Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Russia sanctions & new weapons, is Trump stuck in Groundhog Day?

 

at 7/14/25 6:58am

President Trump finds himself in a rerun of his first term on Ukraine policy. Declawed by lawmakers in D.C. and forced to push policies that worsen the U.S. relationship with Russia. He is expected today to announce that the U.S. will be sending more advanced patriot missile batteries to Ukraine — via NATO member countries, which will be paying for it. It’s not clear whether this is the “big announcement” he told reporters he’d be making on Ukraine on Monday or whether that could include tough new sanctions on Russia. The sanctions, which would impose enormous tariffs of 500% on countries that buy Russian energy, are being pushed by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) in a Senate bill that now has some 85 co-sponsors. Trump has not endorsed it yet but has made suggestions he would support it.Pumping more weapons into the war won’t help Ukraine win; backing secondary sanctions will kill prospects for peace. He should press for compromise from all sides in the conflict.There is a depressing sense of Groundhog Day to the situation President Trump finds himself in again today. Having said that “sanctions cost us a lot of money” at the recent G7 Summit in Canada, signing this latest act into law will simply confirm that he is no longer in control of U.S. policy towards Russia, as he wasn’t during his first term. Indeed, the proposed legislation would have a much worse effect on U.S.-Russia relations than the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, which was also pushed by Senator Graham. When President Trump signed CAATSA into law, he included a statement expressing displeasure at its flawed nature and how it would limit his executive authority in foreign affairs. CAATSA has been used for example to sanction Turkey in December 2020 over the purchase of Russian S-400 air defence and in March 2021 for the poisoning and imprisonment of the late political dissident, Aleksey Navalny. The difference with this latest sanctions bill is that, in addition to killing prospects of peace in Ukraine, it will cause self-harm to the U.S. economy — the tariffs would affect trade with a number of major U.S. partners including the EU, Taiwan, and China — and to America’s increasingly tarnished world standing.Attempting to undermine Russia by pushing vast tariffs against its main trading partners simply will not work. Anyone who believes that China will suddenly stop importing Russian oil against the threat of U.S. sanctions is a fool or deliberately disingenuous.As it did earlier this year, China will simply respond with tit for tat tariffs against Washington. While a much feared spike in inflation has not materialized yet, many American economists predict prices to rise over the summer. The rate of U.S. growth appears set to slow, according to the OECD. And that is on the basis of tariffs that President Trump threatened to impose. From ramping up China tariffs to 145% the average U.S. tariff on China is now around 51%. America’s effective tariff rate with the whole world stands at around 14.1% today.At no point since 2014 has it appeared remotely likely that sanctions would change President Putin’s stance towards Ukraine. As far back as February 2022, the day after the war in Ukraine started, Tulsi Gabbard, now U.S. Director of National Intelligence, was quoted as saying, “sanctions don’t work… What we do know is that they will increase suffering and hardship for the American people. And this is (the) whole problem with the Biden administration: They are so focused on how do we punish Putin that they don’t care and are not focused on what is actually in the best interests of the American people.”Meanwhile, Russia will continue to prosecute its grinding war against Ukraine with devastating consequences for that country. Now President Trump has struck a deal to send Patriot missiles to Ukraine via NATO (NATO countries will be paying for them), putting the financial burden on Europe as foreshadowed in my previous article. In widely reported comments, President Trump accused President Putin of throwing a lot of “bull****” about peace talks. But the core of his comments were about the capabilities of U.S. military equipment, how Washington has given Ukraine three times as much as Europe and how that balance should be “equalized.” He also refers to the “brilliant” U.S. defense contractors and urges Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to “step them up” so that they can produce equipment more quickly.My take is that, with a 5% NATO spending commitment pocketed, an increasingly frustrated President Trump increasingly looks upon the war as a business opportunity. This follows approval of a one-time spending splurge of an additional $150 billion for the Department of Defense — more than twice Britain’s yearly military spending and the reversal of a decision to temporarily pause weapons shipments to Ukraine. Trump says a major driver of this decision was the increase in Russian drone and missile strikes on Ukrainian cities including Kyiv. Ukraine undoubtedly needs weapons to defend itself. The rate at which Ukraine is losing territory on the battlefield has accelerated significantly in recent weeks. However, daily territorial gains remain objectively small, albeit at a punishing human cost in death and injury. But providing more “defensive” weapons won’t help Ukraine win, though it may arrest the speed of defeat. Not providing weapons won’t help Russia secure a spectacular breakthrough either.Russia has, arguably since the collapse of the first Istanbul talks in April 2022, focused on the attritional nature of the war, bleeding Ukraine and its Western sponsors dry of the economic means to fight. This lurch back to arming Ukraine to the teeth won’t change that. Longer term, the new NATO commitment to 5% defense spending will gradually shift the balance of military power in Europe, such that European NATO members could stand on their own two feet against Russia. But it won’t happen soon enough to help Ukraine snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Further talks between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Russia counterpart Sergei Lavrov took place on July 10 in Kuala Lumpur. But the Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the talks was bland. Beyond a brief reference to the search for peaceful solutions to conflict, it focused more on the reestablishment of “unhindered ties between their countries’ societies,” including through direct flights. A strategic reset of U.S.-Russia relations undoubtedly remains a big priority for the Kremlin. But right now, they appear in no hurry to settle. They, too, are consumed by a sense of déjà vu. Going right back to the failed Minsk peace agreements of 2014 and 2015, peace efforts have always come to nought because of a desire by Western powers to force Russia to concede without imposing obligations on Ukraine to make concessions.President Trump now needs to step back and look at the canvas. While the texture of a future peace deal provides considerable scope for compromise on both sides, including on the issue of how the territorial status quo is described, one Russian demand will not change: NATO membership. Unless President Trump can broker Ukrainian acceptance that it will not join NATO, amidst resistance to any compromise from European allies, he will not bring peace to Ukraine, though he might dent the American economy. Time to rip off that plaster.

[Category: Trump, Russia, Putin, Ukraine, Zelensky, Nato, Enewsletter, Eu, Patriot missiles, Sanctions, Ukraine war]

— Israel's war on Iran broke the nuclear non-proliferation treaty

 

at 7/13/25 10:05pm

Rather than helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the Israeli-initiated 12-day war on Iran damaged the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In response to the attacks on its nuclear facilities, on July 2, Iran suspended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose responsibilities include verifying NPT state parties’ compliance with their nonproliferation commitments. At the same time, these illegal attacks, which the U.S. joined, have created the conditions for the kind of endless war that President Trump allegedly wants to avoid. While the prospects for Iranian-U.S. diplomacy in this context look bleak, there might still be a way out through regional non-proliferation cooperation.The end of nuclear transparency in IranIran’s suspension of cooperation with the IAEA marks the end of nuclear transparency provided by agency inspections in the country since 1974. Thanks to this transparency, we knew, prior to June 13, the exact amount and locations of Iran’s fissile material stockpiles — which could not have been diverted to military uses without being noticed by the IAEA. Now, due the Israeli and U.S. attacks, this knowledge has been lost.Israel — whose goal appears to be to weaken and remove the Iranian government, rather than just its nuclear program — is likely to push for additional military actions. That Iran’s nuclear capabilities were, predictably, not all destroyed by the military strikes, makes it difficult for Washington to restrain Israel even if it wishes to do so. This points to the open-ended aggression that experts have long warned would result from attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities.Apart from its perception that the IAEA is politically biased in favor of Israel and Western countries, Iran’s decision to suspend cooperation with the agency arguably reflects a concern that nuclear transparency might undermine its interests. By indicating the location of nuclear materials and facilities that survived the war, IAEA findings could be used to facilitate future Israeli and U.S. military targeting.Demonstrating the flawed logic of aggressive counterproliferation, the war on Iran could be seen as a perfect argument for Tehran to leave the NPT and develop a nuclear deterrent. After all, the use of force against its territorial integrity can constitute a circumstance in which “extraordinary events have jeopardized [its] supreme interests,” the legal basis for withdrawal under the NPT’s Article X.Prospects for bilateral Iranian-US nuclear diplomacyYet, Iran has neither withdrawn from the NPT nor closed the door to diplomacy. Iran is currently reviewing a U.S. proposal for resuming bilateral talks. As Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said, "Iran needs guarantees it won’t be attacked again if the talks don’t succeed."The trust required for bilateral diplomacy, let alone for credible security guarantees, has been severely undermined by the war — which took place while the last round of Oman-mediated Iranian-U.S. talks was still ongoing. According to Araghchi, this constituted a ”betrayal of diplomacy.”A nuclear deal would also require a compromise on the key issue of uranium enrichment. A compromise was already reached in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action when Iran agreed to verifiably limit enrichment activities in exchange for sanctions relief. The obstacle here has been President Trump’s self-inflicted difficulty in accepting anything resembling the JCPOA — from which he withdrew in 2018, thus renewing a nuclear crisis with Iran.President Trump has insisted that Iran should not be allowed to enrich any uranium, assuming that the country can be coerced to accept his terms through maximum pressure. But Iran has consistently rejected this demand. If his approach now rests on the assumption that Iran will finally give in as a result of the war, efforts at bilateral diplomacy are likely doomed. On the other hand, the Trump administration has demonstrated ambiguity on the enrichment issue. Together with the president’s aversion to endless wars, this might still allow for a compromise solution.Possibilities for diplomacyOne of the most promising avenues in the Iranian-U.S. talks since April was a regional nuclear consortium involving Iran and other Gulf states. The main sticking point seemed to be the location of joint uranium enrichment facilities: while Iran viewed the enhanced nuclear transparency provided by the consortium as a way to build international confidence in its enrichment activities, Washington saw it a means to end enrichment on Iranian soil.This plan could still be feasible if the U.S. were to accept limited enrichment on Iranian soil as part of the consortium. This would serve the objective of nonproliferation and still might look different enough from the JCPOA for President Trump to claim victory.The previous idea of U.S. investment in the consortium nevertheless seems unlikely after Washington’s involvement in Israel’s military operation that also included the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. However, other extra-regional powers such as China or Russia could be invited to join the venture, thus enabling a de facto security guarantee to Iran. Notably, the Bushehr nuclear power plant was Iran’s only nuclear facility that was spared in the June attacks — partly due to the presence of Russian staff there. As an alternative to a nuclear consortium, Gulf states could jointly agree to cap uranium enrichment levels and fissile material stockpiles in the region. While such restrictions would initially mainly affect Iran’s program, over time they would also build confidence in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions, which also include plans for uranium enrichment.To verify these restrictions, the Gulf states states could establish a regional nuclear verification mechanism modeled on the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). This could complement IAEA safeguards and, in the case of Iran, substitute for them as long as the country’s cooperation with the agency remains suspended.Although Iran cannot be expected to implement restrictions on its nuclear activities without sanctions relief by the U.S., it could nevertheless commit to doing so pending such relief. This could allow an informal Iranian-U.S. compromise even without a bilateral nuclear agreement.At minimum, a conditional agreement on regional nuclear restraint would increase political pressure on Washington to lift sanctions on Iran, while a regional verification mechanism would provide an argument against further military action.By way of comparison, the additional confidence created by ABACC apparently explains why Brazil is allowed to enrich uranium without international objection — despite the lack of public reporting on related details and the country’s refusal to sign the Additional Protocol with the IAEA.Choice between diplomacy and endless warThe 12-day war represented the culmination of the disastrous U.S. maximum pressure policy, which since 2018 has undermined nonproliferation for the sake of scoring domestic political points and fostering Washington’s special relationship with Israel. Continuing on this path now risks leading to an endless war in the Middle East.A diplomatic off-ramp still exists but it would require a U.S. policy shift from coercion to compromise. The political costs of such a shift for President Trump could be reduced through linking the compromise to a regional nuclear arrangement. While extending the non-proliferation benefits beyond Iran, the involvement of multiple stakeholders committed to its success could also make such an arrangement more sustainable than the JCPOA.

[Category: Israel, Nuclear weapons, Nuclear non-proliferation, Npt, Iran]

— Bombers astray! Washington's priorities go off course

 

at 7/11/25 10:05pm

The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.A pair of stories with contrasting narrativesAmid the roar of B-2 bombers and other warplanes bizarrely flying over the White House on the 4th of July, President Donald Trump signed his “Big, Beautiful Bill” increasing defense spending by $150 billion and the national debt by $3 trillion. The military hardware was a bow to the U.S. military’s successful June 21 strike on Iran’s nuclear program. Nonetheless, it was a strange way to celebrate the nation’s 249th birthday. Only in today’s Washington could one celebrate dive-bombing the national debt ever closer to $40 trillion.About $113 billion of that $150 billion is slated for the Pentagon’s 2026 coffers (the rest would be spent later). That has allowed the Pentagon to send Congress a base budget for next year that totals $848 billion, which is actually less than this year’s $831 billion, when inflation is taken into account. But adding the base budget request to the one-time bonus, and other national-security spending, pushes proposed defense spending to roughly $1 trillion in 2026. Where such future $100+ billion annual add-ons will come from remains a mystery.News outlets that focus on economics wasted no time citing one of the bonus bill’s big winners. “The Pentagon will budget about $150 billion over five years on big-ticket projects such as ships, munitions production and missile-defense systems, including a roughly $25 billion down payment on the planned Golden Dome antimissile shield,” the Wall Street Journal noted. Echoed Bloomberg News: “The package boosts defense spending by $150 billion, with much of the funding going to new weapons systems made by major contractors.”The troops will get July 4th picnic-table scraps. Only 6% of the $150 billion is earmarked for improving the quality of life for troops and their families. On July 3, Stars and Stripes reported that the Army will save nearly $5 million a year by shutting down a program that for decades has provided mental-health services for children of U.S. troops based overseas. That’s happening despite a May report that said such Pentagon-run schools are overwhelmed by kids with mental health problems.Army officials said they are eliminating the program because “similar services exist.” Funny how such logic never applies to the redundancy of the Pentagon’s nuclear triad of bombers, ICBMs, and submarines, which cost about $5 million every half hour.Why wonky weapons-buying changes won’t workA defense reform bill now slinking its way through Congress is simply the latest in military camouflage, disguising future taxpayer rip-offs as the latest and greatest good-government bromide. This new wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing is the Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery Act — the SPEED Act (PDF), in Capitol Hill lingo. “With the SPEED Act, Congress and industry are yet again setting the stage for another round of decimating changes that will have disastrous results,” Scott Amey here at the Project On Government Oversight said in his July 1 analysis of the proposed legislation.Amey, a recognized expert in the admittedly wonky arena of government procurement law, warns that the bill:Prioritizes speed above the cost to the taxpayer. Prioritizes “best value” of rushed requirements above cost efficiency, and risks steering contracts to well-connected or undeserving companies. Promotes buying so-called “commercial” products and services, and the general principles of “offered for sale” and “similar,” all of which are misleading and result in overcharges for defense-only solutions because they are exempt from providing certified cost or pricing data that would ensure the federal government gets a fair deal. Raises certain monetary thresholds, which results in overcharges.The SPEED Act, Amey argues, “will take us back 60 years, to a time when companies blatantly took advantage of the federal government … which will lead to new $436 hammers and $10,000 toilet seat covers.”Excellent! The Bunker is always on the prowl for new material.It’s too easy to ignore troop deaths in peacetimeBattlefields and blood are first cousins in combat. The Bunker has done many deep dives over the years into those who voluntarily went into harm’s way in the nation’s uniform, and didn’t get to come home. There’s generally a patriotic predisposition to want to know about these heroes, waging war in our name.But the deaths of U.S. troops in peacetime is a murkier realm. The U.S. military trains like it fights, which means that over the past decade more troops have died while training for combat than in combat itself. Yet too little attention is paid to their sacrifice. They’re not battling a foe other than inadequate training, or a moment’s inattention that could have saved a life.The Pentagon noted the deaths of three U.S. troops recently. Their sacrifice should not pass unnoted:— On July 3, Task & Purpose reported on the July 1 death of Navy Special Warfare Boat Operator 2nd Class Noah Tobin after an unexplained malfunction during a California parachute jump.— On June 27, Air & Space Forces Magazine detailed how Air Force Captain John Robertson died at a Texas base in 2024 after he failed to fully engage a safety pin on the ejection seat of his T-6 trainer after landing, sending him 100 feet into the air without a parachute.— On July 1, Task & Purpose reported on the death of Army Specialist Matthew Perez, 20, who died in 2024 after a string of snafus beginning with “an incorrectly tied knot” doomed him while parachuting at a Louisiana post.Your valor was not in vain.Here’s what has caught The Bunker’s eye recently→ Royal NavyDespite critics who argue that the U.S. Navy’s huge aircraft carriers would be sitting Peking ducks in a war with China, Commander Joshua M. M. Portzer maintained in the July issue of Proceedings that each of them is “a queen on the Pacific chess board.”→ Speaking of carriers…The Navy’s newest aircraft carrier faces a 20-month delivery delay because of problems with elevators designed to move munitions around the vessel, Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg News reported July 7.→ Slice of warThe Pentagon Pizza Report, operated by an anonymous computer geek, tracks Google data flowing from pizzerias near the headquarters of the Defense Department to telegraph when the U.S. military might be preparing to strike, the Washington Post reported July 1.Thanks for dropping in for a slice of The Bunker this week. Kindly share with pals so they can subscribe here.

[Category: The bunker, Pentagon budget]

— Bombers astray

 

at 7/11/25 10:05pm

The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.A pair of stories with contrasting narrativesAmid the roar of B-2 bombers and other warplanes bizarrely flying over the White House on the 4th of July, President Donald Trump signed his “Big, Beautiful Bill” increasing defense spending by $150 billion and the national debt by $3 trillion. The military hardware was a bow to the U.S. military’s successful June 21 strike on Iran’s nuclear program. Nonetheless, it was a strange way to celebrate the nation’s 249th birthday. Only in today’s Washington could one celebrate dive-bombing the national debt ever closer to $40 trillion.About $113 billion of that $150 billion is slated for the Pentagon’s 2026 coffers (the rest would be spent later). That has allowed the Pentagon to send Congress a base budget for next year that totals $848 billion, which is actually less than this year’s $831 billion, when inflation is taken into account. But adding the base budget request to the one-time bonus, and other national-security spending, pushes proposed defense spending to roughly $1 trillion in 2026. Where such future $100+ billion annual add-ons will come from remains a mystery.News outlets that focus on economics wasted no time citing one of the bonus bill’s big winners. “The Pentagon will budget about $150 billion over five years on big-ticket projects such as ships, munitions production and missile-defense systems, including a roughly $25 billion down payment on the planned Golden Dome antimissile shield,” the Wall Street Journal noted. Echoed Bloomberg News: “The package boosts defense spending by $150 billion, with much of the funding going to new weapons systems made by major contractors.”The troops will get July 4th picnic-table scraps. Only 6% of the $150 billion is earmarked for improving the quality of life for troops and their families. On July 3, Stars and Stripes reported that the Army will save nearly $5 million a year by shutting down a program that for decades has provided mental-health services for children of U.S. troops based overseas. That’s happening despite a May report that said such Pentagon-run schools are overwhelmed by kids with mental health problems.Army officials said they are eliminating the program because “similar services exist.” Funny how such logic never applies to the redundancy of the Pentagon’s nuclear triad of bombers, ICBMs, and submarines, which cost about $5 million every half hour.Why wonky weapons-buying changes won’t workA defense reform bill now slinking its way through Congress is simply the latest in military camouflage, disguising future taxpayer rip-offs as the latest and greatest good-government bromide. This new wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing is the Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery Act — the SPEED Act (PDF), in Capitol Hill lingo. “With the SPEED Act, Congress and industry are yet again setting the stage for another round of decimating changes that will have disastrous results,” Scott Amey here at the Project On Government Oversight said in his July 1 analysis of the proposed legislation.Amey, a recognized expert in the admittedly wonky arena of government procurement law, warns that the bill:Prioritizes speed above the cost to the taxpayer. Prioritizes “best value” of rushed requirements above cost efficiency, and risks steering contracts to well-connected or undeserving companies. Promotes buying so-called “commercial” products and services, and the general principles of “offered for sale” and “similar,” all of which are misleading and result in overcharges for defense-only solutions because they are exempt from providing certified cost or pricing data that would ensure the federal government gets a fair deal. Raises certain monetary thresholds, which results in overcharges.The SPEED Act, Amey argues, “will take us back 60 years, to a time when companies blatantly took advantage of the federal government … which will lead to new $436 hammers and $10,000 toilet seat covers.”Excellent! The Bunker is always on the prowl for new material.It’s too easy to ignore troop deaths in peacetimeBattlefields and blood are first cousins in combat. The Bunker has done many deep dives over the years into those who voluntarily went into harm’s way in the nation’s uniform, and didn’t get to come home. There’s generally a patriotic predisposition to want to know about these heroes, waging war in our name.But the deaths of U.S. troops in peacetime is a murkier realm. The U.S. military trains like it fights, which means that over the past decade more troops have died while training for combat than in combat itself. Yet too little attention is paid to their sacrifice. They’re not battling a foe other than inadequate training, or a moment’s inattention that could have saved a life.The Pentagon noted the deaths of three U.S. troops recently. Their sacrifice should not pass unnoted:— On July 3, Task & Purpose reported on the July 1 death of Navy Special Warfare Boat Operator 2nd Class Noah Tobin after an unexplained malfunction during a California parachute jump.— On June 27, Air & Space Forces Magazine detailed how Air Force Captain John Robertson died at a Texas base in 2024 after he failed to fully engage a safety pin on the ejection seat of his T-6 trainer after landing, sending him 100 feet into the air without a parachute.— On July 1, Task & Purpose reported on the death of Army Specialist Matthew Perez, 20, who died in 2024 after a string of snafus beginning with “an incorrectly tied knot” doomed him while parachuting at a Louisiana post.Your valor was not in vain.Here’s what has caught The Bunker’s eye recently→ Royal NavyDespite critics who argue that the U.S. Navy’s huge aircraft carriers would be sitting Peking ducks in a war with China, Commander Joshua M. M. Portzer maintained in the July issue of Proceedings that each of them is “a queen on the Pacific chess board.”→ Speaking of carriers…The Navy’s newest aircraft carrier faces a 20-month delivery delay because of problems with elevators designed to move munitions around the vessel, Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg News reported July 7.→ Slice of warThe Pentagon Pizza Report, operated by an anonymous computer geek, tracks Google data flowing from pizzerias near the headquarters of the Defense Department to telegraph when the U.S. military might be preparing to strike, the Washington Post reported July 1.Thanks for dropping in for a slice of The Bunker this week. Kindly share with pals so they can subscribe here.

[Category: The bunker, Pentagon budget]

— Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

 

at 7/11/25 12:46pm

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia. Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war. Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified. Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy. Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement. Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base. But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia. This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser. What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia? Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful. China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open. The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down. At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine. Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment. Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.Though Central Asian nations seek to reduce their dependence on Moscow, Russia, however, retains leverage through security ties, energy routes, and migrant remittances. China, the region’s other major partner, would view Western overtures with suspicion. Hawks may ultimately pin their hopes on destabilizing Russia internally. Ethnic fractures are a key pressure point: non-Russian minorities, such as Dagestanis, Buryats, Tuvans, die disproportionately in the war in Ukraine. Hence, bodies like the U.S. Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) and hawkish think-tanks like Hudson Institute fuel “colonial exploitation” narratives aimed at stirring unrest in the Caucasus and Siberia. Exiled Russian opposition figures cheered the 2023 Wagner mutiny as a potential tipping point. But external efforts to destabilize and fragment Russia are more likely to trigger a nationalist backlash than collapse. If cornered, Putin or his successor won’t surrender but escalate, possibly to nuclear brinkmanship. The irony is that Trump once rode to power mocking the architects of ‘forever wars.” Now, his own impulses — frustration with Putin, a craving for displays of strength — risk reviving the very policies he once condemned. The hawkish “blob” needs no grand conspiracy to hijack his agenda; it merely needs to exploit his instincts. The question is whether Trump recognizes the trap before this new cold war turns hot.

[Category: Enewsletter, Putin, Trump, Zelensky, Ukraine war]

— The 8-point buzzsaw facing any invasion of Taiwan

 

at 7/10/25 10:05pm

For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions. Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.In Washington, “China is going to invade Taiwan” has devolved into little more than a talking point these days. While it remains the essential premise underpinning defense policy, very little is generally said about Taiwan itself and its suitability as a stage for major military operations. That seems like an odd omission considering how much energy and resources American officials have expended in preparing to defend the place, including sending billions in direct military aid.Hundreds of billions have either been spent or pledged to defend Taiwan. Yet Taiwan’s greatest defensive advantage is the main island of Taiwan itself. The island’s terrain is wholly unsuited for the kind of massive military invasion policymakers use to justify defense budget increases resulting is more than $1 trillion American annual defense budgets. A careful study of Taiwan’s geography including on-the-ground observations reveal eight significant challenges an invader would have to overcome to successfully conquer the island. The following draws from my recent research on the island and will be fleshed out in a forthcoming report from the Stimson Center.First, an invader would have to cross the Taiwan Strait to reach the island. An invasion force would include huge numbers of people, vehicles, and supplies. The only way to transport the bulk of such a force is with surface shipping which would be extremely vulnerable to submarines, underwater mines, long-range missiles, and now uncrewed attack vessels.Second, Taiwan’s extensive shoreline provides few acceptable landing options. The majority of the island is covered by mountains and in most places, the mountains drop straight into the sea. An invader would have to establish a beachhead away from the cliffs, but all of these areas present two deeply troublesome military challenges. Third, if the invader secures a foothold, it would then need to build up combat power ashore for the eventual breakout assault to capture the rest of the island. Again, Taiwan’s water-intensive agricultural land would make that difficult. The invader wouldn’t be able to stage people and vehicles in rice paddies. They would fare better doing so in developed port facilities, but they would still have to do so while fighting within the city.Fourth, the invader would need to successfully breakout from the beachhead. Taiwan’s usable beaches lead either directly into a city or into farmland. Landing into a city creates means the invader would immediately be confronted by urban combat. Landing outside of the cities means the invader would crash across the beach only to then immediately become mired in the island’s extensive agricultural land which consists mainly of rice paddies.Fifth, the invader would have to figure out how to fight across Taiwan’s landscape. Armored vehicles can’t drive through rice paddies. Tanks and armored personnel carriers, which would be needed in massive quantities to protect soldiers in the open terrain and cities, would need to stick to the island’s road network. Surface roads through the rice paddies provide a single lane in each direction at best. An advancing armored force that gets stopped when the lead vehicle is destroyed by the defenders would not be able to drive around the new obstacle because the tanks would get stuck in water-logged fields. The only option would be to turn around and find another route. The defenders would be able to pull off the same trick again and again. It would be much faster for the invader to use Taiwan’s highway network, but these roads are often elevated which means the defender needs only to drop sections of the road to completely disrupt forward movement. Again, the invading force would not be able to easily bypass such an obstacle because it would require driving through rice paddies.Sixth, the invader will have to contend with the island’s formidable natural obstacles restricting movements towards the ultimate objective in Taipei. Along the western plain of the island, the mountains reach all the way to the sea in several places creating narrow passes through which an invader would have to fight. The Yilan plain on the island’s east coast offers long stretches of inviting landing beaches, but an invader would have to fight directly through the mountains to reach Taipei along a highway that includes numerous bridges spanning deep river valleys and long tunnels bored through rock. The island’s natural obstacles provide the Taiwanese with the ability to create a layered defense.Seventh, Greater Taipei occupies a massive ancient lakebed in the northern part of the island. Mountains surround the city which is only accessible on the ground through narrow passes. One such pass is so narrow that the highway winding through it is elevated the entire way with opposing traffic lanes stacked vertically. Another pass is a little wider but it has been developed into essentially a long city with a winding river running through the middle creating a mile’s long obstacle protecting the approaches to Taipei.Lastly, if an invader overcomes all of these challenges, they will still have to contend with Taipei proper. The metropolitan area covers 250 square kilometers. The city is very dense with relatively little open space at street level. A significant proportion of the city’s buildings rise above 20 stories. The scale of a contested battle over Taipei is almost impossible to comprehend. The closest equivalent in history would be the Battle of Stalingrad in World War II. That city had a population of approximately 850,000 in 1940. During the six months the Germans and Soviets fought for control of the city, upwards of 2 million people were killed as the armies fought block by block. Greater Taipei today has a population of well over 7 million.There are various strategic, political, and economic reasons why China’s leaders are much more likely pursue their goal of gaining political control of Taiwan through means other than a massive military invasion. But because American policymakers and military planners continue to cite the Chinese threat to Taiwan as the principal scenario around which to craft their proposals, it’s important to understand realities on the ground there.With only a basic understanding of Taiwan’s complex terrain, it becomes immediately obvious that there are few places on Earth less suitable for what would be the largest single military operation in history. The doyens of the national security establishment may need to find a new pacing threat.

[Category: China, Enewsletter, Taipei, South china sea, Taiwan strait, Indo-pacific, Taiwan]

— Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

 

at 7/10/25 10:05pm

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along. It is difficult to deny the extent of Syria's economic devastation. The size of Syria’s economy more than halved between 2010 and 2022. Around 70 percent of Syrians live in poverty, and half the population is food insecure.Proponents maintain that sanctions are not responsible for civilian harm. “Today's actions are intended to hold the murderous Assad regime accountable. They are not directed at the Syrian people,” reads a typical White House statement. The European Parliament similarly claims its sanctions on Syria were “designed to have minimal impact on the population.”It’s difficult to say how much of Syria’s economic collapse is due to the civil war and Assad’s governance versus Western sanctions. However, there is overwhelming evidence that broad economic sanctions cause immense harm to civilians: slowing economic growth; hindering access to food, fuel, and medicine; and contributing to mass death. In some cases, the effects of sanctions are comparable to those of war.Sanctions on Syria impeded humanitarian efforts, fueled food inflation, and drove the collapse of the country’s healthcare system. The overthrow of the Assad government made it politically expedient to admit what many had long ignored or denied.Two members of Congress who advocated for sanctions prior to Assad’s fall have since reversed course, arguing that easing them would “facilitate stabilization, reconstruction, international investment, [and] humanitarian recovery,” and improve “economic and financial access for ordinary Syrians.” Following Trump’s announcement in Riyadh, Secretary of State Rubio said that lifting sanctions would “facilitate the provision of electricity, energy, water, and sanitation, and enable a more effective humanitarian response across Syria.” He similarly told a Senate hearing that “nations in the region want to get aid in, want to start helping them, and they can't because they are afraid of our sanctions.” Rubio here highlights how U.S. sanctions function as a form of economic siege — they hinder humanitarian assistance and isolate countries economically and diplomatically. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Dorothy Shea argued this month that, “The cessation of U.S. sanctions against Syria will give the country a chance to succeed.”It is difficult to reconcile such statements with the claim that sanctions don’t hurt civilians. If lifting sanctions will benefit the civilian population, then their imposition must have caused harm.The dirty secret of sanctions policy is that these harms are often intentional. Many say outright that the function of sanctions is to facilitate economic collapse. It is not collateral damage — it is the mechanism of pressure.For example, a State Department memo from the inception of the embargo on Cuba suggested “denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of [the] government.” When asked about the efficacy of the first Trump administration’s sanctions on Iran, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, “Things are much worse for the Iranian people, and we’re convinced that will lead the Iranian people to rise up and change the behavior of the regime.” He spoke with similar approval of the suffering of the Venezuelan people under U.S. sanctions — a sentiment echoed by Trump, who later gloated, “When I left [office], Venezuela was ready to collapse. We would have taken it over.”While Trump officials have been particularly candid, policymakers in both parties regularly refer to macroeconomic factors such as GDP, oil output, foreign reserves, currency stability, and the cost of food — factors that directly affect the wellbeing of a population — as metrics of sanctions’ “success.” Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.), a critic of many U.S. sanctions, once remarked that, “Economic pain is the means by which the sanctions are supposed to work.” But there is a reason that few want to admit the reality of how sanctions work; because doing so would be an admission of violating international law. As dozens of legal organizations and over 200 lawyers wrote in a letter last year, the intentional targeting of civilians with sanctions amounts to collective punishment, which violates international humanitarian law and the U.N. Charter.Major sanctions on Syria are on their way out. That’s good news.But the justifications for their removal are admissions of what civil society critics and researchers have long argued: sanctions are killing the same people their advocates claim to protect. While Syria serves as a case study, this is equally true wherever there are broad economic sanctions regimes, from Cuba to Venezuela to Iran.If sanctions depend on the suffering of civilians to function, they are not a diplomatic tool — they are a weapon of economic warfare. It is long past time to treat them as such.

[Category: Sanctions, Syria]

— Diplomacy Watch: Trump changes tune, music to Zelensky’s ears

 

at 7/10/25 10:05pm

After recently deciding to withhold the shipment of certain weapons to Ukraine and opposing new sanctions on Russia, the Trump administration is seemingly reversing course following weeks of unproductive peace talks and multiple large-scale Russian bombardments on Ukraine.On Tuesday, President Trump expressed deep frustration with President Putin following a lengthy phone call between the two. “I’m not happy with Putin, I can tell you that much right now, because he’s killing a lot of people,” Trump said. “We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin. You want to know the truth? He is very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless.” Trump also said that Putin was “not treating human beings right,” and that Washington would be “sending some defensive weapons to Ukraine, and I’ve approved that.”This dissatisfaction also comes as Russia has been pummeling Ukraine with some of its most intense attacks to date. In addition to starting its summer offensive in Ukraine, the Russian military launched 537 aerial weapons last Friday night and over 700 on Wednesday, with each attack resulting in civilian casualties. The decision is a reversal in policy from earlier in the month when American stockpiles were running low. According to White House Spokesperson Anna Kelley, the decision to halt some shipments “was made to put America’s interests first following a review of our nation’s military support and assistance to other countries across the globe.”“The Department of Defense is sending additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure the Ukrainians can defend themselves while we work to secure a lasting peace,” said Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell. Significantly, the administration is weighing sending a Patriot Air Defense system as part of the weapons package. This would be the first Patriot system provided to Ukraine under the Trump administration and the fourth that Kyiv has received from Washington overall.In addition to approving further weapons shipments to Ukraine, the Trump administration has reportedly given its approval to a measure proposed by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), which would place wide-reaching sanctions on Russian officials and additional tariffs on countries that do business with the Kremlin. Graham and his co-sponsor, Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), said in a press release, “the dominating view in the United States Senate is that Russia is the aggressor, and that this horrific war and Putin’s aggression must end now and be deterred in the future.”The bipartisan bill, which would impose 500% tariffs on certain nations, is gaining momentum and is expected to come to a vote in the Senate later this month, according to Senate leadership. “The Senate will move soon on a tough sanctions bill – not only against Russia – but also against countries like China and India that buy Russian energy products that finance Putin’s war machine, Sen. Graham posted on X. “The Senate bill has a presidential waiver to give President Trump maximum leverage.The bill isn't without its opponents, though. “The country that will be harmed the most under this legislation will be the United States, both economically and strategically,” wrote Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) in a piece for Responsible Statecraft. “If implemented, these tariffs would make U.S. trade with most of the world untenable, raise prices for American consumers, and risk further weakening the dollar.”In other Ukraine War news this week:The Wall Street Journal reports that France and the United Kingdom will begin to coordinate the usage of their nuclear weapons in defense of Europe. “Any adversary threatening the vital interests of Britain or France could be confronted by the strength of the nuclear forces of both nations,” said the French Ministry of Defense. While in Malaysia for an ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. There, Lavrov presented new ideas regarding a peace deal to the United States. According to The Washington Post, Rubio expressed frustration in Moscow’s unwillingness to be flexible, but that the recent proposal was a “new and a different approach.” Rubio didn’t offer any further details and cautioned that the deal wouldn’t necessarily “guarantee a peace.”From this week’s State Department briefing:Spokesperson Tammy Bruce fielded a question concerning Trump’s policy toward weapons shipments to Ukraine and the conflict in general, and confirmed Washington’s policy of supporting Ukraine. “We care about those people,” she said. “We care about making sure that they have what they need.” Bruce added that “the president feels obviously very passionate and determined regarding the ability of Ukraine to defend itself.”

[Category: Qiosk, Russia, Ukraine, Trump, Putin, Zelensky, Russia-ukraine, Rand paul, Diplomacy watch]

— MTG moves to cut aid to 'nuclear armed' Israel

 

at 7/10/25 3:27pm

As Israel’s war on Gaza slogs on, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R- Ga.) wants to cut U.S. military aid to Tel Aviv.Indeed, Greene submitted an amendment to the 2026 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, which provides annual funding for DoD operations, that would strike $500 million in proposed additional military assistance for Israel.“Nuclear armed Israel’s national debt is under $400 Billion compared to our crippling national debt of $37 TRILLION,” Greene explained on X. “Nuclear armed Israel seems to have their defense and debt under control, so the American taxpayers should not be required to give Nuclear armed Israel another $500 million in our U.S. defense bill.”Greene told Steve Bannon’s War Room podcast that the U.S. already gives Israel billions each year for its defense systems. “This is not a helpless country, and we already give them $3.4 billion every single year in the state — from the State Department. $3.4 billion every single year,” she said. “They don’t need another $500 million in our defense budget.”Greene’s amendment would repeal section 8067 of the 2026 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, which would provide $500 million to Israeli cooperative programs — at the heart of Israel’s aerial defense operations. Of the proposed $500 million in aid Greene wants to block, $60 million would go toward Israel’s Iron Dome air-based defense system. Additional funds intended for Israel’s ballistic missile defenses and missile defense architecture are also on the chopping block.Greene’s amendment to target additional military aid to Israel follows Israel’s so-called “twelve day” war on Iran, where the U.S. struck Iran in an effort to target its nuclear facilities. Greene has spoken against U.S. involvement in that conflict.And the amendment comes amid ongoing negotiations between the Trump administration and the Israeli government regarding Gaza, where Israel has killed at least 57,000 Palestinians since October 7, 2023. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff suggested a 60 day ceasefire in Gaza could come by the end of this week, but that has not materialized.Notably, Greene told Steve Bannon Wednesday that “it’s important to say nuclear-armed Israel, because they do have nuclear weapons.” Israel is indeed widely understood to have nuclear weapons, though Israel nor the U.S. acknowledge their existence and American politicians rarely discuss them. Israel is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.The House Committee on Rules will consider the Department of Defense Appropriations Act with Greene’s amendment on July 14.

[Category: Israel, Gaza, Qiosk, Iran, Marjorie taylor greene, Washington politics, Military aid, Israel aid]

— How China is 'eating our lunch' with soft power

 

at 7/9/25 10:05pm

In June 2025, while U.S. and Philippine forces conducted joint military drills in the Sulu Sea and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reaffirmed America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific at Singapore’s Shangri-La Dialogue, another story deserving of attention played out less visibly. A Chinese-financed rail project broke ground in Malaysia with diplomatic fanfare and local celebration. As Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim noted, the ceremony “marks an important milestone” in bilateral cooperation. The contrast was sharp: Washington sent ships and speeches; Beijing sent people and money.Although the U.S. has increased its military presence in the region, from reinforcing defense pacts with the Philippines to expanding freedom of navigation patrols, it continues to lag where influence is most enduring: civilian visibility and public imagination. A survey taken during the first six weeks of this year by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute warned that U.S. tariffs, short-term aid, and inconsistent engagement threaten to undermine trust. As detailed in the paper “Charm Offensive amid the Tariff War,” the unpredictability of a second Trump administration has allowed China to demonstrate something the U.S. no longer consistently projects — reliability. China’s influence in Southeast Asia has grown because it consistently shows up. Its diplomats speak local languages, its media shapes youth discourse, and its projects, though self-interested, touch people’s daily lives. Meanwhile, American values are often spoken from afar or filtered through the language of security. America didn’t lose soft power because China out-argued democracy. It lost because it stopped doing the hard work of showing up early, often, and empathetically.Southeast Asia is not a peripheral theater, but a central pillar of 21st-century geopolitics. Located at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, the region is home to over 650 million people and constitutes the world’s fifth-largest economy, projected to become the fourth by 2030. Strategically, it encompasses critical maritime chokepoints. The South China Sea alone facilitates an estimated $3.5 trillion in annual trade, while 40% of global maritime commerce passes through the narrow channel of the Strait of Malacca. In both military and economic terms, what happens in Southeast Asia significantly impacts global trajectories. More than any other region, Southeast Asia embodies the global balancing instinct. Governments there do not want to choose between the United States and China. Instead, they seek diversified engagement: U.S. leadership without constraint, and Chinese investment without control.The United States has long professed support for “ASEAN centrality,” but its engagement has too often been episodic, reactive, or filtered through a narrow security lens. If Washington intends to remain a long-term presence in the Indo-Pacific, it must begin treating Southeast Asia not as a chessboard but as a chorus of sovereign voices.While the U.S. positions itself as the torchbearer of universal norms, China promises to never impose. America frequently invokes freedom, democracy, and human rights across speeches and communities. But in much of Southeast Asia, those values are no longer experienced as trustworthy exports. They are seen as patchy in application, moralistic in tone, and increasingly divorced from the everyday experiences of those listening.In contrast, China does not attempt to export a values system. China’s approach is pragmatic: it delivers infrastructure, educational exchanges, and economic tools, often wrapped in language that stresses sovereignty, partnership, and mutual respect. While the U.S. lectures and reiterates its commitment to maritime security and freedom of navigation, China listens and builds dormitories, lays undersea cables, and hosts youth forums. Chinese cultural centers are present in nearly every ASEAN capital. TikTok and WeChat are among the most used apps in the region. Even pro-U.S. elites now find themselves surrounded by Chinese-funded networks and Chinese-inspired alternative narratives. Beijing’s blend of non-interference rhetoric and strategic investment is winning regional favor, leaving the U.S. struggling to keep pace. Of course, China’s soft power model is not without contradictions. Its Belt and Road financing has been criticized for opaque terms and unsustainable debt; its infrastructure projects have sometimes triggered labor abuses, poor community consultation, and environmental degradation, from Laos’s rail corridor to dam-induced displacements in Cambodia. In Indonesia, projects like Mandalika and Rempang have sparked protests over forced evictions and inadequate compensation. China’s non-interference rhetoric often masks accountability gaps. Its soft power works, but it doesn’t escape scrutiny — it simply operates with a more convenient value proposition that prioritizes state-to-state relationships over societal alignment.The issue here is not that U.S. values are less worthy — it’s that they are no longer visible, culturally translated, or institutionally embedded in the region. This is not a call for abandoning American principles. Rather, it is a wake-up call that principles unaccompanied by presence quickly become noise.The good news is that Southeast Asia hasn’t closed the door. The United States doesn’t need to replicate China’s model, but it must re-enter the competition for public imagination before the next generation decides America is no longer part of their future. Soft power isn’t built on slogans, but earned through people, programs, and sustained storytelling. If the United States hopes to reclaim influence in Southeast Asia, it must stop leaning solely on security alliances and start increasing its efforts to connect on a deeper, more human level. Despite DOGE’s push to reduce State Department staff and departments, there remains bipartisan and strategic momentum in Washington to reassess and potentially reverse course on soft-power investment.Analysts warn that cuts to U.S. development aid have created a vacuum that rival powers — particularly China — are keen to fill. Even modest increases in funding or targeted initiatives could yield outsized returns by strengthening people-to-people ties, reinforcing democratic norms, and enhancing America’s long-term standing in the region.To do this, Washington needs to significantly scale up its soft-power efforts. This includes reversing cuts to the Fulbright Program, investing more in the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, and the Peace Corps, which have long fostered educational and cultural exchange in the region (though the administration's recent crackdown on foreign students coming to study here certainly hasn't helped). Establishing a Southeast Asia Public Engagement Office — staffed with regional experts and youth communicators — would allow for more targeted outreach. Reviving American cultural centers, expanding book donation programs, and launching tech initiatives in everyday public spaces beyond the embassy will help the U.S. connect more deeply across the region.While the U.S. has strong security ties in Southeast Asia, military presence alone doesn’t build lasting influence. Real credibility comes from soft power. Deterrence can prevent conflict, but it doesn’t inspire loyalty or a shared sense of purpose. If Washington hopes to remain a credible Pacific power, it must show up and become a trusted neighbor before the crisis comes.

[Category: China, Southeast asia, Phillipines, Malaysia, Belt and road, Soft power, Asean, Enewsletter, Us-china]

— The Pentagon spent $4 trillion over 5 years. Contractors got 54% of it.

 

at 7/9/25 10:05pm

Advocates of ever-higher Pentagon spending frequently argue that we must throw more money at the department to “support the troops.” But recent budget proposals and a new research paper issued by the Quincy Institute and the Costs of War Project at Brown University suggest otherwise.The paper, which I co-authored with Stephen Semler, found that 54% of the Pentagon’s $4.4 trillion in discretionary spending from 2020 to 2024 went to military contractors. The top five alone — Lockheed Martin ($313 billion), RTX (formerly Raytheon, $145 billion), Boeing ($115 billion), General Dynamics ($116 billion), and Northrop Grumman ($81 billion) – received $771 billion in Pentagon contracts over that five year period.This huge infusion of funds to arms makers comes at the expense of benefits for active duty personnel and veterans of America’s post-9/11 wars. Despite pay increases in recent years, there are still hundreds of thousands of military families who rely on food stamps, live in subpar housing, or suffer from other financial hardships.Meanwhile, there are plans to cut tens of thousands of personnel at the Veterans Administration, close Veterans health centers, and even to reduce staffing at veteran suicide hotlines. And many of the programs veterans and their families depend on — from food stamps to Medicaid and more — are slated for sharp cuts in the budget bill signed by President Trump earlier this month.It would be one thing if all of the hundreds of billions of dollars lavished on weapons contractors were being well spent in service of a better defense. But they are not. Overpriced and underperforming weapons systems like the F-35 combat aircraft and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) have shown themselves to be quite effective at consuming taxpayer dollars, even as the run huge cost overruns, suffer lengthy schedule delays, and, in the case of the F-35, are unavailable for use much of the time due to serious maintenance problems. The problems with the Sentinel and the F-35 are likely to pale in comparison with the sums that may be wasted in pursuit of President Trump’s proposal for a leak-proof “Golden Dome” missile defense system, a costly pipe dream that many experts feel is both physically impossible and strategically unwise. In the more than four decades and hundreds of billions of dollars spent since Ronald Reagan’s pledge to build an impenetrable shield against incoming ICBMs, the Pentagon has yet to succeed in a test conducted under realistic conditions, and has even failed in a large number of the carefully scripted efforts. And Golden Dome is more ambitious than Star Wars — it is supposed to intercept not just ICBMs, but hypersonic missiles, low-flying drones, and anything else that might be launched at the United States. The good news is that if you are a weapons contractor, whether from the Big Five or the emerging military tech sector in Silicon Valley, Golden Dome will be a gold mine, regardless of whether it ever produces a useful defense system.The Silicon Valley crowd fully acknowledges the problems current industry leaders have had in producing effective weapons at an affordable price, and they have an answer — give the money to them instead, and they will produce nimble, affordable, easily replaceable, software driven weapons that will restore America to a position of global primacy. But the new guard is interested in much more than just building new products that they can sell to the Pentagon. The leaders of these emerging tech firms — led by Elon Musk at SpaceX, Peter Thiel at Palantir, and Palmer Luckey at Anduril — describe themselves as “founders” who will drag America from the doldrums to a position of unparalleled military dominance. And unlike the CEOs of the big contractors, these new-age militarists are vocally hawkish. Some, like Palmer Luckey, have publicly gloated about how we can beat China in a war that he sees coming in the next few years, while others, like Palantir CEO Alex Karp, have cheered on Israel’s campaign of mass slaughter in Gaza, even going so far as to hold the company’s board meeting in Israel at the height of the war as a gesture of solidarity.Even after Elon Musk’s messy public breakup with Donald Trump, the tech sector still has a leg up over the old guard in influence over his administration. Vice President J.D. Vance was employed, mentored, and financed by Palantir’s Peter Thiel, and former employees of Anduril, Palantir, and other military tech firms have been appointed to influential positions in the national security bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin and its cohort have a strong hand to play in Congress, where campaign contributions, hundreds of lobbyists, and suppliers located in a majority of states and districts give them immense power to keep their programs up and running, even in cases where the Pentagon and the military are trying to cancel or retire them.Even at a proposed budget of $1 trillion a year, there may need to be some tradeoffs between legacy firms and new tech companies as the Pentagon chooses the next generation of weapons. The missing ingredient in all of this is the voice of the public, or strong input from members of Congress who care more about forging an effective defense strategy than they do about bringing Pentagon dollars to their areas. When it comes to creating a defense system appropriate to the world we live in, it shouldn’t be about Lockheed Martin versus Palantir, it should be about common sense versus special interest pleading. Technology alone will not save us, as we have seen from the repeated failures of “miracle weapons” like the electronic battlefield in Vietnam, or President Reagan’s Star Wars initiative, or the advent of precision-guided munitions to actually win wars or achieve favorable outcomes from Vietnam to Iraq to Afghanistan. Coming up with a defense plan that actually makes sense – and has any prospect of succeeding – will mean confronting the power and influence of the weapons contractors of all stripes, who now consume the bulk of the expenditures intended to promote the safety and security of America and its allies.

[Category: Pentagon, Spending, Arms industry, Contractors, General dynamics, Military industrial complex, Enewsletter, Lockheed martin, Palantir, Pentagon spending]

— Graham: Trump ready 'to move' on Russia sanctions

 

at 7/9/25 9:33am

Sen. Lindsey Graham’s long awaited Russia sanctions bill advances — now with President Trump’s support.The legislation, which has over 80 co-sponsors in the Senate, would impose punishing sanctions on myriad Russian officials and sectors, while enacting 500% secondary tariffs on countries doing business with Moscow, like India and China.The legislation had stalled for months in light of repeated White House concerns that the package might upset diplomatic efforts toward a negotiated political solution to the war in Ukraine. But now, Graham says Trump has given the green light. “We’re moving,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), the author of the bill. Graham said Trump “told me it’s time to move so we’re going to move.”Prospects for the legislation bubble amid diplomatic malaise, where Trump, increasingly fed up by the lack of diplomatic progress regarding the Ukraine war, even reversed a decision made by the Pentagon last week to halt Ukraine aid.“We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin, if you want to know the truth,” Trump told reporters during his cabinet meeting yesterday. “He’s very nice to us all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless.” At the cabinet meeting, Trump himself concurred that he was “very strongly” considering the sanctions proposal lobbied by Graham. “It’s totally at my option. They pass it totally at my option, and to terminate totally at my option. And I’m looking at it very strongly,” he said.Trump’s words have been music to Graham’s ears. “President @realDonaldTrump is spot on about the games Putin is playing,” Graham wrote on X Tuesday. “The Senate will move soon on a tough sanctions bill – not only against Russia – but also against countries like China and India that buy Russian energy products that finance Putin’s war machine. The Senate bill has a presidential waiver to give President Trump maximum leverage.” Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-S.D.) also signaled yesterday there would be an announcement on the legislation soon. “We’ll have more to say about that later this week,” he told reporters, saying there’s significant “interest” in moving the bill forward.Thune stressed the importance of coordinating the bill’s consideration with the White House to PunchBowl News.“We want to make sure, when we move it, that we’re coordinating it with the WH, with the House… I’m hoping that we’ll get the other entities in a place where there’s an opportunity for us to get this done,” he said.Andrew Desiderio reported in PunchBowl News that the week of July 21st was likely the first week the bill could be considered on the Senate floor.

[Category: Washington politics, Trump, Graham, Russia, Ukraine, Sanctions, Qiosk, Ukraine war]

— Westerners foolishly rush to defend Azerbaijan against Russia

 

at 7/8/25 10:05pm

The escalating tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan — marked by tit-for-tat arrests, accusations of ethnic violence, and economic sparring — have tempted some Western observers to view the conflict as an opportunity to further isolate Moscow.However, this is not a simple narrative of Azerbaijan resisting Russian dominance. It is a complex struggle over energy routes, regional influence, and the future of the South Caucasus, where Western alignment with Baku risks undermining critical priorities, including potential U.S.-Russia engagement on Ukraine and arms control.The immediate spark came in June, when Russian security forces raided alleged Azerbaijani-linked criminal networks in Yekaterinburg, resulting in the deaths of two Russian nationals of Azerbaijani origin and arrests of more suspected mobsters. Baku condemned the raids as ethnically motivated, while Moscow claimed the deaths were due to natural causes. The fallout was swift: Azerbaijan arrested Russian nationals, including Kremlin-linked media employees accused of espionage and seemingly random expatriates, while state-backed media in Baku launched a fierce anti-Russian propaganda campaign.This clash built on deeper tensions. Since Azerbaijan’s 2023 reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh, which sidelined Russian peacekeepers and exposed Moscow’s waning regional influence, President Ilham Aliyev has pursued an assertive foreign policy. Aliyev’s sharp public criticisms of Russia over the Azerbaijan Airlines plane crash in Russian airspace in December 2024 — in which he demanded accountability, compensation, and justice—signaled a newfound combativeness toward Moscow, marking a departure from Baku’s traditionally cautious diplomacy with its powerful neighbor. Backed by Turkey and courted by the West for its energy exports, Azerbaijan aims to dominate the South Caucasus and serve as a critical energy hub for Central Asian exports to Europe that bypasses Russia.Baku’s ambitions center on the proposed Zangezur Corridor, a transit route through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave and Turkey. This corridor, under prospective Ankara-Baku control, aligns with Western efforts to reduce reliance on Russian hydrocarbon export but is strongly opposed by both Russia and Iran, who fear it would bolster Turkish influence at their expense. Armenia, caught in the middle, faces intense pressure, with Aliyev threatening military action if Yerevan resists.Armenia’s own pivot complicates the situation. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s pro-Western government has distanced itself from Moscow, freezing its participation in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and signaling openness to NATO membership. Yet, this leaves Armenia isolated, as Western support remains largely rhetorical while Azerbaijan’s threats are tangible. Domestically, Pashinyan’s crackdown on opponents, labeled as “pro-Russian forces,” further destabilizes the country.Encouraged by the growing geopolitical convergence between Armenia and Azerbaijan, some Western diplomats have rushed to back Baku, seeing an opportunity to push Russia out of the South Caucasus. The EU ambassador to Azerbaijan condemned alleged “violence, torture, and inhuman treatment” against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia, while the British ambassador expressed solidarity with the “Azerbaijani people.” This framing is telling — both diplomats portrayed the Yekaterinburg incident as an unprovoked ethnic attack rather than a police operation targeting alleged criminals. While skepticism of Russian law enforcement is warranted, uncritically accepting Baku’s narrative — from a regime no less authoritarian than Moscow’s — is a deliberate political choice.Although high-ranking EU officials like Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas didn’t comment specifically on the latest clash, both have called Azerbaijan a “trusted partner” for energy security. Meanwhile, NATO has deepened its ties with Baku through programs like the Defense Education Enhancement Program.This support reflects Azerbaijan’s decades-long lobbying efforts in Western capitals. Washington DC-based think tanks like the Atlantic Council, the Hudson Institute, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and unofficial lobby shops like the Caspian Policy Center, some of them tied to Azerbaijani state-funded initiatives, have promoted Baku as a pro-Western counterweight to Russia and Iran. Meanwhile, lobbying firms, sometimes skirting transparency rules, have secured congressional endorsements, with lawmakers praising Azerbaijan’s geopolitical role. Now, with the Russia-Azerbaijan rift widening, these long-cultivated networks are poised to push for even deeper Western alignment. Some in Washington, London, and Brussels may see Azerbaijan as a useful counter to Russia, but embracing Baku uncritically would be a strategic miscalculation for four key reasons.First, Moscow maintains decisive military superiority over Azerbaijan, including nuclear capabilities and the ability to swiftly cripple Baku's critical oil infrastructure with precision strikes. The only country that could potentially come to Azerbaijan’s aid, Turkey, is unlikely to commit itself as it has its own complex relationship with Russia, of which the Caucasus is but one piece of a much bigger puzzle. While Moscow’s focus on Ukraine limits immediate escalation, once Russia achieves its objectives there, it could shift attention to the Caucasus. Any Western-backed confrontation would be largely futile at best and, at worst, could provoke disproportionate retaliation against Azerbaijan while further destabilizing the region.Second, overt Western support for Azerbaijan would reinforce the Kremlin’s narrative that the U.S. seeks to encircle and weaken Russia at every turn. This would make future dialogue — whether on ending the war in Ukraine or reviving arms control talks — far more difficult. Given the existential risks of a U.S.-Russia confrontation, prioritizing a minor regional rivalry over strategic stability would be shortsighted. Third, Aliyev’s regime is no democratic ally. His government has jailed critics, stifled dissent, and weaponized nationalism — largely mirroring Putin’s own playbook. In June, it sentenced a young researcher, Bahruz Samadov, to 15 years in jail on spurious treason charges solely for advocating peace with Armenia. Backing Baku for short-term geopolitical gains would further erode Western credibility on human rights and the “rules-based international order.” Fourth, encouraging Azerbaijani aggression — whether against Armenia or through proxy confrontations with Russia — could trigger a wider regional conflict. The U.S. has no vital national interest in the Zangezur Corridor, but it does have an interest in preventing another war that could draw in Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Russia. Such a scenario would increase pressure from the usual interventionist quarters in Washington for the U.S. to join the fray against Russia and Iran.Rather than taking sides, the U.S. should use its renewed dialogue with Russia to quietly push for de-escalation, making clear that Washington does not seek to exploit the conflict to further isolate Moscow. Simultaneously, the U.S. should use its influence over Azerbaijan to discourage further provocations, including threats against Armenia and Russian citizens in Azerbaijan. The U.S. does not need another proxy conflict with Russia. Washington should resist the temptation to view Azerbaijan’s defiance of Russia as an opportunity to "win" the South Caucasus. Instead, the priority must be preventing further escalation — both to avoid another humanitarian crisis and to preserve the possibility of broader U.S.-Russia dialogue on far more pressing issues, from Ukraine to nuclear arms control.

[Category: Russia, Putin, Armenia, Nato, Ilham aliyev, Azerbaijan]

— American cult: Why our special ops need a reset

 

at 7/8/25 10:05pm

This article is the latest installment in our Quincy Institute/Responsible Statecraft project series highlighting the writing and reporting of U.S. military veterans. Click here for more information.America’s post-9/11 conflicts have left indelible imprints on our society and our military. In some cases, these changes were so gradual that few noticed the change, except as snapshots in time.This is the case with the “Cult of Special Operations Forces (SOF)” that has emerged since 2001, first within the military, and then with society through mass media including popular autobiographies and movies ranging from “Black Hawk Down,” “Lone Survivor” “American Sniper,” “SEAL Team Six: The Raid on Osama Bin Laden” and many, many others. The Cult has metastasized to many broader cultural accoutrements (video games, fashion, veteran culture, etc.).As with other situations where we see friends proceeding down an untenable path together, America’s relationship with its special operators requires an intervention.First, to my SOF colleagues past and present, it’s not you…it’s us. Well, it’s mostly us — but a little bit you, too. This is not a screed against SOF; I am an old SOF tribal member, and I have many friends and family members within the community. Our SOF troops are an incredible resource for the country — they are almost invariably brave, patriotic, fit, and spectacularly competent. Regardless of our differing policy views, we should be proud of their professionalism and their many tactical accomplishments over recent decades. What I am about to say will no doubt anger some of my SOF friends — but mainly because they’ll know that I’m right. In the coming years, we will require an institutional and psychological reset of relations between America and her special operators. The elitism and secrecy of the current “Cult of SOF” is bad for the military, bad for society, and — ultimately — bad for the operators themselves. SOF and "Big Army"Until relatively recently, the U.S. military had a problematic relationship with its special forces. The Vietnam experience soured many in the conventional military on the special operators, whom they saw as ill-disciplined and overrated. Others argued that concentrating superior troops and leaders in single units denied the rest of the force the leavening effect that those soldiers could have added to regular formations.Despite the skepticism of senior leaders, however, SOF expanded on an ad hoc basis in the years following Vietnam, until its tenuous position with the Pentagon changed with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which established an overarching Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and strengthened the position of SOF within the defense structure. The institutional strength of SOF relative to their conventional cousins was subsequently turbocharged by the 9/11 attacks and their leading role in the ensuing Forever Wars. Today’s operators enjoy a privileged and inverted relationship with their parent services. SOF is now a caste apart, dominating the upper ranks of the military and monopolizing media and cultural attention. The “quiet professionals” many originally envisaged now have a media machine unrivaled across the military. Today’s SOF often treat the conventional military as the minor leagues from which they can selectively draw new talent. This distinction impacts the morale of conventional forces, even if few are prepared to publicly discuss it. This stratification has impacts beyond hurt feelings, however. Separate chains of command and separate lines of effort can sometimes undermine what should be unified campaign plans. SOF theory begins with the proposition that specially selected and trained small units can have a vastly disproportionate battlefield impact, and this has often been the case. Sometimes, however, conventional units and scarce air assets have had to drastically intervene to pull SOF forces out of untenable situations of their own making, as happened in Mogadishu, and Operation ANACONDA, and elsewhere. SOF and SocietyAmerica’s worship of its special operators raises uncomfortable questions about who fights America’s wars and how that affects U.S. policy.For the better part of two centuries, America’s “special sauce” was its ability to raise effective mass forces in wartime. The U.S. ground forces that crushed the Axis represented a large number of (reasonably) well-trained, highly mobile, and lavishly supplied conventional forces, backed by massive firepower and embedded within a joint force capable of asserting and lethally exploiting U.S. dominance of the air and sea (dominance that were themselves products of mass mobilization). These quality conventional units were by doctrine and design reliant on ordinary conscripts and volunteers. Even elite ground units of World War II, like our five airborne and six marine divisions, were tough but basically accessible to most troops, and, by extension, to the average American. By definition, however, not everyone can be SOF — a hard reality that raises difficult questions about who actually fights today’s wars.It is a question that policymakers are in no hurry to explore, though. Small and insular SOF units provide a dysfunctional policy community with a lethal, capable, and discrete instrument that they can quietly employ with little political cost. Casualties stay within a self-selecting and narrow segment of society. Policymakers can wage war with minimal impact on broader American society and, all too often, they have little incentive to embed SOF efforts within a viable political strategy. Put simply, SOF can and does offer political leaders easy answers to complicated problems. That being said, much of SOF’s vaunted secrecy is largely illusory: host country nationals and adversaries soon know that they are there and usually their activities are open secrets within the U.S. With each operation, it is worth asking whether SOF’s secrecy is designed to shield their activities from the enemy or from the American public and our various oversight mechanisms. The Cult of SOF's Negative Impact on SOFEven among the operators themselves, adulation can breed arrogance and a lack of accountability.Most SOF troops will admit to sometimes seeing absurd episodes of indiscipline and favoritism that would have been crushed in even the most anodyne conventional unit, but which are quietly tolerated or overlooked in the fraternity culture of some SOF elements. Most innocently, this entails quietly covering for illustrious senior troops whose bodies can no longer take the staggering demands SOF life. In other cases, it can give way to more insidious and even criminal conduct. The case of Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher may be the best known entry in SOF’s pantheon of misconduct, but is hardly alone. In 2017, a group of SEALS and Marine operators killed an Army Green Beret in a sickening hazing incident in Mali and followed it with a bizarre and shocking apparent ex parte effort to intercede with the soldier’s widow. This followed a 2012 episode also in Mali, others in Iraq and Afghanistan, another in Erbil, and incident after incident elsewhere. In many cases, the troops involved have faced relatively light consequences for their actions, if, indeed, they faced any at all. To their credit, some SOF leaders themselves have openly addressed the repeated breaches of basic disciplinary standards. Clearly, at least some SOF felt the strain of multiple combat deployments over the last 20 years. At the same time, however, we can also surmise that the command climate of some units was undermined by the ability to mask problems behind a shroud of public adulation, secrecy, and elitism. A Warning From History"When a nation reawakens, its finest sons are prepared to give their lives for its liberation. When empires are threatened with collapse, they are prepared to sacrifice their non-commissioned officers."—Menachem Begin, The Revolt (1951) SOF are tremendously skilled and dedicated professionals and America is fortunate to have such troops. At the same time, though, SOF’s place within the broader military and society needs a reset. Congress and executive branch officials should strengthen oversight of SOF and sharply question whether extravagant demands for secrecy are justified (from whom are we really concealing our hand?) Policymakers should ensure that when SOF is needed, their actions are synchronized with other kinetic and non-kinetic measures and embedded with a broader diplomatic and political strategy. SOF can be an exquisite tool, but they are not a stand alone policy. The Special Operators themselves currently recognize that discipline and standards within their community need reinforcement. They can also ensure their training highlights their role within a broader force and ensure that the military as a whole is also recognized where appropriate. The fact that even an excellent film like “Black Hawk Down” barely mentions the 10th Mountain Division troops who incurred significant casualties while rescuing Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu should have incurred institutional pushback from the Army technical advisors and, frankly, from the SOF participants themselves.More broadly, as we enter a different strategic setting from the 20-year war on terror, military commanders should seriously reconsider how SOF will be employed in a new mission set and what types of command relationships will this setting entail. We should note that SOF played a crucial role in the 1989 invasion of Panama and the 1991 Persian Gulf War — two of our more successful military endeavors of the postwar era — but they did so firmly ensconced within, and subordinated to, the larger conventional task force. At the end of the day, though, redressing the imbalance will be difficult: the Cult of SOF has a long pedigree. An obsession with elite and specialized forces is a phenomenon observed in late-stage empires from Byzantium, with its Varangian mercenaries, through mid-20th century France with its Paras and Legionnaires, all immortalized in Jean Larteguy’s novels.It is the unfortunate affectation of a restless and decadent society that is in constant conflict overseas, but whose own disaffected citizens feel little obligation to defend their country or to view their wars as anything other than spectator sports. The public worship of today’s military is, in many ways, a political and emotional tithe that obscures the reality that the American public has outsourced its wars to a small and self-contained subset of society. SOF are simply the apogee of this phenomenon. Through little fault of the operators themselves, they sit at the pinnacle of a warped religion only slightly of their own making.

[Category: Veterans project, Special forces, Military, Endless wars, Veterans, Vietnam]

— Shotgun wedding? Israel and Syria go to the altar

 

at 7/8/25 10:05pm

For half a century, the border between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights was a model of hostile stability. The guns were silent, but deep-seated antagonism prevailed, punctuated by repeated, failed attempts at diplomacy. Now, following the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and a 12-day war between Israel and Iran that has solidified Israel's military dominance in the region, the geopolitical ice is cracking. In a turn of events that would have been unthinkable a year ago, Israel and Syria are in “advanced talks” to end hostilities. Reports now suggest a White House summit is being planned for as early as September, where Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would sign a security agreement, paving the way for normalization. But this is no outbreak of brotherly love; it is a display of realpolitik, a shotgun wedding between a triumphant Israel and a destitute Syria, with Washington playing the role of officiant.The groom is Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s new president, a former jihadist leader who has swapped his fatigues for a suit. Al-Sharaa assumed power just six months ago and sits atop a transitional government formed from the ashes of a 14-year civil war, largely comprising the ranks of his former fighting force, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). He governs a country in ruins, desperate for economic relief and a respite from conflict. The other party to this unlikely courtship is an emboldened Israel, fresh from a military operation against Iran that American and Israeli officials have called a stunning display of Israel’s military and intelligence dominance. Though the damage to Iran’s nuclear program is severe but “not total,” according to Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the perceived success of the campaign has emboldened Israel, which is keen to press its new strategic advantage. Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu speaks of “broad regional possibilities,” and his government is aggressively pushing to expand the Abraham Accords in the aftermath.“We have an interest in adding countries, such as Syria and Lebanon…to the circle of peace and normalization,” declared Gideon Sa’ar, Israel’s foreign minister, on June 30. For Israel, bringing Syria into the fold would be the ultimate strategic prize — transforming one of the historic linchpins of Arab rejectionism of Israel into a partner and possibly formalizing on paper its 58-year illegal hold over most of the Golan Heights.Israel’s actions since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dynasty in December 2024 have been a brutal demonstration of the new power dynamic. Israeli forces have not only pummeled what remained of Syria’s military infrastructure but have also moved into the U.N.-patrolled demilitarized zone, seizing new territory deep inside Syria, including the strategic peak of Mount Hermon, which overlooks Damascus.The potential agreement—whether its final form will be a non-aggression pact or a more comprehensive normalization—may come with a hefty dowry to be paid entirely by the Syrians. According to statements by Israeli officials, that price is the Golan Heights, a strategic plateau of internationally recognized Syrian territory, largely conquered by Israel in 1967. Though the “quiet talks” between Israel and Syria are shrouded in secrecy, Israel has made its position on the Golan Heights publicly clear, with the Israeli Foreign Minister stating that it will “remain part of the state of Israel ” and Prime Minister Netanyahu declaring that it will remain part of Israel “for eternity.” A Syrian concession of the Golan Heights to Israel would shatter the "land for peace" principle enshrined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. This was the formula that underpinned the 1979 Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords, which saw the full return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, and the 1994 Jordan-Israel treaty, which included the return to Jordan of roughly 380 square kilometers that Israel had controlled since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Crucially, “land for peace” was the explicit basis for all previous, albeit failed, negotiations with Syria, from the Madrid Conference in 1991 to the Turkish-mediated talks in 2008. The precedent of the “Rabin deposit ”— the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s reported commitment during U.S. brokered negotiations in the mid-1990s of a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for full normalization — has for decades set the bar for Syrian expectations, a standard Israel is now overturning with its demands that the Golan remain under its control.The Abraham Accords of 2020 pioneered a new model that decoupled normalization from territorial concessions by Israel or genuine progress on Palestinian statehood. For the original signatories, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and later joiners Morocco and Sudan, none of whom share a border with Israel, the deals provided benefits for each signatory. Morocco received U.S. and Israeli recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara, the UAE secured a symbolic promise that Israel would suspend annexation of parts of the West Bank, and Bahrain gained a powerful ally against its larger and more powerful neighbor, Iran.Sudan’s incentive was removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. However, its formal peace with Israel never fully materialized as the country descended into civil war.Now, Israel is applying this doctrine to Syria, albeit in a cruder, more coercive form. Its continued control over most of the Golan Heights—which it formally annexed in 1981 (a move recognized only by the U.S. under President Trump in 2019)—has been declared non-negotiable. The area is now home to some 30,000 Israeli settlers, with plans approved since al-Sharaa's rise to power to increase that population even further. And yet, the Syrian side is attempting to push back against this new reality, albeit from a position of weakness. While unnamed Syrian sources have floated ambitious proposals for the return of one-third of the Golan Heights, the official position is far more modest. Following a call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani expressed Syria’s “aspiration… to return to the 1974 disengagement agreement.” In effect, Syria’s official position circles back to the original “land for peace” formula—resetting the process to the open-ended negotiation framework of Resolution 242.Even this scaled-back demand, however, faces a wall of political opposition that extends beyond Netanyahu’s government, exemplified by figures like Benny Gantz, a prominent opposition leader and former Defense Minister, who has stated that Israel “must not withdraw from the strategic positions” in the newly seized territory. His insistence on maintaining “Israel’s security superiority” reveals a shared consensus between the government and its centrist opposition, effectively boxing Syria out of any meaningful territorial negotiation.This is a negotiation where Israel holds all the cards; its troops occupy Syrian territory with guns pointed toward Damascus, and its recent military actions—from the 12-day campaign against Iran to the ongoing war in Gaza—demonstrate a clear capacity for aggression to secure its demands.Acting as the enthusiastic matchmaker for this abusive relationship is President Donald Trump’s administration. For Trump, for whom personal chemistry is paramount, a single meeting in May was enough to judge Sharaa as "young, attractive," and "tough." That instinctive judgment, coupled with Saudi-Turkish lobbying, was sufficient to reverse decades of antagonistic policy. His envoys, Tom Barrack and Steve Witkoff, have been relentless in their public messaging. Barrack speaks of Syria as an “experiment of getting this done the quickest,” while Witkoff hints at “big announcements” regarding the Abraham Accords. Yet even the American envoys acknowledge the political minefield Sharaa must navigate. Barrack himself noted that the process must be managed carefully to avoid domestic backlash in Syria. “He cannot be seen by his own people to be forced or coerced into the Abraham Accords,” Barrack said. “So he has to work slowly.” This awareness of appearances, however, does not change the underlying strategy. The rapid dismantling of the U.S. sanctions regime, formalized in a June 30 executive order, is the critical tool for this transaction. But this is not a blanket pardon; rather, it is a carefully sequenced exercise in control. While the order terminates the broad sanctions program, it keeps the most potent leverage in play: Sharaa himself and Syria's status as a State Sponsor of Terrorism remain under “review," not revoked, their removal held back as bargaining chips.This provides Washington with carrots, offering Sharaa the immediate, tangible benefit of general economic relief while holding back the ultimate prizes of personal and national delisting. These rewards are contingent on numerous conditions, with “taking concrete steps toward normalizing ties with Israel” at the top of the list, as the White House fact sheet on Syrian sanctions revocation makes clear.However, many Syrians view any deal with Israel cynically. In response to Israeli demands for a demilitarized south in February, protests erupted with chants of, "Netanyahu, you pig, Syria is not for division!" Druze communities in Sweida, which Israel has tried to woo, have hoisted banners rejecting Israel’s encroachment and affirming, "The Syrian law is their protector." For many Syrians, regardless of sect, Israel is not making a peace offer but exploiting their country's weakness to formalize a land grab—a view amplified by the unprecedented violence in Gaza and an ongoing aggressive expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.In addition, the core Palestinian issue, the original casus belli of the decades-long conflict, remains entirely unresolved, with the prospect of a two-state solution seemingly more distant than ever.For Damascus, bankrupt and battered, a deal is not about not what Israel will give but what it will finally stop taking. The potential prize for Syria is two-fold: an end to the relentless airstrikes and a withdrawal of Israeli troops from the U.N.-designated buffer zone they seized after 2024—an outcome that, despite the seizure's illegality under international law, remains far from guaranteed. Given the power imbalance, however, these are not Syrian demands but potential Israeli concessions: the reward for Damascus finally accepting the new reality on the Golan.Ultimately, the inevitable agreement between Syria and Israel will be less a partnership of equals and more a transaction dictated by the new calculus of power, which is tilted overwhelmingly in Israel's favor. The only real question is the nature of the reception to follow: will it be a grand celebration of full normalization on the White House lawn desired by the U.S. and Israel or a more discrete, politically palatable truce that Damascus desperately needs?

[Category: Israel, Netanyahu, Trump, United states, Middle east, Abraham accords, Syria]

— Why Israel is now turning its sights on Turkey

 

at 7/8/25 4:16am

As the distribution of power shifts in the region, with Iran losing relative power and Israel and Turkey emerging on top, an intensified rivalry between Tel Aviv and Ankara is not a question of if, but how. It is not a question of whether they choose the rivalry, but how they choose to react to it: through confrontation or peaceful management.As I describe in Treacherous Alliance, a similar situation emerged after the end of the Cold War: The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the global distribution of power, and the defeat of Saddam's Iraq in the Persian Gulf War reshuffled the regional geopolitical deck. A nascent bipolar regional structure took shape with Iran and Israel emerging as the two main powers with no effective buffer between them (since Iraq had been defeated). The Israelis acted on this first, inverting the strategy that had guided them for the previous decades: The Doctrine of the Periphery. According to this doctrine, Israel would build alliances with the non-Arab states in its periphery (Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia) to balance the Arab powers in its vicinity (Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, respectively).But after 1991, there were no Arab states left that could pose a conventional military threat to Israel. Israel’s focus, as a result, shifted to Iran. The new threat to Israel, Israeli decision-makers decided, was no longer the Arab vicinity, but rather the Persian Periphery.What was odd, of course, was that Iran's hostility toward Israel throughout the 1980s, was not seen by Israel as decisive, as its focus was on Iraq and the Arab states. In fact, throughout the Khomeini era, Israel sought to reestablish relations with Iran and despite getting rebuffed by the clerical regime, Israel lobbied Washington to talk to Iran, sell arms to Iran, and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israel rhetoric because it wasn't reflective of Tehran's real policies.Iran was at first taken by surprise by the Israeli shift. At the time, its revolutionary zeal was fast declining, and the Rafsanjani government was desperately seeking to establish better relations with the US to gain access to investments and economic opportunities. It offered the US access to Iranian oil fields and sought to participate in the major conferences aimed at establishing the region's geopolitical order. But Iran was rebuffed by Washington and excluded from the Madrid conference.Instead, Israel convinced Washington that for Israel to make peace with the Palestinians, the U.S. needed to neutralize the new threat Israel was facing —- Iran's Islamic fundamentalism — by sanctioning and isolating Iran. As Martin Indyk told me, the more peace could be established between Israel and the Palestinians, the more isolated Iran would become. The more isolated Iran was, the more peace there could be between the Israelis and Arabs.This is when the real Israeli-Iranian rivalry begins. Tehran responded by targeting what it viewed as the weakest link in the Israeli-American strategy to isolate Iran: The Oslo process. If the peace process was sabotaged, none of the other objectives of the US and Israel could be achieved. It was at this moment that Iran seriously began to support rejectionist Palestinian groups (its relations with Hamas remained fraught for a few more years, till Sheikh Yassin was assassinated by Israel in 2004).The logic of this strategic rivalry has guided both states for the past three decades: Israel has sought to isolate and sanction Iran, prevent U.S.-Iran diplomacy, kill any potential U.S.-Iran deal, and push the U.S. to go to war with Iran. Tehran has challenged Israel on every front, armed and trained anti-Israel groups, and grudgingly sought to escape the isolation Israel has successfully imposed on Iran by striking a deal with the U.S.Israel has scored several major victories: Iran's Axis of Resistance is largely shattered, and Israel is on the verge of establishing sustained air dominance over Iran. It may not succeed in doing this, but it has dramatically moved its position forward. Israel is on the offensive; Iran is on the defensive.Even though this rivalry is far from being over, and Israel is far from being the clear victor, it has already started glancing toward the next state that needs to be subjugated in order for Israel to achieve military hegemony in the Middle East: Turkey. (Israel's doctrine is to achieve security not through balance, but through domination).Turkey's victory in Syria pushes it deeper into Israel's focus. But Turkey is different from Iran: It is a member of NATO and the G20, its economy cannot easily be sanctioned, it is a Sunni power with stronger soft power in the broader Middle East than Shia Iran has enjoyed for the past 10-15 years. Turkey, of course, has several vulnerabilities as well, including the Kurdish separatist movement.But as long as Israel believes its security can only come through militarily dominating all its neighbors that can pose a challenge to it — that is, those who have the capacity to do so regardless of whether they have the intent or not — then Turkey's emergence as a major power in the region will put it into Israel's crosshairs, whether it likes it or not.The forces of geopolitics cannot be eliminated. They can at best only be tamed.This article was republished from Substack

[Category: Israel, Erdogan, Netanyahu, Iran, Arab states, Syria, Turkey, Turkey]

— On a roll: Trump to host 5 African leaders this week

 

at 7/8/25 3:44am

Fresh from hosting the signing of a peace deal between the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) and Rwanda last month, President Donald Trump will now welcome the leaders of five African countries at the White House for a U.S.-Africa mini-summit later this week Critics would say this active interest in Africa is purely transactional. The question is, does it matter? It is true that Trump wants to open up opportunities for American companies to tap into the plethora of critical natural resources found in abundance across the continent. These resources can be downstreamed in technology-heavy industries, such as electric vehicles and semiconductors, key to creating jobs in an advanced economy.But to get to these opportunities there must be peace, which the Trump administration seems at this point committed to pursuing.On June 27, the Trump administration brokered a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda in the hopes of ending a decades-long war between the two neighbors. Although separate negotiations are currently ongoing in Doha, Qatar, between the DRC and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group that has spurred the recent increase in violence, this initial peace deal serves as hope that sustainable peace could soon be achieved.Soon after this peace deal was struck in a signing ceremony in the Oval Office, it was reported that Trump’s Senior Advisor Massad Boulos — who served as the lead American diplomat in the negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda — will be leading the American effort to end the Sudan Civil War that has ravaged the country since April 2023. That war has led to the displacement of over 11 million people, and has turned into a complicated diplomatic imbroglio, with countries including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran sending weapons to Sudan. Former President Joe Biden, who was otherwise quite inactive on African affairs, tried unsuccessfully to bring about a long-lasting conclusion to the conflict.This week’s summit in Washington will bring together the leaders of the West and Central African states of Mauritania, Senegal, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Gabon. Though no schedule nor description of planned events or discussions have been publicly announced, the collection of Anglophone and Francophone countries are likely to discuss topics focused on enhancing business dealings with American companies and finding ways to increase trade between the five African countries and the United States.Though security might come up, it is unlikely to be a central focus of the meetings. Despite the fact that West Africa is now more impacted by jihadi terrorism than any other part of the world, the countries visiting Washington have thus far avoided suffering serious security challenges from the jihadi groups expanding across North Africa and the Sahel.Despite being relatively small, a couple of the countries visiting the United States are notable regional actors. Under President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Senegal, for example, is leading the effort to quell the fallout from Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso’s decision to leave the regional community ECOWAS and form their own independent body known as the Alliance of Sahel States. Faye has conducted shuttle diplomacy between the countries and has sought ways to reintegrate them into the regional fabric. Meanwhile, Mauritania is a major departure point for migrants looking to escape into the United States — a key issue for the American president, who has argued for stricter enforcement of the U.S. border and limitations on both legal and illegal migration into the United States.This summit will likely serve as a close follow-on from the 13th annual U.S.-Africa Business Summit that concluded June 25 in Luanda, Angola. During the summit, $2.5 billion of new deals were announced between businesses and governments, including geopolitically significant projects such as a hydropower plant to be built along the Ruzizi River, which serves as the border between the DRC and Rwanda. The American company Anzana Electric will take a 10% percent stake in the project.This week’s meetings also come before a full U.S.-Africa summit is expected to take place in New York City in September. This will be the first such convocation between the United States and African countries since Biden’s U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit was held in Washington in December 2022.

[Category: Central africa, Trump, Mauritania, Senegal, Liberia, Guinea-bissau, Gabon, Congo, Drc, Rwanda, Qiosk, West africa]

— Tucker Carlson 'platforming' Iranian president is an American tradition

 

at 7/7/25 10:05pm

Over the Independence Day holiday, Tucker Carlson announced that he had conducted an interview with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.Dan Crenshaw immediately attacked him. “Nothing screams July 4th like platforming the leader of a terror state that labels us ‘The Great Satan,” the hawkish Republican congressman shared on X. Fellow rightwing hawks and frequent Carlson critics, Senator Ted Cruz and radio host Mark Levin, piled on, admonishing Carlson for daring to do this.But why wouldn’t an American political pundit or stateside journalist of any kind do this?That this is “wrong” would have been news to the New York Times when they interviewed the leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1979. The MacNeil/Lehrer report also interviewed Khomeini. A number of mainstream American outlets interviewed him. These particular interviews were on the eve of the U.S. hostage crisis that began in early November of 1979. CBS News’ Mike Wallace interviewed Khomeini two weeks after the hostage crisis began. Time magazine also interviewed him during the crisis and declared Khomeini 1980’s "Man of the Year."That label was not an endorsement of Khomeini. Time called Adolf Hitler “Man of the Year” in 1938. Like with Khomeini, that was not an endorsement of the German dictator. It was recognition of his impact on the world stage at that time. This is why American journalists also interviewed Hitler.Journalism 101 requires covering and talking to the major players in any given conflict.During the Obama administration, controversial Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was interviewed by the American press on a regular basis. American reporters had interviewed al-Qaeda terrorist leader and eventual 9/11 mastermind Osama Bin Laden. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was interviewed by CBS News maven Dan Rather one month before the 2003 U.S. invasion. Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was interviewed a number of times throughout many American administrations.Outside the Middle East, entertainment host Ed Sullivan interviewed Cuba’s Fidel Castro on his popular nighttime variety series in 1959. ABC News’ Barbara Walters interviewed him in 1977. The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour interviewed Castro in 1985. In fact, Cigar Aficionado interviewed the brutal dictator in 1994, in which publisher Marvin Shanken’s first question was “How important are cigars to Cuba?”That interview might actually sound like “platforming” someone who probably shouldn’t be. That said, the magazine republished the interview in the summer of last year to celebrate its 30th anniversary.Last June, Carlson interviewed Russian President Vladimir Putin, which was also controversial. Less controversial were the times Barbara Walters interviewed Putin, NBC News interviewed him, CBS News interviewed him, the New York Times interviewed him, and all the American outlets who interviewed different Russian presidents going back to the earliest days of the Cold War.Why would so many American journalists “platform” so many adversaries of the United States?Because even framing the question that way is ridiculous. Carlson’s explanation for why he recently interviewed Iran’s president is similar to what any journalist of any generation might say to critics who could question their decision to interview international bad actors.“We know we’ll be criticized for doing this interview,” Carlson explained in a short video clip to address any such questions, prior to releasing his actual interview. “Why did we do it anyway? Well, we did it because we were just at war with Iran 10 days ago, and maybe again.”That part is important. It’s as if hawkish figures, like Crenshaw, Cruz, and Levin, who seek war, find it treasonous to let Americans hear all the sides involved. Wars in which American sons and daughters potentially could be asked to risk their lives for.It’s easier to get to war if fewer questions are asked and only one side can exclusively control the narrative. Carlson continued, “And so, our view, which has remained consistent over time, is that American citizens have the constitutional right and the God-given right to all the information they can gather about matters that affect them.”One could imagine Barbara Walters giving a similar answer if challenged for interviewing Castro or Putin. Different words, perhaps, but the same, simple journalistic reasoning.In the interview, Carlson asks Pezeshkian, among other things, about his country’s seriousness in continuing nuclear negotiations and also why his countrymen chant slogans like ‘Death to America’ and call the U.S. ‘The Great Satan,’ and the Iranian president gives his answers.Is he serious? Is he lying? Is this a man that can be believed?That’s not the point. He’s a politician. The same questions might also apply to any American politician. The point is that Americans hear him. “The purpose of the interview was to add to the corpus of knowledge from which Americans can derive their own opinion,” Carlson said. “Learn everything you can, and then you decide.”Tucker Carlson interviewing Iran’s president isn’t a scandal. It’s basic journalism. More scandalous is how many journalists today no longer feel the need to do it.

[Category: Enewsletter, Tucker carlson, Iran, Pezeshkian, Iran nuclear deal, Israel, Us-iran]

— Does Germany’s ruling coalition have a peace problem?

 

at 7/7/25 10:05pm

Surfacing a long-dormant intra-party conflict, the Friedenskreise (peace circles) within the Social Democratic Party of Germany has published a “Manifesto on Securing Peace in Europe” in a stark challenge to the rearmament line taken by the SPD leaders governing in coalition with the conservative CDU-CSU under Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Although the Manifesto clearly does not have broad support in the SPD, the party’s leader, Deputy Chancellor and Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil, won only 64% support from the June 28-29 party conference for his performance so far, a much weaker endorsement than anticipated. The views of the party’s peace camp may be part of the explanation.Why it matters The release of the Manifesto poses a challenge to the party’s leadership that could weaken the governing coalition. Polls indicate that Germany’s Social Democratic Party commands only about 15% of public support. It remains, however, indispensable to the parliamentary majority government headed by Friedrich Merz and the CDU-CSU parties (Christian Democratic Union of Germany and Christian Social Union in Bavaria). The new leadership of SPD wants to turn the page on the Olaf Scholz era and sees its role in the Merz government as an opportunity to rebuild its electoral fortunes after its miserable 16% showing in the February elections.To date, accommodation of CDU-CSU on a range of issues has not helped SPD’s standing with voters.Unfortunately for Merz, his own hold on power requires the SPD not to lose much more ground. After the resounding defeat of SPD Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the much younger Klingbeil rose to party leadership and, as Deputy Chancellor and Finance Minister, supports Merz’s stance on Ukraine and the defense buildup. Important backing comes from the SPD Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.A heretofore timid and cowed minority of SPD politicians hold onto the preference, deeply embedded in the strategic culture of post-World War II Germany, for conciliation over confrontation in resolving international crises. Unease about the prevailing stance on Ukraine may be part of the weak voter support for the SPD. Merz has played up the idea of a Russian threat to NATO as early as 2029 if Ukraine is defeated, and has built considerable public support for rearmament based on these forecasts.The unyielding stance on the war in Ukraine draws together the parliamentary majority held by CDU-CSU and SPD, as well as the Greens, while the parliamentary opposition consists of the AfD and the Linke (left) party, both of which question continued support for Ukraine absent any diplomatic initiative. The German policy on Ukraine appears to hinge on the hope that a prolonged conflict will ultimately compel Russia to retreat from its war aims and accept a compromise acceptable to Ukraine’s leadership.This stance, framed in moralistic and principled terms equating compromise with dishonorable appeasement, is highly resistant to any revision. The insistence on staying the course seems to be rooted also in optimism that a successor to President Trump will return the U.S. to its former role as guarantor of European security and reliable foe of Russian ambitions.The ManifestoThe Manifesto marks a revival of the traditional foreign policy course set by Willy Brandt beginning in the late 1960s, credited in the minds of many SPD members and other Germans with producing the peaceful dissolution of the USSR and the reunification of Germany.The two leaders of the peace camp who produced the Manifesto are Rolf Mützenich, leader of the party’s Bundestag faction until February, and Ralf Stegner, a member of the SPD Executive Committee until recently. The 100 signatories of the Manifesto include a former party chairman, several former ministers, and historian Peter Brandt, son of the former Chancellor.The release of the Manifesto marks a departure for these signatories, most of whom supported Scholz’s Zeitenwende of 2022, which boosted aid to Ukraine and defense outlays more generally.The authors charge that the party and the coalition are seeking peace and security by preparing for war rather than, as the authors advocate, pursuing the same aims along with, rather than against, Russia. They concede that Germany should build up its defense readiness (Verteidungsfähigkeit), but they invoke the Helsinki Final Act concept of collective security, which they say produced valuable arms control agreements and enabled the reunification of Germany.They also call for de-escalation and mutual confidence building to accompany a carefully calibrated rearmament framed solely in a defensive mode and for supporting German and European industrial development.The signers also endorse a European diplomatic strategy to end the war in Ukraine and oppose the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles in Germany.Reception of this action by SPD mainstream has been cold. The SPD defense minister, Boris Pistorius, by far the most popular SPD politician, accused the signatories of failing to face reality and exploiting the public’s desire for peace.The disappointing showing for Klingbeil at the party conference may reflect misgivings within the party about his unreserved support for what many see as excessive bellicosity and fear-mongering on the part of Merz. The timing of the peace faction’s Manifesto release suggests they hoped to open a breach in the party ranks.

[Category: Spd, Ukraine, Merz, Nato, Europe, Germany]

— Trump lifted sanctions on Syria. Now do Cuba.

 

at 7/7/25 10:05pm

President Trump’s new National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) on Cuba, announced on June 30, reaffirms the policy of sanctions and hostility he articulated at the start of his first term in office. In fact, the new NSPM is almost identical to the old one. The policy’s stated purpose is to “improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy” by restricting financial flows to the Cuban government. It reaffirms Trump’s support for the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which explicitly requires regime change — that Cuba become a multiparty democracy with a free market economy (among other conditions) before the U.S. embargo will be lifted.The policy outlined in the NSPM has yet to be translated into legally binding regulations, so it’s too early to tell if restrictions on U.S. trade or travel to Cuba will tighten. But the bottom line is that Trump’s new Cuba policy is not “new” at all. It’s just the latest variation on the embargo imposed on Cuba in 1962. For the next 63 years, Washington has tried to bend the Cuban government to its will by crippling the Cuban economy, all to no avail. Cuba today is no closer to being a capitalist multiparty democracy than it was in 1962 or 1996. As we argue in a recent Quincy Institute brief, U.S. policy toward Cuba needs a major reset, a shift toward a policy of pragmatic engagement — not as a favor to the Cuban government, but because engagement better serves the interests of the United States and the Cuban people. Advancing U.S. interests sometimes requires setting aside old animosities and engaging with former adversaries, as President Trump has done with Syria, Russia, China, and others. The president defines his “America First” foreign policy as one that champions “core American interests” and “puts America and its interests first.” U.S. policy toward Cuba in recent years has failed that test. Sanctions have increased the risks to U.S. national security on issues that the president has identified as U.S. priorities for the Western Hemisphere: migration, narcotics trafficking, access to strategic minerals, and the rising influence of China and Russia.Conditions in Cuba today are far different than when President Trump issued his first NSPM in 2017, so U.S. Cuba policy needs to be reconsidered. Cuba is experiencing an unprecedented economic and social crisis rooted in the government’s mismanagement of the economy, the impact of the COVID pandemic, and crippling U.S. economic sanctions. Cubans are enduring shortages of all basic necessities, deteriorating government services, and repeated electrical blackouts. As a result. the crisis has produced the largest emigration in Cuban history—nearly a million people in the past three years, 75% of whom have come to the United States.Cuban society is also undergoing profound social change. The legalization of private enterprises has given rise to a dynamic private sector despite restrictive government regulations. The expansion of internet access and social media has led to a more robust civil society despite government censure and intimidation. Cuba’s crisis is rapidly raising the costs to the United States of sanctions policy by stimulating migration, opening the door to geopolitical rivals China and Russia, blocking U.S. access to Cuba’s strategic minerals, hurting U.S. relations with allies, and threatening cooperation with Cuba on issues of mutual interest, including counter-narcotics cooperation. As internal processes of change evolve in Cuba, disengagement leaves the United States on the sidelines, unable to exercise any positive influence on the trajectory of that change.The United States needs to take the initiative to reset U.S.-Cuban relations to safeguard U.S. interests and ease the suffering of the Cuban people. The immediate goals of a new policy should be to:Relieve migration pressures by making immediate regulatory changes that would aid the recovery of the Cuban economy and encourage the growth of the Cuban private sector, which is among the NSPM’s stated aims. The Cuban private sector is real and growing, forming the cornerstone of a revitalized economy and civil society despite operating in an increasingly hostile business environment. Its success is critical to the Cuban people and the Cuban economy. U.S. sanctions add another layer of obstacles for it to overcome. Tangible support requires relaxing, not tightening, restrictions on U.S. trade, investment, and financial transactions, especially with the private sector. Taken together, these measures would significantly reduce migration pressures.Expand commercial and cultural engagement to compete with the influence of China and Russia. The United States is a natural economic partner for Cuba — a potential source of trade, tourism, and investment far beyond what Russia or China can offer. Moreover, a robust economic relationship with the United States would give Cuba an incentive to limit its military and intelligence cooperation with U.S. adversaries.In addition, Cubans have far greater cultural affinity with the United States than with Russia or China, a comparative advantage that should be built upon by loosening, not tightening, restrictions on cultural and educational exchanges, and travel.Reengage with the Cuban government diplomatically to advance cooperation on issues of mutual interest, reduce bilateral tensions, and address human rights and property issues. Engagement facilitates cooperation and opens diplomatic channels in hopes of finding common ground. Making unilateral demands of Cuba on contentious issues has never produced results, whereas engagement has led to successful cooperation on counter-narcotics operations, migration, and environmental protection, among other issues.The United States should continue to voice its support for basic human rights and condemn the Cuban government when it violates them. However, demanding Cuban concessions on human rights as a precondition for improving bilateral relations has never worked. No U.S. policy can force the Cuban government to adhere to high standards of human rights, but engagement creates incentives for the Cuban government to be responsive to Washington’s concerns.***A policy of engagement needs to be grounded in realistic expectations. It will not erase the fundamental differences between the United States and Cuba, and it is not an alternative path to regime change. The pace and extent of this engagement ultimately depend on the Cuban government’s interest in improving relations. But the initial steps recommended here are ones the United States can and should take unilaterally, because they advance U.S. policy interests and offer the opportunity to set U.S.-Cuban relations on a better path for the future.

[Category: Sanctions, Russia, China, Us, Cuba, Enewsletter]

— BRICS takes aim at Israel as it wades into geopolitical conflicts

 

at 7/7/25 4:34am

The BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil has issued its leaders’ declaration, with a significant section on geopolitics and security and particular criticism of Israel’s recent bombing of one of its newest members — Iran — and its war on Gaza.The Rio summit represented the BRICS at its biggest so far: 10 full members, and 10 partner countries. Indonesia was this year's new member. In a world of increasing tensions and conflict, BRICS decided to wade deeper into questions of geopolitics and hard security but managed to forge an impressive consensus on these questions.BRICS is not a formal organization but rather a loose coalition of what I have called the “global east” (Russia and China) and several global south states. Following its first leaders’ summit in 2009 as BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China), South Africa joined to make it BRICS. Post-2023, five new members have been added (Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates), and 10 partner countries have been announced at a lower tier of participation.BRICS' original mandate of addressing global economic and collective action challenges and strengthening the multilateral order expectedly remained the biggest focus of this year’s declaration, including substantial paragraphs devoted to development finance, health, trade, and climate change, among others.BRICS has traditionally been focused on economic coordination but has increasingly been wading into fraught geopolitical/hard security questions since the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. This is an unsurprising effect of the international system turning more conflictual, with more major wars of late than we have seen for a long time. But as this summit showed, BRICS is showing a notable ability to forge consensus on these challenging questions. The Middle East, Africa and South Asia were a bigger focus this year than Ukraine.In the Middle East context, the U.S. was not mentioned or criticized by name in the declaration, but there were seven critical references to Israel. Israel is criticized implicitly and explicitly on its occupation of Palestinian land, "denial or obstruction of humanitarian access and the targeting of humanitarian personnel," "the use of starvation as a method of warfare," violations of sovereignty and continuing occupation in Lebanon, and the International Court of Justice case lodged by South Africa in 2023. However, Hamas is not mentioned, nor is the Oct 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel. But the "release of all hostages and detainees" is demanded.Notably, Israel and the United States were not mentioned explicitly in context of the recent war on Iran. But the attacks on Iran were condemned, representing stronger language than the joint statement specifically on this conflict issued by BRICS just two weeks prior to the 2025 summit. The UN Security Council was also invoked in this regard.On other security fronts, the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22 in Kashmir, India was condemned explicitly, as were attacks on civilian targets in Kursk in Russia. The roles of Pakistan and Ukraine were not mentioned by name in these contexts. The declaration contained significant text on combating terrorism in the specific contexts of India, Syria, and Sudan, and more broadly. Conflicts in Sudan, Syria and Haiti got dedicated paragraphs. The Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa were also mentioned in the security context.Most of the declaration is taken up, as expected, with a host of non-security issues, including development finance (NDB), food, health, science/space, and education. Climate, a top Brazilian priority, gets a major section, linked to development. The declaration rejected the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as protectionist. The declaration also criticized recent U.S. trade policies by expressing “serious concerns about the rise of unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures which distort trade and are inconsistent with WTO rules."Finally, BRICS sees the world as already multipolar. Multipolarity was both recognized as a reality and encouraged in the document. The text mentions "the context of the contemporary realities of the multipolar world." and supports "fostering (a) multipolar world" in the G20 context. It also states that "multipolarity can expand opportunities for emerging markets and developing countries to develop their constructive potential"In response Sunday, President Donald Trump declared on his Truth Social that any country that aligned with BRICS policies would get slapped with an additional 10% tariff. Countries are awaiting final tariff news as the July 9 "liberation day" deadline looms.

[Category: Israel, Rio, Brics summit, Global south, Global east, Russia, India, China, Tariffs, Brics, Qiosk]

As of 7/14/25 7:11pm. Last new 7/14/25 7:10am.