Rnews Crooked Bough News Round-up: Military Watch

Military Watch

— An Enhanced Su-27 with Su-35 Avionics: How Capable is Russia’s Su-27SM3 Air Superiority Fighter?: at 6/12/25 4:03pm
Entering service in the Soviet Air Force and in the Soviet Air Defence Forces in 1984, the Su-27 Flanker was considered the most capable air superiority fighter developed during the Cold War era. After its unveiling caused significant concern in the Western world, the Flanker’s considerable advantages over rival fighters was subsequently confirmed during the 1990s after intensive testing in the United States against U.S. Air Force F-15s. Although the Soviet Armed Forces were scheduled to introduce enhanced variants of the Su-27 into service from the mid-1990s, including the improved Su-27M air superiority fighter, the Su-27PU interceptor, and the Su-27IB strike fighter, the state’s disintegration delayed the introduction of such aircraft by close to two decades. The events of the 1990s also ended the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su57-half-price-ambitious-mig142" >MiG 1.42 program</a>, which was intended to operationalise the country’s first fifth generation fighters from 2001 as a direct successor to the Su-27, thus ensuring that the Russian Armed Forces would continue to rely heavily on the Flanker for decades longer than intended. Russian procurements of the Su-27 itself would decline sharply after 1991, with the bulk of remaining production being for export as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/final-gift-from-the-soviets-how-china-received-three-of-the-ussr-s-top-fighters-weeks-before-the-superpower-collapsed" >rapidly adopted</a> the Flanker as its new primary fighter. Although the Russian Defence Ministry funded upgrades for a portion of its Su-27 fleet to the Su-27SM fleet in the 2000s, the enhancements were highly conservative, and did little to reverse the fleet’s growing obsolescence.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/03/article_683e6246718d22_15488327.jpeg" title="Su-27 Fighter in Soviet Service">The Russian Aerospace Forces would begin procurements of enhanced Su-27 derivatives on a significant scale in the 2010s, namely the Su-30M2, Su-30SM, Su-34 and Su-35, allowing the service to gradually phase Soviet built Su-27s and other older fourth generation fighters out of service. As the service ordered the first Su-35s in 2009, it also placed an unexpected simultaneous order for 12 Su-27 fighters, which would be built to a new standard with capabilities far superior to those of the older Su-27SM. The decision to order Su-27s was taken due to the existence of surplus kits to build the fighters, which had been produced with the intention of delivering them to China for license production before the East Asian state cut its planned orders. With the fighters considered obsolete if built to the standard initially intended, development of a new variant of the Su-27 was considered necessary, the result of which was the Su-27SM3. The fighters integrated enhanced variants of the AL-31F engine, reportedly the AL-31F-M1, which provided improved power for onboard systems, higher levels of thrust, and reduced maintenance needs. This was paired with the integration of an avionics suite closely based on <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su35-vs-su27-ten-top-improvements" target="_blank">that of the Su-35</a>.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/03/article_683e6226c8b7f8_96991807.jpeg" title="Irbis-E Radar on Su-35 Fighter">A primary advantage which the Su-27SM3 retained over prior variants was the integration of the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/why-russia-s-air-force-loves-the-su-35-s-irbis-e-radar-a-detailed-look-at-the-sensor-suite-built-to-hunt-stealth-fighters">Irbis-E</a>&nbsp;X-band multi role passive phased antenna array radar, which was technologically decades ahead of the N001 mechanically scanned array radar used by the Su-27S and Su-27SM. As an electrically scanned array radar, the Irbis-E could simultaneously track and engage targets both in near space and a few metres off the ground, while being able to scan in fractions of the time and emitting a much lower signature to avoid revealing the fighter’s position. An outstanding feature of the radar is its two-step electro-hydraulic drive unit, which turns the antenna mechanically to 60° in azimuth and 120° in roll, while the the antenna device scans using an electronically controlled beam in azimuth and angle of elevation in sectors exceeding 60°, allowing the Su-27SM3 to scan across a particularly wide breadth of angles. Complementing the new radar, the Su-27SM3 integrated a fully glass cockpit based on that of the Su-35, as gained compatibility with a wide range of new munitions types, most significantly the R-77-1 active radar guided and the R-74 infrared guided air-to-air missiles.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/03/article_683e620424ad65_09588488.jpg" title="Russian Aerospace Forces Su-27SM2">The Su-27SM3 gained particular prominence in late November 2015, when the aircraft were deployed the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/repelling-israeli-turkish-su35-syria" target="_blank">Khmeimim Airbase in Syria</a> in response to the Turkish shootdown of a Su-24M strike fighter earlier that month. By that time the fighter program was considered a significant success, with a contract earlier that year having secured financing for the modernisation of ten Su-27S fighters to the same standard, with these aircraft designed Su-27SM2. Two Su-27s which had been modernised to test the upgrade package were also delivered, bringing the total number of enhanced fighters to 24. Modernisation of the Su-27 to the Su-27SM2/SM3 standard was far from isolated to the Russian Air Force, with the United States and China having implemented similar upgrades on much larger scales for their own older fourth generation fighters. These included the integration of the AN/APG-63 AESA radar onto Cold War era F-15s in the United States, and integration of a large AESA radar, likely the same as that from the J-16 fighter, onto J-11B fighters to bring them to the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/first-j-11bgh-fighters-with-aesa-radars-join-china-s-naval-aviation-how-capable-are-they" target="_blank">J-11BG standard</a>. Like the Su-27SM2, cockpit displays and weaponry were also modernised to complement the new radars. The Su-27SM3 upgrade package nevertheless stood out in that it brought a legacy fighter long since out of production back to assembly lines for a limited period, with Russia’s surplus of Su-27 airframe kits which stimulated interest in developing the upgrade package being a unique factor in the program.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— U.S. Cancels Vital E-7 ‘Flying Radar’ Program Needed to Track Chinese Stealth Planes: at 6/11/25 7:46pm
U.S. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth has confirmed that plans for the procurement of E-7 Wedgetail early warning and control (AEW&amp;C) systems for the U.S. Air Force has been cancelled, bringing the future of the service’s support capabilities for long range engagements into serious question. I would file this entire discussion under difficult choices that we have to make. But you know, the E-7, in particular, is sort of late, more expensive and ‘gold plated,’” he stated when testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee.&nbsp; “so filling the gap, and then shifting to space-based ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] is a portion of how we think we can do it best, considering all the challenges,” he added. It was subsequently confirmed that the much smaller E-2 Hawkeye, which currently serves in the U.S. Navy, was under consideration to serve as a stopgap measure until space based systems could fully perform the role previously assigned to AEW&amp;Cs. Hegseth had just hours beforehand stated that the E-7was is an “example” of a platform that is “not survivable in the modern battlefield,” stressing that space-based assets would be able to fulfil the same role more effectively.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/12/article_684a2207106d76_07751905.jpg" title="E-3 Sentry AEW&amp;C System">Procurement of the E-7 has been considered particularly vital due to both the to growing obsolesce of the E-3 Sentry AEW&amp;C system which the Air Force currently relies on, and to the considerable wear on the service’s E-3s which have resulted in very low availability rates and high operational costs. The cutting edge capabilities of China’s own new AEW&amp;Cs, namely the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/kj500-flying-radar-america-hates" target="_blank">KJ-500</a> and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-newly-unveiled-kj3000-flying-radar-bolster-counter-stealth" target="_blank">KJ-3000</a>, have further strengthened the consensus on the need for a more modern AEW&amp;C capability. Commenting on the decision to procure the E-7 in late 2022, leading expert on Chinese next generation fighter programs, and author of the book&nbsp;<a href="https://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/Chinas-Stealth-Fighter-Hardback/p/50764">Chinas Stealth Fighter: The J-20 Mighty Dragon and the Growing Challenge to Western Air Dominance</a>,&nbsp;Abraham Abrams, observed:&nbsp;“The KJ-500’s induction is thought to have influenced the USAF’s decision on how early to retire its very large but increasingly obsolete E-3 Sentry fleet and replace them with the modern E-7 Wedgetail – a technological equivalent to the new Chinese aircraft. The decision was finalised in 2023, after officials including [PACAF Commander] General [Kenneth] Wilsbach repeatedly stressed both the extreme limitations of the E-3 and the contrasting high sophistication of the latest Chinese AEW&amp;Cs.”Abrams further noted that American fighter units rely significantly more heavily on AEW&amp;C support than their Chinese counterparts, due to Chinese fighters on average carrying much larger and more powerful radars. The F-35, for example, carries a radar approximately one third smaller than that of the F-15 and J-20, and approximately half the size of that of the J-16.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/12/article_684a222b702f75_08108730.png" title="F-35 Fifth Generation Fighter and Chinese J-XX Sixth Generation Fighter">The decision to procure the E-7 was further influenced by the fast growing capabilities of Chinese fifth generation fighters, namely the J-20, which senior officers in the Air Force have specifically stated the E-3 is inadequate to track and support American operations against. General Wilsbach stated in March 2022 regarding the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/u-s-pacific-air-force-chief-evaluates-future-of-china-s-j-20-fighter-an-air-superiority-or-multirole-jet" target="_blank">first encounter</a> between F-35s and J-20s that E-3 Sentry AEW&amp;Cs in the region were suffering obsolescence issues, implying that as a result that during the encounter: “our early warning aircraft could not see the J-20…. Those sensors that we rely on the E-3 aren’t really capable in the twenty-first-century, especially against a [stealth] platform like the J-20 or something similar to that. It just can’t see those platforms far enough out to be able to provide an advantage to the shooters… that’s why I would like to have the E-7.” The fact that the cancellation of plans to procure the E-7 occurs as China is <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/how-many-j20-stealth-fighter-will-china-build-top-expert-predicts-over-1000" target="_blank">rapidly expanding</a> its J-20 fleet with increasingly sophisticated variants, and is making <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/worlds-largest-fighter-plane-china-ultra-long-range-sixth-gen" target="_blank">considerable progress </a>towards fielding the world’s first sixth generation fighter, is expected to make the decision significantly more controversial.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Is the Pentagon Halving F-35A Orders to Pay For the F-47? Fighter’s Viability in Question as Sixth Generation Era Looms: at 6/11/25 5:41am
The U.S. Department of Defence has cut its request for new F-35A fighters for the U.S. Air Force by 50 percent from 48 to just 24 fighters for Fiscal Year 2026, according to multiple reports from local media outlets, raising significant questions regarding the future of the program. The reduction follows steady cuts to the Air Force’s annual F-35A procurement plans over more than a decade from 110, to 80, 60 and finally 48 fighters. The proposed cuts have occurred amid a growing crisis in the Air Force over its budget, in particular due to the immense development, procurement and operational costs of the new <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/boeing-unprecedented-investments-f47" target="_blank">F-47 sixth generation fighter</a> which analysts have widely concluded are unaffordable without deep cuts being made. The U.S. Department of Defence is reportedly considering <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/why-navy-faxx-sixth-generation-defunded-finance-f47" >cutting funding</a> for the U.S. Navy own sixth generation fighter program the&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/delays-contact-award-many-sixthgen" >F/A-XX </a>to reallocate funds to the F-47. Reducing procurements of the F-35 would not only result in significant savings on procurement costs, but would also avoid spending on operational costs, with the fighter being significantly <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/f35-sustainment-costs-44pct-controversy" >more expensive to sustain</a> than the F-16s and A-10s it is being acquired by the Air Force to replace.&nbsp;A significant portion of these funds could potentially be re-invested in the F-47.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/11/article_6849506257d701_80935252.png" title="Chinese Sixth Generation Long Range Fighter Prototype">As the F-35’s cost effectiveness has increasingly been brought to question when compared to the next generation F-47, particularly for high intensity operations in the Pacific for which the newer aircraft is expected to be significantly better suited, a further important factor which may be affecting the decision to deeply cut procurements is the aircraft’s increasingly questionable viability as China approaches operationalisation of its first sixth generation fighters. China’s&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-unveiled-stealthiest-fighter-sixth-generation" >unveiling</a>&nbsp;of two new&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/worlds-largest-fighter-plane-china-ultra-long-range-sixth-gen" >sixth generation fighters</a>&nbsp;in December 2024 already at flight prototype stages raised serious concerns regarding America’s future capability to wage an air campaign in the Pacific,&nbsp;and raised the prospects of the F-35 fleet being left a generation behind the most capable fighters in the theatre. The unveiling of the new Chinese fighters was notably <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/chinese-sixth-generation-cut-pentagon-demand-f35s-lockheed" >quick to affect</a> the stock price of the F-35’s primary contractor Lockheed Martin specifically for this reason. Deep cuts to F-35A procurements to equip the U.S. Air Force would allow a greater proportion of the fighter’s production capacity to be allocated to supplying foreign clients. It would also cause difficulties for the Air Force, however, as the service would be forced to further extent the planned service lives of its fleets of Cold War era F-15s, F-16s and A-10s. With the future of the F-35 program remaining highly uncertain, the possibility of future orders remains closely tied to how both American and Chinese sixth generation fighter programs proceed.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— North Korean Superheavy Artillery Guns Demonstrating Long Range and High Precision Against Ukrainian Forces - Intel. Chief: at 6/11/25 3:36am
Commander of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Directorate Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov has singled out the performance of North Korean 170mm self-propelled howitzers, during a recent interview focusing on foreign countries’ support for the ongoing Russian war effort, lamenting the serious complications which these guns’ advanced capabilities have caused for Ukrainian forces. North Korea is the only country in the world to field artillery of this calibre, with the system having entered service in the mid-late 1970s, and being modernised considerably over close to half a century. With the gun’s Korean name remaining unknown, it has been referred to in the West as the Koksan, after the region it was first observed in by U.S. intelligence in 1978. Variants have otherwise been referred to in NATO member states as the M1978 and M1989, based on the years in which they were first seen. The howitzer is surpassed in size only by the Soviet 2S7M Malka, although this system has a relatively short range and was only ever fielded in a small number of units, in contrast to the Koksan which is very widely deployed by the Korean People’s Army and by many estimates has the longest engagement range in the world.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/11/article_68492f50f32fa2_01062252.jpeg" title="Korean People`s Army Leadership Inspect 170mm Artillery Units">Regarding the capabilities of the 170mm howitzer, the Ukrainian intelligence chief observed: “Unfortunately, this gun is demonstrating itself quite well in battle. It’s firing from quite a long range, and it’s quite good in terms of accuracy.” “We have data that the Russian Federation was provided 120 pieces. But I think that supply will continue because these guns are demonstrating themselves quite well. This is unfortunate for us because this is artillery for long-range firing,” he elaborated. 120 guns would in North Korean service equip approximately four army artillery regiments. It remains uncertain whether the 170mm guns are in service in the Russian Army, or whether they are operated by Korean People’s Army units stationed in Russia, with the possibility remaining that the system is being used by both services. In a&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-artillery-saved-russia-6million">previous assessment&nbsp;</a>on October 31,&nbsp;2024, Military Watch&nbsp;highlighted the possibility that the 170mm guns could join the ongoing Russian war effort, just two weeks before the first images <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-koksan-170mm-ukraine">confirmed their arrival&nbsp;</a>in Russia. Subsequent batches were <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorea-delivers-new-170mm-artillery-russia">filmed arriving</a> in mid-December. Financing from exports of 170mm guns to Russia could allow for an acceleration of production in North Korea, potentially of new variants modified to meet Russian Army requirements. Use of the guns in the theatre may also lead Russia to commission the opening of a production line for 170mm ammunition domestically with North Korean support.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/11/article_68492f0f21f137_58904164.png" title="North Korean 170mm Guns Being Transported in Russia">North Korea’s deployment of by far the world’s largest artillery force has led both Russian and overseas analysts to assess artillery to be an area where support from the country would be&nbsp;<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/will-we-see-north-korean-forces-in-eastern-ukraine/" >particularly valued</a>&nbsp;in the Ukrainian theatre. The Russian Army was by the end of 2024 already estimated to have&nbsp;received up to 9 million rounds&nbsp;of 122mm and 152mm artillery from the country, with the transfer of 170mm guns allowing for a third calibre to be sold. Newer images have confirmed the adoption of 60mm and 140mm mortars for use in frontline Russian Army units. Due to the sharp contraction both of Russia’s defence sector and of its ground forces in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the country not only fields mortar and artillery systems in just a fraction of the numbers that North Korea does, but is also estimated to have much lower productive capacities.&nbsp;As a result, the Russian Army’s reliance on North Korean supplies has continued to grow, with many Russian artillery units having come to rely almost entirely on ammunition supplied by North Korea. At least six Russian artillery units currently source between 50 and 100 percent of their munitions from the country.&nbsp;The ongoing conflict is widely thought to be <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/north-korea-has-earned-estimated-20b-from-military-support-for-russia-report/" >fuelling</a> a major economic boom in the heavily militarised East Asian state, footage from which has shown signs of further acceleration of its previously already significant economic growth.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Ground]
— How Capable is the HQ-19 Long Range Missile Defence System China is Offering to Pakistan?: at 6/11/25 2:06am
The government of Pakistan has confirmed that China has offered to supply <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-3000km-hq19-role" target="_blank">HQ-19 long range missile defence</a> systems to the country’s armed forces, in the aftermath of a brief period of high intensity conflict with Indian forces in which Chinese-supplied armaments were credited with having <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/pakistani-j10c-shot-down-indian-rafale" target="_blank">facilitated major victories</a> in the air. Pakistan previously fielded a very limited surface-to-air missile arsenal, but procured Chinese HQ-16 medium range air defence systems in the mid-2010s, followed by confirmation in 2021 that it had <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/pakistans-hq9p-complicate-indian-operations" >acquired HQ-9P</a> long range systems. The HQ-9 was first commissioned October 14, 2021,&nbsp;with its advanced capabilities and forward deployment locations fuelling significant speculation that they may have played important roles in supporting air operations against Indian forces. Even if not engaging targets directly, the HQ-9’s powerful sensors can provide early warning of potential threats and targeting data to fighter units. The HQ-19 has the potential to add a further higher tier to this growing air defence network, and is specialised in ballistic missile defence. The system could potentially network with the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEW&amp;C) systems which Pakistan is currently <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/bolstering-pakistan-aerial-kill-chains-talks-chinese-kj500" target="_blank">holding talks to procure</a> from China, complementing its powerful ground based radars with powerful elevated sensors.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/11/article_6848c9bcdafe56_34392485.jpeg" title="Missile Battery From HQ-9 System in Pakistani Service">The HQ-19 is considered a broad equivalent to the American <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/us-army-thaad-fail-first-combat-test-yemeni-missiles" target="_blank">Terminal High Altitude Air Defence</a> (THAAD) system, and provides a top tier level to the China’s surface to air missile network. It was designed to intercept medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in their with exo-atmospheric midcourse stages. The system could have significant strategic value for Pakistan due to the relatively small size of India’s arsenal of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, and would potentially allow the country to repel both strategic and tactical nuclear attacks. The system is thought to employ kill vehicles for terminal to mid-course interception, with these using thrust vectoring for high speed manoeuvring at extreme altitudes where aerodynamic control is difficult to achieve. It is thought to use a steep-angle cold launch system to reduces stress on launchers. The system has an engagement range estimated at over 1000 kilometres, allowing it to provide a very wide area defence across vast regions of Pakistani territory, and potentially allowing even a single system to cause a major strategic shift in South Asia. The system is also capable of engaging low orbit satellites. Pakistan’s procurement of the system could lead India to respond by reducing its reliance on ballistic missiles for nuclear delivery, developing ballistic missiles with superior evasive capabilities, or acquiring the Russian<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-first-regiment-s500-long-range-air-defence" target="_blank"> S-500 long range system</a> to bolster its own strategic missile defences.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: South Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Italian Navy Considers Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier Amid Renewed Focus on Pacific Ops: at 6/10/25 7:58pm
Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy Admiral Enrico Credendino on June 8 confirmed that service is considering procuring its first a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, stating that this was part of a broader effort to address evolving maritime threats and energy requirements. The need for increased onboard power for cyber defence and drone warfare made the capacities of nuclear propulsion systems potentially valuable. The nuclear-powered carrier remains in the conceptual and feasibility assessment phase, although procurement of such a ship would align with the Southern European state’s evolving strategic doctrine which emphasis the need for continuous global deployments, enhanced mission readiness, and greater integration with allied forces across a wide range of theatres. The ability of Italian industry to develop a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier remains in serious question, with the only prior European attempt to produce such a ship having resulted in major performance issues and cost overruns, producing the French warship&nbsp;Charles De Gualle which has suffered from serious limitations. Italy’s nuclear industry is considerably less advanced, and it is likely that a nuclear powered aircraft carrier program would rely on significant support and technology transfers from either France or the United States.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_6848b92567bf37_83144861.jpeg" title="French Carrier Charles De Gaulle and U.S. Navy Nimitz Class Supercarrier">Only France and the United States have produced nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in the past, although the Soviet Union laid down one supercarrier with nuclear propulsion systems, the Ulyanovsk, which was not completed before the state’s disintegration. The Indian Navy and the British Royal Navy are among the services that previously considered procuring such ships, before focusing investments on conventionally powered vessels. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is expected to begin to field nuclear-powered supercarriers in the 2030s, and is close to commissioning its first <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-rival-ford-supercarriers-nears-service-entry-fujian" target="_blank">conventionally powered supercarrier</a>, the Fujian, into service. Although multiple Russian nuclear-powered supercarrier designs have been pitched to the country’s defence ministry, none have been financed. Other than aircraft carriers, the U.S., France, Britain, India, China and Russia all produce nuclear-powered submarines, with North Korea expected to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/strategic-attack-nkorea-nuclear-submarine" target="_blank">begin fielding such ships</a> in the 2030s. Russia also fields the world’s only nuclear-powered surface combat ship, the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-shipbuilding-chief-claims-refurbished-kirov-cruiser-will-be-world-s-top-surface-combatant-is-he-right" target="_blank">Kirov Class cruiser </a>Admiral Nakhimov. Nuclear propulsion systems have a number of drawbacks, including considerable production and sustainment costs. They provide significantly more power to for onboard systems, however, while allowing ships to sustain high speeds, and avoiding the need for refuelling on long distance missions.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_6848ba00780136_03256351.jpg" title="F-35Bs on Italian Navy Carrier Cavour ">Italy has led Europe in prioritising military deployments to the Pacific, as part of a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/french-charlesdegaulle-pacific-ops" target="_blank">broader trend</a> towards European states supporting the U.S.-led Pivot to Asia initiative to try to ensure the perpetuation of a Western-favouring balance of power in the region. The country made its&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/italy-first-stealth-fighters-japan-euro-f35s" >first ever F-35 deployment&nbsp;</a>to Japan on August 4, when F-35As arrived at the Japanese Air Self Defence Force’s Komatsu Air Base in Ishikawa Prefecture to participate in exercises with Japanese air units. Such deployments have been <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/italy-can-play-a-role-in-the-indo-pacific-but-must-do-it-its-own-way/" target="_blank">strongly endorsed </a>in a number of Western papers. The Italian Armed Forces began their <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/italy-f35-japan-experience-carrier" >second F-35 deployment </a>to Japan in August 2024, when eight of the F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing capable aircraft deployed on the aircraft carrier&nbsp;Cavour as part of a tour of the Pacific. The services have placed a strong emphasis on interoperability with Japanese forces in the region, with Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto having visited Japan and boarded the Cavour, and stated regarding plans to work with Japan’s navy: “We are talking about ships and aircraft from different countries preparing to operate, should the need arise, as if they are all part of the same force.” Crosetto stated that the Cavour’s operations in the Pacific were “not a matter of sending a message to China or North Korea,” highlighting the primary rationale for attributed to the deployment by experts, and likely to future investments in nuclear powered carriers as well. The two East Asian countries were considered the primary targets being alluded to when the minister referred to joint operations as “part of the same force,” and represent the region’s only major military powers that are not in the Western sphere of influence and do not host Western forces on their soil.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Naval]
— Israel Replenishes Ukrainian Patriot Air Defence Arsenals After Heavy Combat Losses: at 6/10/25 4:34pm
Israeli Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Brodsky has confirmed that his country has transferred MIM-104 <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/netherlands-replenishes-ukraine-patriot-losses" target="_blank">Patriot air defence systems</a> to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. “The Patriot systems that we once received from the U.S. are now in Ukraine. These are Israeli systems that were in service in the early 1990s. We agreed to transfer them to Ukraine," the ambassador informed the Ukrainian media outlet Insider. Speaking on June 8, he notably refrained from specifying the timing of the transfer, and thus did not provide confirmation as to whether <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/israel-delivering-large-quantities-patriot-air-defence-ukraine" >reports by Western sources</a> in January 2025 of such transfers were accurate, or whether the systems were delivered more recently. Brodsky further refrained from elaborating on the number of systems which have been delivered, meaning it will likely remain uncertain whether Israel agreed to supply its entire arsenal, or has maintained some units in storage. It has been reported that radars and other parts of the Israeli systems will first be refurbished in the United States before delivery to Ukraine.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_684827386c0b61_71456804.jpg" title="Israel Defence Forces Missile Battery From Patriot Air Defence System " > Israel faced sustained pressure from across the Western world to supply armaments to Ukraine from early 2022, but previously refrained from doing so due largely to its perceived need to maintain ties with Russia. The <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hamas-capture-merkavas-vehicles-offensive" target="_blank">outbreak of hostiles</a> between Israeli forces and paramilitaries in the Gaza Strip, and subsequently <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hezbollah-artillery-air-defence-escalation" target="_blank">with Hezbollah</a>, the Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition, and Iran, significantly increased the country’s reliance on Western support, which has been reported by some sources to have been a major factor leading Tel Aviv to accept Western requests to transfer armaments.&nbsp;The <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/interview-syria-defeat-russia-israel-security" target="_blank">overthrow of the government</a> of Israel’s neighbour Syria in December 2024 by Turkish and Western backed <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-intel-chief-slams-policy-syria" target="_blank">insurgents</a> may have been a further factor, with the installation of a Western-aligned government and destruction of its vast air fleets and&nbsp;North Korean-supplied&nbsp;missile arsenals having taken signifiant pressure off Israeli defences. Patriot systems were procured at a time when Iraq, Libya and Syria were adversaries that remained outside the Western sphere of influence, and all maintained significant ballistic missile programs and combat aviation capabilities. Successful military action against all three Arab states by Israel’s strategic partners in the region and in the Western world has effectively removed these security challenges.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_684829d6963342_13130950.jpg" title="Surface-to-Air Missile Launches By Patriot Air Defence Systems">The Israel Defence Forces in May 2024 confirmed plans to mothball Patriot systems, at a time of high intensity engagements with adversaries with advanced missile capabilities. This&nbsp;was interpreted by a number of analysts as a significant indication of the Patriot’s&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/patriot-save-ukraine-combat-record">performance shortcomings</a>.&nbsp;Retirement of Israel’s Patriots systems followed widespread reports of the serious friendly fire issues during combat operations, leading to the shooting down of significant numbers of Israeli drones. U.S. Military sources have reported that&nbsp;<a href="https://www.twz.com/air/israel-is-shooting-down-a-lot-of-its-own-drones">40 percent of aircraft</a>&nbsp;shot down by Israeli forces in late 2024 were friendly.&nbsp;This mirrored&nbsp;<a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-apr-21-war-patriot21-story.html#:~:text=The%20first%20friendly%2Dfire%20incident,to%20Central%20Command%20spokesman%20Lt.">similar issues</a>&nbsp;faffecting the U.S. Army’s Patriot systems during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Patriot has been replaced in Israeli service by the more advanced&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/finland-davidssling-russian-intel-compromised">David’s Sling </a>developed jointly by Israel and the United States, which forms a core part of the country’s multi-layered network. Israel is the only operator of the Patriot system to have phased it completely out of service, which combined with the significant size of its arsenal makes it highly valued as a supplier, at a time when U.S. and its NATO allies have faced serious shortages of Patriot systems, with the U.S. Army’s arsenal increasingly&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/airdefence-shortage-forces-danger">thinly stretched</a>. The age of Israeli systems, however, makes the far from cutting edge.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_684827261d1f17_86704392.png" title="Ukrainian Patriot System Milliseconds Before Iskander Missile Strike ">The Patriot is by far the most costly and high value weapons system operated by Ukraine, and is exported by the U.S. for approximately $2.5&nbsp;billion per system, although some sources have cited a cost of $1.5 billion.&nbsp;The systems have been donated to the Eastern European country by multiple NATO member states, with the United States in December 2022 having been the first to pledge to provide them. The need for new supplies is considered particularly dire due to both an inability to replenish Ukraine’s previously vast arsenals of Soviet standard air defence systems, and due to the very high rates at which Patriot systems delivered from across the Western world have been destroyed in combat. The Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile has been <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/patriot-effectiveness-questioned-ukrainian-air-force">singled out</a> in Ukrainian Air Force reports for its ability to evade interception by the system, and has been confirmed by video footage to have destroyed them multiple times. The Iskander was first&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/patriot-take-out-ukraine-replace">confirmed</a>&nbsp;to have successfully destroyed a Patriot system on February 23, 2024, with a&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-patriot-losses-iskander">subsequent strike&nbsp;</a>destroying another system&nbsp;near the Sergeevka locality on March 10 that year, after which new footage in July&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-iskander-ukraine-patriot">confirmed the destruction</a>&nbsp;of two batteries in the Odessa region. On August 11 three more batteries and an AN/MPQ-65 radar were reported&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/american-patriot-mpq65radar-ukraine">destroyed</a>&nbsp;in Iskander-M strikes.&nbsp;One of the Iskander-M’s more recent successes saw the&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/patriot-destroyed-russian-iskander-missile">destruction</a>&nbsp;of the Patriot’s AN/MPQ-65 multifunctional radar station, combat control cabin, and missile launch vehicles in the Dnepropetrovsk region.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_684828234f49f7_62910557.jpg" title="Cluster Warhead Explosions From Iskander-M Strike on Ukrainian Patriot Batteries">The extent of Western shortages of Patriot systems has been widely attested to by senior officials, with assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jake Sullivan having&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/no-more-patriot-ukraine-stocks" >confirmed</a>&nbsp;as early as April 2024 that the United States would be unable to provide new systems to Ukraine, despite recent requests from President Zelensky for “at least seven”new units. “The U.S. Patriot systems right now are being deployed around the world, including in the Middle East, to protect U.S. troops,” Sullivan stated.“If we can unlock further American Patriot batteries we would send them. But we are doing a lot of the supplying of the actual missiles that go into those batteries that get fired,” he added. European NATO members’ inventories have been even more seriously depleted, with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock having confirmed in April 2024 regarding her own country’s capacity: “Unfortunately, the stocks, especially our own Patriot systems, are now pretty much exhausted. Therefore I made it clear at a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting that we need to check the availability of all Patriot systems in Europe and globally, and that we will make every effort to obtain these systems for Ukraine.” Israel’s capacity to provide new systems is thus highly valued, although considering the age of the systems and their limitations, their ability to provide viable cover for Ukrainian forces and strategic targets remains in serious question.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Middle East, Missile and Space]
— Bolstering Pakistan’s Aerial Kill Chains: Talks Underway to Procure Chinese KJ-500 ‘Flying Radar’ Planes: at 6/10/25 3:45pm
China and Pakistan have been confirmed to have entered formal negotiations for the sale of a KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEW&amp;C) systems, which if finalised could represent a game changer for the Pakistan Air Force’s situational awareness and targeting capabilities in times of conflict. Talks on the procurement are taking place as the Indian Defence Ministry is <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-ambassador-details-terms-su57-deal-considered-india" target="_blank">considering</a> a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/indian-pakistani-clashes-win-su57" target="_blank">license production deal </a>to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-offers-india-unprecedented-control-su57-transfer-full-source-code" target="_blank">procure Russian Su-57</a> fifth generation fighters on a large scale, likely the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-prepares-su57m1-production-airframe-upgrades" target="_blank">new Su-57M1 variant</a>, which has enhanced stealth capabilities that would pose new challenges in the event of a future air war. The KJ-500 provides advanced detection capabilities against stealth aircraft, particularly when networked with fighters with modern phased array radars and with the radars of ground-based air defence systems. The system has been deployed extensively by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force in supporting roles for its fleet of <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/how-many-j20-stealth-fighter-will-china-build-top-expert-predicts-over-1000" target="_blank">J-20 fifth generation fighters</a>, and has been singled out by figures in the U.S. Air Force leadership as a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/kj500-flying-radar-america-hates" target="_blank">particular threat</a> to American air power in the Pacific. The system can provide targeting data to fighter units and ground-based air defence systems, and can contribute to guiding anti-aircraft missiles to their targets.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_68480e0126e911_75203833.jpeg" title="Chinese PLA Air Force KJ-500A AEW&amp;C">Negotiations for the sale of the KJ-500 are occurring as Pakistan continues to procure J-10C and JF-17 Block III ‘4+ generation’ fighters from China, which are by far the most capable in its fleet. The Pakistan Air Force is also <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/pakistan-j35-fifth-gen-before-2027" target="_blank">expected to receive</a> J-35 fifth generation fighters before the end of the decade, with unconfirmed reports indicating that a fleet of 40 of the stealth fighters is planned. The J-10C and JF-17 Block III which form the backbone of the fleet are both lightweight fighters that carry relatively small radars, which makes support from an asset like the KJ-500 particularly valuable. Although larger Chinese fighters such as the J-16 and J-20 carry much larger radars and can operate much more effectively without such support, they still benefit considerably from it, with the importance of supporting AEW&amp;Cs being significantly greater for lighter aircraft. The J-35, although heavier than the J-10C, also carries a radar significantly smaller than those of the J-16 or J-20.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_68480e1b4083c8_17052591.jpeg" title="Chinese PLA Air Force J-10C Armed For Air-to-Air Combat">One month before the first reports of talks to procure the KJ-500 occurred, the Pakistan Air Force made its first deployment of Chinese-supplied ‘4+ generation’ fighters for combat operations, with the J-10C credited with &nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/indian-air-force-faces-pr-crisis-240-million-rafale-destroyed" >shooting down at least one</a>&nbsp;Indian Air Force Rafale fighter during border clashes, among other successes. Confirmation of the superiority which Chinese equipment has increasingly been able to provide may have been a significant factor in the decision to move ahead with procurement of the KJ-500. A further factor may have been the importance of Chinese-developed kill chains, which were reportedly used by the Pakistan Air Force to great effect during clashes with Indian fighter units. Kill chains saw aviation assets and ground based air defence systems networked, allowing missile shorts launched from a particular aircraft or system to be guided by other aircraft or systems to their targets. The KJ-500 is considered an optional asset to strengthen such kill chains. &nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: South Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— China’s New Hybrid-Engine Type 99 Tank Promises Power For Energy Weapons and Unprecedented Range: at 6/10/25 6:06am
A new hybrid-powered testbed variant of the Chinese <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-s-most-powerful-battle-tank-marks-ten-years-in-frontline-service-how-powerful-is-the-type-99a" target="_blank">Type 99A main battle tank</a> has begun field testing, with the vehicle integrating diesel and electric propulsion with the promise to revolutionise many aspects of its performance. The system is reported to have significantly reduced the vehicle’s acoustic signature, accelerated torque delivery, and provided much greater support for potential future energy-intensive onboard systems such as electronic warfare systems and directed energy weapons. The new propulsion system is also expected to provide an unprecedentedly long range, easing the burden on logistics by achieving far greater levels of fuel efficiency. A further benefit is the new engine’s greater optimisation for operations at high altitudes, where the thin air can reduce the efficiency of internal combustion engines. The tank’s development is expected to leverage China’s world leading electric vehicle industry, which has emerged entirely in a league of its own in terms of both output and sophistication. High-energy storage and thermal management technologies from the civilian industry has long been seen to have the potential to provide tremendous benefits for Chinese armoured warfare capabilities.&nbsp;&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_6847b050c0de26_74335241.png" title="Chinese Type 99A Main Battle Tank">China is expected to lead the world in operationalising hybrid and eventually fully electric main battle tanks, with South Korea <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/world-first-hydrogen-powered-tank-skorea-k3">following</a> by seeking to develop a hydrogen-only propulsion system for its K3 main battle tank by the 2040, and to field a hybrid diesel and hydrogen powered variant of the vehicle as a stopgap in the 2030s. The two East Asian countries are considered the world leaders in the capabilities of their tank industries, with Western producers having failed to move on from modernising Cold War era designs while their vehicles have recent demonstrated multiple <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/just-four-abrams-left-russia-wiped-out-87pct-ukraine" target="_blank">serious deficiencies</a>. Although Russia led the world in the field in the Soviet era, it has also failed to operationalise a clean sheet post-Soviet tank design, with its ambitious <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russias-t14-turret-revolutionary-improvement">T-14 program</a> having suffered tremendous delays. While all other tank producers have just a single class of main battle tank in production, China currently produces five separate tank classes, including the Type 99A which equips elite units, its cheaper counterpart the Type 96B, the much lighter Type 15 built for mountain and amphibious warfare, the VT-4 which is produced for export, and derivatives of the early Cold War era Type 59 such as the Al Kafil-1 produced for the Iraqi Army.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_6847b12d2cda44_17816273.png" title="Chinese Next Generation Lightweight Tank Prototype" >China is expected to lead the world in the development of a heavily automated next generation tank class with a two man crew, down from the three man crews of current Chinese, Korean and Russia tanks, and the four man crews of U.S. and German tanks. Chinese state media outlet CCTV in 2022 <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-s-semi-autonomous-next-gen-tank-needs-just-half-the-crew-of-its-western-rivals-unveiling-imminent" >teased the unveiling</a> of a never before seen fourth generation battle tank which would achieve unprecedented levels of automation and crew protection. A prototype of a new&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/first-look-china-tank-prototype-light" target="_blank">lightweight tank </a>fitting this description was seen from mid-2024.&nbsp;The Type 099A is currently the country’s most capable tank class, and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-s-most-powerful-battle-tank-marks-ten-years-in-frontline-service-how-powerful-is-the-type-99a" target="_blank" >first entered service</a> in 2011. Approximately 350 Type 99A tanks are thought to have been produced, and at 55 tons they are considerably heavier than the 43 ton Type 96 or than competing Russian or South Korean designs. Relatively little is known regarding its capabilities, in part due to secrecy surrounding the program and the lack of efforts to market it for export. It is known that the tank uses a 1500hp engine and has superior armour protection to other Chinese vehicles, including a turret with arrow shaped applique armour, composite panels, spaced modular armour and a JD-3 infra red jammer. The highly positive assessments of the VT-4 tank which have been made by foreign operators, however, indicate that the Chinese tank industry is operating at the cutting edge. Integration of a new propulsion is system is expected to lead to the emergence of a distinct new variant of the Type 99 tank, and may also&nbsp;accelerate work on the development of a clean sheet next generation successor to the design.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Asia-Pacific, Ground]
— Did Ukraine’s New F-16s Shoot Down a Russian Su-35 ‘Super Flanker’ Near Kursk?: at 6/9/25 7:44pm
Following the publication of footage confirming that a Russian Aerospace Forces Su-35 fighter was shot down in the first week of June, which the Ukrainian Air Force reported was “a result of a successful operation in the Kursk direction,” a number of Western and Ukrainian sources have claimed that the aircraft was shot down by an F-16 fighter. These claims followed the delivery of the first F-16s to the Ukrainian Air Force in August 2024, and the loss of one of the fighters within a month of delivery, a second on April 12, and a third on May 16 during an engagement with Russian targets thought to be drones or cruise missiles.&nbsp;The Russian Aerospace Forces are estimated to have lost eight Su-35s to accidents, friendly fire and surface-to-air missile attacks since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in February 2022.Although the Su-35 has been used intensively for air-to-air operations, and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ten-days-air-battles-lose-mig29-left" target="_blank">claimed multiple kills </a>against Ukrainian MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters often at high rates in high intensity periods of engagements, the aircraft has never suffered losses in air-to-air combat. The Ukrainian fighter fleet had previously gained no confirmed kills against Russian fighter aircraft, with the discrepancy in capabilities between the aircraft fielded by the two fleets leading Ukraine to primarily employ its fighters to<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/biden-hits-major-missile-upgrade-ukraine-f16" target="_blank"> fire long range cruise missiles</a> from deep inside the airspace under its control.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_68479cc7d69708_97118572.png" title="Russian Aerospace Forces Su-35 Shot Down Near Kursk">With the F-16 having seen a production run of close to half a century long, there are very significant discrepancies between the capabilities of the variants in service around the world today. The variants operated by the Ukrainian Air Force, however, lie at the opposite end of the spectrum to the<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/latest-f16-pentagon-no-want" target="_blank"> modern F-16 Block 70/72</a> in production today, and are very early 1980s models that have been modernised conservatively. The fighters no only rely on obsolete mechanically scanned array radars, but also lack the Link 16 data link system which leaves their ability to operate as part of a network with other assets highly limited. These ageing F-16s were already widely assessed to be greatly outmatched by the Soviet Union’s top air superiority fighter of the time, the Su-27, with the discrepancy in capabilities between them and modern Su-35s today being significantly greater still.&nbsp;Ukrainian sources and international analysts have consistently pointed to the severe performance disadvantages faced by the country’s fighters against the more capable models such as the Su-35 fielded by the Russian Aerospace Forces. On June 3 Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuri Ignat <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-air-force-f16s-far-outmatched-russian-fighters" target="_blank">stated to this effect</a>: "Unfortunately, today Russia has jets that see farther and missiles that fly farther. That’s even when compared to F-16s. They also have powerful air defences, which work in tandem with aviation.” Ignat <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-air-force-laments-f16-cant-compete-russian-su35">previously lamented </a>in March: &nbsp;“The modifications that Ukraine has cannot compete one-on-one in an air battle. We need a comprehensive approach as the [Russian] Su-35 is a relatively new jet… This includes ground-based air defence, electronic warfare systems, and ideally, an airborne radar. Also crucial are onboard radars for our aircraft and air-to-air missiles.”&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_68479cfb1122b6_66386701.jpeg" title="Ukrainian Air Force F-16 Equipped For Air-to-Air Combat">Russia’s dense deployments of ground based air defence systems and control of the air near the frontlines has been a primary factor leading the Ukrainian Air Force to deploy its fighters far behind the frontlines, where they serve as launch platforms for long range missile attacks. Even when deployed in such a way, however, F-16s have <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-s40n6-400km-shoot-down-f16" target="_blank">still suffered losses</a>&nbsp;to long range missile attacks. The fact that a Su-35 was shot down in Kursk thus raises the question of the likelihood of an F-16 being deployed so far forward not engage a target well behind the current frontlines. While such operations may be highly viable for squadrons equipped with stealth fighters like the F-35, it remains highly questionable whether F-16s would be employed to engage a target so far inside Russian controlled territory due to the tremendous risks this would entail. Such usage of the fighters would contrast sharply with the particularly risk averse ways the aircraft have been employed so far.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_68479d263202b7_11955960.jpeg" title="Russian Aerospace Forces Su-35 Fighters ">A leading limitation of the F-16s in Ukrainian service that brings their ability to threaten the Su-35 into question is the obsolescence of their radars. These not only serious limit situational awareness, but also leave the fighters highly vulnerable to jamming, while their large radar signatures can easily alert Russian forces to their locations. A number of Western sources have contested that the Ukrainian Air Force may have gotten around this issue by using offboard radars to guide AIM-120 air-to-air missiles to their targets, which would allow F-16s to operate without turning their radars on. The F-16’s lack of a Link 16 data link, however, would limit their ability to use targeting data from assets such as ground-based <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/combat-losses-wont-give-ukraine-patriot-free" target="_blank">Patriot missile systems</a> or <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-receives-saab340-flying-radar" target="_blank">Saab 340 airborne early warning and control</a> systems. The Saab 340’s relatively small and ageing sensor suite for an aircraft of its type, however, and the aircraft’s very <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/while-elephant-asset-why-sending-saab-340-flying-radars-to-ukraine-will-not-end-well-for-kiev" target="_blank">high vulnerability </a>if operating within approximately 400 kilometres of Russian positions, raises serious questions regarding the possibility of the aircraft being used to support the shooting down of a Su-35 near Kursk. The very high levels of training that would be required for such a complex kill also raises questions due to the very limited training time and experience Ukrainian personnel have had.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_68479d46038f53_83631957.jpg" title="Saab 340 AEW&amp;C">The possibility of F-16s operating alone shooting down a Su-35 would appear extremely unlikely, arguably far moreso than claims which surfaced in 2019 of Indian Air Force MiG-21s shooting down Pakistan Air Force F-16s, with the discrepancy in capabilities between the fighters in this case being even greater still. Nevertheless, the possibility of near obsolete fighters compensating for the obsolescence of their sensors by pairing relatively modern missiles with AEW&amp;C systems has been highlighted by analysts in the past, and even without Link 16 cannot be discounted entirely. The fact that Western contractors have been confirmed repeatedly to have <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/britain-france-central-role-facilitating-ukrainian-attack-energy-infrastructure" target="_blank">played central roles</a> in <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-hypersonic-patriot-mercenary-casualties" target="_blank">operating complex equipment </a>for Ukraine, and the significant possibility of such personnel being onboard the country’s AEW&amp;C systems, may also have heavily compensated for Ukrainian personnel’s limited training and experience.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_6847a1b81ccae4_77325430.jpg" title="Lightweight F-16 (front) and Ukrainian Su-27 Heavyweight Fighters">Should Ukrainian F-16s have achieved a kill by pairing with AEW&amp;C systems, it would further highlight the considerable value of even lower end AEW&amp;Cs like the Saab 340, and would likely make the two aircraft that Ukraine does field priority targets for future Russian strikes. Sources on both sides have since early 2022 consistently presented kills in ways that would reflect as favourably as possible on their forces to raise morale and the prestige of their defence sectors, and made highly dubious claims to this end. A&nbsp;notable example ws Russian sources’ claims in late 2022 that a<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-air-defences-break-range-record-in-combat-first-kill-for-the-famed-400km-range-40n6-missile" target="_blank"> very long range kill</a> against a Ukrainian Su-27 fighter, which was though two have been achieved by an air defence system, was in fact <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/extreme-range-su57-su-27-kill-reports" target="_blank">achieved by its new Su-57</a> fighter. The particularly high prestige brought by air-to-air kills in particular has led to such achievements being fabricated entirely, with the most prominent example being wholly unrealistic Ukrainian government claims regarding the ‘Ghost of Kiev’ fighter pilot shooting down multiple far more modern and capable Russian combat jets in the conflict’s opening stages, which was subsequently admitted to have <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-admits-ghost-kyiv-isnt-real-wartime-myth-russia-rcna26867" target="_blank">been war propaganda</a>.&nbsp;Similarly, presenting the shootdown of a Su-35 as the result of an F-16 operation would be highly valuable for Ukraine and its Western supporters’ public relations efforts, particularly in light of the growing criticism of the obsolescence and severe limitations of the F-16s Ukraine fields.&nbsp;While the possibility of a kill cannot be discounted, the incentives to misattribute such a kill to an F-16 for public relations purposes remain very significant, while the precedents for doing so are considerable.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Just Four Abrams Tanks Left: How Russia Wiped Out 87 Percent of Ukraine’s U.S.-Supplied Fleet: at 6/9/25 5:56pm
The Ukrainian Army has been assessed to have lost 87 percent of its M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, with 27 of the 31 vehicles delivered by the United States in late 2023 having been destroyed or captured since they <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-footage-shows-ukraine-s-u-s-supplied-abrams-tanks-in-first-combat-images-indicate-possible-combat-loss" >began to be utilised</a> for frontline operations in February 2024. By late August 2024 losses were estimated at close to two third of the fleet at 20 of the 31 tanks, with subsequent footage over the following nine months confirming the losses of seven more. On September 1 footage confirmed serious damage to an Abrams tank, which was filmed&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/captures-leopard2a6-abrams" >being captured</a>&nbsp;and towed away by Russian forces near the&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-army-disordered-retreat" >strategically located town</a>&nbsp;of Avdiivka alongside a German-supplied Leopard 2A6 tank. Later that week new footage <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-confirms-two-more-u-s-supplied-abrams-tanks-destroyed-by-russian-forces-in-pokrovsk" >confirmed the destruction</a> of two Abrams tanks, the first near the village of Volchye in the Pokrovsk direction, and the second near the settlement of Berdychi. Less than a week later on September 14, an image confirmed that another Abrams tank had been disabled and secured. This brought total estimated losses to 24 tanks, leaving just seven in service.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_68478475161730_57304460.jpeg" title="Ukrainian Army M1A1 Abrams Tank">With the fleet seriously depleted, footage and images of Abrams tanks in the Ukrainian theatre became increasingly scarce after September 2024. Nevertheless, on October 28 images <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/capture-abrams-pokrovsk-ukraine">confirmed</a> that Russian Army units had captured a Ukrainian Army Abrams tank used by the 47th Mechanised Brigade near the city of Pokrovsk. Subsequently in June 2025, footage showed two of the Ukrainian Army’s last remaining Abrams tanks being <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-army-captures-two-ukraine-abrams-intact" target="_blank">captured and towed away</a> by Russian Army units near the frontlines in the Sumy region, after the vehicles had been abandoned relatively intact.&nbsp;This brought estimated losses to 27 tanks, although Russian government sources have <a href="https://www.rt.com/russia/618849-russia-destroy-abrams-tanks-ukraine/">cited</a> a lower figure of 26.&nbsp;While it remains uncertain how many of the Abrams tanks captured were subsequently taken back to Russia, and in what state some of them were in, there remains a significant possibility that Russia now has more operable Abrams tanks in its possession that the Ukrainian Army.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_684786373c1601_63981950.png" title="Ukrainian Army M1A1 Abrams Tank During First Frontline Operations in February 2024">The Abrams tank was brought into service in the U.S. Army in 1980, with its design having been heavily influenced by that of the Soviet T-64 which had entered service 16 years prior, and had been widely acknowledged in the West to provide tremendous superiority. The Abrams provided a tremendous leap in capability over the preceding M60 that had equipped the most capable U.S. Army and Marine units. The <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/polish-army-receives-new-batch-abrams" target="_blank">latest variants </a>of the Abrams in production today are considered the most capable main battle tanks in the Western world, with the vehicle standing out for its sheer size as the heaviest tank class in the world. Operations in Ukraine represent the Abrams’ first high intensity combat against a peer level state adversary, with a combination of the serious operational difficulties it has had, and the extreme losses suffered, having resulted in highly critical assessments of its capabilities. &nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/10/article_68478442afcc04_06966708.PNG" title="Drone Footage of Ukrainian Army M1A1 Abrams Tank Moments Before Rear Armour Hit ">Most of the Abrams tanks filmed being destroyed or otherwise neutralised were targeted&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-army-takes-out-another-ukrainian-abrams-tank-with-guided-artillery-shot" >by guided artillery</a>&nbsp;or&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-taking-out-abrams-ukraine" >by single use ‘kamikaze’ drones</a>, although one was confirmed to have been&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-t72b3-abrams-ukraine" >destroyed by a Russian T-72B3</a>&nbsp;tank after the two exchanged fire near Avdiivka.&nbsp;The losses faced have caused considerable concern among NATO members, and particularly Poland which <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/delivery-116-m1a1-poland-major-war" target="_blank">plans to field a fleet</a> of 366 of the vehicles. With the Abrams’ survivability in the Ukrainian theatre increasingly called to question, one unnamed defence official speaking to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in May stated that on the basis of this issue, regarding the possibility of further Abrams deliveries being made: “We are starting to doubt if the Ukrainians actually want these vehicles — the tank roof is the weakest point of the Abrams and this is a drone war.” In December 2024 U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan concluded that the tanks had proven not to be useful and did not have the desired impact in the theatre. “When it comes to Abrams tanks, we sent Abrams tanks to Ukraine… These Abrams tank units are actually undermanned because it’s not the most useful piece of equipment for them in this fight,” he stated.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Ground]
— British Plans to Field Nuclear-Armed F-35A Fighters Confirmed: Will They Share American Warheads?: at 6/9/25 5:39pm
Following unconfirmed reports that the British Ministry of Defence was <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/britain-considers-restoring-second-nuclear-f35a" >considering plans to procure</a>&nbsp;F-35A fifth generation fighter aircraft and nuclear gravity bombs to restore an air-launched nuclear strike capability, Minister of State for Defence Maria Eagle on June 9 confirmed for the first time that such procurements are expected to be made. In response to a parliamentary question from Conservative Member of Parliament Andrew Snowden, Eagle stated that under the new Strategic Defence Review&nbsp;there would be “a shift to a new mix of F35Bs and F35As,” indicating that this could undercut planned numbers of F-35B fighters. The Strategic Defence Review specifically stated: “More F-35s will be required over the next decade. This could comprise a mix of F-35A and B models according to military requirements to provide greater value for money.” The F-35B was previously procured due to its unique short takeoff and vertical landing capabilities, which allowed it to be deployed from <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/performance-british-carriers-calls-retirement" target="_blank">Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers,&nbsp;</a>which lack the catapult launch systems or arresting gear needed to operate other kinds of fixed wing aircraft. The much greater contributions made by British industry to manufacturing the F-35B variant compared to the F-35A were also considered an important factor in the decision to exclusively procure the former.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/09/article_6846f3de9a6535_27106858.jpg" title="F-35A Drops B61-12 Nuclear Bomb During Test">As the possibility of procuring the planned number of 138 F-35B fighters increasingly diminished from the early 2010s, procurements of the F-35A have been debated multiple times and have been openly advocated by senior officers in the Royal Air Force. The F-35B is approximately 50 percent more costly to procure, has significantly higher operational costs and lower availability rates, and is far more constrained in its combat potential and its range. The F-35A’s lower costs would allow the Royal Air Force to expand its fifth generation fighter fleet far more affordably, while the aircraft’s range and larger weapons bays make it far more suitable for delivering nuclear attacks. It remains uncertain whether the Ministry of Defence plans to develop an indigenous class of nuclear gravity bomb for the F-35A, much as Israel is reported to have done for its own stealth fighters, or whether the United Kingdom will enter a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States. Nuclear sharing agreements are currently in place with NATO members Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Turkey, allowing their forces to use American nuclear warheads stationed on their territories in the event of a major conflict.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/09/article_6846f403633b13_10167681.jpeg" title="British Armed Forces F-35B Conducts Vertical Landing">Regarding the possibility of the United States entering into new nuclear sharing agreements&nbsp;with NATO allies, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff nominee Dan Caine on April 1&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/next-pentagon-chief-confirms-willingness-provide-more-allies-nuclear-attack" >stated</a> that this could be considered "From a military perspective, expanding NATO allies’ participation in the nuclear deterrence mission in some capacity would enhance flexibility, survivability, and military capability. If confirmed, I will work... to evaluate the cost/benefit of such a decision," Caine stated. All nuclear sharing partners are clients for the F-35A, with the exception of Turkey which is currently&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/us-considering-turkish-return-f35-program" >negotiating to return&nbsp;</a>to the F-35 program and procure the aircraft. The F-35A’s advanced stealth capabilities in particular make it an optimal aircraft for launching&nbsp; nuclear attacks.&nbsp;Germany remains the only nuclear sharing partner not to have planned to adopt the F-35A to form the backbone of its fleet, although the country decided to place a small order for 35 of the fighters specifically for nuclear strike roles due to the class’ particularly distinct superiority for such missions.&nbsp;The Royal Netherlands Air Force&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/europe-snuclear-stealth-fighter-f35-dutch" >became the first&nbsp;</a>foreign partner to have the F-35 take over nuclear strike roles in June 2024, after the U.S. Air Force&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/f35s-cert-stealthy-nuclear-strike" >had done so</a> two months prior in March. As the U.S. Air Force has from 2023 gradually re-established its forward deployed nuclear forces in the United Kingdom, there has been growing speculation that this may have been intended from the outset to facilitate a new nuclear sharing agreement with the British Armed Forces.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Nine New Technologies to Revive Russia’s MiG-35: Realising the Fighter’s True Combat Potential: at 6/9/25 4:35am
Developed from the mid-2000s as a heavily enhanced derivative of and successor to the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/mig29-fighter-marks-40-years-in-service-how-russia-s-extremely-manoeuvrable-fighter-has-evolved" >Soviet MiG-29</a>, the MiG-35 medium weight fighter program had by the middle of the 2020s fallen far short of expectations, with just six aircraft in service and no apparent plans to produce more. While the enhanced MiG-29M fighter had seen considerable success on export markets, with 46 sold to Egypt, 14 to Algeria, and 45 and 24 carrier based MiG-29K derivatives for service in the navies of India and Russia itself respectively, the MiG-35 never received foreign or domestic orders at anywhere near the levels predicted. Reports from early 2025, however, indicate that this may change in future, as the Russian Defence Ministry and the state owned United Aircraft Corporation reportedly plan to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-resurrecting-mig35-ukraine-nkorea-opportunities" target="_blank">facilitate production </a>of the aircraft on a significant scale for the Russian Aerospace Forces. Such orders have the potential to revive the program, and allow many of the new technologies developed over the past decade, the majority of them for Russia’s new <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-prepares-su57m1-production-airframe-upgrades" target="_blank">Su-57 fifth generation fighter</a>, to be integrated onto the lighter MiG aircraft, thereby enhancing its combat potential and making it a far more competitive performer on international markets. Five of the most significant new technologies which the fighter could integrate are explored below:&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/05/23/article_683089c334ba37_85902284.jpeg" title="Unarmed MiG-35 Fighter Takes Off with External Fuel Tanks - MiG-29 in the Background">R-77M Air-to-Air Missiles&nbsp;A primary limitation of Russian fighters compared to their American, Chinese and even European counterparts has been a lack of top performing air-to-air missiles. While the R-77-1 represents a broad equivalent to the American AIM-120C5 and Chinese PL-12, not only did Russia operationalise the missile relatively late around 2014, but it also fielded no counterpart to the Chinese PL-15 and PL-16 or to the American AIM-120D or AIM-260. As a result when facing top performing enemy fighters, Russian pilots operating the Su-35, MiG-35, or other modern combat jets are outranged by close to 100 kilometres, and in some cases more, when using their standard armament, while having significantly lower kill probabilities even within short ranges. The R-77M developed for the Su-57 fighter has the potential to<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/world-s-top-seven-most-dangerous-standoff-air-to-air-missiles-from-european-meteors-to-russian-r-37s" target="_blank"> largely bridge the gap </a>in performance, and has a range of approximately 200 kilometres compared to just 110 kilometres for the R-77-1. The missile is reported to use an AESA radar in its homing head for greater immunity to jamming and a longer target lock on range, while its active phased array antenna technology is intended to provide the missile with a fuller and wider angle picture of its target making it far more difficult to evade. For the MiG-35 to compete with modern Chinese and American fighters such as the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/pakistani-j10c-shot-down-indian-rafale" target="_blank">combat proven J-10C</a> in the air-to-air domain, integration of the R-77M or a similarly capable weapon is considered vital.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/05/23/article_683089893fa275_77862127.jpeg" title="R-77M Air-to-Air Missiles Carried on External Pylons on Su-57 Fighter">izdeliye 810 Air-to-Air Missiles&nbsp;The izdeliye 810 has been developed as a miniaturised derivative of the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/longest-ranged-aam-performs-ukraine-su57" target="_blank">R-37M very long range</a> air-to-air missile, and reportedly entered service in early 2025 with an engagement range of over 300 kilometres. While the MiG-35 was <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/mig-35s-to-carry-hypersonic-air-to-air-missiles-fighter-s-new-capabilities-come-to-light" target="_blank">previously reported</a> by Russian state sources to be compatible with the R-37M, not only does the fighter lack the operational altitude or cruising speed needed to make fully effective use of it, but the missile’s very large size means it will take a significant toll on the MiG-35’s flight performance and leave little carrying capacity for other ordinance. Integration of the much more compact izdeliye 810 has the potential to provide the MiG-35 with the longest air-to-air engagement range for a fighter of its weight range without similar compromises to its performance. The fighter’s relatively small radar by Russian standards, however, is not considered capable of guiding the missile to targets at its fully range, meaning it will need to be networked with other assets such as <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-mig31bm-deliver-prized" target="_blank">MiG-31 interceptors</a> or forward-deployed ground-based systems to provide guidance. &nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/05/23/article_6830896646a669_43770862.jpg" title="R-37M Air-to-Air Missile">Modern Radar and Helmet-Mounted Targeting SystemThe MiG-35 was initially expected to be the first Russian fighter to enter service with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the&nbsp; Zhuk-A/AM, although the six aircraft purchased by the Defence Ministry all integrated the older Zhuk-ME passive electronically scanned array (PESA) radar. This was reportedly done to reduce costs, although there was significant speculation that the decision was taken due to delays in developing the Zhuk-A/AM. Russia’s radar industry has since progressed significantly, with the Su-57 fighter’s N036-1-01 frontal AESA radar set to be replaced in the near future on the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-prepares-su57m1-production-airframe-upgrades" target="_blank">new Su-57M1 variant</a> with a next generation AESA radar. A more capable AESA radar for the MiG-35, possibly based on that of the Su-57M1, could significantly bolster situational awareness and electronic warfare capabilities. While other Russian tactical combat jets such as the Su-35 and MiG-31 integrate much larger radars than their Western counterparts, allowing them to compensate for shortcomings in sophistication with sheer size and power, the MiG-35’s cannot carry larger radars, meaning integration of the most sophisticated sensor suite possible is vital.Alongside a new radar, other avionics can also help to significantly boost situational awareness. In December 2024 Russian state media&nbsp;unveiled a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-su57-cutting-edge-helmet" target="_blank">new helmet-mounted targeting system</a> for the Su-57, which resembles similar systems used on the Chinese J-20 and American F-35 fifth generation fighters that work by projecting critical information directly onto the pilot’s visor. This includes&nbsp; flight and targeting data, providing a much more comprehensive view of the operational environment.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/05/23/article_68308937ac4625_51462392.png" title="Su-57 and New Helmet System">New Cruise Missile and Guided BombThe <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su57-cruise-missile-debut-ukraine">Kh-59MK2 cruise missile</a> was designed as the primary air to ground armament of the Su-57 fighter, and if integrated onto the MiG-35 could provide a formidable long range strike capability that heavily compensates for the fighter’s lack of stealth capabilities. The missile class optimised for neutralising small hardened targets at long ranges of close to 300km, and carries either a 320 kilogram penetrating warhead, or a smaller pellet warhead designed to affect targets over a wider area. Other warheads proposed have included a more powerful penetrator and a cluster munition carrier.&nbsp;A further class of air-to-ground ordinance developed for the Su-57, but with significant potential to be integrated onto the MiG-35, is the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-drel-precision-cluster-production" >PBK-500U&nbsp;Drel </a>500kg precision guided glide bomb. Glide bombs have emerged during the Russian-Ukrainian War as a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/gates-hell-bunker-busting-glide-bombs" target="_blank">weapon of choice</a> for precision strikes and close air support, and while delivering far greater quantities of ordnance and at a far lower cost than cruise missiles, they can still be launched from sufficient distances that fighters are relatively safe from being targeted by most surface-to-air missile systems. The Drel bomb provides “fire and forget” capabilities, meaning they do not require illumination of its targets or wire guidance by an aircraft, and instead use&nbsp;inertial and GLONASS satellite guidance and an identification friend or foe system accurate enough to engage fast moving targets. Each bomb contains fifteen self-guided anti-tank element charges which weigh around fifteen kilograms each, with these high payload sub munitions combined with the bomb’s precision allowing a very small number of Drel bombs to cause tremendous damage that would require multiple bombing runs if using older bombs. Although the MiG-35 has a much lower takeoff weight, it can carry comparable amounts of ordinance to a stealth configured Su-57 as it does not need to store its weaponry internally.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/05/23/article_683088fa097659_32931580.jpg" title="Kh-59MK2 Cruise Missile">Electronic Warfare SuiteAs has been the case for many ‘4+ generation’ fighters, MiG-35’s designers may compensate for the fighter’s lack of stealth capabilities by placing a strong emphasis on integrating a powerful electronic warfare suite. One possibility is that the fighter could integrate a derivative of the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-su-57-fighter-s-new-himalayas-electronic-warfare-complex-provides-unique-defence-capability" target="_blank">Su-57’s Himalayas suite</a>, which is distributed across the stealth fighter’s&nbsp; including on the wings, allowing it to better interfere with enemy targeting systems and protect the fighter from missile attacks from all directions. Russian media reports indicate that the suite’s long range exceeds the effective use radius of most Western air-to-air missiles. Integration of such an electronic warfare suite, or possibly a suite developed using more advanced technologies developed for the newer Su-57M1 fighter, could significantly improve the MiG-35’s survivability. Integration of derivatives of the Su-57’s avionics onto another aircraft would be far from unprecedented, with a notable example being the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su-57-communications-systems-to-be-integrated-onto-tu-22m3m-tactical-bombers">integration</a> of a communications platform closely based on that of the stealth fighter onto modernised Tu-22M3M bombers.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/05/23/article_683088b51b92d5_33713478.jpg" title="MiG-35 Demonstrates Manoeuvrability">EnginesIn the 1990s Russian industry completed development of an enhanced variant of the MiG-29’s RD-33 engine, the RD-33M which significantly reduced fuel consumption, ended black smoke emissions, and increased maximum thrust by nine percent from 81kN to 88.26kN. The MiG-35 has continued to rely on these ageing engines, and could see its flight performance, range, and the amount of energy available for onboard subsystems all improved significantly if integrating a more modern powerplant that utilises more of the technologies developed in the past 30 years. In particular, a smaller engine developed based on the technologies used in the Su-57M1 fighter’s <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/first-look-stealth-optimised-al51f-1-powering-russia-su-57m" target="_blank">AL-51F powerplant</a> could help to significantly reduce operational costs and maintenance needs, while providing a flight performance unrecognisable from that of the original MiG-35. With the fighter’s range being a primary deficiency relative to heavier classes of fighter, a modern engine could do much to bridge the performance gap, while major savings on operational costs could help to compensate for the greater cost of producing a more advanced engine.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Russia Redeploys Scarce Tu-160 Bombers As Far As Possible From Ukraine After Sustained Attacks on Primary Base: at 6/8/25 9:21pm
The Russian Aerospace Forces have redeployed Tu-160 strategic bombers from Engels-2 Airbase located just 500 kilometres behind the Ukrainian frontlines, to one of its easternmost facilities just 500 kilometres from the U.S. state of Alaska. At least two of the aircraft were seen at Anadyr Airbase, located over 6,600 kilometres from Ukraine. With the bombers being equipped with 5000 kilometre range Kh-101/102 cruise missiles, however, they will still be able to take part in precision strikes on targets on Ukrainian territory, as well as across Europe, with the aircraft’s own ranges by many estimates being the longest of any combat jets in the world. Th decision to redeploy the bombers follows sustained Ukrainian attacks on their primary operational facility, Engels-2 Airbase, including a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-successful-attack-russia-bomber-facility" >successful strike</a> on June 6 which resulted in a major fire. This attack occurred five days after <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-most-successful-strike-russian-bomber-bases" >coordinated drone operations</a> using fleets of AI-driven aircraft infiltrated deep into Russia struck bomber bases across the country, <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/how-damaged-russian-bomber-ukraine-drone-attack" >causing serious losses</a> among the Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bomber fleets.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_68461bcf738fa0_69841643.jpeg" title="Satellite Footage of Tu-160 Bombers at Anadyr Airbase (Airvector)">It remains uncertain what portion of the Tu-160 fleet was redeployed to&nbsp;Anadyr Airbase, or the extent to which Ukrainian attacks on facilities further west influenced the decision. Bombers frequently deploy to bases across Russia for exercises and shows of force in peacetime, although the timing of the latest deployment has fuelled speculation that it may at least partly be a response to ensure the aircraft’s security.&nbsp;Engels-2 Airbase has been successfully targeted multiple times by Ukrainian forces, albeit never with a confirmed kill against bombers based there. On January 8 a Ukrainian long range drone strike&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-major-blow-russia-strategic-bomber-fleet" >successfully targeted</a>&nbsp;the Kombinat Kristall fuel depot near the&nbsp;facility, with the attack&nbsp; reported to have destroyed reserves of T-8V high-density specialised aviation fuel used by the Tu-160 fleet. Subsequently on March 20 a drone attack caused a&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-successful-strike-key-hub-russian-tu160-fleet" >major explosion</a>&nbsp;at the facility.&nbsp;These strikes were far from unprecedented, with three attacks on Engels-2 having been launched in December 2022 alone. <img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_68461c41772967_35204277.jpeg" title="Tu-160 Bombers at Engels Airbase">The Tu-160 is by far the highest value combat aircraft fielded by the Russian Armed Forces, and has from 2015 received considerable investment from the Defence Ministry to resume production. The termination of production after the USSR’s disintegration, the subsequent destruction of many of the aircraft inherited by Ukraine due to Western pressure in the 1990s, and crashes in Russia that followed, means only 16 Soviet built Tu-160s are in service, falling far short of the fleet of 70 the Russian Aerospace Forces plan to field. Production was&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/boosting-tu160m-bombers-70strong" >reported in January 2023&nbsp;</a>to be set to undergo significant expansion, after the first new Tu-160M bomber having&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-first-post-soviet-bomber-tu160" >made its first flight&nbsp;</a>in January 2022. Major losses to the Tu-95MS strategic bomber fleet as a result of Ukrainian attacks on June 1 have only further increased the urgency of both preserving the newer Tu-160 fleet and ensuring the smooth operationalisation of the 54 planned new aircraft. Procurements may be further expanded should the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-attack-accelerate-pakda-bomber" target="_blank">PAK DA next generation bomber</a> program, which is already very far behind schedule, faces further delays or cancellation.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— China and Pakistan’s JF-17 Block III Fighter Sees Orders From Azerbaijan More Than Double to 40: at 6/8/25 7:41pm
China and Pakistan have secured a $4.6 billion order for 40 <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/jf17bl3-pakistan-revolutionise-fleet" target="_blank">JF-17 Block III fighters</a>, with the Azerbaijan Defence Ministry procuring the aircraft to significantly expand and modernise the country’s combat aviation capabilities and phase out Soviet-built MiG-29 fighters. The order expands Azerbaijan’s procurement from a previous fleet of 16 fighters, the first of which arrived in the country in September 2024.&nbsp;The contract’s announcement by Pakistani government sources occurred a month after the new JF-17 variant’s heavier counterpart, the J-10C, gained <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/pakistani-j10c-shot-down-indian-rafale" target="_blank">major victories </a>in the service of the Pakistan Air Force in a series of air battles with the Indian Air Force, <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/indian-air-force-faces-pr-crisis-240-million-rafale-destroyed" target="_blank">shooting down at least one</a> Rafale fighter among other successes. This significantly increased the prestige of modern Chinese ‘4+ generation’ aircraft with their first major combat test. The JF-17 Block III uses many of the same technologies as the J-10C and has similarly advanced avionics and weapons, but is a lighter aircraft with much lower procurement and operational costs, and has a much more conservative flight performance, while being restricted to carrying a smaller radar and weapons payload. The Pakistan Air Force currently deploys both fighter classes as part of a high-low combination, with the JF-17’s very low lifetime costs being a key factor allowing Azerbaijan to afford a fleet of 40 of the aircraft.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_68461292ba58a6_28202509.jpeg" title="Pakistan Air Force J-10C with PL-15 Air-to-Air Missiles and Three External Fuel Tanks">With the average cost of the JF-17 Block III fighters expected to cover only part of the $4.6 contract value, it remains highly uncertain what other armaments Azerbaijan will procure as part of the remainder of the deal.&nbsp;A lifetime supply of spare parts, extensive weapons supplies and technology transfers, may raise the value of the JF-17s to a greater portion of the overall contract value.&nbsp;JF-17 fighters are assembled in both China and Pakistan on separate production lines, although those built in Pakistan rely very heavily on Chinese inputs due to the limitations of the Pakistani tech sector and industrial base. The fighter class was jointly developed by the two countries, but does not serve in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force and is produced in China exclusively for export. The JF-17 Block III has gained considered interest from a number of potential clients, most notably the Bangladesh Air Force where it may <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/bangladesh-considering-procurement-of-chinese-jf-17-block-iii-fighters-high-low-pairing-with-j-10c-planned" >succeed</a> older Chinese-supplied J-7 fighters in service. The fighter is considered a close counterpart to the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/thai-air-force-confirms-swedish-gripen" target="_blank">Swedish-American Gripen E/F </a>lightweight fighter, which has similarly been marketed for its combination of cutting edge avionics and very low operational costs and maintenance needs, while suffering from many of the same performance limitations. The recent combat successes of the J-10C, however, and the clearly much higher status allocated to the J-10 within the Pakistan Air Force, raises the possibility that clients considering both aircraft will be more inclined towards the heavier and more capable model over the lighter one.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Why the U.S. Navy F/A-XX Sixth Generation Fighter May Be Defunded to Finance the Air Force’s F-47: at 6/8/25 5:40am
The U.S. Department of Defence is reportedly considering cutting funding for the U.S. Navy’s <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/delays-contact-award-many-sixthgen" target="_blank">F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter </a>program, which is intended to provide the service with a much needed successor to its F-18E/F and F-35C fighters, in order to prioritise financing for the development of the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/boeing-unprecedented-investments-f47" target="_blank">Air Force’s own</a> sixth generation fighter the F-47. A Pentagon request to the House and Senate defence policy committees in May stated regarding this possibility: “Given the schedule delays and cost growth across numerous airframes, DoD recommends a focus on the F-47, giving the Navy’s F/A-XX program time for technical maturity and development.” “Phasing the F/A-XX after the Air Force’s initial F-47 development will alleviate capacity concerns in the industrial base,” it further elaborated. While there was considerable uncertainty regarding the Air Force’s sixth generation fighter program from mid-2024, with its affordability having been brought to serious question, the significant support the program received from the newly inaugurated Donald Trump administration paved the way for <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/boeing-selected-develop-f47-sixth-generation-fighter-turning-point" target="_blank">Boeing to be selected </a>as a primary contractor in March 2025, allowing development to proceed.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_6845a19d74ff62_55184857.jpeg" title="U.S. Navy F-35C on Supercarrier USS Carl Vinson (U.S. Navy)">Before March, the possibility was raised by analysts that the Air Force’s greater budgetary struggles could lead it to postpone or even abandon plans to field a sixth generation fighter, leading the Navy’s F/A-XX to enter service sooner. The Navy has procured <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/expands-f35c-japan-iwakuni" target="_blank">F-35C fifth generation fighters</a> on only a small fraction of the scale on which the Air Force has <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/funding-next-batches-f35-delayed-radar-fuselage-redesign" target="_blank">procured the F-35A</a>, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of its fleet, which makes the rapid development and procurement of a sixth generation fighter appear far more urgent for the Navy. The prioritisation of the Air Force’s program, however, could lead the Navy’s own program to be undercut, which has potentially very serious consequences for the viability of its carrier air wings in high intensity combat, particularly in the Pacific theatre. China’s fielding of the J-20 as an <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-phase-single-crystal-blade-ws15" target="_blank">increasingly capable</a> and very long range fifth generation fighter in <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/how-many-j20-stealth-fighter-will-china-build-top-expert-predicts-over-1000" target="_blank">fast growing numbers</a>, and its <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-unveiled-stealthiest-fighter-sixth-generation">unveiling</a>&nbsp;of two new <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/worlds-largest-fighter-plane-china-ultra-long-range-sixth-gen" target="_blank">sixth generation fighters</a>&nbsp;in December 2024 already at flight prototype stages, has raised serious concerns regarding America’s future capability to wage an air campaign in the Pacific, and has thus provided a primary rationale for financing both the F-47 and the F/A-XX<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_6845a0f5590ba6_95402571.webp" title="Chinese J-XX Sixth Generation Long Range Fighter Prototype">Citing Chinese capabilities in particular, acting Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James W. Kilby stated regarding the need to develop the F/A-XX: “The sixth-gen fighter has some capabilities that we need to counter” the People’s Liberation Army Navy. “Those are signatures, those are range, those are different engines. Those are all the things that will make it survivable. The Air Force and Navy have different missions, but we’re going against the same threat,” he elaborated. His statement appeared to imply a warning that cuts to the F/A-XX program would undermine the Air Force’s ability to wage war in the Pacific due to the important support provided to a broader war effort by naval aviation.The Air Force has struggled with extreme funding shortages, as it seeks to finance the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/usaf-200-b21s-expansion-fleet" target="_blank">B-21 intercontinental range bomber</a> program, continued procurement, operations and modernisation of the F-35 which has run <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/f35-sustainment-costs-44pct-controversy" target="_blank">tremendously over budget</a>, development and procurement of the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/head-sentinel-icbm-development-woes" target="_blank">Sentinel ICBM</a> which is also several billion dollars over budget, urgent F-15EX fighter and E-7 AEW&amp;C procurements, and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/usaf-retire-b52-finance-b21-stealth" target="_blank">modernisation of the B-52</a> bomber fleet, among several other high priority investments. This has seriously limited the funding available for the F-47, particularly as the aircraft is expected to require parallel development of tankers with advanced stealth capabilities to be able to operate effectively in the Pacific. With Air Force officials having recently <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/usaf-chief-cites-china-sixth-gen-stronger-fleet" target="_blank">consistently called</a> for an urgent surge in funding, and some explicitly stating that this could be <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/exclusive-allvin-says-air-force-must-grow-even-at-expense-of-other-services/" target="_blank">done at the expense</a> of other services, the possibility of the Navy being forced to compromise on its requirements or its timeline for the F/A-XX remain highly significant.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Russian Army Makes First Ever Advance Into Dnipropetrovsk: 90th Tank Division Spearheads the Assault: at 6/8/25 5:25am
On June 8 the Russian Army for the first time advanced into the central Ukrainian region of Dnipropetrovsk, with the 90th Tank Division operating under Battlegroup Centre having spearheaded the assault over the western border of the Donetsk region to reach the border with Dnipropetrovsk, before continuing to advance west. The advance follows significant breakthroughs by Russian Army units on the frontlines in the&nbsp;northern Sumy region and in Donetsk. The advance into Dnipropetrovsk is expected to place considerable additional pressure on the Ukrainian Army’s frontline positions, loosing the hold on the town of Pokrovsk which has been under a sustained Russian assault for months. The strategic location of Dnipropetrovsk, which is bordered by the sharply contested and largely Russian held regions of Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, makes its potential fall to Russian Army advances a turning point in the conflict. The sparsely populated region remains an important mining and logistics centre.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_684590dd247e92_86461487.png" title="T-72B3M on the Frontlines with 2022 Standard Armour and Arena-M System">The 90th Tank Division is split between three tank regiments and single motorised infantry regiment, and deploys an estimated 300 T-72 tanks, the large majority of which are modernised to the T-72B3 standard, supported by BMP-2 and BTR-82 fighting vehicles and a number of self-propelled howitzers. The T-72 has formed the backbone of the Russian Army’s armoured units since the start of full scale hostilities in February 2022, despite the decision to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/why-russia-t62m-to-ukraine-local-force" >bring older T-62</a> and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/t80-repel-ukrainian-assault-donetsk" >newer but higher maintenance T-80</a> tanks back into service, and efforts to expand production of the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-army-rt90m-active-protection" >new T-90M tank</a>. T-72s have continued to be modernised to build on the standard capabilities of the T-72B3 variant, with the latest variant <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-new-enhanced-t72-features" target="_blank">seen from late 2022</a> having an armour configuration closely based on that of the T-90M. Modernised T-72s were in March <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-enhanced-russian-t72-first-active-protection-system-ukrainian-frontlines" >seen for the first time&nbsp;</a>integrating the new Arena-M active protection system, as the class has continued to be incrementally enhanced.&nbsp;Although the T-72 was fielded in limited numbers by the Ukrainian Army in 2022, the tanks have come to also <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-10-times-more-t72s-a-year" target="_blank">form the backbone </a>of its fleet, both as large stockpiles have been brought out of storage, and as considerable numbers previously exported to Eastern European Warsaw Pact states by the Soviet Union are <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-receives-large-batch-t72-tanks-poland" target="_blank">donated to Ukraine</a>.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Ground]
— Russian Army Units Now Training to Use North Korean 140mm Mortars: KPA Armaments Form an Increasingly Central Part of the Arsenal: at 6/8/25 4:30am
New footage from training grounds in Russia has shown that Russian Army personnel are now training to operate North Korean supplied 140mm mortars, reflecting part of a broader trend towards the widespread adoption of equipment from the East Asian state. The <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-reliance-nkorean-armaments-extreme-60mm-mortars" target="_blank">scale on which</a> a very wide range of North Korean equipment is now being used has raised the possibility that the Russian Army will rely on it heavily not only for operations in the Ukrainian theatre, but also more widely, including for units deployed near the country’s borders with NATO members and defending key cities and military facilities in the interior. The magnitude of the procurements being made means it is likely that North Korean armaments will continue to be used by the Russian Armed Forces on a significant scale well into the 2030s and beyond. The publication of footage of personnel training to use 140mm mortars occurred less than a week after footage from the frontlines in the Ukrainian theatre confirmed that Russian Army regular units have been equipped with North Korean 60mm mortars for combat operations. 60mm mortars are standard equipment in light infantry battalions in the Korean People’s Army (KPA).<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_68453d6742b446_43186230.jpg" title="North Korean 60mm Mortar Used by Russian Frontline Units">Although the Soviet Union retained stockpiles of equipment for its&nbsp;ground forces&nbsp;that dwarfed those of its small eastern neighbour throughout the Cold War, the severe decline of the Russian Army from 1992 left it with a very small fraction of Soviet era equipment in service. The extreme contraction of the defence sector, mass scrapping of Soviet equipment, and poor storage conditions for much of the equipment that remained, has seriously hindered the Russian Army’s ability to wage a prolonged war in the Ukrainian theatre without relying on imported equipment. As early as mid-2022, shortages of military equipment reportedly led Wagner Group military contractors to rely on armaments procured from North Korea. Reliance on Korean armaments increased significantly from 2023, and began to include sophisticated weaponry that in many cases outperformed its Russian-produced counterparts. A notable examples is the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-bulsae4-antitank-takes-out-ukraine-artillery-kursk" >Bulsae-4 anti tank missile system</a>&nbsp;which was&nbsp;<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/north-korea-closes-russias-anti-tank-missile-gap-with-ukraine/" >first seen in use</a>&nbsp;in the theatre in August 2024, and introduced a very long 10 kilometre range and top attack capability previously not seen on Russian systems.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_68458a3b5bb5c0_30109937.png" title="North Korean 170mm Self-Propelled Howitzers Being Transported in Russia in 2024">North Korean armaments have been prized not only for their often highly advanced capabilities, but also for the sheer quantities in which they have been available, with the country by the end of 2024 estimated to have dispatched&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-artillery-saved-russia-6million" >over 6 million artillery rounds</a>&nbsp;to Russia. The country’s value as a supplier stems from the fact that its active peacetime forces far outnumbered Russia’s own in many areas, with its artillery forces in particular being several times as large. It is also a result of both the far larger stockpiles which the Korean People’s Army retains, and the much greater productive capacities of the North Korean defence sector. The country was estimated to have shipped 4-6 million shells to Russia in 2024 alone, where Russian industry could only produce up to 2.3 million that year. By the second quarter of 2025, nearly half of artillery rounds used by the Russian Army were of North Korean origin, with many Russian artillery units having come to rely almost entirely on ammunition supplied by North Korea. By then at least six Russian Army artillery units sourced between 50 and 100 percent of their munitions from the country.&nbsp;These supplies have been supplemented by the dispatch of Korean People’s Army units, including 170mm self-propelled artillery, to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-details-nkorea-role-repelling-kursk" target="_blank">support the Russian Army</a> on the frontlines from late 2024.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Ground]
— Funding For Next Batches of F-35 Stealth Fighters Delayed: New Radar Requires Fuselage Redesign: at 6/7/25 7:33pm
The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) has confirmed that funding to produce the next two batches of the fifth generation fighter aircraft, Lot 18 and Lot 19, has been delayed, after having originally been scheduled to be finalised before the end of June. Uncertainty remains regarding the total number of fighters that will be produced under the next batches and their costs, which have in recent years steadily increased due to a combination of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/f35-jet-fighter-tariffs-2b807ad3" target="_blank">factors</a>. The Lot 18 contract is reportedly set to cover the production of 145 F-35s including 48 F-35As for the U.S. Air Force, 16 F-35Bs and five F-35Cs <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/marine-corps-cut-f35b-stealth-fighter-procurement" >for the Marine Corps</a>, and 14 F-35Cs for the Navy, with the remaining 62 aircraft being built for foreign militaries. Although the U.S. Air Force was initially expected to procure the F-35A at rates of 110 per year, this was gradually cut to 80, 60 and finally just 48 fighters, which has caused issues for the service’s fighter fleet as older fourth generation aircraft are phased out of service <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/us-withdrawing-f15-44yrs-china-doorstep" target="_blank">far more slowly</a> than previously expected. As the only fighter of its generation in production in the Western world, the F-35 program continues to be relied on very heavily not only by the U.S. Armed Forces, but also by <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/f35-europe-clients-production-dominance-market" >close to 20 other services</a> across the world, which is reflected by the fact that close to 45 percent of F-35s being produced expected to continue to be allocated to foreign clients.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_6844db57796258_25402462.jpg" title="F-35 Production at Fort Worth, Texas">Regarding the delays to reaching contract, an unnamed government official “revealed as the teams work through the final phases of pricing and terms and conditions, it is now clear that additional time will be needed to complete the necessary DOD [Department of Defence] and [Lockheed Martin] reviews.” Although the Joint Program Office stressed that delays to reaching a contract were not related to issues with the F-35’s new AN/APG-85 radar, this has remained a leading issue with the program. The F-35’s previous AN/APG-81 radar’s smaller size than the sensors fielded by <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-j20-fifth-generation-began-serial-production-10yrs">Chinese fifth generation fighters</a> such as the J-20, combined with the American radar’s age, led it to be seen as far from optimal for air superiority mission in the Pacific, for which F-35s are relied on very heavily. The AN/APG-85 operationalises a significant number of new technologies, the nature of which has not been disclosed, with the specific stated goal of better ensuring air superiority. The new radar is significantly larger than the AN/APG-81, and thus requires a new forward fuselage to be developed for future F-35s to accommodate it, which has been expected to cause delays. This is particularly complicated due to the need to ensure the redesign does not negatively impact the F-35’s radar cross section.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/08/article_6844db7588ce28_17563537.png" title="Chinese J-XX Sixth Generation Fighter Prototype">Pressure to modernise the F-35 has been steadily increased due to the rapid progress made by the Chinese J-20 fifth generation fighter program, both to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-phase-single-crystal-blade-ws15" >enhance its performance </a>with the operationalisation of new variants, and with the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/how-many-j20-stealth-fighter-will-china-build-top-expert-predicts-over-1000" >expansion of its production scale</a>. To make the aircraft more competitive against new Chinese fighters, Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet&nbsp;in lat May <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/lockheed-ceo-unmanned-f35-ops-upgrades" >pitched</a> a number of upgrades, and stated that an enhanced ‘5+ generation’ F-35 variant could be reshaped for superior stealth capabilities and integrate new radar absorbent coatings to narrow the capability gap with <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/worlds-largest-fighter-plane-china-ultra-long-range-sixth-gen" >new sixth generation fighters</a>. China’s&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-unveiled-stealthiest-fighter-sixth-generation" >unveiling</a>&nbsp;of two new sixth generation fighters&nbsp;in December 2024 already at flight prototype stages&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/chinese-sixth-generation-cut-pentagon-demand-f35s-lockheed" >raised serious questions</a>&nbsp;regarding the future viability of the F-35 in Pacific War scenarios. Despite the need to improve the fighter’s performance, the Pentagon in 2023 <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-powerplant-f35-review-needed" >terminated</a> one of the most ambitious programs intended to do so, namely the Adaptive Engine Transition Program which had been intended to provide a clean sheet new engine which would very significantly increase its range, thrust/weight ratio and the power available for onboard systems. As the Air Force and Navy face increasing shortages of funding for their respective F-47 and F/A-XX sixth generation fighter programs, the future of the F-35 remains highly uncertain.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— South Korea’s New President Quashes Western Hopes of Expanded Arms Supplies For Ukraine: at 6/7/25 5:37am
On June 4 the election of opposition leader Lee Jae-myung as president of the Republic of Korea ended hopes in the Western world both for a more active South Korean role in the ongoing cold conflict between the Western Bloc and China, and more immediately for Seoul to begin supplying armaments to bolster the Ukrainian war effort against Russia. Although public opinion in South Korea has consistently <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2024/11/29/south-koreans-oppose-ukraine/" >overwhelmingly opposed </a>the possibility of equipping Ukraine’s armed forces, contrasting sharply with the<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/czech-citizens-raise-13-mln-modernised-tank-ukraine-2022-10-03/" target="_blank"> tremendous support </a>that arms supplies to the country has received across Europe, then president Yoon Suk-yeol in November stated that such supplies could not be ruled out. Amid sustained Western pressure on Seoul to revise its policy, Western analysts widely highlighted that South Korean armaments could <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/korean-support-kyiv-would-transform-ukraine-and-koreas-global-role" target="_blank">transform</a> the conflict in the favour of Western Bloc and Ukrainian interests.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/07/article_6844cb1164ce07_89081987.avif" title="President-Elect Lee Jae-myung">In November 2024, following the confirmed deployment of North Korean forces to&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-details-nkorea-role-repelling-kursk" target="_blank" >bolster Russian defences</a>&nbsp;in the Kursk region, Kim Tae-hyo who then served as principal deputy national security adviser warned: “If the illegal military cooperation between North Korea and Russia continues, [South Korea] will not stand by but respond firmly in collaboration with the international community.” He called for “phased measures” to respond, which was seen to hint at the possibility of arms supplies. Although the Yoon administration’s policies were particularly strongly aligned with Western interests across a broad range of issues, the state of public opinion, and the existence of laws prohibiting sending arms to an active war zone, made it difficult to proceed to supply Kiev. The dispatching of South Korean forces to play supporting roles in the conflict, mirroring the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/foreign-combatants-donbas-battles-russia" target="_blank">tremendous support</a> provided by Western specialists on the ground from early 2022, was also considered a possibility in a number of Western assessments, but was expected to face tremendous public opposition domestically.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/07/article_6844cc9f2513a4_18993102.jpg" title="Korean People`s Army Personnel in Kursk">South Korea’s defence sector is by far the largest other than the United States which predominantly produces NATO-compatible equipment, and for many kinds of ground forces equipment, in particular all kinds of artillery, its productive capacity far exceeds that of the U.S. Supplies from the country to Ukraine would mirror the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-expecting-heavy-artillery-missile-reinforcements-nkorea" target="_blank">tremendous</a> artillery and other supplies which Russia has received from North Korea, and on which the Russian Army has now become <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-reliance-nkorean-armaments-extreme-60mm-mortars">extremely heavily dependant</a>. Moreover, the country has very large stockpiles of air defence equipment far exceeding those of European states, and produces NATO standard systems that far surpass the performances of their European counterparts. The country also deploys a number of high performance Soviet tanks, namely T-80U/UK main battle tanks procured from Russia in the 1990s, which were at the time a close contender for the title of the most capable class of main battle tank in the world. These vehicles could be easily integrated into the Ukrainian Army, which already <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-lancet-t80-kursk" target="_blank">operates small numbers </a>of T-80s, providing one of the most capable vehicles in the country’s fleet.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/07/article_6844cb6d5f1ed8_32539754.jpg" title="Polish Army K2 Tanks Supplied by South Korea">South Korea has already made significant contributions to the Ukrainian war effort, albeit indirectly. The country has supplied hundreds of thousands of artillery shells to the United States, which were procured specifically to allow America’s own artillery stockpiles to be diverted to the Ukrainian Army without excessively depleting U.S. Army supplies. It has also provided main battle tanks and artillery to Poland at a particularly high rate, with 96 K2 tanks <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/south-korea-to-triple-tank-deliveries-to-poland-96-k2s-incoming-in-2025-production-surge" target="_blank">expected to be delivered</a> in 2025 alone, allowing the Polish Army to retire its T-72 and PT-91 tanks and supply them to Ukraine quickly. Nevertheless, the election of Lee Jae-myung as president is expected to totally end prospects for direct supplies, and potentially limit the indirect support that Seoul may provide. Lee has been far more measured in criticising Russia, and been <a href="http://www.kukinews.com/newsView/kuk202202280030" >highly critical </a>of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyys policy toward Russia as “incompetent” and “provocative,” while being particularly outspoken against the possibility of arms supplies to the country. With South Korean support having been a potential game changer due to its unique industrial capacity, Lee’s election may have represented one of the more pivotal events in the war effort against the favour of Kiev and its Western supporters.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Asia-Pacific, Ground]
— Ukraine Launches Another Successful Attack on Russia’s Top Strategic Bomber Facility: at 6/7/25 4:25am
The Ukrainian Armed Forces on June 6 launched a successful series of strikes on multiple Russian military targets, which were reportedly intended to pre-empt large scale Russian attacks. The Russian <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-responds-ukraine-drone-strike-air-missile" target="_blank">attacks in question</a> were launched in the afternoon of June 6, and were stated by multiple Russian government sources to have been launched in response to Ukraine’s own <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-most-successful-strike-russian-bomber-bases" target="_blank">devastating drone raids</a> on its key bomber facilities five days prior, as well as the destruction of railway infrastructure which caused significant civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff announced regarding the attack: “on the eve of the massive enemy shelling, enemy airfields and other important military facilities were hit,” adding that a successful strike was carried out on Engels-2 Airbase in the Saratov region. “The Diaghilev airfield in the Ryazan region, where air tankers and escort fighters are based, which are used to provide missile strikes on the territory of Ukraine, was also hit,” it elaborated. Engels-2 Airbase has since the 1990s been the most important strategic bomber facility in Russia, and alongside Tu-95MS bombers that form the backbone of the fleet and are deployed widely across the country, it also hosts the country’s sole operational unit of <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ruaf-four-tu160ms-recieve-months" target="_blank">Tu-160 bombers</a>.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/07/article_68444c353acab4_87904562.png" title="Tu-95MS Bomber Hit During June 1 Attack on Belaya Airbase">Commenting on the attack in Engels-2, Saratov Govoernor Roman Busargin stated: “As a result of the UAV attack, there is a fire at one of the industrial enterprises in Engels… There are no preliminary casualties. All relevant services are working on the scene. Specialists are taking all necessary measures to eliminate the consequences.” The Russian Defence Ministry stated regarding Ukraine’s attacks that the Armed Forces “alerted air defence systems intercepted and destroyed 174 Ukrainian fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles over Bryansk, Rostov, Saratov, Voronezh, Kaluga, Kursk, Oryol, Ryazan, Tula, Belgorod, Tambov, and Moscow regions, and the Republic of Crimea.” “Three Ukrainian Neptune-MD guided missiles were also destroyed over the Black Sea by air defence systems,” it further reported. Footage from near Engels-2 has shown the fuel depot there being struck and fully engulfed in flames, raising the possibility that the facility may have suffered further damage.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/07/article_68444c7d3bafe3_30928370.webp" title="Fuel Tanks Ablaze After Ukrainian Strike on Engels-2">The concentration of Tu-160 bombers at Engles-2 has been a primary factor preventing their destruction in Ukraine’s June 1 drone <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/how-damaged-russian-bomber-ukraine-drone-attack" target="_blank">attacks on other bomber bases </a>across the country. The facility is nevertheless far from fully secure, and has been hit during multiple previous Ukrainian attacks. On January 8 a Ukrainian long range drone strike <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-major-blow-russia-strategic-bomber-fleet" >successfully targeted</a> the Kombinat Kristall fuel depot near the&nbsp;airbase, with the attack is reported to have destroyed reserves of T-8V high-density specialised aviation fuel used by the Tu-160 fleet. A subsequent drone strike on March 20 caused a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-successful-strike-key-hub-russian-tu160-fleet" >major explosion</a> at the facility.&nbsp;These strikes were far from unprecedented, with Engels-2 having been attacked three times in December 2022 alone, in one case by a jet-powered drone class. The fact that these attacks have consistently failed to neutralise the bomber fleet, however, indicates that air defences and fortifications in place may be effective.&nbsp;Nevertheless, the repeated successful attacks on a very high value target located more than 500 kilometres behind the frontlines as been interpreted by many analysts as reflecting poorly on the capabilities of Russian air defences to counter emerging threats, which has serious implications for the security of its facilities in the event of a broader conflict with NATO.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)]

As of 9/28/25 3:04am. Last new 6/12/25 3:25am.

Next feed in category: Military Times