation and coordination.[59] Syrian and Turkish defense officials have held several meetings since January 2025 to discuss Turkey’s military presence in Syria and Turkish assistance to the Syrian armed forces.[60] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara stated on April 23 that the Syrian government is negotiating with Turkey over the future of its military presence in Syria.[61]Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Security Service (GSS) forces targeted an Iranian-linked weapons and drug smuggling network along the Syria-Iraq border on May 20.[62] Syrian forces raided several warehouses and smuggler hideouts in al Hari and Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, that were run by Ahmed Hussein Ali al Jghaifi.[63] Jghaifi reportedly facilitates smuggling operations for senior Iranian militia leaders in Iraq and Syria.[64] The forces seized large quantities of anti-tank guided missiles, thermal missiles, ammunition, machine guns, night-vision equipment, narcotic pills, and hashish.[65] Syrian media reported on May 20 that smugglers within al Jghaifi’s network were transporting weapons to Lebanon and Iraq.[66] Syrian forces arrested over 35 individuals, including Jghaifi.[67] The Albu Kamal border crossing with Iraq was a key smuggling route for Iran and Iranian-backed groups under the Assad regime.[68] Syrian transitional government forces have conducted several raids in recent weeks targeting Iranian-backed smuggling networks and infrastructure along the Iraq-Syria border.[69]Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with a Jordanian delegation led by Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Ayman Safadi in Damascus on May 20.[70] The Jordanian delegation also included the Jordanian water, transport, industry, and energy ministers.[71] Shaibani and Safadi signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to establish a “supreme coordination council” between the two countries.[72] The council will hold periodic meetings to strengthen coordination between the two countries.[73] The council will submit reports to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Jordanian King Abdullah II.[74] Safadi emphasized that Jordan will support Syria in “building a free, sovereign, stable, and secure Syria.”[75] Safadi stated that Jordan has and will continue to cooperate with Syria on defense and security issues that threaten both countries, such as drug and weapons smuggling.[76]Safadi also stated that Jordan will coordinate with Syria to prevent further Israeli military operations in Syria and will work to facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Syrian territory.[77] Safadi claimed that Israeli attacks on Syria represent an attack on Jordan, given that attacks on Syria threaten Jordan’s northern border and destabilize the entire region.[78] Shaibani reiterated Syria’s call for Israel to adhere to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, which would require Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory.[79]Syrian MoD forces thwarted an attempted prison break by Assadist remnants in Latakia Province on May 20.[80] Assad regime remnants reportedly attempted to free prisoners from al Bassa Central Prison and clashed with MoD forces at the prison.[81] Units from the Syrian Army’s 50th Division repelled the attack. Two division members sustained injuries during the attack.[82] The Assadist remnants retreated, and security forces conducted a search operation in the surrounding area to pursue the individuals who attempted the prison break.[83] The Assad regime remnants may have sought to free Assad loyalists from the prison.[84]IraqNothing significant to report.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripThe Houthis are seeking to acquire Chinese-made data dumping devices for their security and intelligence agencies, likely to increase their domestic surveillance capability.[85] An independent Yemeni defense outlet, citing an unspecified leaked document, claimed that the finance aide to the Houthis’ domestic intelligence services chief, Majed Ahmed Salman Marai, is trying to purchase $60,000-worth of Chinese-made data dumping devices.[86] Data dumping devices can manipulate large amounts of data and transfer data between devices.[87]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing significant to report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60234[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-15-2025[3] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60234[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-14-2025[5] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60234[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-13-2025[7] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60234[8] https://amwaj.media/en/article/inside-story-iran-to-decide-on-talks-with-the-us-amid-no-sign-of-written-proposal[9] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1924804889957351798[10] https://www.sharghdaily dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6/1010092-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA ; https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1060321/ ; https://www.hawzahnews dot com/news/1251528/[11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-7-2025[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-15-2025[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-14-2025[14] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/747858/[15] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-passive-defense-organization-another-target-sanctions ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-18-2024[16] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/747858/[17] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/747858/[18] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response[19] https://t.me/army21ye/2998[20] https://t.me/army21ye/2998[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-16-2025; https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1924836221659828594[22] https://t.me/army21ye/2998[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-launched-two-operations-against-ships-israels-haifa-port-2024-06-06/https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-ship-haifa-port-with-islamic-resistance-iraq-2024-06-26/;https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1806379471567798635[24] https://www.idf dot il/en/mini-sites/israeli-navy/; https://www.isra-tech dot net/haifa-port-under-the-ownership-of-adani-ports/[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13 ;[26] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html?searchResultPosition=3 ; https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html[27] https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/05/20/flight-cancellations-to-israel-extended-by-major-airlines/; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/airlines-suspend-flights-israel-after-houthi-attack-airport-2025-05-06/[28] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/airlines-suspend-flights-israel-after-houthi-attack-airport-2025-05-06 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-working-intercepting-missile-launched-yemen-2025-05-04[29] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/as-israels-economy-struggles-leading-economists-say-ending-the-war-in-gaza-would-help[30] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/748086[31] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/ministry-defense-logistics-export[32] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/analysis-opinion/1689501192-gallant-s-visit-to-azerbaijan-underlines-iranian-threat-to-regional-security[33] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/24809 ; https://farsnews dot ir/khalilamerinia/1744306259017018434https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-11-2025[34] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/28/3315374 ;https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/747942/[35] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/747528[36] https://amwaj.media/en/article/iran-weighs-options-as-azerbaijan-aligns-closer-with-israel-us[37] https://www.jpost dot com/international/article-846086[38] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-854584[39] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-14-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-30-2023-6569315598267[40] https://basirat dot ir/fa/news/372957[41] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/20/eu-lifts-all-economic-sanctions-on-syria-hoping-to-speed-up-post-assad-recovery[42] c[43] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/20/eu-lifts-all-economic-sanctions-on-syria-hoping-to-speed-up-post-assad-recovery ; https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-eu-decides-and-imposes-sanctions/a-56515391 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051325[44] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051325 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1924468469359137224[45] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-ease-aid-restrictions-syria-limited-show-support-new-government-wsj-reports-2025-01-06/ ; https://syriadirect.org/syria-embarks-on-fragile-transition-sanctions-stand-in-the-way/ ; https://x.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1894800717233234417[46] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050825 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07/[47] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050625[48] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050525[49] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/5/20/eu-agrees-to-lift-all-economic-sanctions-on-syria-diplomats[50] https://x.com/Seyfebubekir/status/1886127717457740034; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1903768244650983866[51] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051425[52] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6473910/[53] https://www.hawzahnews dot com/news/1259939[54] https://bon-bast.com/[55] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1923081781844070858[56] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1923081781844070858[57] https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-lifts-sanctions-against-syrias-defence-ministry-intelligence-agencies-2025-04-24[58] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1924838243859624391 ; https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1924852820513083480[59] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1924838250285236348[60] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sharaa-discuss-defense-pact-with-turkeys-erdogan-sources-say-2025-02-04 ; https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/03/turkey-increasing-military-assistance-to-syria.php ; https://x.com/HornReview/status/1885003185376411841[61] https://www.yahoo.com/news/syria-seeks-redefine-presence-foreign-141323482.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/world/middleeast/syria-president-nyt-interview-takeaways.html[62] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1924866656121028807[63] https://x.com/AlekhbariahSY/status/1924742730896281681 ; https://x.com/idrees_al_shame/status/1924744108695785657[64] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1924714984074051635[65] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1924752160597709053 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142825 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/31626 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1924783700342145243 ; https://x.com/MelhameYahya/status/1924747131761340572[66] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1924749720477446439 ; https://x.com/AlekhbariahSY/status/1924742730896281681 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/57595[67] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1924749720477446439 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1924783700342145243[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-20-2025[69] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/56691 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1916102446285279457 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135917 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889606521929265620[70] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qaSlEe9Sgc8[71] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9_G8qrtZ9k ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/874[72] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9_G8qrtZ9k ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/883 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnR8tDAYQRo[73] https://youtu.be/t9_G8qrtZ9k?t=93[74] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9_G8qrtZ9k ; https://youtu.be/t9_G8qrtZ9k?t=94[75] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9_G8qrtZ9k ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/57559[76] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9_G8qrtZ9k ; https://youtu.be/t9_G8qrtZ9k?t=415 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130072[77] https://youtu.be/t9_G8qrtZ9k?t=431[78] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9_G8qrtZ9k ; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1924802353762304169[79] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9_G8qrtZ9k ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130075[80] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1924736413964104080 ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B0%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84[81] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1924736413964104080 ; https://www.syria dot tv/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B0%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%89[82] https://www.syria dot tv/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B0%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%89 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1924736413964104080[83] https://www.syria dot tv/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B0%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%89[84] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1924744858830291385 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-syria%E2%80%99s-emerging-insurgency[85] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1924248618828996624[86] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1924248618828996624[87] https://www.digital-detective.net/datadump/

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 13, 2025

 

at 5/17/25 3:11am

 Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William RunkelMay 13, 2025, 6 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on May 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations. Putin stated on May 13 that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[1] Putin gave this figure as part of a statement claiming that Russia has a higher monthly recruitment than Ukraine and therefore may be exaggerating these recruitment figures to posture a large Russian military amid ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and the West, however. Putin did not explicitly state when Russian recruitment levels hit 50,000 to 60,000 personnel each month, but previous Ukrainian and Russian statements imply that Russia may have aimed to reach this monthly recruitment figure in 2025. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave recruitment figures at the end of 2024, indicating that Russia is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates.[2] Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated in late January 2025 that roughly 450,000 people signed Russian military service contracts, that an additional 40,000 people joined Russian volunteer formations in 2024, and that the Russian military aimed to "maintain this momentum."[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in early March 2025 that Russia's recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue.[4] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in April 2024 that Russian forces are "increasing the number" of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000 new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025, to 623,000 just over three months later.[5] Syrskyi stated on May 13 that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025.[6] Syrskyi's and Putin's figures indicate that Russia may be generating enough forces to replace losses while also increasing the overall size of its force grouping in Ukraine.Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances in Fall 2024, despite a slowed rate of advance in the first four months of 2025.[7] Russian forces are likely able to generate enough forces to sustain their replacement rate and increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[8] The Russian military is currently prioritizing sending poorly-trained recruits into highly-attritional infantry assaults to make grinding advances — despite enduring a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained — in an effort to pressure Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands amid ongoing negotiations. Russia is also attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and while making additional battlefield advances.The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO. US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli informed the US Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2025 that the Russian military is reconstituting and expanding its force structure and materiel production at a faster rate than most Western analysts anticipated, despite suffering approximately 790,000 casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[9] Cavoli stated that the Russian military command has deployed over 600,000 soldiers to the frontlines in Ukraine, which is nearly double the size of Russia's initial invasion force and is consistent with Syrskyi's report that there are 623,000 Russian military personnel in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree in September 2024 ordering the Russian military to establish a 1.5 million combat-ready force, indicating his long-term interests in increasing the size of the Russian military.[10] Cavoli's report coheres with recent indicators signaling that Russia is expanding and upgrading military bases, barracks, training grounds, warehouses, and railways near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, to support a future influx of personnel.[11] Russia is also integrating railways and roadways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with Belarusian infrastructure. ISW has long assessed that Russia's restoration of the MMD and Leningrad Military District (LMD) is part of the Kremlin's long-term restructuring effort to prepare for a potential large-scale conventional war against NATO.The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicles units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 13 that the Russian military command has developed a series of standards in equipping frontline units with motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and Chinese- and Russian-made buggies.[12] Mashovets stated that Russia is working to equip every battalion with up to 30 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; every platoon with up to nine motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; and every "Storm V" penal recruit assault company with up to 15 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to three buggies. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is struggling to source enough motorcycles to equip every unit to the standard level and that equipment rates between frontline units vary considerably as a result. Mashovets stated that the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) had up to 1,125 motorcycles, up to 975 ATVs, and 210-215 buggies as of end of April and beginning of May 2025 and noted that other Russian CAAs have varying equipment allocations depending on the number of assault companies and platoons within the CAA. Ukrainian and Russian sources previously suggested that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is working to formalize Russian motorcycle usage, and the appearance of a defined doctrinal organization and allocation for motorcycle units within the Russian military is consistent with this effort.[13]Russian forces currently appear to be utilizing motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles, although Russian units may begin conducting assaults exclusively with motorcycles in the future. Mashovets stated that Russian units currently prefer to use motorcycles in tandem with infantry and armored vehicles.[14] The Russian military appears to be undergoing a transition period and moving towards regularly conducting assaults exclusively on motorcycles, although Russian forces may also continue to conduct these combined assaults if Russian commanders assess that motorcycle assaults are less successful. The Russian military may also continue to rely on combined assaults if the Russian MoD cannot improve its abilities to supply Russian units with motorcycles; however, as Mashovets noted that Russian servicemembers are continuing to rely on volunteer organizations to supply some units with motorcycles.[15] ISW previously noted that Russian motorcycle usage is a response to Ukrainian drone innovations and an attempt to offset the significant armored vehicle losses that Russian forces sustained in 2024 and possibly conserve some tanks and armored vehicles for future use.[16] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker, unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[17] The Russian military will likely retain its lessons learned in Ukraine beyond the war in Ukraine.Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Zelensky signed a decree on September 30, 2022, prohibiting Ukrainian negotiations with Putin.[18] Zelensky told journalists during a press briefing on May 13 that Russian officials are misrepresenting the decree as an obstacle to negotiations as the decree is intended to prevent Ukrainian persons besides Zelensky from negotiating with Putin on Ukraine’s behalf, rather than restricting Zelensky from exercising his “[constitutional] rights and duties,” as Ukraine’s head negotiator.[19] Chairperson of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee Oleksandr Merezhko reiterated this point to Ukrainian English-language news outlet Kyiv Independent on May 13 and stated that Ukraine’s Constitution "clearly" specifies Zelensky as Ukraine’s chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky’s constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees.[20] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak stated on May 13 that Zelensky will only negotiate with Putin in Istanbul, as lower-level officials from either country would lack the authority to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.[21] Russian officials routinely cite this decree as an "obstacle" to negotiations despite ongoing Ukrainian outreach to Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations.[22]Key Takeaways:The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations.The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicle units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere is currently no active ceasefire in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 13.Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues near Tetkino and Novyi Put (both southwest of Glushkovo).[23]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drone crews of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in pairs where one servicemember prepares the drone for launch and the other operates the drone near Kursk Oblast international border.[24]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tetkino.[25]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported offensive operations in Belgorod Oblast on May 13.Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Vodolahy and in southeastern Bilovody (both northeast of Sumy City).[26]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further south and southeast of Bilovody than geolocated footage indicated.[27]Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to attack near Bilovody and Loknya (southeast of Bilovody).[28]Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy and Chernihiv oblast border areas.[29] Elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Bilovody.[30] Drone operators of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[31]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 13 but did not advance.[32]Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Lypsti (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[33]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 13 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk along the international border near Krasne Pershe and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Novoosynove and towards Hlushkivka on May 12 and 13.[34]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD] are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[35] ISW first observed this unit operating in Ukraine on May 9.[36]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 13 but did not advance. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed the Russian forces recently advanced near Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[37]Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on May 12 and 13.[38]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Raihorodka (east of Borova).[39]Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[40]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Kolodyazi and Hrekivka (both northeast of Lyman).[41]Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, and Novomykhailivka; east of Lyman near Torske on May 12 and 13.[42]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on May 13 that Russian forces conducted several assaults on motorcycles and other light vehicles for the first time in the Lyman direction.[43]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[44] Elements of the Russian 283rd and 254th motorized rifle regiments (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kolodyazi.[45]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka on May 12 and 13 but did not advance.[46]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 13 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka, south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechnye, and Bila Hora on May 12 and 13.[47] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces conducted a motorized assault on six motorcycles near Vasyukivka.[48]A non-commissioned officer in a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian drones can penetrate "tens of kilometers" into Ukraine's rear in the Kramatorsk direction.[49] The non-commissioned officer noted that Russian forces are increasingly deploying drones with longer ranges in the area.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[50]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Toretsk.[51]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest and southwest of Toretsk.[52]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]), seized Malynivka (southwest of Toretsk).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stara Mykolaivka, Romanivka, Novoolenivka, Zelene Pole, and Kalynove (all southwest of Toretsk).[54]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Petrivka; southwest of Toretsk near Stara Mykolaivka, Novo Poltavka, Yelyzavetivka, Romanivka, Novoolenivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Malynivka and toward Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, and Zorya on May 12 and 13.[55] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Ukrainian forces recently repelled Russian motorized assaults consisting of motorcycles and light vehicles near Zorya.[56]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov assessed that Russia's offensive operations will temporarily decrease in the Toretsk direction so that Russia can accumulate forces for a new wave of highly attritional attacks.[57]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th "Sparta” Spetsnaz Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Malynivka.[58]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces seized Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk) within the past week and recently advanced to central Myrne (east of Pokrovsk).[59]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast and west of Myrne.[60] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently seized Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced west of Myrne and northeast of Myrolyubivka (both east of Pokrovsk).[61]Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Lysivka, and Sukhy Yar; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on May 12 and 13.[62]A non-commissioned officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction observed that Russian forces are wearing anti-thermal cloaks during infantry assaults to conceal their heat signatures from Ukrainian drones.[63] The Ukrainian servicemember noted that Russian forces experience command and control (C2) problems between the Russian command and drone crews because the Russian military has not fully integrated ground forces with drone units.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoukraininka and Shevchenko (both south of Pokrovsk).[64]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[65]Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; and east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Zaporizhzhia on May 12 and 13.[66]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 13 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near and within Bahatyr, east of Oleksiivka (both west of Kurakhove), and south and southwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[67] Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Bahatyr, but another milblogger denied these claims.[68]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, Rozlyv and Bahatyr, and southwest of Kurahkove near Odradne and Rozdolne on May 12 and 13.[69]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Bahatyr.[70]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces likely recently seized and advanced north and south of Novosilka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[71]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Dniproenerhiya (both north of Velyka Novosilka) and up to one square kilometer near Zelene Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[72]Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Vilne Pole, Komar, and Vesele, and toward Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Zelene Pole, and Novopil on May 12 and 13.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Fedorivka and Vilne Pole and near Zelene Pole on May 13.[74]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Temirivka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[75]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on May 13.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[76]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 13 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked southeast of Orkihiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv towards Pavlivka on May 12 and 13.[77]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserves) are reportedly operating in unspecified locations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[78]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 13 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 12 that Russian forces seized islands in the Dnipro River near Nova Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City).[79]Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction and east of Kherson City towards Sadove on May 12 and 13.[80]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a small series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched ten Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces downed all ten drones.[81]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/314845 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76914[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2024[3] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/24/01/2025/67937f679a7947ddcbeb9a3f[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025 ; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/vadim-skibitskiy-gur-plani-rosiyi-zminilisya-1740949422.html[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025[6] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24215[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2025[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2024[9] https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/general_cavoli_opening_statements.pdf[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025[12] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2735 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02cbJagR9pB5VvE8EqDGjySnTUoo6v2CGTkf2fbcvfApJ17HFzzNDP45kibfvUDdVEl ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2736 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2737 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2738[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2025[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2737[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025[18] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/6792022-44249[19] https://www.dw dot com/uk/zelenskij-pro-peremovini-z-putinim-a-sobi-nicogo-ne-zaboronav/a-72531250 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdmzfvnqF3U ; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1922320068458819749[20] https://kyivindependent dot com/didnt-zelensky-impose-a-ban-on-talks-with-putin-not-really/[21] https://suspilne dot media/1016363-zelenskij-gotovij-zustritisa-u-stambuli-tilki-z-putinim-podolak/ s. ; https://www.youtube.com/live/7x4AeZ904t4[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/26492 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71096 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23393[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164508[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91596[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9134 ; https://t.me/Waryaz_we_are/229[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28535[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/26492 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71096[29] https://t.me/epoddubny/23408[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28535[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/71122[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/314755 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28517[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91606 ; https://amalantra dot ru/68-motostrelkovaya-diviziya/[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025[37] https://t.me/tass_agency/314769[38]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164559[40] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1922012001686950127; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9128; https://t.me/dumky_frontovyka/1960 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164526[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35729 ; https:// t.me/voenkorKotenok/64220[42]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64220[43] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1016399-oznak-peremira-ci-pripinenna-vognu-ne-bulo-situacia-u-zoni-vidpovidalnosti-osuv-hortica/[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/71085[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35729[46] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64202[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908[48] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908[49] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/13/za-misyacz-dvi-roty-mozhna-poklasty-na-kramatorskomu-napryamu-rosiyany-shturmuvaly-i-vmyraly-navit-pid-chas-peremyrya/[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28526[51] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1921974748889653336; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1921974588071657969; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1922011991448690921; https://t.me/yuzhny_front_ZOV/15280 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9129[52] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1922189267683459075; https://www.tiktok.com/@andriy_viytyshyn/video/7503231878917311752 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1922291766327197751 ; https://www.instagram.com/p/DJimHJQi1GT/[53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35756 ;[54] https://t.me/rybar/70338 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64225[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64225 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71096[56] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908[57] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1016399-oznak-peremira-ci-pripinenna-vognu-ne-bulo-situacia-u-zoni-vidpovidalnosti-osuv-hortica/[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13802[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9135; https://t.me/voin_dv/14918[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35729 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35756[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/52623 ; https://t.me/vrogov/20287 ; https://t.me/sashakots/53652 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23413; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35737; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64224; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91629; https://t.me/tass_agency/314829; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35729[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64224[63] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/13/bagato-duzhe-vmyrayut-lyagayut-pachkamy-poblyzu-pokrovska-postijni-rali-motoshturmovykiv/[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14904[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35753 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35747[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71096[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35745; https://t.me/rybar/70350 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14913; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64223[68] https://t.me/yurasumy/22940; https://t.me/rybar/70350; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64223 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35745 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14912[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908; https://t.me/voin_dv/14914; https://t.me/wargonzo/26492; https://t.me/voin_dv/14912; https://t.me/rybar/70350; https://t.me/yurasumy/22940; https://t.me/dva_majors/71096 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64223[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/14908[71] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9133; https://t.me/Poltavska_brigadeNGU/518; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922227925505413537; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1922208752649859540; https://t.me/wild_hornets/2941; https:// t.me/WarArchive_ua/28143; https://x.com/wilendhornets/status/1922214298853470512[72] https://t.me/rybar/70350; https://t.me/voin_dv/14913[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9908[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/14913; https://t.me/voin_dv/14905[75] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164546[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/14899[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184[78] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91592[79] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164526[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24184[81] https://t.me/kpszsu/34285

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, May 13, 2025

 

at 5/17/25 2:32am

 Kelly Campa, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Victoria Penza, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.Iran is preparing for a potential escalation with the United States by positioning military assets on key islands in the Persian Gulf and signaling its intent to target US bases, commercial shipping, and regional allies. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri inspected military positions in southern Iran on May 12 to prepare for a possible escalation against the United States and approved deployments of military assets to the Nazeat islands around the Strait of Hormuz.[1] Bagheri ordered the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy, in coordination with local and tactical commanders, to implement a new operational plan around the Nazeat Islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities, fortify air defenses, and integrate advanced command and control infrastructure.[2] Bagheri explicitly stated that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces "if the US military makes a mistake.”[3] The Nazeat islands—including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri Island—are key positions for controlling maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[4] The IRGC has recently deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands, though it is unclear if Bagheri ordered these specific deployments.[5] AFGS-affiliated media published an article on May 13 showcasing IRGC Navy surveillance footage of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower from a Mohajer-6 drone and highlighted a new underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province, likely to signal Iranian capability to surveil and strike US naval assets.[6] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[7] The deployments to Nazeat could enable similar activities again. These activities follow new implicit US threats, including a statement by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on May 9 that raised the possibility of renewed military action against Iran if ongoing US-Iran talks fail.[8]Iranian officials continued to categorically reject US demands for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi told the Parliament’s National Security Commission on May 13 that uranium enrichment is Iran’s “red line” and emphasized that Iran will not negotiate on missile or regional defense issues.[9] Gharibabadi warned that Iran will ”see no need to continue the negotiations” if the United States continues to demand zero uranium enrichment. Gharibabadi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi—who led the most recent round of technical talks in Oman on April 26—will likely lead Iran’s technical team in future technical negotiations that will almost certainly focus on Iranian uranium enrichment levels and Iran’s centrifuge stockpile.[10] Parliamentarian Ebrahim Rezaei separately stated on May 13 that several parliamentarians called for suspending nuclear negotiations until the United States publicly recognizes Iran’s right to uranium enrichment.[11] Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister and lead Iranian negotiator Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, have said that Iran will not negotiate ”on the principle of enrichment itself.”[12]Iran reportedly proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, according to Western and Iranian media.[13] The consortium would return enrichment levels to 2015 JCPOA levels at 3.67 percent.[14] It would also give Saudi Arabia and the UAE access to Iranian nuclear technology. Iran previously proposed a similar consortium between Iran and the Persian Gulf states in 2007.[15] This new proposal is likely part of Iran's efforts to maintain some level of uranium enrichment.[16]Houthi air defenses appear to have prevented US forces from establishing air supremacy over Yemen, though the Houthis did not create sufficient disruption to prevent US operations.[17] Control of the airspace is a continuum that stretches from air parity, which is when no force controls the air, to air supremacy, which is when the opposing force—in this case, the Houthis—is incapable of any effective interference with friendly air operations.[18] Air superiority, which falls between air parity and air supremacy, means a friendly force can operate without "prohibitive" interference from the opposing force.[19] The Houthis shot down seven MQ-9 Reaper drones and reportedly nearly struck an F-35 and an F-16 during the US air campaign between March 15 and May 5.[20] The Houthis probably possess the ability to shoot down F-16s. The Houthis use an Iranian-made version of the SA-6 Gainful, which other US adversaries have used to shoot down F-16s.[21] US Central Command (CENTCOM) was able to continue air operations despite this surface-to-air missile fire, and it is unclear to what degree Houthi air defenses impeded CENTCOM air operations, if at all. A well-designed air campaign can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means. A relatively brief air campaign is unlikely to achieve long-term strategic effects like the destruction of an enemy’s missile program, because the adversary can usually rebuild the assets that are destroyed in the air campaign. The Houthis can replenish their losses from the air campaign through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market, thus demonstrating the air campaign’s limitations.[22]US President Donald Trump announced that he will order the cessation of “all” US sanctions on Syria at the Riyadh Investment Forum on May 13.[23] Trump said that the United States will ”tak[e] them all off” in order to give Syria a ”chance at greatness.”[24] US sanctions on Syria have severely limited the international community’s ability to contribute to Syria’s post-war reconstruction. Trump's announcement does not immediately lift US sanctions on Syria, however. The United States has levied numerous sanctions on Syria targeting the Assad regime and Iranian-backed actors in Syria since 1979, which are:State Sponsor of Terrorism designation: The United States designated Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1979, which has restricted US foreign assistance, banned defense exports and sales, and placed controls over the export of dual-use items.[25] Trump must submit a report to Congress certifying that the Syrian government is not supporting acts of international terrorism before the proposed recession can take effect.[26]Sanctions by executive order: Trump can repeal sanctions that former US presidents decreed by executive order from 2004 to 2012.[27]Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) designations: The United States formally designated Jabhat al Nusra—HTS's predecessor—as an FTO and SDGT in 2012 as an alias for al Qaeda in Iraq.[28] Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio each have the power to revoke SDGTs and FTOs, respectively.[29] Trump did not specify whether he would lift individual SDGT designations on Syrian officials. The US State Department designated Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara as an SDGT in 2013 but revoked the $10 million bounty on Shara in December 2024 after US officials met with Shara.[30] Shara was still listed as an SDGT as of May 13.[31] The United States also listed current Interior Minister Anas Khattab as an SDGT in 2012 for his membership in al Qaeda in Iraq.[32]Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019: The Caesar Act is the most stringent layer of US sanctions imposed on Syria. The Caesar Act targets anyone who provides support to the Syrian government, supports the Syrian oil and gas industry, exports aircraft or military equipment, or provides construction or engineering directly or indirectly to the Syrian government.[33] This discouraged several Gulf countries from supporting Syrian reconstruction during the early days of its transition.[34] The US Congress will need to pass a new law to repeal the Caesar Act. The US president cannot repeal the act unilaterally.Trump did not specify on what timeline he would remove US sanctions on Syria. Trump’s announcement still marks a significant inflection in US policy towards Syria, regardless of the timeline for which the sanctions will be lifted. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani called Trump’s announcement a ”new beginning on the path to reconstruction.”[35] Trump is expected to meet directly with Shara in Riyadh on May 14, according to White House-affiliated sources.[36]Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is attempting to incentivize the Trump administration to waive sanctions by offering the United States investment opportunities in Syria. Syrian officials told Western media on May 8 that Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with the United States that includes US private sector participation in all areas of Syrian reconstruction, at the exclusion of China or other powers.[37] Syrian Emergency Task Force head Mouaz Moustafa, who recently met with Shara to discuss US investment in Syria with US energy executive Jonathan Bass, said that Shara explicitly authorized envoys to propose several opportunities for US investment in Syria to Trump, including allowing a US entity to manage Syria’s oil and gas resources.[38] Bass told Western media that Shara told him he wants a "Trump Tower” in Damascus.[39]Shara‘s is likely offering the United States exclusive investment opportunities as a bargaining chip to convince the United States to remove sanctions because Shara will find it hard to meet all of the Trump administration’s “confidence-building measures.” US diplomats gave the Syrian government a list of eight demands in mid-March 2025 that Damascus would need to address before the United States would consider removing sanctions.[40] The Syrian government said that it plans to fully address most of the US demands and has taken tangible steps to do so, including forming a committee to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice and cracking down on Palestinian and Iranian-backed militant groups in Syria.[41] Shara is likely unwilling to act on the US condition that he bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, however. Shara has appointed several loyal foreign fighters to high-ranking positions in the Syrian government and has said that his government guarantees that foreign fighters will not pose a threat to neighboring countries.[42] Shara could calculate that a counter-proposal that reduces Russian and Chinese engagement in Syria, a key US strategic priority, could ease pressure resulting from his unwillingness to fully observe all the US conditions and still secure sanction relief on Syria. It is not clear whether the Syrian government’s investment offers to the United States influenced Trump’s May 13 announcement.Key Takeaways:Iranian Military Planning in the Persian Gulf: Iran is preparing for a potential escalation with the United States by positioning military assets on key islands in the Persian Gulf and signaling its intent to target US bases, commercial shipping, and regional allies.Iranian Nuclear Program: Iranian officials continued to categorically reject US demands for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations.US Air Campaign in Yemen: Houthi air defenses appear to have prevented US forces from establishing air supremacy over Yemen, though the Houthis did not create "prohibitive” disruption that would prevent effective US operations.US Sanctions Policy in Syria: US President Donald Trump announced that he will order the cessation of “all” US sanctions on Syria at the Riyadh Investment Forum on May 13. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is attempting to incentivize the Trump administration to waive sanctions by offering the United States investment opportunities in Syria.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial appreciated from 837,000 rials to one US dollar on May 12 to 834,500 rials to one US dollar on May 13.[43]Iran is continuing to try to circumvent US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports. The United States sanctioned several front companies on May 13 that were created by the Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated Sepehr Energy to facilitate sanctioned oil trade.[44] The front companies include several People's Republic of China-based companies, which illustrates the cooperation between US adversaries to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign.SyriaThe General Security Services (GSS) arrested a member of a pro-Assad Alawite insurgent group in Latakia City on May 12.[45] GSS forces arrested a member of the Coastal Shield Brigade, which is an Assadist insurgent group led by former Assad regime military officer Miqdad Fatiha.[46] The captured Coastal Shield Brigade fighter was involved in attacks against GSS and Syrian military positions.[47] His arrest follows a failed attack by Alawite insurgents in Tartous Province on May 9.[48] The Coastal Shield Brigade denied that the arrested fighter was a member of the brigade.[49] The Coastal Shield Brigades has frequently published false information about Assad regime elements and has framed previous extrajudicial killings targeting former regime commanders across Syria as murders against innocent civilians.[50]Gunmen on motorcycles continue to conduct extrajudicial revenge killings targeting former Assadists in Syria. Unknown gunmen on motorcycles assassinated an Assad regime soldier in the al Ansari neighborhood of Aleppo City on May 13.[51] Gunmen have used motorcycles for extrajudicial killings across Syria since the fall of Assad. The GSS imposed a ban on motorcycles in high-traffic areas of Deir ez Zor City on May 13 after residents expressed concern for their safety.[52] The GSS similarly banned motorcycles in Homs City on May 4 after motorcycle-mounted gunmen conducted several sectarian killings.[53] Extrajudicial revenge killings are in part due to a lack of government-led transitional justice efforts to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the civil war, which causes vigilantes to take matters into their own hands. The motorcycle bans are a stopgap solution that address a symptom of the larger problem, which is a lack of transitional justice.Russia is likely pursuing an economic relationship with the Syrian government, which Russia can use as leverage in negotiations over Russian military presence in Syria. Syria received the majority of its approximately 61,000 barrels of oil imports per day in April from Russia.[54] Russia has provided the majority of Syrian oil imports since January 2025.[55] Iran supplied approximately 90 percent of Syria’s crude oil before the fall of Assad in December 2024.[56] ISW-CTP previously assessed on March 6 that increasing Russian oil exports to Syria suggest that Russia seeks to reestablish its economic relationship with Syria, possibly to gain favor with the interim government and try to secure military basing rights in Syria.[57]Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) executive committee member Murat Karayilan reiterated on May 13 that the PKK needs to see certain actions from the Turkish government before it disarms.[58] The PKK announced on May 12 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle” after forty years of militant activity.[59] PKK-affiliated media reported on May 13 that Karayilan stated that the PKK needs to trust the Turkish government in order to disarm itself and that the group’s “first aim” is the physical freedom of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.[60] Several high-ranking PKK leaders have insisted in the months leading up to the May 12 announcement that Turkey must free Ocalan from prison before the group officially disarms. This stipulation implies that the PKK may decide to retain its weapons as long as Ocalan remains in prison.[61] Karayilan said that the PKK is “displaying a genuine approach” but that the Turkish government’s current approach “does not inspire much trust.”[62] Karayilan reiterated that the PKK believes that it must end its “armed war strategy,” but that this will not be possible “in practice” without “necessary legal changes” from the Turkish government.[63]IraqNothing significant to report.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripSee the topline section.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) may have killed Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Mohammed Sinwar on May 13. IDF aircraft struck an underground command and control complex in Khan Younis with dozens of munitions in an operation similar to the strike that killed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut in September 2024.[64] The Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry said the strike killed six people and injured over 40 others but did not name Sinwar in the casualty count.[65] The lack of nearby IDF troops to secure the strike area and recover Sinwar’s body will slow an official announcement of Sinwar’s death.Gaza City Brigade Commander Izz al Din al Haddad will likely assume control over Hamas in the Gaza Strip in the event of Mohammed Sinwar’s death.[66] Haddad likely assumed a prominent leadership position in the northern Gaza Strip after Yahya Sinwar’s death due to travel and coordination challenges across the Gaza Strip.[67] Haddad's experience as a long-time brigade commander and his probable role coordinating operations in northern Gaza will enable him to relatively smoothly assume command of Hamas’ military organization.[68]CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/ ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/23/3311610[2] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1714518[3] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/[4] https://akharinkhabar dot ir/politics/2667904[5] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/742328[6] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745057 ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/18/3308640[7]https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-growing-iranian-threat-around-the-strait-of-hormuz ;https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/iran-file/iran-file-iran-intensifies-its-escalation-around-the-strait-of-hormuz ;https://www.npr.org/2019/07/18/743016095/iran-says-its-revolutionary-guard-seized-foreign-oil-tanker-in-strait-of-hormuz[8] https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2025/05/09/exclusive-steve-witkoff-ahead-round-4-talks-iran-has-agreed-they-dont-want-nuclear-weapon/[9] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6466382[10] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/741150/[11] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6466382[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-12-2025[13] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/13/iran-proposes-partnership-with-uae-and-saudi-arabia-to-enrich-uranium ; https://www.didbaniran dot ir/بخش-سیاسی-3/221534-انتقال-اورانیوم-غنی-شده-به-کشورهای-منطقه-خلیج-فارس-تحت-نظارت-امارات-عربستان-به- سود-ایران-است[14] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/13/iran-proposes-partnership-with-uae-and-saudi-arabia-to-enrich-uranium[15] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1922264507386109973[16] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-12-2025[17] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html?searchResultPosition=3[18] https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-01/3-01-AFDP-COUNTERAIR.pdf pp.2.[19] https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-01/3-01-AFDP-COUNTERAIR.pdf pp.2.[20] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html?searchResultPosition=3[21] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1913273337108722082; https://time.com/archive/6727516/rescuing-scott-ogrady-all-for-one/; https://www.twz.com/news-features/what-air-defenses-do-the-houthis-in-yemen-actually-have#:~:text=Iranian%2Dbacked%20Houthi%20militants%20in,to%20be%20obscure%20and%20ambiguous.[22] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/04/made-in-yemen-assessing-the-houthis-arms-production-capacity/[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-will-remove-us-sanctions-syria-2025-05-13; https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1922328009853264070[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-will-remove-us-sanctions-syria-2025-05-13/[25] https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/[26] https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/225444.htm[27] https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/32396.htm; https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-13338-blocking-property-certain-persons-and-prohibiting-the-export-certain; https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/syria-sanctions[28] https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201759.htm; https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20121211[29] https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224; https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/[30] https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224; https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/us-lift-10-million-bounty-de-facto-syrian-leaders-head-rcna185076[31] https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnlist.pdf[32] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=15591; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1797[33] https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/07/the-power-and-limits-of-threat-the-caesar-syrian-civilian.html[34] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/caesar-act-explained-new-us-sanctions-syria; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-sanctions-hold-up-qatari-support-syria-sources-say-2025-02-26[35] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/13/world/middleeast/trump-syria-president-meeting.html[36] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/13/world/middleeast/trump-syria-president-meeting.html[37] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0[38] https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/syria-sharaa-trump-united-states-delegation-; https://www.axios.com/2025/05/13/trump-syria-al-sharaa-meeting-saudi[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-tower-damascus-syria-seeks-charm-us-president-sanctions-relief-2025-05-11/[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/ ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/[41] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1922040161379975659; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025; https://x.com/Elysee/status/1920169532569595986[43] www.bon-bast.com[44] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0139[45] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1921989186669711820 ;                    https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142439 ;                    https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922234977560727754 ; https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4395[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2025#:~:text=A%20former%20Republican,the%20Assad%20regime.[47] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1921989186669711820 ; https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4395[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2025#:~:text=Likely%20Alawite%20insurgents,for%20transitional%20justice.[49] https://t.me/almougahid313/633[50] https://t.me/almougahid313/473 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920063779661816192 ; https://www.facebook.com/Sewar.Sul/photos/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%81/3866503183601595/?_rdr[51] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122445 ; https://www.facebook.com/HalabTodayTV/posts/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%80%D9%80%D9%80%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A/1105237064961518/ ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922309861087576211[52] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142467 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/47481[53] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-7-2025#:~:text=Gunmen%20on%20motorcycles,across%20Syria.%5B60%5D[54] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/753653/%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%88%d9%81%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d8%ba%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%81/ ; https://attaqa dot net/2025/05/12/%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B0-%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3/[55] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/753653/%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%88%d9%81%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d8%ba%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%81/[56] https://www.ft.com/content/9d65fb40-a389-42ad-b9c5-42533a276dde ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-13-2025[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025[58] https://firatnews dot com/guncel/karayilan-turk-devleti-bir-an-once-yasal-degisiklikleri-yapmali-212602[59] https://firatnews dot com/kurdIstan/pkk-212559[60] https://firatnews dot com/guncel/karayilan-turk-devleti-bir-an-once-yasal-degisiklikleri-yapmali-212602[61] https://firatnews dot com/guncel/bayik-Onder-apo-disinda-kimse-kongre-yi-toplayamaz-210411; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2025[62] https://firatnews dot com/guncel/karayilan-turk-devleti-bir-an-once-yasal-degisiklikleri-yapmali-212602[63] https://firatnews dot com/guncel/karayilan-turk-devleti-bir-an-once-yasal-degisiklikleri-yapmali-212602[64] https://t.me/moriahdoron/21653 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1922318239222129101 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1922339286973640840 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate092824[65] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hamas-authorities-say-6-killed-in-idf-strike-dont-name-muhammad-sinwar-among-the-dead/[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/order-battle-hamas%E2%80%99-izz-al-din-al-qassem-brigades-part-2 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate101724[67] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate101724[68] https://www dot jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-853826 ; https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-853741

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 11, 2025

 

at 5/17/25 1:25am

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with William RunkelMay 11, 2025, 4:45 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on May 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12.[1] Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" the direct negotiations that he claimed "[Ukraine] interrupted" in 2022 on May 15.[2] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia will soon announce its delegation to the resumed negotiations in Istanbul and that such negotiations should account for "developments of the 2022 talks."[3]Putin and Ushakov are referring to Russia's April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression.[4] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[5] The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia also demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded to limit the Ukrainian military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Putin is rejecting the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire and instead continues to demand Ukrainian surrender in an attempt to secure his strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Putin stated during the press conference that the purpose of renewed bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations would be to "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine.[6] Putin suggested that Russia and Ukraine could pursue a ceasefire as part of these renewed negotiations, but claimed that a "real truce" should not enable the "rearmament" and "replenishment" of the Ukrainian military. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into Eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[7] Kremlin officials recently claimed that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive Western military aid, while failing to offer similar concessions for Russia to limit its own force generation and defense production efforts.[8] Calls for the elimination of these alleged "root causes" and limitations on Ukraine's force generation capabilities are in line with Putin's demands for Ukrainian neutrality, as well as Putin's pre-war demand that would have required NATO to roll back to its pre-1997 borders.[9]Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have recently intensified their engagement with Western media in an effort to message directly to the Trump administration and American public and portray Russia's terms for Ukraine's surrender as reasonable.[10] Putin's May 11 press conference and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's recent interviews with Western media are part of an attempt to inject Kremlin narratives into the Western information space aimed at convincing the West that Russia is able to conquer all of Ukraine militarily and scaring Ukraine and the West into conceding to Russia's demands.[11] Putin's rhetorical posturing is an attempt to conceal limitations in the Russian military's capabilities and distract from Russia's failure to make any significant progress on the battlefield over the last two years. Putin and other Kremlin officials firmly maintain their war aims that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and have thus far refused to consider any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia's demands.[12] The Kremlin is falsely portraying itself as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine while continuing to attack frontline Ukrainian positions and setting conditions for further military aggression against Ukraine and NATO in the coming years.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15. Zelensky stated that he will personally wait for Putin in Turkey and that Ukraine is waiting for Russia to agree to the US-Ukrainian-European general ceasefire proposal.[13] Putin discussed renewing the 2022 Istanbul negotiations in a call with Erdogan on May 11, and Erdogan expressed support for resuming talks.[14] Erdogan noted during his call with Putin that a comprehensive ceasefire would "create the necessary environment" for peace talks.[15] European officials largely called on Putin to agree to a comprehensive ceasefire agreement before beginning bilateral peace negotiations with Ukraine.[16]Key Takeaways:Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the northern Kharkiv and Novopavlivka directions.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces continued ground attacks in Kursk Oblast on May 11.Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked southwest of Glushkovo along the international border near Tetkino, Volfinskiy, and Novyi Put on May 10 and 11.[17]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Tetkino.[18]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 11.Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northern Sumy Oblast on May 11.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[19]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 10 and 11.[20]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on May 11 that Russian forces recently increased the number of daily attacks in the Vovchansk direction from between one to two assaults to up to five.[21]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[22]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 11 but did not make confirmed advances.Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Mala Shapkivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Kamyanka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on May 10 and 11.[23]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on May 11 that Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction are receiving older reinforcements who are less capable of conducting assaults and experiencing logistics problems that are hindering offensive operations.[24]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 11 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milbogger claimed on May 11 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Borova near Makiivka.[25]Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna on May 10 and 11.[26]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Black Raven" detachment (purportedly a volunteer unit) are reportedly operating near Nadiya (east of Borova).[27]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 11 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 11 that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman near Hrekivka and east of Lyman in Torske.[28]Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Nove, Olhivka, Ridkodub, and Lypove and northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, and Hrekivka on May 10 and 11.[29]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 11 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka on May 10 and May 11.[30]The commander of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian forces have accumulated large quantities of motorcycles for assaults near Bilohorivka.[31] The commander also stated that Russian forces continue to use fiber-optic drones almost daily in the Siversk direction.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 11 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske, north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, southeast of Chasiv Yar toward Ozaryanivka, and south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora and Predtechyne.[32]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[33]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Oleksandropil toward Zorya and near Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[34]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, Romanivka, and Nova Poltavka; and southwest of Toretsk toward Zorya and near Stara Mykolaivka, Malynivka, Oleksandropil, and Vodyane Druhe on May 10 and 11.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Toretsk and near Romanivka.[36]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the “Tserber” group of the Russian 109th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA)) are reportedly operating in central Toretsk.[37] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Yablunivka (southwest of Toretsk).[38]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 11 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on May 10 and 11.[39]Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on May 11 that fighting remains intense in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions.[40] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 11 that Russian forces are currently concentrating on destroying infrastructure in the rear Ukrainian areas of this direction in order to facilitate future Russian advances.[41] The servicemember stated that Russian forces are trying to destroy Ukrainian reconnaissance and communications equipment in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 11 that Russian forces are concentrating offensive operations near Hrodivka and attempting to advance from Myrolyubivka toward Moskovke (all east of Pokrovsk).[42]Order of Battle: Elements of the "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[43]Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south and west of Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement during a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault.[44]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 11 that Russian forces advanced near Novomykolaivka, west of Uspenivka, and in Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka); northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka); and in Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[45]Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Preobrazhenka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske.[46]Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attacking up to 30 times per day in the Novopavlivka direction and have assembled up to three mechanized regiments' worth of troops in this direction.[47]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 11 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Bahatyr, and Oleksiivka on May 10 and 11.[48]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 11 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[49]Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Novopil on May 10 and 11.[50] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Velyka Novosilka.[51]A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction reported on May 10 that Ukrainian forces repelled a multi-directional company-sized Russian mechanized assault with three tanks, eight infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and a large number of motorcycles in the area on May 9.[52]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 11 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on May 10 and 11.[53]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 11 but did not advance.[54]Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on May 11 that Russian forces are trying to land small infantry groups on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta to conduct reconnaissance on Ukrainian positions.[55]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 108 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[56] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 60 Shahed and other drones over the eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine; that 41 decoy drones were "lost in location,” meaning that Ukrainian forces lost sight of the drone and do not know what happened to it; and that Russian drone strikes affected Sumy Oblast.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76899 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76899[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/314561 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23911063[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-2022-document-6e12e093 ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html ; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76899[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025[9] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=ru[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/314505 ; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/10/world/video/russia-ceasefire-resistant-dmitry-peskov-digvid[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76899[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025;[13] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1921611690891940116 ; ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14175https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1921469464358346850 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14175[14] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76900 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/58843 ; https://x.com/trpresidency/status/1921524395874390050[15] https://x.com/trpresidency/status/1921524395874390050[16] https://x.com/JanLipavsky/status/1921479272163672557 ; https://x.com/edgarsrinkevics/status/1921516658973163870 ; https://x.com/donaldtusk/status/1921515458412392937 ; https://x.com/bundeskanzler/status/1921524319286362491; https://x.com/bundeskanzler/status/1921524321945588090; https://x.com/bundeskanzler/status/1921524324487307666 ; https://suspilne dot media/1015273-evropa-hoce-buti-ucasniceu-potencijnih-peregovoriv-miz-ukrainou-ta-rosieu-mzs-francii/; https://www.radiofrance dot fr/franceinter/podcasts/questions-politiques/questions-politiques-du-dimanche-11-mai-2025-6758757 ; https://www.barrons.com/news/putin-s-proposed-ukraine-talks-a-first-step-but-not-enough-macron-a90f041c[17] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91488; https://t.me/dva_majors/70971; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91525; https://t.me/wargonzo/26453; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28427[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91509[19] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1921240824332894710 ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21806 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164373[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2413 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2413 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2413[21] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/masshtabnyh-proryviv-nemaye-ale-ataky-posylyly-viktor-tregubov-pro-sytuacziyu-bilya-vovchanska/[22] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91506[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/masshtabnyh-proryviv-nemaye-ale-ataky-posylyly-viktor-tregubov-pro-sytuacziyu-bilya-vovchanska/[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64169[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108[27] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23294[28] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64169 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164373[29]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64169[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106[31] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1015195-vijska-rf-gotuut-masovanij-sturm-na-motociklah-na-siverskomu-napramku-dani-81-oaebr/[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106[33] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1921577442608587184; https://t.me/prizrak_lpr/40[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164367; https://t.me/yurasumy/22907[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106; https://t.me/yurasumy/22907; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91514[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164367; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91514; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91532[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91514[38] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13795[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/vorog-namagayetsya-perekydaty-syly-cherez-oskil-i-zherebecz-u-zsu-prokomentuvaly-sytuacziyu-na-fronti/[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-zminu-taktyky-protyvnyka-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/[42] https://t.me/yurasumy/22906[43] https://t.me/sashakots/53619[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9118; https://t.me/fpvredrone/62; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1921474063609811318; https://t.me/skarlatop/4820[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35679; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164399; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35692; https://t.me/yurasumy/22905; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164373; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35696[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/my-zamanyuyemo-voroga-u-vognevi-mishky-ta-znyshhuyemo-sotnyamy-syly-oborony-pivdnya/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-zminu-taktyky-protyvnyka-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106; https://t.me/yurasumy/22904[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164367[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/52567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ;[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/14875[52] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/12JaCoAq1KX/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/dijshly-do-liniyi-zitknennya-i-zlamalysya-nashi-dronari-vidbyly-potuzhnu-ataku-okupantiv-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku/[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/desantni-diyi-na-hersonshhyni-ta-shturmy-na-zaporizhzhi-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-ataky-okupantiv-na-pivdni/[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/desantni-diyi-na-hersonshhyni-ta-shturmy-na-zaporizhzhi-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-ataky-okupantiv-na-pivdni/[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/34173

[Author: Unknown]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 7, 2025

 

at 5/17/25 1:25am

 Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and Karolina Hird with Nate Trotter and William RunkelMay 7, 2025, 9:30 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on May 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated on May 6 that Russian President Vladimir Putin's refusal to agree to a 30-day ceasefire is the main impediment to  establishing peace in Ukraine and that Russia will be hurt if the parties do not agree to a comprehensive ceasefire, as "Russia is not winning the war."[1] Kellogg noted Russia's failure to secure positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, its inability to reach Kyiv and Odesa cities, and Russian forces' high attrition rates — all in line with ISW's assessment that Russia's battlefield situation has deteriorated since 2022.[2] US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 7 that Russia is "asking for a certain set of requirements" and "concessions in order to end the conflict," but that the United States thinks that Russia is "asking for too much."[3]Kellogg reiterated that Ukraine has agreed to a renewable comprehensive sea, air, and land ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days and that Ukraine is willing to immediately sign the agreement.[4]  Kellogg stated that Ukraine is prepared to accept a "ceasefire in place" that will require both Russia and Ukraine to withdraw 15 kilometers from the current frontline in order to establish a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone that could fall under an unspecified monitoring mechanism. Kellogg stated that members of the UK- and French-led Coalition of the Willing are willing to deploy a "ceasefire force" west of the Dnipro River that will patrol and reinforce the comprehensive ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Kellogg's statement on May 7, claiming that Russia has not received any Ukrainian proposals to establish a demilitarized zone.[5]Russia is likely attempting to prolong and delay discussions about a comprehensive ceasefire to obfuscate its continued rejection of the United States' ceasefire proposals. ISW continues to assess that Russia likely remains opposed to any sort of enforcement or monitoring mechanisms, as Russia would likely weaponize the absence of such mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations, as it has done before.[6] The Kremlin has also repeatedly outright rejected the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, claiming that such deployments would be unacceptable for Russia.[7] Russia remains committed to its long-standing effort to prolong peace negotiations in order to make battlefield gains and attempt to secure additional concessions from the United States.[8]  Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a building in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely seized positions in Tetkino.[9] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southern Tetkino and continued to claim on May 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement.[10] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), pushed Ukrainian forces out of Tetkino, however.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian mechanized assaults against Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border) on May 7 and that Ukrainian forces continue efforts to use mine-clearing equipment to create paths through Russian minefields in the area.[12] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novyi Put, but other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the area.[13] ISW has not observed geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces have entered Novyi Put. Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[14]Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory, reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck and seriously damaged the Fiber Optic Systems plant in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia.[15] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the plant.[16] The Fiber Optic Systems plant is the only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables, which Russian forces are increasingly relying on for the operation of fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones on the battlefield in Ukraine.[17] Ukraine notably struck the same plant on April 5.[18] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian strikes on May 7 caused a second fire near the Fiber Optic Systems plant, likely at the Saranskkabel machine-building enterprise.[19] Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian defense enterprises in Tula City, including the Instrument-Making Design Bureau, which produces anti-tank systems, small arms, and combat modules, and the Scientific-Production Association (SPLAV), which produces Grad, Uragan, and Smerch multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[20] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that its sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted drone strikes that hit the SPLAV plant and the Bazalt weapons and ammunition plant in Krasnoarmeysk, Moscow Oblast.[21] Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows smoke near the Fiber Optic Systems and SPLAV plants.[22]Kovalenko further reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Shaykovka Airbase in Kaluga Oblast, where Russia bases and stores Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and Kh-22 cruise missiles, and the Kubinka Airbase in Moscow Oblast, where Su-27 and MiG-29 fighter jets are based.[23] Russian milbloggers, including a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Kubinka Airbase.[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down at least nine drones over Kaluga Oblast, at least six drones over Tula Oblast, and at least two drones over Moscow Oblast.[25]Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations. Officials in the republics of Chuvashia and Tatarstan and in Voronezh and Tver oblasts warned on May 7 that authorities may restrict mobile network usage to "ensure security" on May 9.[26] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned on May 7 that Moscow City and Oblast authorities may place "limitations" on mobile internet operation during Victory Day celebrations "for obvious reasons" and stated that Russians "must treat this with absolute understanding."[27] Several Russian banks and internet giant Yandex warned that the disconnection will likely affect Russians' access to banking, taxi, courier, and public transportation services, particularly in Moscow City and Oblast.[28] Russian authorities have been periodically testing their Sovereign Internet system, which allows Russia to completely disconnect itself from the global internet and increasingly censor Russians' ability to communicate and access information.[29] Reports of significant Russian internet outages have increased in the first months of 2025, and Russian authorities likely seek to take advantage of the May 9 holiday to conduct a widespread test of the Sovereign Internet system without encountering significant opposition from Russians.[30] The Kremlin also likely seeks to prevent Russians from circulating imagery and footage of damage and fires from any possible Ukrainian long-range strikes on May 9 to avoid shattering the facade that Russia's victory in Ukraine is near on Victory Day itself — even though Russia has no significant battlefield successes to flaunt for the 2025 holiday.[31]Russian authorities have already tested the ability to temporarily disconnect from the internet during recent Ukrainian long-range drone strikes against Russia and likely intend to informationally link these planned May 9 disconnections to actual Ukrainian drone strikes as part of efforts to mitigate any opposition to the disconnection ahead of May 9. Russian media reported that over 30 Russian cities, including in Yaroslavl, Tver, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Tula, Leningrad, Kaluga, and Kursk oblasts, experienced difficulties connecting to the internet during the Ukrainian drone strikes on May 7 and that all of Saransk and several other settlements in the Republic of Mordovia were completely disconnected from the internet.[32] Moscow City residents have been complaining about widespread mobile internet outages since May 5, which Russian authorities have explained as preparations for the May 9 Victory Day celebrations.[33] A Russian Telegram source claimed on April 25 that Russian authorities shut down mobile internet access in occupied Crimea due to Ukrainian drone strikes and alleged that the measure was ineffective, only causing issues for Russian authorities who rely on the internet for communications.[34] Russian authorities will likely continue disconnecting large areas of Russia from mobile internet networks during Ukrainian long-range strikes to continue testing the Sovereign Internet system and, secondarily, prevent Russians from immediately circulating reports, imagery, and footage of the results of these Ukrainian strikes.Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.[35] The agreement addresses enhanced defense cooperation and coordination; the "legacy and falsification" of colonialism; arms control and non-proliferation, including in space; organized crime and internationally sponsored terrorism; international information security and the regulation of the information space; and energy and economic cooperation. The agreement notably includes a provision for the development of military-technical cooperation between Russia and Venezuela. This strategic partnership agreement coheres with Russian efforts to strengthen relations with Venezuela over the past several years, in large part to contest US influence in the Western hemisphere and to paint Russia as a competitive and capable world power.[36] Russia and Venezuela previously signed 17 agreements, including eight strategic-level agreements, in November 2024 that include intelligence sharing, counterespionage, drone use, and petroleum technologies.[37]  Maduro is in Moscow for the May 9 Victory Day celebrations, and Russia is likely attempting to showcase its allies, partners, and diplomatic successes to international audiences.[38]Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Current Time outlet reported on May 6 that the European Council prepared a new sanctions package against the Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, 27th Scientific Center, and 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute.[39] The sanctions package will reportedly reference November 2024 and February 2025 reports from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) detailing how Russian forces used chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas — a type of riot control agent (RCA) banned under the CWC — near Marivka and Ilinka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (on the west [right] bank of the Dnipro River across from Enerhodar and the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant [ZNPP]) in 2024. The OCPW found traces of CS gas in soil and water tests following Russian strikes, which explains its presence in areas beyond the current frontline. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 6 that Russian forces executed three surrendering Ukrainian POWs on May 3 near Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[40] ISW continues to observe a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in, or directly enabling, their subordinates to conduct these executions in violation of international law.[41]Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent request to resign from his post. Putin and Kadyrov met on May 7 to discuss socioeconomic issues in the Chechen Republic.[42] Kadyrov ended the meeting by thanking Putin for his positive assessment of Chechen force generation efforts and Chechen forces' participation in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Kadyrov stated that "we will not let [Putin] down," to which Putin replied, "I have no doubt," suggesting that Putin expects Kadyrov to continue leading the republic. Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post on May 5 in an interview with Chechnya Segodnya, but noted on May 6 that only Putin can authorize this decision.[43]Key Takeaways:US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire.Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area.Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7.Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations.Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent request to resign from his post.Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationSee topline text for updates on Kursk Oblast.Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in Belgorod Oblast on May 7.Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 7 but did not advance.The spokesperson of a Ukrainian Border Guard detachment reported on May 7 that Ukrainian border guards repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempting to cross the international border in an unspecified area of Sumy Oblast on May 6.[44] The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces frequently attempt to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast using small groups of three to 10 infantry and motorcycles.Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[45]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced near the Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on May 6 and 7.[47]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[48]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kamyanka and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on May 6 and 7.[49]The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue using armored vehicles to transport infantry to the frontline for assaults.[50]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Sheikh Mansur" volunteer battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stroivka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[51]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 7 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky, Nadiya, and Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on May 6 and 7. [52]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Raihorodka and Kopanky (both east of Lyman).[53]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on May 7 that Russian forces seized Lypove (northeast of Lyman).[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have consolidated positions in northeastern Ridkodub (just north of Lypove) and advanced south of Nove (just northwest of Lypove); near Kolodyazi (southwest of Lypove); and northwest of and within central Torske (east of Lyman).[55]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Mir, Lypove, Yampolivka, Zelene Dolyna, and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske on May 6 and 7.[56]A Russian milblogger claimed that the area near the Svyato-Voznesenskyi Church in northern Torske is a contested "gray zone."[57]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are operating in Nove and Lypove.[58] Mashovets stated that elements of the 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division) withdrew to the rear to restore their combat capability after suffering serious losses. Mashovets stated that some forces and assets of the 1st GTA (MMD) redeployed from the Kupyansk direction to the area of responsibility of the 20th CAA in the Lyman direction, with elements of the 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) and of the 423nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) operating near Nove. Mashovets stated that elements of the 31st, 36th, and 37th motorized rifle regiments and 19th Tank Regiment (all of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 164th and 169th separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 25th CAA) are operating in the Lyman direction.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) and northeast of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[59] Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced near and possibly within Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), indicating that Ukrainian forces may have pushed Russian forces from the settlement at an unspecified time since Russian forces seized the settlement in October 2024.[60] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 that Russian forces seized the chalk quarry south of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and advanced in eastern and central Hryhorivka.[61]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 7.[62] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the directions of Hryhorivka, Vekhnokamyanske, Ivano-Darivka, Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), and Pereizne (south of Siversk).[63]Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 6th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades, the 14th Separate Tank Battalion (possibly a reconstituted Soviet unit) (all of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and of the "127th Motorized Rifle Brigade" (reportedly 3rd CAA) are operating in the Siversk direction.[64] Mashovets stated that up to four motorized rifle regiments of the Russian mobilization reserve and up to 11 separate rifle battalions of the 3rd CAA are also operating in the Siversk direction.Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the Severny Mine north of Chasiv Yar.[65]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[66]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar; south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 6 and 7.[67]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Burevestnik" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) and drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[68] Artillery elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[69]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian servicemembers raising a flag in northern Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[70]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandropil (southeast of Toretsk) and advanced south of Oleksandropil and north and northeast of Novoolenivka.[71]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Nova Poltavka and Kalynove on May 6 and 7.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoolenivka.[73]The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables to strike Ukrainian logistics.[74] The commander stated that Russian forces are using about 150 FPV drones per day to loiter over and close to the ground near logistics routes to strike Ukrainian vehicles on roads near Oleksandropil, Nova Poltavka, and Novoolenivka. The commander stated that Russian forces are bringing fiber optic cable drones to their forward positions on foot in order to strike Ukrainian near rear areas.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoolenivka.[75] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[76]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 7 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces cleared Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced near the pond south of the settlement.[77]Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Promin and toward Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Dachenske, and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on May 6 and 7.[78]The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue constant infantry assaults in small groups and use light motorized vehicles to transport infantry.[79] The commander reported that Russian forces do not attack with armored vehicles due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes. The commander noted that Ukrainian forces are capturing some Russian soldiers within one week to one month of when the Russian soldiers signed military service contracts. The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are increasing their drone usage and conducting drone strikes roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline.[80]Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and to eastern Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka), respectively.[81]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novooleksandrivka and near Preobrazhenka (both northeast of Novopavlivka); into central Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka); and north of Troitske.[82] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in half of Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[83]Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Novovopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Novooleksandriivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Nadiivka, and Sribne; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka and Troitske on May 6 and 7.[84]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in western Novooleksandrivka.[85]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and more than one kilometer southeast of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[86]Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Bahatyr, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 6 and 7.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[88]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[89]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novosilka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[90]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Novopil, and Rivnopil on May 6 and 7.[91]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novopil.[92]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke (formerly Chervone) on May 6 and 7 but did not advance.[93]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove; and west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Shcherbaky and towards Novoandriivka on May 6 and 7.[94] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 7 that Russian forces counterattacked near Stepove and Shcherbaky.[95]Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated on May 7 that Russian artillery strikes disabled one of the two power lines connecting the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the Ukrainian power grid.[96] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy stated that a complete disconnection of the ZNPP from the power grid could cause another blackout at the plant and increase the risk of a radiological incident near the plant.A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against a concentration of elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) near occupied Myrne, Zaporizhia Oblast (north of Melitopol), killing 22 servicemembers including three officers.[97]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[98]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[99]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Tuman” drone group are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Dudchany (northeast of Kherson City on the west [right] bank of the Dnipro River), and drone operators of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[100] Elements of the 88th ”Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate near the coast of occupied Crimea.[101]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a large and prolonged series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine from the evening of May 6 to the afternoon of May 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities and Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, between the evening of May 6 to the afternoon of May 7.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched several waves totaling 187 strike and decoy drones from near Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two ballistic missiles and 81 drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 64 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kyiv, Sumy, Zhytomyr, Donetsk, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[103]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.foxnews.com/video/6372430613112[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025[3] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/05/07/vance-munich-meeting-russia-ukraine-00332623 ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/vance-russia-asking-too-much-ukraine-war-offer/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1012439-ssa-hocut-sob-rosia-ta-ukraina-pocali-dialog-miz-sobou-vens/ ; https://www.youtube.com/live/zOJ-RbkEXxM[4] https://www.foxnews.com/video/6372430613112[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/23872569[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025[9] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1919864934600462544; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1919772350704242868; https://t.me/control_sigma/41539;[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35480; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35488; https://t.me/wargonzo/26358; https://t.me/dva_majors/70668; https://t.me/yurasumy/22787; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23238; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28204[11] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35485; https://t.me/dva_majors/70690; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91275[12] https://t.me/rusich_army/23213; https://t.me/rusich_army/23218; https://t.me/rusich_army/23230; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163819; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91302; . https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91285; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91278; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91275; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28204[13] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28203; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23238; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91302; https://t.me/rusich_army/23213; https://t.me/rusich_army/23218[14] https://t.me/wargonzo/26368 [15] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9211; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9214[16] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91277; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1020 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1022; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1026[17] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9211; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9214[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040525[19] https://t.me/astrapress/80693[20] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9211[21] https://suspilne dot media/1012505-droni-sbu-udarili-po-klucovih-oboronnih-zavodah-rf-dzerela/[22] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1908310709584236603; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1920005235059163148; https://x.com/Dmojavensis/status/1920013978115170462; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1919955615062835469 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/38663[23] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9212; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36948[24] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9212; https://t.me/vrogov/20192; https://t.me/bazabazon/37103; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1919764667276161288; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/15089;  https://t.me/dva_majors/70681; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91308 ; https://t.me/fighter_bomber/20967[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/52200; https://t.me/mod_russia/52208; https://t.me/tass_agency/313640; https://t.me/mod_russia/52197[26] https://t.me/oanikolaev/8684; https://t.me/idelrealii/41107; https://www.business-gazeta dot ru/news/671558; https://t.me/idelrealii/41107; https://t.me/tass_agency/313796; https://t.me/rian_ru/292672; https://t.me/rian_ru/292650;[27] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/07/05/2025/681b2b539a79473c0decb65f; https://t.me/tass_agency/313818 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/05/07/eto-ne-sboi-v-kremle-poprosili-moskvichey-s-ponimaniem-otnestis-k-ogranicheniyam-mobilnogo-interneta-na-9-maya ;[28] https://t.me/rian_ru/292672; https://www.rbc dot ru/finances/07/05/2025/681b0bf79a794720a298f78f?from=from_main_1; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/05/07/banki-sistema-bystryh-platezhey-magaziny-i-servisy-taksi-predupredili-o-pereboyah-v-rabote-iz-za-ogranicheniy-mobilnogo-interneta-v-moskve;[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-8-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2023;[30] https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/widespread-internet-outage-in-russia-blamed-on-foreign-infrastructure[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025[32] https://t.me/bazabazon/37122; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/05/07/stalo-izvestno-ob-otklyuchenii-mobilnogo-interneta-v-30-rossiyskih-gorodah/; https://www.gazeta dot ru/tech/news/2025/05/07/25721114.shtml; https://t.me/astrapress/80637; https://t.me/sotaproject/97450[33] https://www.gazeta dot ru/social/2025/05/05/20986490.shtml; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/05/05/v-moskve-i-podmoskovie-proizoshel-sboy-v-rabote-mobilnyh-operatorov;[34] https://t.me/treugolniklpr/107123[35] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6305; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76860; https://t.me/tass_agency/313872; https://t.me/tass_agency/313883; https://t.me/tass_agency/313884[36] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2024; https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/04/russia-in-review-march-26-april-4-2019.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/04/russia-in-review-march-26-april-4-2019.html[37] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2024[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025[39] https://www.currenttime dot tv/a/es-rossiya-himoruzhie/33406373.html[40] https://don.gp dot gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=388560; https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/8683 [41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2025[42] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76862[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025[44] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1011969-prikordonniki-ne-dopustili-sprobu-drg-zajti-na-sumsinu/[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163799; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5703[46] https://t.me/vovkodavy34/10 ; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1920026903328543215 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27991[47]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973[48] https://t.me/dva_majors/70690[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973[50] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRoDMka3UfA; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/07/pihotyncziv-rozpedalyty-vdalosya-nepogano-poblyzu-kupyanska-spalyly-vorozhyj-tank-ta-jogo-pasazhyriv/[51] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5702[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163743  ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993;[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2729[54] https://t.me/tass_agency/313840 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52232; https://t.me/mod_russia/52233[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163743; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28232; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28232; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28232; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35520[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163743[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28232[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2729[59] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2731[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/70690; https://t.me/yurasumy/22817[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993[63] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2731 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2730 [64] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2730[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9084; https://t.me/osirskiy/1151[66] https://t.me/rybar/70167[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973; https://t.me/rybar/70167[68] https://t.me/rybar/70167; https://t.me/dva_majors/70717[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/52213[70] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9080; https://t.me/dva_majors/70671;[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35507; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163806; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35515[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/70671[74] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1011917-ce-odna-z-najvazcih-dilanok-frontu-aku-a-baciv-ak-vijska-rf-diut-bila-trasi-pokrovsk-kostantinivka/[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/70671 ; ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70717https://t.me/dva_majors/70747; https://t.me/dva_majors/70717[76] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13776[77] https://t.me/yurasumy/22812[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973[79] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/07/po-odnomu-kozhni-5-hvylyn-nepodalik-pokrovska-rosijski-komandyry-metodychno-kydayut-svoyih-soldativ-pid-bpla/[80] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRoDMka3UfA; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/07/try-bronovani-mashyny-z-dvadczyatma-pasazhyramy-poblyzu-pokrovska-rozbyly-kolonu-bronovanoyi-tehniky/[81] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1919864947074351353; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1919854976119005278; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1919855271507083305; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27972; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9088; https://t.me/BULAVA72b/221 [82] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35478; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35494; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35520; https://t.me/yurasumy/22810; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163806[83] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35494[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973; https://t.me/wargonzo/26363; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35494; https://t.me/dva_majors/70690; https://t.me/yurasumy/22810[85] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35478[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/14780[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973; https://t.me/wargonzo/26363[88] https://t.me/voin_dv/14780[89] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9083; https://t.me/opbr_zsu/534[90] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163806[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973; https://t.me/voin_dv/14780[92] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28170[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973; https://t.me/dva_majors/70690 [95] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28206 [96] https://t.me/energyofukraine/3793; https://t.me/orlovdmytroEn/5861[97] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/674[98] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35502; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35517[99] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23993; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23973[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/70661; https://t.me/dva_majors/70678 [101] https://t.me/dva_majors/70710[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/34034[103] https://t.me/kpszsu/34034; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14123; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1012195-rf-pocilila-raketou-u-dvir-kolisnoi-apteki-u-velikomu-burluci-na-harkivsini-so-vidomo-pro-poskodzenna/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2495 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4585 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4586 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4587 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11711 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11711 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1011805-ataka-rosijskih-bezpilotnikiv-na-kiiv-u-nic-na-7-travna/ ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4590; https://x.com/MVS_UA/status/1919965552698659002 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35454; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/42463; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4549; https://t.me/sumskamiskarada/37186; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9208 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1011753-armia-rf-vdarila-balisticnou-raketou-po-velikij-cerneccini-na-sumsini-so-rozpovili-ocevidci/; https://t.me/astrapress/80686

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 10, 2025

 

at 5/17/25 12:48am

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with William RunkelMay 10, 2025, 3:45 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:45am ET on May 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 10 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 0 to 0800 on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 10 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 10. Any reports of Russian ground activity in these SITREPs are implicit accusations that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced following the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Kyiv on May 10 that he, European officials, and US President Donald Trump are proposing a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12.[1] Zelensky called on Russian officials to respond to the proposal and stated that Europe and the United States should impose additional sanctions on Russia's energy and banking sectors if Russia fails to agree to the ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded by claiming that Ukraine has not responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin's previous ceasefire proposals and that pressuring Russia is "useless."[2] Peskov claimed during an interview with ABC News published on May 10 that Putin supported the idea of a ceasefire but has "questions" about how a ceasefire will account for recent and possible future Russian advances in Ukraine, Ukrainian mobilization, and Western military assistance to Ukraine.[3] Peskov reiterated Putin's previous demands for the West to stop all military aid to Ukraine and force Ukraine to stop mobilizing and training servicemembers as a condition of a ceasefire. Putin criticized the initial March 13 US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal and insinuated that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive military aid.[4]Putin, Peskov, and other Russian officials have not yet offered any comparable concessions, such as stopping Russia's own force generation and defense industrial efforts, as part of a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials appear to be trying to define the conditions of any and all ceasefires in a way that facilitates further Russian battlefield gains in the short term and supports Russia's ability to attack Ukraine again in the future. Peskov also claimed that Ukraine is trying to leverage ceasefire proposals to "escape from negotiations," questioning Trump's stated objective of using a general ceasefire as a building block to precede peace negotiations.[5]The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with the Coalition of the Willing during a semi-virtual summit on May 10, consisting of officials from Lithuania, Romania, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Australia, Croatia, Iceland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, the European Commission, and the European Council.[6] Zelensky welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Kyiv for the summit.[7] The Coalition of the Willing and NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte expressed support for the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.[8] Macron stated that the coalition is working on a proposal to deploy a military contingent to Ukraine and that the coalition will hold a series of meetings in the coming weeks.[9] NBC News reported that Ukraine, the United States, and European partners formulated a term sheet with a list of conditions for Russia to consider.[10] The document, according to an unspecified Western official, contains 22 proposals, including the 30-day general ceasefire. Reuters reported on May 9 that a French diplomatic source stated that US and European partners are finalizing the 30-day ceasefire proposal and new sanction packages if Russia refuses the proposal.[11]Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine. Reuters reported on May 10, citing two Western security officials and a regional official, that Iran is preparing to provide Russia with an unspecified number of Fath-360 launchers in the near future.[12] The officials stated that Russia likely intends to use these launchers with the short-range ballistic missiles that Iran provided to Russia in Fall 2024. A Ukrainian military source told The Times in September 2024 that Iran provided over 200 Fath-360 ballistic missiles to Russia.[13] US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli stated in April 2024 that Iran has provided over 400 short-range ballistic missiles and "hundreds of thousands" of artillery shells to Russia.[14] ISW has not observed reports of the Russian military launching Iranian-provided missiles against Ukraine, however. Iran began providing Russia with Shahed drones in Fall 2022, and Russia began producing and using its own Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 analogues (which Russia calls Geran-1 and Geran-2, respectively) with imported Iranian components and using Iranian production licenses as early as summer 2023.[15] Russia continues to deepen military cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Russia's use of Iranian missiles against Ukraine would mark a significant intensification of Russian-Iranian relations.[16]The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.[17] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on May 10 that the Russian government plans to close the airspace over Volgograd and Saratov oblasts near the Kapustin Yar missile launch site in Astrakhan Oblast, where Russian forces reportedly store Oreshnik missiles, from 0600 May 12 to 1600 May 13 Moscow time.[18] Russian milbloggers asserted that the airspace closure is typical for combat and test launches of ballistic missiles and claimed that the closure suggests Russia might conduct an Oreshnik strike on Kyiv City.[19]US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression. Deputy Head of the Verkhovna Rada's Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, Yehor Chernev, told The New York Times (NYT) in a May 10 article that Ukraine is "running low" on long-range missiles, artillery, and ballistic missile defense systems.[20] An unspecified congressional official told the NYT that the United States recently approved Germany’s transfer of 125 long-range artillery rockets and 100 Patriot air defense missiles to Ukraine. A Western intelligence official stated that the Ukrainian military has improved its ability to "ration" Patriot air defense missiles by using cheaper interceptors to target smaller threats. Patriot air defense systems are essential to maintaining Ukraine's air defense umbrella, as Soviet-era and other Western-provided air defense systems are unable to intercept Russian ballistic missiles.Key Takeaways:Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing.The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10.Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine.The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsSee text below for reported violations.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[21]A Russian milblogger claimed on May 9 and 10 that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino and Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo) in apparent violation of the Victory Day ceasefire.[22]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[23]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 10.Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued assaults in northern Sumy Oblast on May 10 but did not advance.The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border guard detachment operating in northern Sumy Oblast stated on May 10 that Russian forces continued attacks along the international border with Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts and that Russian forces have intensified guided glide bomb strikes over the last two days.[24]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near the border area of Sumy Oblast.[25]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 9 and 10 but did not advance.[26]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[27]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kupyansk direction on May 10.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka on May 9 and 10.[28]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Mir and northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Hrekivka on May 9 and 10.[29] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Lypove.[30]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 10 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 9 and 10.[31]Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on May 10 that Russian forces have conducted up to 10 Shahed drone strikes against Slovyansk per night over the last week (between May 2 and May 9).[32] Lyakh reported that Russia is increasingly utilizing Shahed strikes against frontline settlements.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 10 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 9 that Russian forces advanced into the center of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and along windbreaks in the direction of Dyliivka (south of Chasiv Yar).[33]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Oleksandro-Shultyne on May 9 and 10.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking near Stupochky constantly over the last week.[35]A Russian milblogger claimed on May 10 that Russian forces are splitting their focus in the Chasiv Yar direction between Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar) and Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[36] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating north of Chasiv Yar are trying to advance on Kramatorsk and Russian forces operating south of Chasiv Yar are trying to advance on Kostyantynivka.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division), the "Burevestnik" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), and the "Volga" Artillery Regiment (reportedly Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[37] Elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating toward Kostyantynivka.[38]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Toretsk.[39]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 10 that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently advanced east of Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk) and are attacking the settlement.[40] The milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced toward Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne and toward Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; southeast of Toretsk near Oleksandropil; southwest of Toretsk near Nova Poltavka, Hnativka, Yelyzavetivka, and Stara Mykolaivka, between Stara Mykolaivka and Sukha Balka, and toward Zorya and Malynivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on May 9 and 10.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 10 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Toretsk near Valentynivka.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 10 that Ukrainian forces also counterattacked in Toretsk.[43]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on May 10 that Russian forces recently intensified air strikes against Toretsk and that Russian forces continue to accumulate personnel in the Toretsk direction.[44]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[45] Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced along Tsentralna Street in southeastern Novoserhiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[46]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 9 that Russian forces advanced further south near Novoserhiivka than geolocated footage indicated.[47]Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Promin, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Hrodivka, Lysivka, and Novotoretske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on May 9 and 10.[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka and Myrolyubivka.[49]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 10 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 9 and 10 that Russian forces advanced in the fields southwest of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and near Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[50]Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Preobrazhenka, and Nadiivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske, Bohdanivka, and Horikhove on May 9 and 10.[51] The Russian (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoolenivka and Novoserhiivka.[52]Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov rported that Russian forces are attacking on motorcycles and in civilian cars with first-person view (FPV) drone support.[53]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the eastern outskirts of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove) and along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway in the fields south of Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove).[54]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr and Odradne on May 9 and 10.[55] The Russian (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Oleksiivka.[56]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 10 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Novopil, Rivnopil, and toward Zelene Pole on May 8 and 9.[57] The Russian (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelene Pole and Novopil.[58]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 10 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Shcherbaky on May 9 and 10.[59]Order of Battle: Elements of the BARS-3 "Rodina" Battalion (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[60]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 10 but did not advance.[61]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[62]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces did not conduct long-range drone or missile strikes against Ukraine on the evening of May 9 to 10 or during the day on May 10.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/z-12-travnya-maye-rozpochatisya-povne-j-bezumovne-pripinenny-97701[2] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/05/10/25748894.shtml ; https://t.me/tass_agency/314486[3] https://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/us-european-weapons-ukraine-stop-ceasefire-putin-spokesperson-121659250 ; https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/kremlin-insists-arm-deliveries-ukraine-stop-agreeing-ceasefire/story?id=121656242[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025 ; https://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/us-european-weapons-ukraine-stop-ceasefire-putin-spokesperson-121659250 ; https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/kremlin-insists-arm-deliveries-ukraine-stop-agreeing-ceasefire/story?id=121656242[6] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/ukrayina-gotova-shvidko-j-konstruktivno-ruhatisya-do-miru-vi-97689[7] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1921183388947325373 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14165[8] https://x.com/SecGenNATO/status/1921149708698788142 ; https://suspilne dot media/1014815-gensek-nato-pidtrimue-30-denne-bezumovne-pripinenna-vognu-v-ukraini/ ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/z-12-travnya-maye-rozpochatisya-povne-j-bezumovne-pripinenny-97701[9] https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/coalition-of-the-willing-drafting-proposal-1746882890.html ; https://suspilne dot media/1014827-makron-anonsuvav-novi-zustrici-koalicii-ohocih-pro-so-tam-govoritimut-miznarodni-partneri/[10] https://www.nbcnews.com/world/russia/russia-ukraine-war-trump-envoy-witkoff-interpreter-kremlin-rcna205878[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-europeans-finalising-30-day-ukraine-russia-ceasefire-proposal-diplomatic-2025-05-09/[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-send-russia-launchers-short-range-missiles-sources-say-2025-05-09/[13] https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/ballistic-clmpm3d7m[14] https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/general_cavoli_opening_statements.pdf[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032125[17] https://ua.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-kyiv-ukraine-may-9-2025/[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91444 ; https://strana dot today/news/484756-rf-zakryvaet-vozdushnoe-prostranstvo-nad-polihonom-hde-ispytyvajut-oreshnik.html ; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/rosiya-zakrivae-povitryaniy-prostir-kapustinim-1746857988.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=post ; https://t.me/astrapress/80888[19] https://t.me/rusich_army/23323 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22874[20] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/10/world/europe/eu-ukraine-weapons.html[21] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28078; https://t.me/OSHP_225/4988[22] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91428 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23312 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91473 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26431 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164260[23] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91433[24] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xws0LfMnT3w&t=2805s; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/10/peremyrya-na-sumskomu-napryamku-vorog-syple-kabamy-a-nashi-zbyvayut-molniyi-zi-strileczkoyi-zbroyi/[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164193[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076[27] ttps://t.me/RVvoenkor/91480[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076[32] https://suspilne dot media/1014531-posolstvo-ssa-poperedilo-so-rosia-gotue-masstabnu-povitranu-ataku-zelenskij-uviv-sankcii-proti-rf-1172-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746867046&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[33] https://t.me/t3mny/2272[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076[35] https://t.me/t3mny/2272[36] https://t.me/yurasumy/22885[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91419; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164172[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164234[39] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1921110347345285197; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DJRKHT4sL_1/[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64143[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076; https://t.me/t3mny/2272; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64143[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91430; https://t.me/wargonzo/26431[44] https://suspilne dot media/1014531-posolstvo-ssa-poperedilo-so-rosia-gotue-masstabnu-povitranu-ataku-zelenskij-uviv-sankcii-proti-rf-1172-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746863775&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[45] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1921097153646133470; https://t.me/ewoks152bbs/203[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9115 ; https://t.me/gostrikartuzy/950[47] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31497[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26431 ; https://t.me/don_partizan/8226[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543[50] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31497 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64129[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543[53] https://suspilne dot media/1014531-posolstvo-ssa-poperedilo-so-rosia-gotue-masstabnu-povitranu-ataku-zelenskij-uviv-sankcii-proti-rf-1172-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746862814&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9110 ; https://t.me/dumky_frontovyka/1944[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12438[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164194[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/52362

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, May 7, 2025

 

at 5/17/25 12:48am

 Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Andie Parry, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.The Houthis will likely exploit the ceasefire with the United States to reconstitute themselves while continuing to target Israel. US airstrikes from March 15 to May 5 targeted Houthi weapons and ammunition depots, sites related to missiles and drones, and Houthi leadership.[1] It is unclear how much the US airstrikes degraded Houthi capabilities, however. A Saudi news outlet said that some US assessments report that US airstrikes destroyed 80 percent of the Houthis’ missile stockpile.[2] An Israeli war correspondent assessed on May 6 that the Houthis still have dozens of ballistic missiles and hundreds of drones, which can reach Israel.[3] CNN reported that an unspecified US official said that the air campaign had only “limited” effects, however. The air campaign will only have temporary effects, regardless of the degree to which the campaign degrades Houthi capabilities. The Houthis can replenish their drone and missile arsenal through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market.[4] US airstrikes have also targeted and killed mid-level Houthi commanders and technical experts, which presumably temporarily disrupted the Houthi chain of command.[5] The Houthis are a well-entrenched military and political organization with decades of wartime experience, which will make it possible for the Houthis to rapidly replace dead commanders and experts.[6] Iran, Axis of Resistance partners, and surviving Houthi commanders and experts can train and develop less experienced replacements.Houthi officials have clarified that their ceasefire with the United States does not include Israel, and that they will continue to attack Israel in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[7] The Houthis launched three drones targeting Eilat Airport in southern Israel and an Israeli military target in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on May 7 after the US ceasefire took effect.[8] The Israel Defense Force (IDF) intercepted one of these drones.[9] These attacks likely represent a continuation of the Houthis' effort to ”blockade” Israel, but the Houthis have decided to target Israeli airports rather than Israeli shipping. Attacks targeting Israel use different weapon systems than the attacks targeting maritime shipping. Attacks targeting Israel require medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range drones, while maritime shipping attacks can use shorter-range drones and anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles. This means that the Houthis can rebuild their anti-ship missile stockpile that they will need for future campaigns in the Red Sea.[10]The Houthis will almost certainly resume attacks targeting international shipping again in the future and can do so for reasons and at a time of their choosing. An unspecified Houthi spokesperson separately told Al Jazeera on May 7 that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships until Israel transfers aid into the Gaza Strip.[11] The Houthi spokesperson also said that they will assess any future US support for Israel and determine their position accordingly.[12] The Houthis initiated their campaign in October 2023 to impose an ”economic blockade” against Israel by targeting vessels that entered Israeli ports.[13] This campaign frequently targeted vessels that had no clear ties to Israel, however.[14] The Houthis could launch a similar campaign in the future when they want and for reasons they choose. The Houthis will have internalized the lessons learned during this round of escalation, which could make their attacks more effective in the future.The Houthi-US ceasefire is reportedly a “verbal understanding” rather than a formal agreement, and the conditions remain ambiguous.[15] An unspecified US official told Al Jazeera on May 7 that the ceasefire was a “verbal understanding” instead of a formal agreement.[16] Neither US nor Houthi officials have explained the specific terms of this ceasefire.[17] Anonymous Iranian officials also told the New York Times and Amwaj media separately that Iran used its influence over the Houthis to convince the Houthis to agree to a ceasefire.[18] It is unclear why Iran would have needed to convince the Houthis to take this ceasefire. The Houthis are required only to stop attacks targeting maritime shipping, something they have not done since November 2024. The United States, in return, ceases its air campaign.Persistent energy shortages have fueled public frustration and strained the Iranian economy, which may pose a growing threat to regime stability. Power outages have increased in Iran in recent days due to the energy crisis in Iran. Traders at the Tehran Province iron market went on strike on May 5, alongside other small protests across Iran in recent days over the repeated power outages.[19] The Iranian Interior Ministry ordered all provincial governors on May 7 to open all government offices, banks, and municipal offices nationwide from 6 am to 1 pm starting May 10 to reduce electricity consumption.[20] The ministry also announced that Thursdays will be an official holiday across all provinces until September 22 to further ease strain on the energy grid. The Iranian Management of Electric Power Generation and Transmission Organization (Tavanir) cut electricity to approximately 700 banks in Tehran Province for exceeding consumption limits and warned that high-usage customers who ignore warning messages will face additional power cuts.[21] It remains unclear how the regime will address the worsening shortages and the mounting economic losses caused by outages and the subsequent business closures. Iranian officials stated that electricity shortages have caused around 20 billion US dollars in losses to Iranian industries nationwide.[22] New blackouts also could trigger protests. Natural gas cuts in January 2023 sparked demonstrations in northeastern Iran, and nationwide blackouts during the June 2021 heatwave fueled widespread public unrest.[23] Small protests and strikes over the energy crisis in Iran could escalate into anti-regime protests, similar to how demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.[24]Key Takeaways:Houthi Ceasefire: The Houthis will likely exploit the ceasefire with the United States to reconstitute themselves while continuing to target Israel. The air campaign will only have temporary effects, regardless of the degree to which the campaign degrades Houthi capabilities. The Houthis can replenish their drone and missile arsenal through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market. The Houthi-US ceasefire is reportedly a “verbal understanding” rather than a formal agreement, and the conditions remain ambiguous.Houthis and Attacks on Israel: Houthi officials have clarified that their ceasefire with the United States does not include Israel, and that they will continue to attack Israel in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis will almost certainly resume attacks targeting international shipping again in the future and can do so for reasons and at a time of their choosing. An unspecified Houthi spokesperson separately told Al Jazeera on May 7 that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships until Israel transfers aid into the Gaza Strip.Iranian Internal Unrest: Persistent energy shortages have fueled public frustration and strained the Iranian economy, which may pose a growing threat to regime stability. Traders at the Tehran Province iron market went on strike on May 5, alongside other small protests across Iran in recent days over repeated power outages. Small protests and strikes over the energy crisis in Iran could escalate into anti-regime protests, similar to how demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 825,500 rials to one US dollar on May 6 to 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7.[25]SyriaDruze factions that have consistently cooperated with Damascus have retained their weapons and control internal security in Suwayda Province. The Men of Dignity, Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, and the Sheikh of Dignity forces now make up roughly 80 percent of the General Security Service (GSS) in Suwayda Province. The leaders of these factions have maintained open lines of communication with Damascus throughout the transition.[26] These groups cooperated with the Assad regime when needed for the Druze community’s well-being, but the groups were not Assad supporters or in positions of authority under the former regime.[27] Men of Dignity and Ahrar al Jabal leaders supported a year-long popular protest movement against the Assad regime in Suwayda, for example.[28] Despite the Suwaydawi GSS’s current composition of anti-Assad Druze, an amendment to the agreement between the transitional government and Druze leaders will reinstate dismissed police officers, even if they were in positions of power under the Assad regime.[29] The GSS forces in Suwayda will retain their weapons that Druze leaders have promised will not be used outside of Suwayda Province.[30] Druze who live outside of the main Syrian Druze enclave in Suwayda have negotiated their own security solutions and will maintain security within their own communities by retaining weapons.[31]The Druze integration into the Syrian state demonstrates that most Druze factions, while they distrust the new government, believe that cooperation with the government will better protect their communities than confrontation. The Druze cooperation further indicates that the Israeli campaign to protect the Druze against the transitional government by pressuring the government into stopping confessional violence perpetrated by extremists is based on flawed assumptions about the Druze position in Syria and the government's position towards the Druze.[32] Men of Dignity leaders have called handing over weapons to the Syrian state “suicide,” but the group’s negotiations with Damascus have enabled them to retain their weapons and formalized already existing militia structures and groups within Suwayda Province.[33] The Syrian Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry continue to attempt to limit weapons to those authorized by the state, meaning that the formalization of these terms with the Druze was essential to both maintain Druze security and ensure that weapons remained only in the hands of the state across the country.[34]The Syrian transitional government has reportedly engaged in talks with Israel through several channels, likely in part to honor US requirements that Syria does not become a “source of threat[s]” to Israel. Unspecified Syrian sources told Reuters on May 7 that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has facilitated talks between Israel and Syria on security, counterterrorism, and confidence-building measures.[35] The UAE reportedly established the channel after Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on April 13, which “assuaged” Emirati concerns about Shara.[36] A senior Syrian security source said that the channel is "strictly" limited in scope and is not used to discuss IDF activity in Syria.[37] Syrian intelligence officials, former Israeli intelligence officials, and Emirati security officials are reportedly involved in the channel.[38] The scope of the UAE-facilitated channel between Syria and Israel suggests that it is related in part to Syrian efforts to obtain sanctions relief from the United States. A Syrian-Israeli channel that is designed to discuss counterterrorism and confidence-building measures most likely concerns Palestinian or other Iranian-backed activity in Syria. The United States gave Syrian officials a list of “confidence-building” conditions for partial US sanctions relief on March 18, including that the Syrian government ban Palestinian militias and political activities in order to “assuage Israeli fears.”[39] The Syrian government responded that it would not ”allow Syria to become a source of threat to any party, including Israel."[40] The government has since taken tangible steps to honor this, including by detaining several prominent Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leaders in Syria and forming a committee to monitor Palestinian activities.[41]Israeli and Syrian officials have also reportedly communicated through several other non-UAE facilitated channels to discuss other discrete security issues. Shara acknowledged on May 7 that Syria had engaged in indirect talks with Israel to “calm the situation," likely referring to recent tensions between Syria and Israel after attacks on Druze communities.[42] Israeli media also reported that a Syrian defense official and officials from Quneitra Province visited Israel and met with Israeli defense officials in late April, citing an unspecified Syrian source.[43]Syrian President Ahmed al Shara conducted his first official visit to Europe in an effort to obtain sanction relief.[44] President Shara and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on May 7.[45] Shara, Shaibani, and Macron discussed sanctions, security issues, and Syrian reconstruction.[46] Shara’s visit comes as the European Union (EU) prepares for its annual review of the sanctions targeting Syrian individuals and entities, which are due to expire on June 1.[47] The Syrian government and civil society organizations also called on the EU not to renew these sanctions in a May 7 joint statement.[48] Macron confirmed after meeting with Shara that France will seek to gradually lift the EU’s sanctions on Syria.[49] Macron also outlined several conditions for the Syrian government to meet before lifting sanctions, including cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and holding perpetrators of recent inter-confessional violence accountable.[50] France’s conditions are very similar to the conditions that the United States gave Syria in mid-March in return for partial sanction relief.[51] The Syrian government had addressed a majority of these similar conditions as of April 26.[52] The French decision to demand that Syria hold the perpetrators of recent inter-confessional violence accountable indicates that the Syrian government will need to take additional steps related to the recent violence, however.Unknown armed groups have continued to target Alawites in Syria and could reignite sectarian tensions. Unidentified gunmen killed four farm workers in the Alawite village of Ain al Jawza, Latakia Province, on May 6.[53] Syrian media reported that the same gunmen likely killed two more Alawite field workers in the village of Tal Sekkin, Hama Province, on May 6, less than 50 kilometers from the first attack.[54] These assassinations occurred in areas that were previously hotbeds of the Alawite insurgency and risk reviving a sectarian-based insurrection against the Syrian transitional government.[55]The Salafi-Jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah assassinated an Assad regime soldier in Hama Province, emphasizing the need for transitional justice. Three Saraya Ansar al Sunnah members killed former National Defense Forces (NDF) leader Khaled al Omar in Taybat al Imam, Hama Province, on May 7.[56] Omar led a group of NDF fighters between 2014 and 2015.[57] The opportunity for such revenge killing is due in part to a lack of transitional justice to punish those responsible for atrocities during the civil war.Gunmen on motorcycles continue to conduct assassinations across Syria, underscoring the transitional government’s continued challenges in maintaining security. Unidentified gunmen on motorcycles killed three men outside a car dealership in Azaz, Aleppo Province, on May 7.[58] The GSS announced a ban on armed motorcycle riders in Homs City on May 4, after a spate of attacks using motorcycles there.[59] The transitional government has not yet expanded this ban to other provinces, even though gunmen continue to use motorcycles to engage in sectarian violence and conduct revenge killings across Syria.[60]IraqA parliamentarian from former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition announced on May 7 that he will join a rival bloc aligned with National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025.[61] The parliamentarian, Thaer Makhif, won the second highest number of votes behind an independent candidate in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[62] This parliamentarian's announcement is notable given that Maliki and Hakim have clashed over Maliki’s outsized influence in the Shia Coordination Framework in recent months.[63] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Hakim attempted to form a political party with former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi in 2020 that would have supported then-Prime Minister Mustafa al Khadimi and opposed Iranian-backed groups.[64] Iran reportedly urged unity amongst Shia Coordination Framework leaders on April 30, likely to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[65]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripSee topline section.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing Significant to Report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/25/politics/houthis-target-drones-hampering-trump-mission/index.html[2] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1920167357755875750[3] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1919797587336474791[4] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/04/made-in-yemen-assessing-the-houthis-arms-production-capacity/ ; https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/american-elections-2016/2025/05/02/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%91%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%91%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1912212572347965827 ; https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/c4eae92382c7456cae8c607af9d03794 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/13/us/politics/yemen-houthi-drones-report.html ; https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/126709[5] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9; https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/25/politics/houthis-target-drones-hampering-trump-mission/index.html ;https://x.com/A_ALGABARNI/status/1920083142360072417 ; https://www.defenseliney dot net/posts/255[6] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/13/yemen-houthis-recruit-more-child-soldiers-october-7; https://www.saba dot ye/en/news3460472.htm; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/s1prrn61ee; https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/19/houthi-yemen-trump-iran-hezbollah-assad-gaza-airstrikes/[7] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919828903524483215 ; https://x.com/alejri77/status/1919850095601725516 ; https://x.com/abdusalamsalah/status/1919929348540248492; https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9[8] https://t.me/army21ye/2938[9] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1920021405686546695[10] https://amwaj.media/en/article/a-deal-in-the-shadows-how-oman-iran-helped-broker-houthi-us-understanding[11] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthis-us-deal-embarrasses-israel-attacks-will-continue/[12] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthis-us-deal-embarrasses-israel-attacks-will-continue/[13] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be[14] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be[15] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9[16] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9[17] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9; https://x.com/abdusalamsalah/status/1919929348540248492[18] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html ; https://amwaj.media/en/article/a-deal-in-the-shadows-how-oman-iran-helped-broker-houthi-us-understanding[19] https://x.com/KayhanLondon/status/1919379229818401077 ;https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1919740952698118467 ;https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1920133279660810645 ;https://ensafnews dot com/590639 ;https://tejaratnews dot com/اعتراض-مردم-خوزستان-به-قطع-برق-در-گرمای ;https://www.zirnevisnews dot ir/240405[20] https://x.com/FarsNews_Agency/status/1920150618926137686[21] https://x.com/FarsNews_Agency/status/1920037844313096546[22] https://www.rouydad24 dot ir/fa/amp/news/379120 ;https://tejaratnews dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%AA-37/948603-%D8%A2%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B9-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86[23] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-gas-cut-protest/32225417.html ;https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-57719556 ;[24] https://apnews.com/article/208de9a8f9e64d32b3be2d98aa95e265 ;https://www.reuters.com/article/world/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-take-idUSKBN1YR0QO/[25] https://www.bon-bast.com/[26] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919751604837711991 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1894139731728109813 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025 ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1181914033301593&id=100044490217016[27] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/insight-suwaydas-position-syrian-situation[28] https://syriadirect.org/suwayda-protesters-resolute-despite-regime-military-reinforcements ; https://npasyria dot com/en/88918 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-protest-update-september-12%E2%80%93september-18[29] https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1918788738785673508 ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid02BmujXfi82eV2SPX1Tfh79rk5GfcHPhFnv37kNt972NspYuNAqPyatwnDVoZEyn4Cl[30] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/syria/2025/05/05/%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1[31] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919751604837711991 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/druze-near-damascus-resist-demand-turn-arms-tensions-boil-2025-05-06[32] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/02/israel-says-airstrikes-in-syria-are-message-to-protect-druze-minority ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050225[33] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/syria/2025/05/05/%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1[34] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/313[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/ ; https://x.com/azelin/status/1920085465790554420; https://apnews.com/article/syria-uae-ahmad-alsharaa-visit-israel-bdddfd69e4ac475929f3a4133881b36a[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26/[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025[42] https://x.com/RymMomtaz/status/1920186312654471213 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/[43] https://www.haaretz dot com/middle-east-news/2025-05-07/ty-article/.premium/syrian-officials-visited-israel-in-april-opening-direct-uae-mediated-contact-sources-say/00000196-aabd-d1bb-a5d6-aefd2e8a0000[44] https://www.reuters.com/world/syrian-leader-heads-france-first-european-trip-2025-05-07/ ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/129172[45] https://x.com/SyPresidency/status/1920168746141753597[46] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142245 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/syrian-leader-heads-france-first-european-trip-2025-05-07/[47] https://www.reuters.com/world/syrian-leader-heads-france-first-european-trip-2025-05-07/[48] https://snhr dot org/blog/2025/05/07/syrian-and-international-organizations-call-on-eu-to-end-assad-era-sanctions-on-syria-now/[49] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/129214[50] https://x.com/Elysee/status/1920169532569595986[51] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/[52] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26/ ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142245[53] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919820581614072059 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1JAVyV68VW/[54] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920060786812101053 ; https://x.com/AlMayadeenLive/status/1919858141816107048[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-8-2025#:~:text=Syrian%20transitional%20government,insurgent%20fled.%5B44%5D ;[56] https://t.me/alaydiat/304 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1ALqsXqJvg/ ; https://www.facebook.com/Sewar.Sul/photos/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%81/3866503183601595/?_rdr ; https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1920033342033940727 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920063779661816192[57] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920063779661816192[58] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920068907089436889 ; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1920084802083967483 ; https://www.syria dot tv/%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8[59] https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1919353148726030348[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2025#:~:text=The%20General%20Security,the%20Assad%20regime. ; https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1919353148726030348[61] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%80-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83[62] https://ihec dot iq/the-results-of-the-parliament-elections-2021 ; https://alssaa dot com/post/show/7041-بيانات-بابل-الانتخابية[63] https://almadapaper dot net/391980/[64] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2022/8/1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%a5%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%b9[65] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate043025

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2025

 

at 5/17/25 12:12am

 Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate TrotterMay 6, 2025, 7:45 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on May 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian attacks near Novyi Put and Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that fighting continued near the railway station in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[1] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southwestern Tetkino, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are defending near Tetkino.[3]Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided munition strike on a Russian position in southwestern Tetkino, indicating that Russian forces maintain positions near the Tetkino Railway Station.[4] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to isolate Russian units near Tetkino.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have interdicted and maintained fire control over an unspecified section of the 38K-040 Tetkino-Karyzh highway.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.[7]Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West. Russian Security Council Secretary and former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu published an op-ed in the official Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta on May 6, arguing that military and political unity against a common enemy is Russia's only path to a strong and victorious future.[8] Shoigu repeatedly juxtaposed the Red Army's defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Shoigu extolled the Soviet State Defense Committee's (an executive governing body established following Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union) "strictly centralized framework" that ensured effective coordination and implementation of orders on the frontline and the home front. Shoigu stated that Russian public consciousness experienced a national identity crisis following the fall of the Soviet Union and underscored the importance of preserving and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values to resolve this crisis and form an unofficial Russian state ideology (the Russian constitution forbids the adoption of a formal state ideology).[9] Shoigu reiterated Russian narratives designed to justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and accused the collective West of preparing for a direct military conflict with Russia and seeking to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia.The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia. The Kremlin is leveraging government-wide initiatives to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in positions of power in Russia and long-term rhetorical campaigns to disseminate the belief that the world is divided into two groups (the West and the Russian-led "multipolar world") seeking to destroy one another — mirroring the Soviet Union's framing of geopolitics as an existential conflict between communism and capitalism.[10] Russia's evolving informal state ideology includes aspects of the Soviet Union's ideology, such as a strong centralized government and a unified perception of the state enemy, but lacks the greater justification for why Russia must destroy its enemies.[11] The Kremlin is attempting to unify Russian society, particularly elites, under this world view in order to ensure that any successor to Russian President Vladimir Putin will embody similarly aggressive and dangerous ideals that perpetuate eternal conflict with the West and NATO.Putin's envisioned informal state ideology is somewhat at odds with that being developed by Russian ultranationalists — one of Putin's key constituencies. Putin is promoting an informal state ideology that supports a civic Russian identity and a multiethnic and religiously diverse population.[12] Russian ultranationalists, whose perspective is often voiced most clearly by Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, appear more interested in an ideology predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[13] Putin is likely resistant to such an ideology as it risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic and religiously-diverse population and could pose a threat to regime stability. Russian officials are struggling to balance placating the increasingly influential ultranationalist community with offsetting critical economic issues and labor shortages with migrant labor, and the war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with the West will only exacerbate these issues.[14]Shoigu also underscored the importance of the Kremlin's development of military-patriotic education programs — such as the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), Yunarmiya, and the Russian Military Historical Society — and noted that they are designed to prepare Russian citizens for military service.[15] ISW has long reported on the Kremlin's efforts to centralize control over and expand multi-generational youth programs as part of Russia's long-term force generation efforts and multi-pronged efforts to militarize Russian society.[16] The Kremlin may intend to leverage these military-patriotic education programs to workshop a future state ideology and socialize Russian citizens to this ideology from a young age.Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II. Shoigu noted in the May 6 article that the Soviet Union made "mistakes" when planning for a war with Nazi Germany, including failing to properly equip and manage Soviet troops, and suffered from poor strategic planning and ineffective military doctrine.[17] Shoigu claimed that Nazi Germany was able to exploit these mistakes to make significant advances early in the war (to the gates of Moscow, in fact), but that the Soviet Union was able to improve its capabilities and mobilize society to support an eventual victory. Shoigu's article notably ignores the role that the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, which Joseph Stalin used to seize the Baltic States and part of Poland while Adolf Hitler invaded the rest of Poland in 1939, played in Stalin's unwillingness to prepare for war with Nazi Germany. Shoigu's comments are likely an attempt to use references to the Second World War to tacitly acknowledge the Russian military's shortcomings at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, for which Shoigu was to a considerable extent responsible as Defense Minister. Shoigu's retelling of the Second World War mirrors Russia's unpreparedness for a long war at the start of the full-scale invasion and significant setbacks in 2022 when Ukraine forced the Russian military to withdraw from around Kyiv and from northern Ukraine and liberated significant swathes of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Shoigu is also attempting to draw parallels to the Second World War to frame the Russian military as having secured the permanent initiative on the battlefield and portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable to both the international community and the domestic Russian populace. Shoigu is likely attempting to draw on the mythos of the Second World War to signal to domestic audiences that Russian victory is near and requires united societal support, even though Russia has no significant battlefield successes to flaunt on Victory Day 2025.Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime. Kadyrov told Chechen news outlet Chechnya Segodnya on May 5, in response to rumors of his resignation, that he asked to be "relieved" from his post as Chechen Republic head and hopes that his request "will be supported" but that unspecified others "will have their own initiatives, their own vision."[18] Kadyrov stated on his Telegram channel on May 6 that "many" misunderstood his May 5 statement and clarified that only Putin can decide whether Kadyrov can leave his post and that Kadyrov can only ask to leave or offer his resignation.[19] Kadyrov emphasized that he is a "team man" and will follow Putin's orders, implying that he will retain his post if that is what Putin decides.[20] It is currently unclear how serious Kadyrov is about this request, as Kadyrov has periodically expressed his desire to resign as Chechen Republic head since 2016 and has consistently walked back these statements.[21]Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on March 27, citing a source in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), that Kadyrov's relations with Putin have deteriorated in recent months as Putin was displeased with Kadyrov's "frequent and uncoordinated negotiations" with monarchies in Middle Eastern countries.[22] One source told investigative outlet Novaya Gazeta that Kadyrov helped Putin negotiate with Qatar about the fate of Russian military bases in Syria and that Kadyrov "carried out even more delicate orders from the Kremlin" in the Middle East, however.[23] Kadyrov has acted as a stabilizer within the Chechen Republic and elsewhere in the North Caucasus during particularly tense moments since the early 2000s, particularly moments that could pose threats to the stability of Putin's regime.[24] Kadyrov's death or departure from office, should it occur during or immediately after the war in Ukraine, could leave Putin's interests in the North Caucasus unguarded unless Kadyrov and Putin appoint a suitable successor.It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death. Novaya Gazeta reported on May 5, citing a Russian Telegram channel and several other sources familiar with the matter, that Kadyrov has "changed priorities" and spent a lot of time receiving health treatment and largely delegated his external engagements since February 2025.[25] Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov's daughter and former Chechen Deputy Prime Minister and Culture Minister Aishat Kadyrova suddenly resigned in early February 2025 and that sources in the Chechen government reported that Kadyrov's other two daughters, Khutmat and Khadizhat Kadyrova, also stopped working in civil service positions at the same time. Novaya Gazeta reported that Aishat Kadyrova travelled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in late February 2025 to identify investment opportunities for the Kadyrov family in the wake of Kadyrov's reportedly declining health.Novaya Gazeta reported that only two of Kadyrov's 14 children "play a significant role" in Kadyrov's future plans: 26-year-old Aishat Kadyrova and 17-year-old Adam Kadyrov.[26] A Novaya Gazeta source reported that Kadyrov would not have "had the headache of appointing a successor" if "Aishat [Kadyrova] had been born a man," given Aishat's success in political and business roles. Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov has positioned Adam Kadyrov as his obvious successor, including by instructing Chechen officials to treat Adam as Kadyrov's main heir. ISW has previously observed reports of Kadyrov giving favorable appointments to Adam, arranging meetings between Adam and Putin, and appearing to prefer him as heir over his elder son, Akhmat Kadyrov.[27] Adam Kadyrov famously stoked interethnic tensions after footage emerged in September 2023 of Adam beating a detained man accused of burning a Quran, an act which Ramzan Kadyrov praised and subsequently rewarded.[28]Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 6 that Ukrainian authorities returned 205 Ukrainian POWs, comprising members of almost all branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[29] Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW exchange with Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also reported on May 6 that Russia and Ukraine conducted a 205-for-205 POW exchange.[30]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast.Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino.Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West.The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia.Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II.Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death.Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6.Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationSee topline text for updates in Kursk Oblast.Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in northwestern Belgorod Oblast near Demidovka on May 5.[31]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Demidovka.[32]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 6 but did not advance.A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Sumy City toward Bilovody and Loknya.[33]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[34]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 5 and 6 but did not advance.[35]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk direction, but this advance is likely not recent.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the fields west of Kyslivka (southeast of Kupyansk), likely in late March or early April 2025.[36]Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Hlushkivka and toward Novoosynove on May 5 and 6.[37]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Kontora" Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[38]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 6 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Hrekivka on May 5 and 6.[39]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 6 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Olhivka, Ridkodub, Lypove, Novy Mir, Novomykhailivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Nove, and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Torske, and Myrne on May 5 and 6.[40]Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Shram" Group are operating in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[41]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[42]A Russian milblogger claimed on May 6 that Russian forces attacked southwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryhorivka.[43]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka on May 5 and 6.[44]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 78th “Sever-Akhmat” Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[45] Drone operators of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[46]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Berehova Street in eastern Novospaske (formerly Petrivka, west of Toretsk).[47] Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Toretsk.[48]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tarasivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk).[49]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Dyliivka, and Krymske; southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, Sukha Balka, Stara Mykolaivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Kalynove; and west of Toretsk near Novoolenivka on May 5 and 6.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tarasivka.[51]A Russian milbloggers claimed on May 5 that Russian forces have recently intensified guided glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka.[52] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Russian forces have increased the accuracy of guided glide bomb strikes in the area, with roughly 60 percent of the glide bombs reaching their targets.[53]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on May 6 that Russian forces, including elements of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), seized Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk) and in eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55]Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on May 5 and 6.[56]The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 6 that Russian forces have started driving much faster on motorcycles in off-road areas, indicating that the Russian military has likely started training its troops to use motorcycles better.[57]Russian forces have likely recently intensified long-range Shahed drone strikes against Ukrainian near-rear areas. The Russian MoD claimed on May 6 that Russian forces conducted a Shahed-136 strike on Ukrainian forces in Volodymyrivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[58] The Russian MoD similarly claimed on May 5 that Russian forces conducted a Shahed-136 strike on a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[59]Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Solona River south of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[60]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[61]Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Uspenivka, and Novooleksandrivka and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Sribne, and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on May 5 and 6.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novooleksandrivka.[63]Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently struck a bridge over the Solona River along the T-0428 Andriivka-Mezhova highway in Novopavlivka.[64]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 6 but did not advance.Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove near Andriivka and Kostyantynopil and in the direction of Bahatyr on May 5 and 6.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[66]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[67]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and north of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka) during a series of large motorcycle assaults in the area on May 3 and 4.[68] Ukrainian sources reported on May 4 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 70 motorcycles during the assaults.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) participated in the advance near Novosilka.[70]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Zelene Pole and Novopil (west of Velyka Novosilka).[71] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka) and are leveraging increased cover from new foliage to make more rapid advances in the area.[72]Russian forces continued assaults north of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and in the direction of Odradne and Komar; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Novopil on May 5 and 6.[73]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly struck Ukrainian forces near Vilne Pole.[74]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke (formerly Chervone) on May 5 and 6 but did not advance.[75]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 6 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[76]Russian forces conducted ground attacks south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove; and west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky and Kamyanske and towards Novoandriivka on May 5 and 6.[77]Ukrainian sources reported on May 6 that Russian forces are conducting motorcycle assaults more frequently due to the terrain in the Zaporizhia direction and that Russian forces are using a ”wave” tactic of sending four to five motorcycles to find gaps in Ukrainian defenses and then following up with dismounted infantry to consolidate positions.[78]Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate Head Oleh Korikov reported that Russian forces are blocking the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) monitoring mission at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).[79] Korikov noted that the ZNPP lacks a reliable water supply, an external power supply, qualified personnel, proper maintenance of safety systems, and any warning, radiation monitoring, or emergency preparedness systems.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1251st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction, and drone operators of the “Nemets” drone group (291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[80]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 6 but did not advance.[81]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 6 that Russian forces launched 136 Shahed and other drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 54 drones over Ukraine and that 70 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian sources reported that the strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts and killed one civilian in Odesa Oblast.[83]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/wargonzo/26343 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26357 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22786 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22783 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70616 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/41532 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70647 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23211 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21177 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91226 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91229 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23217[2] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23217 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35466[3] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35416 ; https://t.me/divannyevoini/14950 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91182 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91170 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91229 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91226[4] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27965 ; https://t.me/soniah_hub/10365[5] https://t.me/yurasumy/22783 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21170 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2025[6] https://t.me/wargonzo/26357[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2025 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70607[8] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/06/eto-nasha-pobeda.html[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/acts/news/69810 ; http://kremlin dot ru/acts/news/69810[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen042325 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024[15] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/06/eto-nasha-pobeda.html[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2024[17] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/06/eto-nasha-pobeda.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313484[18] https://chechnyatoday dot com/news/385072[19] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5700[20] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5700[21] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/05/2025/6819ff4d9a7947b627111f9e; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/2025/05/06/20993624.shtml; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2022/09/04/939111-ramzan-kadirov-zayavil-o-vozmozhnosti; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/05/06/1108636-kadirov-poprosil[22] https://istories dot media/news/2025/03/27/kadirov-vstupil-v-konflikt-s-kremlem-govoryat-istochniki-vazhnikh-istorii/?tztc=1[23] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/05/vozvrashchenie-molodogo-ramzana[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024; https://kyivindependent dot com/30-years-since-start-of-first-chechen-war-kadyrovs-chechnya-remains-one-of-most-brutal-places-on-earth/; https://neweasterneurope dot eu/2024/12/15/chechnyas-instability-implications-for-russia-and-the-eu/; https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2010/11/north-caucasus-of-the-bizarre?lang=en[25] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/05/vozvrashchenie-molodogo-ramzana[26] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/05/vozvrashchenie-molodogo-ramzana[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2023[29] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1919732905833599419 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1919732742004105216 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14109[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/52193 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52189[31] https://t.me/rybar/70153; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28107[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28107[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28106; https://t.me/rusich_army/23189[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449[36] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1919660584229888015; https://t.me/rubak112/245[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163702[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901[41] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5698[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163685[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35465[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26343 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163628[45] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5699[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163676[47] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27935 ; https://t.me/azov_media/6790[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1919639459231908009[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163685 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22782 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163628[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154 ; https://t.me/rybar/70153[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163628 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2352[53] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2352[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/52179 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52180 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52184[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28101 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163685 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/06/ye-motoczykly-z-yakyh-shhe-ne-vstygly-plivku-zderty-poblyzu-pokrovska-dronari-aktyvno-zakryvayut-vorozhyj-motosezon/[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/52177[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/52135[60] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27953; https://t.me/gostrikartuzy/944[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35440 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22779 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28157[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91161 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35414[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35414[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91193 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163709[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64022 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26343[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26343[67] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13769[68] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/29285 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27934[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/minus-70-motoczykliv-za-dobu-zsu-kosyat-vidchajdushni-moto-shturmy-rf-na-shlyahu-do-dnipropetrovshhyny/ ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2747959232260454&rdid=iuAqmdX8AhTjdkr8 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/05/motoczykletnyj-bliczkryg-zahlynuvsya-syly-oborony-spalyly-blyzko-70-vorozhyh-bajkiv-pid-chas-odnogo-shturmu/[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35415 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35468[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64019[72] https://t.me/yurasumy/22778[73] https://t.me/readovkanews/95967; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/14757[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899[78] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/06/taktyka-hvyl-i-avos-na-pivdni-prodovzhuyetsya-masova-utylizacziya-vorozhogo-motozaliza/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/06/bajk-shou-v-zaporizkyh-stepah-vorog-jde-vpered-motoczykletnymy-nakatamy/[79] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1011425-vidsutni-nadijne-vodozabezpecenna-ta-stabilne-zovnisne-elektropostacanna-oleg-korikov-pro-situaciu-na-zaes/; https://snriu.gov dot ua/news/holova-derzhatomrehuliuvannia-u-onlain-formati-vziav-uchast-v-cherhovomu-zasidanni-mizhnarodnoi-asotsiatsii-iadernykh-rehuliatoriv-inra[80] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35439 ; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/2963; https://t.me/dva_majors/70602[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/33942[83] https://t.me/kpszsu/33942; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2494 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14152; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1919653735417946230; https://t.me/synegubov/14154; https://t.me/synegubov/14160 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/05/06/u-harkovi-vnaslidok-udaru-po- dot ynku-barabashovo-poshkodzheno-blyzko-90-torgivelnyh-ob%ca%bcyektiv/; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19626; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02KnP5U5sp4hCMX6w5eeEiySdC56qR6dhoRjsbtaYGgR9hQbLBArD24pe8398vMSCSl; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/29905; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/06/na-odeshhyni-cherez-rosijski-obstrily-zagynula-lyudyna/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9554

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, May 6, 2025

 

at 5/17/25 12:12am

Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Ben Schmida, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Victoria Penza, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.The Omani Foreign Minister announced a “ceasefire” between the United States and the Houthis after the Houthis reportedly agreed to end attacks on international shipping.[1] US President Donald Trump said that the United States will stop attacks on the Houthis, and in return, the Houthis will stop targeting maritime shipping.[2] The Houthis have not targeted shipping through the Red Sea since November 2024, making it unclear what concessions the Houthis provided to the United States. The United States launched the air campaign to ensure freedom of navigation, but it is unclear how long it will take for the risk-averse shipping industry to return to transiting the Red Sea.[3] Shipping prices remain higher than before October 2023, in part because shipping has not returned to the Red Sea for fear of Houthi attacks.[4] The United States began the campaign against the Houthis because the Houthis threatened to restart their attack campaign in the Red Sea if Israel violated the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, and the air campaign sought to establish deterrence vis-a-vis the Houthis.[5]A very senior Houthi official framed the announcement as a victory and reiterated that they will continue to “support Gaza” against Israel.[6] Mohammad Ali al Houthi, one of the senior-most Houthi officials, said that the Houthis will continue to “support Gaza,” though it is not clear if the Houthis will continue to conduct maritime attacks. Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea said on May 4 that by targeting Ben Gurion International Airport, the Houthis could continue to blockade Israel.[7] This may suggest that the Houthis will attempt to “blockade” Israel by attacking other Israeli assets.The Houthis will very likely use the end of US airstrikes to rebuild their anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile stockpiles to target shipping in the future. The Houthis have learned that they can disrupt international shipping markets at any time and for any reason of their choosing with minimal consequences. The US air campaign probably inflicted some tactical setbacks for the Houthis by targeting weapons depots, communications sites, supply chains, and command –and –control assets. A US official told CNN that the effect on Houthis' operations was “limited.”[8] But all air campaigns generate only temporary effects, and the Houthis will be able to rebuild these assets while implementing lessons learned on how to better harden and protect their facilities.The United States reportedly deployed two B-52H bombers to Diego Garcia.[9] The deployment of two B-52Hs adds to the six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers already at Diego Garcia. The B-52H is not a stealth aircraft, though it has nearly double the payload of the B-2.[10] The United States previously increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island in March 2025.[11] Senior Iranian military officials threatened to target Diego Garcia in response to the initial US build-up in March 2025.[12] This suggests that Iran may perceive the US deployments as a threat. The military buildup comes amid US-Iran nuclear talks and Houthi attacks on Israel.Damascus has appointed influential armed group commanders accused of human rights abuses to Syrian army posts, which likely seeks to ameliorate influential armed groups in the short term but risks alienating minority communities over the long term. Syrian media reported on May 5 that the Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) appointed Brigadier General Ahmad al Hais (Abu Hatem Shaqra) to lead the newly-formed 86th Division.[13] Ahrar al Sham, a once-powerful Islamist group during the civil war, expelled Shaqra for banditry and other crimes.[14] Shaqra then founded and commanded Ahrar al Sharqiya in 2016, a faction within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) comprised of fighters from eastern Syria who were close to Shaqra.[15] The United States sanctioned Ahrar al Sharqiya and Shaqra in 2021 for committing abuses against civilians, particularly Syrian Kurds, and integrating former ISIS members into its ranks.[16] Shaqra has limited experience commanding forces in combat, and it is unclear what practical qualifications he has as a division commander.[17] Shaqra does have a large number of fighters and a ”mafia-like network” that could benefit Shara.[18] This suggests that Shara is offering concessions to a powerful warlord rather than selecting a competent combat commander.Damascus has also appointed several other SNA commanders accused of human rights abuses to high-level commands within the new army, including Suleiman Shah commander Abu Amsha, Hamza Division commander Sayf Abu Bakr, and Sultan Murad commander Fahim Issa.[19] Shaqra and these other SNA commanders all commanded SNA factions that retain their influence through local networks and have major international backers, like Turkey.[20] Fahim Issa, for example, is close to Turkish hardline politician and Erdogan ally Devlet Bahceli.[21] Shara likely calculates that he needs the support and cooperation of these groups to avoid infighting with powerful factions that would make it more difficult for him to extend his control over Syria. Shara recognizes that ignoring these factions or attempting to subordinate them by force is too difficult for his relatively meager armed forces, especially without Turkish assistance. The networks these individuals control could also rapidly destabilize certain areas of Syria.These decisions will likely make integrating minority armed groups much more difficult, particularly the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Shaqra and other SNA commanders' previous abuses against minority communities in northeastern Syria, such as the Kurdish and Yazidi populations, will likely threaten Shara’s efforts to expand and legitimize central authority over Syria in the long term. Shaqra’s new 86th Division will reportedly operate in Raqqa, Deir ez Zor, and Hasakah provinces, which are sensitive commands given their large Kurdish population and the ongoing negotiations over the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s integration into state security services.[22] A spokeswoman for the SDF’s Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) condemned Damascus’s appointment of Shaqra on May 6 and argued that it “legitimizes impunity and perpetrates violence against women and indigenous peoples.”[23] Shara risks disrupting Damascus’s negotiations and cooperation with communities whose support it needs, such as the Kurds.Syrian President Ahmed al Shara could use an HTS-controlled administrative supervisory department to exert control over government ministries run by “independent,” non-HTS ministers. The Central Authority for Supervision and Inspection is a department within the government that the Assad regime used to “control, rather than supervise or inspect” government departments and ministries, according to a French journalist.[24] Shara appointed Amer Namas al Ali to lead the Central Authority on May 4.[25] Ali was a member of Jabhat al Nusra and subsequently HTS.[26] He reportedly helped structure HTS’s civilian Idlib-based government, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).[27] Ali’s appointment suggests that Shara could use the Central Authority to exert control over government ministries controlled by non-loyalists. Shara appointed nine “independent” ministers to his cabinet on March 29, who do not have ties to HTS or the SSG and are professionals, former activists, and former Assad-era ministers who served in their positions before the civil war.[28] These "independent” ministers lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.[29] Shara made these appointments under considerable domestic and international pressure to broaden his ruling coalition, and placing loyalists or ideologues in these roles would have caused significant internal blowback and created more challenges for his effort to remove sanctions.[30] He could exert his control by using bureaucratic bodies if he used the Central Authority to control or influence decisions in the ministries, as the Assad regime did.Iran is trying to expand security and economic ties to bolster its influence in Africa. Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 6.[31] Radan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Ethiopian Federal Police to expand bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, cybercrime, drug and human trafficking, and arms smuggling. Radan separately visited Burkina Faso on May 6 to advance bilateral police cooperation and share security expertise.[32] Radan has led high-level security engagements since 2023 with Iraq, Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Tajikistan, and Russia, all of which resulted in agreements focused on intelligence sharing and training programs.[33] Iranian (LEC) commanders traditionally rarely traveled abroad, but Radan started increasing his foreign engagements as part of an effort that likely aligns with Iranian strategy to professionalize and modernize the Iranian law enforcement apparatus and to export Iranian military, defense, and enforcement technologies. This cooperation likely includes the exchange of expertise on oppressive policing tactics, crowd control, digital surveillance, and methods for suppressing dissent—capabilities that the Iranian regime has honed through decades of internal security operations. Cooperation with African countries would also allow Iran to build trust while simultaneously opening new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams. Iran previously pursued barter-style defense deals to gain critical resources, in which Iran received roughly 9 tons of Venezuelan gold in 2020 in exchange for technical support and refinery equipment.[34] These transactions reflect the Iranian strategy to leverage security exports to access hard currency and natural resources, alongside efforts to pair arms deals with economic outreach in Africa to secure uranium, expand influence, and mitigate sanctions pressure.[35]Iran has also intensified its economic engagement with African countries through expanded trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives. The Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit, held in Iran from April 27 to May 1, highlighted Iran's focus on four priority sectors, including mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment.[36] Iranian officials announced plans to increase annual trade with Africa to 10 billion US dollars, backed by projects such as building industrial parks, refineries, and developing shipping lines and air routes to improve logistics.[37] Iran also signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners during the summit and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms, including a 2 billion Euro credit line and a new Iran-Africa development fund.[38]Key Takeaways:US-Houthi Ceasefire: The Omani Foreign Minister announced a “ceasefire” between the United States and the Houthis after the Houthis reportedly agreed to end attacks on international shipping. US President Donald Trump said that the United States will stop attacks on the Houthis, and in return, the Houthis will stop targeting maritime shipping. The Houthis will very likely use the end of US airstrikes to rebuild their anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile stockpiles to target shipping in the future. The Houthis have learned that they can disrupt international shipping markets at any time and for any reason of their choosing with minimal consequences.US Deployments to Diego Garcia: The United States reportedly deployed two B-52H bombers to Diego Garcia. The deployment of two B-52Hs adds to the six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers already at Diego Garcia. The B-52H is not a stealth aircraft, though it has nearly double the payload of the B-2.Syrian Army Appointments: Damascus has appointed influential armed group commanders accused of human rights abuses to Syrian army posts, which likely seeks to ameliorate influential armed groups in the short term but risks alienating minority communities over the long term.Iran in Africa: Iran is trying to expand security and economic ties to bolster its influence in Africa. Iran has also intensified its economic engagement with African countries through expanded trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyIran and Russia continue to coordinate on US-Iran nuclear talks. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 6 to discuss the progress of US-Iran nuclear negotiations and the implementation of the January 2025 Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Agreement.[39] Putin said Russia is ready to facilitate dialogue between Iran and the United States and provide "necessary technical assistance."[40] Russia has positioned itself to mediate and store Iranian enriched uranium since March 2025.[41] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia’s role in mediating US-Iran talks is unlikely to secure US interests, given Russia’s alignment with Iran.[42] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, echoed Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi's comments and stated on May 3 that Iran has the right to possess the "full nuclear fuel cycle," including uranium enrichment capabilities.[43] Ulyanov also previously downplayed concerns by claiming that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium poses “no weapons risk.”[44]Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi appointed Brigadier General Ali Akbar Talebzadeh as Deputy Commander of the Artesh Air Force.[45] Talebzadeh previously served as Deputy Coordinator of the Artesh Air Force. Mousavi appointed Brigadier General Masoud Jafari as the new Deputy Coordinator of the Artesh Air Force.The Iranian rial appreciated from 842,000 rials to one US dollar on May 5 to 825,500 rials to one US dollar on May 6.[46]SyriaThe General Security Service (GSS) will ban the use of motorcycles after 7 pm in Homs City in the coming days.[47] Armed gunmen have used motorcycles to kill religious minorities and other civilians, indicating that the GSS ban is a security measure.[48] The GSS will also ban armed motorcycle riders during the day in Homs.[49] Organized groups, like the Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, have also conducted motorcycle assassinations. The group assassinated an Alawite shop owner in Jableh, Latakia Province, using motorcycles on May 5.[50] The transitional government is likely attempting to dampen the sectarian violence and other general insecurity in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime.The GSS thwarted two separate rocket smuggling attempts in the central Syrian desert on May 5. The GSS intercepted a gas truck carrying a large shipment of Iranian 107mm rockets in Sukhnah, Homs Province. The truck allegedly originated from SDF territory.[51] The GSS also arrested an individual attempting to smuggle rockets into Homs Province at a checkpoint in Hribsha, south of Deir ez Zor Province.[52] It is unclear who the intended recipient of these rockets was or their final destination.Intra-Druze community violence continued in isolated cases between Druze groups collaborating with the transitional government and those with Assad ties in Suwayda Province. Local Druze factions affiliated with Assadist Raji Falhout and Naji al Shaarani attacked GSS-affiliated Druze Men of Dignity fighters in al Dour, near the Daraa-Suwayda provincial border.[53] The Falhout faction falsely believed that transitional government forces from Daraa Province had entered the village with the Men of Dignity.[54] Raji Falhout is sanctioned by the US Treasury for leading a “gang” that smuggled Captagon with Hezbollah and Assad’s Military Intelligence Directorate.[55] At least four men died in the fighting before Druze notables, including Sheikh Hamoud al Hanawi, visited the village to restore calm.[56] Unspecified armed groups separately mortared a village five miles north of al Dour, emphasizing that violence is ongoing in isolated areas.[57] Intra-community divisions will likely continue to surface as Druze factions further integrate into the transitional government security structure. Factions that have economic incentives for opposing the government, like those affiliated with Captagon smuggling, are likely to be the fiercest resistors to transitional government integration.The transitional government deployed to the Damascus-Suwayda road on May 6 as part of an agreement between Druze leaders and Suwayda Governor Mustafa Bakour.[58] The transitional government initially deployed the Syrian 40th Division to villages along the Damascus-Suwayda road on May 1 before passing responsibility to the GSS.[59]Newly formed divisions within the Syrian army have continued to train new recruits across Syria in recent days. Southern Syria-based media reported on May 4 that the first class of 40th Division recruits graduated from a training course and deployed to Daraa Province.[60] The 40th Division is based in southern Syria and is expected to eventually deploy forces in Daraa and Suwayda.[61] A second class of 900 recruits is expected to graduate within days and also deploy within Daraa Province.[62] 62nd Division Commander Abu Amsha also posted photos on social media on May 5 showing 62nd Division soldiers firing rifles and rocket-propelled grenades during a training exercise.[63] The 62nd Division is currently operating in Hama Province.[64] Syrian media also reported on May 3 that recruits from the central Badia-based 42nd Division graduated from an engineering training course.[65]Anti-government actors inside and outside of Syria are reportedly encouraging Syrians to sabotage public services, likely as part of efforts to undermine the transitional government. A Sunni activist from Latakia Province said on May 5 that actors inside and outside of Syria have encouraged Syrians to sabotage Syrian public services by stealing electricity cables, sabotaging internet service, or destroying water infrastructure.[66] The activist said unknown actors have conducted sabotage operations like these “every day and night” and that these efforts have prevented the government from successfully advancing infrastructure and public services in the area.[67] Insurgent leaders may calculate that deteriorating economic conditions and the government's inability to fix or provide basic services will weaken popular support for the government and generate momentum for the insurgency. This would be consistent with the objectives and strategies of pro-Alawite insurgents based in the coastal region, which appear motivated by an interest in restoring Assad-era power structures to address economic grievances and security concerns. That actors outside Syria are attempting to build support for the insurgency is consistent with several former Assad regime officials who have taken responsibility for or claimed to have supported the pro-Alawite coastal insurgency.[68]Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed Turkish efforts to protect Syria’s territorial integrity and ensure its stability during a phone call with US President Donald Trump on May 5.[69] Erdogan asked Trump to consider easing sanctions on Syria, stating that it would contribute to Syrian and regional stability.[70]IraqIraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji discussed the implementation of the March 2023 Iraq-Iran bilateral security agreement with the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadiq on May 6.[71] Sadiq is a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[72] The security agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm Kurdish opposition groups and relocate their members away from the Iran-Iraq border.[73] The Iraqi federal government banned all Iranian Kurdish opposition political, military, economic, and social activity on April 24 as a part of the implementation of the agreement.[74] Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari separately said in a May 6 interview that Kurdish opposition groups withdrew from the Iran-Iraq border and that Iraqi Border Guards had backfilled Kurdish opposition positions along the border.[75]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripCENTCOM conducted at least seven airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen after 1:00 pm ET on May 5.[76] All the airstrikes happened before the ceasefire. CENTCOM conducted at least four airstrikes in two sorties on unspecified Houthi facilities in al Sawad in southern Sanaa City.[77] CENTCOM also struck Houthi-controlled Ras Issa Port three times.[78]Israel conducted at least 10 airstrikes on May 6 targeting critical Houthi infrastructure near Sanaa City, in response to the Houthis’ ballistic missile attack on Ben Gurion Airport, Israel, on May 4.[79] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that they destroyed Sanaa International Airport.[80] Yemenia Airlines suspended all flights to and from Sanaa International Airport until further notice and confirmed that Israeli airstrikes demolished the airport’s passenger terminal and three Yemenia aircraft.[81] Israel separately struck Asr, Heyzaz, and Dhaban power stations near Sanaa City, which reportedly caused power shortages in the Houthi-controlled capital city.[82] Israel also struck the Amran Cement Factory west of Amran City at least four times. The IDF said that the Houthis used the factory to produce cement to build tunnels and military infrastructure.[83]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing Significant to Report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/1919813712791363857[2] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/06/politics/us-to-stop-strikes-on-houthis-in-yemen[3] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4167047/uscentcom-forces-continue-to-target-houthi-terrorists/[4] See Average Global Price To Ship a 40-foot Container Graph in topline section[5] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1901001417831150000 ;https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1901428374486089974[6] https://x.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1919822836425793889; https://x.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1919822557529711004[7] http://t.me/army21ye[8] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/06/politics/us-to-stop-strikes-on-houthis-in-yemen[9] https://x.com/Global_Mil_Info/status/1919580907079405936[10] https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/air/b-2-stealth-bomber/b-2-technical-details#:~:text=Payload%3A%20%3E%2040%2C000%20lbs.,Gross%20Takeoff%20Weight%3A%20336%2C500%20lbs.; 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https://x.com/Seyfebubekir/status/1886127717457740034; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1903768244650983866[20] https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/syrias-new-rulers-are-working-to-unify-military-power/[21] https://x.com/Eyupyildizlar/status/1911192322613576075[22] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919365978384654383[23] https://www dot npasyria.com/212446/[24] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1918960083255357548[25] https://x.com/SyPresidency/status/1918921929429332291[26] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1918964911637496024[27] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1918964911637496024[28] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/30/world/middleeast/syria-new-transitional-government.html[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-31-2025[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-31-2025[31] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6458617/[32] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85824720/[33] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85290352 ;https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1906244 ;https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5996375 ;https://www.irna dot ir/news/85480608 ;https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402102417390 ;https://www.irna dot ir/news/85155437[34] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-30/iran-is-hauling-gold-bars-out-of-venezuela-s-almost-empty-vaults[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-2-2024-iran-pursues-economic-and-military-influence[36] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512591 ;https://www.irna dot ir/news/85814587[37] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512591[38] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512591 ;https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512357[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-discussed-iran-us-talks-with-tehran-kremlin-says-2025-05-06/ ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85825025/[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-discussed-iran-us-talks-with-tehran-kremlin-says-2025-05-06/ ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85825025/[41] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2011803/ ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-04/iran-putin-to-help-trump-broker-nuclear-talks-with-tehran ; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/03/04/putin-agrees-help-trump-direct-talks-with-iran/[42] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-2-2025#_ednb577f185a42d90c85febe5ad70b0865335[43] https://basirat dot ir/fa/news/375597/[44] https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cz7v1y7gj99o[45] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/744168/[46] https://www.bon-bast.com/[47] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BmPM4wCJn/ ; https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1919353148726030348[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025#:~:text=Unidentified%20gunmen%20on,on%20May%204. ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903189886137667966[49] https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1919353148726030348[50] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919467741204873590 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/277 ; https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=670303958966843&set=a.104872708843307&type=3[51] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919457007871930811[52] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1919465864882991360[53] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919758799335796988 ; https://x.com/SyrNetworkNews/status/1907826566471528572 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1919732048811425850[54] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919750451035066823[55] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2648[56] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919792922255392845 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919748212807602260 ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0JRXszDVo49cpJrEsGrQdxV9N3nZXMH5NtVHP2H8uPFBwW1sn57P91zYFB1QBKqfrl?__cft__[0]=AZWYPHSks-Jv4jTntvS9dqNOIsA2JKAjuAc7DqZPqHS2cINWO0vcTDn9AH8G7ERxUFNjvwv4eXke45zA6eswT25SPDTQumPeO7wWLOy-pKM8MTVms02SxKk6fRgF2ZmZ_F2uCwHyKddByi2JrbP9duIBnlzFKHKYdyO0DOvKx-IYUBA8UzK0wfakNgCftqHCKPIdX0wvjl1K-8gFrmJG6WNl&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1919790766076973392 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919750451035066823/history[57] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0FknK7oQ3iHG4ED6MHqAZx5SFpt5isfHqrkg64ja8k3Yrpf6Nn47sQYvyygj8cUP2l?__cft__[0]=AZXBKLMmtQdqUU85_idvLj4Bd_Yq5FxadH6toignKbeMFAu4wGDM-YPG5EUmFo6L0Ao0jJr358JDZmGoHyKAJboSzt74LLMTBpCjSIKSB6xlzeEJMmC4_ytJSQfImtg7WGg42rOFXkJihBHM4PSjjvBbwNO-J5rIxn_UYRwtiuKVRyYzUDsGWtJlrbq-VLJNdHWgt66KcOWMPmauAiuBcUa_&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0y4JgwKWVVyjgfASF8pUXbfkjB5EEKULnuSj9apmALRCvYNPzg21AsNbNcCCMhXGal?__cft__[0]=AZWLTqtOwRXWsghTetgu2yzaVL6OUkGiyJ2O8WBp_b02clw1MyAt12SY6knV1MvDF3yS9S1hPjymd5AttHJtw1vhb39_R3d7zMygetrZN_g2ysIdrFZ0OKcLrI4zA3qI5wZ6fWHb6WMKVsxH08JUyUy5dtHHEQ-41coeccyrSZtrokeAqJr8ncAoZFJXrIhJXc34f-elVkhKwueVzIBjHoSY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[58] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919708026153369915 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050525[59] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l ; https://t.me/AjaNews/375808 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128797 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919708026153369915[60] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=691676116892449&id=100081501990851&rdid=0Ej3yx5mQAZlbUMc#[61] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1891120055770902697 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136009[62] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=691676116892449&id=100081501990851&rdid=0Ej3yx5mQAZlbUMc#[63] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1919519272600011197[64] https://twitter.com/AliAlBarghout/status/1909014781954306257 ; https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02yvCw1ied4VZdFafdahhWrTz6AQ1Py3XtCD57qZr3q4GTZXBCpJnqKf1a6peGSa6Rl&id=61570019040908[65] https://t.me/ALBADIA_24/4220[66] https://www.syriarevisited.com/p/sunni-activist-from-latakia-reflects[67] https://www.syriarevisited.com/p/sunni-activist-from-latakia-reflects[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-9-2025[69] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-he-had-productive-call-with-turkeys-erdogan-visits-planned-2025-05-05/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-abd-baskani-trump-ile-telefonda-gorustu/3557804[70] https://t.me/Euphrats_post/92104, https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1919434979798339744, https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-abd-baskani-trump-ile-telefonda-gorustu/3557804[71] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/525296/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9[72] https://shafaq dot com/en/Report/Mohammed-Al-Sadiq-the-shadow-man-on-the-Iranian-helm-in-Iraq[73] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-iran-sign-deal-tighten-border-security-2023-03-19/[74] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1918352807217803366[75] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/iraq/2025/05/06/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86[76] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919462821777055791 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919496900392165504 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919500353311064526[77] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919462821777055791 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919500353311064526[78] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919496900392165504[79] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919742997958152521https://x.com/Jamal_Atamimi/status/1919740211065393391 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919795281706578212;https://x.com/idfonline/status/1919739981553123826[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1919739981553123826[81] https://x.com/South24E/status/1919785156111487405 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919761204144177518[82] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1919750773652496684 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919742997958152521[83] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919795281706578212;https://x.com/idfonline/status/1919739981553123826

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, May 9, 2025

 

at 5/16/25 11:23pm

 Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.The verbal ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis appears to only cover one of the three reported original US demands conveyed by Oman at this time.[1] The United States reportedly passed three demands to the Houthis via Oman, according to a Yemeni analyst. The three conditions required the Houthis to cease all attacks on US commercial and military vessels, stop targeting Israel, and re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap. The Houthis have followed the first condition to cease attacks on US commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, but have demonstrated that they will not comply with the second demand to stop targeting Israel.[2] The Houthis attacked Ben Gurion Airport and the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on May 9, for example (see below for more information on this attack). The Houthis could re-engage with the roadmapThe Houthis could re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap and technically follow a second of the three demands. The Houthis are unlikely to engage seriously in peace talks because the Houthis have not suffered any defeats that would force them to the negotiating table, however.[3] The roadmap includes a “political process under UN auspices” that would presumably work towards some form of power-sharing agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.[4] The Houthis are likely unwilling to engage in negotiations that would cause them to lose their control over northern Yemen because they desire to control all of Yemen and view themselves as the rightful Yemeni government. The Houthis appear to believe that the US-Houthi ceasefire is a “victory.“[5]The Yemeni analyst stated that Saudi Arabia was “fully informed” of the US proposal and Omani mediation efforts, but the extent of the Houthi engagement with the third condition remains unclear.[6] Riyadh and the Houthis almost reached a deal before the October 7 War broke out in 2023 and have maintained communication since.[7] The timing of the US-Houthi ceasefire is particularly significant as US President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia on May 13 and 14, although Yemen is reportedly not on the agenda for his Riyadh meetings, according to the Yemeni analyst.[8]The ambiguity surrounding the US-Houthi ceasefire will likely cause international shipping companies to exercise caution before reentering the Red Sea in greater numbers. The ceasefire only applies to US vessels, according to the reported terms, though US officials have suggested that the agreement covers all ships.[9] The Houthis have implied that they will not attack other ships. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi referred to the Houthi maritime attack campaign in the past tense on May 8, suggesting the campaign would not continue.[10] The last Houthi attack on commercial shipping was in November 2024, though the Houthis threatened to resume the attack campaign in March 2025. The Houthis may be interfering with international shipping, however. The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on May 9 that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Red Sea lasting several hours.[11] The Houthis have interfered with GPS systems in the past.[12] These disruptions, combined with the ambiguity surrounding the ceasefire, suggest that the safety of commercial shipping in this maritime corridor remains under threat.Israeli defense officials gave conflicting information about whether the US THAAD missile defense system succeeded or failed to intercept a Houthi ballistic missile on May 9. The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport and claimed a drone attack targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area in central Israel on May 9.[13] Israeli defense officials stated on May 9 that the US THAAD system successfully intercepted the Houthi ballistic missile, but other unspecified Israeli defense sources said that the THAAD system failed to intercept the missile.[14] The unspecified Israeli defense sources said the Arrow 3 intercepted the missile.[15]Details about the activities of senior Hezbollah commanders in northern Yemen in the early 2010s demonstrate how Iran and its allies likely share lessons, techniques, and capabilities over time.[16] Yemeni sources posted new photos and information showing Hezbollah advisers in Yemen on May 8. [17] The IDF killed both Hezbollah advisers in Fall 2024 during the campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] One Hezbollah commander, Ali Adel Ashmar, played a major role in the capture of Amran and Sanaa cities, which happened in July and September 2014, respectively.[19] This suggests that Hezbollah played a major role in advising the 2014 Houthi campaign. Hezbollah also sent Mohammad Hussein Srour, who at the time of his death was Hezbollah’s Aerial Command commander, to Yemen to support the development of Houthi missile capabilities and drone manufacturing.[20] Key Houthi commanders have now assumed an advising role with Iraqi militias that is similar to Hezbollah’s advising role in Yemen. A US airstrike killed a top Houthi drone expert outside Baghdad in July 2024, for example.[21] This demonstrates how Iran and its key proxies and partners share lessons learned, techniques, and capabilities over time and across the region. The Houthi commanders in Iraq today surely share lessons learned from their Hezbollah advisers in the 2010s, as well as the lessons the Houthis have learned over two decades of war against several different regional and international powers.Unspecified Iranian diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands.”[22] Iranian sources added that shifting US demands on Iran’s missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance are complicating progress in the negotiations. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously stated on April 16 that “contradictory” US positions do not help the negotiations and emphasized that “Iran must hear Washington’s real stance” to assess whether a framework agreement is possible.[23] An Iranian expert close to the regime separately stated on May 1 that the fourth round of talks originally scheduled for May 3 was postponed due to “contradictory US positions.”[24] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff initially said Iran could enrich uranium to 3.67 percent, but later demanded all enrichment be stopped and eliminated.[25] Witkoff then said in a Breitbart interview on May 9 that he hoped that Iran would “voluntarily“ stop enrichment before adding that the US “red line“ is that “an enrichment program can never exist in Iran again.“[26] Araghchi confirmed on May 9 that the fourth round of talks will take place in Muscat, Oman, on May 12.[27] An Iranian Parliamentarian claimed on May 6 that the talks were postponed partly due to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi’s reported desire to join the nuclear talks as a European representative.[28] The Parliamentarian also claimed that Grossi provided reports to the United States suggesting that Iran is “very close” to a nuclear bomb.[29] Araghchi held a phone call with Grossi on May 9 to discuss cooperation between Iran and the agency and the current status of the US-Iran nuclear talks.[30] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that Iran will accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its nuclear program, as Iran views uranium enrichment as its “undeniable right” and sees giving up as a core national red line. CTP-ISW also continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to concede on its missile program, as the missile program is essential to its defense strategy, especially given the weakness of Iran’s conventional armed forces.[31]Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi visited the Abdanan Air Defense Group in Ilam Province on May 9 to assess its combat readiness and defensive capabilities.[32] Mousavi emphasized the key role of air defense in protecting Iran’s airspace, and stressed the importance of modern training, advanced technologies. Various senior Iranian commanders including Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Haji Zadeh conducted several inspections on Iranian air defense zones in southeastern, south and western Iran in recent weeks.[33] The amount and frequency of these air defense inspections are highly unusual. Senior Iranian commanders do not typically visit so many air defense sites within such a short period of time. Iranian commanders are presumably conducting these inspections to ensure that units remain prepared for a strike.The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced on May 9 that it held a conference to discuss its disarmament and will soon announce a decision of “historic importance.”[34] PKK-affiliated media reported that the PKK held a two-day conference from May 5 to 7 in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil Mountains after imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called for the group to disarm.[35] Ocalan made the historical call in late February 2025 after months of negotiations with the pro-Kurdish Turkish People’s Equality and Democracy (DEM) party and politicians allied with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[36] The PKK said it would provide “relevant documents and information” along with its upcoming announcement.[37] A Turkish journalist who previously wrote for a pro-Erdogan newspaper reported on May 9 that the PKK is expected to announce that it will end all operations against Turkey and will disband itself, citing two sources familiar with the matter.[38] The PKK Executive Committee said in late February 2025 that it would disarm in response to Ocalan’s call to dissolve the group, but several high-ranking PKK leaders have continued to insist since Ocalan’s call that Turkey must free Ocalan from prison before the group officially disarms.[39] Erdogan and his Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) have repeatedly stressed that they will not negotiate with the PKK and that PKK disarmament is a unilateral process.[40] DEM Party co-chair Pervin Buldan told PKK-affiliated media on May 9 that Erdogan will “imminently” make a statement on the PKK announcement.[41]The PKK’s possible refusal to disarm may result in a Turkish decision to resume attacks on alleged PKK targets in northern Syria, which could further complicate the US-backed Syrian Defense Forces’ (SDF) integration into the Syrian state. Turkey identifies the targets of its operations in Syria as the “PKK,” even when striking forces under the SDF.[42] Turkey often equates the entirety of the SDF and the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK.[43] YPG elements in the SDF, while linked to the PKK, have prioritized the protection of Syrian Kurds over the achievement of PKK objectives in recent months. Turkey has linked its campaign to disarm the PKK through Ocalan to the US-backed SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.[44] Turkish officials stated in late February 2025 that they believed Ocalan’s call for the PKK to disarm and dissolve would pressure the SDF into disarmament and integration into the Syrian transitional government under the Defense Ministry.[45] This belief is based on the Turkish government's conflation between the PKK, the SDF, and the YPG, which dominates the SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from the SDF, but he rejected Ocalan’s call and argued that it “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.”[46] Abdi later agreed to integrate the SDF and Kurdish-controlled territory into the Syrian state in March 2025.[47]Key Takeaways:US-Houthi Ceasefire: The verbal ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis appears to only cover one of the three reported original US demands conveyed by Oman at this time. The three conditions required the Houthis to cease all attacks on US commercial and military vessels, stop targeting Israel, and re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap.Houthis and the Saudi-Led Roadmap: The Houthis are unlikely to seriously re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap because the Houthis have not suffered any defeats that would force them to the negotiating table. The Houthis are likely unwilling to engage in negotiations that would cause them to lose their control over northern Yemen because they desire to control all of Yemen and view themselves as the rightful Yemeni government. The Houthis appear to believe that the US-Houthi ceasefire is a “victory.“Red Sea and Shipping Prices: The ambiguity surrounding the US-Houthi ceasefire will likely cause international shipping companies to exercise caution before reentering the Red Sea to a greater degree.The Axis of Resistance in Yemen: Details about the activities of senior Hezbollah commanders in northern Yemen in the early 2010s demonstrate how Iran and its allies likely share lessons, techniques, and capabilities over time. Key Houthi commanders have now assumed an advising role with Iraqi militias that is similar to Hezbollah’s advising role in Yemen. A US airstrike killed a top Houthi drone expert outside Baghdad in July 2024, for example.Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Unspecified Iranian diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands.”Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): The PKK announced on May 9 that it held a conference to discuss its disarmament and will soon announce a decision of “historic importance.”Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8 to 840,000 rials to one US dollar on May 9.[48]Iran faces growing disruption to its key oil exports as US sanctions on Chinese refineries threaten its main revenue stream. Reuters reported on May 8 that US sanctions imposed in March and April 2025 on two small Chinese independent refineries—Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical and Shandong Shengxing Chemical—have begun to disrupt Chinese handling of Iranian crude oil.[49] The sanctioned refineries now face a loss of port access, financing restrictions from major Chinese banks, and the loss of domestic crude oil supply from state firms like China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).[50] The sanctioned Chinese refineries are also using third-party entities to sell their products and bypass formal restrictions. The US State Department separately sanctioned China-based Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group and three oil terminal operators, along with numerous firms, vessels, and captains, for facilitating hundreds of millions of dollars in Iranian oil sales on May 8.[51] These sanctions follow an increase in US sanctions targeting China-based entities involved in the illicit Iranian oil trade as part of US President Donald Trump’s renewed "maximum pressure" campaign.[52] China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, purchasing approximately 90 percent of Iran’s total oil exports, according to Reuters.[53]SyriaUS State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce said on May 9 that the US has a sanction waiver mechanism “in place” but is waiting for Syria to “appropriately” respond to US conditions.[54] Bruce’s statement comes amid US debates over easing sanctions on Syria.[55] The United States gave Syrian officials a list of conditions for partial US sanctions relief on March 18. These demands called on Syria to combat terrorism, adopt a policy of non-aggression with neighboring states, and exclude foreign fighters from official roles.[56] The Syrian government responded to the US on April 26 and said that it had addressed a majority of these conditions.[57] The government has fought terrorists and adopted a non-aggression policy, but it has not excluded foreign fighters from official positions.[58] Bruce also condemned the Syrian Defense Ministry’s May 5 appointment of Brigadier General Ahmad al Hais (Abu Hatem Shaqra) as a division commander in the army, which Bruce called a “serious mistake that the [United States] does not support.”[59] Shaqra founded and commanded Ahrar al Sharqiya in 2016, a Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) faction comprised of fighters from eastern Syria who were close to Shaqra.[60] The United States sanctioned Ahrar al Sharqiya and Shaqra in 2021 for committing abuses against civilians, particularly Syrian Kurds, and integrating former ISIS members into its ranks.[61]Israeli media reported on May 9 that Syrian officials asked Israel for time to allow the Syrian transitional government to “organize” and “stabilize its internal affairs” during Emirati-mediated talks in Abu Dhabi.[62] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has reportedly facilitated recent talks between Israel and Syria on security, counterterrorism, and confidence-building measures.[63] Israeli media reported that three close aides to President Ahmed al Shara met with two Israelis with previous Israeli security experience in Abu Dhabi on a recent, unspecified date.[64] An Israeli official who did not confirm whether they had personally attended the talks said that the Israel-Syria talks were “preliminary, non-committal discussions.”[65] Unspecified members of the Syrian delegation told the Israelis that Syria has no interest in conflict with its neighbors, including Israel.[66] Israeli officials reportedly said that Shara’s messages were “positive but not enough.”[67]The Syrian Navy conducted its first “large-scale" naval operation on May 9 to combat smuggling along the Syrian coast.[68] Syrian naval forces arrested several human traffickers and seized weapons aboard vessels during the operation.[69] The Syrian Navy began to conduct routine patrols along the Syrian coast on April 25.[70] There has been significant smuggling and human trafficking along the Syrian coast for over a decade.[71]Syrian Energy Minister Mohammad al Bashir and Turkish Energy Minister Alp Arslan Bayraktar signed a natural gas deal on May 9.[72] Bashir is a trained engineer who served as interim Syrian prime minister from December 2024 to March 2025 and as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-controlled Syrian Salvation Government prime minister in Idlib from January 2024 to December 2024.[73] Turkey will supply Syria with six million cubic meters of natural gas per day through the Kilis-Aleppo pipeline located in northwestern Syria.[74] Bayraktar said that Turkey aims to start supplying natural gas within three months.[75] Bashir said that the Turkish supply will contribute to increasing electricity usage and improving the energy situation in Syria.[76] The Syrian government has consistently sought foreign assistance for its severely damaged energy sector since coming to power in December 2024.[77] Syrian President Shara met with US businessman and Argent liquified natural gas (LNG) company CEO Jonathan Bass on May 2 to discuss potential investment in Syria’s energy infrastructure by Western firms.[78] Bashir has also recently met with Saudi and Qatari officials to discuss cooperation in the energy sector.[79] Qatar began providing natural gas supplies to Syria from Jordan in mid-March to help address electricity production shortages and improve infrastructure.[80]Likely Alawite insurgents conducted an unsuccessful raid targeting the Syrian Army’s 56th Division barracks in Khirbet al Maza, Tartous Province, on May 8.[81] 56th Division soldiers reportedly wounded several insurgents in the attack..[82] The 56th Division pursued the retreating insurgents and continued to search the local area for fighters.[83] The attack follows the Syrian Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) reinforcement and increased surveillance in Tartous Province as part of a security plan to counter the Alawite-majority, pro-Assad insurgency that has been active in Tartous since the fall of the Assad regime.[84] This is the first pro-Alawite insurgent attack on Syrian government forces since April 21.[85] The pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigades, a sectarian Alawite insurgent group in western Syria, denied that the attack took place.[86] The Coastal Shield Brigades has frequently published false information about Assad regime elements and has framed recent extrajudicial killings targeting former regime commanders across Syria as murders against innocent civilians.[87] Extrajudicial killings—including those targeting former regime elements—are destabilizing and underscore the need for transitional justice.The General Security Services (GSS) thwarted a likely Lebanese Hezbollah-supported attempt to smuggle weapons, ammunition, and narcotics into Lebanon from Serghaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on May 9.[88] The weapons included a locally-produced anti-FPV drone gun, a 9A91 compact assault rifle, and a light machine gun.[89] A large box of the prescription opioid Tramadol was also found along with tactical accessories, such as rifle scopes, gas masks, and a tactical chest rig.[90] The smugglers were likely attempting to smuggle these supplies to Hezbollah, which is in the process of reconstituting itself after the Fall 2024 Israeli campaign in Lebanon. Serghaya lies on a road that travels northwards into Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, which is a Hezbollah stronghold. Hezbollah could use Tramadol as a substitute for morphine or other pain management drugs in combat, though Hezbollah could also generate money by smuggling Tramadol.[91] GSS forces previously seized a weapons shipment heading to Lebanese Hezbollah in Serghaya on January 26.[92]Gunmen on motorcycles and Salafi-jihadi groups continued to conduct extrajudicial revenge killings targeting former Assadists across Syria from May 7 to 9, which underscores the need for transitional justice in Syria. Unknown gunmen on motorcycles killed a former Assad regime Air Force Intelligence member on May 7.[93] Unknown gunmen separately killed a Tiger Forces fighter in Safira, Aleppo Province, in a separate attack on May 8.[94] The Tiger Forces were an elite special forces unit that was part of Assad’s Syrian Arab Army.[95] Salafi-Jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah assassinated a National Defense Forces (NDF) commander in the al Waer neighborhood of Homs City, on May 9.[96] The slain commander was known for his efforts to organize a military defense of Homs City against HTS before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[97] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah also assassinated a Shia Assad regime fighter known for his association with Liwa al Quds in the al Mashad neighborhood of Aleppo city in a separate attack on May 9.[98] Liwa al Quds was a pro-Assad Palestinian militia. These killings are spurred in part by a lack of government-led transitional justice efforts to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the civil war.Suwayda Province Governor Mustafa Bakour announced on May 8 that police stations will open in four areas of Suwayda Province.[99] The activation of new police stations in Suwayda City, Shabha, Salkhad, and outside of Suwayda City, Suwayda Province, is the result of a recent agreement between the Syrian transitional government and Druze leaders to integrate Suwaydawi fighters into state security services.[100] Bakour recently confirmed that Suwayda’s police forces, which will be composed of Suwaydawi policemen, have already integrated into the Syrian Ministry of Interior.[101] Bakour said that there are 100 officers and nearly 2,100 personnel in the police forces thus far, which includes both former officers and new recruits.[102] A non-Suwaydawi officer appointed by Damascus will command these police forces, likely in order to ensure the police remain responsive to the state.[103]IraqNothing significant to report. Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripSee topline section.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing significant to report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. 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https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-8-2025 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/qatar-supply-gas-syria-with-us-nod-sources-say-2025-03-13/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkish-energy-ministry-delegation-visit-syria-discuss-energy-cooperation-2024-12-24/[78] www dot sana.sy/en/?p=354232; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0[79] https://sana dot sy/en/?p=353814 ; https://sana dot sy/en/?p=354339[80] https://www.undp.org/arab-states/press-releases/qatar-provides-reliable-natural-gas-supplies-syria-critical-improving-electricity-supply[81] https://alikhbariah dot com/%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d8%aa%d9%8f%d8%ad%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%84-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%b7/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920766078767997115 ;[82] https://alikhbariah dot com/%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d8%aa%d9%8f%d8%ad%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%84-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%b7/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920766078767997115 ;[83] https://alikhbariah dot com/%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d8%aa%d9%8f%d8%ad%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%84-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%b7/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920766078767997115 ;[84] https://alikhbariah dot com/%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d8%aa%d9%8f%d8%ad%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%84-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%b7/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-syria%E2%80%99s-emerging-insurgency[85] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2025#:~:text=Likely%20Alawite%20insurgents,restrict%20insurgent%20movement.[86] https://t.me/almougahid313/494[87] https://t.me/almougahid313/494 ; https://t.me/almougahid313/473 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920063779661816192 ; 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[Author: ISWKF]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2025

 

at 5/16/25 11:23pm

 Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson,Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel and Nate TrotterMay 9, 2025, 6:30pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on May 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 8 to 0800 on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 9. Any reports of Russian ground activity in these SITREPs are implicit accusations that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.]Click here to read ISW's in-depth coverage of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday. US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected. Trump stated on May 8 that the United States calls for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire that “must ultimately build toward a peace agreement.”[1] Trump noted that he is committed to securing a Ukrainian-Russian peace with the Europeans. US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 8 that Russia asked for “too much” because Russia perceives that it is winning the war on the battlefield.[2] Vance stated that Russia cannot expect Ukraine to cede territory to Russia that Russian forces have not seized — in reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demand that Ukraine cede territory in eastern and southern Ukraine that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[3] Vance reiterated that the United States wants Ukraine to remain a sovereign country. US President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 9 that he is working together with European states to achieve a ceasefire at least 30 days long.[4] Zelensky reported that his May 8 phone call with Trump demonstrated that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe are “on the same page” about the necessity of a full ceasefire. The Kremlin has consistently rejected Ukrainian and American proposals for 30-day ceasefires while blaming Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace negotiations.[5]Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 8 and 9 but claimed that all of Russia supports Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine.[6] Russian forces have not seized any significant towns in Ukraine since the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and the only mid-sized settlement that Russian forces have seized in Ukraine since December 2024 is Velyka Novosilka (pre-war population of 5,000).[7] Ukrainian sources previously reported that Russian forces were trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and the remaining area of Luhansk Oblast and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by Victory Day on May 9.[8] Russian forces did not accomplish any of those objectives, and have in fact been trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk for roughly a year.[9]Ukrainian long-range strikes and improved integration of tactical drone operations with defensive operations and counterattacks — all enabled by Western military support — have slowed, and in some places stalled, Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. Ukraine’s successful integration of Ukrainian drone innovators and operators with ground forces appears to have stalled Russia’s offensive against Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 and early 2025.[10] Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian ammunition depots, defense industry facilities, and oil and gas infrastructure have at times compromised Russia’s ability to supply frontline units and have compounded the rising costs of Russia’s war against Ukraine.[11] Ukrainian forces have also intentionally exacerbated other Russian vulnerabilities over the last year, including exacerbating Russia’s shortage of operational reserves by launching the incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and forcing the Russian military to redeploy troops from other frontline areas to defend against the incursion.[12]The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin thanked and highlighted North Korean troops at the Victory Day parade on May 9, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that high-ranking North Korean commanders who participated in recapturing Kursk Oblast attended the parade.[13] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov declared that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on April 26, after almost nine months of Russian operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[14] Russian officials have repeatedly platformed the recapture of Kursk Oblast as a significant military achievement, and ISW previously forecasted that Russian officials would highlight the Kursk operation as part of the Victory Day celebrations.[15] Russian officials’ praise of the Kursk operation ignores the fact that Putin reportedly initially tasked Russian forces with retaking Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and Putin’s continued willingness to extend this timeline throughout Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025, prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over retaking Russian territory.[16] Russian officials are also ignoring recent Ukrainian attacks and advances into Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.[17]Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations. Russian state media posted footage on May 9 showing Russian forces displaying Orlan-10, Orlan-30, and Zala reconnaissance drones; Lancet-51 and Lancer-52 loitering munitions; and Geran and Garpiya long-range strikes drones during the Victory Day parade in Moscow City.[18] Russia state news outlet RIA Novosti posted footage showing Russian forces riding in Chinese-made all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and Russian-made buggies during a Victory Day parade in Khabarovsk City, Khabarovsk Krai.[19] Russian media also posted footage of Russian forces showcasing tanks equipped with counter drone netting at a Victory Day parade in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.[20] Russia’s use of counter drone netting, ATVs, buggies, and motorcycles are all tactical adaptations in response to Ukrainian drone operations. Russian forces have increasingly leveraged reconnaissance and strike drones to destroy frontline Ukrainian positions and damage Ukrainian cities throughout the war in Ukraine. Russian officials appear to be highlighting these weapons, vehicles, and counter-drone adaptations to the Russian public to frame these innovations as a form of “victory” in Ukraine. Russian officials’ willingness to highlight these adaptions during Victory Day parades suggests that the Russian military intends to preserve these adaptions in future military operations rather than reverting to pre-2022 forms of combat.The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea. The Kremlin indicated that heads of state and senior representatives of at least 30 states, the heads of the Palestinian Authority and Kremlin-backed separatist region of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the heads of several international organizations — including the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — travelled to Russia for the Victory Day parade and subsequent events on May 9.[21] The Kremlin reported that 55 military units and over 11,500 military personnel in total participated in the parade in Moscow, including military personnel from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Egypt, the PRC, Laos, Mongolia, and Myanmar.[22]Russian officials specifically praised the PRC and North Korea for their support, including of the war in Ukraine. Putin gave a speech at the parade in Moscow highlighting the contribution of the “courageous people of China” in Russia’s victory in the Second World War, and Putin sat next to PRC President Xi Jinping at the Victory Day parade.[23] Putin and Xi issued a joint statement on May 8 that referenced Putin’s original war aims in Ukraine and called for the resolution of the war in Ukraine to eliminate the “root causes” of the war — a long-standing Russian talking point and demand for the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.[24] ISW noted that this joint statement was a notable inflection in PRC rhetoric. Putin expressed well-wishes to North Korean soldiers and hugged a North Korean military veteran at the parade, and Russian state media highlighted this gesture.[25] North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, his daughter Kim Ju-ae, and several North Korean officials visited the Russian embassy in Pyongyang to commemorate the May 9 Victory Day holiday.[26] Russia is likely attempting to emphasize its deepening relationships with the PRC and North Korea in particular to posture itself as possessing broad international support, including for its war in Ukraine, to a domestic Russian audience and the wider international community.Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians. Putin claimed on May 8 at a dinner with foreign delegations in Moscow that May 9 is a “sacred date” for the “multinational people” of Russia.[27] Putin also claimed on May 9 in a speech at the Victory Day parade that the Soviet Union’s “truly iron unity” prevented Nazi Germany from seizing the country.[28] Putin claimed that Russia defends the honor of all Red Army soldiers from different nationalities and that all of the republics in the Soviet Union bore a common burden in the Second World War. Putin additionally said that Central Asia and the South Caucasus made “enormous” contributions in the Second World War. Putin’s efforts to highlight Russia’s and post-Soviet countries’ diverse population as equal contributors to the Soviet war effort are part of an effort to promote an informal state ideology that supports a civic Russian identity and a multiethnic and religiously diverse population. Putin routinely attempts to posture Russia as an ethnically diverse and harmonious country in an attempt to balance among Russian ultranationalist demands for restrictions against migrants and assimilation of ethnic minorities.[29] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages while also disproportionately targeting migrants and ethnic minorities in Russian military recruitment efforts.[30] Putin’s choice to promote multiculturalism at Russia’s largest national holiday demonstrates that Putin continues to support an informal state ideology that supports Russian civic nationalism. This manifestation of Russian nationalism is notably at odds with Russian ultranationalists’ attempts to create an ideology predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[31] Putin will likely continue to struggle to balance Russia’s need to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages and long-term demographic decline with placating the increasingly influential pro-war Russian ultranationalist community.Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.[32] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that the delegations would hold a meetings of EU foreign ministers and the Core Group on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.[33] The Core Group announced on May 9 the creation of a special tribunal within the Council of Europe to investigate and prosecute Russian officials for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.[34]Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB). The EU, Denmark, France, and Italy agreed on May 9 to transfer one billion euros (roughly $1.1 billion) from proceeds from frozen Russian assets to the European Peace Fund to purchase weapons from the Ukrainian DIB for the Ukrainian military.[35] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that the EU also allocated 600 million euros-worth (roughly $675 million) of artillery and ammunition to Ukraine and more than 200 million euros (roughly $225 million) to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses.[36] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha noted on May 9 that the EU has committed to supply Ukraine with over 1.35 million artillery shells in 2025.[37]Key Takeaways:US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected.Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day.The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations.The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea.Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians.Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort — Northern AxisRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire Violations See text below for reported violations.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast as Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[38] ISW is unable to assess when this advance occurred.Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian drone company reported on May 9 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Gornal (south of Sudzha along the international border).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces regained lost positions in Tetkino.[40]The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked in undefined areas of Kursk Oblast on May 8 and 9.[41]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking in Kursk Oblast.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 and 9 that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border) and that fighting continues near Tetkino.[43]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Grom-Kaskad" drone brigade and the “Storm” detachment of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[44]The Russian MoD accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in Belgorod Oblast on May 9.[45]Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted imagery on May 9 from Japanese OSINT analysts showing Russian decoy S-300 and S-400 air defense systems in an unspecified area of Russia’s Far East.[46] Kovalenko stated that Russia had roughly 24 S-400 systems and 12 S-300 systems in the Far East but moved an unspecified number of these air defense assets to western Russia, including to Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast; Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast; Savasleyka Air Base in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast; and Moscow Oblast.Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian milbloggers implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in Sumy Oblast on May 9.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 9 that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Marine (east of Sumy City along the Sumy-Belgorod Oblast border).[47]The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in Sumy Oblast reported on May 9 that Russian forces have intensified artillery and guided glide bomb strikes along the international border of Sumy and Kursk oblasts and are using unspecified North Korean weapons.[48] The commander noted that Russian forces are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and between 40 and 50 motorcycles a day during attacks but that Russian assault tactics using small infantry groups have not changed. The commander stated that Russian forces are using donkeys and horses to transport ammunition.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[49]Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 8 and 9.[50]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Kupyansk direction on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and east of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on May 8 and 9.[51]A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire by attacking in unspecified areas in the Kupyansk direction, including across the international border north of Kupyansk near Bereznyky.[52]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “121st Regiment” (reportedly 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD] are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[53]Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Borova direction on May 9.The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka on May 8 and 9.[54]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near Novoyehorivka.[55]Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Lyman direction on May 9.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 9 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novomykhailivka, within eastern Kolodyazi (both northeast of Lyman), and north and northwest of the Kolodyazi.[56]The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Mir; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Novomykhailivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on May 8 and 9.[57] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on May 9 that Russian forces continue attacks in the Lyman direction.[58] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on May 9 that Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups in violation of Russia’s ceasefire.[59]The Russian MoD claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near Lypove and Ridkodub.[60]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 9 that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups with artillery support and occasionally attack in groups of three to four personnel on motorcycles.[61]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in the Siversk direction near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and Fedorivka (south of Siversk) on May 8 and 9.[62]Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking near Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 8 and 9.[63]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on May 9 that Russian forces are attacking from Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) toward central Chasiv Yar with drone support.[64]Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Toretsk direction on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka, Dachne, and Krymske, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Oleksandropil on May 8 and 9.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continues southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka.[66]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating Russia's ceasefire near Toretsk and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka and Novoolenivka on May 9.[67]Zaporozhets reported on May 9 that Russian forces are intensifying their use of first-person view (FPV) and fiber-optic drones near Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk), likely to support intensified Russian offensive operations near Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[68]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[69]The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking east of Pokrovsk near Hrodivka, Promin, and Yelyzavetivka, southeast of Pokrovsk near Novotorestke, south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyarivka, and Zvirove on May 8 and 9.[70] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 8 that Russian forces conducted a motorized assault consisting of 14 motorcycles and civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction.[71]The Russian MoD accused Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral ceasefire near Myrolyubivka and Myrne (both east of Pokrovsk).[72]Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[73]The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and toward Novomykhailivka, east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka and toward Troitske on May 8 and 9.[74]The Russian MoD accused Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral ceasefire near Novooleksandrivka and Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[75]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction as Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Likarniana Street in central Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[76]Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on May 8 and 9 that Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by advancing into Bahatyr and Oleksiivka, and near Odradne, and toward Komar (all west of Kurakhove) on May 8 and 9.[77] Another milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced east of Bahatyr and near Odradne (west of Kurakhove) prior to the start of Russia’s ceasefire on May 8.[78]The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, and Odradne, and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on May 8 and 9.[79]The Russian MoD claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[80]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction before the start of Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka).[81]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 and 9 that Russian forces advanced toward Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and further north of Dniproenerhiya.[82]The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske, Vilne Pole, and Pryvilne; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and toward Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Novopil on May 8 and 9.[83]The Russian MoD accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 9 by attacking near Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[84] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Feodorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) but did not specify when the counterattacks occurred.[85]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia before Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 9. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Stepove (southwest of Orikhiv).[86]The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky on May 8 and 9.[87]Geolocated footage published on May 8 shows Ukrainian forces recently striking a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system near Stepove (southwest of Orikhiv in Russia’s near rear).[88]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-3 "Rodina" Battalion (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[89] Elements of the Russian BARS-11 "Kuban" detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[90]Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Kherson direction on May 9.The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in the Kherson direction on May 8 and 9.[91]Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 and 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking Russian forces on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near the Antonvisky Bridge and striking Russian positions near Nova Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City) and on the Kinburn Spit (in Mykolaiv Oblast).[92]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces did not conduct long-range drone or missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 8 to 9 or during the day on May 9.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114474136794655068[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O0nQrKiZWRs ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/05/08/dzhey-di-vens-rossiya-v-peregovorah-po-ukraine-prosit-bolshe-razumnogo-ey-ne-otdadut-territorii-kotorye-ona-dazhe-ne-zavoevala[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2025[4] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920818331143074113[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124[8] https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/russian-army-plans-to-reach-dnipropetrovsk-1746538770.html ; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2025/05/05/russias-deadly-innovations-cost-40-of-all-casualties-in-pokrovsk-as-putins-races-to-dnipropetrovsk-border-ahead-of-sacred-holiday/ ; https://24tv dot ua/ru/gde-usilitsja-nastuplenie-rossii-do-9-maja-24-kanal_n2803301; https://24tv dot ua/ru/boi-fronte-karta-kakie-goroda-hotjat-zahvatit-rossijane-pered_n2809699[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/03/18/frontline-report-ukraines-youngest-general-stabilizes-pokrovsk-front/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2024 ; 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https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525[25] https://iz dot ru/1883779/2025-05-09/putin-peredal-nailuchshie-pozhelaniia-boitcam-kndr; https://ria dot ru/20250509/putin-2015981677.html; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2025/05/09/25739330.shtml; https://t.me/tass_agency/314260;https://t.me/tass_agency/314262][26] https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1746781443-192707492/dprk-fm-makes-public-press-release-on-v-day-of-russia-felicitated-by-supreme-leadership-of-state/; http://www.vok.rep dot kp/index.php/revo_de/getDetail/ien250509008/en; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23896877[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76877[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121123; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025[32] https://suspilne dot media/1013885-u-lvovi-z-vizitom-perebuvaut-kallas-i-golovi-mzs-krain-evrosouzu/[33] https://suspilne dot media/1013885-u-lvovi-z-vizitom-perebuvaut-kallas-i-golovi-mzs-krain-evrosouzu/[34] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europe-throws-support-behind-ukraine-special-tribunal-prosecute-russia-2025-05-09/ ; https://mfa dot gov.ua/en/news/lvivska-zayava-shchodo-zavershennya-roboti-koaliciyi-derzhav-zi-stvorennya-specialnogo-tribunalu-shchodo-zlochinu-agresiyi-proti-ukrayini[35] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3991126-es-domovivsa-spramuvati-1-milard-vid-zamorozenih-aktiviv-rosii-na-zakupivlu-ukrainskoi-zbroi.html[36] https://x.com/Denys_Shmyhal/status/1920805192901030055[37] https://mfa dot gov.ua/news/andrij-sibiga-za-rezultatami-zustrichi-u-lvovi-derzhavi-yes-vzhe-zobovyazalisya-nadati-ukrayini-shchonajmenshe-135-mln-snaryadiv-do-kincya-roku[38] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920574295832502372 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1920393710593868164 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/41614[39] https://t.me/rugby_team_army/102[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/22853[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35609; https://t.me/rybar/70249; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91374; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35647; https://t.me/dva_majors/70840; https://t.me/rusich_army/23284; https://t.me/wargonzo/26405; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91388; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91403; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28334[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/26403 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70876[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448[46] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9231; https://x.com/AS_22im/status/1920426188918386721[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91410; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91409; https://t.me/yurasumy/22872[48] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1013675-intensivnist-stala-silnisa-komandir-ekipazu-pro-situaciu-v-kurskij-oblasti-rf-na-kordoni-z-sumsinou/[49] https://t.me/epoddubny/23380[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067; 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[Author: ISWKF]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2025

 

at 5/16/25 10:23pm

 Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Anna Harveyand Frederick W. Kagan with William RunkelMay 8, 2025, 10:45pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:50pm ET on May 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 8, and any reports of Russian ground activity in this SITREP are by default an accusation that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 7 to 0800 on May 8. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks reported in the 0800 SITREP occurred after the start of Russia's ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 7 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 7 before Russia's implementation of its unliteral ceasefire on May 8.]The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov published an article on May 8 in which he argued that Russia's war in Ukraine will go down in history as a feat of courage and significance equal to the victory of the Soviet military and people during the Second World War.[1] Belousov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is a continuation of the "glorious traditions" of Soviet bravery and heroism and of the Soviet people's enthusiasm for enlisting and otherwise supporting the war effort. Belousov claimed that Russia's victory in Ukraine is "inevitable." Belousov said that domestic unity is a necessity for Russia's victory in Ukraine just as the Soviet Union's "moral and spiritual unity" was a critical factor for its victory in the Second World War. Russian state media highlighted Belousov's statements comparing the Second World War to Russia's war in Ukraine in their coverage of his 10-page essay, indicating that the Kremlin is trying to message to the domestic audience that Russia will achieve its goals in its war in Ukraine as long as Russian society remains unified and supportive.[2] Kremlin officials have recently seized on the mythos of the Second World War to form the basis of a new pseudo-state ideology that will span across generations and that the Kremlin intends to use to justify potential future aggression against the West.[3]Belousov reiterated the Kremlin's oft-repeated fallacious narrative that Russia had no choice but to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because the situation was "life or death." Belousov claimed that Ukraine is a conduit for the collective West's "crusade" against Russia, which Belousov claimed is a manifestation of "eternal Russophobia" and intended to eradicate Russian statehood. Belousov quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech from February 24, 2022, announcing the full-scale invasion.[4] Belousov amplified Putin's accusations that the United States and its Western allies had a policy of "containment" against Russia and created a situation in which Russia had to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to defend Russia's interests.[5] The Kremlin is attempting to link Putin's anti-Western claims to the mythos of the Second World War in order to heighten the existential threat against Russia that the Kremlin claims Russia is currently facing. It is also reconstructing the Soviet-era narrative that the West is conspiring to destroy Russia (in place of the Soviet Union) and that the conflict will be unending.Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.[6] Belousov stated in his May 8 essay that Russia has reformed and augmented its military specifically in response to NATO expansion and military build-up (undertaken only well after the Russian 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine), including by reorganizing Russia's Western Military District (WMD) into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD); re-opening two former military academies and establishing a new third military academy; and fully forming, staffing, and equipping two combined arms armies, a river flotilla, a mixed aviation corps, and 50 other formations and units.[7] ISW has long assessed that Russian military restructuring efforts, including reforms of the LMD and MMD, are part of future preparations for war against NATO.[8]Medvedev threatened that European countries must "remember" the "crushing defeat of Nazi Germany" when supporting Ukraine.[9] Medvedev notably made his threat on his English-language X account, indicating that Medvedev intended this threat for international audiences.[10] Other senior Russian officials have also intensified accusations against European states for supporting "Naziism" in recent days.[11] Medvedev's threat and Russian claims of European "Nazism" are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push European countries into refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine.[12] Kremlin officials have also recently framed European efforts to shoulder more of their own defense requirements (in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts) as threatening to Russia, and the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign likely also aims to prevent European states from building up their defenses. Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service Head Vice Admiral Peter Reesink warned in an interview with Politico published on May 8 that Russia's most threatening behavior is its military buildup and moving military assets towards Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states.[13] Reesink stated that Russia appears to be producing more artillery than the Russian military needs for its war in Ukraine when taking account of the assistance Russia is receiving from its allies. Reuters published an investigation on May 8 revealing that Russia has been constructing a significant new production line for explosives at the Biysk Oleum Plant in Siberia that is planned to produce 6,000 metric tons of explosives annually.[14] Reuters noted that this would be enough explosive to manufacture 1.28 million 152mm artillery rounds and that Russia produced nearly two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024, suggesting that this new production line could expand Russia's artillery shell production capacity by over 50 percent when completed.Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on April 28 Russia's ceasefire starting at midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and ending at midnight on the night of May 10 to 11 in honor of Victory Day on May 9.[15] Russia's Victory Day celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War while minimizing the role of the United States. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completely ceased combat operations and remained at their current positions at midnight Moscow time on May 8 in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral ceasefire.[16] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces did not stop combat operations "despite the announcement of the ceasefire." Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack across the entire frontline.[17] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russian forces shelled Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts after the start of the ceasefire.[18] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that servicemembers from three Ukrainian units operating in the Pokrovsk direction and in southern Ukraine confirmed that they received instructions to open fire only in response to Russian combat operations.[19]Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump on May 8 about the concrete steps needed to achieve peace.[20] Zelensky reiterated to Trump that Ukraine is ready for an immediate 30-day ceasefire and for talks "in any format." Zelensky reported that Trump supported a 30-day ceasefire. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated that Ukraine can only start peace negotiations after the implementation of an unconditional 30-day ceasefire and that the United States and Ukraine's European partners agree with this timeline.[21] Yermak noted that Russia and Ukraine can agree on a format for peace negotiations and appoint delegations after a longer-term ceasefire is in place.The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 7 that Ukraine does not want to seriously discuss a long-term ceasefire.[22] Zakharova claimed that Russia's support for the previous US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure and Russia's unilateral Easter truce shows that Russia has never been against a ceasefire, even though the Kremlin has continued to protract and delay meaningful negotiations to establish a comprehensive ceasefire.[23] Zakharova accused Ukraine of repeatedly violating the strikes and Easter ceasefires and claimed that there could be progress toward a long-term ceasefire should Ukraine observe shorter-term ceasefires. Zakharova repeated recent Kremlin narratives that Ukraine cannot control its own military and Putin's rejection of previous US and Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposals on the grounds that there are "nuances" about enforcement mechanisms and weapons provisions to Ukraine that the parties would need to work out prior to implementation.[24] Russia previously accused Ukraine of violating the strikes and Easter ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations, and Russian officials will likely do the same during the unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in order to distract from Russia's continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.[25]Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.[26] These engagements mark the third official meeting in 2025 between Putin and Xi. Putin and Xi signed a package of bilateral intergovernmental and interdepartmental cooperation documents and issued a joint statement on May 8.[27] Xi travelled to Russia to attend Russia's Victory Day celebrations on May 9. Putin and Xi discussed the roles that China and the Soviet Union played in the Second World War, emphasized the importance of their countries' contributions to the defeat of fascism, highlighted significant Chinese and Soviet losses in the war, and claimed that China and the Soviet Union were the "main theaters" in the war.[28] Russian officials repeatedly use the mythos of the Soviet Union's sacrifice during the Second World War to persuade the Russian population that their increasing social and economic sacrifices for the Russian war effort in Ukraine can lead to victory.[29] Russian officials are likely overemphasizing World War II mythos to bolster support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine in part due to Russia's inability to showcase battlefield successes for Victory Day 2025.The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war. The Russian–Chinese joint statement asserted that Russia and the PRC are "convinced" that a long-term and sustainable settlement in the war in Ukraine requires the elimination of the "root causes" of the war.[30] The joint statement claimed that Russia and the PRC will work to counter attempts to "rehabilitate" Nazism and the rise of militarism that contribute to discrimination and intolerance. The joint statement noted that Russia "positively evaluates" the PRC's position on the war in Ukraine and that Russia welcomes the PRC's desire to play a role in the political and diplomatic efforts towards settling the war. The PRC and Brazil — two members of BRICS — have notably put forth peace proposals for the war in Ukraine that heavily favored Russia.[31] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[32] Putin named Ukraine's "demilitarization" and "denazification" as Russia's main goals when he launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022, and Russian officials have consistently used these terms to call for the removal of the current legitimate Ukrainian government, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself in the future.[33] Russia has attempted to exploit diplomatic meetings with PRC and Iranian officials in recent months to publicly reiterate these original war aims and posture Russia's allies as supportive in these efforts.[34] The PRC has previously publicly attributed talk of Russia's alleged need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine only to Kremlin officials — not PRC officials.[35] The May 8 joint Russian–Chinese statement declaring that "the parties" are "convinced" of the need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war is a notable inflection in PRC rhetoric.The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc. Russia and the PRC reiterated their mutual interest in establishing a multipolar world order in which the UN plays a central role.[36] Xi further claimed that both Russia and the PRC bear a special responsibility as permanent members of the UNSC and great powers to oversee the creation of a new multipolar world.[37] The joint statement underscored both parties' commitment to the creation of a Eurasian security architecture - a reference to the architecture that Putin first proposed in June 2024 with Xi's support.[38] The joint statement highlighted the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS - organizations that Kremlin officials have previously labelled as the foundation of Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture.[39] The joint statement paradoxically called for an end to confrontational bloc mentality and specifically cited NATO expansion as an example of such bloc mentality. The statement noted that Russia and the PRC find the construction of military blocs that are anti-Russian and anti-Chinese in nature unacceptable. The statement emphasized the need to eliminate the "root causes" of interstate conflicts before the creation of a Eurasian security architecture - the first time Russian officials have publicly linked their calls for the elimination of "root causes" with Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture. ISW continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN, BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power and that Putin's Eurasian security architecture proposal is part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc to further Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weaking the West and its allies.[40]The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties increased 23 percent between March 2025 and April 2025 and increased by 84 percent between April 2024 and April 2025.[41] The UN HRMMU reported that at least 209 civilians were killed and 1,146 civilians were injured in the war in April 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that 97 percent of these civilian casualties were in unoccupied Ukraine and that April 2025 had the highest number of civilian casualties since September 2024. The HRMMU reported that almost half of these casualties were due to missile and loitering munition strikes and noted several Russian drone and missile strikes in urban areas of Kryvyi Rih and Sumy, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, and Kharkiv cities in April 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that short-range drone strikes accounted for 23 percent of civilian casualties, most of which were in Kherson Oblast. The UN HRMMU noted that a drone strike against a civilian bus in Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (on the east [right] bank of the Dnipro River immediately across from the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant) significantly contributed to these casualties.The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US–Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.[42] The United States and Ukraine signed the bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30.[43]Key Takeaways:The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society.Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms.Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks.The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire.Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war.The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc.The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025.The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US-Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort — Northern AxisRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire Violations See topline and axes text for reports of violations of Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast before Russia's unilaterally imposed Victory Day ceasefire as Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Chapayeva Street in southwestern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and southeast of the settlement.[44]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced up to the international border south of Oleshnya (southeast of Sudzha).[45]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked in Kursk Oblast on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[46]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking across the international border in Kursk Oblast on May 8.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border).[48]A Russian milblogger claimed on May 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces maintain their drone superiority over Russian forces in the area.[49] Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Zaslon" radar system in Kursk Oblast.[50]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[51]A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire near Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City) on May 8.[52]Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast before Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to central Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).[53]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced near Vodolahy, Bilovody (both north of Sumy City), and Loknya.[54]A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's unilateral ceasefire near Bilovody on May 8.[55]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction, and elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions northwest of Sumy City near the Sumy-Bryansk Oblast international border.[56]Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 7 that Russian forces advanced on the eastern outskirts of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[57]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[58]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory.[59] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in unspecified areas of northern Kharkiv Oblast.[60] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack in the Kharkiv direction following Russia's implementation of its unilateral ceasefire.[61]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Synelnykove (south of Vovchansk).[62]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction before the start of Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced to the northeastern outskirts of Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[63]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[64]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Hlushkivka.[65] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka.[66] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on May 8 that fighting is ongoing in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kupyansk direction.[67]Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction as Ukrainian forces accused Russian forces of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8. Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Makiivka (northeast of Borova).[68] ISW is unable to assess if this recent Russian advance occurred before the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[69]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Hrekivka and toward Olhivka.[70] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Novoyehorivka (east of Borova), and Hrekivka.[71]Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Lyman direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and west of the Nove (northeast of Lyman).[72]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and toward Ridkodub and Novyi Mir on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[73]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Kolodyazi and toward Ridkodub and Novyi Mir.[74] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Kolodyazi and Torske (east of Lyman) and toward Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna (all northeast of Lyman).[75] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces continued to attack in the Lyman direction after Russia's implementation of its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[76]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Siversk direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[77]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanske.[78] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Bilohorivka and Fedorivka (southeast of Siversk)[79]Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 8.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar and entered the Sieverny mine.[80]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Predtechnye on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[81]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, Bila Hora, and Predtechnye.[82] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Chasiv Yar and Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) on May 8.[83] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral ceasefire in the Chasiv Yar direction after Russia implemented its unilateral ceasefire[84]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's unilateral ceasefire and counterattacked in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 8.[85]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Burevestnik" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) and the "Volga" Artillery Regiment (reportedly Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[86]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction before Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced to Radhospna Street in northwest Druzhba.[87]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southern Nova Poltavka (west of Toretsk).[88]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced north of and into central Nova Poltavka, west of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk), north of and into northern Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk), north of and toward Oleksandropil, and into the western outskirts of Leonidivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[89] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces seized most of Oleksandropil but did not specify when the advance occurred.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced to the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway near Novoolenivka.[91]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Toretsk, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Nova Poltavka, and southwest of Toretsk near Malynivka on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[92]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces Russian forces attacked near Toretsk, Dyliivka, Shcherbynivka, Nova Poltavka, Malynivka, and Yelyzavetivka and toward Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[93] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Toretsk, Krymske (north of Toretsk), Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk), and Yelyzavetivka on May 8.[94] Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces attacked in the Toretsk direction following Russia's implementation of its unilateral ceasefire.[95]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's unilateral ceasefire by counterattacking near Toretsk.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's ceasefire near Toretsk.[97]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on May 8 that Russian forces operating in the Toretsk direction are using the cover of spring foliage to storm Ukrainian positions in small infantry groups.[98]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukranian positions near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[99] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk).[100]Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Pokrovsk direction on May 8.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces marginally advanced near Novoserhiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[101] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces made this advance on May 7 prior to Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire, but the other milblogger did not specify when this advance occurred.[102]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Zvirove, Novoserhiivka, and Udachne on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[103]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk, Lysivka, Kotlyne, Zvirove, Novoserhiivka, and Udachne.[104] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk), near Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk), and near Kotlyne, Zvirove, and Udachne on May 8.[105] Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack in the Pokrovsk direction following Russia's implementation of its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[106]A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8 by conducting drone strikes against Russian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[107]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 7 that Russian forces continue to increase their use of motorcycles in assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[108] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 8 that Russian forces are conducting small infantry assaults with motorized vehicle and drone support.[109] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are repeatedly deploying assaults consisting of poorly trained infantry to first overwhelm Ukrainian defenses before better-trained infantry attack.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[110]Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Novopavlivka direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8. Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on May 8 that Russian forces seized Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka) before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.[111] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 that Russian forces advanced south of Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and near Kotlyarivka, Nadiivka (both east of Novopavlivka), and Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[112]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka and Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Trotiske and Bohdanivka on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[113]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Novooleksandrivka, Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Trotiske, and Bohdanivka.[114] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyarivka, and Preobrazhenka (east of Novopavlivka) on May 8.[115] Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces attacked in the Novopavlivka direction after Russia implemented its unilateral ceasefire.[116]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Rozdolne (southwest of Kurakhove).[117]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and near Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove) prior to Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[118]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Bahatyr, and Oleksiivka and toward Odradne on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[119]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Bahatyr, Oleksiivka, and Odradne.[120] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[121]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Andriivka and Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove) on May 8.[122] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian detachment reported on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral ceasefire by attacking near Bahatyr on May 8.[123]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 43rd Spetsnaz Company (reportedly also of the 29th CAA) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[124]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction before Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced in fields northwest of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).[125]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 that Russian forces advanced north of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[126]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Novosilka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Novopil on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[127]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Vilne Pole and Novosilka and toward Novopil.[128] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Novosilka, Pryvilne (west of Velyka Novosilka), and Novopil on May 8.[129] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking near Novopil and Novosilka.[130] Voloshyn stated that Russian aviation has ceased activity since the start of Russia’s ceasefire but that Russian forces continue artillery and drone strikes, albeit at a decreased intensity.A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8 by conducting drone strikes against Russian positions along the Vilne Pole-Novosilka-Novodarivka line (west and southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[131]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Zaporizhia direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[132]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Kamyanske and Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[133] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Stepove and Shcherbaky.[134] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces attacked near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske.[135]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-3 "Rodina" Battalion (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction, and drone operators of the "Viking" Drone detachment are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[136] Drone operators of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and of the "Nemets" group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[137]Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Kherson direction on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[138]The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction.[139] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in the Kherson direction.[140] Ukrainian officials reported on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by striking civilian infrastructure in the Kherson direction.[141]A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8 by attempting to land on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near the Antonvisky Bridge.[142]A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kherson direction reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaging in combat at a distance, so this area of the front is largely static.[143]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[144]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a drone strike against Ukraine on the evening of May 7 before Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched a third wave of drone strikes against Ukraine during the evening consisting of 31 Shahed and decoy drones.[145] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 20 drones in northern and central Ukraine and that six decoy drones were "lost in location." The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that the evening drone strike hit infrastructure near Uman, Cherkasy Oblast.[146]The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces did not launch missiles or long-range drones against Ukraine on May 8 as of 0800 Kyiv time.[147] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces had increased glide bomb strikes against Sumy Oblast in violation of Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[148]Former Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the General Staff, retired Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko, stated in an interview published on May 8 that Russian forces are using a roughly one –to-one ratio of Shahed strike drones to decoy drones in their strike packages.[149] Romanenko stated that these decoy drones include "Gerber" and "Parodi" drones and that Russian forces have improved their decoy drones over time, using the decoys to conduct reconnaissance and equipping the decoys with small warheads. Romanenko reported that some of the explosives in decoy drones are meant to detonate immediately upon impact while others have delayed detonations. Romanenko stated that Russian forces use these decoys primarily to distract Ukrainian air defenses and augment the drones with parts that make them falsely appear on radars as much larger targets.Romanenko clarified that reports from the Ukrainian Air Force that Russian drones were "locationally lost" mean that Ukrainian forces detected the drones but that the drones then maneuvered and left the area of responsibility of the Ukrainian unit that first identified the drone such that Ukrainian air defenders could not locate the drone again.[150]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Russia is likely using increased Belarusian-Chinese cooperation as part of its sanctions evasions measures. Belarusian Economy Minister Yuriy Chebotar claimed on May 7 during a meeting of Belarusian-Chinese Intergovernmental Committee on Cooperation's Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation in Beijing that Belarus aims to increase trade, economic, and industrial cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC).[151] Chebotar highlighted Belarusian-Chinese cooperation in mechanical engineering, machine tool production, and optics and electronics.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] http://www.scrf.gov dot ru/media/files/file/83ufGkI0SUHYUOJoEaGisEuiDfyFVUMu.pdf[2] https://iz dot ru/1883256/2025-05-08/belousov-sravnil-borbu-vs-rf-s-neonatcizmom-s-podvigom-naroda-i-krasnoi-armii; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23884365; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7711576; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/05/08/belousov-sravnil-borbu-s-neonatsizmom-s-podvigom-krasnoy-armii/;[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025[4] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843[5] http://www.scrf.gov dot ru/media/files/file/83ufGkI0SUHYUOJoEaGisEuiDfyFVUMu.pdf[6] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1920352919485845990[7] http://www.scrf.gov dot ru/media/files/file/83ufGkI0SUHYUOJoEaGisEuiDfyFVUMu.pdf[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525[9] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1920352919485845990[10] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1920352919485845990[11] https://t.me/MID_Russia/57570; https://t.me/RusEmbUK/2165; https://t.me/MID_Russia/57448; https://t.me/tass_agency/313910 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313911; [12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025[13] https://www.politico.eu/article/china-cyber-menace-more-threatening-russia-warns-dutch-spy-chief/[14] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-russia-explore-ways-restore-russian-gas-flows-europe-sources-say-2025-05-08/[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/52304[17] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1920415076143514031[18] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9223[19] https://t.me/suspilnenews/49674[20] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920573788967833743[21] https://www.zeit dot de/2025/19/andrij-jermak-wolodymyr-selenskyj-ukrainekrieg-verhandlungen-russland-usa/komplettansicht[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/23883057[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325[26] https://tass dot ru/politika/23891041 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23888557 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23886607[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76870[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76873[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025[30] http://www.kremlin dot ru/supplement/6309; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250509/753c2b212a76424ab45a3be0bab53eca/c.html[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092724[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025[36] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76872 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76873 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76871 ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250508/53e27a12b51f4423b4b2602323b16015/c.html ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250509/32253c7ff4d9487e9c68a8d58a315112/c.html[37] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76872[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76872 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76873 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76871 ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250508/53e27a12b51f4423b4b2602323b16015/c.html ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250509/32253c7ff4d9487e9c68a8d58a315112/c.html[40] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024[41] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Protection-of-Civilians-in-Armed-Conflict-April-2025 ; https://suspilne dot media/1012683-nimeccina-peredala-novij-paket-dopomogi-zelenskij-zaklikav-pripiniti-vogon-sonajmense-na-30-dib-1170-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746708297&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[42] https://www dot rbc.ua/ukr/news ; https://www dot rbc.ua/ukr/news/rada-ratifikuvala-ugodu-zi-ssha-nadra-1746635236.html ; https://www dot youtube.com/live/k6sz-i2lmdw ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/310279 ; https://t.me/yzheleznyak/12499; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14148; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920507414299672651; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14147; https://suspilne dot media/1013477-zelenskij-i-prezidentka-ek-obgovorili-podalsi-kroki-dla-vstupu-ukraini-v-es/; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920500408457236857[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2025[44] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920202569772666922; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1920114542593364373; https://t.me/SHACHA190/130628; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10950; https:// t [dot] me/warriorofnorth/8116; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9100[45] https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1920169394442842210; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1920028442998845493; https://t.me/tankova_brugada/2593[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/52304[48] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91343; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91344; https://t.me/wargonzo/26383; https://t.me/dva_majors/70775; https://t.me/yurasumy/22845; https://t.me/rybar/70221; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91348; https://t.me/rusich_army/23249; https://t.me/rusich_army/23250; https://t.me/epoddubny/23377[49] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64073[50] https://t.me/usf_army/555[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91319[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28269[53] https://x.com/p6060083/status/1919991600165372185 ; https://x.com/Raver__/status/1919884812900266189 ;[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/70772[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28269[56] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/53667; https://t.me/rusich_army/23267; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164003[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28243[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l[60]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl ;[61] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/[62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164003[63] https://t.me/rubak112/248; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9091[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl[67] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1012873-bojovi-zitknenna-8-travna-fiksuut-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-ta-na-kupanskomu-napramku-sinegubov/[68] https://t.me/bratstvo252/1233; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9092[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163978[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl[76] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[78] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64081; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163978[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl[84] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/[85] https://t.me/wargonzo/26392[86] https://t.me/wargonzo/26392[87] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1920364764485587240; https://t.me/Orki3MsbLauda/170[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9090; https://t.me/bbs117_army/48;[89] https://t.me/yurasumy/22851; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91335; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91315[90] https://t.me/dva_majors/70772[91] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64078; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28257; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28257 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70756[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[93] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l[94] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl[95] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/[96] https://t.me/mod_russia/52304; https://t.me/tass_agency/314041[97] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64088[98] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/08/dyktatura-pogody-ta-zelenky-poblyzu-toreczka-rosiyany-zminyly-grafik-shturmiv/[99] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163939[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/70756 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70797[101] https://t.me/yurasumy/22850; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163978[102] https://t.me/yurasumy/22850[103] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[104] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l[105] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl[106] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/[107] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28261[108] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9567[109] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/08/cze-masshtabne-slaboumiye-yakes-taktyka-myasnyh-shturmiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-proczvitaye/[110] https://t.me/sashakots/53558[111] https://t.me/mod_russia/52305[112] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35552; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35548; https://t.me/yurasumy/22850; Https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64076; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64079[113] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996[114] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l[115] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl[116] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/[117] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1920276526722851315; https://www.facebook.com/61573845209927/videos/1215029306922099/; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1920251724226

— Iran Update, May 8, 2025

 

at 5/16/25 10:23pm

 Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens,Carolyn Moorman, Ben Schmida, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel.[1] Abdulmalik’s statements demonstrate how the Houthis view the Red Sea attack campaign as one element of a broader Houthi strategic effort to pressure Israel to end its campaign in the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire secures an end to maritime shipping attacks, but the Houthis will continue to fire on other Israeli economic targets in pursuit of the same objectives. The Houthis have already shifted to targeting Israeli airports, for example. Abdulmalik framed the ceasefire as a victory against the United States. Abdulmalik implied that the ceasefire would not be permanent by adding that “when” the United States gets involved in a “third round” of airstrikes, the Houthis will confront the United States again.[2] The Houthis could resume attacks at any time and for any reason they choose.Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign.[3] The United States conducted at least 32 airstrikes targeting Houthi oil offloading infrastructure at Ras Issa Port between April 2 and May 5.[4] This initially created fuel shortages and posed challenges for both the Houthis’ military operations and separately civil service provision in Houthi-controlled territories, but the Houthis gradually learned techniques to ensure service continuity despite the airstrikes.[5] The US airstrikes on April 17 targeting Ras Issa Port alone cost the Houthis approximately $700 million worth of damage, according to a Yemeni economist.[6] The Yemeni Oil Company announced on May 8 that they have successfully repaired the Ras Issa Oil Port’s filling platforms and would restore fuel distribution to all their stations within 24 hours, which demonstrates that even serious damage can be rapidly fixed.[7] Cargo ships have also reportedly resumed offloading operations at Ras Issa Port.[8] Even the best-designed air campaigns can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means.International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.[9] Shipping companies are still “assessing the deal” and remain deeply skeptical about returning to the Red Sea routes because of the ambiguity of the ceasefire terms, according to the Wall Street Journal on May 8.[10] This includes whether the truce applies broadly to commercial shipping or just US vessels.[11] Other regional events, such as a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, could prompt the Houthis to target international shipping again in the future if the Houthis see a benefit in doing so. The Houthis claimed a likely Iranian attack targeting Saudi Arabia in 2019 during the 2019 US-Iran escalation, demonstrating that the Houthis will sometimes support Iran’s regional objectives even at risk to the Houthi movement.[12] The US airstrikes only addressed the tactical manifestations of the Houthi threat to the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea rather than resolving the underlying strategic and political drivers motivating the Houthis’ campaign. The Wall Street Journal added that industry experts expect it could take months to restore shipping confidence.[13] The persistent risk that the Houthis could disrupt global maritime commerce for months--if not years--at a time underscores the seriousness of the Houthi strategic and economic threat.Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.[14] Unspecified Syrian transitional government officials told the Wall Street Journal on May 7 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara wants to meet US President Donald Trump to discuss broad US investment and aid to rebuild Syria.[15] Shara reportedly requested to meet with Trump during Trump’s upcoming Gulf visit through US businessman and liquified natural gas (LNG) company CEO Jonathan Bass and Syrian Emergency Task Force head Mouaz Moustafa.[16] Bass and Moustafa met with Shara in Damascus on May 2 and presented him with a plan for Western firms to invest in Syria’s energy industry.[17] Syria has significant oil and gas infrastructure that needs to be rebuilt or updated after over a decade of civil war.[18] Bass and Moustafa said that Shara "responded favorably" to the idea of the United States’ waiving or lessening sanctions in order to make the investment possible.[19] An unspecified senior Syrian Foreign Affairs official confirmed Shara’s interest by telling Western media that Syria seeks a relationship with the United States that includes “energy and economic ties.”[20] Bass said that Shara and Syrian officials were also interested in participation from US companies in all areas of Syrian reconstruction.[21] The Trump administration has not yet acknowledged Shara’s reported request.Shara’s proposal may seek to obtain full sanctions relief from the United States by offering investment in Syria. Shara will find it hard to meet all of the Trump administration’s “confidence-building measures,” and could view possible investment in Syria’s energy sector as a bargaining chip.[22] The United States under the first Trump administration previously sought to allow US companies to invest in energy infrastructure in northeastern Syria, and Shara could calculate that a similar scheme would help him obtain sanctions relief.[23] US sanctions that have been in place since the fall of the Assad regime currently prevent direct US economic involvement in Syria. Shara and Syrian transitional government officials have attempted to attain partial or full US sanctions relief since assuming power in December 2024 and have communicated back and forth about several “confidence-building” conditions that the US requested that Syria observe.[24] The Syrian government said that it plans to fully address most of the US demands, including the destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[25] The government has also taken tangible steps to honor the US request that it limit Palestinian military and political activity in Syria.[26] Shara is likely unwilling to act on the US condition that he bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, however, given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[27] Shara said on May 8 during a press conference in Paris that his government guarantees that foreign fighters will not pose a threat to neighboring countries, which suggests that he does not plan to remove them from the current Syrian army ranks or offices.[28] Shara could calculate that a counter-proposal that creates opportunities for US industry in Syria could mitigate his unwillingness to fully observe all the US conditions and still secure sanction relief on Syria.Syrian officials may also be attempting to exploit perceived US interest in curtailing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence abroad in order to secure US sanctions relief and economic support. Unspecified Syrian government officials described Shara’s proposal as a “Marshall Plan-style" program in which US and other Western companies would invest in Syria’s reconstruction instead of China or other powers, according to the Wall Street Journal.[29] That the Syrian officials reportedly specified that Shara would be willing to exclude China suggests that the Syrian government may be attempting to exploit a perceived US interest in curbing the PRC’s influence abroad in order to spur US interest and investment in Syria. Bass said that Shara wants “Boeing” and “US telecom” and not “Huawei,” referring to the Chinese telecommunications company that has invested heavily in partnerships in the Middle East.[30]Recent steps by the Syrian government suggest that it seeks to develop genuine economic partnerships with US adversaries like China and Russia if it cannot secure sanctions relief and economic assistance elsewhere, however. The Syrian government most recently hosted PRC officials on March 27 and discussed “enhancing cooperation,” which CTP-ISW assessed was likely related to securing Chinese support for the transition.[31] Shara and the Syrian transport minister have met with Chinese transport and medical manufacturing businessmen to discuss Chinese investment in Syria within the past week.[32] The Syrian government also reinitiated Syria’s economic ties with Russia in recent months. Russia has delivered Syrian currency and Russian oil to Syria, and Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate Russian investment contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert.[33] Both PRC and Russian officials have made it clear that they seek to increase involvement in Syria. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement on May 8 following a press conference in Moscow that emphasized Russian and Chinese support for Syria’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.”[34]A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.[35] Reuters originally reported that the Treasury Department granted the sanctions exemption, but the United States has not yet confirmed the sanctions exemption.[36] The Qatari-backed grant initiative will provide Syria with $27 million monthly for three months to pay the salaries of select civilian public sector workers.[37] An unspecified Syrian financial source told Western media that the grant is conditional and will not apply to Syrian Defense Ministry or Interior Ministry personnel.[38] The Syrian government previously announced in January 2025 that it would raise public sector salaries by 400% the following month, but has yet to do so due to a lack of funding.[39] The unspecified Syrian source said that the Qatari funding will help implement this salary raise over the next several months and that the Syrian government would acquire other funds for employees excluded from the initiative.[40] Qatar had previously delayed this initiative in late February 2025 due to uncertainty over whether the funding would breach US sanctions.[41] Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad Yasser Barniyeh welcomed the exemption and said that the Syrian government hopes it will be followed by further measures to ease sanctions.[42] Barniyeh is an economist trained at Damascus, Kansas State, and Oklahoma State universities before working for the Arab Monetary Fund.[43] Barniyeh participated in the liberalization of the Assad regime's economy in the early 2000s, when he served on the Syrian Commission on Financial Markets and the Damascus Securities Exchange.[44]Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri inspected an underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province on May 8.[45] Salami threatened to attack any country that supports an attack on Iran. Footage of the base during the visit showed Iranian Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones have a range of 200 and 480 km, respectively.[46] The precise location of the facility is unclear, but the inspection of a base hosting drones that has the range to target most of the Persian Gulf from the southern Iranian coast suggests that Iranian officers were inspecting units and reviewing plans for post-strike responses in the Persian Gulf region. Hormozgan Province lies along Iran‘s southern coast. The visit follows a series of similar inspections at Iranian military and defense sites in Hormozgan and the surrounding provinces.[47] Senior military officers often visit units and facilities under their command as part of their preparations for major defensive and offensive operations to ensure that their commands are well-prepared. IRGC-affiliated media also published old footage on May 8 that showed an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone surveilling the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.[48] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately claimed on May 8 that Iran equipped all of its fighter jets with long-range munitions and updated navigation systems.[49] Most Iranian fighter jets are Cold War third- and fourth-generation aircraft like the F4 Phantom and F14 Tomcat. These threats follow new US threats to attack Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on May 7 that he wants to "blow up" Iran's nuclear centrifuges either “nicely" through an agreement with Iran or “viciously."[50]An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel. UK authorities arrested eight Iranian nationals on May 4 after foiling a suspected Iranian-directed terror plot to target the Israeli Embassy in London.[51] The Guardian reported on May 8 that the UK police conducted its largest raid across the country due to threats of a suspected terror plot.[52] UK MI5 assessed that the plot had reached an “advanced but not imminent” stage and detained the suspects. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi denied Iranian involvement in the terror plot and called for diplomacy.[53] It is possible that the Iranian IRGC did not notify Araghchi about this plot. The IRGC has previously failed to notify other government bodies about its operations.[54] Iran has historically relied on unconventional methods to impose costs on Israel, including conducting terror attacks on Israeli diplomatic and civilian targets abroad. This recent Iranian plot in the UK does not represent an inflection in Iranian activity but is part of a decades-long strategy that includes assassination and bombing plots against Israeli interests in Argentina, Cyprus, Turkey, Georgia, Greece, and Azerbaijan.[55] Iranian officials and Iranian media have previously suggested that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response to the Israeli airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Damascus in April 2024.[56] Iranian officials have also repeatedly warned that Iran will conduct a third missile attack on Israel.[57] Israeli strikes on Iran in October 2024 damaged Iranian long-range missile production, which suggests that Iran‘s ability to respond militarily using its missile stockpile may be somewhat constrained. Iran can still impose costs on Israel by attacking Israeli diplomatic targets in the region and beyond, however.[58]Key Takeaways:Houthis Respond to Ceasefire: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel. Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign. International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.Syria and Sanctions Relief: Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.Syrian Salaries: A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.Iranian Officers Inspect Military Facilities: Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran.Iranian Terrorist Operations in the United Kingdom: An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7 to 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8.[59]Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Indian officials in New Delhi, India, on May 8 to discuss India-Pakistan tensions and bilateral economic cooperation.[60] Araghchi met with Indian President Droupadi Murmu and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.[61] Araghchi and Jaishankar discussed the implementation of the May 2024 ten-year Chabahar cooperation agreement.[62] The agreement outlines the development of Iran’s southeastern Chabahar port to facilitate trade between Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries, which effectively bypasses Pakistani ports.[63] India was the second largest importer of Iranian oil before the US maximum pressure campaign in 2018.[64] Araghchi also met with Pakistani officials in Pakistan on May 5.[65] This series of meetings comes amid military escalation between India and Pakistan.[66]Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian stated that direct negotiations under “threat or coercion” are irrational and dishonorable but that negotiations in “equal, pressure-free conditions” are "rational and honorable."[67] Ahmadian’s remarks may lay the ground for justifying direct negotiations with the United States. Ahmadian’s remarks follow an Israeli report on May 7 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi approached US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to request direct US-Iran negotiations, reportedly due to Iran’s frustration with the slow progress of Omani-mediated talks.[68] The fourth round of US-Iran talks, initially scheduled for May 3, was postponed due to "logistical reasons.”[69]SyriaThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) opened a field hospital for Druze civilians in Hader, Quneitra Province, on May 8.[70] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the field hospital is part of the IDF’s efforts to support the Syrian Druze population.[71] The IDF has been operating in Hader since December 2024.[72] The establishment of an IDF field hospital in Hader follows Israel’s efforts to pressure the Syrian transitional government to halt sectarian violence against the Syrian Druze community.[73]The Syrian and Iraqi governments continued to strengthen border security on both sides of the northern Syria-Iraq border.[74] The Syrian Interior Ministry began to recruit new members for the General Directorate of Border Guards on May 8.[75] The Syrian Defense Ministry recently deployed forces to the Iraqi border on April 18 to tighten control and curb illegal smuggling activities.[76] Syrian media also reported on May 7 that the Iraqi Army deployed new unspecified military units along the border across from the Syrian towns of Albu Kamal and Baghouz.[77] The Iraqi Army previously deployed the 34th Armored Brigade’s 1st Tank Battalion, which operates under the 9th Armored Division, to the Iraq-Syria border on April 16.[78] Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari said in an interview on May 6 that the Iraqi federal government has had no security coordination with the Syrian Interior Ministry yet.[79]IraqIraqi media reported that a “high-level” Shia Coordination Framework delegation will discuss multiple “key” issues with Iranian officials from May 8 to 9, including the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[80] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A Shia Coordination Framework source stated that the delegation represents all Shia Coordination Framework components and is authorized to “reach an understanding with Tehran on certain [unspecified] issues of mutual understanding.”[81] Iran reportedly sent a message to Shia Coordination Framework leaders on April 30 that called on the Shia Coordination Framework to remain unified ahead of the upcoming elections. Iran‘s message likely aims to increase the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[82] A fragmented Shia Coordination Framework could allow smaller, less organized parties to outperform Iranian-backed parties.Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed multiple memoranda of understanding (MOU) during bilateral talks in Ankara, Turkey, on May 8.[83] The MoUs focused on multiple areas, including defense manufacturing and counter-narcotics. Sudani emphasized the importance of Iraq-Turkey security and counterterrorism cooperation and welcomed efforts to disarm the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during a press conference with Erdogan.[84] Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan agreed in February 2025 to form a strategic alliance to counter the Islamic State.[85]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripSee topline section.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing Significant to Report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. 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https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-853143[71] https://t.me/damascusv011/31247 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1920385063432204723 ;[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024#:~:text=The%20Israel%20Defense,Daraa%20Province.%5B20%5D[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025[74] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/56580[75] https://x.com/syrianmoi/status/1920164492085792839[76] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/121826 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/55260[77] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/56580[78] https://t.me/MODiraq/11367[79] https://www.alhadath dot net/iraq/2025/05/06/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86[80] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9[81] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9[82] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025[83] https://ina dot iq/eng/39783-al-sudani-and-erdogan-sponsor-mou-signing-ceremony-between-iraq-and-turkey.html[84] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B8%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%AD-%D9%84-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1[85] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-neighbors-near-security-alliance-agreementIran Update, May 8, 2025 Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Schmida, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ET The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.  Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel.[1] Abdulmalik’s statements demonstrate how the Houthis view the Red Sea attack campaign as one element of a broader Houthi strategic effort to pressure Israel to end its campaign in the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire secures an end to maritime shipping attacks, but the Houthis will continue to fire on other Israeli economic targets in pursuit of the same objectives. The Houthis have already shifted to targeting Israeli airports, for example. Abdulmalik framed the ceasefire as a victory against the United States. Abdulmalik implied that the ceasefire would not be permanent by adding that “when” the United States gets involved in a “third round” of airstrikes, the Houthis will confront the United States again.[2] The Houthis could resume attacks at any time and for any reason they choose.  Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign.[3] The United States conducted at least 32 airstrikes targeting Houthi oil offloading infrastructure at Ras Issa Port between April 2 and May 5.[4] This initially created fuel shortages and posed challenges for both the Houthis’ military operations and separately civil service provision in Houthi-controlled territories, but the Houthis gradually learned techniques to ensure service continuity despite the airstrikes.[5] The US airstrikes on April 17 targeting Ras Issa Port alone cost the Houthis approximately $700 million worth of damage, according to a Yemeni economist.[6] The Yemeni Oil Company announced on May 8 that they have successfully repaired the Ras Issa Oil Port’s filling platforms and would restore fuel distribution to all their stations within 24 hours, which demonstrates that even serious damage can be rapidly fixed.[7] Cargo ships have also reportedly resumed offloading operations at Ras Issa Port.[8] Even the best-designed air campaigns can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means.  International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.[9] Shipping companies are still “assessing the deal” and remain deeply skeptical about returning to the Red Sea routes because of the ambiguity of the ceasefire terms, according to the Wall Street Journal on May 8.[10] This includes whether the truce applies broadly to commercial shipping or just US vessels.[11] Other regional events, such as a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, could prompt the Houthis to target international shipping again in the future if the Houthis see a benefit in doing so. The Houthis claimed a likely Iranian attack targeting Saudi Arabia in 2019 during the 2019 US-Iran escalation, demonstrating that the Houthis will sometimes support Iran’s regional objectives even at risk to the Houthi movement.[12] The US airstrikes only addressed the tactical manifestations of the Houthi threat to the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea rather than resolving the underlying strategic and political drivers motivating the Houthis’ campaign. The Wall Street Journal added that industry experts expect it could take months to restore shipping confidence.[13] The persistent risk that the Houthis could disrupt global maritime commerce for months--if not years--at a time underscores the seriousness of the Houthi strategic and economic threat. Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.[14] Unspecified Syrian transitional government officials told the Wall Street Journal on May 7 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara wants to meet US President Donald Trump to discuss broad US investment and aid to rebuild Syria.[15] Shara reportedly requested to meet with Trump during Trump’s upcoming Gulf visit through US businessman and liquified natural gas (LNG) company CEO Jonathan Bass and Syrian Emergency Task Force head Mouaz Moustafa.[16] Bass and Moustafa met with Shara in Damascus on May 2 and presented him with a plan for Western firms to invest in Syria’s energy industry.[17] Syria has significant oil and gas infrastructure that needs to be rebuilt or updated after over a decade of civil war.[18] Bass and Moustafa said that Shara "responded favorably" to the idea of the United States’ waiving or lessening sanctions in order to make the investment possible.[19] An unspecified senior Syrian Foreign Affairs official confirmed Shara’s interest by telling Western media that Syria seeks a relationship with the United States that includes “energy and economic ties.”[20] Bass said that Shara and Syrian officials were also interested in participation from US companies in all areas of Syrian reconstruction.[21] The Trump administration has not yet acknowledged Shara’s reported request. Shara’s proposal may seek to obtain full sanctions relief from the United States by offering investment in Syria. Shara will find it hard to meet all of the Trump administration’s “confidence-building measures,” and could view possible investment in Syria’s energy sector as a bargaining chip.[22] The United States under the first Trump administration previously sought to allow US companies to invest in energy infrastructure in northeastern Syria, and Shara could calculate that a similar scheme would help him obtain sanctions relief.[23] US sanctions that have been in place since the fall of the Assad regime currently prevent direct US economic involvement in Syria. Shara and Syrian transitional government officials have attempted to attain partial or full US sanctions relief since assuming power in December 2024 and have communicated back and forth about several “confidence-building” conditions that the US requested that Syria observe.[24] The Syrian government said that it plans to fully address most of the US demands, including the destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[25] The government has also taken tangible steps to honor the US request that it limit Palestinian military and political activity in Syria.[26] Shara is likely unwilling to act on the US condition that he bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, however, given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[27] Shara said on May 8 during a press conference in Paris that his government guarantees that foreign fighters will not pose a threat to neighboring countries, which suggests that he does not plan to remove them from the current Syrian army ranks or offices.[28] Shara could calculate that a counter-proposal that creates opportunities for US industry in Syria could mitigate his unwillingness to fully observe all the US conditions and still secure sanction relief on Syria. Syrian officials may also be attempting to exploit perceived US interest in curtailing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence abroad in order to secure US sanctions relief and economic support. Unspecified Syrian government officials described Shara’s proposal as a “Marshall Plan-style" program in which US and other Western companies would invest in Syria’s reconstruction instead of China or other powers, according to the Wall Street Journal.[29] That the Syrian officials reportedly specified that Shara would be willing to exclude China suggests that the Syrian government may be attempting to exploit a perceived US interest in curbing the PRC’s influence abroad in order to spur US interest and investment in Syria. Bass said that Shara wants “Boeing” and “US telecom” and not “Huawei,” referring to the Chinese telecommunications company that has invested heavily in partnerships in the Middle East.[30] Recent steps by the Syrian government suggest that it seeks to develop genuine economic partnerships with US adversaries like China and Russia if it cannot secure sanctions relief and economic assistance elsewhere, however. The Syrian government most recently hosted PRC officials on March 27 and discussed “enhancing cooperation,” which CTP-ISW assessed was likely related to securing Chinese support for the transition.[31] Shara and the Syrian transport minister have met with Chinese transport and medical manufacturing businessmen to discuss Chinese investment in Syria within the past week.[32] The Syrian government also reinitiated Syria’s economic ties with Russia in recent months. Russia has delivered Syrian currency and Russian oil to Syria, and Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate Russian investment contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert.[33] Both PRC and Russian officials have made it clear that they seek to increase involvement in Syria. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement on May 8 following a press conference in Moscow that emphasized Russian and Chinese support for Syria’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.”[34] A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.[35] Reuters originally reported that the Treasury Department granted the sanctions exemption, butthe United States has not yet confirmed the sanctions exemption.[36] The Qatari-backed grant initiative will provide Syria with $27 million monthly for three months to pay the salaries of select civilian public sector workers.[37] An unspecified Syrian financial source told Western media that the grant is conditional and will not apply to Syrian Defense Ministry or Interior Ministry personnel.[38] The Syrian government previously announced in January 2025 that it would raise public sector salaries by 400% the following month, but has yet to do so due to a lack of funding.[39] The unspecified Syrian source said that the Qatari funding will help implement this salary raise over the next several months and that the Syrian government would acquire other funds for employees excluded from the initiative.[40] Qatar had previously delayed this initiative in late February 2025 due to uncertainty over whether the funding would breach US sanctions.[41] Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad Yasser Barniyeh welcomed the exemption and said that the Syrian government hopes it will be followed by further measures to ease sanctions.[42] Barniyeh is an economist trained at Damascus, Kansas State, and Oklahoma State universities before working for the Arab Monetary Fund.[43] Barniyeh participated in the liberalization of the Assad regime's economy in the early 2000s, when he served on the Syrian Commission on Financial Markets and the Damascus Securities Exchange.[44] Syria CoT Map Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri inspected an underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province on May 8.[45] Salami threatened to attack any country that supports an attack on Iran. Footage of the base during the visit showed Iranian Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones have a range of 200 and 480 km, respectively.[46] The precise location of the facility is unclear, but the inspection of a base hosting drones that has the range to target most of the Persian Gulf from the southern Iranian coast suggests that Iranian officers were inspecting units and reviewing plans for post-strike responses in the Persian Gulf region. Hormozgan Province lies along Iran‘s southern coast. The visit follows a series of similar inspections at Iranian military and defense sites in Hormozgan and the surrounding provinces.[47] Senior military officers often visit units and facilities under their command as part of their preparations for major defensive and offensive operations to ensure that their commands are well-prepared. IRGC-affiliated media also published old footage on May 8 that showed an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone surveilling the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.[48] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately claimed on May 8 that Iran equipped all of its fighter jets with long-range munitions and updated navigation systems.[49] Most Iranian fighter jets are Cold War third- and fourth-generation aircraft like the F4 Phantom and F14 Tomcat. These threats follow new US threats to attack Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on May 7 that he wants to "blow up" Iran's nuclear centrifuges either “nicely" through an agreement with Iran or “viciously."[50] An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel. UK authorities arrested eight Iranian nationals on May 4 after foiling a suspected Iranian-directed terror plot to target the Israeli Embassy in London.[51] The Guardian reported on May 8 that the UK police conducted its largest raid across the country due to threats of a suspected terror plot.[52] UK MI5 assessed that the plot had reached an “advanced but not imminent” stage and detained the suspects. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi denied Iranian involvement in the terror plot and called for diplomacy.[53] It is possible that the Iranian IRGC did not notify Araghchi about this plot. The IRGC has previously failed to notify other government bodies about its operations.[54] Iran has historically relied on unconventional methods to impose costs on Israel, including conducting terror attacks on Israeli diplomatic and civilian targets abroad. This recent Iranian plot in the UK does not represent an inflection in Iranian activity but is part of a decades-long strategy that includes assassination and bombing plots against Israeli interests in Argentina, Cyprus, Turkey, Georgia, Greece, and Azerbaijan.[55] Iranian officials and Iranian media have previously suggested that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response to the Israeli airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Damascus in April 2024.[56] Iranian officials have also repeatedly warned that Iran will conduct a third missile attack on Israel.[57] Israeli strikes on Iran in October 2024 damaged Iranian long-range missile production, which suggests that Iran‘s ability to respond militarily using its missile stockpile may be somewhat constrained. Iran can still impose costs on Israel by attacking Israeli diplomatic targets in the region and beyond, however.[58] Key Takeaways:·        Houthis Respond to Ceasefire: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel. Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign. International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.·        Syria and Sanctions Relief: Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.·             Syrian Salaries: A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.·        Iranian Officers Inspect Military Facilities: Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran.·             Iranian Terrorist Operations in the United Kingdom: An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7 to 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8.[59]Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Indian officials in New Delhi, India, on May 8 to discuss India-Pakistan tensions and bilateral economic cooperation.[60] Araghchi met with Indian President Droupadi Murmu and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.[61] Araghchi and Jaishankar discussed the implementation of the May 2024 ten-year Chabahar cooperation agreement.[62] The agreement outlines the development of Iran’s southeastern Chabahar port to facilitate trade between Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries, which effectively bypasses Pakistani ports.[63] India was the second largest importer of Iranian oil before the US maximum pressure campaign in 2018.[64] Araghchi also met with Pakistani officials in Pakistan on May 5.[65] This series of meetings comes amid military escalation between India and Pakistan.[66]Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian stated that direct negotiations under “threat or coercion” are irrational and dishonorable but that negotiations in “equal, pressure-free conditions” are "rational and honorable."[67] Ahmadian’s remarks may lay the ground for justifying direct negotiations with the United States. Ahmadian’s remarks follow an Israeli report on May 7 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi approached US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to request direct US-Iran negotiations, reportedly due to Iran’s frustration with the slow progress of Omani-mediated talks.[68] The fourth round of US-Iran talks, initially scheduled for May 3, was postponed due to "logistical reasons.”[69]SyriaThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) opened a field hospital for Druze civilians in Hader, Quneitra Province, on May 8.[70] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the field hospital is part of the IDF’s efforts to support the Syrian Druze population.[71] The IDF has been operating in Hader since December 2024.[72] The establishment of an IDF field hospital in Hader follows Israel’s efforts to pressure the Syrian transitional government to halt sectarian violence against the Syrian Druze community.[73]Southwestern Syria MapThe Syrian and Iraqi governments continued to strengthen border security on both sides of the northern Syria-Iraq border.[74] The Syrian Interior Ministry began to recruit new members for the General Directorate of Border Guards on May 8.[75] The Syrian Defense Ministry recently deployed forces to the Iraqi border on April 18 to tighten control and curb illegal smuggling activities.[76] Syrian media also reported on May 7 that the Iraqi Army deployed new unspecified military units along the border across from the Syrian towns of Albu Kamal and Baghouz.[77] The Iraqi Army previously deployed the 34th Armored Brigade’s 1st Tank Battalion, which operates under the 9th Armored Division, to the Iraq-Syria border on April 16.[78] Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari said in an interview on May 6 that the Iraqi federal government has had no security coordination with the Syrian Interior Ministry yet.[79] Deir Ez Zor mapIraqIraqi media reported that a “high-level” Shia Coordination Framework delegation will discuss multiple “key” issues with Iranian officials from May 8 to 9, including the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[80] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A Shia Coordination Framework source stated that the delegation represents all Shia Coordination Framework components and is authorized to “reach an understanding with Tehran on certain [unspecified] issues of mutual understanding.”[81] Iran reportedly sent a message to Shia Coordination Framework leaders on April 30 that called on the Shia Coordination Framework to remain unified ahead of the upcoming elections. Iran‘s message likely aims to increase the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[82] A fragmented Shia Coordination Framework could allow smaller, less organized parties to outperform Iranian-backed parties. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed multiple memoranda of understanding (MOU) during bilateral talks in Ankara, Turkey, on May 8.[83] The MoUs focused on multiple areas, including defense manufacturing and counter-narcotics. Sudani emphasized the importance of Iraq-Turkey security and counterterrorism cooperation and welcomed efforts to disarm the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during a press conference with Erdogan.[84] Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan agreed in February 2025 to form a strategic alliance to counter the Islamic State.[85]  Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:·        Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas·        Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen·        Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip See topline section. The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon Nothing Significant to Report. CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.  The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm[2] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm[3] https://x.com/ypcye/status/1920388873915355381[4] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907498123565453467 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912942033763004448 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916213258056335479 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1918360758649344161 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1918403660272324682 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919099222781006166 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919496900392165504[5] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919089443178213687 ;https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1919385020013170971[6] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1913172913831727220[7] https://x.com/ypcye/status/1920388873915355381[8] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1920404660914933860 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/seafarers-stranded-off-yemen-port-eye-exit-after-us-houthi-ceasefire-deal-2025-05-08/[9] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce-shipping-industry-a3b01ecf?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 [10] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 16, 2025

 

at 5/16/25 9:07pm

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and George BarrosMay 16, 2025, 8:00 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on May 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine. The Russian delegation reportedly formally demanded that Ukraine cede territory to which Russia has informally been laying claim, while asserting that Russia is ready to continue the war for years. Russia may again formalize previously informal territorial claims in the future as part of Russia's effort to secure full Ukrainian capitulation. Turkish, Ukrainian, and American delegations met on the morning of May 16 in Istanbul, after which Turkish, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met.[1] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, the head of the Russian delegation, likely met with US State Department Director of Policy Planning Staff Michael Anton before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[2] The Ukrainian delegation, including Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, and Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg, UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell, French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor's Advisor for Foreign and Security Policy Gunter Sautter to coordinate positions before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[3] Umerov and Medinsky announced that Ukraine and Russia would exchange 1,000 prisoners of war (POWs) each in the near future.[4] Medinsky stated that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their visions for a possible future ceasefire and that bilateral negotiations will continue after this presentation.[5] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that an unspecified source stated that there was no specific date set for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their ceasefire plans.[6]Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come. Medinsky claimed that those "who do not know history" say that there should be a ceasefire first, then negotiations to achieve peace.[7] Medinsky claimed that war and negotiations should be conducted simultaneously, and Carroll reported that Medinsky stated that Russia is "ready to fight for a year, two, three – however long it takes."[8] Medinsky reportedly referenced the Great Northern War (1700-1721) when asking "how long [is Ukraine] ready to fight?" and claimed that "Russia is prepared to fight forever."[9] Russia state media confirmed that Medinsky spoke about the 18th-century war with Sweden during the meeting.[10]Ukrainian diplomatic sources told various Western and Ukrainian outlets that the Russian delegation made "unrealistic" and "unacceptable" demands that went "far beyond" any demands Russia has previously discussed.[11] The delegation reportedly repeated the Kremlin's demand that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before the start of a ceasefire. The Economist foreign correspondent Oliver Carroll reported that a source stated that the Russian delegation additionally threatened to seize Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Goncharenko similarly reported that the Russian delegation threatened to annex Sumy Oblast in order to create a "security zone."[12]The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy – but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16 Istanbul meeting.[13] Russian officials have informally claimed all of Kharkiv Oblast as part of Russia and launched offensive operations to create buffer zones in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts in May 2024 and March 2025, respectively, that are likely part of Russian territorial expansion efforts, however. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in early February 2025 that Kharkiv Oblast is "strategically" and politically significant for Russia and that he was "certain" that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast because Russia needed a "sanitary zone" to protect itself from Ukrainian shelling.[14] Ganchev further claimed that Kharkiv Oblast would have held a "referendum" to become the "fifth oblast to join Russia" in September 2022 had it not been for the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast at that time. Russian forces launched attacks across the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border in April 2025 to create a buffer zone and possibly press further toward Sumy City in order to expand Russian territorial demands in Ukraine.[15] Russian forces similarly launched offensive operations in May 2024 to create a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated at that time that Russia's envisioned "buffer zone" should encompass all of Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin's concept of the buffer zone is a thinly veiled justification for Russia's intent to subsume larger portions of Ukraine.[16]Russian officials have long been informally laying claim to additional territories in Ukraine beyond Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have consistently claimed that "Novorossiya" – an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all southern and eastern Ukraine – is an "integral" part of Russia and that Odesa City is a "Russian" city."[17] Novorossiya geographically encompasses Kharkiv Oblast. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority."[18] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. The Kremlin may increasingly adopt this pattern of informally discussing additional Russian territorial claims and then formally introducing these claims as demands in peace negotiations in the future.ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory. Putin articulated his theory of victory for his war in Ukraine in June 2024, which posits that Russia will be able to win a war of attrition against Ukraine by continuing gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and preventing Ukraine from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations, assuming Russia’s war effort outlasts Western support for Ukraine.[19]ISW previously assessed that Russia faces a number of compounding materiel, defense industrial, manpower, and economic issues that threaten Russia's ability to continue the war in Ukraine in the long term.[20] Putin is likely prioritizing dividing Ukraine's Western allies and weakening Western support to Ukraine in order to secure his desired end state in negotiations, rather than effectively addressing Russia's domestic problems. Putin’s decision to intensify offensive operations throughout Ukraine in March and April 2025 is only exacerbating these issues and underscores his commitment to pressuring Ukraine in negotiations. ISW continues to assess that increased Western – especially US – military aid and economic sanctions are necessary to enable Ukraine to inflict significant battlefield losses on Russia and force Putin to either change his theory of victory or make an economically painful and unpopular decision to implement another partial involuntary reserve call-up.Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military, including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 15 to appoint former Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General Oleg Salyukov as Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.[21] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia, citing an unspecified source, reported on May 15 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces to replace Salyukov.[22] Mordvichev most recently served as the commander of both the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and Central Military District (CMD) and oversaw Russia's seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian MoD also appointed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk as the new CMD commander, and Russian outlet Ura reported that a high-ranking source in Russian military circles confirmed these reports.[24] Solodchuk most recently served as commander of the Kursk Grouping of Forces and led Russia's efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.[25] Russian insider sources and milbloggers welcomed Mordvichev's appointment and interpreted it as a sign that the Kremlin is initiating a modernization effort to enhance Russia's ability to plan and execute operations in Ukraine and beyond.[26]The Kremlin is likely appointing Mordvichev to proliferate positional warfare tactics and operational concepts for grinding marginal advances – the main tactics Russian forces used in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction – across Russia’s Ground Forces. Mordvichev’s appointment indicates that the Kremlin approves of the tactics developed under Mordvichev’s command – namely, the use of grinding, highly attritional, infantry-led assaults – and aims to institutionalize these tactics that the CMD used to advance in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction since late 2023.Mordvichev is one of the few Russian commanders to have achieved tactical penetrations of the Ukrainian line in the last two years and one of Russia’s most celebrated commanders at the moment, but these limited tactical penetrations have come at great costs.[27] Russian forces suffered significant personnel and equipment losses in exchange for approximately 60 kilometers of penetration since elements of the CMD first redeployed to the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction in October 2023.[28] Mordvichev’s appointment is likely also an effort to distill lessons learned and tactics from the CMD to the rest of the Russian military, as ISW has previously observed Russian units in the Kupyansk and Velyka Novosilka directions implementing the attritional assaults that the CMD utilized to seize Avdiivka in February 2024.[29]Russian forces are continuing to expand their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, although it remains unclear whether the Russian military command will prioritize further advances towards Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk during Summer 2025. Geolocated footage published on May 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and seized Myrolyubivka and Mykhailivka (just west of Myrolyubivka).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 16 that Russian forces advanced further north and southwest of Myrolyubivka and northwest of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Myrolyubivka, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger insinuated that the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade is subordinated to the Central Grouping of Forces.[32] The brigade was likely previously subordinated under the Southern Grouping of Forces, as the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade from the Kurakhove direction to reinforce offensive operations near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) in January 2025.[33] ISW has not observed reports of the brigade engaged in combat since March 2025, however. Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and other elements of the 51st CAA appeared to culminate in Toretsk in February and March 2025, but the brigade may be reentering combat after a period of rest and reconstitution.Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 16 that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near and within Yelyzavetivka (east of Myrolyubivka) that are complicating Russian advances towards Myrnohrad (west of Yelyzavetivka and just east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk.[34] Russian milbloggers also recently acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Yalyzvetivka, and ISW is therefore expanding Ukrainian advances in the area, although these advances are likely not recent.[35] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) and 51st CAA are attempting to advance from Malynivka toward Novoekonomichne and north of Nova Poltavka (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in order to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Yelyzavetivka and to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[36]Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations northeast and east of Pokrovsk after largely abandoning this area in favor of advances further northeast of Pokrovsk toward Kostyantynivka and southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka in early 2024.[37] Ukrainian officials recently reported that Russia is reinforcing its units in the Pokrovsk direction, and ISW recently observed reports that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently redeployed from the Kurakhove direction to near Malynivka.[38] These recent redeployments and the reported appointment of Valery Solodchuk as Central Military District (CMD) commander after his recent success in Kursk Oblast indicate that the Russian military command may refocus on the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in the coming weeks and months. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may attempt to advance along the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line to envelop Pokrovsk instead of fighting through the more urban and heavily defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to Pokrovsk.[39] The Russian military command may redeploy forces from Kursk Oblast or additional elements of the 51st CAA to the CMD’s area of responsibility (AoR) around Pokrovsk and reintensify efforts to advance west of Pokrovsk should the Russian military command prioritize seizing Pokrovsk over pushing further toward Kostyantynivka from the southwest during Summer 2025.The Russian military command may alternatively choose to continue prioritizing advances toward Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025. Russian forces intensified offensive operations aimed at eliminating the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in February and March 2025, and recent Russian advances into Novoolenivka and near Zorya (both southwest of Toretsk) will likely force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from their limited positions remaining in the pocket in the near future.[40] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are currently attempting to attack along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk) and Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[41] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are the main force attacking between Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Nova Poltavka and that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are attacking in other areas southwest of Toretsk, including toward Romanivka.[42] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway and facilitate deeper advances northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka.[43] ISW recently observed reports that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) redeployed from western Zaporizhia Oblast to the Stara Mykolaivka area and that unspecified drone operators recently redeployed from the Kursk direction to near Kalynove (south of Stara Mykolaivka).[44] The Russian military command may continue to reinforce the Russian force grouping southwest of Toretsk and attempt to advance further along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway toward Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk) in the coming weeks if they intend to prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025.Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months. Russian advances southwest of Toretsk currently support both of these efforts, but the Russian military command will likely have to choose to prioritize one direction in the coming weeks due to near-term constraints in Russia’s manpower and materiel reserves.[45] Recent Ukrainian estimates suggest that Russia is recruiting enough forces to slowly grow their force grouping in Ukraine, but ISW has not observed indications that the Kremlin has generated a sufficient operational reserve to support multiple intensified operations as of this report.[46]Russian forces have thus far struggled to break out of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, which has likely complicated Russia’s plans for an offensive against Kostyantynivka and the wider Ukrainian fortress belt. Russian forces may conduct an operational pause after they level the frontline southwest of Toretsk in order to give Russian units in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk time to make more significant advances before beginning a concerted offensive against Kostyantynivka. The recent intensification in Russian activity northeast, east, and south of Pokrovsk suggests that Russian forces may assess that Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk are becoming increasingly vulnerable and that Russian forces should renew their efforts to envelop the town. The Russian military command may attempt to pursue the envelopment of Pokrovsk and significant advances toward Kostyantynivka simultaneously, but pursuing both operations will expedite the timeline for a likely Russian culmination and will undermine Russian forces’ ability to accomplish either goal. Russian forces also must continue to balance offensive operations near Toretsk and Pokrovsk with the manpower and materiel demands of ongoing efforts to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, seize Kupyansk, and push toward Borova, Lyman, Sumy City and Kharkiv City.Key Takeaways:Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine.Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come.The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy - but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16 Istanbul meeting.ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory.Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military, including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces.Russian forces are continuing to expand their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, although it remains unclear whether the Russian military command will prioritize further advances towards Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk during Summer 2025.Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months.Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in the Zaporizhia direction.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population, and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 15 and 16.[47]Russian milbloggers claimed on May 15 and 16 that fighting continues in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and near Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Atynske (southeast of Tetkino in Sumy Oblast) and Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino across the international border).[49]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near the international border near Sudzha.[50]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on May 16.Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on May 16 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advanced from Veselivka (northeast of Sumy City).[51]Fighting continued north and northeast of Sumy City along the Vodolahy–Loknya line.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 16 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Bezsalivka.[53]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 16 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 300 meters toward Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[54]Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi, Kurdiivka and Hlyboke and towards Vysoka Yaruha and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory.[55] Geolocated footage published on May 15 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force mission south of Zhuravlevka (north of Kharkiv City in Belgorod Oblast) toward the international border, possibly to prepare for future offensive operations in the area west of Striplecha (just east of Zhuravelvka in Kharkiv Oblast).[56] Official Ukrainian sources reported on May 15 that Russian forces attacked in the directions of Kurdiivka and Vysoka Yaruga and used an unspecified number of armored vehicles and a significant number of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles.[57] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces also attacked near Hlyboke with one car and six motorcycles.[58]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 16 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Putnykove and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pischane and Novoosynove on May 15 and 16.[59]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 16 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 15 that Russian forces advanced on the eastern bank of the Tekuch River near Hrekivka (southwest of Borova).[60]Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and toward Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Kruhlyakivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Kolisnykivka; and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on May 15 and 16.[61]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 16 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 15 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman).[62]Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Novyi Mir and Ridkodub and toward Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 15 and 16.[63]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Torske (east of Lyman).[64]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 16 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 15 and 16.[65]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 16 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Chasiv Yar, northwest of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), and into Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[66]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Klishchiivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on May 15 and 16.[67]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in Stupochky.[68]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 12, 15, and 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk, north of Dachne (north of Toretsk), west of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and in the northern outskirts of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[69]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk and northwest of Oleksandropil (west of Toretsk).[70]Russian forces continued offensive operations in Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske; west of Toretsk near Katerynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Novospaske (formerly Petrivka), Zorya, Stara Mykolaivka, and Nova Poltavka and toward Popiv Yar on May 15 and 16.[71]See topline text for additional details on Russian activity southwest of Toretsk.Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on May 16 that elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are utilizing unit commanders in infantry assaults in the Toretsk direction.[72]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: See topline text for reports of Ukrainian advances east of Pokrovsk.Assessed Russian advances: See topline text for reports of Russian advances east of Pokrovsk.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk).[73]Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne on May 15 and 16.[74]Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[75]Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and Novoserhiivka and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Zaporizhzhia, and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on May 15 and 16.[76] Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev reported on May 16 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a multi-directional reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault with 12 armored vehicles, five tanks, and 25 motorcycles in an unspecified area between the Novopavlivka through Velyka Novosilka directions.[77] A Ukrainian outlet suggested that the mechanized assault may have occurred near Novooleksandrivka.[78]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 16 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove) and Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[79] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces occupy central Bahatyr.[80]Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr on May 15 and 16.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Bahatyr.[82]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 16 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), south and northwest of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), northwest of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka), and east of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[83]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, Pryvilne, and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole on May 15 and 16.[84]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 16 that the elements of the Russian 5th CAA (EMD) seized Vilne Pole, but ISW assessed Russian forces seized the settlement as of May 15.[85]Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade and drone operators of the 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[86]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces recently advanced in the Zaporizhia direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 15 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced northwest of Lobkove (southwest of Orikhiv).[87]Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka, and Stepove on May 15 and 16.[88]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 15 and 16 but did not advance.[89]A Russian milblogger claimed on May 16 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups periodically cross from the Russian-occupied east (left) bank of the Dnipro River to the west (right) bank.[90]Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against a Russian military base in occupied Crimea on May 16. The "Atesh" Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported that there were explosions at the base of the Russian 126th Coastal Defense Brigade and the 8th Separate Artillery Regiment (both of the 22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) near occupied Perevalne (southeast of Simferopol).[91] Geolocated footage published on May 16 shows an explosion and fire at an ammunition warehouse in Perevalne.[92] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, stated that "unknown drones" struck Russian warehouses in occupied Crimea overnight.[93]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on May 15 and 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Aktarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 73 Shahed drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 36 drones were "lost." Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian drones struck Odesa, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv oblasts.[95]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Minsk on May 16 to discuss strengthening defense cooperation.[96] Lukashenko and Belousov emphasized that Belarus and Russia are planning the upcoming "Zapad-2025" joint military exercise in both Russia and Belarus. Lukashenko thanked Russia for providing Belarus with military hardware, including airplanes and helicopters, and announced that Belarus is actively working to implement Russian President Vladimir Putin's plan to deploy advanced weaponry, including Oreshnik medium-range missiles, in Belarus.[97] Belousov highlighted that Russia is training over 300 Belarusian servicemembers at Russian military educational institutions in modern combat operations and unmanned systems.[98] Belarusian International Military Cooperation Department Head Valery Revenko stated on February 20 that the "Zapad-2025" exercise will occur in mid-September 2025, but it remains unclear how many servicemembers will participate.[99] Russia may use the exercise to permanently forward deploy Russian forces in Belarus. Russia and Belarus ratified a treaty in March 2025 allowing Russia to build military bases in Belarus.[100] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91764[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/71285; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91764[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164880[51] https://t.me/milinfolive/148466[52] https://t.me/rybar/70432[53] https://t.me/milinfolive/148466[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28665[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095 ; https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5462 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28665[56] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1923083295652446274 ; https://t.me/FENRIRFPVMAVICJOB/62 ; https://t.me/FENRIRFPVMAVICJOB/63; https://t.me/FENRIRFPVMAVICJOB/64 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/192310070756713304 1; https://t.me/brigada92_war/3248 ; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1923298875953086764 ; https://t.me/br58ua/1592[57] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095 ; https://t.me/brigada92_war/3248 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9261 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24330[58] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095[60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64304[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64304[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64304 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64296[64] https://t.me/rybar/70432[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/26563; https://t.me/dva_majors/71285; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164877; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31589[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095; https://t.me/wargonzo/26563[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35898; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35873[69] https://t.me/prizrak_lpr/44; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1923351183852220418; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1923349427219022241; https://t.me/tytanybpla/94; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1923349973870989356; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1923349791272042902; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1102; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1923101167657116039; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1923101881355669935; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1923396578053673019; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/663; https://t.me/ombr_28/2105[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28675; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31570; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164894[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095[72] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1019387-cerez-vtrati-u-torecku-armia-rf-zalucae-upravlinna-brigad-do-sturmiv-otu-lugansk/[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35909[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9156; https://t.me/stepovi_hyzhaky_59/6038[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095[77] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=642716195415806&id=100090322922535&rdid=dHKwy4Kp4gcUZirY[78] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-armed-forces-defeat-russian-mechanized-convoys-near-novooleksandrivka-village/[79] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31579; https://t.me/voin_dv/14978[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/14978[81] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329; https://t.me/dva_majors/71285;[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/14978[83] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28696; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64297; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64322; https://t.me/voin_dv/14978[84] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10095; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329[85] https://t.me/mod_russia/52735 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52738 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52740 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2025[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/14964[87] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9159 ; https://t.me/rubak_vyriy/61[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24329 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0angbARaHb2B7gNhZk9BK1oyKjE6t18HMGo4xNnyWTDe6RDvqngbPnQpyS1tZg74el[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24314; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0angbARaHb2B7gNhZk9BK1oyKjE6t18HMGo4xNnyWTDe6RDvqngbPnQpyS1tZg74el[90] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164940[91] https://t.me/atesh_ua/6985 ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1019009-v-krimu-prolunali-vibuhi-na-vijskovih-obektah-armii-rf-ates/[92] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/79614 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1923275872049516767 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71293 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/79594 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1226[93] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9263[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/34464[95] https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1018183-na-cerkasini-16-travna-znisili-32-udarnih-droni-podrobici/ ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11808 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11809 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/16/u-kmva-povidomyly-pro-naslidky-ataky-rosijskyh-bpla/ ; https://www.facebook.com/100064704725226/posts/1124281876405293/?mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=YQLo0apZbgjtm9tB# ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1019025-rf-atakuvala-odesku-oblast-dronami-e-travmovani/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/42786 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/16/dronova-ataka-na-odeshhynu-ye-postrazhdali-zrujnovani-zhytlovi-budynky/ ; https://t.me/kpszsu/34464[96] https://belta dot by/president/view/my-znachitelno-prodvinulis-lukashenko-o-voenno-tehnicheskom-sotrudnichestve-s-rossiej-715283-2025/ ; https://t.me/modmilby/47603 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52730 ; https://t.me/modmilby/47596[97] https://belta dot by/president/view/my-znachitelno-prodvinulis-lukashenko-o-voenno-tehnicheskom-sotrudnichestve-s-rossiej-715283-2025/[98] https://t.me/mod_russia/52741[99] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025 [100] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, May 16, 2025

 

at 5/16/25 9:07pm

Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Ria Reddy, Alexis Thomas, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings. Israel targeted Houthi-controlled al Salif and Hudaydah ports on May 16 as part of an Israeli campaign to disrupt the Houthi ability to enable attacks targeting Israel.[1] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated after the airstrikes on May 16 that Israel will continue to strike Houthi targets “including [Houthi] leadership and all infrastructure that enables [the Houthis] to attack [Israel].”[2] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Israel’s main airport, Ben Gurion Airport, to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip by imposing an “economic blockade” on Israel.[3] The Houthis have launched four ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport since May 12.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepts many of these missiles with its ballistic missile defenses, but some missiles have penetrated Israeli defenses.[5]The IDF targeted Salif and Hudaydah ports likely because the Houthis use these ports to generate revenue and smuggle weapons that they use to launch drone and missile attacks targeting Israel.[6] The United Nations, through the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism, inspects vessels in Djibouti before the vessels offload cargo at Yemeni ports.[7] UN ambassadors have previously warned that there has been a surge in Iranian ships bypassing international inspections and offloading uninspected cargo at Hudaydah Port since 2023.[8] The solid fuel missiles, which Iran smuggles to the Houthis and the Houthis use to target Israel, cannot be disassembled for transit and then reassembled. The challenges inherent in transporting these missiles mean that Iran needs to move solid fuel missiles on larger vessels that presumably require more robust port facilities than smaller dhows commonly used to smuggle weapons to the Houthis.[9] The Palestine-2 and Zulfiqar solid fuel ballistic missiles that the Houthis use to strike Israel are 10 meters long, for example, which makes them more difficult to transport on small dhows.[10] The IDF previously targeted Hudaydah Port on May 5, which decreased the port's capacity by 50 percent, according to the Basha Report.[11] The Basha Report estimated that the May 16 airstrikes reduced the port's capacity by an additional 10 to 20 percent.[12]The Houthis probably forced cargo vessels to stay at Hudaydah Port after the Israeli evacuation notices on May 14 to discourage Israeli airstrikes on certain areas of Hudaydah Port. The IDF also published evacuation orders for the Hudaydah, Salif, and Ras Issa ports on May 11 and May 14.[13] The IDF struck near berth three and seven on May 16, according to the Basha Report.[14] Two Panamanian-flagged, Emirati-owned vessels and one Panamanian-flagged and -owned vessel were docked at berths two, four, and six, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence and Basha Report.[15] A Comoros-flagged vessel was also at Hudaydah Port, north of berth seven.[16] The Houthis were reportedly not allowing the vessel at berth four to leave the port, which is consistent with Starboard Maritime Intelligence data.[17] Starboard‘s data indicates that the vessel at berth four arrived on May 15 and did not leave before the time of the strike.[18] The Houthis have previously employed a similar strategy and held vessels hostage at Houthi-controlled ports as leverage with international actors.[19] All four vessels in and around Hudaydah Port at the time of the strike previously stopped at Djibouti Port, suggesting that the vessels complied with the UNVIM inspections regime described above.[20]US airstrikes targeting Sanaa City in March 2025 reportedly killed Houthi drone and missile chief Zakaria Abdullah Yahya Ahmed Hajar, who reportedly previously trained in Iran, Lebanon, and Syria.[21] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force reportedly trained Hajar in drone warfare and worked closely with him.[22] Saudi Arabia added Hajar to their designated terrorist list in August 2022 for his involvement in Iranian weapons smuggling to the Houthis, Houthi attacks on international shipping, and Houthi ballistic missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia.[23] The United States killed several Houthi drone and missile experts during its airstrike campaign against the Houthis between March and May 2025.[24]The Islamic State is attempting to use discontent with the Syrian transitional government among Salafi-jihadi hardliners to undermine the government and expand recruitment. Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s ruling coalition consists of a wide variety of Sunni Arab groups that were opposed to the Assad regime, some of which are hardline Salafi-jihadists.[25] These Salafi-jihadists remained allied with Shara as he disavowed the Islamic State in 2013 and then al Qaeda in 2016.[26] Other hardliners broke with Shara both times, remaining with the Islamic State in 2013 and al Qaeda in 2016.[27] The Islamic State is again attempting to divide Shara’s following by appealing to hardline and foreign Salafi-jihadists in Ahmed al Shara’s coalition.[28] The Islamic State criticized Shara for cooperating with the United States after his meeting with Trump on May 14 and Shara’s previous efforts to eliminate the influence of “non-state actors and non-Syrian armed groups,” which is a key US demand. The Islamic State encouraged those fighters to join the Islamic State instead.[29]The Islamic State likely hopes to exploit discontent with the transitional government’s ideological moderation and cooperation with the United States. Salafi-jihadi factions linked to Shara’s original coalition that helped overthrow Assad are at ideological odds with the transitional government’s stated approach to respect and preserve the rights of Syrian minorities, though Shara subordinated these factions to himself in the late 2010s and early 2020s and has taken steps to ensure their loyalty.[30] Some individuals within these factions have repeatedly expressed discontent with the direction of the government.[31] Both al Qaeda-linked ideologues and the Islamic State have made similar arguments criticizing Shara’s Western ties in the past.[32]This Islamic State recruitment drive is likely an attempt to further infiltrate transitional government-controlled areas of Syria.[33] The Islamic State noted its growing presence in the “countryside and [city] outskirts” in Syria.[34] The group has had a presence in western Syria under both the Assad regime and the transitional government. It attacked a major Shia shrine south of Damascus in summer 2023, and the Syrian transitional government thwarted an Islamic State plot to target the same shrine in January 2025.[35] Islamic State cells have not successfully conducted attacks in western Syria since the fall of Assad, but Salafi-jihadi groups ideologically aligned with the Islamic State and explicitly opposed to the new government, like Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, have claimed tens of attacks targeting religious minorities across western Syria.[36] ISIS-aligned groups like Saraya Ansar al Sunnah have taken advantage of the porous security situation in western Syria after the fall of the Assad regime, which ISIS could similarly exploit to further infiltrate from eastern Syria.[37]The Iraqi political debate over the Iraqi prime minister’s decision to invite Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara to the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17 illustrates the continued divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, repeatedly criticized Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s invitation to Shara to attend the summit due to Shara’s former membership in al Qaeda in Iraq.[38] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri notably defended Sudani’s invitation to Shara, however.[39] Maliki and Khazali will reportedly run on separate lists against Sudani’s coalition, which will include Ameri.[40] Shara announced on May 13 that Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani would attend the summit in his place due to internal Iraqi opposition to his participation.[41] Sudani met with Khazali and Ameri on May 13, suggesting that Sudani may have caved to Khazali and Maliki’s pressure and discussed the pressure with Ameri before ensuring Shara declined the invitation to the summit. Shara announced he would not attend the summit on May 13 without specifying reasons for his absence.[42]The IRGC Quds Force commander probably traveled to Iraq to ensure alignment among Iranian-backed Iraqi parties ahead of the Arab summit, particularly over engagement with Syria and the invitation to Shara. A State of Law parliamentarian criticized unspecified Iraqi political parties for portraying Iraq as weak in order to attack the Iraqi federal government in an interview on May 14.[43] The parliamentarian added that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on May 14 to “secure the Arab Summit,” implying that Ghaani sought to create unity among the Iranian-backed parties. Ghaani arrived one day after Sudani met with Khazali and Ameri, and would presumably need to forge unity after the political sparring over the invite to Shara. Many Iranian-backed factions, including Khazali’s Asaib Ahl al Haq, threatened the summit if Shara attended, while Ameri defended Shara’s invite. Iran is especially concerned about tensions between the Shia Coordination Framework ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections.[44] Iranian-backed Iraqi parties lost a significant number of seats in the 2021 elections due to inter-party competition that advantaged a more unified opposition.[45]Iranian efforts to secure Syrian debt reimbursement through Iraqi mediation probably do not represent a change in Iranian hostility towards Damascus, though it does illustrate Iran’s economic fragility and need for funds. An informed source told Iraqi media on May 15 that Ghaani emphasized to several Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including Maliki and Ameri, that the Iraqi federal government should help recover Syrian debt to Iran.[46] Iranian parliamentarians and former diplomats calculate that Iran spent about 30 billion US dollars to bolster the Assad regime. CTP-ISW cannot verify this number.[47] Ghaani’s effort to secure Syrian debt to Iran follows US President Donald Trump’s announcement on May 13 that he intends to lift “all” sanctions on Syria, despite several legal obstacles to doing so.[48] Ghaani may have discussed this with Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians due to Shaibani’s planned attendance at the Arab Summit in Baghdad, where Iraqi leaders could engage Shaibani.[49] Ghaani reportedly discussed other Iranian “desires” regarding sanctions relief and the US-Iran nuclear negotiations for the Iraqi federal government to raise at the summit with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji on May 14.[50] It is not clear what Iraq could offer Syria to entice the new Syrian government to repay Assad’s debts to Iran. The money and other support that Tehran gave Assad would have been used to attack the Syrians who currently control Syria.Iran and the Iranian-backed Iraqi actors that Ghaani approached to mediate Syria’s debt repayment continue to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media in late February 2025 that Iraq has not normalized relations with the Syrian government due to Iranian opposition, demonstrating the reality that Iran is still hostile towards Syria.[51] Iran also views Turkey’s influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives. Iranian officials have also expressed concern that the fall of Assad created a vacuum for ISIS to exploit and spread instability to Iran.[52] Maliki and Ameri, like some Iranian officials, view Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Shara as “terrorists.”[53] It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians would be able to compel the Syrian government to repay its debt to Iran. The Syrian government would also almost certainly prioritize reconstructing Syria over repaying Iran because Iranian money made serious contributions to Syria’s destruction.Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely begin the first phase of a pressure campaign to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq. Ghaani reportedly discussed applying political and diplomatic pressure on Turkey to withdraw from Iraq during meetings with Shia Coordination Framework leaders on May 15.[54] Turkey maintains at least 136 permanent military bases across northern Iraq and has built 121 of these bases since 2018 to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), according to BBC analysis.[55] The PKK announced on May 9 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle” after forty years of militant activity.[56]Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders may use force to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq if the diplomatic and political efforts fail. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi figures appear to believe that political and diplomatic pressure will be sufficient to ensure a Turkish withdrawal upon PKK disarmament, but Turkey has not expressed willingness to withdraw at this time. Turkey exerts major influence within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and has previously worked with Iraqi Sunni parties to increase its influence in Iraq, often at Iran’s expense.[57] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously struck a Turkish base in Ninewa Province and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq to impose a cost on Turkey for its regional activities.[58]Key Takeaways:Israeli Strikes on Houthi-Controlled Ports: The Houthis probably forced cargo vessels to stay at Hudaydah Port after the Israeli evacuation notices on May 14 to discourage Israeli airstrikes on certain areas of Hudaydah Port. Israel targeted Houthi-controlled al Salif and Hudaydah ports on May 16 as part of an Israeli campaign to disrupt the Houthi ability to enable attacks targeting Israel. The IDF targeted Salif and Hudaydah ports likely because the Houthis use these ports to generate revenue and smuggle weapons that they use to launch drone and missile attacks targeting Israel.ISIS Recruitment Efforts in Syria: The Islamic State is attempting to use discontent with the Syrian transitional government among Salafi-jihadi hardliners to undermine the government and expand recruitment. The Islamic State likely hopes to exploit discontent with the transitional government’s ideological moderation and cooperation with the United States. This Islamic State recruitment drive is likely an attempt to further infiltrate transitional government-controlled areas of Syria.Iranian-backed Iraqi Parties Remain Divided: The IRGC Quds Force commander probably traveled to Iraq to ensure alignment among Iranian-backed Iraqi parties ahead of the Arab summit, particularly over engagement with Syria and the invitation to Shara. The Iraqi political debate over the Iraqi prime minister’s decision to invite Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara to the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17 illustrates the continued divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework.Iran Seeks Debt Reimbursement from Syria: Iranian efforts to secure Syrian debt reimbursement through Iraqi mediation probably does not represent a change in Iranian hostility towards Damascus, though it does illustrate Iran’s economic fragility and need for funds. It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians would be able to compel the Syrian government to repay its debt to Iran. The Syrian government would also almost certainly prioritize reconstructing Syria over repaying Iran because Iranian money made serious contributions to Syria’s destruction.Iran and Turkey in Iraq: Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely begin the first phase of a pressure campaign to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq. The IRGC Quds Force commander reportedly discussed applying political and diplomatic pressure on Turkey to withdraw from Iraq during meetings with key pro-Iran political leaders. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders may use force to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq if the diplomatic and political efforts fail.Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) met in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and snapback sanctions. This is the first meeting between Iran and the E3 since the start of US-Iran nuclear talks.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyIran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) met in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and snapback sanctions.[59] This marks the first Iran-E3 meeting since the start of US-Iran nuclear talks on April 12. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi led the Iranian delegation.[60] UK Foreign Office Political Director Christian Turner stated that Iran and the E3 “shared [a] commitment to dialogue” and “agreed to meet again,” citing the “urgency” of the moment. This urgency likely refers to US President Donald Trump's 60-day nuclear deal deadline, which ends in June 2025.[61] The meeting also comes after E3 diplomats recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if no substantial deal is reached.[62]Senior Iranian military officials are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected the Southeastern Air Defense Zone in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on May 16.[63] The inspection follows Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri‘s order to deploy military assets to the Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf.[64] The new inspection by Mousavi reflects continued Iranian efforts to enhance Iran’s air defense capabilities and reinforce key military infrastructure in southern Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh previously inspected the Southeastern Air Defense Zone on April 4.[65]Iran continues to deepen its economic ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. The Iran-EEU free trade agreement, signed in December 2023, entered into force on May 15.[66] The EEU is comprised of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The deal aims to facilitate trade between the parties in various sectors, including agriculture, textiles, and industrial goods.[67] The deal reportedly cuts Iranian tariffs on Russian imports from 16.6 percent to 5.2 percent.[68] Iranian media reported that the deal could raise Iran-EEU trade to 12 billion dollars.[69] Iran and Russia have continued to expand ties since they signed the January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.[70] Iran recently approved the opening of the first Russian bank branch in Iran, likely to bypass the US dollar-based SWIFT system and bolster Iran's economy.[71] The deal is part of a broader Iranian effort to reduce dependence on Western markets and mitigate the effect of sanctions on Iran's deteriorating economy.The United States continues to target Iranian oil exports by increasing pressure on foreign buyers. A US Treasury delegation warned banks in Hong Kong in April 2025 against facilitating Iranian oil shipments to China.[72] The Treasury delegation asked banks to identify individuals facilitating illicit Iranian oil trade and scrutinize "suspicious" non-US dollar transactions on May 16.[73] China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, purchasing approximately 90 percent of Iran’s total oil exports.[74] Approximately 6 million tons of Iranian crude oil were delivered to independent Chinese refineries in April.[75] The US warning comes amid US President Donald Trump’s renewed maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports. Part of this campaign has included an increase in sanctions targeting PRC-based entities involved in illicit Iranian oil trade.[76]The Iranian rial appreciated from 830,000 rials to one US dollar on May 15 to 829,000 rials to one US dollar on May 16.[77]SyriaUnknown fighters mortared the Druze town of al Thala along the Suwayda-Daraa border on May 15.[78] Prominent Druze militia Mudafat al Karama called the attackers “outlaw mercenaries” and warned that attacks between provinces and confessional groups seek to weaken Syria.[79] Shelling also targeted other towns near the provincial border.[80] This marks some of the first cross-province violence targeting Druze communities in Suwayda since Druze notables and Damascus agreed to a security framework in early May.[81]The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) seized weapons and military equipment in two separate operations near Qardaha, Syria, on May 15 and 16.[82] GSS forces raided a warehouse in Bahmra, west of Qardaha, on May 15, containing approximately 1,000 improvised explosive devices that appeared to have been manufactured at scale.[83] GSS forces also seized various quantities of ammunition, a MILAN anti-tank guided missile launcher, and a Konkurs anti-tank guided missile in Qardaha, Latakia Province, on May 16.[84] Qardaha is former Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s hometown.[85] The GSS has seized numerous weapons linked to Assadist insurgent cells in Qardaha since January 2025, which suggests that it has served as a likely insurgent support zone.[86] It is unclear if insurgents have continued to use it as a support zone, given the lack of insurgent attacks in western Syria.GSS forces also seized small arms, grenades, communication devices, and other military equipment in Beit Tema, Rif Dimashq Province, on May 16.[87]The United States will offer Syria initial economic and sanctions relief via a sanctions waiver before removing all US sanctions. US President Donald Trump announced on May 13 that he will order the cessation of “all” US sanctions on Syria.[88] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on May 15 that the Trump administration will initially seek a 180-day waiver on sanctions imposed on Syria by the US Congress.[89] Rubio said that Trump intends to use the waiver authority granted to him by the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which penalizes those who do business with the Syrian government.[90] Rubio added that the Trump administration will attempt to repeal the act entirely if the Syrian transitional government “makes enough progress.”[91] The Trump administration will need Congressional approval to remove the Caesar Act. The US Treasury Department issued a six-month general license in January 2025 that authorized certain transactions with the new Syrian government after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[92] Rubio met with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Turkey on May 15 to discuss US-Syria relations and a roadmap for lifting sanctions.[93]IraqSee topline section.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripSee topline section.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing significant to report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.  The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1923400705714352639; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1923386330408521805 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1923385561449910337; https://t.me/moriahdoron/21748[2] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/4gvsmejgd#[3] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3481853.htm[4] https://t.me/army21ye/2981;https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthi-missile-likely-aimed-at-israel-falls-short/;https://t.me/army21ye/2964?single;https://t.me/army21ye/2972[5] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1923078353784868867;https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1923359347482005723; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-working-intercepting-missile-launched-yemen-2025-05-04/[6] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1923400705714352639[7] https://vimye.org/[8] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/stop-israeli-attacks-yemen-enforce-sanctions-iran-houthi-link[9] https://www.edrmagazine.eu/edr-analysis-houthi-maritime-strike-capabilities#:~:text=It%20is%20not%20clear%20whether,target%2C%E2%80%9D%20Dr%20Kaushal%20said.&text=It%20is%20a%20solid%20fuel,will%20not%20find%20a%20target.; https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-missile-arsenal-iran-israel-hamas-ed74174915e301d30c50493f2c629a1a; https://headedforspace.com/why-solid-rocket-boosters-are-dangerous/#:~:text=2)%20A%20Solid%20Rocket%20Booster,explode%20in%20the%20following%20article.)[10] https://armyrecognition.com/military-products/army/missiles/hypersonic-missiles/palestine-2-hypersonic-missile#spec; https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/zolfaghar/[11] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments[12] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments[13] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1921625616861810785 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1922542231837118527[14] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments[15] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments; Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"[16] Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"[17] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments; Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"[18] Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025[20] Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"[21] https://www.defenseliney dot net/posts/260[22] https://www.defenseliney dot net/posts/260[23] https://www.defenseliney dot net/posts/260[24] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4167047/uscentcom-forces-continue-to-target-houthi-terrorists[25] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate033125[26] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/78961-al-nusra-commits-to-al-qaida-deny-iraq-branch-merger/ ; https://www.brookings.edu/research/profiling-jabhat-al-nusra/[27] https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/twenty-years-after-9-11-the-fight-for-supremacy-in-northwest-syria-and-the-implications-for-global-jihad/ ; https://academic.oup.com/book/57951 pg 93 and 127[28] SITE Intelligence Group, ” IS Condemns Julani Sacrificing Religion and Sovereignty at Trump's "Doorstep," Mocks Search for Dead Americans in Dabiq” May 15, 2025. Available by subscription. ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051425[29] SITE Intelligence Group, ” IS Condemns Julani Sacrificing Religion and Sovereignty at Trump's "Doorstep," Mocks Search for Dead Americans in Dabiq” May 15, 2025. Available by subscription.[30] https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-24-2024 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/jihadi-counterterrorism-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-versus-the-islamic-state/[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-24-2024[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-24-2024[33] SITE Intelligence Group, ” IS Condemns Julani Sacrificing Religion and Sovereignty at Trump's "Doorstep," Mocks Search for Dead Americans in Dabiq” May 15, 2025. 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https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0090[77] Bon-bast.com[78] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1923175841971704130 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1923106562073112727 ; https://www.facebook.com/althalaa10/posts/pfbid034AAHaR9CmuH89Kf2u7sqBfJpR7dKzC8wkHruswpLopPYVvnPjiCphCsiDPRYggChl?__cft__[0]=AZUrV1lNlubvvgs_X9rXDsSyqSUqMJoeOOFWcrASyCyC9SterrBirjtINw4Vut45trSELRRGqru242TlvBrPcribYg0MXPIOMaPecn-WLFKuxcOMTKQtqx8QwZYvOsXtqK7Rcz6dBE4wPS2enPdAIGIKF_URorDJ_gsntIinwPqbKT3AehjfJFMNXSrpGxcFXMg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1923123054130971042[79] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02GSYF5eBFxopAGxdCcSstD9CkmVNrB8h6EPNQgqXJZiZyvFf6EWAcVDGsyhJ2YjFGl&id=100064919851077&__cft__[0]=AZXOkWYSftrJ1nZjiQcekkp7t0NgTVVeSLN827gZmpuVmBQmXxushQcffH242pOKQ8wRofRXA5gFm5K1kG8cjqECQJUegDoGExFkVTeTYr92UUWrsqlFfcKVEzGsx2fEeqGkQlspVzVcAOxtFwkySLNAtzzhzSMgbmYbzGiGbzAMPg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[80] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02xhqcjHmMixkJQu9SS9iHN3prBckqsAjJ7JbhV8EcZVKfsow2oGqEExrfGAqpjDRl&id=100088574370045&__cft__[0]=AZWHWafhVu7W-gsdNrcBT--dlXwWAy7CzT3R-IyGSsmLjSiScMq0AUVxdAkASMZOPetFHpKGD3boBrfMWa6KiRfszlIz2TeIp8DelQ89xCdoVaKYarXt84mndg-ySHg6o45hKgDKhmq3OSK47He4A-k5TXLN0uK78An4HeDH-L7Sz05sxXptCF3Z7fkVUQQwsQ0&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1923175841971704130 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1923337382713086438 ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1923132929137431034[81] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050525[82] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1923340880682852521 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/24242[83] https://x.com/OALD24/status/1923370569627521404 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1923109607003566437[84] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4584 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1923437816173781025[85] https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-assads-domination-of-qardaha/[86] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1913254810716975472 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-18-2025 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883134566367715559[87] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1923340880682852521[88] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025[89] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-15/trump-will-seek-180-day-waiver-to-congress-sanctions-on-syria?taid=682630d1f8868200012edcfe&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter[90] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-15/trump-will-seek-180-day-waiver-to-congress-sanctions-on-syria?taid=682630d1f8868200012edcfe&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter[91] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-15/trump-will-seek-180-day-waiver-to-congress-sanctions-on-syria?taid=682630d1f8868200012edcfe&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&embedded-checkout=true[92] https://apnews.com/article/treasury-bashar-assad-sanctions-syria-biden-4df4fb793579c7aa820bcf5392286bd5[93] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/834 

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, May 14, 2025

 

at 5/14/25 7:21pm

 Andie Parry, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has continued to prioritize appeasing loyalists in his ruling coalition over reassuring minority groups that the government will protect them, which risks future instability. The Syrian Interior Ministry promoted Latakia Province General Security Service (GSS) Director Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Knefati to commander of the Interior Ministry Special Forces on May 13.[1] Knefati served as the Latakia Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025, which included the spate of sectarian-motivated violence and insurgent activity in coastal Syria in March.[2] Some Latakia Province GSS personnel took part in the March 2025 massacres.[3] The committee charged with investigating the violence has yet to release its report.[4] Knefati, as the commander of forces that are accused of committing atrocities, bears responsibility for the actions of those forces and could be named in the report. The Alawite community remains deeply fearful of the new transitional government after the recent coastal massacres. A lack of transitional justice could stoke protests and increase distrust in the government, which risks future political instability. It would similarly disincentivize minority communities from disarming due to fears for their safety.Ahmed al Shara has continued to elevate commanders of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions in the Syrian military apparatus without requiring them to reform or restructure their forces. Syrian Deputy Defense Minister Fahim Issa met with several unspecified Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated leaders near Ras al Ain, Hasakah Province, on May 13.[5] Issa previously commanded the Sultan Murad Division, which is an SNA faction, and has overseen the “northern region” within the Syrian MoD since April 2025.[6] The SNA currently controls Ras al Ain.[7] Shara likely calculates that he needs the support of these SNA commanders to avoid infighting among powerful factions, which would hinder his efforts to establish control over Syria. Shara almost certainly recognizes that alienating these factions or attempting to subordinate them by force would be too difficult a task for his relatively meager armed forces, especially without Turkish assistance. The networks that these individuals control could also rapidly destabilize certain areas of Syria if they chose to mobilize these networks against the Syrian government. The elevation of these individuals will likely reinforce the Kurdish minority’s skepticism of Damascus and further delay the implementation of integration agreements between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces and the transitional government.[8] Shara’s decision to pursue state building and power consolidation in this way will likely instill feelings of insecurity among members of the Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite communities, which may discourage these communities from cooperating with the government, despite their desire to be part of a unified Syria. Systemic issues that arise from choices that Shara makes to consolidate power may not have immediate implications, but they will likely weaken the Syrian state in the long term.The Syrian Interior Ministry and Foreign Ministry appointed several Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated individuals to senior ministerial and security positions between May 10 and 13.[9] Unspecified Syrian security sources told Saudi media that these appointments are part of the foreign, defense, interior, and justice ministries’ new plans and procedures to enhance security, enforce the law, and restore public confidence.[10] The Syrian government’s appointment of HTS affiliates to key ministerial and security positions suggests that President Shara aims to maintain his and HTS’s influence within key ministries. Shara’s decision to position loyalists in these roles will enable him to shape the policies of the Syrian government and its security services. The newly-appointed individuals include:Abdul Qader al Tahhan (Abu Bilal Quds) as Deputy Interior Minister for National Security Affairs.[11] Tahhan was previously the Aleppo sector commander in al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and the HTS-led Fateh Mubin operations room that overthrew the Assad regime.[12] Tahhan also led the al Quds Battalion, an Aleppo-based Islamist opposition group, and commanded several battalions within Jaysh al Fatah.[13] Jaysh al Fatah was a coalition of Syrian Islamist opposition groups that formed in March 2015.[14]Hakim al Deiri (Dia al Din al Omar) as GSS Director of Latakia Province.[15] Deiri previously served as the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) Public Security Spokesperson.[16] Deiri was also the Deir ez Zor Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025.[17]Muhammad Taha al Ahmad as Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs.[18] Ahmad served as SSG Minister of Economy from November 2017 to December 2019 and SSG Minister of Agriculture from December 2019 to December 2024.[19] Ahmad also served as the Director of Civil Administration in the Islamist opposition coalition Jaysh al Fatah prior to 2017.[20]US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met in Riyadh on May 14, marking a positive development in US-Syria relations.[21] This meeting marks the first time that US and Syrian heads of state have met in 25 years. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended the meeting remotely. Trump, Shara, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman discussed the importance of lifting sanctions on Syria and the impact that lifting sanctions would have on regional stability.[22] Trump announced on May 13 that he intends to lift “all” sanctions on Syria, though there are several legal obstacles that Trump must overcome in order to be able to do so. Trump and Shara also discussed eliminating the influence of “non-state actors and non-Syrian armed groups.”[23] Shara is unlikely to meet this demand, given that he has already appointed several foreign fighters who are loyal to him to senior positions in the Syrian government in an effort to consolidate power.[24] Trump also encouraged Shara to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel.[25] Shara did not explicitly reject the proposal but reiterated his commitment to the 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel, which would require Israel to withdraw from the Syrian territory where it has operated since the fall of the Assad regime.[26] Trump praised Shara as a “young, attractive... [and] tough guy” following the meeting.Western media and a Yemen analyst have reported somewhat different information about the formation of the recent US-Houthi ceasefire, though these reports are not mutually exclusive.[27] US officials told Western media that the Houthis approached the United States first through Omani mediators to request a ceasefire.[28] A Yemen analyst reported on May 7 that US officials submitted three demands to the Houthis. These demands included halting attacks on US vessels, stopping attacks targeting Israel, and re-engaging in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap.[29] This report is not inconsistent with the report that the Houthis approached the United States first, given that the United States could have proposed these demands following the initial Houthi request for a ceasefire.[30] The Houthis accepted the first demand, but they appear to have rejected the second demand, and it is unclear if they agreed to re-engage in peace talks. Senior Houthi officials, including Houthi Political Bureau member and spokesperson Mohammed al Bukhaiti, have told international media since April 10 that the Houthis would cease attacks on US vessels if the United States stopped its air campaign targeting the Houthis.[31] The Houthis have not attacked maritime shipping since November 2024, though they threatened to renew the attack campaign in March 2025.The Houthis have not abandoned their October 7 War objectives and are, therefore, not defeated. The Houthis still seek to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip by imposing an “economic blockade” on Israel.[32] The Houthis attacked ships with reported ties to Israel between October 2023 and November 2024 to disrupt trade through Israeli ports.[33] The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since November 2024.[34] The Houthis launched three separate unsuccessful ballistic missile attacks targeting Ben Gurion Airport on May 12 and 13.[35] The Houthis announced on May 4 that they would focus their attacks on Ben Gurion Airport after Israeli air defense systems failed to intercept a Houthi ballistic missile that crashed in the airport’s parking lot.[36] The Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport are meant to achieve the Houthis’ original October 7 War objective to support Hamas by hurting the Israeli economy and imposing an economic cost on Israel for its operations in the Gaza Strip.[37] The US-Houthi ceasefire has not rendered the Houthis unwilling or unable to continue to try to achieve this objective.Iran is reportedly trying to get Arab countries, including Iraq, to encourage the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and conclude a nuclear deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in Baghdad on May 14 to encourage the Iraqi federal government to raise “Iranian desires” at the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, according to an unspecified source speaking to Iraqi media.[38] Araji is a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. Ghaani will reportedly meet with other Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians during his visit to Baghdad. The unspecified source stated that Iran “seeks Arab support” to remove international sanctions on Iran and “move toward a nuclear agreement more quickly.” Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands during the ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations for zero uranium enrichment and criticized the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports.Iran reportedly recently proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, likely to try to maintain some level of uranium enrichment. Emirati Foreign Affairs Minister Khalifa Shaheen al Marar and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud will attend the Arab Summit. It is possible that this proposal will be discussed at the summit.Key Takeaways:Government Formation and Consolidation of Power in Syria: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has continued to prioritize appeasing loyalists in his ruling coalition over reassuring minority groups that the government will protect them, which risks future instability. The Syrian Interior Ministry promoted Latakia Province General Security Service (GSS) Director Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Knefati to commander of the Interior Ministry Special Forces on May 13. Knefati served as the Latakia Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025, which included the spate of sectarian-motivated violence and insurgent activity in coastal Syria in March. Knefati, as the commander of forces that are accused of committing atrocities, bears responsibility for the actions of those forces and could be named in the report.Government Formation and Consolidation of Power in Syria: Shara has also continued to elevate commanders of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions in the Syrian military apparatus without requiring them to reform or restructure their forces. The elevation of these individuals will likely reinforce the Kurdish minority’s skepticism of Damascus and further delay the implementation of integration agreements between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces and the transitional government.Government Formation and Consolidation of Power in Syria: The Syrian Interior Ministry and Foreign Ministry appointed several Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated individuals to senior ministerial and security positions between May 10 and 13. The Syrian government’s appointment of HTS affiliates to key ministerial and security positions suggests that President Shara aims to maintain his and HTS’s influence within key ministries.Trump-Shara Meeting: US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met in Riyadh on May 14, marking a positive development in US-Syria relations. This meeting marks the first time that US and Syrian heads of state have met in 25 years. Trump, Shara, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman discussed the importance of lifting sanctions on Syria and the impact that lifting sanctions would have on regional stability.US-Houthi Ceasefire: The Houthis have not abandoned their October 7 War objectives and are, therefore, not defeated. The Houthis still seek to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip by imposing an “economic blockade” on Israel.US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is reportedly trying to get Arab countries, including Iraq, to encourage the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and conclude a nuclear deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in Baghdad on May 14 to encourage the Iraqi federal government to raise “Iranian desires” at the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, according to an unspecified source speaking to Iraqi media. The unspecified source stated that Iran “seeks Arab support” to remove international sanctions on Iran and “move toward a nuclear agreement more quickly.”Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyIran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will meet in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[39] The Iranian delegation will likely try to persuade the E3 not to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on May 13 that the E3 may trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[40] The E3 previously stated that Iran needed to conclude a new nuclear deal by June 2025.[41] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[42] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[43] The IAEA has not released the report at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report will almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions.[44] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi may lead the Iranian delegation. Ravanchi and Gharibabadi previously led the US-Iran technical talks in Oman on April 26.[45] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal and has recently met with senior Russian officials to discuss the Iranian nuclear program and US-Iran nuclear talks.[46] Gharibabadi has also recently coordinated with China and Russia on Iran’s nuclear program.[47] The Iran-E3 talks were originally scheduled for May 2 but were postponed after the fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks was delayed.[48]A group of Iranian parliamentarians echoed a senior Iranian military commander’s recent threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if Israel or the United States strikes Iranian energy infrastructure.[49] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 13 to disrupt international commercial shipping if the United States “makes a mistake.”[50] Bagheri recently inspected military positions in southern Iran and approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Persian Gulf.[51] Bagheri also ordered the IRGC to implement a new operational plan around these islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities.[52]Senior Iranian military officials are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Khosravi Air Defense Group in northeastern Iran on May 14 to inspect the site’s operational readiness and capabilities.[53] Sabahi Fard inspected surface-to-air artillery positions and observation posts at the site. Senior Iranian commanders have recently conducted several inspections of air defense sites and military bases across Iran, likely to ensure that units remain prepared for a potential strike.[54]The Iranian rial depreciated from 834,500 rials to one US dollar on May 13 to 836,000 rials to one US dollar on May 14.[55]SyriaThe Kurdish National Council (KNC) announced on May 14 that it will form a Kurdish delegation to negotiate with the Syrian government.[56] The KNC is a minority Kurdish political coalition that is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).[57] KNC Spokesperson Faisal Youssef told Kurdish media that the delegation will hold talks with the Syrian government to “find a solution to the Kurdish issue.“[58] The KNC’s announcement comes amid tension between Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Syrian Kurdish political parties over the form of governance in Syria.[59] Kurdish political parties, including the KNC and its longtime political rival, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), recently unified their position during the April 26 Kurdish Unity Conference.[60] The Kurdish parties called for a federal structure that would create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[61] Shara rejected these demands on April 27, calling the push for federalism “divisive” and urging the PYD-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to preserve “national unity.”[62]Unspecified individuals continue to conduct targeted killings across Syria. Unknown gunmen kidnapped an Alawite man near Jableh, Latakia Province, on May 14.[63] This and similar instances of sectarian violence could risk reviving a sectarian-based insurgency against the Syrian transitional government.[64] Syrian media separately reported on May 14 that unknown gunmen shot a GSS member in Aleppo City.[65]The GSS raided a large Captagon laboratory in Qardaha, Latakia Province, on May 13.[66] Qardaha is former Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s hometown.[67] GSS forces seized industrial-grade manufacturing equipment and a large weapons cache in the laboratory.[68] Captagon, which is an addictive amphetamine, was previously one of the largest sources of income for the Assad regime and Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah.[69] The presence of a Captagon laboratory in Assad’s hometown underscores the former regime’s deep involvement in the narcotics trade. Captagon manufacturing is unlikely to cease completely following the fall of the Assad regime, given that some Syrians may still rely on this industry for income.The GSS arrested several former Assad regime members in three separate operations across Syria on May 14. GSS forces targeted former regime members who refused to give up their weapons in the town of Talkalakh, western Homs Province.[70] The GSS arrested at least five individuals, seized several small arms, and recovered a large amount of currency.[71] GSS forces separately arrested a National Defense Forces (NDF) member in al Haffah, Latakia Province.[72] The NDF member was responsible for supervising several checkpoints in Damascus under the former Assad regime and has been accused of torture and extortion.[73] GSS forces also arrested a former Assad regime member in Damascus Province who reportedly ran an informant network for the Assad regime.[74] These arrests come amid a series of revenge killings that have targeted former Assad regime members. Revenge killings are caused in part by a lack of government-led transitional justice efforts to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the civil war.The leader of the Israeli Druze community, Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif, announced a halt to interference in the Syrian Druze community, reversing his past calls to action.[75] Tarif stated that he is in contact with Syrian Druze sheikhs to assist the Syrian Druze community without interfering in its internal decision-making. He reaffirmed the Syrian Druze community’s right to self-determination without external influence.[76] Tarif likely directed these statements, in part, at the Israeli government, which has emphasized that it seeks to protect the Druze community in Syria. Tarif’s statements come shortly after the Syrian transitional government and Druze armed faction leaders reached a joint security agreement in Suwayda Province.[77] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the transitional government likely concluded this agreement to build support for Damascus within the Syrian Druze community.[78] Tarif’s statements may reflect that relations between the Syrian Druze community and the Syrian transitional government are gradually improving.IraqSee topline section.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripThe Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing significant to report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922220001399869449[2] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922220001399869449 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-syria%E2%80%99s-emerging-insurgency[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czxnwrqey4go ; https://snhr.org/blog/2025/03/11/803-individuals-extrajudicially-killed-between-march-6-10-2025/[4] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/05/two-months-in-coastal-investigation-committee-yields-no-results-amid-accusations-of-deliberate-delay ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate041125[5] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1922329344065585422 ; https://x.com/AhmadBetar7/status/1921994954911461881[6] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1911122576555855994 ; https://www.syria dot tv/عودة-الحلف-القديم-وتفعيل-قرارات-اجتماع-تركيا-فهيم-عيسى-قائداً-للفيلق-الثاني ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-reaches-deal-integrate-sdf-within-state-institutions-presidency-says-2025-03-10/[9] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122423 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922126461575565522 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/31286 ; https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922220001399869449[10] https://x.com/AsharqNewsSYR/status/1922260542938333303[11] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122423 ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تعيينات-أمنية-جديدة-في-سورية ; https://www.syria dot tv/الداخلية-السورية-تُجري-تعيينات-أمنية-جديدة-في-عدد-من-المحافظات[12] https://nabd dot com/s/154711610-bf15bc/عبد-القادر-طحان-قائد-جهاز-الأمن-العام-هل-يغسل-التاريخ-الجهادي-بالمنصب؟>[13] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تعيينات-أمنية-جديدة-في-سورية[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-rebels-army-conquest-jaish-al-fatah.html[15] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922126461575565522[16] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922157722188874023[17] https://www.facebook.com/groups/1611247285852843/posts/3914019755575573 ; https://x.com/Wolveri07681751/status/1885429497878516009[18] https://t.me/damascusv011/31286[19] https://syrianmemory.org/archive/figures/5e663c1fef8f6f0001972dab[20] https://x.com/pressrahhal/status/1921231738954457555 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-rebels-army-conquest-jaish-al-fatah.html[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/14/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions/4b174694-308c-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html ; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/14/trump-meets-syria-president-after-lifting-us-sanctions#:~:text=Trump%20later%20travelled%20to%20Doha%2C%20where%20he,for%20Syria's%20reintegration%20into%20the%20international%20arena. ; https://t.me/SyPresidency/990 ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/832[22] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/14/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions/4b174694-308c-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/832[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025 ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/832[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/14/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions/4b174694-308c-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html[26] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/14/trump-meets-syria-president-sharaa[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html?searchResultPosition=3 ; https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13[29] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13[31] https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/houthi-united-states-strikes-gaza-blockade-israel-shipping[32]https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/01/middleeast/israel-says-it-thwarted-attacks-from-yemens-houthis-intl-hnk/index.html[33] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be[34] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be[35] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthi-missile-likely-aimed-at-israel-falls-short/;https://t.me/army21ye/2964?single ;https://t.me/army21ye/2972 ;https://x.com/idfonline/status/1922328548146069872;https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1922433178284769622[36] https://t.me/army21ye/2923[38] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5--%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%B1%D8%BA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9[39] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/24/3312693[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-europeans-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-diplomatic-sources-say-2025-05-13/[41] https://jewishinsider dot com/2025/02/uk-ambassador-israel-simon-walters-inss-iran-nuclear-talks-sanctions/[42] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf[43] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2024/11/21/iran-says-west-resolution-will-weaken-disrupt-iaea-interactions ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-21-2024[44] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-14-2025[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-25-2025 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/06/329[46] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/middleeast/iran-united-nations-ambassador.html ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2025[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-8-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-17-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-23-2024 ; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/220980/Gharibabadi-to-appointed-as-Iran-s-top-nuclear-negotiatior?utm_source=chatgpt.com[48] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-uk-france-germany-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-2025-04-30/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025[49] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/24/3312838[50] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/[51] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/[52] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/23/3311610[53] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/24/3313099[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-24-2025 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025 ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-8-2025 ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2025[55] www.bon-bast.com[56] https://x.com/rudaw_arabic/status/1922536008593117235[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2025 ; https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/syria/24032025[58] https://npasyria dot com/213046[59] https://x.com/SDCPressT/status/1900460888781439061[60] https://npasyria dot com/213046[61] www dot npasyria.com/211587[62] https://t.me/SyPresidency/875[63] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1922636380468842853 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922657368736752030[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/alawite-insurgents-seek-use-sectarian-violence-destabilize-interim-government-syria ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-12-2025 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1921497035770831336; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122375; https://t.me/almougahid313/600 ; https://x.com/AlekhbariahSY/status/1921339210092384632 ;[65] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922624569707237882[66] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922389386303250838 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922553755792269667 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/57049[67] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922389386303250838 ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qardaha[68] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922389386303250838[69] https://www.dw dot com/en/syrias-dictator-is-gone-but-his-drug-dealers-are-still-busy/a-72033154[70] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922625016274751823 ; https://t.me/HomsGov1/2659 ; https://x.com/AlekhbariahSY/status/1922614254647058931 ; https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922607192013754660[71] https://t.me/HomsGov1/2659 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922625016274751823[72] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4475 ;https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922646827314110477 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142562 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922736171693527445 ;[73] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4475 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922736171693527445 ;[74] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922674262957080951[75] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/05/muwaffaq-tarif-calls-for-a-unified-syria/[76] https://x.com/joetruzman/status/1895897759775146078?s=46&t=OYTvR5h_qYY_4fPQ5FKbFA[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025[78] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2025

 

at 5/14/25 7:21pm

 Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, and Karolina Hird with William Runkel and Nate TrotterMay 14, 2025, 5:10 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on May 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed on May 14 that the April 2022 draft Istanbul protocols could be the basis for an agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine.[1] Miroshnik is echoing Putin's May 11 call to "resume" the 2022 Istanbul direct negotiations in response to the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a 30-day minimum general ceasefire.[2] Miroshnik noted that Russia and Ukraine could make "adjustments" to the 2022 Istanbul protocols to account for changes in the past three years, but specifically insisted that Russia's April 2022 demands that Ukraine significantly reduce its military capabilities and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances — including NATO — remain unchanged. Putin and Miroshnik are deliberately reiterating Russia's terms in the Istanbul protocols because the protocols included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression — aims that the Kremlin continues to pursue.[3] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[4] The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of the full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Miroshnik's observation that Russia and Ukraine could adjust aspects of the Istanbul protocols to reflect the changes in the war over the past three years is an attempt to frame the Kremlin as willing to negotiate, which obfuscates the fact that Russia has actually maintained its long-term goal of total Ukrainian surrender. Putin, Miroshnik, and other Russian officials continue to demand Ukraine's full surrender in an attempt to secure Russia's strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.[5]Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul. Ryabkov stated on May 13 that the upcoming Istanbul discussions would need to address the "primary sources" of the war in order to achieve a sustainable end to the war, likely alluding to Russia's continued demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes."[6] Ryabkov also reiterated the claim that Ukraine must continue to "denazify." Russian officials repeatedly invoke the term "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv.[7] Russian officials have defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[8] Ryabkov's statements reflect the Kremlin's long-standing effort to achieve its pre-war demands that call for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and for the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, despite recent Kremlin efforts to feign interest in good-faith negotiations.Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published a survey conducted from May 2 to 12 that showed that 74 percent of respondents trust Zelensky — an increase from 69 percent in March 2025.[9] The May 2025 KIIS poll showed that 71 percent of respondents do not support holding elections after a ceasefire, even if Ukraine receives security guarantees, and instead think that Ukraine should hold elections only after the establishment of a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war. KIIS noted that the majority of respondents in all regions of Ukraine support Zelensky and do not support holding elections until after the end of the war. The poll's majority opinion that elections should not occur until after the end of the war is in line with Ukraine's law on martial law and the Ukrainian Constitution, which stipulate that Ukraine cannot hold elections during martial law and cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[10] The Kremlin has repeatedly tried to weaponize Zelensky's alleged "illegitimacy" to reject and delay ceasefire proposals and negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future agreements Russia may sign with Ukraine.[11] The Kremlin has also repeatedly attempted to justify its invasions of Ukraine by claiming that large portions of eastern and southern Ukraine want to join Russia.[12] The KIIS poll — the results of which were relatively consistent across all regions of Ukraine - undermines these Kremlin narratives.Key Takeaways:Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation.Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul.Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 14.Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Tetkino and toward Novyi Put (both southwest of Glushkovo).[13]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 234th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and "Aida" Group of the Chechen 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[14]A Russian milblogger claimed on May 14 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Popovka in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.[15]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Loknya (northeast of Sumy City) and to the southern outskirts of Bilovody (north of Sumy City).[16]Ukraine's Siversk Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups in the Sumy direction.[17]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[18]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk.[19]The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on May 14 that Russian forces are trying to accumulate personnel in the Kharkiv direction.[20]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[21]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk along the international border near Topoli and Petrivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on May 13 and 14.[22]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Kontora” Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[23]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[24]Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novoserhiivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Olhivka on May 13 and 14.[25]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) marginally advanced near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[26]Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Lozova, Yampolivka, and Novomykhailivka; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 13 and 14.[27]Drone operators of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 13 that Russian forces have reduced their use of armored vehicles in combat in this direction and are increasingly using motorized civilian vehicles, likely due to Ukrainian drones destroying Russian armored vehicles.[28]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) on May 13 and 14 but did not advance.[29]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar and northwest of Ozaryanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[30]Russian forces attacked near and within Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 13 and 14.[31] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault and destroyed three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[32]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[33]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 and 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and west of Yablunivka (southwest of Toretsk).[34] Additional geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Zorya (southwest of Toretsk).[35]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further north of Toretsk than available geolocated footage indicated.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Oleksandropil and near Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[37]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka, and toward Bila Hora; and southwest of Toretsk near Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Novoolenivka, Romanivka, Yelyzavetivka, and towards Zorya, Hnativka, and Yablunivka on May 13 and 14.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Romanivka.[39]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating on the western flanks of Toretsk.[40] Drone operators from the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[41]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and in central Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[42]Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 14 that Russian forces seized Mykhailivka (east of Pokrovsk).[43] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk), although other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces only advanced in the central part of the settlement.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast, north, and northwest of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[45]Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Malynivka, Myrne, Myrolyubivka, and Novotoretske and toward Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on May 13 and 14.[46]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[47] Drone operators of the 80th "Sparta" Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[48]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[49]Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka, Novomykolaivka, Novoserhiivka, and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske, Horikhove, and Bohdanivka on May 13 and 14.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka.[51]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[52]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[53] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces occupy two-thirds of Bahatyr.[54]Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka, and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 13 and 14.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked northwest of Bahatyr.[56]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[57]Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 13 that Russian forces advanced further east of Zelene Pole than the available geolocated footage indicates, as well as northwest of Zelene Pole and east of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[58]Russian forces continued attacking north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Komar, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Rivnopil on May 13 and 14.[59]Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on May 13 that Russian forces have concentrated assault units of four unspecified Russian regiments in the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[60]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske direction (east of Velyka Novosilka).[61]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 14 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked southeast of Orkihiv towards Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on May 13 and 14.[62]The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on May 14 that Russian forces are increasing the number of first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) while decreasing the number of glide bomb strikes in the Zaporizhia direction.[63]Russian forces continued attacks in the Kherson direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on an island in the Dnipro River delta north of Dnipriany (east of Kherson City).[64]Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction and east of Kherson City towards Sadove on May 13 and 14.[65]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City), and elements of the naval detachment of the Russian 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating drones over unspecified areas of the Black Sea.[66]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 145 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 80 Shahed drones over eastern, northern, western, and central Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces lost sight of 42 decoy drones. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian drones damaged civilian, critical, and industrial infrastructure in Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, Donetsk, Rivne, Ternopil, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[68]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/23940079[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-2022-document-6e12e093 ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html ; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040325[6] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1025391[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525[9] https://kiis dot com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1529&page=1[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/69465[13] https://t.me/wargonzo/26519; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152; https://t.me/dva_majors/71159[14] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35785; https://t.me/iamsniper/13148[15] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13136[16] https://t.me/wargonzo/26519; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31551[17] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1017539-na-sumsini-zbilsilasa-sira-zona-deepstate/[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966[19] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28558; https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5451[20] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/14/vorog-vtratyv-polovynu-roty-za-dva-tyzhni-poblyzu-harkova-nyshhat-i-pihotu-i-bronetehniku/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9140; https://t.me/Ochi151/75[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966[23] https://t.me/brussinf/9492 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164650[24] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35789[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966[26] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35796[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966[28] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/13/katayut-na-czyvilnij-tehniczi-bez-zahystu-ukrayinski-drony-proridzhuyut-avtopark-rf-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/ ; https://t.me/umftteam/486[29] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35777 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31545[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35777[32] https://t.me/official24ombr/1064 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/14/sproba-proryvu-na-bmd-pid-chasovym-yarom-minus-try-korobochky-ta-desant-syly-oborony-daly-vidsich-okupantam/[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28574[34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9137 ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1098 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9138 ; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2982[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9143 ; https://t.me/osirskiy/1159[36] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31545[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64228 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22950 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91649 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28559 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91688 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35790 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31548[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28559[40] https://t.me/rybar/70374[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/52648 ; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/195 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91653[42] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1922421080381128983; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922188582057328737; https://t.me/mod_russia/52605 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9139 ; https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/2884[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/52655 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52656[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91649 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22950[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64228 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35790 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91649[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71155 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152[47] https://t.me/sashakots/53664[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164639 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13802[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/71152[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28565 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35779[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64234[52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9144; https://t.me/hunterfpv/84[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/14928[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164610[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164610; https://t.me/wargonzo/26519[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/14928[57] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1922421076132241729; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922230887250272355; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922227925505413537[58] https://t.me/rybar/70362[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/13/shturmy-mayut-harakter-navaly-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-atakuyut-sylamy-chotyroh-polkiv/[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/14918[62]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/14/uskladnyuyut-logistychni-pidyizdy-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-tryvaye-obmin-udaramy-po-tylah/[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164526[65]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216[66] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/676 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1922637945451770329 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71155 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71156[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/34334[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/34334 ; https://suspilne dot media/1017173-es-planue-uhvaliti-18-j-paket-sankcij-proti-rf-na-peremovini-v-tureccinu-pribude-derzsekretar-rubio-1176-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1747198848&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://kh.dsns.gov dot ua/operational-information/xarkivska-oblast-operativna-informaciia-stanom-na-0700-14-travnia-2025-roku; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1017255-lozivskij-rajon-harkivsini-zaznav-rosijskogo-udaru-postrazdali-troe-ludej/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2506 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14270 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EDS6DfZFD/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kropyvnytskiy/1017211-masovana-dronova-ataka-na-kirovogradsinu-castinu-bezpilotnikiv-zbili/ ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1017231-vnoci-armia-rf-atakuvala-vorozbu-poskodzeno-obekti-kriticnoi-infrastrukturi/; https://www.facebook.com/100064542380040/posts/1115780313916704/?rdid=fnDe16J5JqHwTMpG ; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4576; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1017755-armia-rf-vdarila-po-obektu-promislovoi-infrastrukturi-v-sumah/ ; https://www.facebook.com/hryhorov.sumska.ova/posts/pfbid0skzZWbioJVpWWsLvhVUTx5zk2tj5vFyPjk3PqKYdifZio87G6Hbgkbk1pLMEdrtnl ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35563 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/14/raketnyj-udar-po-sumah-odna-lyudyna-zagynula-semero-poraneni-sered-nyh-troye-u-krytychnomu-stani/ ; https://t.me/suspilnerivne/28611; https://suspilne dot media/rivne/1017209-sili-ppo-pracuvali-na-rivnensini-dvoe-ludej-zaznali-poranen/ ; https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61564854669117; https://suspilne dot media/1017173-es-planue-uhvaliti-18-j-paket-sankcij-proti-rf-na-peremovini-v-tureccinu-pribude-derzsekretar-rubio-1176-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1747205825&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 3, 2025

 

at 5/14/25 1:27am

Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William RunkelMay 3, 2025, 4:00 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:45 am ET on May 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal. Zelensky referred to Putin's May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire demand as a "theatrical production" that does not appear to be serious and is designed to create a sense of comfort and safety for participants of Russia's Victory Day celebration.[1] Zelensky once again articulated Ukraine's willingness to extend a short-term ceasefire to 30 days and stated that an effective ceasefire requires high-quality monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that any joint ceasefire should be comprehensive and last for at least 30 days with the possibility for renewal.[2] Kovalenko noted that shorter ceasefires with vague terms and a lack of monitoring mechanisms afford Russian forces the opportunity to seize on tactical pauses to better prepare ahead of a future summer offensive in Ukraine. Victory Day is Russia's principal patriotic holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), and Russia celebrates Victory Day on May 9. Putin first announced on April 28 Russia's intention to implement a Victory Day ceasefire between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11.[3] Putin's decision to unilaterally impose a fleeting ceasefire during Russia's Victory Day celebration is a deliberate attempt to project a sense of power and control in Russia to both domestic and international audiences. Putin likely also seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations by imposing such an agreement.Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the purpose of Russia's unilateral Easter and Victory Day ceasefires is to "test" Ukraine's readiness to pursue paths towards a sustainable peace.[4] Peskov claimed that Russia will wait for "final," unambiguous statements from Ukraine and will look for Ukrainian actions aimed at de-escalating the war during the holiday. Ukraine and the United States have previously proposed a 30-day general ceasefire to Russia, but Russian officials continue to ignore or outright reject these general ceasefire proposals.[5] Ukraine has also repeatedly called for longer ceasefires so as to pave the way for negotiations toward a durable peace settlement — which is in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts to leverage a ceasefire as the foundation for a lasting peace agreement in Ukraine.[6] Russia is very likely to continue its pattern of leveraging short-term ceasefires to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in an effort to discredit Ukraine and to create tactical or operational pauses to conduct troop rotations, resupply units, and prepare for future offensive operations, as evidenced by the Easter and long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefires.[7] Russia's continued rejection of Ukrainian and US ceasefire proposals of any reasonable length with necessary monitoring mechanisms showcases Russia's disinterest in peace in Ukraine in the near term.The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on May 2 that the US State Department approved and notified the US Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of equipment and maintenance services for Ukraine’s F-16s worth an estimated $310.5 million.[8] The DSCA reported that the sale will include aircraft modifications and upgrades; personnel training related to operation, maintenance, and sustainment support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; ground handling equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; studies and surveys; and US Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services.Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3. Ukrainian forces launched an aerial drone, a naval drone, and missile strike against Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and surrounding areas on May 3.[9] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that Ukrainian forces used a SAM fired from a Magura naval drone to down a Russian Su-30 fighter jet over the Black Sea near Novorossiysk.[10] Ukrainian forces used missiles attached to a Magura naval drone to shoot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter in December 2024, but this is the first time that Ukrainian forces have downed a fixed-wing aircraft using this tactic.[11]Russian milbloggers responded to the May 3 strike, claiming that Russia is lagging behind Ukraine on naval drone development and complaining that Russia has previously lost aircraft over the Black Sea due to Ukrainian drone dominance.[12] The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have the means to combat Ukrainian naval drones and protect Russian aircraft from missile strikes, but that Russian leadership is unwilling to prioritize Russian drone development and innovation. The milbloggers called for Russian coastal defense units and drone operators in the Black Sea to integrate lessons learned from Russian infantry fighting in Ukraine in order to integrate first-person view (FPV) drones with aerial reconnaissance.Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states. Independent Russian media outlets Meduza and Agentstvo reported on May 2 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov authored the foreword of a new book titled "History of Lithuania," which the "Foreign Relations" publishing arm of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) published in March 2025.[13] Lavrov‘s foreword claimed that the national policies of Baltic countries, including modern Lithuania, leverage "falsified” historical narratives to "stimulate" Russophobic and anti-Russian sentiments in their domestic audiences.[14] Lavrov claimed that the book seeks to analyze the development of the "lands that were associated with Lithuania at different times." Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys stated that the book is a Russian propaganda tool designed to provide the Kremlin with scholarly literature to support its denial of neighboring countries’ statehoods and histories separate from that of Russia.[15] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have recently intensified their threats against Europe — particularly the Baltic States — due to Europe's alleged "Russophobia."[16] Kremlin officials have also indicated that Russia views independent states that were once part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union as part of modern-day Russia.[17]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal.The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine.Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3.Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states.Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationLimited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 2 and 3 as Russian forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the area.[18]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 2 that Ukrainian forces maintain unspecified limited positions in Kursk Oblast.[19]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating at the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border.[20]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground attacks in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 3.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 2 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Belgorod Oblast.[21]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 3 but did not advance.Fighting continued north of Sumy City near Bilovody and Vodolahy and northeast of Sumy City near Loknya.[22]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillia (northeast of Sumy City).[23]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 3 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 2 and 3.[24]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Antagonist" drone detachment are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[25]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 3 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka on May 3.[26]The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Kupyansk on May 2.[27]Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Makiivka (southwest of Borova).[28]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahyrzove, Kolisnykivka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Serhiivka and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on May 2 and 3.[29]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces retook Pershotravneve (east of Borova).[30]Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Torske (east of Lyman).[31]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to eastern Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[32]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Ridkodub, Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Myrne, and east of Lyman near Torske on May 2 and 3.[33]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeast Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[34]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hyrhorivka and Bilohorivka on May 2 and 3.[35]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on May 3 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar toward Novomarkove and toward Mayske; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora on May 2 and 3.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[37]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[38]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced into central Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further in northern Novoolenivka (northwest of Oleksandropil), south of Romanivka (east of Oleksandropil), in southern Stara Mykolaivka (southeast of Oleksandropil), and east of Zelene Pole (south of Oleskandropil).[40] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized an intersection of the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Malynivka (southwest of Toretsk) and advanced near Nova Poltavka (northeast of Malynivka) on May 2, but do not current maintain positions in the settlement.[41] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized positions on the southeastern outskirts of Novo Poltavka, however.[42] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Krymske (northeast of Toretsk) toward the Novotoretska Mine near the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway northwest of Toretsk.[43]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske and Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Stara Mykolaivka, Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, and Yelyzavetivka and in the direction of Nova Poltavka on May 2 and 3.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are attacking Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[45]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[46] Elements of the Russian "Orcs" drone detachment are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[47]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 3 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) and are advancing west of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), and near Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[48] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized Mykhailivka and Lysivka (both southeast of Pokrovsk), and most of Myrolyubivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), except for the settlement's industrial zone in the eastern part of the settlement.Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Chunyshyne, Shevchenko, Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on May 2 and 3.[49]The senior communications officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 3 that Russian forces are taking an average of 150 casualties per day in this direction and that Russian forces are attempting to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by May 9.[50] The officer stated that Russia recently reinforced its units in the Pokrovsk direction either with redeployments from the Kursk direction or newly recruited troops. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction posted footage on May 3 purportedly showing the brigade striking a Russian ammunition depot in an unspecified area of this direction.[51]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Myrnohrad direction (east of Pokrovsk).[52]Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[53]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) seized Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[54] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced between Novooleksandrivka and Nadiivka (south of Novooleksandrivka), west of Nadiivka, to eastern Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), and to the outskirts of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[55]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Preobrazhenka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on May 2 and 3.[56]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Bohdanivka.[57]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Troitske; elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are reportedly operating near Kotlyarikva; and elements of the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) are reportedly operating near Nadiivka.[58]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[59]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove) and advanced southwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakove).[60]Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Odradne, Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on May 2 and 3.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Bahatyr.[62]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 200th Artillery Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), and 11th Air Defense and Air Force Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[63] Elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Odradne.[64]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[65]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[66]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Burlatske, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and toward Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and toward Novopil on May 2 and 3.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko.[68]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke (formerly Chervone) on May 2 and 3 but did not advance.[69]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 3 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove; and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and Kamyanske on May 2 and 3.[70]Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in an unspecified location in southern Ukraine.[71]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Shaman” detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka and elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[72]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on May 3.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[73]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea, and 183 strike and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, Oryol cities and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 77 Shahed and other drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 73 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure and commercial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[75]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://suspilne dot media/1009061-rosiani-masovano-atakuvali-harkiv-bezpilotnikami-ukraina-priskorit-stvorenna-vlasnoi-balistiki-1165-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746262169&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[2] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9187[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825[4] https://ria dot ru/20250503/peremirie-2014781779.html[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325 ;[8] https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4173182/ukraine-f-16-training-and-sustainment; https://x.com/statedeptpm/status/1918400116135755966?s=52; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/united-states-has-approved-the-possible-sale-of-f-16-training-support-and-modernization-services-to-ukraine/; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-state-dept-oks-possible-sale-f-16-training-sustainment-ukraine-2025-05-02/[9] https://t.me/kondratyevvi/8772 ; https://suspilne dot media/1009189-u-rf-zaavili-pro-ataku-droniv-na-novorosijsk/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313141 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313142; https://t.me/tass_agency/313145; https://t.me/tass_agency/313154; https://t.me/tass_agency/313162; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87948 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87960 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87968 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87970 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87973 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87977 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87980 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87983 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87985 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87988 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/88004 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1918494321440936304 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1918496033060876706; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36751; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91015; https://t.me/opershtab23/13413; https://t.me/kravchenko_glava_nvrsk/11567; https://t.me/dva_majors/70384 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70412 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70421; https://t.me/dva_majors/70408; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63960;[10] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5792 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/03/vpershe-u-sviti-%e2%80%95-morskyj-dron-magura-znyshhyly-vorozhyj-bojovyj-litak/ ; https://t.me/sotaproject/97317; https://t.me/rybar/70094; https://t.me/dva_majors/70442 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80341; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163331; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163351; https://t.me/rusich_army/23120; https://t.me/dva_majors/70409[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5792; https://kyivindependent dot com/ukraine-war-latest-in-world-first-ukrainian-sea-drone-downs-russian-helicopter/#:~:text=Ukraine's%20military%20intelligence%20(HUR)%20destroyed,missiles%20from%20the%20Magura%20drone.[12] https://t.me/rybar/70097; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9189;[13] https://t.me/sotaproject/97306; https://t.me/agentstvonews/10096; https://www dot lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2550460/ministr-istoricheskaia-kniga-o-litve-izdannaia-v-rossii-popytka-opravdat-imperializm; https://kantiana dot ru/news/prezentatsiya-knigi-istoriya-litvy-sostoyalas-v-bfu-im-i-kanta/; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/05/03/v-rossii-vyshla-kniga-istoriya-litvy-s-predisloviem-sergeya-lavrova-v-ney-govoritsya-chto-gosudarstvo-vozniklo-iz-za-sobytiy-na-territorii-sovremennoy-belarusi[14] https://democracyfund dot ru/userfiles/%D0%9C_%D0%A1_%20%D0%93%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8C%D0%B5%D0%B2%20%D0%B8%20%D0%B4%D1%80_%20%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F%20%D0%9B%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%8B.pdf[15] https://www.lrt dot lt/ru/novosti/17/2550460/ministr-istoricheskaia-kniga-o-litve-izdannaia-v-rossii-popytka-opravdat-imperializm[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections;; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795[19] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1918382806461264210; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zavdannya-maksimalno-priskoryuvati-stvorennya-ukrayinskoyi-b-97521[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163347[21] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1918382806461264210; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zavdannya-maksimalno-priskoryuvati-stvorennya-ukrayinskoyi-b-97521[22] https://t.me/wargonzo/26292[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/70438[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163381[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798[27] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22789[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9054; https://t.me/opbr_zsu/531[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/synegubov/14137[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35240[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9053; https://t.me/bbps_vidarr/204[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63976; https://t.me/yurasumy/22737, https://t.me/motopatriot78/35212[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824[34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9048; https://t.me/apachi_fpv/355[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35257; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35258; https://t.me/t3mny/2270[38] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91018[39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63969[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63976; https://t.me/yurasumy/22737[41] https://t.me/yurasumy/22737 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90989 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35212[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35269[43] https://t.me/yurasumy/22739[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795 ;[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63969[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/70373; https://t.me/dva_majors/70400 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70432 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70439[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/70449[48] https://t.me/yurasumy/22735 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63970 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27974[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/propagandystska-czil-dijty-do-dnya-peremogy-rosiyany-rvutsya-do-kordoniv-dnipropetrovshhyny/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[51] https://t.me/fifthbrUA/938 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/03/zdetonuvav-boyekomplekt-rf-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-nashi-bijczi-vluchyly-u-sklad-bk/[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90996 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91032[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9055; https://t.me/btr80/27185[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63972; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35248; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35207; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63959[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63958; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63959; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63970[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63958; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63972; https://t.me/yurasumy/22734; https://t.me/wargonzo/26292[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35201[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35201[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9049; https://t.me/hunterfpv/77[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/22733; https://t.me/voin_dv/14732[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63974; https://t.me/wargonzo/26292; https://t.me/yurasumy/22733[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63974; https://t.me/yurasumy/22733[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35249; https://t.me/voin_dv/14717; https://t.me/voin_dv/14726[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14720[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9052; https://t.me/Poltavska_brigadeNGU/475[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/14732[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795[68] https://t.me/voin_dv/14732[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/rusich_army/23109[71] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12414[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/70450; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35203[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/70451[74] https://t.me/kpszsu/33739[75] https://t.me/synegubov/14137 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2480 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/97301 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14129 ; https://t.me/police_kh_region/38516 ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22808 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14118 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/33739 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2476 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14130 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14137 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2472 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70393 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14063 ; https://t.me/suspilnemykolaiv/49823 ; https://t.me/suspilnemykolaiv/49824 ; https://www.facebook dot com/mykoda/posts/1083565613805251?rdid=V1Qam9fYWbqX3uZS# ; https://suspilne dot media/1009061-rosiani-masovano-atakuvali-harkiv-bezpilotnikami-ukraina-priskorit-stvorenna-vlasnoi-balistiki-1165-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746250063&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35371 ; https://suspilne dot media/1009061-rosiani-masovano-atakuvali-harkiv-bezpilotnikami-ukraina-priskorit-stvorenna-vlasnoi-balistiki-1165-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746249152&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35372

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, May 1, 2025

 

at 5/14/25 12:55am

 Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore,Ben Schmida, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel would “not allow the [Syrian] Druze ... to be harmed” and threatened additional airstrikes if the violence does not stop, suggesting that Israel aims to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the violence against Druze.[1] An effort to pressure the government to respond as directed assumes that the Syrian government has control over the Sunni fighters attacking Druze communities outside Damascus. Many of these fighters are ad-hoc collections of locals who are attacking the Druze.[2] Some government forces have attacked the Druze.[3] The government deployed General Security Service (GSS) units to cordon off the Druze areas, however, and some of these forces fought alongside local Druze fighters to repulse attacks by Sunni fighters.[4] The government’s deployments alongside local fighters, while other government-linked fighters attack local Druze, suggest that the government does not exert perfect command and control over its forces. The government’s limited control over some extremist elements of its ruling coalition, as well as the localized nature of some of the attackers, indicates that it will be impossible to use airstrikes to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the attacks.Damascus very likely already wants to stop the violence because the attacks on the Druze make it more difficult to secure the external support Damascus needs to maintain its hold on power. The government faces an extremely dire economic situation and needs external aid and economic support, particularly from the West. Many countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have repeatedly emphasized that Syria must prevent violence and hold those responsible accountable.[5] The government will need to convince these countries that the government is deserving of their support.The airstrikes are unlikely to pressure the Syrian government to stop extremists from conducting attacks. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff ordered the IDF to strike Syrian government targets “if the violence against the Druze does not stop.”[6] The government’s limited ability to demand that extremists stop their attacks means that even if the airstrikes did successfully pressure the Syrian government to make demands of Sunni fighters, it is unclear that government demands would have any effect. The government also has significant capacity issues, and airstrikes targeting the Syrian government will only make government efforts to stop the violence more difficult.It is unclear how Israel can secure the Druze population in and around Damascus if the airstrikes fail. Airstrikes—if they fail to pressure the government—cannot prevent Druze from being killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Only ground forces prepared to physically defend the Druze communities by force can protect the Druze. It is unclear if Israel is willing or able to protect the Druze in places like Sahnaya and Jaramana, which are roughly 45km and 58km from the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, respectively. Such a ground operation would be an extremely complex military undertaking. The lack of Druze support for Israeli intervention and the destabilizing effects of a ground operation in Syria mean a ground operation would likely fail and increase the threat to Israel by empowering extremists. Some Druze have protested against Israeli interference in Syria.[7]Only the formation of a combined Druze-Transitional Government force could successfully secure Druze locals from Sunni extremists while also sidelining pro-Regime elements in the Druze community. The ongoing violence is not solely government against Druze violence. The current violence involves pro-government Druze factions, Druze militias associated with former Assad regime networks, local Sunni fighters, and government forces that are responsive to former Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) networks, and others.[8] The Syrian Druze are a politically diverse community (see discussion on different Druze positions below). Some key Druze powerbrokers are negotiating with the government to end the ongoing violence, as GSS and Druze forces have cooperated on the ground.[9] A decision by Damascus to rely on joint Druze-government units could successfully de-escalate the situation while extending government control over well-known bastions of pro-regime sentiment in Jaramana.[10] The government has already taken steps to form joint units.[11] The government’s decision to immediately engage local leaders and cooperate with some Druze militias suggests that Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara and his allies have learned from the experiences with Alawite militias in western Syria, where the failure to engage local leaders and Alawites contributed to continued tension.Damascus has made serious efforts to curb confessional-motivated violence between Sunni extremists, Druze fighters, civilians, and security services. GSS units reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented additional external Sunni groups from participating in the clashes targeting Druze militants and civilians.[12] Government officials immediately ordered former Ahrar al Sham commander and 40th Division Commander Colonel Binyan al Hariri (Abu Fares Daraa) to deploy the 40th Division to Soura Kabira to secure the area after fighting between tribal fighters and Druze militiamen along the Damascus-Suwayda highway.[13] Government forces also began to deploy along the border between Suwayda and Daraa provinces on April 1.[14] These deployments follow several attacks that tribal groups launched on Druze towns along the western Suwayda border.[15] Security forces are expected to soon deploy across Suwayda Province.[16] These are tangible steps that suggest that the transitional government appears to be learning how to better contain violence targeting minorities and rebuild local trust since sectarian-motivated violence swept coastal Syria in March 2025.CTP-ISW defines violence between the Muslim and Druze communities as “confessional” rather than “sectarian” because “sectarian violence” refers to violence between different religious denominations. “Confessional violence” refers to violence between different religions. Most Druze consider themselves a distinct religious group from Islam.[17] Top Druze leaders continued to engage with the Syrian transitional government, even though Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced the government. Men of Dignity leader Laith al Balous and two prominent Druze sheikhs met with the governors of Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra provinces on April 30 and agreed to a ceasefire in Jaramana and Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya. Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri released a fiery statement after the meeting that compared the recent attacks on the Druze community to the massacres that targeted Alawites on the coast in early March.[18] The number of civilians killed and harmed in the recent attacks on Druze-majority areas in and around Damascus is several orders of magnitude lower than the number of civilians killed and harmed in Alawite areas along the coast.[19] Syrian and Turkish media reported that fewer than five civilians were killed in southern Syria.[20] Armed groups affiliated with the transitional government killed 420 unarmed people in western Syria in early March, including 39 children.[21] Hijri, who has consistently criticized the government, announced that he “no longer trusts a government that kills its own people” and called upon "international forces to intervene immediately.”[22] The clear fractures between Druze leaders on engaging the government did not prevent Balous and other Druze leaders from presumably negotiating the deployment of GSS forces across Suwayda Province.Iraqi media reported on May 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar formed an election-related agreement that “resembles reconciliation.”[23] Halbousi’s Progress Party and Khanjar’s Sovereignty Party will reportedly compete in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections together or form a post-election alliance, according to a recent Iraqi media report. CTP-ISW assessed on April 28 that Halbousi may be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[24] The recent report about a Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with the April 28 assessment and could suggest that Halbousi may not be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Mashhadani, Khanjar, and Halbousi’s other historical rivals are members of the United Sunni Leadership Coalition that formed in early January 2025 and has explicitly supported long-held Sunni political demands.[25] Halbousi has also recently called for political action to achieve Sunni political demands, such as after the Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of a law that favored Sunnis in February 2025.[26] A Halbousi-Khanjar alliance would greatly increase Sunni electoral strength, as Halbousi’s party and Khanjar’s former party were the two highest-performing Sunni parties in the 2021 elections.[27]The Houthis may attempt to pressure the UN into ending the UN Verifications and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships in Houthi-controlled ports until the UN ends the mechanism. The United Nations implemented UNIVIM in 2016 to stop prohibited cargo, such as weapons, from being exported to Yemen, while ensuring that Yemen retained access to food and other necessary supplies.[28] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on May 1 that the Houthis are prohibiting oil tankers and cargo ships, including UNVIM cleared vessels, from leaving Ras Issa Port on the Hudaydah coastline.[29] The Houthis reportedly fired warning shots after one vessel attempted to exit, and armed Houthi fighters boarded other vessels.[30] There were at least 14 vessels anchored near Ras Issa Port on May 1, according to Maritime Traffic data. Many of these vessels travelled from Djibouti, where UNVIM officials inspect vessels transporting cargo to Yemeni ports. Houthi Foreign Minister Gamal Amer also recently called for the termination of UNIVIM in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and the UN Security Council President, suggesting the Houthis may be using the vessels as hostages to renegotiate UNVIM or pressure the UN to change how the UNVIM operates.[31]The fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on May 3 was postponed.[32] The Iranian Foreign Ministry reported on May 1 that US-Iran talks were rescheduled at the suggestion of the Omani foreign minister.[33] Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi said the talks were rescheduled for "logistical reasons."[34] Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized in recent months that Iran will not negotiate under military threat or economic pressure.[35] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth threatened military action against Iran in response to Iran’s support for the Houthis in an April 30 tweet.[36] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, who has led the US delegation in the first three rounds of US-Iran talks, retweeted Hegseth's comments. The United States separately sanctioned several entities and vessels on April 29 and 30 that were involved in Iran's ballistic missile program and Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products trade, respectively.[37] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 1 that US sanctions are not helping the US and Iran resolve nuclear disputes, and the next round of talks will be scheduled "depending on the US approach."[38] An Iranian expert close to the regime stated on May 1 that talks were postponed due to what unspecified Iranian sources called “contradictory US positions.“[39] The sources also said that the United States was trying to change the general framework of the talks. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 26 that one of the key disputes between Iran and the United States is whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program, which Iran has repeatedly indicated it is unwilling to make concessions on.[40] Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) were also scheduled to hold talks in Rome on May 2 ahead of US-Iran talks.[41] It is unclear if Iran-E3 talks will also be postponed.Iran continued to expand economic cooperation with China to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reported on May 1 that Iran exported 1.6 million barrels per day of crude oil in April 2025.[42] United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) estimated that Iranian oil exports to China made up 97 percent of Iran's total oil exports in April.[43] Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS security summit in Brazil on May 1.[44] Both officials emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral economic ties to "challenge unilateralism in the international arena.” Iran's participation in BRICS is part of its broader efforts to establish a parallel international order that challenges Western “dominance."[45] UANI also reported that Iran increasingly used tankers previously involved in Russian oil trades, further illustrating cooperation between major US adversaries.[46]Key Takeaways:Israel in Syria: The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel would “not allow the [Syrian] Druze...to be harmed” and threatened additional airstrikes if the violence does not stop, suggesting that Israel aims to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the violence against Druze. The airstrikes are unlikely to pressure the Syrian government to stop extremists from conducting attacks, because the government cannot order the extremists to stop. It is unclear how Israel can secure the Druze population in and around Damascus if the airstrikes fail. Airstrikes—if they fail to pressure the government—cannot prevent Druze from being killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Only the formation of a combined Druze-Transitional Government force could successfully secure Druze locals from Sunni extremists while also sidelining pro-Regime elements in the Druze community. Violence in Southern Syria: Damascus has made serious efforts to curb confessional-motivated violence between Sunni extremists, Druze fighters, civilians, and security services. GSS units reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented additional external Sunni groups from participating in the clashes targeting Druze militants and civilians.Druze-Damascus Relations: Top Druze leaders continue to engage with the Syrian transitional government, even though Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced the government. This demonstrates the political diversity among Syria’s Druze community.Iraqi Politics: Iraqi media reported on May 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar formed an election-related agreement that “resembles reconciliation. The recent report about a Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with CTP-ISW’s April 28 assessment and could suggest that Halbousi may not be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework.Houthis and the UN: The Houthis may attempt to pressure the UN into ending the UN Verifications and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships in Houthi-controlled ports until the UN ends the mechanism.Iran-US Talks: The fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on May 3 was postponed.Iran-China Cooperation: Iran continued to expand economic cooperation with China to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 815,000 rials to one US dollar on April 30 to 820,000 rials to one US dollar on May 1.[47]Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Southwestern Air Defense Zone on May 1 to inspect the site’s operational readiness and capabilities.[48] Sabahi Fard inspected radar and missile systems and stressed the zone’s critical role in protecting Iranian airspace. The site is located in Khuzestan Province, where there are many key Iranian ports and oil and gas infrastructure. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately inspected the 4th Tactical Airbase in Dezful, Khuzestan Province, on May 1.[49] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi and other senior officers accompanied Mousavi during the visit. Israel previously weighed potential strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure in October 2024, a move former US President Joe Biden opposed.[50]Iran continues to strengthen economic ties with African countries, likely to bolster trade and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Iran hosted the third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit from April 27 to May 1 in Tehran.[51] This summit focused on opportunities to bolster trade in the areas of oil, gas, petrochemicals, mining, and energy. Representatives from 38 African countries and senior Iranian political officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, attended the summit.SyriaTurkey appears to be resuming its campaign to pressure the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate into the Syrian state. An unspecified Turkish Foreign Ministry source claimed that Turkey seeks to “implement” the March 10 agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF.[52] The agreement called for the representation of all Syrian communities and their participation in the political process, as well as the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the Syrian state.[53] The March 10 agreement established a seven-point framework to guide future negotiations over the details of the agreement‘s implementation. Those negotiations have not occurred yet.[54] The official did not define what mechanisms Turkey would use to ”implement” the agreement. Turkey threatened to conduct a full-scale assault on SDF-held territories between December 2024 and March 2025 to compel the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state.[55] Turkish officials have consistently demanded that the SDF fully disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[56] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government, however. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties.IraqIran is reportedly attempting to avoid a major rift between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025.[57] An Iraqi Dawa party member told Saudi media on May 1 that Iran would choose between Maliki and Sudani if Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr runs in the elections. Sudani and Maliki are both members of the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed on April 30 that Iran is likely urging the Shia Coordination Framework unity ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[58] Maliki and Sudani reportedly plan to run on opposing lists.[59] Sadr won the largest share of parliament seats in the 2021 election because his Shia National Movement ran on a single list, which would necessitate unity between Sudani and Maliki if Sadr participates in the elections.[60]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since 1:00 pm ET on April 30.[61] CENTCOM conducted an airstrike targeting Houthi fortifications in al Hawak District, south of Hudaydah.[62] The Houthis issued an evacuation order to residents in areas of the al Hawak District in November 2024, likely to use the land to construct these fortifications.[63] CENTCOM also conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi underground facilities in Kitaf District, Saada Governorate, on April 30.[64] CENTCOM also struck Houthi infrastructure in al Khab al Shaaf District, al Jawf Governorate, on May 1 at least six times, which is approximately 50 kilometers (km) behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[65] A Yemeni analyst reported on April 13 that the Houthis had a training camp in Khab al Shaaf District.[66]The Houthis claimed on April 30 that they launched an unspecified number of drones at the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea.[67] Local sources reported on April 30 that the Houthis launched drones from the al Jawba area, south of Marib Governorate.[68]The Houthis claimed on April 30 that they had launched two drones targeting an unspecified “vital” target in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area and Ashkelon, southern Israel.[69] The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a drone from Yemen on April 29.[70] Local sources reported on April 30 that the Houthis launched drones from sites in the Haradh area, Hajjah Governorate.[71]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing Significant to Report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks in the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://allisrael.com/amidst-clashes-in-syria-netanyahu-threatens-israeli-strikes-to-defend-druze-in-syria[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-29-2025; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917955888352051332;[3] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l?__cft__[0]=AZXuWQ3OdcLnmR5SXeyvNF5fYPHeBF2bbjAxLPZxwbu1rrSEyd6iEZe5epVZ3tgRgqfDGhdyf8HTveI-tk98B1VvDxPsHGFIwqgU8TXp1_UN_Hyu7gljtWVACyUUqtfvLXPw3tBM5vB3UA3qq5HKZnwFZ3Ix0aIii9V-1t-coDCnCQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R;[4] https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917946008106836318 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917516256892141682 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917404525280776500 ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0AZ94tv4czygGaDS7zvfHU9HvkuNpGscrdhVhwD8wuXgDhhJYH1Nf3jjDUT1brfjnl[5] https://x.com/SecRubio/status/1898833468441981178; https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-lifts-sanctions-against-syrias-defence-ministry-intelligence-agencies-2025-04-24/[6] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1917566064788992133[7] https://www.newarab.com/news/syrians-protest-against-israeli-attempts-divide-south[8] https://x.com/sameersaboungi/status/1917435513415348358; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917955888352051332; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917946008106836318[9] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917516256892141682; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917602765250965546[10] https://x.com/sameersaboungi/status/1917435513415348358;[11] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l?__cft__[0]=AZUETTAmKqqsN1qeXt7N6XQzMtFKE-N3RfNkYAv3ORN8LA3x43rIh0sAv1wi38rnXjPqW6gAuysogSkJoHIEkpLCfdfbVBb_3AskQ_0MwkADI8MFmiI6cAs4rNgPjJypGTGTYqEgF1Zfh3ucfu0_Ss-ygztWLIMkB_M6lfbHzAAirOnJqmepUrjikKZyOxsR27MuW4Nw9drS938ADbbunoV_&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917602765250965546; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917649465143427525/photo/1[12] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1917603572507722204[13] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l ; https://t.me/AjaNews/375808; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128797 [14] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128816[15] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917639052536275128; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917662312330125701; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1917675308385288581[16] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1918001746846101646; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917988217489362964[17] https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/03/21/5-facts-about-israeli-druze-a-unique-religious-and-ethnic-group/; https://www.ifcj.org/learn/resource-library/who-are-the-druze[18] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1115236280646181&set=a.607854068051074[19] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/16-killed-in-attacks-by-outlaw-groups-in-southern-syria-authorities-say/3553530 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917925886193442946 ; https://www.npr.org/2025/03/09/nx-s1-5322458/syria-revenge-killings-alawites-latakia[20] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/16-killed-in-attacks-by-outlaw-groups-in-southern-syria-authorities-say/3553530 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917925886193442946 ; https://apnews.com/article/syria-israel-druze-clashes-sahnaya-jaramana-40f8aeec865c1d81f128b05ef21dfa59[21] https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/R250305E-1.pdf[22] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1115236280646181&set=a.607854068051074[23] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AB%D9%82%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%85-%D8%B5%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B3%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025[25] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025[26] https://x.com/AlHaLboosii/status/1886773790987763821 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-5-2025[27] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/386432[28] https://vimye.org/about[29] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1917904883648270600[30] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1917904883648270600[31] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1917866771086016569[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-talks-postponed-new-date-depends-us-approach-iranian-official-says-2025-05-01/[33] https://t.me/MFAIran/27078[34] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/1917941337736827292[35] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28066 ; https://x.com/araghchi/status/1898858793934467171 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/irans-president-trump-i-will-not-negotiate-do-whatever-hell-you-want-2025-03-11/[36] https://x.com/SecDef/status/1917741093392707886[37] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0116 ; https://www.state.gov/maximum-pressure-sanctions-on-illicit-traders-of-iranian-petroleum-and-petrochemical-products/[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-talks-postponed-new-date-depends-us-approach-iranian-official-says-2025-05-01/[39] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1917961234391224733[40] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-and-iran-divided-by-key-question-in-nuclear-talks-59b26210 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2025-67e1e57f7311a ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-28-2025[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-uk-france-germany-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-2025-04-30/[42] https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934236/download?inline[43] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/april-2025-iran-tanker-tracker[44] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6453139/[45] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-24-2023#_edn468e988744e943807520b659438a957122 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/84859472[46] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/april-2025-iran-tanker-tracker[47] https://www.bon-bast.com/[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/11/3303226[49] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/11/3303222[50] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/09/biden-netanyahu-call-israel-attack-iranhttps://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response[51] https://en.isna dot ir/photo/1404020704425/The-3rd-Iran-Africa-Economic-Cooperation-Conference ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6453407/[52] https://www.cnnturk dot com/turkiye/disisleri-kaynaklari-turkiyenin-beklentisi-suriye-yonetimi-ile-sdg-arasinda-varilan-mutabakatin-uygulanmasidir-2278259[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/facilitating-new-sdf-agreement-key-stabilizing-syria[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025[55] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-3-2025[56] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/12/19/turkiye-refutes-us-claims-of-ceasefire-with-syrian-kurdish-fighters ; https://www dot kurdistan24.net/en/story/828282/turkish-fm-sdf-must-dissolve-before-we-launch-a-military-operation ; https://damascusv dot com/archives/66220[57] https://aawsat dot com/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7/5138335-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A8%D8%AE-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%83%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%84[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025[59] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA[60] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly[61] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917669019672248537 ;https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917705935494975509 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917902106599580118 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1917860097830899749[62] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917669019672248537; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917705213315788814[63] https://yemenfuture dot net/news/27279[64] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917705935494975509[65] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917902106599580118; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1917860097830899749[66] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1911509908660314565[67] https://t.me/army21ye/2899?single[68] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917718160347717811[69] https://t.me/army21ye/2899?single[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1917308196181393507[71] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917718160347717811

[Author: ISWKF]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2025

 

at 5/14/25 12:10am

Angelica Evans, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and Karolina Hird with William Runkel and Nate TrotterMay 1, 2025, 6pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:20am ET on May 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.[1] The Trump administration and the Ukrainian government published the joint text of the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on May 1 and reported that the agreement is a "fully collaborative partnership" that will fund Ukraine's long-term reconstruction and modernization. The agreement establishes a joint fund that the United States and Ukraine will equally pay into to fund development, infrastructure, and natural resource extraction projects in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials noted that Ukraine will retain full control over "subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources" and the right to determine the terms of use for Ukraine's natural resources.[2] Ukrainian officials stated that United States can make monetary contributions or supply additional military assistance to Ukraine as part of the fund, and that Ukraine will allocate 50 percent of its state budget revenues from rent payments, license fees, and other revenue from national resource extraction projects to the fund.[3] The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada must ratify the agreement, and it appears that the United States and Ukraine will also have to sign a series of more technical agreements that will define the terms of the investments and projects in the future.[4]The Trump administration noted that the agreement signals US commitment to "Ukraine's long-term success" and noted that the United States and Ukraine will not allow any person, company, or state that supplied the Russian war effort to benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine.[5] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also noted during an interview on Fox News on May 1 that the agreement is a "strong signal" to Russian officials that there "is no daylight" between the United States and Ukraine.[6] Ukraine's participation in this agreement underscores Ukraine's continued willingness to make compromises in pursuit of a long-term, sustainable resolution of the war in Ukraine despite consistent Russian disinterest in US and Ukrainian peace proposals. US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump’s repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine. Kellogg told Fox News on April 29 that Ukrainian representatives repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to negotiate during talks with senior US and European officials in London on April 23, and it is now "up to [Russian President] Vladimir Putin" to achieve a peaceful resolution to the war.[7] Kellogg stated that Ukrainian representatives in London agreed to 22 "concrete" terms including a "permanent, comprehensive" ceasefire, for which US President Donald Trump has long advocated. Kellogg also stated that US officials previously presented Putin with a roadmap for ending the war in Ukraine and that Putin should directly engage with the US proposal if he "really" wants to end the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview with Brazilian newspaper O Globo published on April 28 that "the ball is not in [Russia’s] court" in terms of ceasefire negotiations because Ukrainian officials have not shown "readiness" for peace negotiations.[8] Lavrov’s statements indicate that Russian officials are uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war and are prolonging negotiations to facilitate battlefield gains. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to hold ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States by falsely shifting the blame onto Ukraine for stalling negotiations to end the war.[9]Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated on April 30 during a BRICS foreign ministers' summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil that Russia will consider Western peacekeeping contingents in Ukraine as legitimate military targets and that such contingents are unacceptable.[10] Shoigu added that Russia has observed signs that the West is planning to introduce "pseudo-peacekeepers" into Ukraine, and another Russian official recently insinuated that Russia would not accept the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a monitoring mechanism for a ceasefire or permanent peace.[11] Russian officials have repeatedly rejected Western overtures to implement any sort of monitoring mechanisms in Ukraine, weaponizing unclear and unilateral Russian ceasefire terms to blame Ukraine ceasefire violations.[12] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on May 1 that Russia will "take all necessary measures" to prevent Ukraine and its Western allies from restoring Ukraine to its 1991 internationally recognized borders.[13] Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly demanded that Ukraine acquiesce to territorial concessions while Russia remains steadfast in its refusal to offer any concessions of its own.[14]Key Takeaways:The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump’s repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine.Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position.Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire Violations There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 1, but Russian forces did not advance.[15]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Battalion (reportedly of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) were reportedly recently operating near Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[16]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in Belgorod Oblast on May 1. Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces recently advanced in the Sumy direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southward along Tsentralna Street to central Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City).[17]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further into central Bilovody than available geolocated footage has confirmed, and that Russian forces made additional gains in an area up to two kilometers deep and eight kilometers wide between Basivka and Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City).[18]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked in Bilovody on May 1.[19]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Khokhla" Detachment of the Chechen 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Turya (east of Sumy City approximately 3.5 kilometers from the international border).[20] Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[21] Elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Bilovody.[22] Elements of the "Anvar" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[23]Russian forces launched Shahed strikes against Sumy City overnight from April 30 to May 1, damaging an industrial facility.[24]Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command reported on May 1 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reconnaissance-in-force mission on the weekend of April 26 and 27 in an unspecified border area of Chernihiv Oblast.[25]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[26]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 30 and May 1.[27]The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on May 1 that Russian forces are not conducting armored vehicle assaults because Ukrainian forces destroy 80 to 90 percent of vehicles used in assaults in this area.[28] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are conducting small infantry group assaults with drone support and noted that Russian and Ukrainian forces have drone parity in the Kharkiv direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on May 1 that Russian offensive activity intensified following the conclusion of Russia's unilateral Easter truce (from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow on April 21) and that Russian forces are fielding a large number of drones near Vovchansk.[29]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[30]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[31]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove, Stepova Novoselivka, and Hlushkivka on April 30 and May 1.[32]The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting more motorized assaults using civilian vehicles such as cars, trucks, and motorcycles in this direction due to an ongoing armored vehicle shortage.[33] The commander stated that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to reinforce light vehicles with metal plates, mesh, and electronic warfare (EW) systems to protect against Ukrainian mines and drone strikes.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Black Raven" detachment (purportedly a drone volunteer unit) are reportedly engaging Ukrainian forces along the international border north of Kupyansk.[34]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 1 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Tverdokhlibove, Cherneshchyna, and Hrekivka on April 30 and May 1.[35]Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 30 and May 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman) and to Pivnichna Street in northern Torske (east of Lyman).[36]Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Nove, Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, and Ridkodub and northeast of Lyman towards Novomykhailivka, Kolodyazi, Novyi Mir, and Yampolivka on April 30 and May 1.[37]The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 30 that Russian forces attempted to establish pontoon crossings across the Zherebets River during Russia's unilateral Easter truce (from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow on April 21).[38] The commander assessed that Russian officials will leverage the Russian-proposed May 8-May 11 Victory Day ceasefire to consolidate manpower and materiel for renewed attempts to establish pontoon crossings and advance across the Zherebets River.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Nove.[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[40]Russian forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 30 and May 1.[41]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 1 that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[42]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechnye, Bila Hora, and Stupochky on April 30 and May 1.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[44]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[45]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk and in western Toretsk; north of Berezivka, toward Nova Poltavka, and north of Tarasivka (all southwest of Toretsk); and that Russian forces cleared the Novotoretske mine northwest of Toretsk.[46]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk toward Zorya; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne, Druzhba, and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske; west of Toretsk near Romanivka, Shcherbynivka, and Leonidivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Kalynove, Tarasivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Hnativka, Oleksandropil, and Yelyzavetivka on April 30 and May 1.[47]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[48] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Romanivka.[49] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Nelipivka (northeast of Toretsk).[50]Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced along Skhidna Street in eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 30 that Russian forces advanced north and northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[52]Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Dachenske, and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 30 and May 1.[53]Russan forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances.Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Muravka; east of Novopalivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 30 and May 1.[54]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) advanced south of Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[55]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway southeast of Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and seized fields southeast of the settlement.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) conducted the assault and advanced into southeastern Bahatyr.[57]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced further south of Bahatyr.[58]Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove toward Oleksiivka and near Kostyantynopil, Rozlyv, and Bahatyr on April 30 and May 1.[59]Russian forces continued assaults in the Velkya Novosilka direction on May 1 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) recently retook positions in Vesele (north of Velyka Novosilka) and seized part of the settlement.[60]Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Velkya Novosilka in the direction of Odradne and northwest of Velkya Novosilka near Shevchenko, Pryvilne, and Vilne Pole on April 30 and May 1.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently repelled a series of Ukrainian counterattacks in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[62]Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 1 that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AoR) extends from the Vovcha River (west of Kurakhove) to the Konka River (southeast of Orikhiv).[63]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA), 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD), 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD), and 68th AC (EMD) are attacking along the Rozlyv-Bahatyr and Rozdolne-Bahatyr lines (northeast of Velkya Novosilka).[64] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD), and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are attacking near Dniproenerhiya, Burlatske, and along the Pryvilne-Novosilka line toward Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka). Mashovets added that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are attacking along the Shevchenko-Burlatske-Pryvilne-Vilne Pole line (northwest of Velkya Novosilka).Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on May 1.Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 1 that Russian forces are launching up to 30 unguided bombs and guided glide bombs against Hulyaipole daily in order to destroy the settlement.[65]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[66]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 1 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Lobkove; and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 30 and May 1.[67]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka, and drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on April 30 and May 1 but did not advance.[69]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 30 to May 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 170 strike and decoy drones from Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 Shahed and other drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 68 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drone strikes damaged infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, and Kyiv oblasts and that strikes damaged civilian and railway infrastructure in Odesa City and Oblast.[71]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90925[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/70265[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuoJXDmLdzC5nHd7pbPG12Gwhsrg5oZrkpaMSVbfjiYqYbbkEW25Az89AD7uCy1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23725; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23722; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9160; https://t.me/dva_majors/70265[33] https://t.me/fedorenkoys/1280 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/30/tanky-zakinchylysya-rosiyany-staly-kydaty-v-bij-obshyti-zalizom-uraly-cherepahy/[34] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23111[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuoJXDmLdzC5nHd7pbPG12Gwhsrg5oZrkpaMSVbfjiYqYbbkEW25Az89AD7uCy1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23725; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23722; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9160[36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9034; https://t.me/opbr_zsu/528; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1917751710769889385; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9039; https://t.me/bbps_vidarr/203 [37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuoJXDmLdzC5nHd7pbPG12Gwhsrg5oZrkpaMSVbfjiYqYbbkEW25Az89AD7uCy1l; 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https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23722 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9160; https://t.me/dva_majors/70265[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/26265[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/51990[46] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63903; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27858; https://t.me/yurasumy/22684 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163149[47] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63903; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuoJXDmLdzC5nHd7pbPG12Gwhsrg5oZrkpaMSVbfjiYqYbbkEW25Az89AD7uCy1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23725; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23722; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63903 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27858[48] https://t.me/yurasumy/22684[49] https://t.me/yurasumy/22684[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163085[51] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1917643202363863509; https://t.me/blacksky_3brop/23 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9035[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35065[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuoJXDmLdzC5nHd7pbPG12Gwhsrg5oZrkpaMSVbfjiYqYbbkEW25Az89AD7uCy1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23725 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23722 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9160 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163162[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuoJXDmLdzC5nHd7pbPG12Gwhsrg5oZrkpaMSVbfjiYqYbbkEW25Az89AD7uCy1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23725 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23722[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35120[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9036; https://t.me/BlackSeaLions/44[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35108 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27810 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27875[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35108[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuoJXDmLdzC5nHd7pbPG12Gwhsrg5oZrkpaMSVbfjiYqYbbkEW25Az89AD7uCy1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23725 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0AcCUV4UWg5YpKBH2S5f9RRzKa8spyUon9yGVTc1RnoRr6Yqa1bWBxARyFqqjUJLYl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23722[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35069[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuoJXDmLdzC5nHd7pbPG12Gwhsrg5oZrkpaMSVbfjiYqYbbkEW25Az89AD7uCy1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23725 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0AcCUV4UWg5YpKBH2S5f9RRzKa8spyUon9yGVTc1RnoRr6Yqa1bWBxARyFqqjUJLYl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23722[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27812[63] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2719 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0iA88CCTGGxSGfV1kwT3jayD6cC71j4ba9MGjXiQJpEm12AKVkP8xpZTFuP4GhuFil[64] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2720[65] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/01/namagayutsya-sterty-z-lyczya-zemli-na-pivdni-okupanty-znyshhuyut-z-povitrya-slavne-misto/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/14687[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kuoJXDmLdzC5nHd7pbPG12Gwhsrg5oZrkpaMSVbfjiYqYbbkEW25Az89AD7uCy1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23725 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0AcCUV4UWg5YpKBH2S5f9RRzKa8spyUon9yGVTc1RnoRr6Yqa1bWBxARyFqqjUJLYl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23722; https://t.me/wargonzo/26265; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/01/namagayutsya-sterty-z-lyczya-zemli-na-pivdni-okupanty-znyshhuyut-z-povitrya-slavne-misto/[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35075; 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[Author: ISWKF]

As of 5/21/25 11:50am. Last new 5/20/25 7:34pm.