- — NYT dam theory ignores history and politics of water in Iran
- On 16 November, the New York Times ran an investigation by Sanam Mahoozi and Erika Solomon that opens with a researcher's hunch. Nima Shokri, who works on water security at the Hamburg University of Technology, had been counting Iranian dams for years, and his team's tally had reached at least 533, some in areas for which there was no apparent need for the water.Last spring, he came across a map of U.S. and Israeli air strikes on suspected missile sites, a semicircle of dots running from north to south, and thought it looked very like his own. While the Times cautiously noted that any connection between the dams and Iran’s missile program "remains speculative," the two reporters interviewed seven water and military experts who, according to their account, “have concluded that the water projects may have been developed to support the country’s military buildup.” Building secret underground complexes near a dam's reservoir and power made sense, according to these sources. Danny Citrinowicz, who spent years as an Iran analyst in Israeli military intelligence, said it would give Tehran "operational continuity."That logic only goes so far. Yes, locating dams and suspected missile or military sites close together makes sense. Yes, a base might make use of a nearby dam. But were these dams built “to support the country’s military buildup,” the question raised by the article? The first two assertions fail to answer that question. In Iran, geography and local politics help explain why dams are built. Both must be considered before attributing their construction to military needs. The report doesn’t even try to do so. Mountains, rivers and qanatsOutside the Caspian strip, most of Iran's rain and snow falls on the Zagros and the Alborz mountain ranges. The Zagros feeds the Karun, the Karkheh and the Dez, Iran’s largest rivers, and dams are built where those rivers emerge from narrow gorges. Missile bases are dug into the same mountains because solid rock offers protection. Dams and underground missile bases may therefore be located in the same mountainous areas for entirely different reasons. But their proximity alone does not establish a military connection. To determine whether the pattern is unusual, their locations must be compared with other places with similar geography.How much of the overlap this accounts for is a question for data rather than for maps. Statistician Omid Solari used publicly available data to examine whether suspected missile sites were unusually close to dams after accounting for geography. His analysis found that the sites appeared closer to dams than randomly selected locations across Iran, according to one measure. But when compared with places that had similar terrain and proximity to rivers and towns, the difference disappeared. His analysis has not been peer-reviewed and uses different, incomplete data, so it cannot establish whether the pattern identified by the Times is explained by geography alone.The need to move water is far older than any dam. Iran gets little rain, and, across most of the country, farmers, unable to count on sufficient rainfall, depend on irrigation. In the summer of 2020, the energy minister said Iran was among the five countries with the largest irrigated area in the world. A 2021 analysis of the Karkheh crisis in the reformist Etemad newspaper pointed to the thousands of miles of qanat channels, and to land abandoned due to drought, as the reason that people in Iran have historically fought over water more than over land. Qanats, of which an estimated 37,000 are still working, tap an aquifer at the head of a valley and carry the water downhill through tunnels to fields and villages, sometimes over many miles. There are more modern irrigation methods, but those are expensive undertakings, and each must be justified on its merits. But the desire to transport water from where its source to where people live is not suspicious in itself.According to data compiled by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), agriculture accounts for about 92% of Iran's freshwater withdrawals. Electricity is a smaller part of the picture than the Times’ military hypothesis implies. Hydropower constitutes something on the order of 14% of Iran's generating capacity but usually accounts for only about 4 to 6% of the power actually produced, rising in years of plentiful rainfall and falling in years of drought. Thus, a dam-constructed reservoir is above all an irrigation and water-supply project. While that does not necessarily establish the purpose of any single dam, it does mean that assuming that Iran's dams serve mainly as power stations starts with their least important purpose.Who asks for a dam?In 1979, Iran had 19 reservoir dams. The energy minister counted 144 in 2020. Most of that growth came after the Iran-Iraq war, when progress toward reconstruction and economic development was measured by large, visible infrastructure projects. The engineering arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Khatam al-Anbiya, became one of the biggest dam contractors. That establishes a real connection between the IRGC and dams, although, based on publicly available information, the link is commercial, not military.A great deal of what initiates and sustains a development project in Iran is local. Parliamentary seats are based on counties; most constituencies elect a single member, and political parties are weak. Much like members of Congress in the United States, Iranian deputies are judged by what they bring home to their constituencies. Provinces compete for shares of the same development budget, and once a dam has been promised, it gains defenders in parliament and officials in the provincial government who keep pressing ministries for money, even when its economic or environmental value is questionable. Take the Dalaki dam in Bushehr as an example. In 2020, Ebrahim Rezaei, who represents Dashtestan, raised its financing with the energy minister in parliament and demanded that the head of Khatam al-Anbiya, the dam's contractor, not halt work on the project for lack of funds. By late 2023, he was listing the dam’s progress among his achievements, along with 65 billion tomans he had secured for it from the oil sector. In October 2024, he said he had sent President Masoud Pezeshkian a letter for assurances of its continued funding. None of this explains why the dam was approved in the first place. It does show how a project gains political support and makes it difficult, once initiated, to cancel.Pressure can also delay a project. Beheshtabad, a plan to carry water from the Karun headwaters to the cities of Isfahan, Yazd and Kerman, was at one point endorsed by the Supreme Water Council but has stalled repeatedly since. Environmental permits and legal complaints are part of that story, and so is the years-long opposition to it by deputies from the provinces from which the water would be diverted. Another example is one of Iran’s driest provinces, Yazd, which has relied for centuries on qanats to transport water from mountains tens of miles away. The first major pipeline from the Zayandeh Rud river was agreed upon in the late 1980s, built during the 1990s and opened in 2000 under President Mohammad Khatami, himself from Yazd. Its planning began years before Iran's first tests of longer-range ballistic missiles. The project followed years of bargaining among provincial officials and the central government over the city's water supply. The Times quotes Amir AghaKouchak, who suggested that a transfer from the Zagros mountains to Yazd “may have been influenced, at least in part, by military considerations.” Unfortunately, however, the report failed to identify precisely which scheme he was referring to, so its planning history and political sponsors cannot be examined.The politics of water infrastructure in Iran is closely tied to the politics of who gets the water. The Karkheh basin offers a clear example. Its rivers flow through six provinces, forming a single water system, but the communities that depend on them are represented by different provincial authorities and members of parliament. The dam is located in Andimeshk, in Khuzestan, while the agricultural areas it serves extend into other constituencies and even neighboring Ilam, where a 50,000-hectare irrigation scheme depends on water transported from the same reservoir.The competing demands became particularly visible during the severe water shortages of July 2021. As protests spread across Khuzestan, water releases from the Karkheh dam increased from about 75 to 160 cubic metres per second. The provincial water authority reported that more than 70% of the reservoir's usable storage had been released. Provincial and parliamentary officials publicly announced the increased flows to downstream areas in Khuzestan. Meanwhile, the irrigation scheme in Ilam received no water allocation from that reservoir that summer. The basin authority later identified excessive releases and the expansion of water-intensive rice cultivation as serious management problems.The episode illustrates a broader problem in Iran's water politics. Although the river is shared, the communities depending on it pursue their interests through separate provincial governments and parliamentary representatives. Decisions affecting the entire basin are therefore shaped by political pressures that arise within individual territories, while the consequences extend beyond their boundaries.These same local demands also influence which dams, canals and water-transfer projects receive political support and public funding. Understanding this competition helps explain the development of Iran's water infrastructure in ways that geography or military considerations alone cannot. Why a dam was planned, how it was paid for, and what it is used for now are all distinct questions. Dates help in answering the first. The Dez dam project, for example, began in 1956 and the dam was completed in 1963. The Karkheh basin was surveyed for irrigation beginning in 1956. A reservoir was proposed in 1980, and the site near Andimeshk was chosen, according to the project history, for its geology. Building began in 1992. Iran first disclosed the existence of an underground missile base on television in 2015. When the bases were actually dug is much harder to pin down. But a dam built decades before the construction of a base is very unlikely to have been conceived as a military or missile base, although it could still have been used or altered for such a purpose later.What would really decide the matter is the paperwork: commissioning documents, budget records, any technical evidence of a dedicated supply line. The best case for the military reading would be a dam that no deputy ever fought for and that irrigates no one’s fields. If such a dam exists, the Times map does not show it.There is a legal reason for caution as well. International humanitarian law gives dams special, conditional protection because of the dangerous forces they contain and the potential devastation that could result if they are attacked. That protection does not automatically disappear because a military site is located nearby. It is possible that military facilities were deliberately placed near existing dams to take advantage of that protection. But even so, this would not establish that the dams themselves were originally built for military purposes.Iran's water policy has caused real environmental damage and allocated a vital resource in unfair ways. But the assertion that these civilian facilities were built for war requires evidence of their original purpose, beyond where they happen to be located. It cannot rest on speculation.
- — A gross misreading of 'Yalta' undergirds lame critique of trilateral
- Representatives of the transatlantic establishment were quick to liken the trilateral summit in Shenzhen to the supposed Anglo-American “betrayal” of Poland and other Eastern European states at Yalta in February 1945. Yalta ratified — but did not create — the division of Europe into spheres of influence that later became frozen into the dividing lines of the Cold War.A less apoplectic strain of the same underlying sentiment holds that President Trump’s willingness to meet his Russian and Chinese counterparts is in itself an unnecessary concession to Russia and China that merely signals weakness and does nothing to advance U.S. interests; as if the avoidance of nuclear war with China were not a vital U.S. interest. The “Yalta 2.0” narrative is not just wrong, though it is that, too, but premised in a gross historical misreading that must be confronted lest it further pollute Western policy discourse. There has been a growing tendency since the Soviet collapse to liken Yalta and the Potsdam conference that succeeded it to a kind of modern-day Treaty of Tordesillas-- an exercise between two great powers of yore, Spain and Portugal, in divvying up distant lands. The reality is different. As it became clear toward 1945 that the second world war was moving toward complete allied victory, the leaders of the three great allied powers —Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin — naturally devoted more of their attention to the delineation and security architecture of postwar Europe. Understandings reached on the postwar status of European countries occupied respectively by the Western allies and the Soviet Union served mostly to ratify existing facts on the ground. It was a concession to reality, not to Stalin, to acknowledge that the Soviet army, by defeating the German army in the East, had already gained control over most of Eastern Europe whether Western leaders recognized this control or not — and, alas, whether the populations of eastern Europe liked it or not.Short of a new war with the USSR — that U.S. and British populations and soldiers would have categorically rejected and that they would probably have lost — FDR and Churchill had no ability to challenge, let alone attempt to reverse, Moscow’s assertion of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Recognition of that assessment should therefore be seen not as a betrayal but as both inevitable and an act of prudence. Yalta was a first step towards establishing the geopolitical guardrails that later helped prevent the Cold War in Europe from spiraling into open and cataclysmic conflict and laid the foundations for U.S. containment strategy that prevented further Soviet expansion without recourse to war.The Yalta comparison is also a false, and even ridiculous description of what is being discussed today. Russia would be completely incapable of occupying eastern Europe, even if it had any desire to do so, which it does not. The Russian army has proved incapable of conquering most of Ukraine. The only Russian demand for additional territorial control is the 2,000 square miles of the Donbas still occupied by Ukraine. That really does not compare to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the other states subjected to Soviet communism after World War II. Nor is China in any position to imitate the U.S. in 1945 and occupy Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. The cliche "if you're not at the table, you're on the menu” that so often accompanies the contemporary “Yalta 2.0” discourse is therefore obviously untrue.Even during the Cold War, Yugoslavia, India, as well as swathes of Africa and the Middle East were able to practice non-alignment — effectively opting out of having to choose a side in the bipolar competition — without being carved up by Washington or Moscow. That is very much the desire, and the ability, of most states in the world today, including for example former Soviet states in Central Asia, which have no desire at all to choose between Russian, Chinese or U.S. hegemony. Their declared strategy is a “multi-vector” one.Let us grant, for the sake of argument, the fantastical notion that the White House is keen on somehow “handing over” former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries to Russia or East Asian states to China. Who in these two regions would possibly go along with such a scheme, and how can they be compelled to do so in the absence of military conquest? The Russian demand for the withdrawal of NATO forces to the lines they occupied in the 1990s does not require the new NATO members of eastern Europe to leave NATO, or to disarm their own forces, let alone that they submit to regime change and Russian political control ( in any case a ridiculous idea, for anyone who knows the Poles and the Balts). It should rather be seen as the first move in a new disarmament process; and NATO, instead of rejecting it out of hand, should come back with proposals of its own whereby limits in NATO forces on Russia’s borders should be matched by strict reciprocal limits on Russian forces in Belarus and Kaliningrad. The model and inspiration should be seen not as “Yalta” but the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaties of the 1990s. The common NATO line is now that “Russia has no say in European security.” No sane person would have said that during the Cold War, and today, alas, hundreds of thousands of dead in Ukraine also demonstrate the opposite.In any case, the Trilateral summit in Shenzhen did not talk about any of these issues. The official statement that followed the talks contained just two elements, both of which should be seen as valuable for humanity. The summit’s call for new nuclear limitation agreements, however vaguely formulated, should be seen as a tentative first step to a restoration of the treaties agreed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the later years of the Cold War — not to end that war, but to try to ensure that it did not escalate into universal catastrophe. More generally, the summit symbolized a truth of vast significance: that if basic peace and order in the world is to be secured, then this will depend above all on reasonably peaceful relations between the world’s most powerful states, secured by agreements regulating those relations.So if there is a legacy of the Cold War to which we should look, it is that of great powers assuming a degree of shared responsibility for maintaining a stable, working international system to be passed down to future generations. The Shenzhen summit represents a significant first step in that direction. Finally, on the score of spheres of influence, it is perhaps worth noting that one is tacitly accepted by virtually the entire world, including China. Nobody is challenging the U.S. insistence on absolute military hegemony in Central America and the Caribbean, because they know that any attempt to do so would bring ferocious U.S. retaliation. Nor have the Europeans, for all their supposed commitment to a “rules-based order” pushed back in any way against the extreme hardening of the Monroe Doctrine under Donald Trump, as witnessed with regard to Venezuela, Cuba, and alleged drug traffickers. Fortunately, there is no chance whatsoever of Russia or China being able to follow this particular U.S. rule.
- — Schumer doubles down on hawkery despite Van Hollen's anti-war test
- In some of his first remarks on the Senate floor since his leadership of the Democratic caucus was formally challenged, Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York blasted President Donald Trump for pursuing an insufficiently hawkish foreign policy.“Trump calls the trilateral meeting with Xi and Putin ‘historic’. Yes, it’s a historic embarrassment that people will remember long into the future,” Schumer said on Thursday. “It’s a betrayal of the United States.”Schumer went on to criticize the President for not securing any concessions from his counterparts, including on curbing Chinese espionage or preventing Beijing and Moscow from helping Iran target American troops. The emphasis of Schumer’s remarks was striking given that dissatisfaction with Trump’s foreign policy and its economic ramifications helped propel Democrats back into the Senate majority earlier this month.As Democrats debate whether their electoral victory presents an opportunity to rethink the party's foreign policy, Schumer's remarks suggest that some of its longtime leaders remain wedded to an older approach.That tension is also emerging as a central dividing line in the contest to lead the new Democratic majority. Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), who announced last week that he would challenge Schumer, has made their disagreements over foreign policy, and in particular over how to approach the issues in the Middle East, as central to his pitch. The two senators represent competing visions of the Democratic Party’s future. Faiz Shakir, a senior advisor to Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), who has supported Van Hollen’s challenge, described him as a“pragmatic progressive” who is “going to know what the people of this country are asking us to do at this moment” and “can bring a lot of factions of the party together.” Much of the debate is over how Democrats should approach using their power of the purse to cut off funding for the war in Iran before the new Congress is seated in January. Van Hollen and a number of his Democratic colleagues have called on the party to insist on a government funding bill that excludes money for the Iran war, which they say will force Trump and the Republicans to decide whether to risk a shutdown to continue the war. Other Democrats argue that a shutdown would be politically risky for the party, and that Democrats should wait until they are in the majority to force the issue. Schumer, for his part, has not clarified his stance, as he continues to say that the war must end and a shutdown must be avoided. Schumer's reluctance to say that he will prioritize ending the war has renewed scrutiny on his longstanding hawkishness toward Iran. Many foreign policy analysts and congressional critics have highlighted his place as one of a few Democratic opponents to the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, as one clear example. Van Hollen has made this contrast central to his leadership campaign. “I don't see how after an election like this where ending the war and bringing down prices was a priority, we can cast a vote to fund the war,” he said recently. “And of course, Senator Schumer was one of the folks who originally opposed President Obama and the JCPOA, but I think the caucus wants to bring this war to an end,” Progressives have also condemned Schumer’s approach in the lead-up to the war, during which he attacked Trump’s diplomacy with Tehran and, critics say, did not act quickly enough to slow the president’s march to war in February. On Thursday, during his floor speech, Schumer questioned what “commitments” Trump made and what he “gave away” over dinner with Chinese President Xi Jinping, echoing his controversial June 2025 accusations that Trump was negotiating “side deals” and “folding on Iran.”The disagreements extend beyond Iran. Van Hollen has taken a leading role in the effort to remove provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would deepen military and intelligence cooperation between the United States and Israel.“The agreements and projects these provisions envision threaten U.S. national security interests by handing Israel leverage over American weapons systems and military technology,” Van Hollen and 11 Senate colleagues wrote in a recent letter to congressional leadership. “If enacted, these agreements would create long-term dependencies by embedding Israeli technology into the U.S. defense industrial base that could make future policy changes costly or difficult to implement.” The letter further argues that the provisions would shift U.S. military assistance to Israel to more “opaque, less discernible avenues,” which the Senators call particularly troubling given Israel's conduct in Gaza, the West Bank, and elsewhere in the region. Schumer has not publicly commented on these provisions, but is seen as one of Israel’s strongest supporters in Congress. In 2025, he told the New York Times that his “job...is to keep the left pro-Israel.” He has repeatedly called himself a “guardian of Israel” throughout his congressional career, which spans 45 years.Their perspectives on the U.S-Israel relationship appears to be a key dividing line between the two senators. Van Hollen was first elected as an establishment-supported, Israel-friendly candidate, but his views have shifted. “Times have changed in a lot of ways, where the Democratic base has changed in a lot of ways, and he has changed along with it,” Yousef Munayyer of the Arab Center recently told The Intercept. “I don’t know that the same can be said for a lot of other folks, like Chuck Schumer.”Independent trackers show that the sitting minority leader currently has more support, though the tallies remain close. The vote for majority leader is expected to take place in a secret ballot on Dec. 1.
- — The biggest takeaway from trilateral is the nuclear piece
- The first trilateral meeting of Presidents Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin, held on November 19 in Shenzhen, was worth holding for one reason above all. The United States has a clear interest in reducing nuclear risks with both China and Russia, and the three leaders agreed to discuss how to do so. Beyond that, the summit yielded little for Washington. Xi gained the prestige of convening the three powers, while Putin gained stature on the world stage even as Russia continues its brutal war against Ukraine.The nuclear pledge deserves attention, however. Beijing has long resisted three-way arms-control negotiations, arguing that the United States and Russia should first reduce their much larger arsenals. China has discussed nuclear risks with both countries in the broader five-power process and held bilateral arms-control consultations with Washington in 2023. Beijing suspended further consultations in 2024, citing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. What Shenzhen adds is Xi’s public commitment to discuss nuclear risk reduction and nonproliferation in a dedicated three-way format. That is a meaningful opening, especially since New START expired in February. However, the joint declaration sets no timetable or agenda and contains no commitment to negotiate limits on arsenals.The other results of the summit were thinner. The leaders endorsed U.N. reform and greater supplies of refined petroleum products without specifying what reforms they wanted or how much additional fuel they would supply. Beijing says they discussed Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula, but the declaration identified no concrete next steps. Its language on immunity for state officials and alleged jurisdictional abuse by the International Criminal Court (ICC) had a clearer political payoff. It aligned with the Trump administration’s position and benefited Putin, who faces an ICC arrest warrant.Xi also brought a familiar proposal into the three-way meeting by calling for crisis communication and prevention mechanisms. Although the joint declaration contained no agreement to establish them, Washington and Moscow should nevertheless take up the proposal and see whether Beijing will agree to practical steps, such as establishing and regularly testing emergency contacts.On balance, Shenzhen was long on symbolism and promises and short on results that advance global stability or U.S. interests. That judgment could change if the three governments schedule nuclear talks and agree on measures that reduce the risk of miscalculation. The summit gave them an opening. Whether they use it is another matter. I won’t hold my breath.
- — Bahrain runs into the buzzsaw of US war, reacts predictably
- On Monday, the High Criminal Court in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, sentenced dozens of Shiite clerics to life in prison, on allegations that they “communicated with..and had collected and received funds” from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.As the trial was running its course, Iranian drones were targeting U.S. military installations in Bahrain, with attacks taking place on Friday, Sunday, and again on Tuesday and Wednesday, ending a two-month lull.Bahrain, the small island kingdom on the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula, is where the pressures of the U.S.-Iran war are concentrated most tightly. A majority Shia population run by a Sunni ruling family, Bahrain has a current population of 1.6 million people (fewer than half, about 740,000 are citizens; the rest are largely migrant workers, mainly from South Asia) and is home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet. It signed the Abraham Accords with Israel, and is also a deeply indebted nation, dependent on its wealthier neighbors for its survival.This is a volatile mix, and Washington has spent the last nine months, through its war on Iran, piling the pressure on its most vulnerable ally in the region.Bahrain was ruled from the Persian side of the Gulf for long stretches of its history until 1783, when the Al Khalifa, a Sunni Arab clan from what is today Qatar, took the island and expelled the Iranian-installed governor. Their descendants now form the royal family that rules Bahrain.Iran, however, never quite accepted this arrangement. Its parliament declared Bahrain the country’s fourteenth province in 1957, and only in 1970, after a U.N. survey found Bahrainis overwhelmingly wanted independence, did the Shah of Iran drop the claim.The Islamic Republic that now governs Iran has not entirely let go of the past. In April, Kayhan, the Tehran daily whose editor was appointed by the late supreme leader, ran a column declaring that “Bahrain was and is part of Iranian territory.” Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan’s managing editor, went on to characterize the ruling family as “puppets of the British government” and accused Bahrain of direct participation in American military attacks on Iran. The last claim reflects the official government line: Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei defended Iran’s attacks on Bahrain this week, claiming that countries in the region aided American forces, and that Tehran’s strikes were “purely defensive in nature.”While annexation of Bahrain is not Iranian policy, irredentist rhetoric from hardliners in Tehran has become useful to Bahrain’s leadership, who leverage these threats to frame dissident citizens as a potential fifth column.As Bahrain’s demographics make clear, it is structurally distinct from its oil-rich, Sunni majority Arab Gulf neighbors. It ran out of meaningful oil reserves long ago and never had the revenue to buy the loyalty of its population. Instead, what it has done is direct a large share of state employment and patronage to its Sunni tribal base, while its Shiite citizens, who make up 55 to 62 percent of the population, are largely excluded from the military and security apparatus where the overwhelming majority of officers are Sunni (many are naturalized foreign-born recruits), and live in underserved neighborhoods and villages.The fear of Iran is the glue that holds this system together, and that fear is not totally imagined. Bahrain’s government said it foiled a coup attempt in 1981 by a Tehran-linked group known as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. Grand Ayatollah Isa Qassim, the kingdom's most senior Shiite cleric, who was stripped of Bahraini nationality in 2016 and sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia on Monday, has lived in Iran since 2018. Manama also accuses other exiles living there of directing armed attacks on Bahraini police.But the same fear has also become a convenient justification for Bahrain’s rulers to treat nearly all dissent, including through peaceful means, as treasonous and Iran-backed. This is what happened in 2011, when the Arab Spring came to Bahrain, and a protest movement that included both sects was crushed with the help of Saudi and Emirati troops. Bahrain’s King Hamad used the episode to hint at Iranian involvement.The same is happening again now. Since the U.S. and Israel initiated hostilities against Iran on February 28, Tehran has retaliated against every Gulf state hosting American forces. Bahrain has, as a result, absorbed hundreds of missiles and drones, which not only struck the Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters, but also industrial and residential sites, and a desalination plant.What made Bahrain’s leadership especially nervous was how some Bahrainis publicly mourned Iran’s slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the opening blows of the war. What followed was a crackdown that swept more than 700 people, for filming attacks, and for social media activity deemed anti-government or pro-Iran. In April, the government stripped 69 citizens of their nationality for “glorifying or sympathising with the hostile Iranian acts” and postponed parliamentary elections. In May and June, Bahraini authorities arrested more than 50 clerics, whose sentences were handed down on Monday.Within the first 24 hours of that verdict, Iran’s foreign ministry and Qais al-Khazali, the leader of an Iran-backed Iraqi militia, issued statements assailing the trials and sentences. In rushing to defend Bahraini clerics, Iran and its allies hand Manama what looks to it like proof that the convicted answer to foreign patrons, which then fuels harsher repressive measures, and so the cycle continues.The economic picture for Manama is also dire. Before the war, the International Monetary Fund had put Bahrain's government debt at 134 percent of GDP, among the highest in the world. It is also the only Gulf Cooperative Council state rated “junk” by all three credit agencies, meaning investors view its bonds as high-risk and demand high interest rates to lend its government money. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran has cut off nearly all of its modest oil exports and forced its aluminum smelter, the Gulf’s largest, to declare force majeure. Bahrain has been bailed out before, by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait to the tune of $10 billion in 2018. It will likely be bailed out again, but this time, its primary donor is strained. Saudi Arabia is fighting its own war with the Houthis in Yemen who have hit Riyadh’s airport and business center, and its critical East-West pipeline, which moves roughly four million barrels of crude per day from the Gulf to the Red Sea. Riyadh is also running a deficit currently projected at $65 billion dollars, up from the $44 billion planned in January, which makes the contours of any future bailout hard to predict.Whatever form that rescue takes, it will certainly come with strings. Given Bahrain's size and its modest economic means, its freedom of action is limited and it has typically followed the lead of its larger neighbors when it comes to foreign policy.Before the war, Bahrain was pursuing rapprochement with the Islamic Republic. Despite being one of the inaugural signers of the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020, it reopened channels with Tehran in 2024, prompted in part by the Saudi-Iranian détente that China brokered in 2023. The current war sealed that opening shut, and now Manama has little room to negotiate with Iran on its own until a wider settlement is worked out.Yet rather than holding out for diplomacy, Bahrain has taken a more assertive line, using its seat as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council to push resolutions demanding Iran reopen the Strait and stop its attacks on its neighbors. One was adopted in March and later one, which initially contained language authorizing the use of force, was vetoed by Russia and China, who argued it was one-sided for ignoring U.S. and Israeli strikes that provoked Iran’s reaction.These moves are unlikely to have endeared the kingdom to Tehran, and may also help in understanding why Bahrain has remained in Iran’s crosshairs.
- — Trump’s honeymoon with South Korea is over
- Following his visit to the White House to meet with President Donald Trump in August of last year, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung had good reasons to believe the strategic alliance was in strong shape. Despite their ideological disagreements, the two leaders held a cordial first summit that in subsequent months led to a resolution of their trade frictions, a $150 billion investment in shipbuilding, substantial investment in commercial projects in the United States, and even a surprise announcement that Trump would help Seoul build nuclear-powered submarines. One of Lee’s key commitments was to increase South Korean defense spending to 3.5% of GDP — the Trump administration’s minimum target for Asian nations.But what a difference a year can make with Trump. On October 21, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Michelle Steel publicly described the relationship as experiencing “turbulence.” Lee’s government, for its part, has tried to downplay recent tensions, arguing that overheated domestic politics in both countries need not undermine the strong foundation of the alliance. As South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun told Parliament in late October, “When you’re in turbulence, fasten your seat belt and it won’t be a problem.”In truth, some of the turbulence is of Seoul’s own making. In March, for example, South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young publicly identified a North Korean uranium enrichment facility, potentially compromising sensitive sources and methods. The Lee government insists that the information was already public, but Washington disagrees and has retaliated by restricting certain satellite-derived intelligence about North Korea and excluded Seoul from a trilateral meeting on North Korean cyber threats. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has complained about intelligence sharing broadly with Seoul, and South Korean Ambassador Kang Kyung-wha acknowledged as recently as last month that his government had not fully addressed Washington’s concerns. South Korea has also been slow in deciding how to invest its pledged $350 billion, angering Trump in the process. For instance, Trump wants Seoul to invest roughly $54 billion in the Alaska LNG pipeline project, but Lee’s government has questioned its commercial viability. Although he has expressed confidence that South Korea will eventually follow through, Trump has made vague threats to resume tariffs if the deals remain stalled. Separately, South Korean regulators imposed a fine of $423 million on Coupang, a U.S.-listed e-commerce company, following a massive consumer data breach. The Trump administration and congressional Republicans were outraged by the move, calling it discrimination against American companies, while the Lee administration justified the measure to protect consumer privacy data.But the Trump administration shares much of the blame for the increasingly contentious bilateral relationship. For one thing, even though Washington and Seoul already agreed in June 2025 to reduce tariffs from 25% to 15% in 2025, Trump periodically threatens to raise tariff rates again to 25% when he gets angry about something. This has surprised and frustrated South Korean officials, who may no longer see Washington as a reliable strategic ally. And perhaps neither do the South Korean people. According to a Pew Research survey from August, 55% of them hold an unfavorable view of the United States — the highest such mark in more than 20 years. North Korea poses a bilateral challenge as well. To be sure, both Trump and Lee want to prioritize renewed engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un rather than deterrence. But the Trump administration’s preferred approach differs from Seoul’s. Trump surprised South Korea by shortening the annual bilateral military drills, known as Ulchi Freedom Guardian, just hours before they began. He argued that they were unnecessarily provocative toward Kim, whom Trump hopes will join him in a summit. Although he publicly accepted Trump’s decision to cut back combined military exercises, Lee would rather derive diplomatic leverage from enhanced military preparedness against North Korea, and the deterrence that comes with it, prior to negotiations. Trump further blamed South Korea for not contributing to the U.S. naval operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, in turn questioning why Washington continues to defend South Korea on the peninsula. Deepening disagreements over China represent yet another irritant. The Trump administration clearly seeks greater “flexibility” in how it uses the approximately 28,500 U.S. troops deployed to South Korea. Rather than focusing exclusively on North Korea, Washington has publicly intimated that China could be the target of their future military operations, and that Seoul would be expected to support that mission. Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge “Bridge” Colby, for example, visited Seoul in January and gave a speech at the Sejong Institute that curiously did not mention North Korea at all, and instead, replaced it with multiple references to countering China. To the shock of South Korean officials, Trump’s National Security Strategy, released last November, neglected to mention North Korea either and focused instead on the need for South Korea to help the U.S. and Japan secure the First Island Chain — a clear reference to containing China. Although Trump’s National Defense Strategy from January did reference North Korea, it avoided stating that denuclearization was still a U.S. priority and put the responsibility to deal with the regime more squarely on Seoul, with limited American support.Trump’s submarine and shipbuilding deals are also in limbo. On the submarines, Trump wants them built at the South Korean defense firm Hanwha’s shipyard in Philadelphia, but the Lee government argues that South Korea offers more appropriate shipyards because they are already outfitted with advanced submarine-building capabilities. There is also the question surrounding the enriched nuclear fuel and associated sensitive technologies, which Seoul wants Washington to provide. But rules governing the bilateral relationship currently do not permit such transfers without specific exemptions or additional authorizations. When the submarine deal was first announced in October 2025, none of these issues had been properly considered by the Trump administration, provoking the current disputes. And on broader shipbuilding, South Korea’s $150 billion financial commitment has largely stalled. Indeed, the president’s Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA) initiative has yielded zero concrete projects, embarrassing Trump, who wants to reenergize the U.S. defense industrial base and add manufacturing jobs. Progress on MASGA has also been hampered by a mix of legal, political, and financial obstacles.Finally, the fallout from the September 2025 ICE raids on South Korean workers at the Hyundai-LG battery plant in the United States continues. Although Seoul wrapped up its internal investigation without retaliating against the U.S. government, attorneys representing more than 300 of the workers, who were allegedly shackled and abused during the ordeal, are now pursuing administrative damages, possibly a precursor to civil lawsuits, against the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and others. The political rhetoric surrounding the case became heated on both sides as the legal process continues to unfold.Despite the growing tensions between them, South Korea and the U.S. remain staunch allies, and in fact, the Trump administration has referred to Seoul as a “model ally,” especially because of its increased defense spending. Lee and Trump reportedly spoke about future diplomatic engagements on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in China this week. But difficulties remain, and the next two years under Trump and Lee could prove even more turbulent when it comes to trade, investment, military cooperation, and foreign policy.Additionally, while many have interpreted the midterm elections as a rebuke of Trump’s foreign policy, they are unlikely to affect U.S.-Korea relations in substantive ways. The president typically has the lead on foreign policy, and lame-duck presidents tend to intensify their focus on it to secure their legacy. For South Korea, this likely means more, not less, of Trump, adding to Seoul’s urgency to somehow figure him out and stop making unforced errors.
- — NYT the latest in showcasing bad US-China takes from DC experts
- A New York Times essay by former Biden administration officials Mira Rapp-Hooper and Ely Ratner published on Nov. 16, “Trump’s China Gamble Is Backfiring,” offers yet another in a long line of depressingly similar and one-sided arguments about China and U.S. China policy appearing across America’s major newspapers and foreign policy journals.The narrative goes like this, invariably: Beijing is ever more threatening in dire ways; Washington is responding inadequately; and only steadily increasing seemingly unlimited levels of American (and, in some examples, allied) military power and counter-pressure will restore stability and protect the West. Largely missing is a serious examination of how American and Chinese policies interact in creating perceived threats, and how credible reassurances, alongside deterrence, might reduce the danger and create lasting peace and prosperity.This outlook began to emerge to prominence with Washington’s embrace of strategic competition as the framework for U.S. China policy in late 2017. But a particularly explicit statement appeared some years later, in Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher’s April 2024 Foreign Affairs essay, "No Substitute for Victory." Its subtitle declared that America’s competition with China must be won, not managed. In this influential essay, efforts to stabilize relations were portrayed as jeopardizing success against Beijing’s supposedly implacable ambitions.Subsequent prescriptions vary, but the underlying pattern is clear. In the Wall Street Journal, for example, Seth Jones argues that America is losing its ability to deter China and calls for substantially higher defense spending to restore deterrence, to the exclusion of virtually anything else. In Foreign Affairs (a particularly prominent publisher of this viewpoint), former Biden officials Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi advocate pooling allied capabilities to counter underestimated Chinese power; Ely Ratner and Nick Danby urge exploiting China’s vulnerabilities; and Michael Beckley and Hal Brands repeat the need for greater forward military power, industrial mobilization, and allied coordination. In The Washington Quarterly, Evan Braden Montgomery and Toshi Yoshihara propose broader countercoercive options including possible escalation against mainland Chinese targets. And a report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) led by Jones recommends placing American industrial production on a wartime footing to confront China and Russia.These authors do not hold identical views. Some acknowledge escalation risks, criticize American mistakes or endorse diplomacy. Nonetheless, their detailed prescriptions overwhelmingly concern strengthening deterrence, restricting and weakening Chinese capabilities and organizing counterpressure. Far less attention, if any, goes to establishing mutually credible limits on both sides’ behavior. In this literature, China presents a clearly formidable and growing challenge to American security, prosperity and international influence across military, economic and technological domains — and, in the strongest formulations, an existential threat to the so-called U.S.-led “rules-based” global order. Moreover, Beijing’s ambitions are treated as so entrenched that stronger resistance becomes the principal (and virtually only) means of changing its behavior. Accommodation is frequently depicted as encouraging further Chinese assertiveness or aggression, without adequately distinguishing unilateral concessions from reciprocal reassurance and restraint.There are certainly grounds for concern about Chinese military expansion, economic coercion and pressure on Taiwan, for example. But identifying such conduct does not explain its causes, establish the limits of Chinese ambitions or determine which American responses would improve security. Nor does an erosion of American military superiority (often stressed in the literature) necessarily establish that effective deterrence requires restoring that superiority.The Rapp-Hooper–Ratner essay illustrates the problem. It attributes continued Chinese assertiveness to President Donald Trump’s accommodation, citing pressure against Japan, military exercises around Taiwan and expanding military facilities. Yet these examples establish Beijing’s continued assertiveness much more clearly than they establish that American accommodation encouraged it.The authors themselves acknowledge that China’s economic campaign against Japan followed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s November 2025 remarks about possible Japanese intervention over Taiwan, a clear provocation to Beijing. More strikingly, the December 2025 blockade exercises they cite began 11 days after Washington announced an unprecedented $11.1 billion Taiwan arms package. Neither circumstance excuses Beijing’s coercion. But both call into question an explanation centered on insufficient American resistance. Overall, the authors do not demonstrate how anticipated American passivity affected the timing, scale or duration of these actions.Their account also gives inadequate attention to the interactive nature of the U.S.-China rivalry. In this dynamic, each side describes its own measures as defensive and necessary, while treating the other’s responses as evidence of aggressive intent. Military deployments generate counter-deployments; technology restrictions encourage retaliation and efforts to eliminate dependencies; political signals regarding Taiwan prompt increasingly coercive demonstrations. Beijing bears responsibility for its choices. But Washington must also examine how its policies affect those choices. These analyses give insufficient attention to how American policies might intensify the Chinese behavior they seek to prevent, and how reciprocal adjustments might interrupt that process.Of course, acknowledging this interaction does not imply equal responsibility for every confrontation. It means recognizing that a strategy based on continually increasing the adversary’s insecurity can strengthen the very tendencies it seeks to counter. Deterrence must convince Beijing that specific acts of aggression will fail. Reassurance must also convince it that restraint on its part will be reciprocated and offer better outcomes than an escalating, zero-sum rivalry.Mind-numbingly similar calls for a united front against China face another problem. Many governments across the Global South, and some American allies and partners, resist organizing their relations with Beijing around Washington’s strategic priorities. They might oppose particular Chinese actions, but also highly value trade, investment and diplomatic cooperation with Beijing. Their reluctance to simply align with the U.S. in an anti-China front reflects interests and judgments that cannot be overcome by more emphatic warnings about the Chinese threat.Washington and Beijing should pursue constructive strategic stability by pairing credible deterrence with mutual reassurance, verifiable restraint and practical steps to prevent and manage crises. Over Taiwan, as I have argued before, Washington should make clear that it remains open to any peaceful, un-coerced settlement freely supported on both sides of the Strait, while Beijing should reaffirm at the presidential level its non-use of a timetable for unification and measurably reduce its military pressure.By repeatedly publishing analyses heavily weighted toward greater pressure and deterrence, major American media outlets offer the public an unduly narrow debate about the nature of the Chinese challenge and the U.S. and allied policies needed to address it. Far more analysis should ask what enduring political relationship competitive measures are ultimately intended to produce, which threats require resistance, which insecurities can be reduced through reciprocal commitments, and where substantive cooperation is possible.Continuing to elaborate ways of deterring and weakening China while neglecting credible mutual reassurance and the search for positive-sum policies risks turning the prevention of war into preparations that make war more likely. A serious debate must examine both the dangers of insufficient deterrence and those of increasing pressure without establishing mutually credible limits and a viable basis for a constructive form of coexistence.
- — Tom Friedman’s deceptive effort to lure Dems to escalate in Iran
- The centrist Democrats’ campaign to rescue - not end - Donald Trump’s illegal war with Iran has officially begun. Behold Tom Friedman’s column today in The New York Times.Tom puts forward an argument with a clever structure. He starts by blasting Trump’s decision to start the war. He cites numerous data points, including testimony from GCC officials that tears massive holes in the White House’s narrative that the situation is under control, that Iran is on the ropes, and that Trump has won the battle for the Strait of Hormuz.This paragraph, for instance:“I had a briefing from a senior Emirati oil official who shared with me a digital map of the relentless Iranian attacks on the fleet of Emirati-owned oil tankers — not when they pass through the Strait of Hormuz near Iran, but when they try to transit the Persian Gulf in Emirati waters, hugging the country’s eastern coastline. These are highly sophisticated attacks, mostly with cruise missiles and drones, that go right into the oil tankers’ engine rooms and disable them. Bull’s-eye every time. The Emirates then has to send tugboats out to rescue the crews and pull the disabled tankers into port. This is happening almost every day.”Now add the testimony from the head of the U.S. Navy, who revealed that insuring ships through the Strait of Hormuz has skyrocketed from $54,000 to a staggering $64 million. That’s a jaw-dropping 118,418 percent increase, a devastating indictment of just how unsustainable and ruinous Trump’s so-called control over the Strait has become. Having brought readers along with him, particularly centrist Democratic leaders in Congress whom this piece specifically targets, Tom takes a dark and sudden turn.Rather than urging Democrats to help end the war, he pivots to arguing against cutting its funding, relying on arguments so flimsy and absurd they almost defy belief. Take this paragraph, for example:“I think it would be a mistake for Democrats to try to cut off funding for the war, just as I thought it was a mistake to talk about defunding the police. You defund it, you own it. That is, Trump will say forevermore that he had the Iranians on the ropes and then the Democrats pulled the rug out from under him. Democrats should do nothing to weaken U.S. leverage on the Iranians. It is a sick regime and a truly destabilizing, malign actor in the region and around the world, one that is now providing Russians with the advanced drone technology that Moscow is using to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure before winter.”So in Tom’s upside-down logic, if Democrats defund the war, they own it, but if they keep funding it, somehow Trump still owns it. Reality, of course, is the reverse. If Democrats choose to bankroll an illegal war their voters have demanded they end, they become complicit, sharing the dubious distinction of co-ownership with Trump and Israel. As I’ve pointed out on this Substack, with shifting voting patterns—especially among younger voters—Democrats are setting themselves up for a reckoning in 2028 if they rescue the war instead of ending it.This is a stunningly moronic argument Tom puts forward, but admittedly, it will resonate with centrist Democrats who have secretly supported the war all along.Tom is correct, however, that Trump will falsely claim that he was about to win the war but that the Democrats “pulled the rug out from under him,” to which I respond: Who cares??Should Democrats really keep an illegal, losing war alive just to stop Trump from spinning another feeble lie? Is this the leadership voters crave—turning a blind eye to an illegal war and the affordability crisis it fuels, all to obsess over Trump’s endless lying?The American people can endure Trump’s lies. We live with them every day. What Americans cannot live with is a war that makes actual living an increasingly difficult proposition. A war that weakens the US on every front and that destabilizes the global economy to the point of a potential depression. But Tom believes Democrats should be more concerned about Trump adding one more lie to his repertoire.Then Tom adds the ever-present false-choice argument that Washington’s foreign policy establishment obsesses over: If you do X, enemy Y will become stronger.So defunding the war will make Iran stronger, Tom says, even though he admits that it is the war itself that has put Iran in a stronger position. So the Democrats should continue a losing war out of fear that ending the war will make the US lose even further. The Israeli officials who pushed Trump into this war in the first place could not have put it better.But this sentence reveals the logical conclusion of Tom’s argument. In reality, he is not arguing for a mere continuation of the war. He wants the Democrats to escalate the war. Because, according to Tom’s own assessment, continuing the war will not change the picture: The US will lose more, regional countries will pay a high price, and Iran’s position will be strengthened.The only way to reverse Iran’s gains, the implicit logic reads, is to escalate the war in order to press Iran back. This is the option the Israelis are pushing for. This is the option Trump is considering.And this is the option Tom is deceptively luring Democrats into enabling.This article was republished from Trita Parsi's Substack
- — Key Hegseth adviser double-dipping for Israel, Saudi Arabia
- This article was co-published with The GuardianOne of defense secretary Pete Hegseth’s key advisers faces questions about potential conflicts of interest over his many roles, including advising the US defense department, Saudi Arabia, and an Israeli defense contractor.Former Republican senator Norm Coleman emerged as an informal yet omnipresent guide for Hegseth in December 2024 as the former Fox News host navigated confirmation hearings for his nomination as defense secretary. Hegseth now finds himself under fire after articles of impeachment were filed by Republican congressman Thomas Massie charging him with “high crimes and misdemeanors,” including waging war against Iran in violation of the War Powers Act, but Hegseth’s imprint on the Pentagon goes beyond the disastrous war against Iran.At the start of his marathon 4 hours and 24 minutes hearing before the Senate armed services committee — a hearing that delved into allegations of sexual misconduct, workplace drinking and marital infidelity — Hegseth took time to “thank the former senator from Minnesota, Norm Coleman, for his mentorship and friendship in this process”Coleman’s service to Hegseth appears to have been rewarded in June, when the secretary of war appointed Coleman to the Defense Policy Board, uniquely situating Coleman to advise on defense procurement decisions of interest to the former senator’s clients.“Serving as a sherpa to rich people seeking to climb Mount Everest is dangerous and thankless work that is often underappreciated by Westerners,” said Jeff Hauser, founder and executive director of the Revolving Door Project, a group that scrutinizes executive branch appointees to ensure they use their office to serve the broad public interest. “But serving successfully as a sherpa to a controversial nominee tends to breed enormous goodwill.”Coleman is a man of many, often highly remunerative, hats. He is the chairman of the Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC), a group comprised of a who’s-who of pro-Israel Republican megadonors. He chairs the Congressional Leadership Fund, one of the biggest super Pacs supporting House Republicans. And he serves as a lobbyist for Saudi Arabia and now as vice chairman of the Defense Policy Board, a Pentagon advisory committee focusing on “matters pertaining to strategic planning, the policy implications of U.S. force structure and modernization, regional defense policies, and other defense policy and national security issues of special interest to the Department”.Last year, Coleman added another job to his resume: senior adviser to Kinetica, an Israeli weapons company ideally positioned to profit from deeper integration between the US and Israeli weapons development industries, posing a potential conflict of interest for Coleman as he advises the Pentagon and Republican candidates on matters related to the defense budget and weapons procurement.“Norm Coleman is a walking conflict of interest on the Pentagon Defense Policy Board,” said Craig Holman, a government affairs lobbyist at Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy organization that opposes corporate influence in government. “Most other advisory boards will not allow the appointment of registered lobbyists.”It is not illegal to simultaneously work as a lobbyist and advise the Pentagon.Questions about the national security implications of US-Israeli defense integration came to a head earlier this year with the introduction of Section 219 of the House National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), legislation that would more deeply intertwine the U.S. and Israeli militaries and commit the U.S. to bilateral research and development and co-production of weapons, joint ventures and licensing agreements.Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a group whose mission includes “provid[ing] education to enhance Israel’s image in North America,” explained that intertwining the U.S. and Israeli militaries and weapons development systems is a necessary step in the face of polling showing rapidly diminishing support for Israel among Americans of all political stripes. “Those figures should concern Israel and its friends because, ultimately, public opinion shapes policy,” said Dubowitz, writing in Israel Hayom, an outlet owned by pro-Israel megadonor Miriam Adelson, last month. Dubowitz went on to advise: “Most importantly, Israel and the United States should deepen their military, technological, intelligence and economic integration to such an extent that inflicting financial harm on Israel would also carry a significant cost for Washington.”FDD, which endorsed congressional efforts to mandate U.S.-Israel defense integration, has a unique tie to Coleman’s Israeli client: its board member Isaac Applbaum is chairman of Kinetica. And Kinetica claims it is uniquely situated to benefit from such an intertwining of the U.S. defense sector with Israel.Kinetica reported in February that Coleman, speaking in his capacity as an adviser to the company at a conference in Tel Aviv, “shared his perspective from his deep proximity to the U.S. defense establishment.”“He highlighted that the U.S. Department of Defense is actively seeking new technologies to integrate into its systems – a shift from a landscape once dominated exclusively by large defense primes to one that is increasingly open to emerging innovation,” wrote Kinetica on LinkedIn. “For Israel, as a strategic U.S. ally, this represents a significant opportunity to scale into the American defense ecosystem.”Speaking to the Defense Brief in June, Kinetica founding partner Aaron Applbaum (Isaac’s son), reiterated this sentiment, explaining the business strategy behind the Israeli startup in a broader ecosystem of growing military spending in the U.S., NATO, Japan, and the Middle East. “It’s a generational opportunity to start a new platform,” said Applbaum.In a LinkedIn post later that month, the company cheered its bet on Coleman as a validation of its business strategy, celebrating his appointment as VP of the Defense Policy Board, writing:“Congratulations to Kinetica’s Senior Advisor, Senator Norm Coleman, on his appointment as Vice Chair of the Defense Policy Board, which advises the U.S. Secretary of Defense and senior Pentagon officials on strategic and national security issues.“As an advisor to Kinetica, Senator Coleman brings a rare combination of policy, leadership, foreign affairs experience and a deep understanding of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship.His appointment reflects an important part of the Kinetica thesis – defense policy, technological superiority and allied innovation are no longer separate conversations. They are part of the same national security mission.”Coleman’s exact role with Kinetica is unclear, but his work for other weapons manufacturers and contractors reveals Pentagon lobbying efforts in the months leading up to his appointment to the Defense Policy Board, raising questions about potential conflicts of interest.“Human beings cannot actually firewall parts of their brain from each other, which means that it is impossible for one’s work for the United States to fail to influence one’s work for Saudi Arabia or defense companies — and vice versa,” said Hauser. “The difference is that Saudi Arabia and defense contractors want their paid agents to have multiple loyalties so that they can be more effective in return for cash, whereas the U.S. government ought to reasonably expect for the undivided loyalty of those who serve it.”In his capacity as senior counsel at legal giant Hogan Lovells Cadwalader, Coleman served as a lobbyist on the firm’s account for Hidden Level Inc., a company producing drone detection systems. The firm’s work included outreach to the departments of defense and homeland security and the White House as part of efforts “regarding drone airspace management and security capabilities”, according to lobbying disclosure filings.Coleman also helped in “raising the profile” of the SkyWater Technology foundry “as a trusted domestic semiconductor manufacturer,” according to the lobbying firm’s description of its work lobbying various Washington agencies, including the Pentagon, on behalf of Coretsu, an AI and technology company seeking to promote “technology applications for legal and regulatory analysis.”After his appointment to the Defense Policy Board, Coleman continued to be listed on the firm’s lobbying disclosures, revealing he was a lobbyist on at least one account that lobbied the Department of Defense: Bear SVTP Development LLC. The company retained Coleman and two other lobbyists to assist with issues related to “[l]and development with respect to AI Data Centers and federal regulation,” according to lobbying disclosures.“It’s a very suspect situation that Norm Coleman is manipulating: he’s advising the Pentagon on what policies to do while he’s also advising contractors on what to do,” said Holman. “But it doesn’t seem to be illegal, just self-serving and unethical.”“The Federal Advisory Committee Act just bans individual lobbyists, not those who serve as lobbyists for another firm like Hogan Lovell,” said Holman, referring to legislation dictating the operations of advisory committees like the Defense Policy Board.Members of the Defense Policy Board seemingly holding significant conflicts of interest is not a new or unusual occurrence. A Center for Public Integrity investigation in 2003 found that nine out of thirty members of the Board had ties to contractors with more than $76 billion in Pentagon contracts and four were registered lobbyists, including its chairman, Richard Perle, who had just resigned his chairmanship. Perle drew fire for his business relationship with Global Crossing Ltd and satellite maker Loral Space & Communications Ltd, but a heavily redacted report by the Pentagon inspector general concluded that he did not violate any ethics laws.Lobbyists face greater scrutiny after the Republicans’ midterms debacle. Stephen Miller, Trump’s new chief of staff, issued a memo ordering White House staffers to get approval before meeting lobbyists.Coleman, Hogan Lovells Cadwalader and Kinetica did not respond to requests for comment.
- — Let’s talk about the trilateral — the one in the Arctic
- On October 30, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts Toshimitsu Motegi and Cho Hyun on the sidelines of the G20 foreign ministers meeting in Atlanta. Together they established the Trilateral Arctic Pacific Partnership (TAPP), an initiative focused on maritime safety, emergency response and economic cooperation in the North.There are good reasons for the United States to pursue this now. Japan and South Korea are developing their commercial interests in the region and both countries are experts in polar research and maritime operations. This initiative opens up new diplomatic options for Washington in the Arctic, particularly as relations have been tense with other Arctic nations.Much of that tension, of course, has been self-inflicted, with recent threats by President Donald Trump to take over Greenland, provoking a diplomatic crisis with Denmark and the rest of the European Union. While the agreement between the U.S., Denmark and Greenland has eased tensions, it didn’t fully heal the damage done to transatlantic trust.Now, with TAPP, Washington can show it can still form constructive partnerships in the Arctic, this time with its Pacific allies. But the way this partnership has so far been presented is concerning.The State Department’s summary of the trilateral meeting places the Arctic initiative alongside criticism of China’s activities in its neighboring seas and “Russia-China cooperation undermining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.” This framing was echoed by some Japanese and South Korean media outlets, but the official readouts from the Foreign Ministries of Japan and South Korea avoided such language.If the U.S. views this initiative purely as another means to pressure Russia and China, Japan and South Korea may not be fully on board. Both nations have commercial interests that require working relationships with Russia and China.Balancing economic interestsSeoul plans to use the Northern Sea Route as a shipping route between Northeast Asia and Europe, with Busan as a logistics hub.It aims to operate regular commercial shipping in the Arctic by 2030 and has already ran a test: the Panstar Arco left Busan on August 22 and returned from Europe 50 days later.However, this route transits largely Russian waters, meaning Korean shipping companies will need Russian infrastructure, logistical support and icebreakers. While South Korean officials stress that their Arctic shipping policy will comply with Western sanctions on Russia, they know they cannot operate in the Arctic without a working relationship with Moscow.Seoul also has a careful relationship with China. Korean experts noted the differences in wording between the U.S. and Korean statements regarding the October meeting. While Seoul sees China as a major economic partner, it wants “Washington to focus on deterring North Korea and facilitating dialogue with Pyongyang rather than containing China.”Japan also treads carefully. While it has joined Western sanctions on Russia, Tokyo has not cut energy ties. Sakhalin-2, a Russian natural gas project, provides around 10% of Japan’s gas imports. Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsubishi have a combined 22.5% stake in the project. Japan purchased around 58% of the project’s output in 2025.Mitsui also has a 10% stake in Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project, along with the state-backed Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security. The project has been affected by Western sanctions, and it’s not currently supplying gas to Japan, but Tokyo has not backed out of its investment. Clearly, energy security is a concern for Japanese policymakers.None of this means that Tokyo and Seoul are about to abandon their security relationship with Washington. But it would be unreasonable to expect Japan and South Korea to view the Arctic solely through an American security lens.As expected, Beijing and Moscow are wary of the new initiative. Chinese experts cited by the Global Times have warned that the trilateral partnership risks “turning the Arctic into an arena for geopolitical and security competition” and that “Washington seeks to work through its alliances to constrain China-Russia cooperation.” Russia’s Foreign Ministry has warned of “countermeasures” if it considers the arrangement a threat.Those reactions aren’t surprising, but they do highlight a potential problem: if TAPP becomes all about confrontation, then the practical work may be overshadowed by strategic signaling. Japan and South Korea could find themselves pulled into a U.S.-led initiative that does not fit with their economic interests.Keep it practicalThe U.S., Japan, and South Korea do not need a common enemy to work together in the Pacific Arctic. The region has enough real challenges: shipping traffic is increasing, sea ice conditions are changing, and emergency response infrastructure remains thin across much of the region.This is where TAPP can make a difference. The three nations could organize joint search and rescue exercises, agree on procedures for sharing information, and coordinate on oil spill and disaster response. The U.S., Japan and South Korea all have substantial and complementary maritime capabilities to contribute.There’s also no need to start from scratch. The Arctic Council’s working groups are already conducting important work on environmental protection, scientific research, and emergency preparedness. The Arctic Coast Guard Forum and North Pacific Coast Guard Forum also provide channels for practical cooperation in these areas, though they have been strained by political disagreements related to the war in Ukraine and Japanese-Russian relations. TAPP could help revive that work, with increased Japanese and Korean expertise and funding. Arctic communities should be involved in decision making on all of these issues. Shipping and energy projects have a direct impact on local economies and ecosystems.Overall, the U.S. should avoid trying to make this initiative a strategic move against Moscow and Beijing. Japan and South Korea will continue to have their own business interests with Russia. A partnership that takes this into account will be more sustainable.The Arctic needs safe shipping lanes as well as stronger environmental protection and disaster management. Strong institutions are needed to ensure cooperation continues despite political divides. The TAPP initiative can help with this, and the U.S. should take the lead.
- — In his first 100 days, Colombia's 'El Tigre' gets a wake up call
- Colombian President Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella is celebrating his first 100 days in office this week with a major international forum in New York City dubbed “Colombia Miracle Week,” where promises of the country’s economic revival and commitment to law and order have helped attract $26 billion in investments in Latin America’s fourth largest economy.His government will also mark the milestone by receiving U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth — the third member of President Trump’s cabinet to visit Colombia since August — on Wednesday as the two countries deepen security ties and explore possible joint military operations against armed groups near the borders with Venezuela and Ecuador.Zoom in deeper however, and the picture is far bleaker for Colombia’s new head of state, as the Trump-endorsed former criminal defense attorney struggles to uphold sweeping campaign pledges amid a devastating earthquake, a severe fiscal deficit, opposition from Congress and the courts, and a seemingly uncontainable security landscape.On the economic front, de la Espriella had to pass the country’s annual budget bill — which increased government spending by 16% despite promising significant cuts — by decree after Colombia’s divided legislature failed last month to come to an agreement. Meanwhile, the new chief executive seeks to overcome a steep fiscal deficit he inherited from former President Gustavo Petro in the form of a $16 billion aid package from the International Monetary Fund and a proposed fiscal reform bill which would allow the government to slash public spending by decree and cut public salaries, except for the security forces, by 20%, which has spurred nationwide protests.On the security front, despite vows to crush the country’s myriad guerrilla, paramilitary and criminal groups in his first 90 days, all major indicators of violence — extortions, kidnappings, homicides and "terrorist attacks” — have risen. The recruitment of minors fueling the expansion of the country’s armed groups is 131% higher than during Petro’s first 90 days in office.Increased air strikes against these groups (seven so far, killing at least eight minors) are already producing blowback, particularly from ELN guerrillas near the border with Venezuela and ACSN paramilitaries along the Caribbean coast.A recent ELN retaliatory attack on a Colombian military base killed one soldier and injured four, while paramilitaries paralyzed the city of Santa Marta in September as the military largely stood by, powerless. There have been so far at least 111 attacks by the ELN and dissident members of the former FARC during the president’s three months in office, while important cities alongside Santa Marta, like Cúcuta, have been thoroughly militarized in response, with seemingly little impact on groups’ day-to-day operations.New data show that 38 members of the Colombian police and military have been killed and 213 wounded in attacks by criminal groups since August.The all-out offensive is already harking back to some of the darkest days of past campaigns to curb drug production and quell irregular armed groups. Reports of extrajudicial killings, including of minors, have emerged across the country, with security forces insisting casualties were armed combatants despite families insisting they weren’t.For a president who has drawn widespread criticism for holding press conferences amid body bags and showing up armed in military fatigues at crime scenes, his hardline security policy appears to be more about optics than substance, prioritizing spectacle over results.In fact, a recent review by Colombian outlet La Silla Vacia found that of all of de la Espriella’s campaign pledges made for his first 100 days, he had kept none and backed away from several, while top officials considered to be unaligned with his “miracle country” project, such as Interior Minister Rodrigo Lara, have since been removed.The Trump administration, meanwhile, appears to be offering its full-throated endorsement of ADLE’s anti-crime strategy, which has included the extradition of dozens of high-priority targets to the U.S. and a 21st century redux of former President Alvaro Uribe’s “Plan Patriot” that seeks to modernize Colombia’s helicopters, radars, drones, special forces, intelligence, cyber defense and more. The approach also includes ramping up DEA-supported operations to seize refined cocaine on land and sea along with issuing visa restrictions on current and former legislators and businessmen who are alleged to maintain ties to narcotics trafficking.Last week, as Washington committed $345 million for a rotary-wing aircraft training center to “sustain the country’s helicopter fleet in its fight against narco-terrorism,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dan Caine, liaised with senior Colombian officials in Bogotá amid the annual multinational military exercise Southern Vanguard, in which 350 U.S. service members participated.Caine’s visit came on the heels of a trip in September by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, where he signed an agreement giving U.S. firms preference in Colombia’s civil nuclear energy program and critical minerals industry in return for drone technology and increased security assistance. Coming shortly after Colombia signed onto the U.S.-led Shield of the Americas consortium and offered the city of Medellín for its regional headquarters, Rubio’s visit produced assurances that the U.S. would provide, within its ability, whatever the Colombian administration requested so long as it asked.Just this month, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno visited the country too, overseeing the delivery of firearms training simulators to Colombia’s international police training school and lauding Colombia’s commitment to boost coca eradication and cocaine interdiction, which have seen sharp increases.To advance Trump administration objectives, the U.S. committed $1 billion in counternarcotics and security aid to Colombia on the occasion of de la Espriella’s August inauguration; transferred MQ9-A reaper drones for the country’s anti-drug efforts; diverted foreign military financing from Europe and Africa to Colombia and other Andean countries; and flew over Colombian skies the same CIA-operated counternarcotics planes that targeted Ecuadorian fishing boats earlier this year, according to the Washington Post.But now de la Espriella's government is on its back foot as the Democrats’ resounding victory in the midterms has led his administration to reconsider its ironclad alignment with Trump’s MAGA movement.After incoming House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks (D-NY) criticized de la Espriella’s endorsement of Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar (R-FL) and took to Colombian media urging him to maintain bipartisan ties in Washington, Colombia’s Foreign Minister Omar Bula sent Democratic leadership a letter apologizing for disparaging statements he’d made against Democrats in years past.Since then, de la Espriella and Meeks seem to have reconciled their differences, with the top Democrat on the foreign policy panel sitting down with senior Colombian officials this week for “Milagro Week.”But the new Colombian administration’s peace and security strategy will likely continue to face scrutiny from Democrats, especially now as they come into control of key foreign policy committees in Congress.Time will tell if de la Espriella is able to reverse Colombia’s fiscal bind and deteriorating security panorama. But if his first 100 days are any indication, it will likely be a bumpy 44 months for El Tigre’s “miracle” government.
- — Trump-Xi-Putin meet could be more important than you think
- The trilateral summit scheduled between President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping should be seen as the first tentative step towards — ideally — a “concert of powers” in which the leading states of the world will manage relations between themselves in such a way as to preserve and promote international peace.In this way, even if the meeting — which is supposed to take place Thursday on the sidelines of the APEC summit — leads to no concrete results, it will still be worth doing. If the ultimate goal is peace and any possibility of co-operation against transnational threats including climate change, rogue AI, and terrorism, it must begin with the fostering of reasonably stable relations between the world’s three most powerful military states. For the U.S. commentariat whose noses are out of joint about the prospect of Trump treating with “authoritarians” one cannot acknowledge the tremendous rise in Chinese power on one hand and then say Trump treating Xi as an equal is some sort of shameful and unnecessary concession to Beijing.The open secret is that the U.S. does in fact badly need China’s help in extricating itself and the world from the war with Iran, which has become an unending quagmire. This war was entirely the doing of President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and had no international or democratic legitimacy whatsoever — or, for that matter, any real basis in U.S. national interests.China, as the other biggest world economy and largest consumer of energy from the Persian Gulf, has an entirely legitimate stake and role in trying to bring this war to an end. Russia too, it may be remembered, played a critical role in bringing about Obama’s JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran — the one that Trump so disastrously cancelled. China might also be able to play a critical role in helping broker a peace settlement in Ukraine; but China needs to be incentivized to do so. Berating Beijing for trading with Russia will achieve nothing.U.S. efforts at universal American hegemony, set out in the “Wolfowitz Doctrine” of 1992 and followed by every subsequent U.S. administration, have failed utterly and have only contributed to a whole set of wars. Democratic Peace Theory has also failed. The Chinese and Russian authoritarian states are not going away, and have to be engaged if global catastrophes are to be avoided.
- — Pentagon fails 9th straight audit, can't account for $2 trillion
- Taxpayer money is flowing to the Pentagon at record levels, yet the Pentagon can’t actually tell you where all that money is going. That’s the conclusion from the Pentagon’s 9th consecutive failed financial audit, which continues to leave the Pentagon as the only major federal Department to have never received a “clean” department-wide audit.Nonetheless, the Pentagon celebrated the audit results in a press release proclaiming that, “For the first time in Department history, clean audit opinions will cover more than 56 percent of DoW assets.” What isn’t mentioned in that press release is that the Pentagon has more than $4.8 trillion in assets, meaning that more than $2 trillion in assets do not have clean audits.This inability to account for literally trillions of dollars in assets is happening at a time when more than half of all Pentagon spending is now going to private contractors who have no qualms spending billions on stock buy-backs and multi-million-dollar CEO compensation packages that do nothing to enhance U.S. national security. This inability to track the Pentagon’s money is also happening as historic levels of taxpayer money are flowing to the Pentagon. The Pentagon budget eclipsed $1 trillion for the first time this year. Next year, the President hopes to increase the Pentagon budget to $1.5 trillion (more than the U.S. military spent at the height of World War II, even adjusting for inflation). On top of all that, the Pentagon has requested tens of billions of dollars in additional funding to pay for the Iran war — a war which Americans are overwhelmingly opposed to. In fact, 74% of voters said the Iran war was a “crucial” or “major” factor when they cast their votes in the midterm elections.All of this points to a simple question: if the Pentagon can’t tell us where our money has gone, why should we give them more money?The basic goal of being able to account for where taxpayer dollars are flowing isn’t just a financial concern either, it’s a national security issue. “Without having sound financial management practices and reliable, useful, and timely financial information routinely available, DOD risks being unable to effectively and efficiently manage its budgets and assets for the benefit of the warfighter,” the Government Accountability Office argued in a May 2026 report on DoD auditing.For warfighters and taxpayers alike, the very least the Pentagon can do as its proposing these unprecedented spending levels is to fully account for how it is spending the enormous amount of money it already has. Until that happens and the nation’s largest bureaucracy can show us the receipts for where our money is going, they should stop asking us for more of it.
- — Will Syria entry into Mecca pact mean clash with the Houthis?
- Syria appears likely to soon join the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, a collective defense agreement established several months ago by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. This development would constitute a milestone in Damascus’ efforts to reassert itself within the region’s security architecture following Syria’s gruesome civil war.Membership in the pact could enhance the legitimacy and prestige of post-Assad Syria while bolstering its military capabilities and deepening partnerships with influential regional states. Syria could benefit from more intelligence cooperation, military training, and Saudi financial support. All this could complement Damascus’ existing security partnership with Ankara. But it’s not all milk and honey. Joining the security configuration could expose Syria to foreign conflicts and geopolitical rivalries while undermining Damascus’ ability to prioritize redevelopment at home. There could also be implications for unresolved problems between Syria’s central government and certain minorities. Such frictions stand to exacerbate if Damascus’ entry into the pact leads to rising sectarian temperatures at home and across the region, particularly within the context of Syrian forces being brought into Saudi Arabia’s conflict with Yemen’s Houthi rebels. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa will have to weigh these risks carefully as he decides whether to join the bloc.Security benefits and military implications for DamascusSyria faces two main threats today. The most immediate one is Israel, which has expanded its illegal occupation of Syrian territory since the former regime’s fall nearly two years ago. Israeli forces have come within 15 miles of Damascus. Since December 2024, Israel has continued launching strikes on Syrian military infrastructure and seeking to empower separatists in the country despite Sharaa offering the Israelis non-aggression and security agreements.Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” pose the second threat. From Damascus’ perspective, the risk is that Tehran will intensify pressure on Syria to ensure that the Islamic Republic can continue accessing Lebanon for the purpose of arming Hezbollah within the context of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran.At least on paper, accession to the pact could provide Damascus with another layer of deterrence by increasing potential costs for Tel Aviv and Tehran that would come with future acts of aggression against Syria. But the likelihood that the pact’s signatories would actually intervene militarily on behalf of Damascus is anything but guaranteed.“Membership of the Mecca Agreement will not immediately allay these pressures in direct security terms,” said James Watt, a former British ambassador who now works for a consultancy called Ambassador Partnership LLP. “But Syria can derive an important degree of confidence from the de facto alliance it has created. In the context of rapid changes in regional security structures, Syria has chosen to join the diplomatic centerpiece of the new regional order. The benefits will amplify over time.”Syria’s ability to make meaningful contributions to the pact is questionable given the degradation of the country’s armed forces and the immense challenges of rebuilding its military institutions. However, Syria’s combat experiences may prove helpful to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan.Indications of a growing Saudi-Syrian security partnership include the reported arrival of Syrian military advisers in Saudi Arabia, Syrian plans to deploy roughly 600 special forces personnel to the kingdom, and the new bilateral defense agreement signed on November 4.“The only place where [Syria] can contribute to a degree is by providing foot soldiers for the Yemen battle front as it does have battle-hardened, experienced and also ideologically motivated former rebel groups who might be relatively more effective in Yemen as compared to any other external force,” said Umar Karim, an associate fellow at the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies, in an RS interview. However, Watt believes that such a contribution would mostly serve as a gesture of Syrian solidarity with Saudi Arabia in the Saudi-Houthi conflict. Regardless, any Syrian deployment to the Arabian Peninsula will divert resources away from the country’s dire domestic needs.Saudi Arabia's growing stake in SyriaAs post-Assad Syria’s most important Arab partner, Saudi Arabia would see Damascus’ membership as enhancing Riyadh’s clout in the Levant and strengthening the kingdom’s security partnerships. Damascus joining the pact would further institutionalize Saudi-Syrian ties and enhance efforts to undermine Iran’s ability to reassert itself in Syria.Noting a “wider Saudi effort to counter Iranian influence beyond the Gulf,” Elijah J. Magnier, a veteran war correspondent and adviser to the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Iraq and Lebanon, explained that “Assad’s fall weakened Tehran’s position in Syria and gave Riyadh an opening.” Furthermore, by “investing in a long-term relationship with Damascus, Saudi Arabia can help limit Iran’s room to rebuild its influence there while working with Turkey, which already has substantial leverage in Syria.” Although the Saudi-Syrian defense agreement demonstrates the extent to which Riyadh is committed to its bilateral partnership with Damascus, Magnier stressed that Syrian membership in the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is a separate matter entirely.“Saudi Arabia would gain a greater stake in the Levant, but it could also face a Syrian request for collective support after Israeli strikes,” he told RS. “Riyadh can advance its strategic interests in Syria through defense cooperation today. Extending a collective guarantee would require it to decide how much risk it is prepared to assume on the Israeli front.” Where do Turkey and Pakistan stand?Turkey is Syria’s “natural security partner,” said Watt, who pointed to two countries’ shared historic ties, Sunni identities, and common opposition to Kurdish separatism.“Within the Agreement, Turkey stands out as having considerable military strength, and through NATO membership an important degree of strategic depth in facing down Israeli threats. In view of all this, the accession of Syria to the agreement seems merely a logical development,” he told RS. “Israel has chosen to take an aggressive stance towards Turkey, but there is nothing inherent that prevents normal relations were Israel to reverse its expansionist policies in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine,” the former British diplomat added. “Turkey has maintained relations with Tehran in a way that facilitates the diplomatic solution sought by the Mecca Agreement.”Meanwhile, Islamabad could gain from an enhanced diplomatic and military presence in the Middle East beyond the Gulf. However, Karim argues that “now there does not seem to be much excitement in Pakistan about” Islamabad acquiring “that kind of strategic and diplomatic influence” in Arab states outside the Gulf.The risk of too many regional entanglementsFor all the potential benefits, Syria’s efforts to balance regional relationships could become complicated if Damascus joins the pact. As Watt told RS, Syria’s membership would mark a departure from the neutrality pursued by post-Assad Syria, which could mean less diplomatic flexibility for Sharaa’s government moving forward.For example, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates raises real concerns about tensions between Damascus and Abu Dhabi resulting from Syrian membership. At the same time, Syria’s relationship with Iran would risk becoming more confrontational should Damascus enter the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. Ultimately, what remains to be seen is whether the pact’s collective-defense provisions will meaningfully enhance Syria’s security. As Turkey and Pakistan’s responses to Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia since the defense clause’s activation last month underscored, each Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signatory has its own national interests that stand to limit its willingness to become directly involved in conflicts involving its allies. This dynamic should cause officials in Damascus to question what concrete military commitments Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan will make when it comes to defending Syria from Israeli aggression.
- — US keeps punishing Iraq to get at Iran
- Washington’s latest attempt to restrict Iraq’s economic relations with Iran exposes a serious contradiction in the U.S. approach toward Baghdad. While Washington seeks to establish an expanded bilateral partnership following the withdrawal of its forces from Iraq, it continues to push Baghdad to become part of Washington’s confrontation with Tehran. This policy risks strengthening those political forces in Iraq that Washington seeks to weaken.On November 8, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein revealed that the U.S. Treasury had demanded the closure of all but two border crossings with Iran. This in turn followed Trump’s alleged threat to strike Iraqi armed factions if they participated in renewed fighting on behalf of Iran. Earlier in October, the Treasury imposed sanctions on an Iraqi bank accused of facilitating Iranian sanctions evasion and supporting armed organizations. Earlier measures targeted militia commanders and individuals allegedly exploiting Iraq's oil industry.But Iran retains an enduring influence in Iraq, a result of both geography and close historical and religious ties. More important is the question of security. Iraq neither can nor wants to serve as Washington’s, or indeed anyone’s, military bulwark against Iran. This thinking has further solidified in Baghdad amid the ongoing war in which Iran has effectively weathered U.S. pressure.The U.S. has tried to pull Iraq away from Iran under previous Iraqi governments without success. But the latest attempt is driven by the understanding that the current Iraqi prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, is a politician particularly suited for this kind of mission given his experience as a businessman and his highly transactional approach to foreign policy. Washington also believes that al-Zaidi, as a man hailing from outside the Iraqi political system, would be better able to integrate the Iran-leaning militias into the state.Yet the problem is that al-Zaidi — having emerged from the Shia Coordination Framework, which includes factions maintaining close relations with Tehran — must balance competing interests while strengthening state institutions. American pressure risks weakening those Iraqi politicians who favor pragmatic cooperation with Washington. Iran-backed factions could portray stringent U.S. demands as evidence that Washington continues to disregard Iraqi sovereignty. Such arguments may resonate with constituencies that are already critical of decades-long U.S. military operations carried out unilaterally within Iraq’s borders.Washington appears to believe that disbanding the militias (now postponed by Baghdad to June 2027) would both limit Iran’s influence and benefit Iraq over the longer run. This idea is appealing, but actually carrying it out would not necessarily result in diminishing Tehran’s influence. Iranian penetration of Iraqi government and society is much greater than just its influence with militias, however powerful they may be. The country’s ministries and other state institutions are packed with bureaucrats and politicians imbued with strong pro-Iranian sentiment. The web of financial and political links between the two countries is such that the notion of “freeing” Iraq from Iran by “disbanding the militias” reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of their relationship. Limiting Iran’s influence will take a significant amount of time and should ideally go hand in hand with helping create a better investment climate for American and other Western companies. Some moves in this direction have been made. On November 8, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Mohsen al-Mandalawi met U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Stephen Fagin to discuss implementation of economic agreements worth some $60 billion announced during al-Zaidi's visit to Washington in July.Promoting closer ties between Iraq on the one hand and Turkey and the Gulf states on the other would also constitute an important step. Syria might not be Iraq’s perfect analogy, but Damascus’ pivot to Turkey and the Gulf states after the fall of the Assad dynasty clearly reduced Iran’s influence there.Increasing pressure on Iraq over its close ties with Iran at this moment, when U.S. efforts to defeat Iran militarily have clearly fallen short, appears especially ill-timed. The Islamic Republic might be economically highly vulnerable because of Washington’s blockade and tightening sanctions regime, but the country appears to have weathered the external threat. Iran’s neighbors are now more hesitant to pressure the Islamic Republic, which has also managed to reconstitute its military capabilities.Moreover, Iraq has already suffered substantial economic damage due to disruptions to oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the war. On November 8, Hussein estimated Iraq’s losses from the conflict at approximately $60 billion. Although Iraqi oil exports, which account for approximately 90% of government revenue, recovered to around 3.5 million barrels per day in October, compared with 2.65 million in September, the deterioration in government revenues has exposed the country's structural vulnerabilities. Further restrictions on cross-border commerce would impose additional costs on an economy with limited capacity to absorb them.Economic relations with Iran are also far more extensive than Washington’s demands appear to acknowledge. Bilateral trade reached approximately $12 billion in Iran’s fiscal year ending in March 2025. The Kurdistan region alone reportedly conducts approximately $5 billion in annual trade with Iran. These commercial connections sustain transportation companies, wholesalers, agricultural producers, merchants, and border communities. Their disruption would affect Iraqi businesses whose operations depend on regular cross-border movement.Moreover, the consequences could extend beyond conventional trade. Iraq has long relied on Iranian natural gas to fuel electricity generation, even as Baghdad has pursued alternative energy supplies. Economic disengagement from Iran is therefore not simply a matter of political willingness. It requires alternative infrastructure, financing, and supply chains that cannot be established overnight. The Development Road initiative running from Turkey to the Gulf region via Iraqi territory might also serve as an option that would allow Baghdad to lessen dependence on Iran. But the project’s implementation is still in its early stages, and some accommodation with the Iran-aligned militias over ensuring security along the route will be of critical importance to advance the project.Thus, continued American efforts to constrain Iraq’s regional engagement risk strengthening precisely those political forces that Washington seeks to weaken. Rather than reducing Iranian influence, political pressure could undermine Iraq’s institutions, encourage anti-American mobilization, and diminish Baghdad's willingness to cooperate with Washington on security and economic issues.
- — Scott Bessent is running Washington’s other war department
- Marco Rubio may be Secretary of State, but the role of top diplomat for Ukraine, Iran and even Gaza was bestowed on two real estate investors, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. And while they manage the diplomacy portfolio, the Treasury Department is waging war. At Treasury’s helm is former Wall Street investor and hedge fund manager Scott Bessent. Now the warrior banker, he uses tariffs as threats and sanctions as bombs.The Trump administration has repeatedly threatened Canada with talk of becoming the 51st state. Handing the file to Bessent, Trump announced that the U.S. would use “economic force” to “get rid of that artificially drawn line” between Canada and the United States.When the Canadian province of Alberta held a referendum on whether they wanted a future referendum on independence, Bessent intervened, saying Alberta would make a perfect partner for the United States. He said Ottawa is frustrating Alberta and its “wealth of natural resources” by not letting it “build a pipeline to the Pacific.” As a solution, he suggested that “we should let them come down into the U.S…. Alberta is a natural partner for the U.S. They have great resources. The Albertans are very independent people." The preliminary referendum was overwhelmingly defeated.Not wanting boots on the ground in Cuba, Trump turned the Cuba file over to Treasury before the Pentagon. The economic strangulation of Cuba has not toppled the Cuban government, but it has devastated its people. The island is in darkness, and water, food, and medicine are scarce. Tens of thousands of surgeries have been canceled. According to U.N. human rights chief Volker Türk, “children are dying because doctors lack access to essential medical supplies and medicines.”Employing a strategy of “carrot and stick,” Bessent said sanctions can go up or down depending on the behavior of the Cuban government. The U.N. says Washington’s sanctions are “incompatible with basic principles of international human rights law.” Bessent’s evaluation is that they are working: “It is working in Cuba right now… we are going to bring this regime down.”Bessent says that, as the strategy is working in Cuba, so it will work in Iran. "Operation Economic Outcast" was supposed to land the killer blow on Iran (and anyone doing business with Iran). And, according to Bessent’s metrics, it did. Even before the war Bessent said, “President Trump ordered… maximum pressure on Iran. And it worked, because in December, their economy collapsed... and this is why the people took to the street.” Bessent told the Senate Banking Committee that “what we have done is created a dollar shortage in the country… The Iranian currency went into free fall, inflation exploded, and hence we have seen the Iranian people out on the street.” Fast forward to Sunday, Bessant said that the projected 25% contraction of the Iranian economy is “one of the fastest collapses in history” and boasted that “everything I’m doing is working.”The force of Bessent’s economic war machine received validation from the State Department on November 10, when Rubio assessed that the military war on Iran was no longer necessary because economic war was working better. "The economic pain that is being inflicted on Iran right now is extraordinary,” Rubio told G7 leaders. "We don't need to conduct military strikes if we're achieving the same objective through economic means and economic pressure.” Bessent had been lobbying Trump to take that route. Of course the Iranians, who after eight months of are still hitting tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and attacking neighbors in the Gulf, like Bahrain (including firing drones at U.S. radar systems on Tuesday) in retaliation for American strikes, might have a word or two to say about that. "Despite all these pressures, the Iranian economy has demonstrated very good resilience, and the claim that Iran’s economy is collapsing is nothing more than an illusion,” Central Bank chief Abdolnaser Hemmati said in October.The leader of the campaign to negotiate with Iran, meanwhile, has been Vice President JD Vance, who was recently speaking almost every day to Qatari and Pakistani mediators. At the end of October, Vance sent a letter to the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, exploring the possibility of direct talks to stave off the resumption of intense attacks by the U.S. But two days after Rubio’s endorsement of economic warfare, Trump signed off on it, pulling Vance off the file. Relying on Bessent’s economic approach, Trump said, “we don’t need a deal with Iran. Those days have long since passed. We’ve got their money, Hundreds of Billions of Dollars, and we’ve got their Strait!”American foreign policy evolution has in the last 25 years favored the Pentagon and the CIA over the State Department. During the two Trump administrations, as Washington has fully appreciated the power of its dollar dominance and control of trade networks and payment systems, the Treasury has risen to join the two predominant agencies, with Bessent at its helm. But that doesn’t mean a kinder, gentler form of foreign policy. A landmark study published in The Lancet by Francisco Rodríguez, Silvio Rendón, and Mark Weisbrot found that unilateral U.S. sanctions are associated with death tolls similar to armed conflict. The prevailing weapons may have changed, but the results are all about punishment with very little room for diplomacy or progress toward peace.
- — Could it be satan? No, Huckabee, just the Americans you work for
- “Satan has blinded the minds” of those against the Iran war, said U.S. Israel Ambassador Mike Huckabee in a late October interview. The devil “has captured their thinking,” he claimed. “I see it as spiritual darkness, spiritual blindness.”“I know it sounds a little funny for an ambassador to be talking like this,” he said.Yes, it does. “Israel is not a political issue,” Huckabee also insisted (it’s not?) “It is a biblical issue. It's a moral issue.” He was referring to the importance of the Jewish state to many of Donald Trump’s American evangelical Christian supporters.Huckabee said this right before the American midterm elections, in which the Iran war and U.S-Israel relations turned out to be significant issues helping to deliver big losses to Republicans.Vice President JD Vance even lamented after the election that the war was in part the “the reason we lost is the war.”But Huckabee rejected Vance’s conclusion. “I don’t agree with that because I don’t think that’s where voters are,” Huckabee said in an interview with Israel’s Channel 12 News. “In fact, if you look at the polls, the only group of people in America that really think that that’s an important issue are the Democrats on the far left.”But that’s just not true. In fact, 74% of voters said the Iran war was a crucial or major factor in their vote according to exit polls. Gallup reported the week before the election that 77 % of registered voters considered the war “extremely” or “very important” to their vote. Polling before the elections reflected an American public across the board — even Republicans — frustrated with the war and wanting an end to it.Furthermore, because of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s role in convincing President Donald Trump to attack Iran, American opinion of Israel has plummeted, too. Exit polls indicate that some 50% of Americans think Washington supports the Israeli government “too much.”That’s not just “the far left.” But instead of engaging in self-reflection, Ambassador Huckabee is worried that American pastors aren’t having the right kind of influence over their flocks.“Too many pastors in America are fearful that if they speak about Israel it might be divisive in their own church,” Huckabee said last week in Jerusalem to an international group of pastors, as reported by U.S.-based Jerusalem News Syndicate. “Well, if we are going to divide people, let’s at least divide them over something worth the division.”“Go home and challenge something that is killing America and killing the faith in America and that is biblical illiteracy,” Huckabee told them. “Go home, be bold, be brave but most of all be biblical.”What does this mean, exactly, “at least divide them over something worth the division”? We know Huckabee is a Zionist because he called himself “an unapologetic one, because I believe the Bible,” in a Yeshiva University graduation address in May. There is nothing wrong with pastor-to-pastor advice. But there is something wrong with an American ambassador who is supposed to be representing the foreign policy of the United States, spending so much time on the taxpayer dime ostensibly advocating for fealty to another nation. Huckabee doesn’t have the diplomatic post and all of the status, authority, residence, office and staff that comes with it to “be biblical.” That’s not his job.“The Chief of Mission — with the title of Ambassador…and the Deputy Chief of Mission head the mission’s ‘country team’ of U.S. Government personnel,” reads the U.S. government embassy site on “The Role of an Ambassador.”According to the job description, ambassadors’ responsibilities include, "speaking with one voice to others on U.S. policy – and ensuring mission staff do likewise – while providing to the President and Secretary of State expert guidance and frank counsel.”Huckabee is supposed to report to Secretary of State Marco Rubio. What does Rubio think of his ambassador claiming that those American who opposed the Iran War have been “captured" or "blinded" by "satan”?Moreover, does Huckabee think JD Vance has been blinded by Satan for repudiating the war? Is Pope Leo, the spiritual leader of 1.4 billion Catholics including 60 million Americans not “biblically literate” for condemning the U.S.-Israel war on Iran as unjust? Such talk really does sound a little funny, ambassador, like the Church Lady on the 1980s-era “Saturday Night Live” asking “could it be… satan?” every time a guest said something she didn't like.But the war is deadly serious and so should be the role of US ambassador anywhere around the world. Public officials are entitled to their own religious views and liberty. But there is something wrong if pastor-official Huckabee is conflating the interests of the U.S. with his personal biblical imperatives — that is the kind of theocratic thinking we are supposed to revile Iran for.Perhaps it’s time to interpret Huckabee’s comments as more than silly one-offs and ask whether Trump should put a more serious person — one who puts American foreign policy interests before his own biblical ministrations— into the job.
- — Squabble over leadership risks plunging the OSCE into crisis
- The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is staring down the barrel of entering 2027 without a chair for the first time in its 51-year history. The Europeans are wrestling Turkey to drop its veto over Cyprus’ bid, raising the stakes by loudly opposing the only other candidate, Georgia. Unable to win over Ankara, Europe should drop its objections to Tbilisi to avert a crisis. With three weeks to go until the OSCE Ministerial Council in Lugano, Switzerland, on December 3, the organization remains deadlocked over who should lead it from 2027-28. The chairperson-in-office role rotates every two years and is normally voted on well in advance with agreement by consensus. EU member Cyprus was the first country to put its hat in the ring almost two years ago, in December 2024.However, Cyprus’ bid has been vetoed by Turkey on the basis of the long-standing dispute over the division of the island in 1974. There is a long history of enmity over the issue between NATO members Turkey and Greece, the latter of which has long backed Cyprus and opposed Turkey’s occupation of half of the island. Indeed, each country has vetoed the other across numerous areas of dialogue and cooperation. Just this past week, the Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC) began lobbying the Trump Administration to veto Turkey’s candidate to become U.N. secretary general. With this history in mind, it’s clear, at least to me, that the Turkish are never going to back down over Cyprus’ candidature for the OSCE chair role. That leaves a second candidate, Georgia, which entered the race in January. However, in late September 2026, 14 European countries came out to block Tbilisi, without raising specific objections. This does not represent a veto. Instead, the EU has said that it will not consider other candidates apart from Cyprus, in an election that requires consensus. Refusing to consider Georgia has resulted in the current stalemate. Europe is effectively taking the chairmanship to the wire, in a bid to force through Cyprus’ candidate. It’s not going to work.This fight raises the real prospect of the OSCE entering 2027 without a chair, leaving it unable, for the first time, to agree on leadership, budgets or meaningful action on the core security priorities of its region, including on Ukraine.The organization comprises 57 member states, including the United States, Russia, and most of Europe and Central Asia. A headless OSCE would cripple the only remaining body in Europe that exists to promote dialogue between countries in times of conflict. This at a time when European states have sidelined bilateral diplomacy with Russia because of the Ukraine war, such that the Europeans have been left out of last week’s Abu Dhabi peace talks. With the unstoppable Europeans facing off against the immovable Turks, the obvious solution would be to drop objections to Georgia’s candidacy.There are strong arguments in favor of Georgia. It straddles one of the hottest geopolitical crossroads in the world, with Russia to its north and Iran to its south. Turkey, while generally on good terms with Tbilisi, has a deeply troubled relationship with Armenia. The fraught geopolitical tightrope that Georgia has had to tread on Russia is precisely why it would make a good chair of the OSCE. Indeed, Georgia assumed the chair of the OSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation in April of this year — and with none of the attending drama.The current government of Georgia has delivered an impressive track record of economic growth and reform that suggests it has the institutional credentials and credibility to lead. It remains a country committed to future membership in the EU despite the difficulties in the relationship, as the prime minister set out at the recent EU Enlargement Summit. This last-minute European barrier to Georgia’s candidacy appears in part linked to the deterioration in Georgian-European relations since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022. While the Georgian government has consistently and repeatedly backed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in official statements, it has found itself in the European crosshairs for not joining economic sanctions against Russia or getting involved with the war effort. The reasons for this are pragmatic. Georgia suffered a brief yet devastating war against Russia in 2008 and the loss of a significant chunk of its territory in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Having visited Georgia often over the past two years, it is clear to me that the loss of territory to Russia represents a deep scar that runs through Georgian society irrespective of which political party citizens support. The idea that Georgia is a Russian ally because it refuses to expose itself to the risk of another damaging war is frankly ludicrous. Georgia still does not maintain diplomatic relations with Russia. Its careful positioning on the war has occasionally put it at odds with the government of Ukraine. And yet Ukraine is not opposing Georgia’s OSCE bid. Nor are the United States, Canada, Russia, Georgia’s immediate neighbours or the Central Asian participating states. Georgia has faced criticism from Europe for clamping down on foreign-funded NGOs. Some Western commentators argue that U.S. and European lawmakers want to deliver a Maidan-style revolution in Georgia.However, these disagreements are entirely incidental to the issue of Georgia’s candidacy to chair the OSCE. The organization was first founded in 1975 (initially as the CSCE) as part of the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate greater dialogue on security between western Europe, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It has always been, purposefully, a big tent that even today can accommodate Russia and Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey and Cyprus, Kosovo and Serbia, and so on.It was perhaps inevitable at some point that a party to a frozen conflict within the group would one day step forward to assume the chairman role, prompting a veto from the other party. This is exactly what has happened with Cyprus’ candidature, which has become an immovable blockage with Europe and Turkey unwilling to give ground.The EU is never going to win that fight, which leaves the OSCE deadlocked with mere weeks to run. So, the Europeans are in the invidious position of not being able to force through their own candidate for the chairman role while blocking the only other credible candidate, Georgia, on procedural grounds. This is deeply unhelpful in circumstances where neither Ukraine nor Russia see objections to Georgia assuming the role. If the OSCE enters a new year without a chair, the OSCE will have become a reflection of Europe’s divisions rather than a mechanism for managing them. It’s time for European nations to drop their objections to Georgia’s candidacy and avoid plunging the OSCE into 2027 in a state of crisis.
- — Trump's Africa envoy puts on a masterclass in bad diplomacy
- Since returning to the White House, President Donald Trump has increasingly relied on special envoys to deal with some of his most vexing foreign policy challenges. While Trump slashed the use of special envoys in his first term, he has come around in his second term, in part because they allow him to bypass his career foreign service officers by compartmentalizing information from “deep state bureaucrats” who he has accused of spying on him and leaking his dealmaking to the press.As in previous administrations, the current Trump administration has assembled a collection of envoys largely based on region and policy imperative. Regions like the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and the Arctic all have special envoys, as do specific countries like Syria, Belarus, Greenland, and Ukraine (currently vacant). Similarly high-profile or strategic policy objectives like hostage affairs and combating anti-Semitism also have designated special envoys.But where the Trump Administration deviates from his predecessors is in Africa. There, he has mostly dispensed with the almost-30-year-old practice of appointing special envoys dedicated to chronically unstable areas like the Great Lakes, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa; as well as country-specific envoys, as for Sudan or Libya.Instead, the president relies not on a special envoy, but rather on a single senior adviser for Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, whose greatest job qualification seems to be, not coincidentally, that he is the father-in-law to Trump’s youngest daughter, Tiffany.Boulos’ appointment in April 2025 was not accompanied by the normal fanfare of previous envoys. In fact, the announcement itself was only two sentences long and did nothing to explain why he was appointed or what his role would be. No biography exists for Boulos anywhere on the State Department website; nor is he listed among the leadership of either the Africa Bureau or the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau — areas where Boulos appears to hold great sway in setting administration policy. The White House website similarly makes no mention of Boulos in any capacity.And yet, despite the undefined nature of his role, Boulos has seen an almost exponential growth in his portfolio that has no parallel among Trump's other envoys. Nor is there any diplomatic or strategic logic to what countries earn his attention and when. At first glance, Boulos’ approach has seemed more in line with that of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in promoting the president's peacemaking agenda, though, unlike Boulos, they feature quite prominently in the administration’s official communications, including the president’s Board of Peace website. Boulos first entered the world of diplomacy in April 2025, when he was given the dual role of negotiating peace in the conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda and promoting U.S. private-sector investment in the region. But quickly thereafter, he was seen at the president's side during the Oval Office meeting with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa the following month; and then again at an undefined White House “mini-Summit “of leaders from West Africa that July, where the President also announced his intention to negotiate an end to Sudan’s deadly conflict. Since then, Boulos has emerged as a sort of “Forest Gump of diplomacy,” arriving in Morocco to support Rabat’s claims on Western Sahara; in Libya to broker an “oil for unity” deal; and then again on even more far flung issues, like Nigeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Algeria, where he has opined on topics stretching from the plight of Christians, to the Iran war, the Abraham Accords, and the war in Gaza.To coordinate these massive diplomatic initiatives, he regularly appears in Brussels, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Ankara, to name just a few. But frequent flyer miles do not an effective envoy make. Indeed, many governments have privately expressed some bewilderment as to how and at what level Boulos should be received when he turns up in their country. Some don’t even know what he is there to discuss, since often the local U.S. embassy hasn’t arranged his meetings. Given that his title of “senior advisor” carries no diplomatic equivalent in the U.S. government or any other, it is rather his familial ties to the Trump clan that opens doors. But even with the Trump calling card, it is questionable how much he has been able to achieve in his 18 months on the job. No doubt the mixed track record is in part due to his enormous portfolio, which would be too expansive for even a seasoned diplomat backed up by a team of career diplomats with experience on the disparate range of portfolios, let alone a “small time truck salesman” from Nigeria with no prior diplomatic experience.It is odd, then, that Boulos is known to keep his own counsel, rarely traveling with more than one staffer and often not even including embassy staff in his meetings with host governments. It's no wonder that many of his diplomatic accomplishments can be described as one State Department colleague put it to me: “all sizzle and no steak.”But such a scattershot approach to peacemaking and diplomacy can rarely deliver results that last, or get to the root causes of age-old conflicts. That is certainly the case in the peace deal he brokered between DR Congo and Rwanda, which to date has done little to actually pause fighting; or in Sudan where he has yet to unlock a ceasefire despite multiple rounds of U.S. sanctions; or in Libya, where his deal to create a unity government has been criticized as little more than a “pact that entrenches elite interests.” What Boulos’ approach lacks, and what every envoy needs to be successful, is a strategic framework from which to operate — a roadmap that spells out what the administration's vision is; what it hopes to achieve; what resources it is prepared to make available; and what diplomatic team it has put in place to carry out this policy. None of these diplomatic building blocks appear to be in place for any of the peacemaking initiatives he has begun or any of the dizzying number of other diplomatic files he has opened. It’s hard to measure success when you cannot first define it.Instead, Boulos has been deployed as a kind of diplomatic utility player, representing the administration at a U.S.-Africa business conference one day, peace talks the next day, and a minerals negotiation after that — sowing confusion all along the way, both within the State Department and among partner countries about what the U.S. approach truly is and who is in charge, since much of his portfolio would normally be handled by one of the State Department’s regional assistant secretaries. Congress remains similarly in the dark. Typically, beyond helping to organize a “whole-of-government” response via an extensive interagency process, a special envoy would keep Congress, the media, and the wider policy community informed on the administration’s efforts. But with only a senior adviser title that comes with no Senate confirmation, Boulos has largely kept clear of Congress and the U.S. media. Here, too, absent that give-and-take over the administration’s policies, the bubble Boulos operates in has produced little more than an X feed chronicling his diplomatic adventures, but offering few details about the substance of his conversations.As new Democratic congressional majorities arrive in Washington in January, they would do well to demand greater clarity from him about his role in setting administration policy, the strategy and resources he is employing, and the ultimate goals he is pursuing across such a vast and competing diplomatic landscape. Such clarity might help to achieve better outcomes in a region of the world where U.S. diplomacy still matters.
- — Progressives say they can save US foreign policy from the blob
- In a stirring 1967 address in New York City, Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. proclaimed the death of the welfare state at the hands of the warfare state. “The promises of the Great Society have been shot down on the battlefield of Vietnam,” King declared. “While the anti-poverty program is cautiously initiated, zealously supervised and required to be an instant success, billions are liberally expended for this ill-considered war. The security we profess to seek in foreign adventures we will lose in our decaying cities.”Nearly six decades later, those who care about peace and dignity for the American people confront a similar dilemma. America’s post-Cold War pursuit of military dominance has generated resistance and destabilized nations abroad while enriching Pentagon contractors at the expense of the American public. It has led the United States into endless wars in the Middle East while pushing our politics in an ever more violent and paranoid direction.The Pentagon budget continues to grow to an eye-watering $1.5 trillion as Biden administration alumni flood the zone with self-exculpatory memoirs and a Republican president who campaigned on purging neoconservatives now finds himself fighting a disastrous war with Iran. Reacting to the sorry state of U.S. foreign policy, a critical mass of Americans have come to recognize that the country’s foreign policy does not serve their interests, as the midterm elections made clear. Congress responded to similar demands after the Vietnam War by initiating a bold (albeit insufficient) swath of reforms to rein in the imperial presidency and prevent U.S. arms from abetting human rights abuses. The question facing today’s progressives is whether they are up to the challenge of forging what Dr. King would call a “revolution of values” in American foreign policy.“A World for All,” edited by progressive foreign-policy maven Matt Duss of the Center for International Policy, seeks to answer this question in the affirmative. The volume of essays from progressive scholars and foreign-policy practitioners is divided into three thematic buckets: one on U.S. policy in several world regions, another on economics and migration, and a third devoted to Congress, the military-industrial complex, and technology. It is oriented, as Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) explains in the foreword, toward “articulat[ing] an affirmative vision” of a new foreign policy that “confronts global oligarchy, strengthens democratic institutions, and builds genuine partnerships.” Such a policy eschews delusions of global dominance while recognizing that “true security comes not from trillion-dollar arsenals but from addressing the root causes of instability: inequality, injustice, and environmental catastrophe.”At times, the volume does not live up to these grand ambitions. Even as the war in Iran raises important questions about the survivability and utility of U.S. military bases, few of the essays detailed how U.S. force posture might need to change to support such a vision. In fact, the Europe essay does not discuss the future of the 80,000 American troops on the continent. Similarly, the book’s discussion of the Ukraine War — the central friction point between the United States and Russia today — largely repackages the status quo in arguing that “the key diplomatic instrument will not be rhetoric or the art of persuasion but the cumulative leverage over Russia that Ukraine and its partners are able to amass.” It does not interrogate whether Ukraine’s leverage diminishes as the war of attrition drags on, likely harming Kyiv’s position at the negotiating table.This is a serious missed opportunity to chart an alternative course to the Cold War relic policy of many establishment Democrats and Republicans, which seeks worldwide U.S. military dominance without acknowledging the exorbitant costs this ambition incurs. These questions of prioritization should be front of mind for anyone trying to map the contours of a progressive foreign policy.As a whole, however, the book is a vital opening salvo in the Democratic foreign policy debate that will play out between now and the 2028 presidential primaries. The chapters on corruption and the defense budget feature bold, actionable recommendations for cracking down on pervasive corporate or foreign influence and ensuring American foreign policy represents the will of the American public. The volume’s contribution on Congress’s abdication of its constitutional responsibilities in war and peace likewise proposes important reforms to rein in the imperial presidency and build transpartisan coalitions to challenge unchecked presidential war-making. The book also rebuts some of the unhealthy ideological organizing principles of American primacy. Its prologue rightly pans “great power competition” with China and Russia for “prioritiz[ing] military solutions over diplomacy, undermin[ing] democracy and exacerbat[ing] inequality while exacerbating xenophobia and racism; and fuel[ing] jingoism…which heightens the risk of conflict. It also distracts from the problems with which the American people are most concerned.” In so doing, contributors Michael Brenes and Van Jackson make the provocative but essential argument that endless wars and interminable rivalries erode American democracy, in terms not dissimilar to King’s.The authors lament that the United States has become a driver of regional conflict in the Middle East through its blank-check support for an “expansionist” Israeli government and autocratic Gulf regimes. Similarly, the authors rightly argue the Iran War is the logical endpoint of the flawed bipartisan precept that overwhelming American military power can solve the political problems that bedevil the region.The authors are correct to observe that only sustained diplomacy with Iran can advance U.S. interests. Their conclusions that the United States should reduce or end its military presence in Iraq and the Gulf states and terminate U.S. assistance to Israel when it violates the laws of war or defies U.S. interests are compatible with a grand strategy of restraint.In several essays, contributors rebuke the Biden administration’s shortsighted focus on a global competition pitting democracies against autocracies as the organizing principle of international politics. The volume recognizes that China’s authoritarian government is not going away and that the United States should strive for a grand diplomatic bargain to reduce the risk of war and help manage vital issues of mutual concern, like climate change, AI, and nuclear arms control. Indeed, the sections on the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America criticize the bipartisan blank check that U.S. military aid and security assistance have provided to authoritarian regimes at great human cost in the name of counterterrorism or the War on Drugs.This represents a welcome break from post-Cold War Democratic foreign-policy orthodoxy. The 2024 Democratic Party platform, for example, characterized President Donald Trump as too soft on autocratic states like Iran and eschewed any mention of guardrails on competition with China. Democratic and progressive documents often suffer from critiquing the methods or decorum of U.S. policy rather than on the tangible outcomes of a faulty strategy of worldwide preeminence. The result has been old wine in a new bottle. To its credit, A World For All avoids this trap. It recognizes that the primary competition between democracy and autocracy is within states rather than between them. It rejects the premise that more defense spending and less bureaucracy will restore American military dominance and keep Americans safe. Its epilogue, written by Heather Hurlburt, notes that for too long, internationalists “have been prone to overpromise on what U.S. leadership can deliver and how ‘indispensable’ we are.”The Biden administration pursued a strategy that rejected the reality of a more multipolar world. If the next Democratic administration forges a new path and heeds the book’s call for humility, diplomacy, and discipline, it can break the cycle of endless war and give the American public its long-awaited peace dividend.
- — The hypersonic missile race is unnecessary boondoggle for US
- Last year, a group of high-ranking former military personnel and weapons company executives issued an ominous warning in an Atlantic Council report. U.S. adversaries, they said, were making rapid advances in hypersonic missile technology, “posing a severe challenge to US battlefield dominance.”“Now is the time to act decisively to close the hypersonic gap and defend the nation’s interests for the future,” the report declared. But is this really an existential threat? Will these technologies be as truly groundbreaking as the defense-tech industry claims? Experts who spoke with RS cast doubt on these positions, arguing that the spending is wasteful because despite the hype, hypersonics won’t provide unique advantages for the United States. Hypersonic missiles can reach speeds of over Mach 5 and remain maneuverable mid-flight to confuse defensive systems. The missiles are designed to evade traditional ballistic missile defense systems by flying at low altitude, leaving them difficult to detect until minutes or even seconds before striking a target. In comparison, traditional ballistics follow high, extraatmospheric, parabolic arcs, allowing radar systems to detect them before they reach their zenith, sometimes affording defenders more than 20 minutes of warning before impact.Claims about the difficulty of intercepting hypersonics aren’t airtight. Despite successful tests of some hypersonics, some experts doubt the feasibility of the claimed maximum speeds, maneuverability, and stealth abilities, according to Scientific American. The Congressional Budget Office agrees, insisting that “technological challenges must still be overcome to field hypersonic missiles.” According to the CBO, if fielded, the weapons would cost at least 30% more per unit than their ballistic counterparts. Even then, they would be more useful than ballistics only against extremely advanced, long-range defense systems, which no US adversaries currently possess. Still, claims of successful tests or deployments of hypersonics by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have caused concern in the national security establishment about growing risks to Washington’s aerial dominance and, particularly, the ability of these weapons to get past U.S. missile defense systems. As of October 2026, Russia has reportedly tested two maneuvering hypersonic systems, and it has used regular hypersonic missiles (Oreshnik) in the war against Ukraine.Iran and North Korea’s claims of hypersonic capabilities remain unverified by independent observers. China has a confirmed hypersonic weapon, with unconfirmed reports suggesting additional successes.The chase for hypersonics ignores a larger geopolitical context, says Kelly Grieco of the Stimson Center , who argues the United States’ major adversaries are acting out of a sense of vulnerability rather than a desire for escalation. For Russia and China, this stems from the transfer of U.S. THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense systems into Ukraine and South Korea. U.S. adversaries see these batteries as giving cover to U.S. activities in their respective regions, making it easier for the U.S. to attack without having to worry too much about defending its equipment and personnel in the region. If hypersonics can evade such defenses, these countries can theoretically respond effectively to any American incursions in the region, thus acting as a deterrent.In this context, these advanced, but expensive and rare, munitions make strategic sense. For a country like Iran, which can manufacture missiles more cheaply and has more limited resources, investing in a few highly advanced long-range missiles to increase deterrence in a future conflict makes strategic sense. In hypothetical wars — and indeed, in the ongoing war in the Persian Gulf — Iran is defending itself close to home against a militarily superior enemy. A country like Iran or China knows that even the threat of a strike to key U.S. sites, or even against the American homeland, would be intolerable for the U.S. and perhaps prevent an attack. However, Grieco felt that, given expensive military supply chains, a less developed missile manufacturing sector, and a different overall strategic orientation, these munitions would do little to enhance American security. The U.S. typically aims to maintain aerial superiority to carry out offensive strikes against an enemy with comparably minimal aerial defenses. Grieco says existing, cheaper ballistic missiles launched en masse would be just as effective at evading or overwhelming any countermeasures. Additionally, she believes the United States’ nuclear triad already serves as a more than effective nuclear deterrent that wouldn’t be improved by hypersonic development.Yet the U.S. is moving ahead with large-scale hypersonics development. Recently, the Pentagon offered private industry incentives to help close the alleged gap, with procurement contracts totaling over $12 billion for FY 2027. This staggering sum excludes additional research and development spending. Although traditional players like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman are in the mix, defense-tech startups are also trying their hand. Pentagon procurement overhauls in 2025 changed the rules to benefit younger, more innovative companies. Since then, venture capital investment in the hypersonic sector has more than tripled, rising to $1.2 billion in 2025 from $220 million the year prior.Newcomer Castelion demonstrates this trend well. As of September 2026, the company is valued at $14 billion after raising $1 billion in Series C funding, largely from venture capital, and winning nearly $500 million in Defense Department contracts this year alone. In September 2026, the Navy placed a nearly $44 million order for 444 rounds of the Castellion hypersonic strike missile, known as the Blackbeard, making it one of its largest such contracts to date. Grieco advised caution toward large-scale investment in immature technologies like hypersonics. Pointing to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, Grieco said the projects are already behind schedule. The GAO reported in July that the Army and Navy alone have already approved over $50 billion in investments and procurement of hypersonic missile technologies. As of July, the Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Program is 24 months behind on modifying ships to carry the $50 million-a-piece CPS missiles. The Dark Eagle, a missile developed jointly by the Army and Navy that will serve as the backbone of the Army’s hypersonic arsenal, is already delayed by two years. There is no central strategy for hypersonic investment. Julia Gledhill, a researcher and defense budgetary expert at the Stimson Center, explained there is no easy way to get a single number for the total U.S. investment in hypersonics today. “You have hypersonic funding in Golden Dome, in the Defense Production Act Money that is focused on industrial base expansion,” she said, adding that they were on the new Pentagon Munitions Acceleration Council’s list of 12 critical munitions. Grieco and Gledhill both said any strategic gains from hypersonics would be marginal at best and that greater investment risked entering a costly escalatory spending cycle with countries like Russia and China, as each strives to gain a technological upper hand with increasingly complex counter systems. Gledhill pointed to Trump’s “Golden Dome for America” as an example, comparing it to the ill-fated Reagan-era “Star Wars” initiative. Estimated to cost at least $1.2 trillion over 20 years, the program aims to build an orbital nuclear missile defense system. Scientists have already dubbed it a “fantasy,” and experts say it would be an unprecedented escalation in militarizing space. Grieco offered a simple explanation for why Washington is continuing this pursuit despite its myriad challenges. Hypersonic investment is “a culture thing,” she said. “There seems to be discomfort with being behind.”
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