Date: Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 12:39 PM
Subject: CounterPunch: The Determination of the Arab Revolutions by Esam Al-Amin (6/3/2011)
To: alamin1919@gmail.com

COUNTERPUNCH

Weekend Edition
June 3 / 5, 2011

Autumn of the Autocrats?

The Determination of the Arab Revolutions

By ESAM AL-AMIN

After the relatively swift triumphs of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions in deposing their dictators earlier this year, other Arab dictators drew a different set of lessons than their populations did.

Fed up with decades of repression, corruption, and the break down of state institutions, as well as the complete loss of faith in any meaningful political or social reforms in their societies, people across the Arab world this spring have waged simultaneous mass movements to force sweeping changes.

Arab autocrats, sustained for decades by the powerful security state, were shocked and startled as they observed in horror the dismantling of the security apparatuses in Tunisia and Egypt, facing fearless populace willing to sacrifice their lives to liberate themselves from the yoke of tyranny and regain their freedoms and dignity.

To their credit, in both the Tunisian and Egyptian models, the armies refused to shoot at their people after the failure of the security forces to clamp down. The popular uprisings spread across each country with incredible determination and zeal as the fear barrier of the ruthless regimes completely broke down.

Shortly after the fall of the Egyptian dictator, people across the Arab world took to the streets in peaceful uprisings against their long time repressive rulers. The concurrent massive demonstrations were especially widespread in Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, against the decades-old repressive regimes of Muammar Gaddhafi in Libya (41 years), Ali Saleh in Yemen (33 years), the Assad family in Syria (Bashar and his father before him- 40 years), and the minority Al-Khalifah dynasty in Bahrain (230 years.)

The primary lesson learned by the Arab masses watching the revolutions unfold in Tunisia and Egypt was that the people’s collective power and determination can ultimately triumph in the face of isolated regimes that have been ruling them with an iron fist.

However, the authoritarian regimes drew different lessons from the Tunisian and Egyptian experience. They did not see the power and determination of the people but the weakness of the regimes and fragility and indecisiveness of its leaders.

In each case, though engulfed in its own particular circumstances and distinct features, the overall framework of how each regime dealt with its own popular uprising is strikingly similar.

As in the Tunisian and Egyptian models the first response of each regime was to rely on the security forces to put a quick end to the uprisings before they spread. When such attempts fail within the first few days, the next step is to try to contain the demonstrations by embracing the demands of the protesters while asking for a return to calm in order to implement reforms.

The problem with these initial steps is that they are perceived by the people as disingenuous and are almost always too late. Like Tunisia and Egypt before them, in each of the cases in Yemen, Libya, Syria, or Bahrain, the initial brutal response of the security forces had an adverse effect and did not stop the protests. In fact, the increasing casualties in the streets intensified the opposition and the revolts became widespread.

For instance, the initial demonstrations that started in Benghazi in mid-February to protest the arrest of a human rights lawyer quickly spread to western Libya, where they were met with repression. Similarly the protests in Yemen spread the same week from Sanaa to the rest of the country as Saleh’s security forces cracked down on the demonstrators. When the people of the southern city of Dar’aa in Syria protested in mid-March calling for freedom and reforms, the protests quickly spread as the Syrian army shortly thereafter surrounded the city killing dozens and arresting hundreds of protesters.

In the next phase of the confrontation between the people and the authoritarian regimes the dictators would call for dialogue and claim to have embraced the calls for reforms. For example, within days of the fall of the eastern city of Benghazi to the opposition, Qaddafi’s son, Saiful Islam, promised that if the protests ended then all demands were on the table. But then he asserted that no reforms or dialogue would be initiated unless the protests ended. President Saleh in Yemen made similar overtures to his people promising to form a national unity government and initiate political reforms if the protests ended.

In Syria the regime announced several steps for political reforms and the end of the state of emergency, which had been in place for almost a half century. The Syrian people held hope that their president would announce, and immediately take steps for far-reaching constitutional and political reforms.

But when the Syrian president addressed the parliament at the end of March it became clear that the reforms embraced by the regime were superficial and vague while requiring a significant amount of time to implement, a ploy that seemed designed to contain the popular uprising. Moreover, the party officials entrusted to propose and implement these reforms were themselves people known to defend the status quo that has favored them for decades.

As in Egypt, when the trick of calling for dialogue and the embrace of a reform agenda fails to attract the people and the opposition groups – mostly marginalized for decades- the regimes would then mobilize their supporters to mount counter-demonstrations.

However, many of the supporters of these regimes act like goons, bullies, and criminals, as they beat up and abuse the opposition. Such elements supporting the regimes include thousands of security officers or party loyalists roaming the streets in civilian clothes. They were called baltagies in Egypt, balatega in Yemen and Shabbiha in Syria. Their main role is to brutalize the people and punish them for their protests in a desperate attempt to halt them. But often times, the end result is the opposite as the people link these thugs to the regimes and become even more enraged.

As the casualties mount and international condemnations of the regimes become widespread, the dictators employ a new tactic by charging that there are armed “Islamic terrorist” groups tied to Al-Qaeda who are killing the protesters and wreaking havoc upon society.

Ultimately, the main strategy of each regime is to regain the initiative from the streets so they continue to use these different tactics in order to split the opposition or wear down the people. Endless promises, delay tactics, and old style propaganda techniques and maneuvers are utilized. President Saleh employed his infamous delaying schemes to wear down the opposition, thus promising to step down five different times as a result of the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, only to renege each time. Eventually, the GCC itself completely abandoned its own initiative. The Syrian president officially lifted the state of emergency. Yet since then, over 1200 people have lost their lives and over 12,000 have been detained without trial. Electricity as well as water and phone lines were cut off from some cities that were under siege by the military for many days.

Watching Hosni Mubarak, his sons, and other high-ranking officials in Egypt dragged to prison and tried for political and financial corruption solidified in the minds of these regimes the fate that awaits them. In essence, the dictators and their cronies are fighting, not just to stay in power, but also to literally escape punishment for their crimes. But perhaps the most brutal and effective tactic to derail any peaceful revolution is to drag the country into civil war.

Regional players such as Israel and the Saudi ruling family, as well as other international players are very nervous about the popular discontent and the changes sweeping the region. The status quo has benefited these regimes and the international order for a long time.

People in the Arab world are instead determined to rely on themselves with an uncompromising will to continue their just struggle for freedom and dignity echoing the voice of another young leader in the Latin American jungles many decades ago, as Che Guevara reminded his comrades “Until victory always” but “better to die standing, than to live on your knees.”

Esam Al-Amin can be reached at alamin1919@gmail.com

* Opposition may have lost best chance at winning reforms

* Sunni leaders say opposition was waiting for Iran guidance

* Emergency law to be lifted on June 1

By Andrew Hammond

MANAMA, May 31 (Reuters) – As martial law comes to an end in the Gulf Arab state of Bahrain this week, opposition activists are wondering whether they threw away what might have been the first real chance for democracy in the Gulf Arab region.

Shortly after young Bahrainis, inspired by uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, converged on a roundabout in early February, the government offered dialogue with opposition parties on political reforms. But the talks failed to get off the ground.

After weeks of behind-the-scenes discussions during which sectarian tension worsened between the Shi'ite majority and Sunnis who saw the ruling Al-Khalifa family as protection, Saudi troops poured in on March 15, martial law was declared the next day and the roundabout encampment was broken up on March 16.

Critics say the leading opposition party Wefaq, headed by Sheikh Ali Salman, failed to show leadership during the unrest, allowing hardliners within the ruling family and among the Shi'ite opposition to steer events.

"What a massively missed opportunity. Wefaq should have had the conviction to stand ahead of the others and sit at the table. I'm sure they rue it," one Western diplomat said.

When talks eventually resume, he said, "the ceiling will be lower" and reforms could have been set back by a decade.

King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa authorised talks on democracy in 2001, but the opposition boycotted elections in 2002 because the upper house of parliament — royal appointees — was to retain key powers.

Seven opposition parties including Wefaq took part in 2006 elections, but hardliners broke away to form the Haq movement.

Haq's exiled leader returned during the protests on Feb. 26 and announced with other groups on March 8 that he wanted to turn the small island kingdom into a republic. That was anathema to Saudi Arabia which financially backs Bahrain to help stave off Iranian influence.

On Tuesday King Hamad called for reform talks "without preconditions" from July 1. But the parameters were vague, and with opposition leaders in jail, protesters off the streets and Wefaq attacked daily in state media, the government will have the upper hand to steer them away from parliamentary reforms.

FEAR OF LOSING THE STREET

Munira Fakhro of secular opposition group Waad says Wefaq was paralysed by fear of losing the street — Shi'ite protesters radicalised by the deaths of their comrades when security forces made a botched attempt to clear the roundabout on Feb. 17.

"My analysis is that after all this anger and death among Shi'ites the street was tilted towards Mushaimaa. Ali Salman was afraid that if he accepted the crown prince's proposal without assurances he would be cheated at the end of the day," she said, referring to opposition anger over the upper assembly in 2002. "I told them, 'the crown prince wants to reach out to you but he's alone because no one is supporting him from his family, you must support him'."

Mushaimaa and the republic supporters are now among 21 men on military trial. The defendants also include Waad's Sunni leader Ibrahim Sharif and some independent Shi'ite rights activists prominent during the protests.

Salman, a young cleric born in 1965, says he didn't agree with the escalation in protests or the open call for a republic, but acknowledges that they complicated the position of Wefaq and the rest of the opposition.

"There is a view that we were late to respond to the call for dialogue, but we had our reasons," he said at Wefaq offices overlooking the waters of the Gulf.

"We did not go to public talks, but we talked behind closed doors. I met the crown prince three times alone during the crisis and my working team was meeting his working team almost daily. But there were no results until March 13."

That day the crown prince said again he was interested in dialogue, but specified this time that it would centre on seven principles, including representative government and a parliament with full powers.

On March 14, Wefaq and six other opposition groups said they wanted clarifications before entering direct talks with the crown prince.

IMPASSE

The government and Sunni leaders have another theory for why the opposition appeared to drag their feet over negotiations: Wefaq was waiting for approval from Iran.

"We think so. How else would you explain them not coming to the negotiating table?" said Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Senior International Counselor at the Information Affairs Authority.

"We need a rational, practical leader who doesn't look for religious blessings before he can embark on a political reform initiative," he said. "We didn't see leadership emerging from their side and they didn't let themselves loose from radical elements or come to the negotiating table."

Sheikh Abdullatif Al-Mahmoud, leader of the mainly Sunni National Unity Rally which emerged as a counter-weight to the Shi'ite opposition during the unrest, goes further.

"In the second week of March their clerics were telling the Shi'ite masses that the Hidden Imam was about to come. That held them up going into talks since they thought the Shi'ite state was coming," he said.

The twelfth Imam of mainstream Shi'ism disappeared in 9th-century Iraq and many believe he will return one day. Mahmoud also suggested the U.S. navy was coordinating with Wefaq and Iran could have been planning a military intervention.

Wefaq leaders roll their eyes at these accusations.

They say they are not interested in Iran's system of clerical rule, and that in any case most Bahraini Shi'ites look to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq as their reference in religious affairs. Bahrain's most senior Shi'ite cleric is Sheikh Issa Qassim.

Mahmoud, Salman and other government and opposition figures spent all of March 13 at Wefaq offices in what proved to be fruitless last-minute talks before a decisive Saudi intervention.

Wefaq wanted a guarantee from the crown prince on elections to a constituent assembly to write a new constitution before entering face-to-face public talks.

Mahmoud wanted the royal family to have guaranteed representation on the assembly and a high bar on the percentage required to approve constitutional amendments to avoid Sunnis being permanently hostage to Shi'ite numerical superiority.

In a sign of the mistrust now prevailing, Mahmoud says that when news came in that Saudi troops were really coming, Salman stood up and announced: "We will seek the help of Iran."

Wefaq says he never said that. (Editing by Reed Stevenson and Jon Hemming)

Dear Friends,

Dear Friends,

Date: Wed, Jun 1, 2011 at 8:39 AM
Subject: Urgent: Several attacks on peaceful protests now
To: Maryam Al-Khawaja <maryam.alkhawaja@gmail.com>

Urgent: attacks on protests right now. Several protests have started today in many parts of Bahrain, all of which have been violently attacked by security forces using teargas, sound bombs and bird shotgun pellets.Due to fear of going to hospitals protesters are treating themselves at home.

Bahrain: Show trial of prominent human rights defender Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja continues before military court against background of torture and intimidation : http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/15241

Poet Ayat AlQurmezi is due to go on trial tomorrow in a military court. More on her case: http://bahrainrights.hopto.org/en/node/3865

Best,

—