Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Let them eat burritos: Out of touch influencers risk all for Trump war

 

at 8/7/26 10:05pm

As the 2026 midterm elections near, polls show American voters’ top priority is the economy, including concerns that the unpopular U.S. war in Iran appears to be driving up prices at home.Might these voter concerns give Republican hawks pause?Apparently not."If we can't handle four dollar oil for a period of months in order to disarm Iran of a nuclear weapon then we are not a superpower anymore,” former George W. Bush speechwriter Marc Thiessen told Fox News last week.One of the biggest pro-Israel lawmakers in Congress had a similar message. "As much as it stinks to pay an extra dollar for a gallon of gas… think about the damage of a nuclear bomb going off in Washington, or New York, or Miami,” Rep. Randy Fine (R-Fla.) said Monday on News Nation.Surely some of these Republicans would recognize that fear of inflation combined with growing opposition to the war could hurt their party come November — that maybe an adjustment in language and tone is in order?Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) gets it. Sort of. He wants to keep prices down for Americans but thinks the only way to do that is to bomb the hell out of Iran for “two to three weeks” to get the Hormuz Strait open. He says the Iranians cannot be trusted to broker a deal without military force, so why not keep doing what hasn’t worked yet over the last five months?Others are leaning hard into the notion that higher prices are just “fake news” — no doubt in hopes that repeating that enough will just make the problem go away.The Iran war "has had basically no impact on food prices in the US,” declared The Daily Wire’s Ben Shapiro on Wednesday, seemingly responding to what writer Sohrab Ahmari is calling the “great American burrito debate” on social media over the current cost of food and how that might relate to the current cost of war.Ahmari’s essay notes that, to Cotton’s point about Hormuz and prices, “even though the United States is the world’s chief net energy exporter, the supply squeeze in the Strait of Hormuz puts inflationary pressure on gas prices in America. And it’s not just gas prices which are affected, but those in many other sectors, too — from transportation to agriculture to restaurants and hospitality.”In addition to rising prices, new data released Friday showed that 23,000 jobs were lost in July, an unexpected number for economists. All eyes are on the new inflation figures to be released this upcoming week. In May, it rose to 4.2%, the highest since 2023 and relaxed in June to 3.5%.Never to be left out, regime change maven and Fox News host Mark Levin on Sunday urged Donald Trump to attack Kharg Island to bring Iranians “to their knees” and not to worry about sparking "a worldwide depression and so on. It won't happen!"Trump seemed to share the same reality-detached hopefulness, proclaiming on Monday that, "Now, US is the King of OIL!" The president shared a chart showing U.S. “oil exports [surging] to historic high!” He is likely hoping that his audience won’t read up on the subject and find that it doesn’t matter how much the U.S. produces; it won’t affect current gas prices at the pump today.One time MAGA-darling turned Trump critic, former Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, wasn’t having it. She called out the president on what Americans are actually experiencing."The national price of gas is $4.10 and diesel is $5.36. Your illegal senseless war on Iran is crushing the very people that voted to end foreign wars, lower inflation, and lower the price of gas,” Greene said on X.Trump even went so far as to suggest that greedy energy companies might be to blame, saying at the Oval Office this week that Chevron and Exxon Mobil are making "too much money,” amid the war. "I don't like it... They ought to give some of that back to the public,” he said, according to C-SPAN.The Independent’s Eric Garcia couldn’t help but notice that Trump sounded like Democrats complaining about "greedflation" under President Joe Biden.None of this appears to be fooling voters, including Republicans.On Tuesday, CNN pollster Harry Enten rattled off some of Donald Trump’s approval numbers among moderate Republicans. “On Iran, he's six points underwater within his own party. Within his own party! You think that's low? (He’s) about 17 points underwater on inflation.” “Inflation was the name of the game with the economy back in 2024,” Enten noted. “If I am a Republican running for Congress in those swing districts, I need those moderate Republicans, and they are leaving Donald Trump, and they may be leaving those Republican candidates as well.”The New York Times suggested on Tuesday that the war was undermining Trump’s presidency. "The war in Iran, along with a cycle of threats and walk-backs, has upended President Trump’s domestic agenda at a dire political moment. Americans are facing rising gas prices."It went on to cite the most recent Quinnipiac University poll, which found that 60% of voters opposed military action against Iran, “a slight uptick since May.” Furthermore, a recent CNN/SSRS poll found that 74% of Americans — including about 43% of Republicans — said the war was not “worth the cost in terms of the financial burden or American casualties," the paper noted.While some hawks are doing mental gymnastics to say war costs and domestic affordability are unrelated, other conservatives have told them to knock it off and course correct.The Daily’s Wire’s Matt Walsh shared an X post on Monday that at the time of this writing had 4.4 million views and climbing.“Grocery prices are insane. They’re still rising. Addressing this problem should be the number one priority of every elected leader,” Walsh wrote. “End the stupid foreign wars and focus on this issue.”In response, Charlie Kirk Show producer Andrew Kolvet tried to downplay current inflation as "hangover from Covid and Biden-era inflation," but also quoted one of his TPUSA college students bemoaning that, "a burrito shouldn't cost $20."The forever-hawkish Marc Thiessen was back again, completely dismissive. "Cry me a river. The burritos in the college cafeteria are included in your meal plan.”Add to that Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-Texas) who recently lost his primary by double digits. "Stop whining, get a job, eat Ramen like the rest of us did in college, on a budget with 4 roommates. The market does not care what you think something should cost," he posted. To which conservative commentator Ryan Girdusky responded: "Can't understand why you lost your re-election."Hence the foreign policy-inflation-driven-burrito-cost debate that is probably still raging on X and that Ahmari insists “the neocons are losing.” He might be right.No matter how much hawks doth protest, there are costs to any war, often including affordability.Iran war defenders pretending otherwise is just something reality won’t afford them.

[Category: Enewsletter, Maga, Donald-trump, Conservatives, Ben-shapiro, Economy, Iran-war]

— Syria walks a tightrope as war engulfs the Middle East

 

at 8/6/26 10:05pm

Syria has so far avoided becoming a battlefield in the U.S.-Israel-Iran crisis, but it has not escaped the consequences. As regional peace remains elusive, Syria is confronting the challenge of rebuilding following years of gruesome civil war while shielding its fragile recovery from a new wave of geopolitical turmoil.The relatively new Syrian government has prioritized reconstruction, foreign investment, and institution rebuilding. However, the expanding crisis has already created economic and security pressures through trade disruptions, investor uncertainty, and new refugee flows.Higher transportation and insurance costs, along with increased caution among investors, threaten to slow Syria’s recovery just as the country seeks to move beyond its long civil war. Making matters worse is the fact that most Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ economies are experiencing contraction as a result of the Iran war, meaning that their earlier economic memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and agreements with Damascus are likely to be cut back, if not eliminated.Despite these challenges, the regional upheaval has created openings that may work in Syria’s favor. The dual blockades of the Strait of Hormuz have reduced Iraq’s ability to export oil through the Gulf and increased overland shipments across Syria to Mediterranean ports. There is also renewed discussion of building pipeline routes linking Gulf producers to the Mediterranean through Jordan and Syria — routes that could eventually generate significant foreign investment if regional conditions permit.Moreover, Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s plans to revive the historic Hejaz Railway, which once connected the region from Mecca all the way to Istanbul, may position Syria as an increasingly important trade and logistics hub in the region, making it essentially a land bridge between Europe and GCC states.Such opportunities could “exponentially” improve Syria’s regional standing, said Karam Shaar, director of Karam Shaar Advisory Limited and a non-resident senior fellow at the New Lines Institute. He added that they could help the Syrian government “solidify its position in power,” a critical objective for Damascus, as the “order of the day for the [current] Syrian regime…is basically consolidation.”Spillover effectBeyond the economic fallout, the conflict has offered a stark reminder of Syria’s enduring vulnerability to regional instability, as its position between Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey leaves it hostage to events beyond its borders, even when Damascus is not directly involved. Lebanon, which quickly became a major flashpoint in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, is particularly important in this regard given its deep connections with Syria.“Whenever the Lebanese economy shrinks, it has an oversized impact on Syria, as the two economies are joined at the hip,” explained Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Oklahoma, in an interview with RS. One impact of the Lebanese crisis has been an uptick in the number of Syrian refugees leaving Lebanon and returning home. “It means an immediate surge in spending, but also brings many problems. Many of those returnees had good jobs in Lebanon and pumped monthly remittances into the Syrian economy,” Landis said. “Syria also is groaning under the weight of returnees. It has no housing, jobs, or capacity to help the inflow of desperate people.”A serious risk for Syria is the cumulative effect of regional instability, including threats posed by armed groups capable of exploiting periods of heightened tension, explained Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat.“We also shouldn’t overlook the continued presence of ISIS remnants, networks linked to the former Assad regime, and Iran-backed groups operating inside Syria or in neighboring countries,” Barabandi told RS. “None of these actors have an interest in seeing the new Syrian government succeed.”Iran’s reach into SyriaOn July 17, Iran carried out an attack on eastern Syria, claiming to have hit a U.S. special operations command center. This strike seems to have been a political message aimed at shaping regional calculations.“Iran’s message is ‘Don’t escalate.’ As the U.S. has threatened escalation against Iran, Iran has demonstrated that it can also widen the circle of pain, striking ever more countries,” Landis said. “The Houthis struck the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Iran is seeking deterrence and to prove to America and its allies that it can take the fight to them.”From Barabandi’s perspective, the strike may also have served as a warning to Damascus amid discussions about a possible Syrian role in limiting Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon.“The message may have been that any Syrian role perceived as helping weaken Hezbollah or reducing Iranian influence in Lebanon would come with consequences. That said, I do not believe Syria is willing to become militarily involved in Lebanon,” Barabandi told RS.But as Shaar sees it, the July 17 attack was not necessarily consequential. “I don’t think it changes the calculus of anyone in the region. The Iranians are just trying to attack as many countries as possible to show their reach,” he said. “But otherwise, I just don’t see the strategic significance of such an attack.”Regardless of the Islamic Republic’s precise intent, the attack underscored Syria’s challenge of maintaining neutrality while navigating pressure from competing regional powers. Syria’s relationship with Israel is particularly challenging. Although Damascus is determined to stay out of the American-Israeli war on Iran, it continues to view the Israeli occupation of southeast Syria as a grave threat to its plans for recovery and sovereign rights, and it continues to consider Tel Aviv’s aggressive actions throughout the Arab world more broadly to be a major driver of regional instability. At the same time, with its priorities centered on economic redevelopment and restoring ties with other Arab states, Damascus has little interest in a confrontation with Israel that could further derail these efforts. As the U.S.-Israel-Iran war continues, the Syrian government is therefore intent on avoiding actions that could further inflame tensions with its nuclear-armed neighbor. It is within this context in which Syria has taken an officially neutral stance on Israel-Iran hostilities, marking a significant departure from the Assad era.Syria’s struggle to build a stable futureSyrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and those around him appear determined to prevent Syria from once again becoming a battlefield for regional rivalries. The government’s primary strategy has been to avoid direct involvement in the American-Israeli war on Iran while maintaining a balanced foreign policy that rests on improving ties with Washington, Arab capitals, and other players on the international stage while doing whatever is necessary to avoid triggering renewed conflict in Syria. At the same time, Syria is seeking to use the shifting regional environment to strengthen its diplomatic position and build stronger partnerships with Turkey and GCC members that could enhance its security and economic prospects.The extent to which Syria will successfully insulate itself from this regional crisis heavily rests on the country’s internal stability and the success of its own institutions. Barabandi believes that Syria’s greatest long-term challenge is effective governance at home.“The long-term success of the new government will depend less on military developments and more on whether it can build institutions that represent all Syrians, apply the rule of law equally, fight corruption, deliver basic services, create economic opportunities, and implement a credible process of transitional justice,” he told RS.Ultimately, Syria’s future will depend on its ability to navigate both regional turmoil and its own internal transformation. The U.S.-Iran conflict has not made Syria a primary battlefield, but it has exposed the country’s continued vulnerability to external shocks. Economic disruption, refugee pressures, and security threats could slow recovery, reinforcing the need for Damascus to avoid escalation and focus on rebuilding.

[Category: Iran-war, Israel, Syria]

— DRC president claims Trump deal requires he seize another term

 

at 8/6/26 10:05pm

Last week, the Constitutional Court of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) opened the door for the country’s sitting president, Felix Tshisekedi, to seek a third term. In a widely expected but nonetheless dramatic decision, the court ruled that the country’s constitution — including its provision limiting presidents to two terms in office — can now be amended via a referendum in the event of “major dysfunction” of state institutions. The country’s 2006 constitution not only limits a president to two five-year terms, but Article 220 stipulates that “the number and length of the terms of office of the President of the Republic … may not form the object of a Constitutional amendment.” Tshisekedi already expressed interest in the idea of a referendum on term limits, saying in June, “I have not asked for a third term, but if the people want a third term, I will accept.” The next presidential election is scheduled for 2028.The court’s decision now threatens to set off a political crisis in the country — one in which the United States, which has actively tried to influence both political and economic issues in the DRC for years, has unintentionally become embroiled.In a press conference on May 6, Tshisekedi argued, without evidence, that amending his country’s constitution was among the conditions put in place by Washington in the minerals agreement the two countries signed last December, which gave American firms preferential access to the country’s resources. Members and supporters of the ruling coalition are now repeating this claim across the media, pointing to Article XII of the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) as the condition requiring an amendment to the country’s constitution. The article in question says that the DRC must commit “to undertake any legislative and constitutional reforms within a maximum period of twelve (12) months in order to align its legal framework with the relevant provisions of this Agreement.” But the SPA does not require any specific changes to the Congolese constitution, let alone any that focus directly on presidential term limits. The only explicit requirement in the SPA is that the Congolese government agrees to amend a 2014 law focused on “the fiscal, customs, parafiscal, non-tax revenue and exchange regime” and to “undertake any legislative and constitutional reforms … to align its legal framework” with the SPA. In order to avoid the appearance of foreign interference, the Trump administration should clearly indicate that the SPA does not require the DRC to make any constitutional amendment relating to presidential powers or term limits.Another argument advanced by Tshisekedi and his supporters is that, since the constitution was largely written by foreigners, it never sufficiently accounted for domestic Congolese realities. The text therefore needs to be amended, if not completely overhauled, in order to be more responsive to local needs. U.S.-based organizations funded by the U.S. government were among those that sent experts to the DRC to help in the drafting and implementation of the constitution.A third major argument presented by Tshisekedi and his supporters has to do with the long-standing war ravaging the DRC’s east. The DRC has for years been fighting a proxy war against Rwanda, in which both countries are providing munitions to various armed groups in a conflict whose origins date back to the Rwandan genocide of 1994.In early May, Tshisekedi said “If we cannot end this war, unfortunately we will not be able to organize elections in 2028.” “The resources are there, we can do it, but we cannot organize them without North Kivu and South Kivu,” he argued, referring to two of the country’s eastern provinces where much of the recent fighting has taken place.The United States is directly implicated in the conflict’s future. Washington brokered an agreement in June 2025 to end the war in exchange for preferential access to the region’s minerals — access which was codified in the December SPA. Despite Trump’s claims to have ended the war, fighting has continued sporadically in the year since.If peace continues to be elusive, and if Tshisekedi continues to cite the conflict to argue for deferring elections, Washington could find itself in a difficult position. In such a case, it would need to pressure Tshisekedi to live up to his end of the peace deal, including ceasing “any state support to non-state armed groups except as necessary to facilitate implementation of this Agreement.” Reporting suggests the DRC continues to provide support to several of the armed groups fighting in the country’s east.Ultimately, the United States’ primary objective in the DRC shouldn’t be to support Tshisekedi’s effort to cling to power, no matter how amenable he’s been to U.S. mining interests. The DRC has long struggled to support a liberal democracy where reliable elections happen as scheduled. The country was under a dictatorship until 1997, when long-time ruler Mobutu Sese Seko fled the country under threat. Laurent-Desire Kabila took over the next day, installing an autocratic government. After years of conflict and unstable governance, a constitution was approved in 2006, providing for two five-year term limits for the office of the president.In 2015, then-President Joseph Kabila — the son of Laurent-Desire — expressed his interest in seeking an unconstitutional third term in office. Tshisekedi, who was in the opposition at the time, spoke out against Kabila’s plans, claiming that they were a breach of democracy. Widespread protests and pressure from foreign governments ultimately forced Kabila to step down at the end of his second term, allowing for elections to be held, in which the Constitutional Court declared Tshisekedi the winner amid claims of electoral fraud by the opposition. The opposition has voiced disapproval over Tshisekedi’s apparent attempt to hold onto power. In a speech before the Conference of Catholic Bishops a couple weeks ago, Martin Fayulu, who officially came in second in the 2018 presidential election and third in 2023, said “Tshisekedi has betrayed the oath he took to respect and defend the constitution.” For the United States, the goal in the DRC shouldn’t be to advance or hinder the interests of any single domestic politician, no matter how powerful they might be. Getting embroiled in the domestic political affairs of the DRC risks pulling the U.S. into a crisis from which it has nothing to gain. Rather, Washington should remain focused on promoting its own interests by seeking access to the region’s economic opportunities and extending its investments across the Congo in an effort to integrate the region’s vital resources into global supply chains. The United States should also work to continuously hold each of the belligerent sides accountable for the peace accord signed last year in Washington. If peace takes hold, then the U.S. wins twice: first by securing a diplomatic victory, and second by lowering barriers to investment for American private sector firms.

[Category: Minerals-deal, Trump-administration, Rare-earth-metals, Drc]

— The rise or fail of middle powers will determine Middle East peace

 

at 8/6/26 10:05pm

For more than two decades, endless wars have destabilized the Middle East, creating huge amounts of human suffering, displacement and trauma. The region is exhausted, with little faith in the possibility of peace and few structures to enable it. The region is now at an inflection point; it can continue endless violence or undertake serious mediation and conflict resolution. The war with Iran has exposed the limits of U.S. military power, leaving only one practical option on the table: pursuing negotiations that recognize the balance of power in the region and the security concerns of all parties. This requires very careful engagement and mediation.There are multiple overlapping conflicts and rivalries within the region. Breaking this cycle requires more than another round of emergency diplomacy; it requires permanent structures for mediation and peacemaking. This article proposes a regional peace table, not for crisis management alone, but to work continuously toward transforming hostile regional relationships into pragmatic ones based on mutual self-interest rather than enduring enmities. The long-term goal is an order built around dialogue, engagement and mutual dependency rather than coercion.The United States, long regarded as the region's principal power broker, has emerged from this period with a bruised reputation. Gulf partners, while recognizing that the U.S. will remain relevant, now view Washington as unreliable and insouciant toward their security concerns. Against this backdrop, so-called "middle powers" have gained new relevance. Countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Oman, Qatar, and Egypt are emerging as both mediators and security partners within the Gulf. Over the coming years, their rising role could shape conflict management and resolution across the region and beyond.Ideas for a more durable regional security architecture in the Middle East are emerging, one in which Iran and Israel will eventually sit at the same table. This does not require trust between the various countries. Moves toward peace rarely start with mutual confidence; a regional peace table would provide the necessary container through which trust can slowly be rebuilt. War breeds hatred and typically ends not through goodwill but exhaustion, when both sides have hurt each other badly enough to recognize that this old path can't continue. Therein lies the good news: great destruction can spark great creativity. A mediation architectureThe Middle East holds multiple interconnected conflicts, including Israel's relationship with the region, the Palestine-Israel conflict, the Iran-Israel relationship, the Gulf's fractured relationship with Iran, the aftermath of Syria’s civil war, and Lebanon's fragile state. All require permanent, sustained mediation rather than the cycles of war that have become the norm.Pragmatically, there will need to be separate negotiating tables, but at the same time a recognition that these conflicts are interconnected. There will be no reduction in the hostile relationship between Iran and Israel, for example, without addressing wider regional issues.Lessons from HelsinkiIn 1975, the Western and Eastern Blocs came together to sign the Helsinki Accords, which created the foundation for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This regional roundtable emerged from the Cold War not by resolving underlying disputes, but by creating permanent architecture within which disputes could be managed and eventually transformed.Helsinki succeeded because it let rival blocks participate without having to concede. It asked adversaries to commit to a shared table and process that would outlast any single crisis. The Middle East needs its own version, with a permanent negotiating framework.A Middle Eastern equivalent would require two complementary tracks. Track 1, a state-led track, would consist of a standing intergovernmental process, with working groups on regional security, economic cooperation, humanitarian issues and crisis management. Running alongside it, track 2 diplomacy would bring together politicians, academics and conflict-resolution practitioners to explore politically sensitive ideas that governments cannot yet discuss publicly. The aim is to come up with new ideas that advance peace and not war.The relationship between these tracks would be critical. Governments negotiate under domestic political constraints and public scrutiny. Unofficial dialogue provides the flexibility to test ideas, identify common interests and prepare the ground for formal agreements. Many successful diplomatic initiatives have begun in precisely these unofficial settings before government involvement. The Oxford Process is one example; the authors of this article are involved in such processes with Middle Eastern leaders today where there is energy and interest in these ideas.A permanent table would need a standing secretariat, regular sessions, and pre-agreed rules for engagement. Qatar and Oman are the natural homes given that dialogue and mediation are the primary levers through which these countries manage power. Plus, they already have existing back-channels to Iran, the U.S., Israel, and the Gulf. When such a table is established, a pilot project could start with low hanging fruit in Gulf-Iran relations, where motivation for progress already exists. A wider security architecture would also be developed in parallel, including Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and Jordan.Iran and Israel will inevitably need seats in any lasting security architecture for conflict avoidance. The goal initially is not reconciliation but mutual non-aggression, transforming hostility into restraint. Direct talks are currently inconceivable, but preparatory Track 2 discussions with an emphasis on communication can proceed through separate, curated groups, with messages passed between them.The Palestinian question is the connective tissue between nearly every regional conflict. Progress requires nothing short of a credible, irreversible pathway to Palestinian statehood. This is why Israel's October 2026 elections matter; if a more pragmatic coalition wins, it could open the door to progress and a desire to improve relationships with the region.Such a process would need to start incrementally, although a broader vision of the endgame is essential. The rising role of middle powers like Qatar makes this kind of multilateral table more viable than it would have been a decade ago, when Washington's word alone was expected to settle conflictual issues. An initiative that is seeded by, and emerges from, the region itself would be far more sustainable. The argument that war is inevitable is the easier position because it asks for no political imagination and no first move. Yet war continues to show itself as an ineffective tool to achieve peace, sparking instead endless cycles of violence.Breaking these patterns requires deliberate, careful architecture that must be sustained over years rather than convened in emergencies, and that must be capable of dealing with Iran-Israel, Lebanon, and Palestine as interlocking problems rather than separate files. Separate negotiations will be required, but they will be bolstered by the systemic and interconnected conversation that such a regional table could provide. Overcoming the profound political problems facing the Middle East will not be easy. But investing in the machinery of peace costs a fraction of what is currently being spent on missiles and bombs.

[Category: Iran, Persian-gulf, Diplomacy, Iran-war]

— American veterans know the cost of a military-first foreign policy

 

at 8/5/26 10:05pm

My nearly 32-year career in uniform has taught me many lessons. One of the most important is that the gap between operational military success and strategic political outcomes can be significant and is rarely, if at all, closed by increased military activity.It is common to invoke military voices when arguing for military force and to treat restraint as a “civilian” position. But the reverse is often true. Those who have served, and seen and felt the impacts of warfare, are the most cautious about resorting to it. Leading with, and relying on, the military has never been a foundational U.S. value. Throughout much of its history, the country has rightly regarded the use of force as a last resort. In his Farewell Address, George Washington warned that "overgrown military establishments" were "inauspicious to liberty." U.S. professional military education teaches Carl von Clausewitz’s theory that military force must remain subordinate to political ends. Colin Powell, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that military force should only be used to achieve clear, definable objectives supported by public opinion. Other retired military officers, including those cited by Andrew Bacevich and Daniel Sjursen in Paths of Dissent, have offered similar arguments.The imbalance in U.S. statecraftThe U.S. military is taught to think about national power through the DIME or DIMEFIL models: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement. In theory, those elements are designed to work together. But, in practice, the post-9/11 wars have left the military far more ready and resourced than its civilian counterparts, which are the elements necessary to shape political outcomes.This imbalance is documented by past and current funding requests and appropriations bills. Recent military budgets are nearly $900 billion a year, with upwards of another $600 billion requested in 2026. By contrast, international affairs budgets (funding diplomacy, development, and security assistance) are closer to $50–60 billion. The disparity is therefore roughly 15-to-1, or upwards of 25-to-1 if indeed a $1.5 trillion defense budget is approved.In “How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything,” Rosa Brooks bluntly states the challenge: when the military is the only fully resourced instrument of foreign policy, every problem starts to look like it has a military solution. In 2008, two colleagues and I published a complementary argument in American Diplomacy, citing then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates' appeal for "a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security." In the nearly two decades since, the spending gap has only widened, and diplomacy and development funding has been cut to historic lows.Too often, military operations are initiated to “send a message,” and troop deployments are announced without clear political aims or criteria for their withdrawal. This over-reliance on military solutions has become an expensive habit.Where military tools meet political realityAfter an initial decade in the infantry, I spent most of my career working at the civilian-military seam of multiple U.S. agencies and with foreign military forces operating under their own political environments. That experience offers a unique perspective — one the restraint community draws on too rarely. U.S. law divides foreign military engagement into three distinct categories of assistance, each with their own unique legal and political requirements and associated costs: training and equipping; advising and assisting; and direct employment of U.S. forces. Several observations apply across all three: First, security cooperation relationships tend to outlast the political rationales that created them. The State Department's 2024 International Security Advisory Board stated the problem concisely: “Security cooperation commitments are easy to initiate but remarkably difficult to draw down, restructure, or terminate responsibly when a partner’s strategic alignment degrades.” Second, over time, every relationship opens a gap between Washington's intent and what is achieved on the ground. One key analysis in 2017 described it as a principal-agent problem or the “divergence between the outcome the principal seeks and the outcome the principal obtains.” The difference can be reduced only when those managing the relationship frankly acknowledge that its original objectives are no longer being met. One example of this, according to the Journal of Strategic Studies report, is that despite massive assistance from the U.S. during the Iraq War, the Iraqi Security Forces that emerged from the training mission “proved far less proficient than was hoped.” Third, military forces operate inside specific political environments that they did not create or fully understand. While training and equipping can improve foreign security force capabilities, these efforts have little influence on civil-military relations, corruption, or other governance challenges. A 2018 comparative study, “Building Militaries in Fragile States,” and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction both drew the same conclusions from different environments. When civilian instruments of national power are not resourced to support a functioning political environment, the military takes on tasks it is neither designed nor trained to do. I served in Iraq when the U.S. military, the Iraqi army, and the Kurdish peshmerga built Combined Security Mechanisms along one of Iraq's most dangerous fault lines in 2010, creating a series of checkpoints and shared patrols that kept armed actors who did not trust each other operating toward a common purpose. They were designed as a temporary solution, not a permanent presence, and they helped manage a security seam; they could not resolve the political disputes beneath it. The lesson was not that U.S. forces should have stayed, but rather that when a military operation concludes, fully resourced diplomatic and political entities need to be deployed. By June 2014, the Islamic State was able to exploit that seam as it seized Mosul and drove toward Baghdad.Restraint as strategic discipline Restraint means using U.S. military power in a disciplined, deliberate way to achieve clear objectives grounded in an honest assessment of likely costs and consequences. The foundation of responsible statecraft is that foreign policy should not be organized around the objective of global military dominance. In “A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy,” Barry Posen argues for a strategy focused on protecting core security interests. But restraint is not just theoretical; it must be practically applied. It cannot be achieved when the military is fully funded but the civilian elements of national security are under-resourced. The civil-military divide is important. The decision to use force belongs to elected civilian leaders, and the military should not get a veto. The military's obligation is to offer its best operational advice, execute lawful orders, and respect constitutional authority. This is a discipline running from former Secretary of State George Marshall's example through Kori Schake's contemporary analysis. Veterans don’t have more authority to decide, but they enjoy more political space to speak out. What those who have served add to the discussion is perspective: not of how recent conflicts should have ended sooner, but rather whether the military must keep shouldering the burdens for which other, now severely depleted instruments of national security were originally built.The cost of a military-first policyU.S. wars and conflicts over the past quarter century have resulted in an estimated 30,000 service-member and veteran suicides (more than four times the number killed in operations), and veteran long-term care costs are one of the largest components of military compensation. Defense budgets that outgrow those of their civilian counterparts are not fiscally responsible; the differences result in even greater costs tomorrow. Those costs are largely paid by the post-9/11 military cohort as well as their families and communities. I have seen firsthand a part of the price we pay through adaptive scuba diving instruction with disabled veterans whose injuries result from policy decisions made years before. A military-dominated foreign policy, without clearly defined political goals and adequately resourced civilian institutions to achieve them, will result in many more veterans needing care for decades to come. A country that leans so heavily on its military owes it to those who serve to fund and resource the other elements of national security, so when military force is deployed it is used appropriately and not because the other tools of national security are not ready. Political leaders protect the military service members they deploy by ensuring this balance exists. Force can be a precise instrument, but its consequences can be unpredictable. Treating the military as the first tool of statecraft, while the other instruments of national security are under-resourced, will remain costly in both dollars and lives.

[Category: Us-military, Diplomacy, Restraint, Veterans]

— Surprise strikes signal Iran is digging in for a long war

 

at 8/5/26 10:05pm

In recent weeks, Iran has gone on the offensive, striking commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz and launching a surprise attack on U.S. forces in Jordan. From a distance, these moves look like self-defeating escalation. Why should a badly damaged state, under severe economic pressure, lash out at the U.S. instead of pushing for a ceasefire?The answer, simply put, is that Iran is digging in for a long war. Whatever Washington's intentions, Tehran increasingly interprets sanctions, negotiations, temporary ceasefires and military strikes as different instruments aimed at a single objective: regime change. As long as this primary objective remains, Iran expects no sanctions relief or meaningful de-escalation. My conversations with Iranian foreign policy analysts suggest that Tehran now believes the war will continue in different forms until the end of Donald Trump's presidency. There is no doubt that the war has punished Iran’s economy. Over 23,000 U.S. and Israeli strikes heavily damaged the country's energy, industrial, transportation, and civil infrastructure, which had kept the country functioning despite decades of onerous sanctions. The country is experiencing the largest contraction in its labor market, along with the highest inflation rate, in its modern history.Beyond economic costs, the war has profoundly changed Iran’s perception of costs and its decision-making logic. The February 28 decapitation strike did not replace old, conservative political leaders and military commanders with more hard-line ones dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as mainstream U.S. media has suggested. Instead, it formed a shadow decision-making system that is more confident, less patient, less predictable, and guided by a different calculation of risk. Iran's experience of failed negotiations with the U.S. before the two major airstrikes in 2025 and 2026 intensified this new perception. In Tehran's view, a comprehensive agreement with the Trump administration is virtually unachievable. Trump either cannot deliver a durable settlement because he cannot afford its domestic political cost, or he does not want to. Even if the administration wants to change course, Israel, which clearly maintains substantial influence within Trump’s inner circle despite the recent rhetoric of Vice President JD Vance, will do what it can to disrupt it. The debate over the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is illustrative. Under the MoU, bombing stopped, and the blockade was lifted despite some violations of the Lebanon ceasefire. But the promised economic incentives were never realized. Tehran exported $6 billion in oil but did not receive the $12 billion in foreign assets it had expected. This limited implementation of the deal hurt Iran’s negotiating team at home.Sources told me that Iranians were also deeply dissatisfied with the Qatari-administered mechanism for allocating Iran’s frozen assets to import essential foods and medicine, and blamed Doha for misleading them.Altogether, these deepened the suspicion that the United States had paused its attacks in order to rebuild its defenses, update its military targets, bring oil prices down, and manage domestic grievances before returning to war. Ironically, hawks in the U.S. complained that the MoU had allowed the Iranians to rebuild their military capabilities in the interim.In Iran, a fragile MoU with no clear economic benefit was seen as a one-sided pause that exposed the Islamic Republic to societal and political pressures that had eased during wartime. While inflation, unemployment, poverty, and mismanagement fueled public anger, power struggles among political and security factions intensified. On one hand, Tehran could wait, ignoring some of Washington’s violations of the MoU while taking advantage of its limited economic benefits, and retaliating if the U.S. resumed the war. A factor weighing on the minds of leaders was that a renewed full-scale war would target Iran’s remaining energy, industrial, and civilian infrastructure, on which the state still depends. However, the leadership in Tehran came to believe that the relative benefits of waiting flowed overwhelmingly in favor of the United States and Israel. In particular, as long as Washington controlled the tempo of the war and decided when the war began, paused, and resumed, Tehran would lack agency.Seeking to break the deadlock, Tehran has thus adopted a strategy of managed confrontation, a form of active deterrence to raise the cost for the United States. Such a confrontation is limited enough to avoid full-scale war but would still increase political pressure on the Trump administration. Even limited attacks can disrupt the U.S. military’s focus, spread out its forces, engage its defensive systems, and force it to spend more on defensive operations than on preparing for a resumption of the war. At the same time, Tehran could keep negotiation channels open and demonstrate its desire for diplomatic solutions.Iran’s economic experience reinforces a confidence that Iran can win this gamble. Iran has absorbed enormous damage without collapsing. As the government allows inflation and currency depreciation to rise, goods keep moving; shelves are not empty, although fewer people can afford what is on them. Iran’s diverse geography helps to bypass the blockade and meet its essential needs. Its privileged welfare system has protected public employees on whom the effective functioning of the state relies, but much of the burden falls on informal workers and small firms. In contrast, a fragile MoU without economic benefits, combined with high uncertainty, will not ease the war’s economic burdens but will lower the cost of a new U.S. attack. As such, a controlled confrontation is more worthwhile.Iran's military and geographic leverage over the Strait of Hormuz helps the country raise the costs of war in a way that could exhaust Trump, perhaps forcing him to abandon the confrontation and change his Iran policy. The pressure is growing: as public support in the U.S. has declined, Trump’s popular approval has fallen to an unprecedented low. Of course, Tehran may underestimate Trump’s tolerance for a prolonged conflict. Another risk is that, while Tehran might be able to calibrate the targets and scale of its own attacks, it cannot control how Washington responds. In addition, Iran's neighbors may lose patience with Iran’s retaliatory attacks on them and join the U.S. in the attack.Finally, domestic discontent over the destruction wrought by the war (on top of a collapsing economy and increased repression) remains a persistent possibility that would fracture wartime solidarity. Still, Iranian leaders appear determined to continue down a path of extended, low-grade war.For Washington, the upshot of this change in Iranian thinking is straightforward. If the U.S. is truly interested in ending the war rather than engaging in endless military confrontation, it must recognize the limits of military pressure. The military campaign might be effective in damaging Iran’s military and economic infrastructure, but, until now, it has been politically counterproductive. It has heightened Iran’s economic crisis and increased poverty, but failed to force Iran's capitulation. More military strikes are most unlikely to alter this seeming paradox. What may yet change this state of affairs is a U.S. effort to incentivize de-escalation. If even part of the $12 billion promised by the MoU had actually reached Iran, its leadership would have been much less likely to take the military initiative. That is the lesson of the broken memorandum: Washington has put enormous effort into making escalation costly, but far too little into making restraint worthwhile. Until that changes, more pressure is unlikely to end Iran's resistance; instead, it may reinforce the lesson Tehran least wants to hear: that resistance is still the only option that pays.

[Category: Iran, Israel, Trump-administration, Strait-of-hormuz, Iran-war]

— Bored of Peace: Why is Trump undermining his own Gaza plan?

 

at 8/5/26 8:31am

A lot can change in a week. Barely five days after President Donald Trump hailed the “historic agreement” on Hamas’s disarmament by the Board of Peace (BOP) — the body Trump created to oversee his Gaza Peace Plan — the very same Board of Peace has now effectively reneged on its own agreement. The deal emerged from eight months of intensive negotiations between BOP High Representative Nicolay Mladenov and Hamas, along with various regional stakeholders, and was expected to pave the way for implementing the long-delayed second phase of Trump’s 20 Point Plan. This would have included desperately needed reconstruction and the establishment of a Palestinian governing body and police force, alongside the disarmament of Hamas and withdrawal of Israeli forces from the devastated enclave. Trump and his BOP had already given Israel an effective pass on most of its Phase 1 obligations, refusing to call out Israel’s daily violations of the ceasefire. Israel has persisted in carrying out near daily airstrikes across Gaza, killing at least 1,250 Palestinians since the ceasefire was signed last October, even as it continues to severely restrict aid, seize more territory, and block the return of Palestinian governing and policing bodies.Last week’s agreement would’ve required each side, notably Israel, to meet all of its outstanding obligations. The two most contentious points — distinguishing between heavy weaponry and small (private) arms, and the sequencing of weapons decommissioning and Israeli withdrawal — were finally agreed after intense pressure on Hamas by the Egyptians and other interlocutors. Most crucially, the deal called for a parallel, phased process in which Israeli military withdrawal and the decommissioning of Hamas weapons occurred concurrently — a pragmatic provision that would ensure progress and prevent either side from exercising a “veto” over the process. Keen to make the deal work, Trump administration officials even lodged an implicit threat, warning that if Israel rejected the plan, “obviously President Trump would be very, very disappointed.”But Israel rejected the terms of the deal, insisting there would be no Israeli withdrawal unless Hamas was fully disarmed and Israel maintained the freedom to continue conducting military operations in Gaza. Instead of calling Israel out, the Trump-aligned BOP did a complete about-face, adopting the Israeli position wholesale. “Contrary to inaccurate reports,” read Monday’s BOP statement, “we note that the withdrawal of the IDF beyond the Yellow Line will take place only once decommissioning is complete, as Hamas committed to the mediators [emphasis added].” Of course, the agreement said no such thing. Article 8 of the BOP’s Road Map expressly states that the decommissioning “process is linked to a phased Israeli withdrawal from the areas it controls in Gaza and the inventorying of weapons held by armed militias.” Indeed, Mladenov himself had said “Withdrawal must move in lockstep with decommissioning.” As such, Trump’s Board of Peace has essentially rewritten its own peace plan, requiring Hamas to meet all of its Phase 2 obligations even before Israel has met any of its Phase 1 obligations.The implications of the Trump administration’s whiplash-inducing turn will be serious and far-reaching. First and foremost, it badly undermines Mladenov’s credibility as a broker. If anything he negotiates can be so quickly and easily negated by the White House, why should Hamas — or for that matter other regional actors like Egypt and Qatar — talk to him? Trump is also undercutting his own peace plan more broadly, jeopardizing one of his few concrete foreign policy achievements. Hamas is unlikely to go along with this latest shifting of the goalposts; after all, the demand that the group unilaterally disarm even as Israel entrenches and expands its control over Gaza while carrying out deadly attacks on a daily basis would be widely (and accurately) viewed as surrender. Most devastatingly, for Gaza’s 2.2 million inhabitants, who have already withstood unspeakable horrors and are now living in the most horrid of conditions, Trump’s U-turn will indefinitely delay desperately needed relief, recovery and reconstruction.

[Category: Board-of-peace, Donald-trump, Israel, Hamas, Gaza]

— El-Sayed overcomes $30 million AIPAC spend, wins Michigan primary

 

at 8/5/26 5:29am

Abdul El-Sayed became the latest progressive insurgent to win a Democratic nomination contest on Tuesday, when he bested sitting House Rep. Haley Stevens to become the party’s nominee for Senate in Michigan. At the time of writing, with 95% of the votes counted, El-Sayed had 48.6% to 47.3% for Stevens. Major media networks have called the race for El-Sayed, the former Wayne County health department director.Similar to recent races in New York and Colorado, El-Sayed made his opposition to the U.S.-Israel relationship and pro-Israel lobby groups such as the the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) central to his campaign, framing his critiques as both a stand against the corrupting influence of big money in American politics and an indictment of U.S. foreign policy. “AIPAC has spent a record amount in this race to elect my opponent because she'll be a reliable vote to a foreign government that is aiding, arming, and abetting a genocide,” the presumptive Democratic Senate nominee wrote on X one week before votes were counted. “I want your tax dollars spent on schools in Michigan, healthcare in Michigan, and roads in Michigan.” Shortly before the election, he poked fun at the interest group for finding “the least capable candidate in America,” referring to Stevens. However, unlike earlier results elsewhere in the country, the result in Michigan was a statewide race in a competitive state, where November’s result could easily play a decisive role in which party controls the Senate in 2027. El-Sayed will run against Mike Rogers, a former congressman who lost a narrow Senate race during the last election cycle and ran in an uncontested primary race this time around. Before the votes were counted, allies of the eventual winner made the case that this race represented more than simply choosing the nominee for one Senate contest. Ben Rhodes, a former top aide to President Barack Obama who has become a critic of the U.S.-Israel relationship, wrote a long thread on social media that accused AIPAC of resorting to lying because they could no longer make a strong, substantial case.“Money must lose. Abdul - and Michigan voters - can show that democracy is still something that is [in] the hands of [the people],” Rhodes wrote. AIPAC spent so much money in this race, he added, “because they want you to feel powerless. So that you think that nothing can change.”For her part, Stevens has described herself as a “proud pro-Israel Democrat” and accused her opponent of trying “to blame all of [his] problems on Jewish Americans.” She voted against a recent amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would have cut $3.3 billion in aid for Tel Aviv. The largest Super PAC arm of AIPAC, the United Democracy Project (UDP), spent a record $30.6 million in this race. In total, AIPAC has spent over $60 million on Democratic primaries in the 2026 cycle, compared to roughly $40 million two years ago, according to a recent report from the New York Times. Once NBC News declared El-Sayed the winner, supporters said his win should send a message to the Democratic Party. "“AIPAC spent over $30 million to stop Dr. Abdul El-Sayed in this race, and that record-high sum wasn’t enough because Democratic voters have had it with the fringe and extremist view that our tax dollars should pay for Israel’s bombs, wars, and genocidal ambitions," the IMEU Policy Project's executive director, Margaret DeReus, said in a statement. As the Quincy Institute’s Eli Clifton wrote in Responsible Statecraft in July, the money donated to UDP, outside of that which came directly from AIPAC, came disproportionately from Republicans and out-of-state donors. UDP is pushing back against a rising anti-Israel sentiment among the Democratic party's base, while largely avoiding taking on the issue directly in its advertisements.“Abdul El-Sayed’s win last night is a significant setback for AIPAC and Israel’s Lobby, groups that spent record sums of money to elect Haley Stevens, a politician who would continue to support unconditional aid to Israel,” Clifton told RS. “Michigan Democrats sent the message that they rejected this influence over their primary election and the politics it represents.”Across the country on Tuesday, results were more mixed. In Missouri’s first district, incumbent Democratic Rep. Wesley Bell defeated progressive challenger Cori Bush by more than 20 percentage points. Bell unseated Bush in 2024 in a race that was then the second most expensive House primary in American history. AIPAC, which was an important funder in Bell’s victory, spent roughly $2 million to support the sitting member this time around, compared to more than $9 million in 2024.

[Category: Aipac, Abdul-el-sayed, Israel, Michigan, 2026-midterms]

— Will Trump meet his Suez moment & seize Hormuz deal on the table?

 

at 8/5/26 3:56am

Oman and Iran appear close to a temporary arrangement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, potentially providing both an exit from the current round of fighting and the foundation for a more durable maritime order. Washington should welcome such an agreement—even if it acknowledges a degree of Iranian authority in administering traffic through the strait—because US interest dictates that open and non-discriminatory passage must be given priority over control.The emerging formula would reportedly divide responsibility for the shipping lanes. Vessels entering the Persian Gulf would travel through waters administered by Iran, while outbound traffic would pass through an Omani-administered route. Iran would be notified of departing vessels and, while this has not yet been discussed, Tehran appears open to also ensuring that Oman would be notified of incoming traffic. Tehran and Muscat may collect and share fees for specified security and environmental services, although this sensitive issue has not yet been settled. The negotiations remain fluid, and any agreement is reportedly linked to the lifting of the American blockade on Iranian ports.The arrangement would represent a slight climbdown by Tehran. Iran’s earlier position would have required traffic in both directions to pass through some portion of Iranian waters as well as Omani waters. That would have brought even ships already inside the Persian Gulf under an Iranian-administered transit system. The emerging division of lanes would give Oman primary responsibility for outbound shipping and limit the universe of vessels requiring Iranian approval or coordination.If successful—and if Washington accepts it—the agreement could help end the present fighting. It remains unclear whether that would restore the previous American-Iranian memorandum of understanding or require a new framework. Nor does it in and of itself move the needle on two other major stumbling blocks: Iran’s demand for a regional ceasefire and Washington’s demands on Iran’s nuclear activities.The Trump administration will likely receive strong pushback from hawkish elements in Washington and Israel who will complain over the arrangement’s de facto acceptance and legitimization of Iran (and Oman’s) management of the Strait.But this critique is borne out of a confusion of what the US’s actual core interest in the Strait is: The free and predictable flow of commerce or preventing the ability of a hostile power to assert control.The Trump administration has increasingly framed the objective as preventing Iran from “controlling” the strait. Yet the central American interest in strategic waterways has historically been less about who administers them than about whether ships can pass through them freely, predictably and without discrimination. Preventing a hostile state from acquiring coercive leverage has generally been a means of preserving passage, not an end that supersedes passage itself.That hierarchy of interests matters. If reopening the strait requires acknowledging that Iran possesses some capacity to regulate traffic in waters along its coast, Washington should not reject an agreement merely because it fails to preserve the appearance of unqualified American dominance.The Suez crisis provides the clearest example. In 1956, Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal Company, displacing the British- and French-controlled corporation that had operated one of the world’s most important commercial arteries. Britain and France regarded nationalization not merely as an economic injury but as a strategic humiliation and, together with Israel, invaded Egypt.President Dwight Eisenhower refused to support them. After rejecting the Anglo-French invasion, Eisenhower’s administration did not make restoration of British or international ownership a condition for accepting Egypt’s continued administration of the canal. Instead, Washington opposed the invasion and pressed for a diplomatic arrangement that would preserve international access. The applicable legal regime emphasized the canal’s free use by ships of all countries on equal terms, while leaving Egypt responsible for administering and defending the waterway.Egyptian control was not the same as unrestricted Egyptian discretion. The distinction was crucial. Washington could accept Egyptian sovereignty over the canal while insisting that sovereignty be exercised within rules guaranteeing nondiscriminatory passage. The overriding American interest was not which flag flew over the canal authority, but whether the canal remained open under internationally accepted rules.A crucial detail that should not be overlooked: Egypt at the time was not an American ally, whereas France and the UK were. Indeed, Egypt was at the time closely aligned with the Soviet Union though not formally allied with Moscow. Washington nevertheless accepted continued Egyptian administration of the canal rather than seeking to reverse nationalization, provided freedom of navigation was preserved.The Turkish Straits offer another instructive precedent. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey recovered control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles, including the right to remilitarize and defend them. Yet commercial vessels retained freedom of passage under an internationally recognized regime. The United States has lived for decades with a strategically important NATO ally exercising extensive authority over a waterway connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean—even though Turkey can regulate warship access and, in wartime, exercise additional powers.The South China Sea makes the same point from another direction. The United States does not claim territory there and formally takes no position on sovereignty over most disputed features. It objects instead to excessive maritime claims, coercion and unlawful restrictions on navigation and overflight. American naval operations are designed to demonstrate that ships and aircraft may exercise rights recognized by international law regardless of which government claims nearby rocks, reefs or waters.Washington certainly cares about China’s growing regional power. Its legal position, however, is not that the United States must control the South China Sea. It is that no coastal power may transform contested waters into an exclusive domain or condition lawful passage on political obedience. Once again, the preservation of navigational rights lies at the heart of the U.S. legal position. Strategically, Washington’s concern about control extends beyond navigation alone, but it is precisely because control creates the capacity to restrict those rights—and to alter the regional balance of power—that it commands such attention.Iran, of course, is viewed in Washington as a hostile power. Few American officials would be comfortable with an arrangement that left Tehran able to close the Strait of Hormuz at will. Any agreement must therefore contain credible safeguards: passage should be nondiscriminatory; notification procedures should not become a discretionary licensing system; service charges should be limited to reasonable fees for services rendered rather than function as political tolls; and disputes should be subject to an agreed international mechanism.But Washington must also acknowledge the strategic reality the war has exposed. The conflict did not give Iran the capacity to close the strait. It revealed a capacity Iran already possessed—perhaps to a greater extent than either Washington or Tehran had fully appreciated.Crucially, a diplomatic agreement recognizing that reality would not expand Iran’s military power. Rather, it would seek to limit that ability through a legally and politically binding agreement that can be sustained for the simple reason that it meets the core interests of all relevant parties.The alternative is to insist that even the symbolism of Iranian control is intolerable. But unless the United States can reliably eliminate Iran’s ability to threaten shipping—a goal it has thus far failed to achieve and appears increasingly incapable of achieving—that position offers no practical path to reopening the waterway. Instead, it creates the conditions for an endless war: a militarily unattainable objective coupled with a political dynamic that makes pursuing it indefinitely more acceptable than abandoning it.If President Trump concludes that keeping the strait open is more important than denying Iran all visible administrative authority, an agreement appears possible. If he decides that American primacy requires rejecting any arrangement that acknowledges Iranian leverage, the likely result will be renewed military action—even though military action has so far failed to guarantee passage.Incidentally, the elevation of control over access is closely associated with the postwar American pursuit of global primacy - the very same grand strategy that has led to America almost always being at war.A settlement that subjects Iranian and Omani administration to predictable, nondiscriminatory international standards may not appear attractive, but would meet America’s core interest of free commerce in a region with fast diminishing strategic significance. Washington should judge it by whether ships can pass—not by whether the agreement preserves the illusion that Iran lacks leverage over waters along its own coast that we now know it always enjoyed.This was republished from Trita Parsi's Substack

[Category: Donald-trump, Strait-of-hormuz, Iran, Oman, Iran-war]

— Trump's quick hits allow for AFRICOM comeback on continent

 

at 8/4/26 10:05pm

Donald Trump’s foreign policy features chaotic decision-making and bombastic rhetoric. But some of his half-baked ideas could have lasting consequences, creating escalation pathways that his successors may be unwilling to close. West Africa provides a crucial case study. Trump ordered strikes in Nigeria in December 2025 and May 2026, and his team has reportedly considered striking Mali. These moves are drawing West Africa deeper into the ceaseless “War on Terror.” U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) – which was rumored to be on the chopping block early in Trump’s second term – may emerge from these years as a bureaucratic winner, with dangerous implications for the future.West Africa has always been part of the War on Terror, but with limitations. After 9/11, as Washington argued that further threats were likely to emerge from geopolitical peripheries, the Bush administration created the Pan-Sahel Initiative, a counterterrorism training program. The broader Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership followed in 2005, and then AFRICOM in 2007. None of those programs forestalled the crises they were meant to prevent. In 2009-2010, the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria transformed into a mass insurgency that continues to trouble that country today. In 2012, a rebellion in Mali produced the first large-scale jihadist takeover in West Africa and gave way to a multi-sided war that still roils the Sahel. Amid those developments, the U.S. avoided direct and overt confrontation with jihadists in West Africa but stepped up its involvement there: the U.S. logistically supported France’s intervention in Mali in 2013; increased its engagement with militaries in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, particularly after Boko Haram’s infamous 2014 kidnapping of nearly 300 schoolgirls; and constructed a $100 million drone base in Niger starting in 2016, from which it conducted surveillance flights. Occasional scandals and shocks – the strangling of a U.S. Green Beret in Mali in 2017 by his colleagues, and a jihadist ambush that killed four American soldiers and five Nigeriens in Niger the same year – hinted at more “kinetic” U.S. presence in the region than was officially acknowledged. Yet in the Sahel and Nigeria, the U.S. avoided the kind of cyclical strikes that unfolded in Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere. Trump’s moves in Nigeria and potential moves in Mali are breaking down longstanding limits on applications of U.S. military power in a delicate region. For Trump, short-term political expediency may be a driver of these decisions. Striking Nigeria in the name of defending Christians caters to significant constituencies and organizations in the United States. Boasting that U.S. forces killed “ISIS Terrorist Scum” reinforces Trump’s brand of toughness. The president and his political appointees may not have a long time horizon in mind.But these short-term decisions, intermittent strikes, and leaked debates over opening new fronts all have long-term implications – especially for AFRICOM and for overall U.S. counterterrorism policy. Early last year, amid the Trump team’s initial fervor for cutting and reorganizing federal agencies, outlets reported that the administration was considering folding AFRICOM into European Command, effectively reversing the process that created AFRICOM in 2007. Yet AFRICOM not only survived but has played a significant role. Bureaucratic survival has allowed AFRICOM to continue deepening long-term relationships and institutional investments on the continent. The military command has pursued an old, failed model of counterterrorism, courting the would-be Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar and cultivating ties to West Africa’s civilian authoritarians in Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, and elsewhere. After being expelled from the drone base in Niger by that country’s new military government in 2024, AFRICOM simply pivoted to seeking new sites for drone bases nearby – a search that seems to be continuing under Trump. Meanwhile, strikes in Somalia have increased in 2025-2026, underscoring AFRICOM’s multifaceted diplomatic and kinetic role. As the White House’s 2027 Pentagon budget request sets a record, at well over $1 trillion, AFRICOM stands to grow along with the rest of the military. Trump’s successor will likely inherit an AFRICOM engaged in at least periodic strikes in both East Africa and West Africa.AFRICOM presents itself as vital to core American interests. In the command’s 2026 posture statement, Gen. Davgin Anderson insisted that the Sahelian jihadist group JNIM (an affiliate of al-Qaida) “has the ambition to threaten the Homeland and conduct attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities.” Yet JNIM, formed in 2017, has never attacked a target outside of northwest Africa, not even in France. Anderson also offered a selective account of what the drone base in Niger had facilitated, trumpeting a 2020 hostage rescue operation in Nigeria as proof of the need for surveillance of the Sahel. Anderson did not mention that other American hostages in the region have had very different outcomes. Another American, kidnapped in 2016 in Niger, was released in 2023 after negotiations. Also unmentioned was the fact that violence in the central Sahel nevertheless steadily increased even at the peak of U.S. surveillance from Niger, which coincided with a high tempo of French counterterrorism operations that killed numerous JNIM and Islamic State commanders.Meanwhile, Anderson offered no detailed plan for success or even drawdown, but rather made a set of generic assertions about the difference that AFRICOM supposedly makes, for example: “Through traditional military operations and a focus on innovation, defense economics, and information operations, we amplify our impact and meet strategic objectives.” The command clearly looks to Africa as a long-term theater of operations: in the posture statement, Anderson twice referred to 2050, adding in one instance, “Africa’s vast resources, strategic geography, and growing population make it critical to U.S. national security.” Strikes in West Africa are all too easily folded into a portfolio that contains many activities but few off-ramps.Africa also features prominently in Trump’s new counterterrorism strategy, released in May. The document includes a section on Africa that purports to end “decades of forever wars” and “failed counterterrorism policies under President Biden,” but the rhetoric reframes and escalates previous approaches, rather than meaningfully breaking with them. In an effort to square the disavowal of “forever wars” with the reality of an open-ended, heavy-handed commitment to training missions, dubious bilateral partnerships, and direct strikes, the document resorts to the same kinds of conflations and expansive language that have recurred throughout the War on Terror: “We are set on bringing home our troops and downsizing our global footprint. This, however, does not mean we will ignore threat groups in Africa capable of External Operations which seek to attack our interests.” The two key words here are “capable” and “interests” – any militant group is potentially “capable” of attacking the United States, and U.S. “interests” are often so broadly defined that any instability anywhere can be construed as a threat to “interests.”The next presidential administration may not continue the Trump White House’s polarizing rhetoric characterizing Christians as “the most persecuted people on earth” or condemning past U.S. policies as “globalist left-wing cultural hegemony.” But the next president will likely build upon some of the precedents Trump has set. This combination – the normalization of strikes in West Africa, and the underlying maintenance, from administration to administration, of sweeping, unfalsifiable rhetorical justifications for military involvement in Africa – is particularly dangerous.

[Category: War-on-terror, Jnim, Nigeria, Mali, Africom]

— Are US and Israel benefitting from 'migration blackmail' in Spain?

 

at 8/4/26 10:05pm

Questions continue to swirl around the flash flood of nearly 60,000 migrants who swam or walked from Morocco into Ceuta, a tiny Spanish enclave on the tip of Africa last week. How did so many migrants manage to breach Moroccan border security forces, who appear to have largely disappeared from their stations? Why had so many migrants received social media messages encouraging them to swarm the enclave? Analysts pointed their fingers at the Moroccan government, arguing it was once again deploying “migration blackmail,” as the practice has been dubbed, to punish its European neighbors and bend them to its will. But this time, Israel and the United States appear to be the principal beneficiaries. Indeed, they have seized on the politically embarrassing episode to weaken a Spanish government they view as one of their principal European antagonists.This was not the first time Ceuta’s border had been breached, nor the first time that Morocco was accused of opening its borders to allow streams of migrants to enter European territory. In 2021, Ceuta and Melilla, Spain’s other enclave in Africa, also saw a mass incursion of 6,000 people into their territories; Spain explicitly blamed Morocco for deliberately relaxing its migration controls to punish the government for criticizing Trump’s 2020 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which Trump did in exchange for Morocco entering into the Abraham Accords with Israel. The pressure worked, as Spain acquiesced in 2022 to support Morocco’s autonomy plan for the occupied territory, in exchange for Morocco’s promise that it would not allow further incursions into the enclaves. France too has often found itself facing down Moroccan tactics to weaponize migration for political concessions. Rabat long refused to accept French returns of undocumented migrant children from Morocco until it secured a package of trade and investment concessions from Paris in 2020. To reward Morocco for acting as Europe’s external border police, the European Union also has time and again rewarded Morocco with hundreds of millions of Euros in aid, most recently as part of the 2024 “EU Migration Pact.”This time, the exact reasoning behind Morocco’s actions remains unclear. Some analysts wondered whether the move was meant to pressure Spain as a first step toward an attempted annexation of Ceuta, which the Moroccan government views as illegally occupied. While officially, the U.S. government recognizes Ceuta as sovereign Spanish territory, voices in the U.S. and Israel have increasingly encouraged Morocco to claim the enclave. The timing is uncanny. For example, the 2027 U.S. House Appropriations Bill passed in July included a report specifically asserting that “Spanish-administered cities of Ceuta and Melilla are located in Moroccan territory,” and urged the State Department to encourage talks over their “future status.”As far back as 2019, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s son Yair tweeted a map of Ceuta and Melilla, saying, “Dear Arabs and Muslims. Want to free occupied Arab Islamic lands? Here’s a good start!” In March, Michael Rubin, a longtime neoconservative analyst with the American Enterprise Institute, openly urged Moroccans to invade the enclaves in a new “Green March,” referring to when Moroccans marched to Western Sahara to claim it from Spain in 1975. Others argue that Morocco is acting more broadly in service of a U.S.-Israeli campaign to punish Spain for calling on Israel to stop its genocide in Gaza and refusing to support the war on Iran.The circumstantial evidence for a broader strategy is significant. Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has been a particular thorn in the side of the U.S. and Israel, emerging as a leading global critic of both countries. In the past three years, Sanchez has imposed arms and settlement trade embargoes on Israel and refused to allow U.S.-flagged cargo ships carrying weapons for Israel, as well as an Israeli warship, to dock or refuel at Spanish ports. (Both ships docked in Moroccan ports instead.) More recently, Sanchez refused to allow the U.S. to use jointly operated military bases on Spanish soil for military operations for the war with Iran. The Trump administration has already threatened to punish Spain with a full trade embargo, particularly dangerous given Spain’s reliance on the U.S. for 30% of its gas and 20% of its oil imports. Israel withdrew its ambassador from Spain in 2024 and expelled Spain from the Civil-Military Coordination Center, which ostensibly oversees the ceasefire and humanitarian aid to Gaza. But the Ceuta incursion unleashed a whole new level of rhetorical fire from Israeli and U.S. officials and right-wing commentators, who jumped on the incident to blame Sanchez’s left-wing government for failing to protect its borders from African migrants, to mock its “colony” in Africa, and even to urge Morocco to overtake the enclaves from Spain for itself. Israel’s ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon, tweeted, “Maybe before it continues lecturing us, it’s time it explained to the world why it still maintains colonial enclaves in Africa.” J.D. Vance chimed in to chide the incursion as the “consequences of mass migration and the radical left-wing globalist policies that have enabled the Invasion of the West,” while President Trump warned, “That’s going to be us in three years if the wrong side gets in.” The Israel-U.S.-Morocco trifecta has grown stronger and more coordinated ever since Morocco signed the Abraham Accords, normalizing its relationship with Israel, in exchange for U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara. The Moroccan government, a monarchical dictatorship, has ignored overwhelming domestic opposition to Israel and has dramatically expanded its military, security and economic ties with the country, rivaling only the United Arab Emirates for the closest Arab-Israeli government relationship. In 2021, Israel and Morocco signed a vast defense cooperation agreement, and Morocco is now one of Israel’s largest arms purchasers; it has expanded intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation and signed at least nine agreements, including on cybersecurity, trade, tourism, agriculture, and energy. In exchange, Israel itself recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, a useful precedent for its own wish to annex what remains of Palestine. Morocco has not issued any formal statement about its role in the Ceuta incursion, nor offered any condolences to the migrants who perished. But by July 31, it had dramatically expanded its deployment of forces to secure the enclave and provided transportation for the 48,000 migrants who returned to Morocco a day after arriving in Ceuta. Whatever the immediate precipitating factor for the migrant incursion, it has served as a useful political cudgel for Israel and the United States. The new migration blackmail now has impacts that extend far beyond the borders of Spain or Europe, just as the U.S.-Israeli conflict over Palestine now reaches deep into the politics of African and Latin American states.

[Category: Morocco, Spain, Israel, Iran-war, Migrants, Ceuta]

— The Helsinki Commission is a Cold War relic that needs to go

 

at 8/4/26 10:05pm

Every government institution should periodically be asked a simple question: is it still performing the mission for which Congress created it?That principle has become a hallmark of the Trump administration. Through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), the closing of USAID, and the restructuring of federal agencies, the administration has encouraged the reexamination of longstanding institutions to ensure they remain faithful to their original purposes.That question should now be asked of one of Washington's least scrutinized congressional bodies: the U.S. Helsinki Commission.Congress established the U.S. Helsinki Commission in 1976, one year after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the culminating political agreement of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE was a landmark diplomatic process that brought together the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and virtually every European nation at the height of the Cold War. The CSCE later evolved into today's Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).The Helsinki Final Act established a political framework intended to reduce East-West tensions by promoting military transparency, economic cooperation, and respect for fundamental human rights. Congress established the U.S. Helsinki Commission as the United States' oversight body for monitoring implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. Today, members of the commission also serve as the U.S. delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, linking the commission directly to the broader institutional framework that grew out of the Helsinki process.There’s just one problem: the Cold War ended more than three decades ago, and the Soviet Union no longer exists. Yet the organization — and its $3 million annual budget — have continued trudging along. The question today is not whether the commission once served an important purpose. Rather, it is why Congress has allowed it to continue operating beyond the mission for which it was originally created. The commission's sustained and biased focus on the country of Georgia over the past several years illustrates why that question deserves serious attention. Most recently, at its 33rd Annual Session on July 8, 2026, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted the “Resolution on Upholding Election Integrity and Fundamental Freedoms in Georgia.” Sponsored by Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.), co-chair of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, the resolution was a political attack on Georgia's elected conservative government, exemplifying the kind of institutional overreach that has increasingly come to characterize the U.S. Helsinki Commission.This stands in stark contrast to the Trump administration’s approach. On July 16, 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio welcomed Georgia's vice prime minister and foreign minister, Maka Botchorishvili, to Washington to participate in a high-level ministerial meeting alongside representatives from more than sixty nations. One day later, President Donald Trump wrote directly to Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, expressing appreciation for Georgia's friendship and affirming his desire to strengthen U.S.-Georgia cooperation in support of sovereignty, security, and lasting prosperity. Yet during this same period, Congressman Joe Wilson was helping advance a resolution through the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly that sought to further isolate Georgia.Acting through the U.S. Helsinki Commission, Wilson has repeatedly advanced biased foreign policy initiatives toward Georgia that diverge from the administration's friendlier approach. Through projects like these, the commission has evolved beyond its original oversight mission into an independent platform for pursuing foreign policy initiatives as individual members of Congress see fit.The commission's campaign against Georgia rests on the unproven premise that the country's current government lacks democratic legitimacy. The OSCE alleged that the October 2024 parliamentary elections were undermined by voter intimidation and the implementation of a law aimed at reducing foreign influence in the country. In part as a response to these concerns, the European Parliament called for the elections to be re-run.Yet no international election observers — including the OSCE — have rejected the results. Georgia's 2024 elections produced an 89-61 parliamentary majority for the governing Georgian Dream party. The results were certified under Georgia's constitutional process and confirmed through a recount. Nearly 90% of ballots were cast using electronic voting technology supplied by Smartmatic, an international election technology company, with the voting system independently tested by the American laboratory Pro V&V. One year later, Georgian voters again returned the governing party to victory in nationwide local elections. Based on these facts, it is difficult to understand how the commission can credibly continue to advance the premise of democratic illegitimacy. In any case, the Trump administration has made clear that such debates are immaterial to its foreign policy approach; the 2025 National Security Strategy states that U.S. foreign policy should be grounded in respect for national sovereignty and cooperation based on shared strategic interests rather than attempts to reshape the domestic politics of partner nations. Since 1997, my company has invested significantly in Georgia's oil and gas sector. During that time, I have watched Georgia welcome American companies like mine across virtually every sector of its economy, recognizing U.S. investment as an important contributor to its economic growth and its strategic partnership with the United States. I have also watched the country evolve from a struggling post-Soviet state into one of America's most reliable strategic partners in the South Caucasus and one of Eastern Europe's leading examples of democratic and economic transformation. My firsthand experience bears no resemblance to the picture repeatedly presented by Wilson and the commission.Congress did not create the commission to act as a shadow State Department. Wilson’s relentless campaign against Georgia's elected government has become a one-man crusade intent on undermining relations with Georgia, a longtime ally and strategic partner. Even the Commission's own leadership has begun to distance itself from his approach. Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), the commission's chairman, recently told Wilson to “stop embarrassing yourself” over a proposal to bring the 2027 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to South Carolina at a taxpayer cost of approximately $4 million.There is a broader disturbing pattern in the commission's treatment of Georgia. Its hearings on Georgia have consistently featured biased critics and political opponents of the country’s democratically elected conservative government while excluding credible alternative viewpoints, resulting in a one-sided record of advocacy. This pattern was evident in the commission's September 2025 hearing entitled “From Partner to Problem: Georgia's Anti-American Turn.” The panel featured former President Salome Zourabichvili, a vocal figure in Georgia's political opposition, as a principal witness without providing representation from Georgia's elected government or any witness offering a contrary perspective. Moreover, Wilson has repeatedly referred to Georgia's democratically elected government as "illegitimate" and “anti-American,” a characterization that goes unchallenged and stands in marked contrast to the broader conduct of official U.S.-Georgia relations, including continued constructive engagement by the administration and members of both the House and Senate.The commission's institutional overreach has consequences that extend well beyond foreign policy. It also undermines American economic interests by exaggerating political risk, discouraging investment, and placing U.S. companies operating in Georgia at a competitive disadvantage.Congress created the U.S. Helsinki Commission to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Final Act during the Cold War — not to advance foreign policy agendas of its own choosing.The U.S. Helsinki Commission fulfilled the mission Congress assigned it nearly fifty years ago. The Cold War has ended, the Soviet Union no longer exists, and the commission has outlived the purpose for which it was created. Its conduct toward Georgia has demonstrated how far it has strayed from its original mission. The time has come for Congress and the administration to sunset the U.S. Helsinki Commission for the benefit of the American taxpayer.

[Category: Cold-war, Georgia, Georgian-dream, Helsinki-commission]

— Iran, Ukraine wars depleted 'virtually all' US long-range missiles: Report

 

at 8/4/26 7:57am

Reuters reported this morning that the U.S. has used “virtually all” its long-range precision strike missiles during its war on Iran.Reuters’ sources would not say exactly how many of these surface to surface weapons, known as Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), the U.S. military has left.This comes amid news that the U.S. has burned through other key weapons systems since war with Iran began. Last week, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated the U.S. has fewer than 827 Patriot missiles, and fewer than 278 THAAD ballistic missile interceptors, in its stockpiles.But the depletion began long ago with the Ukraine war. Since 2022, the U.S. gave weapons to Kyiv at rates faster than it could replace them, including Patriot missile interceptors and an unspecified number of ATACMS.Despite the growing body of evidence, President Donald Trump, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and UN Ambassador Mike Waltz have repeatedly denied the U.S. is running low on critical munitions. Not surprisingly, the U.S. has taken great strides to procure munitions in recent months, including repeatedly floating major spending packages to replenish depleted stockpiles. The latest: a $18.2 billion request for more money for the Pentagon budget.Earlier this spring, the Pentagon awarded RTX a $441 million contract for PAC-2 missiles — older Patriot missiles, which the U.S. has not ordered in decades. The Pentagon has also asked civilian companies, such as Ford, GM, and Oshkosh, to consider making weapons.Last month, a U.S. official told the Washington Post that there weren't enough munitions to sustain military operations in the Middle East. "I don't think the White House is aware of that,” the official said. Munitions are expensive and often take years to build.

[Category: Munitions, Defense, Pentagon, Hegseth, Ukraine, Iran-war]

— US is the real loser if Senate passes virtue signaling Russia sanctions

 

at 8/3/26 10:05pm

As the Senate returns to Washington for its last week in session until mid-September, it faces a long to-do list. But for many senators, the top priority is not enacting legislation that will help Americans but instead rushing to approve the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, known colloquially as the “Russia sanctions bill.”A passion project of the late Sen. Lindsey Graham, the bill is intended to increase economic pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin. The legislation’s backers hope that, by choking off funding for Russia’s war effort, they can force Moscow to make greater concessions in ongoing negotiations to end the four-year old conflict in Ukraine. But this logic and the bill itself are fundamentally flawed. The new legislation will have a limited effect on Russia’s fortunes; as has been the case since the beginning of the war, additional economic punishments are unlikely to be decisive in Putin’s calculus. In fact, the bill is more likely to harden the Russian position than to soften it. The bill contains three main types of provisions. First, it codifies and expands sanctions against Kremlin officials, Russian oligarchs, and Russian banks and corporations. Second, it cracks down on Russia’s shadow fleet, increasing penalties against tankers and companies accused of trying to smuggle oil or evade the Western price cap on Russian oil sales. Third and most significantly, it grants the president the authority to impose up to 100% tariffs on the top five buyers of Russian oil and natural gas, though it exempts allies who are reducing their purchases from Russia over time. The bill also allows the president to waive required penalties if deemed important for U.S. national security. To be sure, if the new bill is passed by Congress and implemented by the White House, it will be economically painful for Russia. The sanctions it prescribes would fully sever Russian banks and energy corporations from the SWIFT system, including Gazprombank, which handles energy transactions. The bill also threatens secondary sanctions and loss of access to SWIFT for third-party intermediaries that continue to process payments from or interact with sanctioned entities. Combined with the bill’s measures aimed at Russia’s shadow fleet, these new sanctions will further complicate any Russian efforts to export oil.However, after more than four years of sanctions, Russian banks and corporations have already developed alternatives. For example, they can turn to small regional banks that have little exposure to U.S. markets. They can also rely on layered shell companies that work through friendly countries, transactions conducted through “stablecoin” digital currencies, and even direct country-to-country bartering in which Russian commodities are swapped for machinery, microelectronics, or other goods. None of these approaches is convenient, but they will allow Russia to weather even the more draconian penalties included in the new bill.The bill’s tariff provisions are likely to have even less effect on Russia’s revenues. Theoretically, the legislation targets the top five buyers of Russian oil and gas, a list that would include key U.S. allies like France, Japan, Spain, Turkey, and Belgium. But members of Congress, fearful of giving Trump more authority to use tariffs punitively against U.S. allies, included a waiver for countries that account for less than 15% of Russian exports and are working to decrease their dependency on Russia over time. This list applies to just about every country that might be hit with tariffs for continuing to buy Russian oil and gas, except for three: China, India, and Hungary.Even if Trump chooses to apply tariffs to these countries, the consequences may be worse for the United States than for Russia. Tariffs on India could cause Russia real economic pain, as New Delhi has shown itself to be sensitive to threats of U.S. economic penalty. But if the conflict in Iran continues to snarl oil markets, India will face constraints on its ability to shift its demand for oil elsewhere. Moreover, the United States has already tried sanctions on India as a way to pressure Russia, and it didn’t work. It did, however, damage U.S. ties with an important partner in Asia.China is the leading buyer of both Russian natural gas and oil, and likely the primary target of the bill’s writers. But using tariffs to penalize Chinese oil purchases would be suicidal for Trump. He’s already run the experiment of putting 100% tariffs on Chinese goods, back on Liberation Day in April 2025. The result was so bad for the U.S. economy that it led to the original Trump TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out). Since then, China has shown its willingness to use its dominance in rare earth minerals to retaliate against what it sees as unfair U.S. trade practices, and it would likely do so again if Trump levies tariffs under the authority of the new legislation. But even smaller tariffs on China are unlikely, since Trump is unlikely to do anything in the near term that derails his September meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.In the end, the new legislation is unlikely to be the knockout blow that forces Putin to give up on his core demands. The tariff provision may affect Russian oil and gas income on the margins, but its effect will be limited by the Trump administration’s higher priority political goals. Russia’s economy is under strain, but it can withstand the modest costs that Graham’s sanctions bill will impose while sustaining the war effort.More importantly, the legislation’s underlying premise — that increased economic pressure is the key to ending the war in Ukraine — is as incorrect today as it was back in 2022. Putin has made clear time and again that he is willing to pay a very high price to achieve what he considers to be an acceptable outcome in Ukraine. He views the war as existential, for Russia and for himself personally, and has been largely insensitive to economic levers since the conflict began. This is unlikely to change.In fact, the new legislation is much more likely to strengthen Russia’s resolve and work against peace. It may do this in two ways. First, it fuels Putin’s narrative that the conflict in Ukraine is really a war between Russia and the West, a storyline that can shore up domestic support and that increases the risks that the war eventually widens. Second, it confirms for Moscow that the United States is not actually interested in peace or in serving as a mediator but rather continues to harbor Biden administration-era hopes of weakening Russia over the long-term. Many in the U.S. Congress probably realize this but will vote for the bill anyway, a virtue signaling gesture taken at the expense of the voters who elected them. In fact, if there is a loser from this legislation it will be the United States, which will face economic uncertainty and the loss of geopolitical influence as more countries tire of the United States using the dollar as a weapon and look for alternatives.

[Category: Russia, Vladimir-putin, Ukraine-war, Donald-trump, Enewsletter]

— Robert Kagan: Sometimes US intervention is worth blowback

 

at 8/3/26 10:05pm

Robert Kagan surprised some people. One of America’s most influential hawks condemned the Trump administration’s botched war in Iran, suggesting in The Atlantic in March that U.S. involvement in the Middle East has been a catalyst of, rather than a prudent response to, Islamic terrorism.A senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and prolific historian, Kagan has advocated U.S. primacy for decades, starting with his support for Nicaragua’s Contra insurgents as the head of the State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy (1985-88). In 1997, Kagan co-founded Project for the New American Century, a neoconservative think tank that lobbied for a muscular foreign policy and the maintenance of U.S. global hegemony. The group exercised its considerable influence to push regime change in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Kagan’s advocacy has always been based on a belief that the world would collapse into disorder without American leadership, even though U.S. military misadventures have repeatedly destabilized parts of the world. So, is Robert Kagan now reconsidering his past hawkishness? I interviewed him to find out. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.Martin Di Caro: Are you undergoing a conversion? Is that fair?Robert Kagan: I don't think so, because I never denied that blowback was a reality. In fact, my writing shows that when the United States is out there acting in the world, Americans tend to not even be aware of the effect of American power on other nations. And so they're constantly shocked whenever the use of American power leads to a response. The best example is Japan and Pearl Harbor. Many Americans acted like it was out of the blue when Japan attacked us when, in fact, the U.S. pursued policies that were likely to lead to a Japanese attack. The same was true of 9/11 in the sense that it was at least in part a response to the American presence in the Middle East. The question is, do you act even though you know that there is going to be blowback because the stakes are worth it. So, I never doubted it and, as I say, recognizing the effect of American power on other nations is an important part of my history.Di Caro: Yet for decades you have advocated for U.S. interventionism and, in the case of the Iraq invasion of 2003, a preemptive war…Kagan: Wait a minute. Can we stop right there? When you say that I’ve advocated for intervention for decades, what in particular are you talking about? I certainly supported the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, but it's not like I was just calling for intervention everywhere at all times. That's a shorthand that you use, but it's what people think, you know?Di Caro: Well, you've never called for an invasion of Iran, but you did support the Contras when you were a member of Reagan's State Department going back to the 1980s.Kagan: Totally. Right. Di Caro: So that's what I'm referring to.Kagan: I definitely believe in the exercise of U.S. power in the world. Sometimes that means intervention, but frequently it doesn't necessarily mean intervention.Di Caro: Do you reject the neoconservative label?Kagan: I do reject it, not only because it has taken on connotations that I think are frankly antisemitic, but because it's just a bad description of what I am. What I am is a liberal. Lib-er-al. My foreign policy is liberal. If you look back on the history of American foreign policy, the people who have pursued the policies that I favor have always tended to be progressive and liberal. And conservative foreign policy in America has always tended to be in the direction of restraint. I worked for the neoconservatives. I worked for Irving Kristol. They were called neoconservatives because they had been on the left and then they were newly on the right. I have never accepted it as a reasonable definition [of my views].Di Caro: We can set aside definitional debates because it may be more important to talk about the consequences of the policies that you've advocated, however you’re labeled, because you're not just some blogger. You’ve been an influential voice in foreign policy. Given your recent commentary about Iran, have you reconsidered your past support for U.S. wars, namely the invasion of Iraq in 2003?Kagan: I went through the process of thinking about my support for the Iraq war long before this Iran issue came up. Look, the key thing about Iraq then and Iran now is the circumstances are just totally different than in 2003. That's not to say that, in retrospect, [the Iraq war] did not turn out to be a mistake, but the strategic arguments were completely different than they are now, and the overall aim of American foreign policy at that time was entirely different from the overall aim of foreign policy now.The strategic context mattered. In 2003 we were not concerned about rising great power challenges. Russia was essentially still on its back. The Chinese were in their Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao mode. There was no particular threat to the world order when the United States went to war in Iraq. To answer your question, I haven't really fundamentally changed my mind. These are different circumstances. You'd have to assume that I had some kind of doctrine of always invading the Middle East whenever possible. But that has not been my doctrine.Di Caro: In 2003 I thought invading Iraq was justified. I'm ashamed that I had such poor judgment. The Iraq war was unnecessary. Kagan: You say it was unnecessary because you don't take seriously the nature of the threat that was posed.Di Caro: What threat did Saddam Hussein pose? He was a tinpot dictator with a hollowed-out military.Kagan: I don't agree with you. He was not just a tinpot dictator. He was actually special. He had already committed two major acts of aggression against his neighbors. By the way, that’s something that Iran has never done. Saddam had invaded Iran. He had invaded Kuwait. He clearly wanted to be the Saladin of the Middle East. You can feel however you want about it, but you were not alone in supporting the Iraq war. It's bizarre to look back and think that it was somehow a peculiar judgment that Saddam posed a threat, when almost everybody including the Clinton administration thought Saddam was a threat. It was practically a consensus view.When the war went bad, a lot of people wanted to pretend that they never supported it and decided that it was an incredibly stupid thing to do. I just don't think it's right to go back and say this was a silly activity when such a significant majority of Americans, including members of Congress, thought that it was an important thing to do.Di Caro: But we can see how disastrous the consequences were. According to The Costs of War Project at Brown University, there were at least 180,000 civilian deaths from direct war violence, and it was the U.S. invasion that triggered all the chaos and the civil war that ensued. 4,500 U.S. service members and 3,600 American contractors were killed…Kagan: In ten years! Over ten years. Di Caro: …millions of people were displaced across the Middle East in the post-9/11 wars. Trillions of dollars for the U.S. Treasury when we factor in decades of long-term care for our veterans. I'm having trouble understanding why you can't admit that this was a mistake.Kagan: Well, I didn't say I can't admit that it was a mistake. I'm not sure what the utility of admitting that it was a mistake is. It's not going to bring anybody back to life. But, you know, there were obviously elements of the Iraq war that were a mistake. I was very clear about it at the time when it was obvious that the administration not only hadn't sent in enough troops initially, but also didn't understand the role that those troops had to play because [Donald] Rumsfeld, from the moment that they invaded, wanted to get out. And so we didn't accept the responsibility that, as Colin Powell said, when you break it, you own it.The biggest effect that I regret is how it influenced Americans’ attitudes towards foreign policy in general… In retrospect it is clear that Americans had become increasingly unenthusiastic about the role the United States was playing in the world.Di Caro: There were good reasons for Americans souring on what I call military misadventures. There’s the harm done to other peoples, but also the returns for the United States have been meager.Kagan: That's what you say, but your whole line of discussion takes for granted all the ways in which the overall American approach to the world produced enormous benefits both for much of the world and for the United States. You take for granted the world order that was in existence. And I'll tell you what, we're not going to be able to take it for granted anymore because we are now experimenting with the world that, I guess, you think would’ve been better, a world in which the United States is basically staying at home and minding its own business.Di Caro: That's not true. My position is that the United States has other tools rather than the almost exclusive application of hard power and coercion. Kagan: You think we didn't use any of the other tools as well? I think we wound up using military force because the other tools weren't working.Di Caro: Soft power. This is something the political scientist Robert Keohane has discussed… Kagan: You’re going to teach me about soft power now?Di Caro: No, but don’t you agree the U.S. has neglected soft power recently?Kagan: I do not. I do not. And there’s a whole myth about the Iraq war that it somehow led to the disenchantment of the rest of the world with the United States and, therefore, we suffered a reputational disaster. In fact, the U.S. alliances, including countries that opposed the Iraq war, were not only strong but actually strengthened in the second half of [George W.] Bush’s presidency. If your view is that the United States has undermined its position in the world, then why do all the allies continue to rely on the United States for their protection, even though it's allegedly this ogre? There's just no logic to that. As the Trump administration destroys the U.S. position, the rest of the world is basically in mourning for a United States that used to be. Di Caro: Do you think the GCC states still want American bases within their boundaries? Kagan: Not now, but not because of the Iraq war. It’s because the United States has proved [under Trump] to be a terribly unreliable ally. Not because they think the United States is immoral. Do you think they're worried about American morality? What they’re upset about is that the United States proved to be an inadequate protector. If Iran had not been able to hit them with all the drones and the missiles, I don't think they would have turned against the United States. They were largely supportive of getting rid of the regime in Iran. It's just that the United States both failed to do that and was unable to protect them.Another reason that I thought this was a bad idea, which is not about changing doctrines, is that the one thing we learned in the 1990s was that you cannot bomb your way to success in these situations. When they went after Slobodan Milošević [in Yugoslavia], I remember getting a briefing from [General] Wesley Clark, who said after four days of bombing, Milošević is going to cave. And 90 days later, it required the threat of an American ground force to get him to retire. So I think we knew that you couldn’t get rid of [Iran’s] nuclear program and certainly not get regime change simply by bombing people.My problem with some of the critics of American policy is that they don't care what happens when America is not involved. They're only interested when America is involved. So when Saddam Hussein, for instance, was killing 200,000 Kurds and other minorities in Iraq using chemical weapons, nobody cared about those 200,000. They only care about the lives that are lost as a consequence of American action. There's quite a double standard in judging American behavior… Di Caro: You mentioned Saddam and the Kurds. That double standard also applies to the U.S. government. Kagan: Yes, I know. We also abandoned the Kurds. Di Caro: The United States looked the other way in the 1980s when Saddam gassed the Kurds, and right up until the eve of the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, George H.W. Bush was sending Saddam Hussein chummy letters telling him how much he wanted to nurture their relationship. It was only after the invasion of Kuwait when Saddam Hussein became Adolf Hitler.Kagan: I agree. Do you want to make the case that the United States is a deeply flawed country that does the wrong thing sometimes? Because if you do, I'm perfectly in agreement with that.Di Caro: My point is that the Gulf War was a Pyrrhic victory. The United States has never been able to extract itself from the Middle East.Some would argue Israel is one reason why the United States can't seem to extract itself, at least from the conflict with Iran.Kagan: Well, that's certainly been true.Di Caro: Why have recent U.S. administrations utterly failed to restrain Israel despite the fact that the U.S. has considerable leverage?Kagan: There are multiple elements to the answer. One is obviously the role of Jews in influencing American policy, which is a reality just the way the Irish, Italians, or Greeks have influenced American policy. The other thing is America is broadly Islamophobic, and so any enemy of Islam is a friend of ours for many Americans. I think Islamophobia is a reality in the United States, and Israel is supposed to be the bulwark against Islam.That's unfortunate. My view is that we should not have a foreign policy based on Islamophobia. We should be able to have perfectly good relations with Islamic countries and with Islam itself.Di Caro: What's your view of Israel's conduct in Gaza? How can we talk about a “rules-based order” after the world allowed that to happen? Israel’s conduct was enabled by the United States.Kagan: I myself almost never talk about a rules-based order because the United States has definitely pursued a double standard with regard to the rules-based order. You could say that we supported the rules-based order in the breach as much as in the observance.Di Caro: You sound like a restrainer now.Kagan: Well, this is the thing again. It’s like if you acknowledge that America does bad things in the world, then that makes you a “restrainer.” In my view, it just makes you analytically honest. Knowing that the United States does bad things does not answer the question of should the United States be involved in the world. Di Caro: The question is how the U.S. should be involved in the world.Kagan: Critiques of the American order are legitimate. The question is what is a better alternative? If you want to tell me let's never get involved in the Middle East again, I would say sure. I'm delighted to never get involved in the Middle East again. But that is not what the restrainers are fundamentally talking about. They're talking about getting out of the whole alliance structure system and ending the nature of American leadership since 1945. The assumption behind that has to be that the world is going to be at least as calm or calmer, and there'll be less turmoil. And I just absolutely reject that. I think there is going to be more turmoil. And I think there are a lot of things that the restrainers are not thinking about and they're almost in my view a little utopian in their assumption that a multipolar world can exist in some kind of peaceful harmony when I think history suggests otherwise.

[Category: Robert-kagan, Neoconservatism, Iran-war, Bush-administration, Iraq-war, Q-a]

— The collapse of national sovereignty in the Middle East

 

at 8/2/26 10:05pm

Those who anticipated that a U.S. war against Iran would risk igniting a region-wide conflagration are looking prescient. The latest metastasis of the conflict has included airstrikes by both the United States and Saudi Arabia in Iraq, against Iraqi militias seen as allied with Iran. The Houthi regime in Yemen, as a direct outgrowth of the U.S.-Iran war, has renewed attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. This has led to new fighting between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, which is preparing a possible new offensive in Yemen and is attempting to draw in dozens of other countries on its side of this fray.The Iranian strategy of responding to the U.S. and Israeli aggression through horizontal escalation has drawn in still more countries. Iranian strikes against Saudi Arabia and the UAE have led to Saudi and Emirati attacks in Iran. Other Iranian retaliatory strikes have occurred in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan, scene of the most recent American casualties.Violence spread last week to Egypt’s Mediterranean port of Damietta, where a drone of unknown origin caused fires on two vessels. Some suggest Iranian allies may have been responsible, but Iran, which has good relations with Egypt, denies any connection and suggests it may have been an Israeli false flag attack.The violence related to the war in Iran is spreading far enough to start overlapping the Russian war against Ukraine, with a Ukrainian strike against a Russia-bound Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea. A merging of the wars in Iran and Ukraine would appeal to at least one Middle Eastern state: Israel.In addition to the actual spreading of violence, there is the threat of still more. President Donald Trump has at various times threatened not only to escalate attacks against civilian infrastructure in Iran but even to attack Oman, which has been one of the mediators trying to de-escalate the violence.Violence related to the current war with Iran builds on lines of conflict that existed prior to the war. The United States already was using Iraqi territory—where, of course, it had waged an earlier major war of aggression—to do battle with Iran when it used a missile strike at the Baghdad airport in 2020 to kill Iranian military commander and political figure Qassem Soleimani. Iran retaliated with a missile attack on a base in Iraq housing U.S. troops. Yemeni-Saudi fighting today was preceded years ago by a devastating Saudi air war against Yemen and extensive interference by both the Saudis and Emiratis in Yemen to promote an alternative to the Houthis. A later disagreement between those two Gulf Arab allies—with the UAE supporting a secessionist movement in southern Yemen—has taken a violent form on Yemeni territory.The Houthis’ interference with Red Sea shipping reprises their earlier use of this tactic in response to the inhumane Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Other examples of extensive region-wide Israeli violence include past and present attacks in Lebanon and occupation of Lebanese territory, a prolonged air war against Syria, expanding occupation of Syrian territory, aerial attacks on the territories of Iraq and Qatar, and clandestine assassination operations in Iran, Jordan, and elsewhere.The Middle East has come to look like—to borrow a phrase from the seventeenth century political philosopher Thomas Hobbes—a war of all against all. The region is not unique in this regard; some parts of central and eastern Africa have exhibited comparable pervasive and contagious violence. But the Middle East currently stands out, especially in ways relevant to U.S. policy. Life in some of the hardest hit parts of the region, including but not limited to the Gaza Strip, is—to use another phrase from Hobbes—nasty, brutish, and short.Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, who presents himself as a friend of the United States and just last month met with President Trump at the White House, stated that the recent U.S. and Saudi attacks on militia targets in Iraq were a “flagrant violation of sovereignty.” A breakdown of the concept of national sovereignty characterizes the region-wide picture of attacks on, or occupation of, other nations’ territories. Respect for the sovereignty of nation states is a bedrock principle of order in the current international system. The United Nations charter explicitly incorporates the “principle of the sovereign equality of all its members” and obligates members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”The only recognized justifiable exception to noninterference in the affairs of other states is the Responsibility to Protect, which involves intervention to forestall genocide or other severe offenses against human rights. But cross-border violence in the Middle East today is not protecting human rights and, in many cases, constitutes an offense against human rights.The concept of sovereignty of nation states is usually traced to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. It thus was originally a European concept, but today non-Europeans place at least as much emphasis on it. China especially stresses the importance of non-interference in the affairs of other states, a theme that has resonance in most of the Global South.The Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in central Europe, which in its complexity, persistence, and number of belligerents resembled in many ways the contemporary Middle East. Each situation had a religious dimension, which in seventeenth century Europe was a contest between Catholics and Protestants. In the contemporary Middle East, there is animosity between Shia and Sunni and, insofar as Israel is concerned, Jewish nationalism. Each situation involved rivalries among lesser actors in the area in which warfare was waged as well as intervention by larger powers, which in the Thirty Years War mostly meant France and Sweden.The fact that the Thirty Years War ended with a comprehensive peace settlement that incorporated an enduring principle of international order might give rise to optimism when thinking about the current disorder in the Middle East. But there is at least as much ground for pessimism, as well as cautionary lessons.The Thirty Years War took a terrible toll. It ended not with kumbaya but instead with sheer exhaustion. It is not the kind of experience to be wished on any region, however hopeful one might be that exhaustion will lead to peace.Intervention by major powers did not help and only made things worse by prolonging the warfare and the suffering. This was true of France’s intervention midway through the Thirty Years War. It is true as well of some of the U.S. military interventions in the Middle East, including the current one.Hobbes’s thinking was influenced primarily by civil war in his native England but probably also by the mayhem on the European continent. His most famous work, Leviathan, was published three years after the Thirty Years War. His solution for establishing order within a single nation was an all-powerful sovereign who ruled with the implied consent of a social contract. The corresponding solution among a group of nations would be a hegemon strong enough to impose international order.The Thirty Years War and Westphalia, however, showed that this was not a viable solution. The obvious would-be hegemon in that situation was the Habsburg monarch in Vienna, who as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, was supposed to have some order-enforcing authority over the portions of Europe where the war was fought. But the extent of that authority was itself an issue, in addition to the religious divisions, among the duchies and principalities that waged the war. The peace settlement affirmed the monarch’s sovereign power over the lands he ruled directly but weakened his role as emperor. One lesson for contemporary U.S. policy on the Middle East is that hegemony — by the United States or anyone else, and even assuming it could be achieved — does not provide a way out of the current disorder.Another lesson, consistent with the principle of nation-state sovereignty, is that victory by one ideological or religious camp over another is also not a way out of disorder. A modicum of peace in the Middle East will be achieved only when the kind of mutual respect and forbearance enshrined in the U.N. charter is widely observed, regardless of the inevitable continuing differences in the politics, ideologies, and religious faiths among states in the region.

[Category: Israel, Saudi-arabia, Persian-gulf, Houthis, Us-military, Iran-war]

— Fox News screaming desperately into wind as Trump loses grip

 

at 8/2/26 10:05pm

Fox News has always served as a purveyor of Republican war propaganda, but its coverage of the Iran conflict has been particularly aggressive, and in many ways unmoored from reality, giving their viewers a more than skewed vision of what President Donald Trump can — and cannot — accomplish in Iran today. It appears that it has been an editorial decision at Fox to convince their audience (whose median age is 55) that the Iranians cannot be negotiated with nor trusted and that war was — and still is — the only option. Its range of hosts and guests continue to insist that Trump’s military campaign has been a rousing success (by all independent, observable accounts it has not) and he just needs to finish the job. Of course this a bit of a far cry from the decisive regime change narrative that Fox had generated in the lead-up to the war.Mark Levin, one of Trump’s favorite hosts on the channel, has been a leading champion of this narrative, saying for weeks before the February war on his Fox show “Life, Liberty & Levin,” that “if we don’t act, and by that I mean not diplomacy, but decisively, quickly, and overwhelmingly with our military against the top of the regime,” then Iran will certainly, according to Levin, “build nuclear weapons, as North Korea has.” Levin also warned his audience that Iran “will not hesitate to launch ICBMs with nuclear warheads against our cities.”Trump made it a point to post these kinds of arguments from Levin and others on Truth Social, prepping the Fox News audience, and the American people more broadly, for war.After the conflict began, longtime host Laura Ingraham reframed the conflict using a classic neoconservative spin. “The real debate here… is not between the interventionists and the isolationists, or even between Trump and some elements of his base,” Ingraham said, “The real conflict here is between those who believe America is good, and those who believe fundamentally America is corrupt and evil.” This of course is a warmed-over strawman seeking to chill any debate over the war, and encouraging the Fox audience to label anyone who opposes Trump’s actions as “anti-American.”As military force failed to meet Trump’s vacillating objectives, Fox’s hosts remained unfazed. Confident as ever, Jesse Watters stated on March 25 that the Iranians were “running out of time and firepower.” In an effort to convince his audience of imminent regime collapse, Watters also said that, “every day that our bombers fly unchallenged, the regime loses power.”Of course time is not on our side. The regime is still in power but the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is now dangerously low, and the same goes for U.S. stockpiles of defensive missile systems. Meanwhile, the first and most intense stage of fighting did little to deplete Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones.Touted as Fox’s wisest military mind, Gen. Jack Keane is a key fixture of the network's war coverage. He, like Levin, says that the Iranians are too irrational for diplomacy. In a recent appearance on “Life, Liberty & Levin,” Gen. Keane said, “We have said on this show multiple times, you cannot trust the Iranians. They will lie and cheat. And even if they make a deal… they will not comply with it.”Now he is on Fox as recently as this weekend suggesting Trump was within range of victory when he paused fighting for the MOU (memorandum of understand) of which he said the Iranians did not comply. He said on July 29 that the U.S. must engage in a "comprehensive" military attack on Iran, focusing on civilian infrastructure like bridges and roads and airports, "isolating" it while the CIA and Mossad can help the people there overthrow the regime.The network creates an echo chamber by bringing on guests to repeat and validate the hawkish positions of the hosts. Maria Bartiromo hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for a softball interview on July 26, in which she asked him what it would take for the war with Iran to conclude. The prime minister urged Americans to support another round of fighting, arguing that only regime change will stop Iran from “wreaking economic chaos through the world, murdering thousands of its own citizens, and shooting at everyone.”“This is what this regime is doing when they don’t have nuclear weapons, so imagine what they would do if they had nuclear weapons,” Netanyahu told Fox News viewers.Marc Thiessen — a prominent neoconservative, Bush administration alum, and Fox News contributor — is another voice in favor of escalation. Throughout the war, Thiessen, a former “never-Trumper,” has appealed to the MAGA base by painting attractive pictures of “simple” ways to win the war. On a July 23 episode of “Special Report,” Thiessen said, “It’s very simple… We have about 14 days of combat where we have to take out all the targets we have available. We took out 85% of their defense industrial base, [so now] we take out 95% of it. We set back all their programs, and we further entomb the nuclear dust, then we stop major combat operations, we impose the blockade, we open up the Strait of Hormuz, and then we go and we help the Iranian people overthrow their regime.” The network’s morning show “Fox & Friends,” offers Today Show-sized breakfast bites for war coverage. Recently, the program featured pro-Israel radio host Sid Rosenberg. He made the case that military action was the only path forward, saying, “it is inevitable that President Trump is going to have to do what he doesn't want to do, which is go in there with this massive, all-out attack. There’s no other way to stop this,” Rosenberg said, “Once you start this,” he added, “there needs to be a finish, and the only finish is complete surrender by the Iranians. I hate to say it, but complete annihilation."The round-the-clock warmongering on Fox News has done little to move the general public, aside from a percentage of older Republican die-hards. But the network's role as a source of validation for the president could give him the confidence to escalate.If Fox News expresses support for any and all military actions Trump takes, he could well conclude that the public as a whole is supportive of his war – a devastating miscalculation, likely to be followed by ill-advised policy decisions.

[Category: Mark-levin, Iran-war, Fox-news, Laura-ingraham, Enewsletter]

— Navy retiring USS Fort Worth halfway through lifespan

 

at 7/31/26 1:53pm

This week, the Navy retired a littoral combat ship only halfway through its lifespan.The USS Fort Worth, a surface combatant ship which cost $400 million to build, entered service in 2012. It was originally meant to serve until the late 2030s, but was retired early due to chronic repair issues and related costs, and longstanding concerns regarding its overall viability.A major issue for the USS Fort Worth was its combining gear, which connects its gas turbine and engines to its water jet shafts. The combining gear took critical damage back in 2016 when crew members failed to follow proper procedures while testing its engines, rendering the boat functionally unusable. The Navy initially scheduled the USS Fort Worth’s retirement for 2022, after only ten years of service. However, the Navy repurposed the ship instead, using it to test new technologies at a port in San Diego.“By retiring early-hull test platforms like Fort Worth, the Navy redirects investments toward upgrading the remaining LCS inventory with enhanced capabilities,” the Navy said in a statement this week. Its retirement helps ensure “the active ships remain relevant, combat-credible, and reliable throughout their service lives.”But, as Dan Grazier, the director of the Stimson Center’s National Security reform program, tells RS: “The whole Littoral Combat Ship concept has failed.” “It's a poorly designed ship that [has an] excessive maintenance burden,” Grazier said. To Grazier’s point, a 2022 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found the Navy “hasn’t demonstrated that this type of ship can perform its intended missions,” and that it was less likely than its counterparts to withstand combat. The USS Fort Worth’s untimely demise is representative of a broader procurement crisis, where the Navy has repeatedly failed to deploy reliable ships that can perform their intended function. Rather, as Grazier tells RS, the Navy has often opted to build elaborately designed ships with unproven technologies, which often do not work as planned. “The Navy's now feeling the real consequences of years of bad policy,” Grazier said. “The size of the fleet is shrinking.”The Navy originally planned to buy 55 littoral combat ships; it cut back to 32 in 2014 as questions mounted about the program’s viability. It now has 27.

[Category: Littoral-combat-ship, Procurement, Defense-budget, Ships, National-security, Navy]

— Trouble in Paris? There's a Gaullist cure for that American hubris

 

at 7/30/26 10:05pm

Last month, as world leaders prepared to gather in France for the G7 Summit, French officials had Donald Trump on the mind.Using its privileges as host, Paris worked diligently to avoid any hiccups that might upset the U.S. president. First, it delayed the meeting from June 14 to June 16, ensuring that it wouldn’t interfere with Trump’s 80th birthday celebration, or the cage match on the White House lawn that accompanied it. Then, French President Emmanuel Macron went “out of his way” to design an agenda to “appeal to the sort of things Trump wants,” as one analyst told Reuters.Last, and perhaps most bizarrely, French officials delayed the ceremonial transfer of the remains of French Resistance hero Marc Bloch, who was set to be reinterred at France’s illustrious Panthéon in the heart of Paris on June 16. This decision was consequential; it meant that, instead of carrying out the ceremony on the anniversary of Bloch’s murder by the Gestapo in 1944, officials had to pay tribute a week later, delaying a national tribute of exceptional historical significance for one of France’s greatest historians and patriots.In the end, France ultimately gave up honoring Marc Bloch on the very day of his martyrdom in order to adjust its schedule to the imperious wishes of the White House and, ultimately, to welcome the U.S. president to nearby Versailles in an effort to curry favor with him.These decisions reflect a sorry state of mind. Even when it comes to our own national history, France has grown accustomed to treating constraints originating in Washington as overriding priorities. Yet nothing required the ceremony to be postponed or the agenda to be reshaped. The relationship that should bind two great allied republics too often resembles one of political dependence, in which Paris is less concerned with defending its own interests and values than with deferentially anticipating Washington's wishes.This situation serves neither France nor the United States.A common misconception is that America's interests are best served by compliant allies who implement decisions made in Washington without question. That is the logic of empire, not of sovereign nations joined in partnership. The United States has far greater need of allies willing to speak candidly than of vassals eager to please, as recent history has repeatedly borne out.When Jacques Chirac's France refused to join the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it was accused of betraying the Western alliance. With the benefit of hindsight, who can seriously argue that Paris was wrong? No weapons of mass destruction were ever found, nor any relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida. The war shattered the Iraqi state, fueled the rise of jihadist terrorism, strengthened Iran's regional influence, and cost American taxpayers trillions of dollars – not to mention the vast number of American and Iraqi lives lost.France's refusal was undoubtedly unwelcome in Washington. Yet it proved salutary. It served as a vaccine against hubris – a timely reminder that no power, however great, is immune to error. It also echoed the enduring lesson of Thucydides' “History of the Peloponnesian War”: no democracy can ultimately prevail abroad while violating the very principles it claims to uphold.It was precisely this lesson that General de Gaulle understood when, in his 1966 Phnom Penh speech, he denounced the Vietnam War. He was not seeking to weaken the United States; he was trying to spare it a strategic disaster. He reminded Americans that no foreign army can indefinitely impose its will upon a people determined to shape its own destiny. History ultimately proved him right.This Gaullist tradition did not consist in systematically opposing Washington. It meant supporting the United States whenever shared interests converged — and saying no when it embarked on a dangerous course.It is precisely this capacity for independent judgment that has gradually disappeared.The Ukrainian crisis offers a striking example. At the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel initially understood the risks. Both opposed extending the prospect of alliance membership to Ukraine and Georgia, knowing that Moscow regarded such a move as a strategic red line that risked triggering a major confrontation on the European continent.Had France firmly maintained that position and continued to promote a European security architecture encompassing Europeans, Russians, and Americans alike, the Ukrainian catastrophe might well have been avoided. Instead, Paris gradually abandoned this vision in favor of growing alignment with NATO enlargement and, inevitably, a logic of confrontation.The same mistake was repeated with NATO's missile defense system. By agreeing in 2012 to join a project purportedly aimed at Iran but viewed by Russia as a hostile strategic deployment, France helped fuel a new arms race. After President George W. Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the priority should have been to rebuild strategic trust. Instead, we chose the opposite course.The same pattern emerged over Iran. When President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, France should have firmly opposed the decision. It should have defended an agreement that was working, reduced the risk of war, and refused to force French companies out of Iran at Washington's behest. Once again, deference prevailed over independence. The successive crises that have engulfed the Middle East – and above all the recent war against Iran, which was interrupted, if only briefly, with the Memorandum of Understanding – have demonstrated the cost of that failure. The conflict ended in what many observers regard as a strategic setback for the United States, a conclusion reached by analysts as different as Robert Kagan in his widely discussed Atlantic essay "Checkmate in Iran" and John J. Mearsheimer.Even worse, should the recent resumption of hostilities evolve into a prolonged conflict, the consequences could extend far beyond the Middle East, triggering a severe global economic crisis in which Western economies would almost certainly bear the heaviest costs.The paradox is that this growing subordination by France, and Europe more generally, to the U.S. has not strengthened the transatlantic alliance; it has weakened it.A genuine alliance depends on partners capable of contributing distinct strengths. France possesses precisely such assets. It is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. It has the world's second-largest maritime domain, an extensive diplomatic network, an independent nuclear deterrent, and a world-class strategic industrial base.In other words, France has all the attributes required to be an indispensable partner to the United States — provided that it rediscovers the confidence to act as itself.The world now taking shape is no longer that of the 1990s. The United States must increasingly shift its strategic resources toward the Indo-Pacific in response to China's rise. It will no longer be able — or willing — to shoulder the burden of Western security indefinitely. Its long-term interest therefore lies not in maintaining economic and cultural dependencies but in fostering allies that are more autonomous, more capable, and more willing to assume responsibility for their own security. France could play precisely this role.One fundamental truth must be restated: the United States is stronger when surrounded by free and sovereign partners. A Gaullist France — capable of offering support when circumstances require it and dissenting when necessary — would be far more valuable to America than a France preoccupied with securing Washington’s approval.The United States does not need a France that behaves as a supplicant. It needs a France willing to speak with candor — a France capable of reminding its ally that no great power remains truly great once it ceases to listen to its friends. By recovering the Gaullist spirit, France would not distance itself from America; it would once again become the ally America respects. Such a relationship would be more balanced, more effective, and better suited to the strategic realities of the twenty-first century – not a relationship of dependence, but an alliance between two sovereign republics united by a shared commitment to democracy and human freedom.

[Category: Enewsletter, European-union, Donald-trump, Nato, Charles-de-gaulle, Emmanuel-macron, France]

— Will naming, shaming & sanctioning terror in Sudan stop bloodshed?

 

at 7/30/26 10:05pm

In June, a bipartisan group of senators introduced the Preventing External Aggression and Conflict Escalation (PEACE) in Sudan Act of 2026. In the House, the pending U.S. Engagement in Sudanese Peace Act and the RSF Terrorism Designation Act partly overlap with the PEACE Act. One of the most consequential questions raised by the various bills is whether to designate Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary force that has been at war with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since 2023, as a terrorist group.What effects could a terrorist designation for the RSF have? Would a designation make ceasefire negotiations – being pursued, although amid much criticism, by President Donald Trump’s Africa advisor Massad Boulos – easier or more difficult? And would a designation constrain the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is credibly accused of backing the RSF? To think through these issues, I talked with several experts on Sudan and on terrorism designations. The stakes go beyond Sudan. There are strong arguments for and against a designation. On the one hand, designating the RSF would index Washington’s commitment to stabilizing Sudan and ending a war that has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions and sent ripples throughout the Horn of Africa. The UAE already stands accused of pursuing a destabilizing and divisive foreign policy from Yemen to Sudan to Libya with its support for strongmen who fuel conflict. Targeting it could show Gulf monarchies that there are limits to their influence in Washington.On the other hand, sanctions regimes face increasing criticism, as their application from Iran to Russia have largely failed to produce sought-after behavior changes, have generally hardened the resolve of their targets, and resulted in unintended negative consequences for civilians. Terrorism designations can even make it harder for humanitarian relief agencies to operate due to fears they could be tarred as providing “material support.” The terrorism designations system has also been criticized as politicized and susceptible to executive overreach. In designating the RSF, a genocidal and destructive group by many standards, the U.S. might nevertheless reinforce problematic powers of the national security state.Moreover, several experts suggested that a designation will have little effect in isolation. If a designation is worth pursuing, it would need to be part of a broader strategy that the Trump administration has not, so far, articulated.Terrorism designations: Mechanisms and limitationsThe U.S. government has multiple designation mechanisms. The pending bills ask the secretary of state to apply the Specially Designated Global Terrorism (SDGT) mechanism. The SDGT designation can apply to a group or to an individual, and can be made by either State or Treasury, albeit under different parameters. The other main designation that might apply to the RSF – the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) – can only be made by State. Both designation mechanisms apply financial sanctions, seeking to make it difficult for the designated entities to move money through the international banking system, as well as to hold property or other assets in the United States and elsewhere. The FTO designation is potentially more sweeping in that it criminalizes providing “material support” to a designated group. Meanwhile, the State Department maintains a list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, which included Sudan from 1993 to 2020.These designation mechanisms exist alongside other sanctions, including for Sudan. In January 2025, the outgoing Biden administration determined that “members of the RSF and allied militias have committed genocide in Sudan,” and sanctioned the RSF’s leader, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti.” However, the Sudanese journalist Eiad Husham told me that “targeted financial and personal sanctions have only a limited impact on the RSF leadership…many of them emerged from a regime that operated under international sanctions for nearly three decades, so they have experience adapting to those restrictions.” Husham added that “sanctions alone do not necessarily isolate individuals politically or diplomatically,” as evidenced by the visit of Hemedti’s brother Algoni to Washington in October 2025, despite being under sanctions himself.A terrorism designation for the RSF would not necessarily hinder the group. Jason Blazakis, a former State Department official who authored the recently published "Terror Disrupted: Countering the Financing of Terrorism," told me that enforcing terrorism designations overseas is difficult; the most effective applications involve “international cohesion” and broad coordination with other governments and the United Nations, something the Trump administration seldom seeks. Even with a coalition, enforcement would still be difficult: for example, Blazakis said, it is “very unlikely that RSF gold profits moving through the UAE would be flagged.” A recent UN report highlighted how a “war economy” fuels the conflict in Sudan; it would not be easy for a terrorism designation to disrupt flows of gum arabic and other commodities from Sudan.Possible political effectsEnforcement problems, however, would not necessarily render a designation meaningless. Blazakis commented that a designation could be wielded diplomatically as a stick now and as a carrot later. Washington leveraged the State Sponsors of Terrorism list for many years as a bargaining chip with Sudanese authorities in the past. To use a designation of the RSF as a tool for pressuring the UAE, as well as Ethiopia, Chad, Kenya, and other accused RSF supporters to break with the militia, according to Blazakis, would require considerable diplomatic finesse.For one expert on Sudan, Tufts University’s Alex de Waal, a designation would at least bring a greater degree of clarity to U.S. policy. Given that the U.S. government has deemed RSF guilty of genocide, de Waal told me, “It’s at least an oddity that being responsible for an exceptionally grave crime in international law seems to be inconsequential, but being designated a terrorist does have consequences.” Still, de Waal noted that “it would be difficult to designate an organization as a terrorist and then immediately talk to them.” The SAF, he added, aims for total military victory, and designating the RSF risked reinforcing the SAF’s “maximalist” position.The real target of a terrorist designation for the RSF is the UAE. Since war broke out in Sudan in 2023, substantial evidence has accumulated regarding Emirati logistical and material support to the RSF. Supply routes and foreign mercenaries have flowed through Chad, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Libya. Husham told me he does not expect the Trump administration to designate the RSF – but, if it did, the move “would force a difficult political and diplomatic conversation with Abu Dhabi.” If the UAE distanced itself from the RSF, that could weaken the group’s hold on western Sudan and even help bring an end to the war. While de Waal agreed that such a development would weaken the militia, it could also fracture it. “So while it’s hard enough to negotiate anything right now, it might be impossible if the RSF fractures.” What hope is there, finally, for a mediated settlement in Sudan? Cameron Hudson, a former U.S. diplomat and longtime Sudan watcher, has argued that designating the RSF could lead to a breakthrough with the SAF, which has rejected successive ceasefire proposals put forward by Boulos. Hudson has also argued, however, that “the latest round of U.S. sanctions on Sudan” – provoked by the alleged use by the SAF of chemical weapons – “will make getting the SAF to the ceasefire negotiation table even harder.” Husham is pessimistic about the Trump administration’s efforts. Boulos, Husham commented, “appears to be overseeing more than sixty countries while being short staffed and having no previous diplomatic experience. That is an enormous portfolio for anyone, particularly when dealing with a complex conflict like Sudan’s.”In short, a chain of events would have to occur before the RSF could be designated, much less for the designation to help end the war. In the meantime, the question of designating the RSF occasions reflection on whether and how the tools of the War on Terror can be used to make peace, disrupt networks of influence, and alter the politics of the Horn and the Gulf.

[Category: Uae, Terror-designation, Rsf, Sahel, Sudan]

— Party elites so blind they can't see their base turning against the war

 

at 7/30/26 10:05pm

Last week, only four House Republicans voted with 210 Democrats to pass a war powers resolution to end the U.S. war with Iran.That means 208 House Republicans voted to continue the war. Hours later, the Republican-led Senate killed the measure, with only one GOP senator voting with the Democrats to end the war, de facto joining four other Republicans who were either absent or missed the vote.The overwhelming majority of congressional Republicans are still clearly committed to President Donald Trump’s war. Republican voters? Not so much.A new Politico poll, published just one day before these votes, revealed a growing gap between congressional Republicans’ continued unqualified support for the war and GOP voters' seeming increasing lack of it.As recently as May, “half of President Donald Trump’s MAGA base thought the Iran war was worth its economic costs” but now barely over a third do, the news outlet reported. On the specific statement, “The U.S. should continue, even if it increases costs in America,” the number in agreement plunged from 50% in May, to 37% in mid-July.“That precipitous, 13-point drop in just two months…reveals how the president’s most die-hard supporters are starting to agree with the majority of Americans who have long opposed the U.S.’ involvement in the war,” Politico noted.The war with Iran has been unpopular with Americans since it began in late February, a sentiment that has only grown with time. Increasing gas prices and other rising costs at home have been top factors in attitudes about the conflict.Republicans have been the factor in keeping those already bad numbers from diving further into the dumps. Until now. This Politico survey does not appear to be an outlier in measuring Republicans’ waning enthusiasm for the war.An Economist/YouGov poll released July 14 showed a majority of the GOP base still supported the Iran war, yet that support was slipping with both MAGA and non-MAGA Republicans. “While overall most Republicans say the war was the right decision (63% vs. 16%), the roughly 26% of Republicans who say they're non-MAGA Republicans are less likely to say the war was the right decision than the wrong decision (31% vs. 51%),” according to the summary released by YouGov.New York Magazine combined this Economist/YouGov poll with the Politico survey to surmise that 51% of self-identified MAGA supporters want the U.S. to “make a deal to end the war in Iran as quickly as possible.”A CBS News poll released in mid-June showed that a majority of both Republicans and Democrats want the war to end, including 60% of all Republicans and 56% of ‘MAGA’ Republicans.”Just as the recent Politico polling contrasted their latest results with their findings in May, on May 19th, Responsible Statecraft cited an Institute for Global Affairs (IGA) survey:Despite the strong GOP support for the overall prosecution of the war, the poll also shows evidence of potential cracks beginning to emerge as the Strait of Hormuz closure drives up prices. Almost half of Republican respondents (46%) say that it has been “somewhat or much harder” for them to afford necessities such as housing, food, or medical care over the last six months. Among Democrats and independents, that number is 78% and 61%, respectively.A large majority of Republicans say the war has worsened this trend. Twenty-four percent say it has affected cost of living “a great deal,” and another 46% say it has had at least some impact on prices.While the IGA poll cited was taken from April 24-27, the Strait of Hormuz — the main reason for the cost of living concern — is still shut today. These voter attitude shifts are not without context and voice in conservative media.Former Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene was once a top MAGA player who post-Congress has since become an aggressive anti-Trump figure, driven in no small part by her anti-war views. Last week when Trump threatened to kill more Iranians for every U.S. soldier killed, Greene posted on X, “Our American soldiers wouldn’t be getting killed if you weren’t fighting an unnecessary war against Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz that was already open before you went to war.”“End the war,” Greene demanded. “In your 1st term in 2019, gas was under $2 and inflation was 1.8%, DO THAT AGAIN!”Reflecting on the earlier ‘America First’ campaign promises of the Trump administration and what’s actually being delivered to GOP constituents, Cato Institute foreign policy analyst Jon Hoffman told RS in an email, “The growing rift on the right regarding the Iran war reflects the broader divide within the Republican party on what an America First foreign policy looks like in practice.” “Many establishment Republicans have tried to repackage decades of conventional thinking under the label of America First, failing to recognize the growing dissatisfaction with status quo policies among the base,” Hoffman added.Establishment Republicans, with a major assist from Trump, have attempted to redefine America First as the same, old, neoconservative D.C. establishment foreign policy consensus. These polls show a conservative base growing weary of it.In addition to the overall disenchantment on the right, data shows younger Republicans are opposing the war in significantly higher numbers than their elders.“The war in Iran — which is so blatantly antithetical to America First — has deepened this rift,” Hoffman noted. “It is a war solely on behalf of Washington elites and special interests. Younger Republicans in particular are tired of endless wars in the Middle East and feel betrayed by Trump's blatant disregard for his own campaign pledge of no new wars.”“Party leadership ignores this growing divide at its own peril,” he warned.A party reckoning could be coming for a number of reasons. But this war, and Republican voters’ attitudes about it, could top that list.

[Category: Polling, Gop, Republicans, Maga, Enewsletter, Congress, Iran, Donald-trump, Iran-war]

As of 8/9/26 11:54am. Last new 8/7/26 10:37pm.