Rnews Crooked Bough News Round-up: Military Watch

Military Watch

— Russian Flanker Engages Italian F-35 Over Baltic Sea: How Does the Power Balance Stand?: at 1/11/25 4:05am
A video released on January 10 has shown an unknown Russian fighter engaging an Italian Air Force F-35A fighter over the Baltic Sea, with the two aircraft seen flying in close proximity. Little is known regarding the incident, with the class of Russian aircraft in question remaining unknown. It was confirmed, however, that the fighter was “a Russian Sukhoi,” and while the deployment of Su-24M or Su-34 strike fighters designed by Sukhoi to shadow NATO aircraft remains highly unlikely, deployment of the Su-27 and its <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/all-russias-15-ftrintercp-classes-dangerous" target="_blank">enhanced derivatives </a>the Su-30SM and Su-35S remains likely. Italy has been particularly active in deploying its sizeable and growing F-35 fleet to secure collective Western Bloc interests, including for air policing in Eastern Europe and for operations aimed at China and North Korea in East Asia. The country was the first European NATO member to deploy F-35s to Japan, with others such as the Netherlands following suit. The fifth generation F-35 is by far the most capable fighter fielded anywhere in the Western world, and has consistently <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/f35-europe-clients-production-dominance-market" target="_blank">defeated all competition</a> in tenders in which it has been permitted to compete.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/12/article_678316d795a8d3_47496049.jpeg" title="Italian Air Force F-35 and Russian Air Force Su-30SM">While the Chinese J-20 and FC-31 are considered<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/first-ever-non-friendly-stealth-fighter-encounter-confirmed-china-s-j-20-and-america-s-f-35-just-met-over-the-south-china-sea" target="_blank"> fully peer level competitors</a> to the F-35, Russia relies on much older ‘4+ generation’ fighters that lack comparable levels of sophistication. Although lacking the F-35’s cutting edge avionics and stealth capabilities, the Russian Su-30SM and Su-35 nevertheless have a number of advantages. These include their far higher manoeuvrability levels at all speeds, their much larger radars well over twice the size of the F-35’s AN/APG-81, their ability to carry over twice as much ordinance in standard configuration, and their ranges which are close to double that of the American jet. The Russian fighters are nevertheless expected to face a tremendous disadvantage in combat if facing the F-35 in open conflict, with Russia as a result relying much more heavily on <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-first-regiment-s500-long-range-air-defence" target="_blank">ground based air defence systems </a>such as the S-400 to protect its airspace, with fighters playing more minor supporting roles. The Russian defence sector has also made considerable efforts to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/facilities-expanded-su57-fighter-production" target="_blank">increase the production</a> of its own fifth generation fighter, the Su-57, which represents a major leap in capabilities over the Su-30SM and Su-35, but has seen only a single battalion’s worth of aircraft produced so far.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Will American F-35 Bases in Greenland Pose a Nuclear Threat to Russia?: at 1/10/25 6:35pm
Statements by U.S. President-elect Donald Trump regarding the "absolute necessity" of integrating Greenland into the United States has drawn renewed attention to the territory’s military significance. While the primary factor in Greenland’s geopolitical significance is widely seen to be it’s considerable reserves of rare earth minerals, it’s strategic location near the Arctic provides significant advantages in a potential conflict between the Western Bloc and Russia. Reflecting prevailing Russian concerns regarding the ongoing expansion of American forces on Greenland, Russian Ambassador to Denmark Vladimir Barbin observed: "The island-based U.S. Pituffik Space Base [formerly known as Thule Air Base] today is a part of the U.S.’ system for warning about a nuclear strike from the Arctic direction. It is undergoing comprehensive modernisation, including radar systems worth <a href="https://sputnikglobe.com/20250109/pepe-escobar-empire-of-chaos-reloaded-1121393521.html" >billions of dollars</a>. It is also building airfield infrastructure for F-35 fighter jets, which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Such jets have already <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/u-s-boosts-f-35-stealth-presence-deep-in-the-arctic-circle-unprecedented-greenland-base-deployment" target="_blank">used the bases airfield for training</a>.” "Russia supports boosting stability in the Arctic. It is possible only on the foundation of creating a system of international security equal for all Arctic states,”he added.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/12/article_67830e85e961d6_66008052.png" title="F-35 Drops Test B61 Nuclear Bomb" >While F-35s have deployed to Greenland in the past, and are expected to grow, the dangers posed to Russian security by their nuclear bombing capabilities remain limited. Greenland is situated approximately 3800 kilometres from the Russian border, while the combat radius of the F-35 is only around 1000 kilometres. Even the world’s longest ranged fighters the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/replenishing-strike-fleet-su34s" target="_blank">Russian Su-34</a> and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-phase-single-crystal-blade-ws15" target="_blank">Chinese J-20 </a>have combat radii estimated at only around 2000 kilometres on internal fuel, with no fighter class in the Western world capable of covering anything close to such distances. Although F-35s are supported by aerial refuelling assets such as KC-135 tankers, a quadrupling of the fighters’ range remains far from viable even with such support. While the threat of F-35s launching nuclear strikes on Russian territory thus appears limited, F-35s could nevertheless be used to threaten shipping in the Arctic from Russia and other Western adversaries, with their powerful network sensors allowing them to maintain situational awareness over wide areas while on patrol. The issue of the F-35’s nuclear capabilities has been particularly sensitive for Russia, with <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/f35-bomb-one-fighter-310000-russians" >assessments</a> in November 2023 having concluded the new <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/f35-larger-nuclear-penetrate-targets" >B61-13 tactical nuclear bomb</a>&nbsp;would allow a single F-35 to kill up to approximately 360,000 inhabitants of Russian cities in a single strike. &nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Lessons From Damascus’ Fall: Former British Ambassador to Syria Details How the West, Israel and Turkey Won: at 1/10/25 1:15am
On December 8, 2024, the almost 14 year long war between the Syrian government and multiple Islamist insurgent groups came to an end, with the capture of the capital Damascus, dismantling of the Syrian Arab Army, and overthrow of the ruling Ba’ath Party marking the end of an era of over 60 years. With the insurgency having received extensive support from across the Western world, and from the West’s Middle Eastern strategic partners in particular Turkey, Israel and Qatar, its success facilitated the toppling of a longstanding thorn in the side of Western geopolitical interests in the region. Elaborating on the origins of the war in Syria, the factors which led to the country’s ultimate defeat, and the longstanding security threats it has faced, Military Watch interviewed former British Ambassador to Damascus Peter Ford. Ford has given interviews throughout the conflict’s duration to outlets including CNN, the BBC, and France 24, The Independent, and has published widely on the subject.&nbsp;Ford recalls that the posting to Damascus was the pinnacle of his 35 year diplomatic career, noting that “as a trained Arabist I felt joy to be going to the country rightly described as the ‘beating heart of Arabism’.” He continued to take a close interest in Syria during subsequent work with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), which it involved frequent visits to refugee camps in “the most hospitable of all Arab countries to Palestinian refugees.” He subsequently co-chaired the London-based British Syrian Society which he stated “campaigned for fair treatment for Syria” during the conflict.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_678068bc808d24_30872078.jpg" title="Syrian Capital Damascus in Peacetime">Military Watch (MW):&nbsp;When looking back at your time as ambassador in Damascus, what experiences do you believe allowed you to form a more accurate understanding of the conflict?Peter Ford: As an insider I was able to see the animus felt by the British and Americans towards Syria over Syria’s refusal to collaborate with the Coalition pacification of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam. That refusal was prompted by Syria’s well-founded fear that next after Iraq on Washington’s to do list was Syria. This, combined with longstanding resentment at Syria’s refusal to toe the line on Israel and rejection of diktats on WMD and human rights, poisoned the chances of Bashar’s tilt towards the West being consummated. It was accordingly no surprise to me that when the Arab Spring was getting under way the US and UK were quick to seize an opportunity for regime change.During my time as ambassador I also had occasion to frequent opposition circles, which were given a certain amount of leeway to operate. That helped me to see, as soon as conflict started in Syria, that the besuited mild-mannered opposition were never going to play any role other than providing a cover for the hard men of the Islamist groups which had gone to ground after the Hama uprising of 1981 but were always a potent potential threat. If Syria was a police state, I realised, it was because there was a lot of policing to do to stop the Talibanisation of civilised, multiethnic, multicultural Syria.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_678068eee49793_16083641.webp" title="Syrian Police Officer in Damascus After Bombing">MW: Turkey, Qatar, Israel and the United States are frequently pointed to as the parties which played the primary roles in the war effort against Syria. Which state actors do you think played the most significant roles, and how did their contributions to the war effort complement one another?Ford: The importance of different countries changed over the years. In the early years of the Syrian conflict the US and UK played major roles in equipping, training and directing operations of the armed opposition, while Saudi Arabia and UAE provided much of the funding. In latter years Qatar became more active with funding while Saudi Arabia and UAE reconciled with Bashar. As the fighting became more focused in the North, Turkey became the dominant force, acting as part of a tag team with the US and Israel.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_6780693f087de9_29833589.jpg" title="U.S. Army Soldiers in a Bradley Fighting Vehicle in Northeast Syria`s Oil Rich Regions">MW: Turkey and the United States have long imposed occupations on oil rich northwestern and northeastern regions of Syria, and extracted Syrian oil for sale. To what extend do you assess this played a central role in weakening the Syrian state over the long term to facilitate its eventual defeat?Ford: It would be hard to overstate the importance to the Syrian state of its being deprived of a resource, oil and gas, which represented over 20% of its GDP and which was crucial to electricity supply. The North East is also the bread basket of Syria, a primary source of grain. No state can survive indefinitely being shut off in this way from its own major sources of wealth, as the US and Turkey well knew.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_67806b74b35d76_81038290.jpg" title="Syrian Man Protesting Against the U.S.-Led Sanctions Regime">MW: Analysts have frequently criticised economic sanctions as an effective tool of Western foreign policy, citing their inability to topple adversary governments. To what extend do you believe sanctions were effective in the case of the Syrian conflict in allowing Western states to achieve their objectives?Ford: The sad truth is that sanctions do work, if sustained long enough and if the target state has no effective work-arounds. For a long time it seemed that Syria could survive but sanctions work not just on essentials like electricity and food but also on morale, on the morale of the people and the military. Thanks to the simultaneously waged information warfare, the Syrian people blamed Assad for deprivations wholly attributable to Western sanctions. Even corruption, one of the major causes of discontent, was in large part due to the fact that sanctions always give rise to corruption as part of a war economy. &nbsp;Unpaid soldiers demand fees at road blocks, for example.&nbsp;Given US proclivity for sanctions the Syria example bodes badly for many other countries which get into Washington’s cross-hairs.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_678069b8b9ff84_59274352.jpg" title="Syrian Arab Army T-62M Tank">MW: Assessments have varied widely on what factors led the Syrian Arab Army to effectively collapse from late November to early December. As a veteran analyst of the conflict and of the country’s domestic and international politics, what has been your assessments?Ford: The Army was nowhere near battle ready. Given the dire economic situation there was no way it could have been made ready. Many experienced soldiers had had to be released to go back and help their struggling families. The Hizbollah back up was no longer there after Hizbollah’s setbacks against Israel. Russia saw what was coming but distracted by Ukraine was in no position to remedy shortcomings or fill gaps.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_67806c111a1c99_49873944.jpg" title="U.S. Senator John McCain with Libyan Insurgent Leaders">MW: Figures supporting continued offensives against countries outside Western influence have widely alluded to the possibility of using information warfare tools to destabilise other adversaries. U.S. Senator John McCain, for one, described the instability which spread across Arab republics in 2011 as “a virus that will attack Moscow and Beijing,” while founder of Liberty in North Korea and Pegasus Strategies Adrian Hong, a close affiliate of U.S. intelligence agencies, stated in much the same vein following successful operations to destabilise Libya and Syria that the offensives were “a dress rehearsal for North Korea.” How do you think Syria’s destabilisation and eventual fall can serve as a warning to other states, and how do you think the kind of modern warfare tools used against the Syrian state could evolve in future?Ford: Syria didn’t even try to compete in the information battle space. It gave up even having a recognised spokesperson after Western and Gulf-controlled Arab media refused to give Syria a hearing. It was asymmetrical warfare, where the pro-armed opposition side had the big guns like Al Jazeera, the US channels, BBC etc and Syria had a few sympathetic Western bloggers and the not-much-watched RT and Press TV. As mentioned earlier this was crucial to undermining domestic support for Assad and diverting attention from the economic warfare being waged against Syria. The Syrians made the mistake of downplaying the impact of sanctions in the belief that admitting harm would affect morale: rookie error.&nbsp;&nbsp;Equally importantly, the information war, especially demonisation of Assad, enabled Western governments to massage their own public opinions into accepting that attempted regime change was a good thing, despite the disasters which regime change had wrought in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.&nbsp;States wishing to avoid the fate of Syria have to up their game. It is quite remarkable that China is so absent from the information battle space. Russia is much more adept and has noticeably upped its effort and sharpened its language.&nbsp;Information counter-warfare can only work if accompanied by sensitive domestic policies which take account of the dominance and penetration of adversary narratives. &nbsp;Target states need in some cases to loosen up to avoid being eaten up.&nbsp;&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_67806acab1c252_74031560.png" title="Turkestan Islamic Party Child Soldiers in Syria`s Idlib Governate" >MW: Conflict in Syria is frequently referred to in the West as the ‘Syrian Civil War,’ while Syrian officials have consistently rejected this characterisation. The term implies that the insurgency is largely indigenous, which critics have argued attempts to disguise both the central role played by foreign actors, and the predominant role played by non-Syrian Islamist militants drawn to the conflict from as far as London and Xinjiang. What is your assessment of this characterisation?Ford: Without huge assists from external actors the insurgents would never have made much progress. Military supplies from the US, training and equipment from Turkey, information support from the UK, jihadi fighters from Central Asia and China, unlimited funding from the Gulf – these were undoubtedly crucial, coming on top of all the economic and information warfare waged from outside. However it was self-deluding to deny the indigenous element, which had already manifested itself in previous decades. And as already mentioned, discontent with the government undeniably increased as the years of deprivation rolled by without any prospect of relief. It was always the calculation of Western strategists that ultimately sanctions would create enough unrest to rekindle the flames of conflict after the conflict appeared to be largely contained. That is exactly what happened.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_67806a67793e38_29312482.jpeg" title="Soviet and Syrian Leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Hafez Al Assad in 1974">MW: The Soviet Union was the primary protector of Syria during the Cold War, and went to considerable lengths to modernise the country’s armed forces, support its economy, and deter Israeli, Turkish or Western attacks on its territory. &nbsp;To what extend do you agree with the assessment that the Syrian War and the great pressure placed on the Syrian state were long term consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet Union?Ford: What I would say is that the Syrian conflict could be regarded as a subset of the West’s long term undeclared war on Russia going back to the days of the Soviet Union. As a British diplomat I was acutely conscious of the fact that London didn’t like Syria because it was close to Russia. In a sense Syria suffered precisely because it was seen as a way of scoring points against Russia. Syria could not be left in peace after the virtual ending of hostilities in 2019 because that would have been to concede Russia a win. Become a pawn in geopolitics at your peril. Syria has paid a heavy price for the West’s obsession with doing down Russia.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_67806a8b5f2672_37353377.png" title="Israeli Howitzer Fires 155mm Shell Into Gaza " >MW: How do you predict the outcome of the war in Syria will affect the outcome of the ongoing war in Gaza and the longer term Israeli-Palestinian conflict?Ford: In one sense what has happened in Syria will make no difference to the situation in Gaza. Syria was never in a position to lift itself a military finger to help Gaza, and the base it provided for Hizbollah hardly made any difference to the help Hizbollah gave to Gaza, which judged by results was nugatory in any case. On the other hand the collapse of Hamas’s erstwhile supporter and the discomfiture of Iran contribute psychologically to the situation by giving an impression that the momentum is all with Israel. &nbsp;Over the long term the loss of the last Arab state which unequivocally supported the Palestinian Resistance may sound the death knell for Palestine. The beacon is gone. The beating heart of Arabism is dead. &nbsp;With no Syria to shame them what is to stop the Saudis now jumping on the normalisation bandwagon with Israel? What then can prevent the Israelis applying to Gaza the treatment already being applied to the West Bank (parcellisation and creeping annexation) and to the West Bank the treatment being applied to Gaza (devastation, culling of population and ethnic cleansing)?
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Middle East, Foreign Relations]
— South Korean Tank Industry Bolstering Global Leadership with K3 Program: at 1/9/25 6:21pm
South Korea’s defence sector is reported to be making significant progress in the development of next generation main battle tank under the K3 program, which is scheduled to see its first prototype produced by 2030. South Korea’s first main battle tank the K1 was closely based on the American M1A1 Abrams, with the most significant change being the substitution of a highly costly and fuel hungry gas turbine engine for a traditional diesel engine. The tank entered service from 1987, and has continued to be incrementally modernised, with over 1500 having been produced as of 2025. Industry reached a major milestone, however, with the development of the K2 tank, which was a fully clean sheet design that is today widely considered the world’s most capable main battle tank. Entering service from 2014, the K2 boasted a wide range of advantages over its competitors in the Western world, including a higher firing rate, lower crew and maintenance requirements, a longer firing range, and use of advanced active protection systems among a range of other attributes. 410 of the tanks have been ordered by the Republic of Korea Army, with <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/south-korea-to-triple-tank-deliveries-to-poland-96-k2s-incoming-in-2025-production-surge" target="_blank">over 1000 planned </a>to be procured by both <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nato-top-tankfirst-live-fire" target="_blank">Poland</a> and Turkey, which have both placed their first orders for the vehicles.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_6780858d3ba090_09630002.jpeg" title="Polish Army K2 Main Battle Tank">The K3’s design is reported to be loosely derived from that of the K2, with the vehicle intended to be better armoured, faster, and more mobile while integrating a new generation of far superior fire controls. One of the most significant changes will be the integration of an intelligent fully automated gun turret, which will improve crew protection while allowing the vehicle to engage its targets much faster and with greater precision. The turret will mount larger 130mm main gun, which is larger than that currently deployed by any tank class in the world. This gun will deploy next-generation kinetic energy penetrators and high-explosive rounds, including locally developed K279 series ammunition. The tank’s armour protection levels will benefit from new generations of composite and reactive armour and advanced active protection systems, with its design set to particularly focus on the ability to counter&nbsp; top attack munitions and single use drones. The major changes in anti-tank warfare seen in the Ukrainian theatre, including the high <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/u-s-concludes-abrams-tanks-not-useful-for-ukraine-following-heavy-losses" target="_blank">demonstrated vulnerability</a> of both Western and Russian tanks to top strikes by single use drones, are expected to influence the K3’s design priorities.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_678085c29aa8b8_89613473.png" title="Demonstration of Active Protection System on North Korean Chonma 2 Tank ">Although the K2’s entry into service in the mid-2010s provided South Korean forces with significant superiority over the most capable tanks fielded by neighbouring North Korea, major advances in the capabilities of the north’s top armoured units have brought this superiority increasingly into question. North Korea unveiled its next generation main battle tank, the Chonma 2, in October 2020, with the vehicle confirmed in 2024 to have entered service. A growing body of information has indicated that the tank has a high level of sophistication, with its advanced active protection system&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorea-nextgen-tank-first-action">first seen in use&nbsp;</a>in footage released in July 2023. Other footage has&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/details-nkorea-next-generation-tank">confirmed</a>&nbsp;the deployment of modern armour piercing fin stabilised discarding sabot rounds with excellent length to diameter ratios, indicating a high penetrative capability. Greater length indicates a more structurally efficient sabot design allowing it to defeat greater line of sight armour depth. More details have also emerged regarding the Chonma 2’s Bulsae-4 non-line of sight anti-tank missile, which has similar characteristics to the American Javelin but over twice the range, and has been extensively &nbsp;<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/north-korea-closes-russias-anti-tank-missile-gap-with-ukraine/">combat tested</a> in the Ukrainian theatre.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/10/article_6780881c1edb40_65664719.png" title="North Korean Chonma 2 Main Battle Tank">On November 21, 2024,&nbsp;North Korea’s defence sector <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorea-cutting-edge-tianma2-aps-top-attack">unveiled </a>the new Tianma 2 main battle tank, which appears to be an enhanced derivative of the Chonma 2 with a modular composite armour turret offering high levels of protection against both kinetic energy projectiles and shaped charges.&nbsp;The unveiling of another new tank class indicates a rapid rate of advance.&nbsp;As North Korea’s standing in the field has continued to advance, the perceived urgency of developing enhanced successors to the K2 has grown in the south. The K2’s strong performance on export markets has further increased the economic attraction of such investments, with the K3 program expected to more than pay for itself by generating export revenues much as the K2 did. While China and the two Koreas have continued to unveil new generations of tanks, it is notable that countries in the Western world, as well as Russia, have remained heavily reliant producing enhanced variants of Cold War era tank designs, with the lack of new clean sheet designs outside East Asia expected to ensure a growing advantage for the region’s tank industries.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Asia-Pacific, Ground]
— Russian Air Force Deploys Su-34 and Su-35 Fighters For New Strikes on Ukrainian Forces in Kursk: at 1/9/25 1:50am
The Russian Air Force has deployed <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-new-su34-third-consecutive-month" target="_blank">Su-34 strike fighters</a> and<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-su35-strikes-air-defence-sites-kursk" target="_blank"> Su-35 air superiority fighters</a> to launch renewed strikes on Ukrainian forces in the Russian Kursk region. The Russian Defence Ministry reported on January 8: "A Su-34 multirole supersonic fighter-bomber, escorted by a Su-35S fighter, took off from its base airfield and carried out a bombing strike on a stronghold and manpower of the Ukrainian armed forces.” It added that the Su-34 used universal planning and correction modules in its attack, and that both fighter classes struck their targets successfully. The Defence Ministry reported the previous day that a Su-34 “delivered a strike on a cluster of Ukrainian military manpower and armoured and motor vehicles near the border in the Kursk Region," with guided glide bombs used in the attack. The strike fighter returned to its airfield only after receiving confirmation from reconnaissance personnel that the Ukrainian targets were destroyed.&nbsp;The Su-34 and Su-35 both entered service in 2014, and currently form the backbone of the Russian Air Force with over 100 of each in service. Although both aircraft are derivatives of the Soviet Su-27 air superiority fighter, the Su-34 is approximately 50 percent larger, has a much longer range, and can carry much greater weapons payloads, making it particularly optimal for strike operations.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/09/article_677fc8ba06b186_80147498.png" title="Russian Air Force Su-34">As Ukrainian forces in Kursk have been simultaneously assailed from several sides, reported losses have become increasingly extreme. The Russian Defence Ministry on October 27 estimated the loss of over “27,150 troops, 177 tanks, 97 infantry fighting vehicles, 106 armoured fighting vehicles, 1,014 armoured combat vehicles since the fighting started in&nbsp;the Kursk area,” which was was up from the 20,650 personnel&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-20650-personnel-kursk" >estimated</a>&nbsp;in the first week of October to have been lost in Kursk by that point. The increasingly widespread use of glide bombs against Ukrainian forces in Kursk and other locations has been highlighted with growing concern by Western and Ukrainian sources, with multiple Ukrainian personnel in January 2024 having informed the&nbsp;New York Times&nbsp;that <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/gates-hell-bunker-busting-glide-bombs" >new</a>&nbsp;Russian strikes using these bombs imposed “additional devastating power,” and with 500kg of explosives could thus obliterate their underground bunkers. One serviceman compared the impact of Russian glide bomb strikes to “hell’s gates,” stressing that the Russian Air Force “would send them two by two by two, eight in an hour… It sounds like a jet coming down on you.” The use of thermobaric warheads has reportedly made Su-34 sorties significantly more lethal still when targeting fortified positions, with this kind of ammunition having been widely likened in Russia to flamethrowers for their special ability to clear trenches and bunkers.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Ukraine Strikes Major Blow to Russia’s Strategic Bomber Fleet: Key Fuel Depot in Flames: at 1/8/25 6:22pm
On January 8 a Ukrainian long range drone strike successfully targeted the Kombinat Kristall fuel depot near the primary operational facility of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, Engels Airbase, sparking a large scale fire which engulfed large parts of the facility’s associated storage tanks. The attack is reported to have destroyed reserves of T-8V high-density specialised aviation fuel used by <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/putin-delegation-inspect-tu160m" target="_blank">Tu-160 bombers</a> based at the facility, which is produced through a complex refining process at only a small number of locations in Russia. The Tu-160 has been relied on increasingly heavily for intercontinental range nuclear deterrence, as well as for tactical strike roles, with <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ruaf-four-tu160ms-recieve-months" target="_blank">production of the aircraft </a>expected to expand the fleet from its current size of little over 20 aircraft to a fleet of 70. The concentration of Tu-160 operations at Engels Airbase raises the significant possibility that T-8V may not be readily available from other facilities, which could potentially significantly impede operations. Although Russia’s nuclear doctrine allows for nuclear strikes to respond to conventional attacks that threaten its nuclear deterrent, Ukraine has launched such attacks multiple times in the past. Examples have included prior attacks on bomber bases and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-strike-space-communications" >radar facilities</a>, including in mid-May 2024 an <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-ballistic-missiles-russia-radars" >unprecedented strike</a> on a Voronezh-DM early warning radar system at the Armavir Radar Station.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/09/article_677fc00a9c5fe4_32895452.jpeg" title="Russian Air Force Tu-160 Strategic Bombers" >In January 2023 the head of leading Russian state tech firm Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, stated that the country was set to significantly<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/boosting-tu160m-bombers-70strong" target="_blank"> increase production of the Tu-160M</a>&nbsp;bomber. The Tu-160 is a major part of Russia’s nuclear triad and, therefore, the upgrade of the operational aircraft and the resumption of the production of these strategic bombers are our priority task. The upgraded missile-carrying bombers outshine their predecessors in terms of their characteristics and have received new onboard radio-electronic equipment, NK-32-02 engines and other systems. The production of these aircraft will be ramped up in the coming years," he stated regarding the program’s future.&nbsp;The Tu-160 is widely considered the world’s most capable strategic bomber, and entered service in the Soviet Air Force in 1986 with a production run planned at 100 aircraft.&nbsp;With under 20 having served in the Russian Air Force due to the fallout from the USSR’s disintegration, and with progress <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-airbase-test-pakda-bomber" target="_blank">developing a next generation bomber </a>remaining slow, the Defence Ministry made a decision in 2015 to resume Tu-160 production. The fleet currently remains small, however, with the Russian Armed Forces being far more heavily invested in the land and maritime arms of its nuclear triad. &nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Iran Deploys Elite Revolutionary Guard Units For ‘Great Prophet 19’ Exercises: Warns Israel to Avoid ‘Large Scale War’: at 1/7/25 6:05pm
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is currently holding the ‘Great Prophet 19’ large-scale military exercise in the country’s Kermanshah province, a territory that faces the country’s leading regional adversaries Israel and Turkey. The exercises are intended enhance the combat readiness of elite units and test a number of newly developed weapons systems. Exercises are expected to bolster the Corps’ operational capacity and address potential threats from hostile actors. Initial phases have involved rapid response scenarios, including the strategic deployment of personnel and equipment in the Avroman mountainous regions. The exercises were initiated at a time of high tensions between Tehran and Israel in particular, and less than a month after Israeli and Turkish backed Islamist militant groups <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/interview-syria-defeat-russia-israel-security" target="_blank">overthrew the government </a>of Tehran’s closest regional strategic partner Syria on December 8, 2024. With Israeli and Turkish forces having advanced far into Syria, and increasingly appearing set to annex large parts of its territory, Iran’s newfound isolation in the region has fuelled speculation that Israel could launch a new series of attacks against Iranian targets.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/08/article_677dec19a03cb9_45675100.png" title="Israeli Merkava Tanks Advancing Into Syria After Fall of Damascus">The Revolutionary Guard Corps is responsible for both domestic security and for almost all foreign operations, and recently suffered a major setback when over a decade of efforts to bolster the Syrian state against Western, Turkish and Israeli backed Islamist insurgent groups ended in the fall of Damascus.&nbsp;The Corps’ operations are in future expected to be focused more heavily on operations domestically and in neighbouring Iraq, where it still retains close ties with the local armed forces and a number of local militia groups. At a time of high tensions between Israel and Iran, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on January 4 stated that Tehran was “fully prepared for the possibility of further attacks by Israel.” “I hope Israel will refrain from taking such reckless actions, as it could lead to a large-scale war,” he stated, adding: “we believe that reason will ultimately prevail and prevent actions that could have serious consequences.” Iranian and Israeli forces launched multiple limited strikes on one anothers territories in 2024, with Iran having launched an unprecedented missile attack on April 13 in response to an&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/generals-killed-israeli-strike-damascus" >Israeli air strike&nbsp;</a>on an Iranian diplomatic building in Damascus twelve days prior.&nbsp;After Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau Ismail Haniyeh was&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/israeli-strike-hamas-f35" >assassinated</a>&nbsp;in his residence in Tehran by an Israeli air strike on&nbsp;July 31, Iran <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/strike-completely-destroys-f35-base" target="_blank" >retaliated</a> with large scale attacks on October 1.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Middle East, Ground]
— North Korea Launches Mach 12 Hypersonic Glide Vehicle: Hwasong-16B Aims to Counter Missile Defences: at 1/7/25 4:21am
The Korean People’s Army has conducted a new test launch of a hypersonic glide vehicle, which has demonstrated the ability to manoeuvre at speeds of over Mach 12 to evade enemy missile defences. The missile was launched on January 6, with images released and an announcement made the following day, marking the first ballistic missile test of the year by the East Asian state. A new carbon fibre complex material was used to manufacture the propulsion engine of the missiles, while according to local sources anew “comprehensive and effective method” has been introduced to the integration of technologies in flight control and propulsion systems. State media reported that the rationale for developing the glide vehicle equipped missile was to realise “a means to change the direction of the battlefield and “to continue to advance the countrys nuclear power against nuclear war repression by placing a weapon system that no one can respond to.” The missile in question appears to be the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorea-hwasong16b-hypersonic-changer" target="_blank">Hwasong-16B</a>, which was<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorea-hwasong16b-hypersonic-changer" > first test launched</a> on April 2, 2024, as the world’s first intermediate range missile class carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/08/article_677dd495653616_98391819.jpg" title="Hwasong-16B Ballistic Missile with Hypersonic Glide Vehicle in April 2024">The Hwasong-16B is expected to revolutionise North Korea’s ability to strike key American military facilities in the Pacific, most notably Andersen Air Force Base and Guam Naval Base which are at the crux of Washington’s power projection infrastructure.&nbsp;As the U.S. has&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/u-s-building-up-to-20-new-air-defence-sites-on-guam-the-world-s-most-heavily-protected-airspace-to-face-chinese-and-korean-strikes" >invested heavily to expand</a>&nbsp;its missile defence capabilities on the territory,&nbsp;the airspace of which is set to become the most densely protected in the world, introducing assets such as hypersonic glide vehicles is critical to ensure its vulnerability.&nbsp;A major advantage the Hwasong-16B retains over older generations of intermediate range ballistic missiles is its use of solid fuel composites, which allows it to be stored fully fuelled and thus launch far more quickly from mobile transporter erector launcher vehicles. This is a highly prized capability which minimises vulnerability to destruction on the ground by Western and allied air and missile assets in the event of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.&nbsp;The ability to launch conventional and nuclear strikes on American military facilities across the Pacific was achieved from 2016-2017, and represented a major game changer for North Korea’s ability to deter and if necessary counter U.S. attacks. The historical memory of the Korean War, during which American bombers&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/legacy-of-terror-dozens-of-unexploded-american-bombs-found-at-construction-site-of-pyongyang-general-hospital" >throughly ravaged</a>&nbsp;the country and were responsible for killing many of the 20-30 percent of the population who died in the conflict, is thought to have remained a major influence on North Korean strategic thought today. While during the conflict America’s network of regional bases were far beyond the reach of North Korean attacks, the vulnerability of this base network seriously complicates potential efforts by the U.S. to project power into the Western Pacific.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Asia-Pacific, Missile and Space]
— North Korean Bulsae-4 Anti Tank Missile System Takes Out Ukraine’s Mobile Artillery in Kursk: at 1/6/25 6:08pm
Footage released on January 6 has provided further insight into the use of the North Korean Bulsae-4 anti tank missile system in the Russian-Ukrainian War, with one of the systems filmed firing on and destroying a Ukrainian Army 2S1 Gvozdika mobile artillery system. The Bulsae-4 was <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/north-korea-closes-russias-anti-tank-missile-gap-with-ukraine/" target="_blank">first observed</a> being operated in the theatre in August 2024, and represents the first non-line of sight anti-tank missile class deployed in Russia, with the exception of American Javelin missile systems captured by Russian forces from Ukraine. The Bulsae-4 has similar characteristics to the Javelin, but over twice the range at an estimated 10 kilometres, and has previously been&nbsp;<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/north-korea-closes-russias-anti-tank-missile-gap-with-ukraine/" >combat tested&nbsp;</a>targeting Ukrainian mobile artillery systems far behind the frontlines. Such missiles can engage targets using targeting data provided by drones and other supporting assets, and strike enemy armour from their top rather than the sides as top armour is usually thinner. The Bulsae-4 represents one of multiple new capabilities which North Korea has been able to provide Russian forces, alongside much <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/move-aside-iskander-kn23b-russia-top" target="_blank">longer ranged tactical ballistic missiles</a>, rocket artillery systems, and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-koksan-170mm-ukraine" target="_blank">howitzers</a> than those produced in Russia itself. Alongside the provision of weapons systems that provide new capabilities, North Korea had by mid-2024 also supplied&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-artillery-saved-russia-6million" >over 6 million </a>152mm and 122mm artillery rounds, allowing the Russian Army to sustain bombardment in the theatre and make up for shortfalls in domestic production.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/07/article_677cb7d169b1e0_77567658.jpg" title="North Korean Vehicles with Octuple Bulsae-4 Launchers">The latest engagement using the Bulsae-4 system occurred near the village of Malaya Loknya in the Russian Kursk region, where Western and Ukrainian sources have widely reported North Korea has made significant ground force deployments to support the Russian war effort. There remains a significant possibility that North Korean personnel could be operating the system to seek and destroy Ukrainian armour, with the obtaining of such experience being a leading benefit for Pyongyang of deploying its forces in the theatre. The system is considered to be rivalled only by the Chinese HJ-10 in its performance, thus representing a game changer for Russian anti tank capabilities, although as a relatively new addition to the North Korean inventory it remains uncertain in what numbers they may be available. The sheer scale of North Korean arms transfers to Russia is expected to provide a major boon to the East Asian state’s economy, and potentially provide funding for further modernisation of its defence sector and the accelerated development of new generations of weapons systems.&nbsp;Russia is expected to partly offset the costs of arms acquisitions with technology transfers to support its neighbour’s space and submarine programs, as well as with the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-realistically-ship-hundreds-mig29-nkorea" target="_blank">delivery of fighter aircraft</a>.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Ground]
— British Defence Sources Warn of High Vulnerability to Ballistic Missile Strikes: How Capable Are Existing Defences?: at 1/6/25 6:01pm
An independent panel leading a government commissioned strategic defence review in the United Kingdom has been “deeply concerned” by the country’s vulnerability to ballistic missile attacks, according to defence sources cited by the Times. The sources noted that the state of the country’s missile defences were found to be sorely lacking, to the extent that they had caused other NATO member to express “frustration” at the weaknesses this presented for the alliance collectively. The paper highlighted “the growing risk to Britain and its military assets overseas, as China, Russia and Iran rapidly develop ballistic missiles that can cross continents at many times the speed of sound,” with senior military sources informing the paper that this would only worsen over the next 15 years. They further highlighted the vulnerability of Royal Navy warships, including those taking part in U.S.-led<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/yemeni-ansurullah-amazing-arsenal-shocked" target="_blank"> operations against </a>the Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition, to ballistic missile strikes. The United Kingdom has continued to face a worsening economic crisis, with the new Labour government expected to make continued cuts to the British Armed Forces. This and the country’s substantial investments in contributing to security collective Western Bloc interests in conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East has raised questions regarding whether investment in costly ballistic missile defence capabilities is at all viable. Although Britain’s small fleet of six Type 45 Class destroyers are expected to retain a limited anti ballistic missile capability,&nbsp;these are <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/british-type-45-destroyers-cant-do-ballistic-missile-defence-small-arsenals-have-limited-versatility" target="_blank">not viable</a> against longer ranged or more sophisticated attacks, while the ships’ <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/type45-withdrawn-yemen-technical" target="_blank">reliability</a> and availability rates have remained abysmally low, the latter often at <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/type45-withdrawn-yemen-technical" target="_blank">just 17-34 percent</a>.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/07/article_677c979c453740_89887456.jpg" title="British Royal Navy Type 45 Class Destroyer">Britain’s vulnerability to ballistic missile strikes was highlighted in November by Russia’s&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/combat-tested-stockpiles-production-oreshnik">employment</a>&nbsp;of the Oreshnik hypersonic intermediate range ballistic missile against Ukrainian targets, which marked the first ever combat deployment of a weapon of its kind. Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Andrey Kelin&nbsp;shortly afterwards&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-ambassador-oreshnik-rein-in-british">claimed</a> the demonstration of this capability had forced the British government to take a more cautious approach towards launching deep strikes against Russian targets. "Not that they [Londons representatives] were scared, but overall they realised that a completely new factor had appeared on the scene - thats the first thing. The second is that we have retaliated for the use of Storm Shadow [long range cruise missiles] deep inside Russian territory. Thats obvious as well. There is a sense that they are being a little more cautious, a little more balanced in their approach to this issue. And, in fact, they are now closely following what is happening," he stated. “In the expert community there was undoubtedly a serious study of the abilities, capabilities of the Oreshnik missile, its deployment on the territory of Belarus, from which, let’s say, any point in Europe is reachable," the ambassador added. Deployment of new medium range ballistic missiles by Russia, in particular the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-first-transfers-nkorean-russia-pukkuksong2" target="_blank">reported procurement </a>of North Korean Pukkuksong-2 missiles with 2500km ranges, also places London within reach.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/07/article_677c8f53d17cd7_48469156.png" title="Engagement Range of Pukkuksong-2 System From Western Russia">The United Kingdom has <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/france-uk-lobbying-deep-missile-strikes" >played a leading role</a>&nbsp;in&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-intel-western-plans-troop-deployments-ukraine" >lobbying</a>&nbsp;the United States to allow for escalation of<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/atacms-strike-s400-launchers-kursk" >&nbsp;joint strikes</a>&nbsp;from Ukrainian territory into Russia, including using British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Although these limited strikes fall well below the threshold for Russia to respond using its intercontinental range nuclear deterrent, the Oreshnik provides a means of launching proportional strikes against targets in Britain and other European states that are involved launching attacks from Ukraine. The United Kingdom has taken a leading role among NATO members in combating Russian forces in the Ukrainian theatre, with&nbsp;British Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Royal Marines Lieutenant General Robert Magowan having in December 2022&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/royal-marines-fighting-russia-months" >confirmed</a>&nbsp;that hundreds of Marines had been carrying out high risk operations in the theatre from April that year. He stressed that these were carried out “in a hugely sensitive environment and with a high level of political and military risk.”&nbsp; This was subsequently further&nbsp;<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/apr/11/up-to-50-uk-special-forces-present-in-ukraine-this-year-us-leak-suggests" >confirmed</a>&nbsp;by leaked Pentagon documents. In December 2023 Polish journalist Zbigniew Parafianowicz&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/specialforces-details-british-ops-ukraine" >revealed</a>&nbsp;that Polish officials had provided him with details on the operations of British forces, with one informing him: “It was a time when the Russians were still standing in Bucha, and the route was a grey zone. It was possible to run into Russians. We passed the last checkpoint. The Ukrainians told us that we continue at our own risk… Well, and who did we meet next? Ukrainian soldiers and … British special forces. Uniformed. With weapons.” British forces were also driving around the countryside with artillery tracking radars to study the course of the conflict and Russian forces’ operations.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Naval]
— Russian Iskander-M Ballistic Missile Strike Takes Out One of Ukraine’s Last S-300 Air Defence Systems: at 1/6/25 4:40am
On January 6 a strike by a Russian <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iskander-successes-strike-artillery" target="_blank">Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile system</a> destroyed parts of a Ukrainian Air Force S-300PS air defence system near the city of Pavlograd in the Dnipropetrovsk region. The location represents one of the westernmost positions at which hostilities are ongoing, as Ukraine has continued to lose ground in its resource rich Russian speaking regions. Components of the S-300 system destroyed appear to include 5N63S command post, the 30N6 illumination and guidance radar, and accompanying support vehicles. Ukraine previously deployed Europe’s largest and most capable network of surface to air missile systems, with S-300P, PS, PT and V systems having been concentrated there in considerable numbers by the Soviet Armed Forces when the country disintegrated, alongside complementary shorter ranged systems such as the medium ranged BuK. Although dating back to the 1980s, these systems were cutting edge and considered well ahead of their time during the Cold War, which allowed them to present a primary impediment to Russian advances when full scale hostilities broke out in February 2022.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/07/article_677c783ebc6b53_54533349.jpeg" title="Surface to Air Missile Battery From Ukrainian S-300 System">Shortages of S-300s and other air defence systems has long been a leading concern for Ukraine’s supporters, with multiple NATO members having responded by <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/netherlands-replenishes-ukraine-patriot-losses" target="_blank">seriously depleting</a> their inventories of American MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems to re-arm Ukraine. With Western Bloc states deploying ground based air defence systems in small fractions of the quantities which the Soviet Union did, however, their capacity to make up for losses is seriously limited. As early as November 2022 Ukrainian Air Force chief spokesperson Colonel Yury Ignat told the London based&nbsp;Financial Times&nbsp;that the inability to procure additional missiles for the S-300 and BuK systems <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-air-defence-s300-buk-expire">posed a major threat</a>, indicating that the service’s ability to continue to fire two missiles at each incoming Russian projectile, as was standard practice for air defence units, would be undermined.&nbsp;In April 2023 leaks of secret documents from the U.S. Department of Defence showed that there were rising concerns within the Pentagon regarding the state of the Ukrainian Air Force’s surface to air missile network. Pentagon officials <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/pentagon-ukraine-air-defence-likely-run">assessed</a> that Ukrainian air defences assigned to protect&nbsp;forces on the frontlines&nbsp;would “be completely reduced” by late May that year, allowing Russian air power to play a much greater role on the battlefield in support of its ground forces. This did indeed materialise, with Russian air strikes widely reported to have played a growing role in supplementing the country’s considerable artillery superiority. Ukrainian Army frontline personnel&nbsp;have <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/gates-hell-bunker-busting-glide-bombs">lamented</a>&nbsp;“the additional devastating power” of Russian bombing, stressing the they were obliterating their underground bunkers and opening“hell’s gates” on their positions. The weaker Ukraine’s air defence network has become, the more easily the Russian Air Force has been able to provide support to ground forces.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/07/article_677c78528852d7_86973627.png" title="Ukrainian Patriot System Milliseconds Before Iskander Strike in March 2024">Iskander-M ballistic missile systems have been used to great effect against Ukrainian surface to air missile systems from 2024 in particular, allowing them to serve as force multipliers that significantly&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-a2s-thin-loss-patriot-s300" >increase the vulnerability</a>&nbsp;of nearby Ukrainian forces.&nbsp; In March footage showed the&nbsp;systems <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-patriot-losses-iskander" >striking</a> Ukrainian Patriot and S-300 systems, while in July footage showed them&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-iskander-ukraine-patriot" >destroying</a>&nbsp;two batteries from another Patriot system near the settlement Yuzhnoye in the Odessa region.&nbsp;Footage released on August 17 <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/patriot-ukraine-iskander-cluster-warhead" >showed the destruction</a> of three surface to air missile batteries from a U.S.-supplied MIM-104 Patriot air defence system in the Lyubimovka settlement in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk region using cluster munitions. On December 15 an Iskander strike was confirmed to have <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/four-patriot-missile-launchers-radar-destroyed-ukraine" >destroyed</a> an AN/MPQ-65 radar station and four surface to air missile launchers from another Patriot system, coinciding with attacks targeting infrastructure at Ukrainian military airfields, personnel concentrations, and military equipment in 146 areas. Successful strikes on S-300 systems, which are fielded much more widely, have been significantly more common.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Missile and Space, Battlefield]
— Russia Makes Large Scale Deployment of S-500 Air Defence Systems to Secure Crimea: at 1/5/25 6:36pm
The Russian Armed Forces have deployed their sole regiment of S-500 long range air defence systems to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge connecting the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian mainland, reflecting concerns in Moscow that Ukraine and its Western supporters could seek to target it as they escalate strikes deeper into Russia. Reports of this development follows confirmation in late December that the armed forces had&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-first-regiment-s500-long-range-air-defence" >formed their first full regiment </a>equipped with&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-new-s500-arctic" >S-500 long range air defence systems</a>, marking an important milestone in plans to deploy them across the country.&nbsp;While each regiment of the older&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/investment-s400-reindustrailised-sector" >S-400 air defence system</a>&nbsp;deploys 16 surface to air missile launchers alongside associated mobile radars and command centres, however, the number of launchers under each S-500 regiment remains unknown. The S-500 entered service in 2021, following over half a decade of delays, and provides an additional layer to the Russian air defence network&nbsp;above the S-300V4 and S-400 systems, but below the A-235 that protects Moscow from ICBM strikes. It is the world’s first mobile surface to air missile system with anti-satellite and anti-ICBM capabilities, and is prized for its powerful sensors facilitating 800km detection ranges, its unrivalled 600 kilometre engagement range, and its ability to intercept targets at high hypersonic speeds.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/06/article_677c69d317e518_64516918.jpeg" title="Missile Battery From S-500 System">In June the head of the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence Directorate Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported that the Russian Armed Forces had&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/s500-first-deployment-crimean-bridge">deployed</a>&nbsp;elements from an S-500 system in Kerch City near the disputed Crimean Peninsula. Following a&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-ballistic-missiles-russia-radars">green light from Washington&nbsp;</a>to launch strikes deeper into Russian claimed territory, there was widespread speculation that Ukrainian forces, operating with considerable support from Western advisors on the ground and<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/global-hawk-ukraine-take-out-s400">&nbsp;intelligence collection assets</a>&nbsp;in the air&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/all-nato-satellite-network-backs-ukraine">and in space</a>, would attempt an attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge using newly U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short range ballistic missiles. A longer range variant of the ATACMS using a single high explosive warhead, rather than cluster warheads, had at the time recently begun to be operated, and would be particularly well suited for such strikes. Elements from the S-500 system were expected to serve as force multipliers for existing air defence assets including multiple battalions of S-400s. The concentration of S-500 systems to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge highlights the impacts which serious delivery delays has had, with the systems originally envisioned to protect major cities and strategic locations in the Arctic and Pacific by the mid-2020s.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/06/article_677c69b0df6089_76231154.png" title="Attack on Kerch Strait Bridge">As a $4 billion infrastructure project, the Kerch Strait Bridge has been a primary potential target for Ukrainian and allied attacks due to both its symbolic value linking Crimea to mainland Russia, and to its military importance allowing Russian forces to redeploy. While Western sources have called for attacks on the bridge since shortly after its construction in May 2018, a bombing on October 8, 2022 took it out of commission for several hours and caused three deaths, which was quickly commemorated in Kiev with a celebratory postage stamp. This was followed by a Ukrainian drone boat attack on the bridge in July 2023, which also caused damage that was quickly repaired. European states have<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/france-uk-lobbying-deep-missile-strikes">&nbsp;lobbied strongly&nbsp;</a>for unrestricted missile attacks very deep into Russia, with London and Paris being among the most active in this regard, and beginning attacks on internationally recognised Russian territory with Ukrainian forces on November 20.&nbsp;Missile attacks launched from November have represented a major escalation, and have been guided by&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/all-nato-satellite-network-backs-ukraine" >vast networks of Western satellites&nbsp;</a>and supported by&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/cia-stealth-network-ukraine-proxy-war-russia" >major deployments</a>&nbsp;of Western Bloc advisors and other specialists on the ground. The missile strikes reportedly achieved some significant successes against Russian forces in the Kursk region, including&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/atacms-strike-s400-launchers-kursk" >destroying</a>&nbsp;components of an S-400 air defence system in late November. There has been some speculation that the S-500’s deployment may be intended to utilise its anti-satellite warfare capabilities to potentially target Western Bloc satellites used to guide attacks against Crimea, and the Kerch Strait Bridge in particular, should these escalate, with its deployment thus intended to deter Kiev and its Western supporters from pursuing such steps.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Missile and Space]
— Iran to Operationalise Russian Su-35 Fighters By Year’s End - Reports: at 1/5/25 2:54am
The Iranian Air Force is scheduled to operationalise Russian Su-35 ‘4++ generation’ fighter aircraft before the end of 2025, according to reports from a number of sources. This information follows reports in November 2024 that the Air Force had <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-airbase-iran-su35-air-defence" target="_blank">begun construction</a> of new hardened facilities for the aircraft at its 3rd Tactical Air Base located 47 kilometres north of Hamedan - a facility colloquially known as Hamedan Air Base. This occurred a year after Iranian Deputy Defence Minister Mehdi Farahi <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-confirms-mi28-su35-tensions" >confirmed</a>&nbsp;in November 2023 that the country had finalised plans to receive&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/worlds-most-dangerous-attack-helicopters" >Mi-28 attack helicopters</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ruaf-new-su35-batch-no-export" >Su-35 fighter aircraft</a>&nbsp;and Yak-130 fighter/trainers from Russia.&nbsp;Reports of an agreement between Tehran and Moscow for the supply of Su-35s were first reported in mid-2022, with the transfer expected to help offset some of the tremendous costs of the large quantities of Iranian armaments that have been supplied to Russia for its war effort in Ukraine. These supplies have included major technology transfers and support to facilitate licensed production of Iranian drones, most notably the Shahed-136, in Russia.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/06/article_677b3828120af2_81102478.jpeg" title="Russian Air Force Su-35 Fighter">The dimensions of new hangers at Hamedan Air Base, which are far too large for the requirements of the Vietnam War era F-4 fighters currently based there, have strengthened the consensus that the facility will host Su-35s. Located in the west of the country, the base is well positioned to allow a Su-35 squadron to quickly respond to threats of air incursions from the country’s regional archival Israel, or from NATO member Turkey. The base is also located near the capital Tehran and several key nuclear facilities. The Su-35’s wide combat radius of over 2000 kilometres also allows the aircraft to project power overland deep into the Middle East, or to loiter across the Straits of Hormuz. There remains a significant possibility that Su-35s will be split between two or more facilities, allowing them to cover more regions of the country and limiting the fleet’s vulnerability to strikes on any particular one. The heavily fortified Eagle 44 underground airbase&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorea-underground-airbase-iran-eagle44" >first unveiled</a>&nbsp;in early February 2023 also appears to have been&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-su35s-nkorean-fortified-iranian-nuclear" >built to accommodate</a>&nbsp;Su-35s. A benefit of dispersing Su-35s is that they can use their modern sensors to serve as force multipliers for units deploying older fighters such as F-4Es and F-14s with obsolete sensors.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Middle East, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Chinese Sixth Generation Fighters Poised to Cut Pentagon Demand For F-35s: Lockheed Martin Stock Drops After New Jets’ Unveiling: at 1/3/25 6:00pm
Stock of the United States’ largest defence contractor Lockheed Martin was downgraded to Hold from Buy at Deutsche Bank by 14.5 percent, with a price target of $523 down from $611. An analyst at the bank specifically cited "Chinas combat aircraft modernisation efforts" as a reason for the decision, following the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-unveiled-stealthiest-fighter-sixth-generation" target="_blank">release of footage</a> showing two Chinese sixth generation fighter aircraft in flight. "Were downgrading Lockheed to Hold [from Buy] as we feel our prior thesis struggles to hold water and we have increased concern on the long-term support for F-35 in the face of Chinas combat aircraft modernisation efforts," Deutsch Bank analyst Scott Deuschle stated. He added that he saw "the reveal of further advancements in combat aircraft capabilities by China as potentially undermining long-term [Pentagon] demand for the F-35 aircraft." The the first images of sixth generation fighter aircraft were released&nbsp;on December 26, with the two new fighters notably having tailless configurations - a key requirement for sixth generation fighters never before seen on any flying fighter in the world.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/04/article_67796a2d689bc3_88831442.JPG" title="Chinese Sixth Generation Fighter Prototype ">The Chinese J-20 and American F-35 are currently the only fifth generation fighters in large scale production worldwide. With China increasingly expected to introduce a sixth generation fighter long before the United States does, and likely not long after the end of the decade, this will likely leave the F-35 at a steep disadvantage in terms of performance, escalating calls to curtail production. Funding could be re-allocated to a sixth generation program, or potentially to asymmetric alternatives such as shorter ranged unmanned aircraft or surface to air missile systems. The F-35 is already considered to be at a disadvantage compared to the J-20, as while the two are considered to have similarly advanced avionics, composite materials, and stealth coatings, the J-20 has approximately double the range, a far superior flight performance, a supercruise capability, a much higher missile carrying capacity, and a larger radar. Progress on the J-20 program has been a key driver of efforts to enhance the F-35’s performance, including through development of the new AN/APG-85 radar, AIM-260 air-to-air missile, and a new electronic warfare suite. Incremental upgrades, however, are not expected to be capable of making the F-35 or the J-20 viable for the most competitive air-to-air missions once sixth generation fighters begin to be introduced.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Five Years Since the U.S. Assassinated the Middle East’s Most Influential General: Has Soleimani’s Vision Been Shattered?: at 1/2/25 6:49pm
January 3, 2025 marks five years since the United States launched a drone strike to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-s-deadly-shadow-commander-general-qasem-soleimani-killed-in-u-s-attack-a-major-thorn-in-america-s-side-for-decades" target="_blank">assassinate</a> Iran’s most senior and decorated military official, Major General Qasem Soleimani, destroying his sizeable convoy near Baghdad International Airport. The U.S. Department of Defence reported at the time that the attack was carried out “at the directly of the [U.S.] President,” with the U.S. Congress having been notified before the strike. The attack launched using MQ-9 Reaper drones, was overseen by the CIA, and was claimed by Israeli sources to have received a degree of support from Israeli intelligence. Alongside the Iranian general, the attack killed four leaders of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces, and led the Iraqi parliament to resolve to evict American forces from the country - a resolution which officials in Washington made clear they would not act on. Widespread protests in towns and cities across Iran, including calls for revenge, were mirrored on smaller scales across Iraq and Pakistan. The <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/consequences-of-america-s-assassination-of-general-qasem-soleimani-everything-that-has-happened-since-updated" >fallout from the strike </a>would continue to grow in the coming weeks, culminating in Iranian missile attacks on U.S. military facilities in Iraq which were confirmed to have caused<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/number-of-american-casualties-from-iranian-missile-strike-rises-to-109-pentagon" > over 100 American casualties</a>.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/04/article_6778a2ef6f8418_48138506.jpg" title="Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah and General Qasem Soleimani">In retrospect the death of Qasem Soleimani may come to be seen as a turning point in the regional balance of power, as while the general had personally overseen the formation and strengthening of a vast network of Iranian-aligned forces across the Middle East, five years later his network is widely assessed to be unravelling. Soleimani’s envisioned ‘Axis of Resistance’ had built up the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/how-powerful-hezbollah-trained-nkorea-hardened" target="_blank">Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah</a> into by far the world’s most powerful non-state fighting force, had begun the buildup of the Yemeni <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/yemeni-ansurullah-amazing-arsenal-shocked" target="_blank">Ansurullah Coalition’s arsenals</a>, had strengthened a network of Shiite militias in Iraq, and had worked closely alongside the Arab Nationalist government of Syria despite ideological differences. This network had thus unified all major forces outside the Western sphere of influence in the region, while also calling on Shiite paramilitary groups from Afghanistan to play limited combat roles. Soleimani’s central role as the architect of this axis was widely attested to, and he had personally consistently commanded on the frontlines when its power was challenged, whether helping to organise Hezbollah’s war effort against Israel in 2006 from a bunker in Southern Lebanon, or combating Turkish-backed Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria throughout the 2010s.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/04/article_6778a36a83cf47_35397310.jpg" title="Qasen Soleimani with Iraqi Paramilitaries During Campaign Against Turkish Backed Islamist State Forces">Soleimani was widely assessed to be one of the two most powerful men in Iran, alongside Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and by far its most influential foreign policy strategist. Sources have widely reported that after fighting a four year campaign against Western, Turkish and Israeli backed jihadist groups in Syria and Iran from 2011-2015, the Iranian general played a key role in persuading the Russian leadership, and President Vladimir Putin in particular, to launch a military intervention to support Syria, Iran and Hezbollah’s counterinsurgency efforts. After his visit to Moscow, Russia proceeded to do so in August 2015. The regional events of 2024 have highlighted the limitations which the self proclaimed Axis of Resistance has faced after Soleimani’s death. While Hezbollah, Ansurullah, and Iran have gained notable military victories, Soleimani’s close confidant Hezbollah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah was <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hezbollah-killed-strike-underground" target="_blank">killed in an Israeli strike</a> in September, with assassinations of other key Hezbollah and Iranian military leaders having been <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/generals-killed-israeli-strike-damascus" target="_blank">carried out</a> throughout the year.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/04/article_6778a6b76c58e6_78596958.jpg" title="Mourners of Qasem Soleimani in Azadi Square, Tehran">Victories for Western Bloc, Turkish and Israeli interests have continued to mount, culminating in the successful <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/interview-syria-defeat-russia-israel-security" target="_blank">overthrow of the Syrian government</a> as Turkish backed jihadist groups marched into Damascus on December 8. Syria’s fall was an outcome which Soleimani had dedicated himself to throughout the 2010s, and with its territory divided between Turkish, Israeli and American spheres of influence, the Axis of Resistance’s land bridges to Israel and the Hezbollah have been cut. The key role played by Soleimani in masterminding the pushback against Western Bloc, Turkish and Israeli advances in the 2010s has fuelled considerable speculation that had he lived, the ‘Axis of Resistance’ could have operated far more effectively as it did in the previous decade, potentially leaving the regional balance of power looking entirely different.&nbsp;Thus although the general’s assassination was highly controversial, and widely assessed by legal experts to be a serious violation of international law and crime of aggression, it retrospect it may have been planned in recognition of Soleimani’s importance, and seen to be precisely what&nbsp;the Western Bloc and its regional partners needed to turn the tide in their favour.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Middle East, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft, Foreign Relations]
— Serbia Now Has One of Europe’s Top Surface to Air Missile Networks: Chinese HQ-22 Becomes Fully Operational: at 1/2/25 4:06am
The Serbian Defence Ministry on January 2 announced that Chinese HQ-22 medium range air defence systems are now fully operational, with the new assets seen by senior officers to have revolutionised the ability of the country’s armed forces to protect national airspace. Chinese Y-20 heavy airlifters&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/chinese-y20-heavy-airlifters-fly-to-serbia-in-force-bolster-ageing-air-defences-with-hq22-missiles" >transported</a>&nbsp;the first of the missile systems to Serbia in early April, 2022, less than two years after Serbia was <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/serbia-s-new-chinese-hq-22-missile-system-to-revolutionise-air-defence-capabilities" >confirmed</a> to have ordered them.&nbsp;The acquisition faced considerable opposition from Serbia’s European neighbours and from the United States, although procuring the HQ-22 was seen to be a less politically contentious alternative to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/serbia-s400-nato-stopped-caatsa" target="_blank">prior plans to acquire</a> Russian S-300 or S-400 systems. Commenting on the operationalisation of the systems, the Defence Ministry observed: “By arming the Air Force and Air Defence with the new FK-3 [HQ-22] air defence missile system, the airspace control and protection system has been significantly improved in the Republic of Serbia.”<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/03/article_67775537effa58_06496598.jpg" title="Missile Launcher From Serbian HQ-22 System">Elaborating on the operationalising of the system,&nbsp;Commander of an HQ-22 unit Captain 1st Class Stefan Manic observed that it was a ”milestone in air defence systems” for the country. He emphasised that the Chinese system’s anti-jamming capabilities, and its sophisticated ability to counter enemy anti-radiation missiles, placed its effectiveness and survivability levels at the cutting edge. The commander further noted that the HQ-22’s extensive countermeasures against electronic warfare were particularly important in modern conflicts. He added that the HQ-22 retained exceptional fire control capabilities, allowing each system to simultaneously engage up to six targets with up to twelve missiles, which was valuable in saturated threat environments. Serbia’s HQ-22s are networked with lower tier air defence systems including modernised Soviet S-125s and new Russian Pantsir-S combat vehicles, which further optimise protection against saturation attacks using large volumes of drones or cruise missiles. While Serbia’s surface to air missile network was previously far from remarkable even by the standards of other European states, the introduction of the HQ-22 has transformed its network into one of the most formidable on the continent.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/03/article_6777557fe823c5_97774307.webp" title="Yugoslav Capital Belgrade Under NATO Bombardment in 1999">The HQ-22 is capable of engaging almost all kinds of aircraft, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles traveling at speeds of up to Mach 3, and at altitudes of up to 27 kilometres. The engagement range of the missiles for the system procured by Serbia is reportedly 100 kilometres.&nbsp;Upon the first delivery of the systems, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic observed that they provided “powerful deterrent” against potential attackers. “We will no longer allow to be a punching bag for anyone,” the president said at the time, in apparent reference to a 78 day bombing campaign carried out by NATO in 1999 against Yugoslavia. Historical memory of the bombings, which included&nbsp;<a href="https://tass.com/world/1246955" >use</a>&nbsp;of highly toxic depleted uranium against civilian areas and strikes on&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/23/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-the-targets-nato-strikes-serb-state-tv-casualties-seen.html" >media buildings</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/may/08/balkans" >outdoor markets</a>, is thought to have led Serbia to place a strong emphasis on air defence despite its limited defence budget.&nbsp;While Serbia was previously expected to complement its HQ-22s with modern fighter aircraft from China or Russia, such as the J-10C, its decision to procure French Rafale fighters will increase the burden on these air defence systems to protect national airspace. Rafales will be <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/serbia-downgraded-rafale-no-missiles" target="_blank" >delivered without </a>their primary air-to-air weapon, the Meteor, while detailed Western knowledge of how the aircraft work will ensure their viability to defend against possible Western Bloc attacks will be highly limited.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Breaking Down All Fourteen Batches of Fighter Jets Delivered to Russian Forces in 2024: Su-57, Su-35, Su-34 and Su-30SM2 Fleets Growing: at 1/2/25 3:38am
The year 2024 saw Russia’s combat aviation industry continue to produce both fighters and helicopters for domestic use and for export, while providing repairs, modernisation and refurbishment for existing fleets. Operating under wartime conditions from 2022, Russian industry has seen domestic demand rise as the Russian Air Force seeks both to replenish losses suffered in Ukraine and to expand its existing fleet. The anticipated end to production of the Su-30SM and Su-35 fighters around 2030 is though to have further fuelled calls to increase supplies of these two classes aircraft to allow production lines to transition to other more modern fighter classes in future. Russia currently operates four separate fighter production facilities building new fighter aircraft, two of which produce two separate fighter classes in parallel. Only three of these facilities, however, have seen orders placed by the Russian Defence Ministry for new fighters, with the fourth, the Sokol Aviation Plant, producing MiG-29M and MiG-35 fighters for export while refurbishing and modernising MiG-31BM interceptors and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-capability-kinzhal-importance" target="_blank">MiG-31I strike fighters </a>for domestic use. A breakdown of the fourteen batches of fighters confirmed to have been delivered to the Russian Armed Forces in 2024, including the factories at which they were produced, is provided below.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/02/article_6776a5603484f8_89234466.jpeg" title="Russian Air Force Su-57">Su-57 Fifth Generation Fighter: Three BatchesRussian state sources have reported the delivery of three batches of Su-57 fifth generation fighters in 2024, including one on <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-air-force-receives-new-su-57-fifth-generation-fighters-can-industry-meet-the-year-s-ambitious-delivery-target">September 12</a>, one on <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/recieves-su57-ambitious-acquisitions-target">November 11</a>, and a third on <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-air-force-new-su57-su34">December 23</a>. The size of the batches remains unknown, and it is highly uncertain whether Russian industry met its highly ambitious target of a&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su57-production-surging-2024-others">67 percent surge&nbsp;</a>in the production of Su-57s in 2024 to produce 20 fighters - up from&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/batch-su57-completed-production-doubled">12 fighters</a>&nbsp;in 2023. The<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-leading-fighter-fourth-phase">&nbsp;Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant</a>&nbsp;in the Russian Far East in August saw&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/facilities-expanded-su57-fighter-production">new facilities opened</a>&nbsp;to facilitate expanded production of the Su-57, although with the final number of fighters delivered not having been confirmed by Russian state sources, there is a significant possibility that production fell short. &nbsp;On November 13, Rosoboronexport CEO Alexander Mikheyev&nbsp;revealed that a contract for the export of the Su-57 had <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/confirms-su57-export-signed">already been signed</a>, with this and anticipated further foreign demand raising the possibility that a growing portion of productive capacity with be allocated to exports in the coming years. Due to the Su-57’s operations in the Ukrainian theatre from early 2022, its degree of high intensity combat testing remains wholly without equal for a fighter of its generation. Operations have included&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-su57-suppress-ukrainian-air-defence">air defence suppression</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/british-sources-su57-r37m-shoot-down-ukrainians">air to air combat</a>, and&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su57-stealth-drone-nato-hands">operations in&nbsp;</a>heavily defended enemy airspace, as well as a range of&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-fifthgen-squadron-intensify">precision strike missions</a>. It has been speculated that a second production line for the fighters could be opened in future, possibly at the Irkutsk Aircraft Plant which currently produces Su-30SM/SM2 fighters.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/02/article_6776a59de504f6_23035918.jpg" title="Su-35 Production at the Komsomolsk on Amur Aircraft Plant ">Su-35 Air Superiority Fighter: Four BatchesFour batches of Su-35 fighters are reported to have been delivered to the Russian Air Force in 2024, including on April 12, May 8, September 12, and November 11. The fighters are produced at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant&nbsp;alongside the Su-57, and have continued to play a central role in the Russian air campaign in Ukraine in roles ranging from <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ten-days-air-battles-lose-mig29-left" target="_blank">air-to-air combat </a>to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-su35-strikes-air-defence-sites-kursk">air defence suppression</a>. A number of sources have reported that orders have been given since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in Ukraine to accelerate production of the Su-35, which if confirmed is expected to serve three purposes. These include replenishing losses, converting more Cold War era units from fighters such as the Su-27, and forming more new aviation units to expand the fleet. The Su-35’s operational costs are notably lower than its Cold War era predecessor the Su-27, while production costs are also estimated at only around $17 million depending on exchange rates. With the fighter combining one of the longest ranges, highest manoeuvrability levels, and largest sensor suites with relatively modest costs, this makes it highly attractive for large scale procurement. Russian acquisitions of Su-35s may be reduced in the near future as the Iranian Air Force is expected to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-airbase-iran-su35-air-defence">begin receiving Su-35s</a> in 2025, and potentially placing followup orders in the aftermath, while Indonesian officials have stated that an acquisition of the aircraft is <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/a-new-phase-in-indonesia-s-long-effort-to-purchase-russian-su-35-fighters-ambassador-confirms-contract-still-in-effect">still under consideration</a>. The possibility of <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/why-nkorean-pilots-deploying-russia">North Korean acquisitions</a> of the Su-35 was also raised with growing frequency in 2024, with American state sources confirming that <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-air-force-modernise-russian-mig29-su27" target="_blank">transfers of some fighter aircraft </a>are expected.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/02/article_6776a5b1df2f30_10465957.JPG" title="Su-34 Strike Fighter with Rocket Pods">Su-34 Strike Fighter: Six BatchesThe Su-34 strike fighter has been procured on a much larger scale by the Russian Air Force than any other post-Cold War era fighter class, and has played a disproportionate role in combat in Ukraine and accordingly suffered particularly high losses. Six batches of the fighters were reported to have been delivered to the Russian Air Force in 2024, namely on <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ruaf-new-batch-su34-glide-bomb">April 5</a>, <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-su34-batch-production-surge">June 17</a>, <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/replenishing-strike-fleet-su34s">September 2</a>, <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su34-intensive-strikes-kursk">October 9</a>, <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-new-su34-third-consecutive-month">November 25 </a>and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-air-force-new-su57-su34">December 23</a>. Although the Su-34 was already being procured on a larger scale than other Russian fighters, in October 2023 the Defence Ministry gave directives to expand production. When giving orders to increase production in 2023, then Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su34m-strike-fighters-batches-capabilities">observed</a>&nbsp;regarding the Su-34’s role in the Russian Air Force: “This warplane is the main workhorse, they have four, five sorties every day,” stressing the “need to step up, hurry up” with production.&nbsp;Su-34s produced in 2024 have all been enhanced Su-34M variants, the first orders for which were&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/introducing-the-su-34m-russia-just-ordered-two-full-regiments-of-its-latest-strike-fighter-design">placed in 2020</a>.Produced at the Chkalov Aircraft Factory&nbsp;in Novosibirsk, Siberia, using parts with supply chains across much of the country, the Su-34 has continued to be widely relied on for both nuclear deterrence and for tactical strike missions across all theatres from the&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-enclave-airstrikes-100-jihadists">Middle East</a>&nbsp;to the&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-to-deploy-new-su-34-strike-fighter-unit-to-arctic-amid-tensions-with-america">Arctic</a>&nbsp;to the Western Pacific. The fighters’ operations gained growing prominence as they were from August frequently filmed launched&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su34-massive-strikes-ukrainian-kursk">intensive bombardment&nbsp;</a>of Ukrainian and allied Western forces in the Russian Kursk region. Their particularly high weapons carrying capacities allow them to deploy new FAB-3000&nbsp;3000 kilogram glide bombs, as well as multiple combinations of lighter ordinance including&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-su34s-thermobaric-ukrainian-vacuum">bombs with thermobaric warheads</a>.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/02/article_6776a5d42f5da6_91738618.jpeg" title="Russian Navy Su-30SM2 Fighter">Su-30SM2 Multirole Fighter: One BatchOne batch of Su-30SM2 fighters was delivered to the Russian Air Force on <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su30sm2-new-engines-deliver" >August 10, 2024</a>. The Su-30SM has been procured as a less specialised and much lower cost counterpart to the Su-35 that benefits from a similarly long range, powerful radar, and high weapons carrying capacity. Produced at the Irkutsk Aircraft Plant, the large majority of production of Su-30s has been funded by export demand, with the closely related Su-30MKI having seen over 270 ordered by India alone, while the Su-30MKA variant has seen over 70 ordered by Algeria. The Su-30SM/SM2 has played an important role in the Russian-Ukrainian War, although it lacks the advanced electronic warfare capabilities of the Su-34 or Su-35, the high weapons carrying capacity of the former, or the triple radars of the latter. The Su-30SM2 variant which first <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ruaf-first-su30sm2-su35-engine" >entered service in 2022</a> improved on the SM variant with the integration of the Su-35’s AL-41F1S engines, which significantly improve its flight performance and range while also providing significantly lower maintenance needs and a longer service life. The Su-30SM saw a new order <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/kazakhstan-rejecting-rafale-chose-su30s" target="_blank">placed by Kazakhstan</a> in 2023, while Belarus is still awaiting delivery of eight fighters scheduled to arrive in 2025. These may be some of the last foreign orders for the class as foreign clients are increasingly drawn to the more capable Su-57. The Irkutsk Aircraft Plant is expected to be occupied with the modernisation of close to 100 Su-30SM fighters to the Su-30SM2 standard, although the facility’s future beyond this remains uncertain.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]
— Ten Most Significant Military Events of 2024: From the Fall of Damascus to China’s New Stealth Fighter Programs: at 12/31/24 6:28pm
Syria Defeated After 13 Year War Effort&nbsp;On December 8, 2024 the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/interview-syria-defeat-russia-israel-security">Syrian state was toppled </a>by Islamist insurgent groups, which removed the ruling Ba’ath party from power after over 61 years of rule. Syria had been in conflict with insurgents since early 2011, with the multi-national coalition of Islamist groups from across the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Central Asia receiving significant support from Turkey, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2019-02-03/ty-article-opinion/.premium/israel-just-admitted-arming-anti-assad-syrian-rebels-big-mistake/0000017f-dbb0-db5a-a57f-dbfa71380000" target="_blank">Israel</a> and countries across the Western world for their protracted 13 year war effort. The widely unanticipated fall of the Syrian state removed a major <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/usaf-syrian-air-defences-threat-air-dominance-insurgency-destroyed">thorn in the side</a> of NATO and Israeli interests, with the country’s defeat having been an objective since the early years of the Cold War when it had benefitted from <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/fighting-america-through-syria-how-the-soviet-union-armed-its-middle-eastern-ally-to-undermine-the-u-s-position-in-lebanon" target="_blank">significant Soviet protection</a>. The Syrian state’s fall has further shifted the balance of power in the Middle East in the favour of Western Bloc, Turkish and Israeli interests, removing the last Arab state in the region other than Yemen that was outside the Western sphere of influence. The geopolitical repercussions of Syria’s fall are potentially tremendous, ranging from the use of the country’s territory as a staging ground for <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/13/uyghur-fighters-in-syria-vow-to-come-for-china-next/" target="_blank">jihadist operations against China </a>and Central Asian states, to the isolation of the paramilitary group Hezbollah in neighbouring Lebanon, and the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/syria-falls-nato-influence-arsenals-ukraine">expected transfer </a>of the country’s vast Soviet-supplied arsenals to Ukraine. The Turkish and Israeli military presences on Syrian territory have expand tremendously since the government’s fall, fuelling significant speculation that Ankara and Tel Aviv will annex large parts of the country into their own territories.&nbsp;The country’s large air defence network and ballistic missile arsenal were dismantled by Israeli forces shortly after the government’s fall.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/01/article_6774f06edeefa5_31042396.PNG" title="Destroyed Ukrainian Army Leopard 2A6 Tank Near Kursk Border ">Ukraine and Allies Initiate Major Assault on Russia’s Kursk Region&nbsp;On August 6 the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a large scale assault on Russia’s Kursk region, in parallel to an attempted by <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-twin-assaults-kursk-belogrod">failed second assault </a>by other units on Russia’s Belgorod Region across the Kolotilovka–Pokrovka border crossing. The operation was quickly assessed to represent a likely turning point in the war in Russia’s favour, as with Ukrainian forces operating across very long supply lines, and surrounded from multiple sides by Russian forces with only minimal air defence, attrition rates quickly became extreme. By early October the Ukrainian Armed Forces and accompanying foreign forces were estimated to have <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-20650-personnel-kursk">lost over 20,650 personnel </a>in Kursk, with many of the country’s most elite units committed to the offensive, as well as much of its most capable hardware such as&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-lancet-t80-kursk">T-80</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/leopard2a6-destroyed-footage-kursk">Leopard 2A6 </a>tanks. The deployment of significant numbers of German tanks to spearhead the assault has drawn parallels to the prior German-led European assault on the Soviet Kursk region during the Second World War, leading the offensive to be informally dubbed a ‘Second Battle of Kursk.’ Multiple sources have confirmed that forces from multiple NATO member states including the Untied States have <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/contractors-kursk-polish-french-details">played a significant role </a>on the ground in the Kursk offensives.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/01/article_6774f041debd91_41424050.png" title="Chinese Sixth Generation Fighter Prototype">China Unveils World’s First Sixth Generation Fighters - U.S. Reconsiders Financing Development Costs to CompeteOn December 26 the first images of sixth generation fighter aircraft were <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-unveiled-stealthiest-fighter-sixth-generation">released</a> from China, showing two unnamed models that are expected to succeed the country’s J-20 as to form the new elite of its fighter fleet. The new fighters notably had tailless configurations, which were never seen before and are a key requirement for sixth generation fighters. The larger of the two aircraft also used a previously unheard of triple engine configuration. The unveiling of the aircraft came at a time when the United States is increasingly hesitating on whether to move ahead with development of a high performance sixth generation fighter under the NGAD program, or whether to pursue a less ambitious lighter and shorter ranged fighter due to difficulties in affording a larger one. It also follows major recent successes in China’s combat aviation industry, including large scale production of the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-phase-single-crystal-blade-ws15" target="_blank">WS-15 next generation fighter</a> engine for new generations of J-20s, and other notable programs including the&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-fc31-trials-deck">FC-31 fighter&nbsp;</a>and&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-unmanned-bomber-15hour">CH-7 unmanned bomber</a>. The consensus has grown that China is set to move from the United States’ sole peer level competitor in fifth generation aviation, to the clear world leader in the sixth generation.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/01/article_6774f013de1a95_87079930.png" title="General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah and Aftermath of Explosion">High Intensity Conflict Between Hezbollah and Israel - General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah KilledFrom October 2023 Hezbollah and Israel engaged in a near continuous series of&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/israel-lebanon-second-gaza-f15s-booms">skirmishes</a>, in which the Lebanese paramilitary group demonstrated sophisticated military capabilities on multiple occasions including the ability to use a range of drone and&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hezbollah-artillery-air-defence-escalation">artillery assets&nbsp;</a>for&nbsp;complex air defence suppression operations. This included&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hezbollah-drone-iron-dome-kamikaze">neutralising</a>&nbsp;Israel’s&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hezbollah-artillery-air-defence-escalation">Iron Dome</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hezbollah-davidssling-strike-new-stage">David’s Sling</a>&nbsp;air defence systems. In September 2024 Israel escalated hostilities by launching an invasion of Lebanon and large scale air strikes against Hezbollah, one of which <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hezbollah-killed-strike-underground">killed its longstanding leader </a>Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah&nbsp;on the evening of September 23. Nasrallah had been one of the top adversaries of Israel, Turkey and the Western Bloc for decades, and had overseen Hezbollah’s campaign to deal Israel its first ever military defeat in 2006, which made him a high priority target for assassination. The attack was second only to the fall of Damascus in its importance in furthering Israeli, Turkish and Western Bloc collective interests in the region. The effective decentralisation of command within Hezbollah nevertheless frustrated Israeli efforts to significantly weaken the group, with its military successes having been considerable. One notable success was the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hezbollah-drone-strike-casualties-haifa">inflicting</a> of over 70 Israel Defence Forces casualties at a military training camp in Binyamina, south of the port city of Haifa, in mid-October.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/01/article_6774effd60a5b9_81650579.png" title="Launch of British Storm Shadow Cruise Missile By Ukrainian Su-24 Fighter">Ukraine and NATO Initiate Deep Strikes Into RussiaAfter months-long efforts by multiple European states to<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/france-uk-lobbying-deep-missile-strikes"> lobby strongly&nbsp;</a>for unrestricted missile attacks very deep into Russia, with London and Paris being among the most active in this regard, attacks on internationally recognised Russian territory began to be launched from November 20. These missile attacks represented a major escalation, and were guided by&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/all-nato-satellite-network-backs-ukraine">vast networks of Western satellites&nbsp;</a>and supported by&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/cia-stealth-network-ukraine-proxy-war-russia">major deployments</a>&nbsp;of Western Bloc advisors and other specialists on the ground. The missile strikes reportedly achieved some significant successes against Russian forces in the Kursk region, including <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/atacms-strike-s400-launchers-kursk">destroying</a> components of an S-400 air defence system in late November. Russia responded by unveiling and making its first ever combat use of a new class of intermediate range ballistic missile on November 21, which Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Andrey Kelin&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-ambassador-oreshnik-rein-in-british" target="_blank">claimed</a> forced the United Kingdom in particular to take a more cautious approach towards launching deep strikes against Russian targets. While deep strikes into Russia using Western missiles launched from Ukraine would have been unthinkable in the Cold War era, it raises the risk of further escalation including Russian retaliatory strikes against targets on the territories of NATO member states.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/01/article_6774efcdf090d3_44784324.png" title="Iranian Ballistic Missiles in Terminal Stage of Flight Towards Israel ">Iran and Israel Launch Direct Missile and Air Strikes on One Another&nbsp;On April 1 an <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/generals-killed-israeli-strike-damascus">Israeli air strike </a>on an Iranian diplomatic building in Damascus killed a brigadier general in the elite Quds Force of the country’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Mohammad Reza Zahedi, marking a major escalation in the longstanding conflict between the two states. Iran responded by launching large scale drone and missile strikes on Israeli targets on April 13, which Israel, the United States, France, Britain and Jordan <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/us-britain-jordan-france-shield-israel-strikes">managed to blunt</a>, although assessments of the actual damage have conflicted sharply. The expenses incurred during the air defence efforts against Iran’s relatively low cost attack, however, were estimated in the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/usnavy-replenish-destroyer-missile-stocks">billions of dollars</a>. Subsequently on July 31 Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau Ismail Haniyeh was <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/israeli-strike-hamas-f35">assassinated</a> in his residence in Tehran by an Israeli air strike, which led Iran to retaliate with large scale attacks on October 1. These <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/strike-completely-destroys-f35-base">struck a facility </a>hosting Israeli F-35 fighters, with some reports indicating that multiple fighters were destroyed in the attack. Israel responded with a relatively small scale attack on Iran on October 26, with Western and Israeli sources claiming that this successfully neutralised many of the Iran’s air defence systems, while Iranian sources reported that the large majority of incoming missiles were intercepted. These escalated hostilities have fuelled speculation that further clashes could be likely in 2025, with the expansion of NATO and Israeli influenced into Syria placing them in a much stronger position to wage war against Iran.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/01/article_6774ef85d3abd1_15828959.png" title="North Korean Koksan 170mm Howitzers Being Transported in Russia">North Korea Intervenes Heavily to Support Russia’s War EffortIn early January the White House reported that Russia was making use of North Korean KN-23B and KN-24 ballistic missile systems and KN-25 rocket artillery systems in the Ukrainian theatre, with the KN-23B at the time <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/move-aside-iskander-kn23b-russia-top" target="_blank">assessed</a> to be the Russian Army’s most potent class of tactical ballistic missile. By the middle of the year it was estimated that North Korea’s escalated arms supplies had furnished Russia with <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-artillery-saved-russia-6million">over 6 million artillery rounds</a>&nbsp;among a range of other assets. From mid-October reports emerged that Korean People’s Army personnel had been&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/skorean-12000-nkorean-support-russia">deployed</a>&nbsp;in considerable strength to Russia for combat operations against Ukraine and its&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-personnel-ukraine-strikes">Western supporters</a>, with first confirmation of&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-koksan-170mm-ukraine">deliveries</a>&nbsp;of Korean 170mm mobile howitzers published in mid-November. North Korea has reportedly also <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/why-nkorean-pilots-deploying-russia">sent pilots for training </a>in Russia, and is expected to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-air-force-modernise-russian-mig29-su27">receive Russian combat aircraft </a>to partially cover the costs of these massive arms transfers, alongside possible technology transfers to support its space and nuclear submarine programs.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/01/article_6774ef6ee525e3_75182739.png" title="Ukrainian Abrams Tank Hit By Precision Guided Artillery Early May">Ukraine’s M1A1 Abrams Tanks Nearly Wiped Out After Long Anticipated Debut: Casualty Rates Remain Immense&nbsp;After Ukraine began to receive M1A1 Abrams tanks from the United States in September 2023, they were&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-footage-shows-ukraine-s-u-s-supplied-abrams-tanks-in-first-combat-images-indicate-possible-combat-loss">first seen</a>&nbsp;deployed on February 23, 2024, with the first loss then&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-destruction-abrams-ukraine">confirmed</a>&nbsp;just three days afterwards. This was followed by a succession of further losses over the next two months, culminating in a temporary&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-army-withdraws-abrams-losses">withdrawal from the frontlines</a>&nbsp;in April. After the tanks were again deployed, they again suffered high rates of losses. Most kills filmed have been achieved&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-army-takes-out-another-ukrainian-abrams-tank-with-guided-artillery-shot">by guided artillery</a>&nbsp;or&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-taking-out-abrams-ukraine">by single use ‘kamikaze’ drones</a>, with one of the kills was confirmed to have been&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-t72b3-abrams-ukraine">achieved by a Russian T-72B3</a>&nbsp;tank after the two exchanged fire near Avdiivka. The Abrams’ effectiveness has<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/u-s-concludes-abrams-tanks-not-useful-for-ukraine-following-heavy-losses">&nbsp;increasingly been questioned</a>&nbsp;by figures including U.S. Undersecretary for Defence for Policy Colin Kahl and U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan. Ukrainian personnel have highlighted their&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/dissatisfied-abrams-losses-technical-issues">dissatisfaction</a>&nbsp;with the Abrams’ performance, citing both technical issues such as vulnerability of electronic components to condensation, as well as their vulnerability to Russian fire. With the Abrams having seen relatively little high intensity combat in its history, but having been widely hyped by Western and Ukrainian sources as a game changer for the war effort, the rapid attrition rates which Ukraine’s small fleet faced, much as was the case for its Leopard 2 and other Western tanks, did much to undermine the reputation of the tank class. &nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/01/article_6774ef41c41369_77441022.jpeg" title="Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition Forces on Parade" >Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition Continue Major Clashes with Israeli, U.S.&nbsp; and British ForcesThe Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition has maintained a high intensity of operations against the United States, Israel, and several of their European allies including the United Kingdom and Turkey. The Yemeni group demonstrated a long reach by launching successful strikes on Israel, with a notable example being its&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/yemen-strike-israeli-defences-fail">attack</a>&nbsp;on September 15 which was reported to have struck a power station in the country. Ansurullah Coalition forces reported that the strike involved “a new hypersonic ballistic missile,” which was able to hit its target. “The enemy’s defence systems failed to intercept and confront [the missile]. It crossed a distance of 2,040km in eleven and a half minutes, and caused a state of fear and panic” in Israel, the statement added.&nbsp;On July 19, Ansurullah Coalition&nbsp;forces carried out a&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/yemeni-forces-drone-strike-tel-aviv-navy">successful drone strike</a>&nbsp;in central Tel Aviv, targeting an area near the American consulate and causing several casualties. In response, Israel conducted an&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/israeli-f15-fighters-strike-yemeni">air strike</a>&nbsp;on an oil depot in the city of Al Hudaydah, located in western Yemen. In addition to drone and ballistic missile attacks, the Ansarullah Coalition has previously launched&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/israeli-f35-missile-defence-yemeni">cruise missile strikes</a>&nbsp;against Israeli targets.In November Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante gave voice to a growing consensus that the Ansurullah Coalition’s military capabilities far exceeded previous estimates, which allowed it to sustain a conflict and continue to take to the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/yemeni-ansurullah-amazing-arsenal-shocked">offensive</a>. Ansurullah’s arsenal includes missiles which “can do things that are just amazing," according to LaPlante. "Im an engineer and a physicist, and Ive been around missiles my whole career. What Ive seen of what the Houthis [Ansurullah] have done in the last six months is something that — Im just shocked,” he stated. Alongside Israel and the United Kingdom, the United States has maintained a high tempo of operations against the Ansurullah Coalition, including using its most heavily armed aircraft the B-2 stealth bomber in mid-October to<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/dangerous-bomb-first-combat-gbu57" target="_blank"> strike fortified weapons sites</a>, although American assessments have continued to express frustration regarding the lack of a noticeable impact on the Yemeni group’s combat capabilities.&nbsp;The&nbsp;Ansurullah Coalition has gained notable successes in its air campaign, including shooting down over a dozen American MQ-9 Reaper drones and claiming to have shot down a U.S. Navy F-18F Super Hornet fighter in December - the loss of which the Navy <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/yemen-ansurullah-shoot-down-f18f-conflicting-claims" target="_blank">attributed to friendly fire</a>.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/01/01/article_6774ef1b8b5a78_83397913.png" title="Georgian Legion (left) and Forward Observations Group Western Fighters in Ukraine" >European States Come Close to Major Intervention in UkraineAmid mounting Ukrainian and allied losses, European leaders have made increasingly vocal calls&nbsp;for major ground force deployments to support Kiev’s war effort. Although Western ground forces, volunteer units and contractors have <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/strike-ukraine-french-contractors-africa" target="_blank">played central roles</a> in the conflict on the ground, escalation to a full scale ground intervention by large NATO armies has the potential to provoke a larger scale conflict between Russia and the Western Bloc. French President Emmanuel Macron&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/macron-expanded-nato-ukraine">stated</a>&nbsp;repeatedly in 2024 that a large scale intervention was not ruled out as part of a policy to “do everything necessary to prevent Russia from winning this war.” Calls for such options to be considered&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/european-states-ground-ukraine-momentum">have been raised</a>&nbsp;by figures such as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, and the Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen.&nbsp;In mid-November the French paper&nbsp;Le Monde&nbsp;reported that France and the United Kingdom had “reactivated” discussions on troop deployments to Ukraine. The United States, however, has remained less committed than many of its more hawkish European allies to escalating the conflict with ground force deployments. In November the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-intel-western-plans-troop-deployments-ukraine" >disclosed</a> information on plans by NATO member states to initiate a major ground force deployment to temporarily end ongoing hostilities, with the goal of eventually turning the tide of the conflict.&nbsp;Analysts have consistently pointed out that the primary factor holding many of the more hawkish European states back has been not an issue of political will, but rather one of limited capabilities, since not only have European states largely exhausted their reserves of ground equipment, by the sizes and readiness levels of their ground forces are also limited. &nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Ground, Battlefield]
— Legacies of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency: Building Jihadist Armies and Introducing the World to Stealth Planes: at 12/31/24 3:34am
On December 29 former U.S. president Jimmy Carter passed away at 100 years old, almost 44 years after ending his term in office in January 1981. After graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1946, Carter was in active duty in the Navy from 1946 to 1953, before serving in the reserves from 1953 to 1961. One of Carter’s most lasting legacies as president was the beginning of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, with his administration having overseen the arming and training of Islamist insurgents against the Soviet-aligned government in the country from 1978, paving the way for the rise of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, while also provoking Moscow into launching a costly military campaign to support the Afghan government against the jihadist threat. The pioneering of the strategy of destabilising Moscow’s strategic partners through support for Islamist groups would become a staple of Western Bloc policy across subsequent decades, including in Yugoslavia in the 1990s and in <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/interview-syria-defeat-russia-israel-security" target="_blank">Syria in the 2010s and 2020s</a>, in both cases highly successfully. Carter’s administration also marked the beginning of hostile relations between the United States and Iran, following the overthrow of the Iranian Pahlavi Dynasty in 1979 and the formation of an Islamic Republic, with the White House forming a close strategic partnership with the new Iraqi government of President Saddam Hussein that went on to invade Iran in 1980.&nbsp;Relations between Washington and Tehran have remained poor ever since, with the year 2024 seeing by far the largest series of <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/f15e-strike-eagles-drone-israel-dangerous" target="_blank" >armed clashes</a> between U.S. and Iranian <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/usnavy-replenish-destroyer-missile-stocks" target="_blank" >missile</a>&nbsp;and air assets in history.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2024/12/31/article_6774019b149e03_80493708.png" title="U.S. Air Force B-1B (top) and B-2 Strategic Bombers">A less well known legacy of the Carter administration was that it was the first to reveal to the world the development of stealth bombers for the United States Air Force. On August 22, 1980 the existence of stealth technology was announced by Secretary of Defence Harold Brown, who stated: “It is not too soon to say that by making existing air defence systems essentially ineffective, this alters the military balance significantly.” The decision to announce the development of the new technology was considered a response to criticisms of the administration’s decision in its first year in office to cancel the development of the B-1 supersonic bomber, which was cited by political opponents to argue that President Carter was compromising America’s defences. The modernisation of Soviet air defences, however, had left aircraft such as the B-1 designed to penetrate Warsaw Pact airspace effectively obsolete, with Carter’s administration instead allocating funding to develop the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/how-america-planned-to-use-the-world-s-first-stealth-jets-for-nuclear-attacks-against-the-soviet-union" target="_blank">F-117 strike fighter </a>and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/why-america-developed-this-massive-2-billion-stealth-bomber-b-2-spirit-built-for-nuclear-strikes-on-moscow" target="_blank">B-2 strategic bomber</a>. These programs both of which pioneered advanced stealth capabilities that made the aircraft much more survivable.&nbsp;Although Carter may be most remembered for his administration’s actions in Afghanistan, where new and highly unconventional offensive methods were pioneered, the fact that stealth capabilities are today synonymous with cutting edge manned combat jets makes his administration significant for moving the technologies through their first flight testing stages and into serial production stages under the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/serbia-s-long-rumoured-second-hit-on-american-stealth-fighter-now-confirmed-and-why-it-matters" target="_blank" >F-117 program</a> in particular.&nbsp;
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: North America, Western Europe and Oceania, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft, Foreign Relations]
— Algeria to Locally License Produce Chinese Type 056 Corvettes - Reports: at 12/30/24 4:31pm
The Algerian Defence Ministry has reportedly placed an order for six Chinese Type 056 Class corvettes, and after confirmation of the Navy’s satisfaction with the first ship of the class built in China, the El Moutassadi, it reportedly plans to produce all these ships under license domestically. The ship delivered to Algeria in 2023 was produced by China’s Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding Group, the world’s leading shipbuilder for surface combat ships, and today represents one of the most advanced warships fielded in Africa or the Arab World. The&nbsp;1,500 ton&nbsp;corvettes each deploy 12 vertical launch cells, including four which accommodate YJ-83 anti ship cruise missile, and eight accommodating HHQ-10 short range surface-to-air missiles. This arsenal is supplemented two triple torpedo tubes for 324mm torpedoes. The Type 056 Class will be relied on to serve as a lighter counterpart to the Russian Project 20380 Steregushchiy Class corvettes, which displace 2,200 tons and deploy significantly longer ranged missiles including Kalibr and Zircon long range cruise missiles.&nbsp;The Algerian Navy has also procured larger 3000 ton Adhafer Class corvettes from China since 2015.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2024/12/31/article_67734a73306bb3_99147776.jpg" title="Algerian Navy Adhafer Class Corvette">China has rapidly gained a growing share of Algeria’s arms market, with notable procurements including YJ-12B and CX-1 anti ship cruise missiles, CH-4 and WJ-700 drones, WM-80 rocket artillery systems, PLZ-45 self-propelled howitzers,&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/chinese-missile-russia-needs-hj12">HJ-12 anti tank missile systems</a>, CHL-906 electronic warfare systems, and according to some sources even&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/hq9b-multi-layered-air-defence-unveiled">HQ-9B long range air defence systems</a>. The country was reported in August to be seriously <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/replacing-t90-vt4-trials-algeria">considering procurement </a>of VT-4 main battle tanks, which would replace its small number of T-55 and T-62 tanks and provide the country with its first tanks with active protection systems among other cutting edge features. Artwork in the Algerian Defence Ministry <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/algeria-adds-su-57-fighter-artwork-to-defence-ministry-building-near-term-acquisition-of-next-generation-russian-jet-likely" target="_blank">unveiled in 2020</a> gave an indication that alongside Su-57 fighters, procurement of <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-offering-cutting-edge-type-052d-destroyers-for-export-are-algeria-and-russia-its-most-likely-clients" target="_blank">Type 052D Class destroyers</a> was also under consideration for the Algerian Navy, which would provide a tremendous leap in maritime power projection capabilities. As part of a broader strengthening of strategic ties with China, Algeria on May 22 was confirmed to have&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/africa-join-china-led-alliance">applied</a>&nbsp;to become a dialogue partner of the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation military bloc, and on September 1 was announced to have joined the Chinese-led BRICS New Development Bank.&nbsp;The country has&nbsp;redoubled investments in its military capabilities since&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ten-years-since-the-wests-war-against-libya-how-it-served-as-a-warning-regarding-us-and-european-intentions" >NATO’s assault</a>&nbsp;on neighbouring Libya in 2011, and&nbsp;has continued to perceive a&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/us-training-fight-algeria-drills-attack-s400" >significant threat</a> from Western military activities in its region. The <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/interview-syria-defeat-russia-israel-security" target="_blank">takeover of the Syrian capital </a>Damascus by Turkish, Western and Israeli backed jihadist militants on December 8 has sparked considerable concern that as the last large Arab republic outside the Western sphere of influence, efforts to destabilise and overthrow the Algerian state may well be redoubled.
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Africa and South America, Naval]
— China’s Newly Unveiled KJ-3000 ‘Flying Radar’ Could Significantly Bolster Counter-Stealth Capabilities: at 12/30/24 5:41am
Closely coinciding with the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-unveiled-stealthiest-fighter-sixth-generation" target="_blank">unofficial unveiling </a>of China’s two sixth generation fighters on December 26, the release of the images of a new heavyweight airborne early warning and control (AEW&amp;C) system has provided insight into the future of the country’s airborne command and control and elevated sensor capabilities. Airborne radar early warning and control systems carry radars several times the size of those that can be accommodated by even the largest fighter aircraft, and can serve as command posts to perform battle management. They are considered important force multipliers for combat aviation, and help fighters and other assets to detect, track and prioritise their targets and coordinate actions against them. Modern AEW&amp;Cs can also share targeting data using data links, and can even guide missiles launched by other assets such as fighters or air defence systems to their targets. The value of their powerful elevated sensors is considered particularly high in conflicts that are likely to include large numbers of fifth and sixth generation stealth aircraft, as their large radars networked with those of fighters, and possibly ground and ship based radars, are expected to be able to significantly increase the distances at which stealth aircraft can be tracked and targeted.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2024/12/30/article_6772cea4766dc5_82618954.jpg" title="Chinese Y-20 Transport ">The new KJ-3000 is notable for being based on the domestically developed Y-20B transport aircraft powered by WS-20 engines, which is currently the largest transport plane in production anywhere in the world. Previously the Shaanxi <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/kj500-flying-radar-america-hates">KJ-500 formed the backbone</a> of the Chinese AEW&amp;C fleet, and upon entering service in 2015 introduced important advancements over prior Chinese AEW&amp;Cs including improvements in AESA radar and data link technologies, and an ability to track 100 targets simultaneously. The aircraft was based on the indigenous Shaanxi Y-9 four engined turboprop transport,&nbsp;however, which as a much lighter aircraft than the Y-20 with a more limited flight performance and endurance. While the KJ-500 is expected to remain in production for the foreseeable future, with the enhanced KJ-500A variant having been unveiled at&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-more-heavyweights-nato-russia">Airshow China 2022</a> featuring significant improvements to avionics, the KJ-3000 is expected to serve as a heavier counterpart capable of carrying much larger sensors as part of a unique high-low combination of systems. It is notable that no other air force in the world fields such a combination. A third AEW&amp;C system, the KJ-600, is also reported to have recently entered service and be currently in production for China’s navy.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2024/12/30/article_6772cd962ce5e6_75346787.jpeg" title="Chinese KJ-500A AEW&amp;C">The Y-20 has played an increasingly central role in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and was previously developed into an airborne tanker, the YY-20, which&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/y20u-begin-combat-readiness-training">began combat readiness training</a>&nbsp;in August 2022. Much as the YY-20 is gradually revolutionising China’s previously relatively limited aerial refuelling capabilities, the KJ-3000 is expected to totally transform its heavyweight AEW&amp;C fleet. The value of modern AEW&amp;Cs has recently been <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-growing-use-a50u-hunt-ukr">demonstrated</a> in the Russian-Ukrainian War, in which Russia has used its limited fleet of A-50U aircraft to guide its longest ranged anti aircraft missiles such as the 40N6 and R-37M to <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-combat-tests-s400-400km-pairing-a50">engage targets at extreme ranges</a> of 300-400km. The value attributed to AEW&amp;Cs is expected to continue to grow as more complex aerial warfare assets, including autonomous and semi-autonomous unmanned aircraft, play growing roles in future fleets. Despite significant investment in the field, China’s reliance on AEW&amp;C is markedly lower than Western air forces, as its fighter aircraft carry far larger radars on average than their Western counterparts. The J-20 and J-16 that form the backbone of the country’s fleet carry radars far larger than those of any Western fighter, several times as large as those of the F-16 that form the backbone of the American fleet, and well over twice as large as that of the F-35.&nbsp;China is also the only country to have developed twin seat stealth fighters, allowing a second officer to perform battle management roles in ways that are impossible for an F-35 or F-22.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2024/12/30/article_6772cee114e063_41673419.jpg" title="Boeing E-7 AEW&amp;C">China’s advanced AEW&amp;C capabilities are considered a leading factor stimulating the United States to invest in 2022 in acquisitions of the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail, although the aircraft is significantly smaller and carries a much lighter sensor suite than the KJ-3000. The Cold War era E-3 Sentry the U.S. Air Force currently relies on is considered long past obsolescence. The sophistication of the Chinese AEW&amp;C fleet was <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/first-ever-non-friendly-stealth-fighter-encounter-confirmed-china-s-j-20-and-america-s-f-35-just-met-over-the-south-china-sea" target="_blank">singled out in 2022</a> by head of the United States Pacific Air Forces Kenneth Wilsbach for the important role it played in supporting operations by <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/chinese-ancient-qi-gong-train-elite-j20-pilots" target="_blank">J-20 fifth generation fighters</a>. “We’re relatively impressed with the command and control associated with the J-20… aircraft in the region… were pretty well commanded and controlled by the Chinese assets,” he stated. “The KJ-500… plays a significant role in some of their capability for long range fires. Some of their very long range air to air missiles are aided by that KJ-500. Being able to interrupt that kill chain is something that interests me greatly.”
[Author: editorial@militarywatchmagazine.com (Military Watch Editorial Staff)] [Category: Asia-Pacific, Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft]

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