Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 20, 2024

 

at 7/26/24 9:34pm

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. KaganJuly 20, 2024, 5:50pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on July 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with former US President and Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump on July 19 and discussed an end-state to the war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated that he agreed to talk with Trump about steps that will produce a fair and truly lasting peace at a future personal meeting.[1] Trump stated that both Russia and Ukraine will be able to come together and negotiate a deal that ends the war.[2] The Kremlin continues to indicate that it is only interested in a negotiated settlement that results in Ukrainian capitulation and paves the way for Russia to destroy Ukrainian statehood, however.[3] Zelensky has recently stressed that Ukraine must significantly weaken Russia's battlefield position in order to develop a stronger negotiating position for future peace negotiations, and Ukrainian leadership continues to call for the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine as part of any lasting peace.[4] Western security assistance that provides Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity required for counteroffensive operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine remains the only likely path for degrading Russia's battlefield position and reducing Russian President Vladimir Putin's current commitment to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity.[5]Ukrainian drones struck a Russian airfield in Rostov Oblast on the night of July 19 to 20. Russian sources claimed on July 20 that Ukrainian forces launched 30 drones against the Millerovo airfield in Rostov Oblast and that the strike caused damage to infrastructure and a fuel tank.[6] Geolocated footage shows a fire at the Millerovo airfield.[7] Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev claimed that Russian forces intercepted and destroyed 26 drones over Rostov Oblast on the night of July 19 to 20.[8] The Russian 31st Fighter Aviation Regiment (1st Composite Aviation Division) is reportedly based at the Millerovo airfield and has SU-30SM aircraft deployed to the airfield.[9]Russian Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continue to use meetings with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers to attempt to rehabilitate the MoD's image among pro-war Russian ultranationalists and portray Belousov as an effective manager of the MoD. Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10 and held another meeting with milbloggers on July 19.[10] Russian milbloggers who attended both meetings claimed that Belousov has already started to address many of their concerns and complaints about the conduct of the war in Ukraine and the MoD bureaucracy.[11] Russian milbloggers noted that Belousov acknowledged that the MoD has yet to find solutions to every issue that the milbloggers raised but stressed that Belousov is not ignoring issues.[12] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed hope that Belousov and the MoD will eliminate all the "painful malfunctions" among Russian forces in Ukraine sooner or later.[13] Another prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Belousov specifically promised to build shelters at military airfields to protect against Ukrainian drone strikes, a widespread point of neuralgia within the Russian pro-war ultranationalist community.[14] Both the Kremlin and the Russian MoD have a vested interest in appearing open to dialogue with milbloggers, who represent a major pro-war constituency, and the Kremlin is likely aiming to portray Belousov as more cognizant of this fact than his predecessor, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.Russian authorities are likely trying to strengthen coercive measures aimed at impressing migrants facing deportation into military service. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on July 19 that the Russian State Duma will consider amendments that would allow Russian authorities to detain foreigners and stateless persons who are subject to expulsion from Russia, in "special institutions" for no more than 48 hours before their deportation.[15]  The amendments reportedly propose that officials from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) or Federal Security Service (FSB) can request that a judge extend the period of detention from 48 hours to 90 days, however. Russian authorities are currently allowed to detain foreigners and stateless persons subject to deportation for a maximum of 90 days.[16] Russian authorities have increasingly been conducting raids against migrants and impressing migrants into signing military contracts by threatening migrants with deportation.[17] The amendments significantly shortening the period during which Russian authorities can detain people facing deportation are likely aimed in part at increasing pressure on migrants to join the military in lieu of deportation.Spanish authorities arrested three individuals accused of conducting cyberattacks as part of a prominent pro-Russian hacking group that consistently targets Ukraine and NATO states supporting Ukraine. The Spanish Civil Guard announced on July 20 that it arrested three unspecified individuals in Manacor, Balearic Islands, and the province of Andalusia for conducting distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks targeting state institutions and the strategic sectors of countries supporting Ukraine following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.[18] The Spanish Civil Guard noted that the hackers belong to the Russian "hacktivist" group "NoName057(16)" and that it continues to investigate several leads for identifying participants in the cyberattacks.[19] NoName057(16) is a pro-Russian cyber collective that emerged in March 2022 and initially targeted Ukrainian government and media sites but has since expanded to target Western government, economic, and logistical entities, including in NATO member states."[20] NoName057(16) relies on volunteers to conduct its cyberattacks and previously published its own crowdsourced botnet, "DDoSia," along with Russian and English language instructions for using DDoSia to conduct DDoS attacks.[21] NoName057(16) has repeatedly emphasized its willingness to cooperate with other cyber actors with which it shares "similar values" and has previously cooperated with other prominent Russian cyber actors "Killnet," "XakNet Team," and "CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn."[22] Mandiant Intelligence assessed with moderate confidence in an article published in September 2022 and updated in April 2024 that XakNet Team and CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn are coordinating operations with the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)-sponsored "Sandworm," or Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 44, and that Killnet also likely has "limited" links to the Russian GRU.[23]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with former US President and Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump on July 19 and discussed an end-state to the war in Ukraine.Ukrainian drones struck a Russian airfield in Rostov Oblast on the night of July 19 to 20.Russian Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continue to use meetings with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers to attempt to rehabilitate the MoD's image among pro-war Russian ultranationalists and portray Belousov as an effective manager of the MoD.Russian authorities are likely trying to strengthen coercive measures aimed at impressing migrants facing deportation into military service.Spanish authorities arrested three individuals accused of conducting cyberattacks as part of a prominent pro-Russian hacking group that consistently targets Ukraine and NATO states supporting Ukraine.Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Svatove, and Donetsk City.Kremlin-affiliated business-focused outlet Kommersant reported on July 19 that low quality machine parts grounded five Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Il-76MD-90A transport aircraft. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City amid continued fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 20. Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within western Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City).[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions north of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) and back 200 meters within northeastern Hlyboke, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[25] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 19 and 20.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Starytsya, Hlyboke, and Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[27] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against a bridge along Soborna Street over the Vovcha River within Vovchansk.[28] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that Russian forces formed and transferred additional assault groups of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Baltic Fleet) near Hlyboke in order to prepare for the resumption of offensive operations.[29] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces also reported that Russian forces regrouped elements of the Russian 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC), and 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps, LMD) near central and eastern Vovchansk to resume assault operations. Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Svatove amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Geolocated footage published on July 20 shows Russian forces raising a Russian flag in central Pishchane and indicates that Russian forces have seized the settlement.[30] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) completed clearing Pishchane on July 20.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 19 and 20 that Russian forces completely seized Andriivka (west of Svatove) and recently advanced up 400 meters northwest of Kyslivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and up to two kilometers near Nevske (northwest of Kreminna).[32] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Hlushkivka, Novoosynove, Pishchane, and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Lozova; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, Hrekivka, and Novosadove; west of Kreminna near Terny; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on July 19 and 20.[33] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on July 19 and 20.[34] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate in the Siversk direction.[35]Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking within Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on July 19 and 20.[36] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly fighting south of Kalynikva, and elements of the "Sever-V" Volunteer Brigade (Volunteer Corps) are reportedly fighting near Hryhorivka.[37] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) assessed that Russian forces near Chasiv Yar are likely conducting a tactical pause while conducting probing attacks and reconnaissance operations.[38] Russian forces did not make confirmed advances amid continued fighting near Toretsk on July 20. Russian forces continued attacks near Toretsk, Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk), and Niu York (south of Toretsk) on July 19 and 20.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields south of Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk) and advanced up to 500 meters deep within central Zalizne, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[40] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly fighting within Niu York.[41] Russian forces did not make confirmed advances amid continued offensive operations northwest and west of Avdiivka on July 20. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing within central Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka) and that Ukrainian forces have begun to withdraw from Novoselivka Persha, but one milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are not withdrawing but only conducting rotations and still maintaining positions in southern Novoselivka Persha.[42] Russian forces also continued attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Prohres, Kalynove, Arkhanhelske, and Skuchne, and west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka and Karlivka on July 19 and 20.[43] Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued fighting in the area on July 20. Geolocated footage published on July 20 shows that Russian forces advanced in fields south of Heorhiivka and within central Krasnohorivka (both west of Donetsk City).[44] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced further within central Krasnohorivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this extent of Russian advances.[45] Russian forces also attacked southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on July 19 and 20.[46] Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Vuhledar direction.[47]Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) on July 19 and 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.[48] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued near Robotyne; east of Robotyne near Verbove; northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka; north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka; and northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka and Shcherbaky on July 19 and 20.[49] Fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on July 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[51] Elements of the Russian 25th Spetsnaz Regiment (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[52] Satellite imagery published on July 20 confirms that Ukrainian forces successfully struck a Russian Coast Guard base on Lake Donuzlav in occupied Crimea on the night of July 17 to 18.[53] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on July 18 that sources in Ukrainian law enforcement stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted a naval and aerial drone strike against the Russian Coast Guard base and damaged and disabled a headquarters with a control point, a warehouse with ammunition and equipment, an electric substation, technical facilities, and Russian firing positions.[54]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted limited missile and drone strikes against targets in Ukraine on the evening of July 19 and on the night of July 19 to 20. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and one Iskander-K cruise missile and 16 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast.[55] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces downed 13 Shaheds and another unspecified type of drone and that Russian forces targeted Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Kyiv oblasts.[56] A Russian milblogger suggested that the unknown drone was a new Russian drone that followed below a Shahed drone at an altitude of 20 to 30 meters, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this speculation.[57] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russian forces attacked energy facilities in Poltava, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts, and Ukrainian Northern Operational Command reported that a Russian Shahed strike damaged a critical infrastructure facility in Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast.[58] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck residential areas in Mykolaiv City on the evening of July 19 with an unspecified number and type of missile.[59]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Kremlin-affiliated business-focused outlet Kommersant reported on July 19 that low quality machine parts grounded five Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Il-76MD-90A transport aircraft.[60] Kommersant reported that the Russian Investigative Commitee's Main Investigative Directorate opened a criminal case against unspecified managers at the Balashikha Foundry and Mechanical Plant (BLMZ) after BLMZ supplied low quality Il-76 bearings causing the Russian MoD to suspend its operation of five Il-76MD-90A aircraft. Kommersant reported that the investigation found that BLMZ purchased bearings accompanied by forged documents from an unknown supplier from 2017 to 2022. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported, citing unspecified open-source data, that the Russian MoD had a total of 18 Il-76MD-90A aircraft at the end of 2023.[61] Corruption and limitations due to Western sanctions may be affecting the Russian MoD's ability to access quality machine parts in a timely manner to repair aircraft.The Russian military reportedly continues to recruit Cuban citizens to fight in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on July 19, citing a source familiar with the matter, that Cuban nationals continue to travel to Russia to fight in Ukraine despite the Cuban government's efforts to crack down against Russian military recruitment. The source stated that the number of Cubans fighting in the Russian military is likely in the "low hundreds." ISW previously observed reports that Cuban nationals are serving in airborne (VDV) formations, including the 106th VDV Division.[62]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  Nothing significant to report.Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Russian Information Operations and NarrativesThe Ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society, Vitaly Kuznetsov, promoted narratives about Russia's alleged "holy war" in Ukraine that ignore Russia's religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine. Kuznetsov claimed on July 20 that Cossacks fighting in the Russian military in Ukraine are "defending the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church and strengthening the Orthodox faith" by constructing religious sites. Kuznetsov also claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is a metaphysical spiritual battle with schismatics, Satanists, neo-pagans, and other enemies of Orthodoxy.[63] Russian authorities have recently taken steps to integrate Cossack organizations, including the All-Russian Cossack Society, into the Russian military.[64] The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate approved an ideological and policy document in March 2024 casting Russia's war in Ukraine as an existential and civilizational "holy war."[65] ISW has previously reported about Russia's religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine, including against the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which Moscow views as schismatic despite the decision by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople in 2019 granting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church its independence from the Moscow Patriarchate.[66]The Russian and Belarusian ministries of foreign affairs (MFA) published a joint report on July 20 about alleged human rights violations in Italy in an attempt to deflect international attention from the Kremlin's ongoing human rights violations and invasion of Ukraine. The Russian and Belarusian MFAs claimed that the Italian government is violating the rights of migrants and Italian citizens and is "Russophobic" and neofascist.[67] The Russian and Belarusian MFAs have recently lobbied similar accusations against Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, and Spain. [68]Russian officials continue to frame NATO member states' defensive actions in response to Russian aggression as provocative. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on July 20 that NATO is creating a fortified "outpost" in northern Norway on the border with Russia and that this is provoking an escalation.[69]Russian sources seized on the murder of former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Iryna Farion on July 19 in order to spread divisions in Ukrainian society and narratives about "Nazism" in Ukraine.[70]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1814424885164421439[2] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/112815440435929028[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030924 ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/19/53/32af8d644e6cae41791548fc82ae2d8e_1691483767.pdf[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2024[6] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130601; https://t.me/rybar/61946[7] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9108?single; https://t.me/etorostov/59748; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1814530231706751310;[8] https://t.me/tass_agency/261647; https://t.me/golubev_vu/1447[9] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3887173-explosions-near-military-airfield-and-oil-depot-in-rostov-region-social-networks.html; https://mil.in dot ua/en/news/in-the-rostov-region-drones-hit-the-millerovo-air-base/ ; https://t.me/army_tv/4467[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061024 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21109 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11029 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/126385 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47931[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/21109 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47931[12] https://t.me/wargonzo/21109 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47931[13] https://t.me/wargonzo/21109[14] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27610.5/4961320/[15] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21407189[16] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/bank/50195[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112423 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023[18] https://www.europapress dot es/sociedad/sucesos-00649/noticia-guardia-civil-detiene-tres-personas-baleares-andalucia-delitos-danos-informaticos-fines-terroristas-20240720091552.html; https://x.com/guardiacivil/status/1814570945270718964; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QRW8mwVf2YQ[19] https://www.europapress dot es/sociedad/sucesos-00649/noticia-guardia-civil-detiene-tres-personas-baleares-andalucia-delitos-danos-informaticos-fines-terroristas-20240720091552.html; https://x.com/guardiacivil/status/1814570945270718964; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QRW8mwVf2YQ[20] https://labs.yarix.com/2022/10/analysis-of-the-russian-speaking-threat-actor-noname-05716/; https://t.me/noname05716/527; https://www.csoonline.com/article/1270051/how-russias-noname05716-could-be-a-new-model-for-hacking-groups.html[21] https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/new-undercover-intel-noname-russian-hacktivist-operations/; https://t.me/noname05716eng/2583[22] https://labs.yarix.com/2022/10/analysis-of-the-russian-speaking-threat-actor-noname-05716/; https://t.me/noname05716eng/2347; https://t.me/noname05716/504; https://t.me/noname05716/4772; https://t.me/noname05716/308; https://t.me/noname05716/298; https://t.me/noname05716/218[23] https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/gru-rise-telegram-minions/[24] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1814701375806128343; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1814701373012725876; https://www.facebook.com/153opbr/videos/3408384029454122/[25] https://t.me/motopatriot/25134; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12897[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl; https://t.me/dva_majors/47677 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21113[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/47677; https://t.me/wargonzo/21113  ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11034; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12897[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12885[29] https://t.me/otukharkiv/301[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6122?single; https://t.me/operational_space/767[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130618; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12900; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27349; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27349[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72809 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12900  [33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkxkcfBLZ6SKmeDpxn22D87ym7Xh4Ltp3tcXTj3dm8ptmUKbnxP2RG98h3xx5jCyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkxkcfBLZ6SKmeDpxn22D87ym7Xh4Ltp3tcXTj3dm8ptmUKbnxP2RG98h3xx5jCyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl[35] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/15707[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkxkcfBLZ6SKmeDpxn22D87ym7Xh4Ltp3tcXTj3dm8ptmUKbnxP2RG98h3xx5jCyl; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130582[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12875; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130582[38] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1814575522459824173[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkxkcfBLZ6SKmeDpxn22D87ym7Xh4Ltp3tcXTj3dm8ptmUKbnxP2RG98h3xx5jCyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130592; https://t.me/dva_majors/47677; https://t.me/motopatriot/25095[41] ttps://t.me/wargonzo/21107[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130592?single; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72827; https://t.me/dva_majors/47677; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18419[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkxkcfBLZ6SKmeDpxn22D87ym7Xh4Ltp3tcXTj3dm8ptmUKbnxP2RG98h3xx5jCyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl; https://t.me/wargonzo/21113; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130592?single[44] https://t.me/oaembr46/914; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6118; https://t.me/IronHelmets/3286; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6119[45] https://t.me/motopatriot/25126; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27345 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130621; https://t.me/voin_dv/9844; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18420[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl[47] https://t.me/voin_dv/9836[48] tps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkxkcfBLZ6SKmeDpxn22D87ym7Xh4Ltp3tcXTj3dm8ptmUKbnxP2RG98h3xx5jCyl[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkxkcfBLZ6SKmeDpxn22D87ym7Xh4Ltp3tcXTj3dm8ptmUKbnxP2RG98h3xx5jCyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21113 ;[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkxkcfBLZ6SKmeDpxn22D87ym7Xh4Ltp3tcXTj3dm8ptmUKbnxP2RG98h3xx5jCyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0236wiKLUrY8LZaNvoW1cRThdhGwe41pHYf5obqbnddQ6utxEzSpMvTz7xqDbpNnJFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NeKvVrm2zhCocYCGhLtrABk2XSsyQmpyHshpJuVmpuqjbLRcAkYVVBDyve3rvCawl  [51] https://t.me/dva_majors/47677[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/47668[53] https://t.me/radiosvoboda/65155 ; https://t.me/krymrealii/30060[54] https://suspilne dot media/793437-droni-sbu-urazili-bazu-beregovoi-ohoroni-na-ozeri-donuzlav-u-krimu-dzerela/[55] https://t.me/ComAFUA/351; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02h72G5aYNtjMMM9GA1MGN4PgJT4nDf6yoWDRtr16etjEsyanm6oNoqvPHTw6kFWJRl  [56] https://t.me/ComAFUA/351; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02h72G5aYNtjMMM9GA1MGN4PgJT4nDf6yoWDRtr16etjEsyanm6oNoqvPHTw6kFWJRl  [57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72855[58] https://t.me/ok_pivnich1/9663 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/20/vorog-bombyt-infrastrukturu-j-energetyku-na-pivnochi/ ; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/3074[59] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/11182 ; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/10651[60] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6843843[61] https://t.me/istories_media/6914 [62] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024[63] https://m.lenta dot ru/news/2024/07/20/ataman/; https://iarex dot ru/news/135101.html[64] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2024-03-24-PDF-Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024; https://ria dot ru/20240323/putin-1935354519.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9Choly-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023[67] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43369; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/1957839/#_Toc166858702[68] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/1957839/#sel=518:1:x0f,618:24:gim ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024[69] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43374[70] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72801; https://t.me/dva_majors/47662 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47705; https://t.me/inners_of_the_politics/8; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57658 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16578; https://t.me/sashakots/47935; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37820

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, July 20, 2024

 

at 7/26/24 9:34pm

Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting several Houthi military targets in al Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 20 in retaliation for the July 18 Houthi drone attack targeting Tel Aviv.[1] The IDF stated that it conducted the strike “in response to the hundreds of [Houthi] attacks carried out against the state of Israel in recent months.”[2] A senior Israeli official told Axios that “the attack by the Houthis on Tel Aviv crossed all the red lines and that is why we responded to it after nine months of restraint.”[3] The IDF airstrike marks the first time Israel has directly struck Yemen since the Israel-Hamas war began.[4] A second unspecified Israeli official told Axios that Israel coordinated the attack with the United States and the international coalition that was established in December 2023 to counter Houthi attacks on international shipping.[5] Houthi media claimed that Israel targeted oil facilities and a power station in al Hudaydah.[6]Key Takeaways:Yemen: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting several Houthi military targets in al Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 20 in retaliation for the July 18 Houthi drone attack targeting Tel Aviv.Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 99th Division operated in Gaza City over the past week and seized weapons in buildings surrounding UNWRA headquarters in Tal al Hawa.West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 19.Lebanon: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least eight attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 19.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 99th Division operated in Gaza City over the past week and seized weapons in buildings surrounding UNWRA headquarters in Tal al Hawa.[7] The IDF raided apartment buildings where Hamas fighters were residing in the neighborhood surrounding UNRWA.[8] Israeli forces seized weapons caches from apartments that included small arms, rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, ammunition, and explosives. Forces also located equipment for Hamas’ naval forces.[9] Israeli forces also located a weapons manufacturing site in the area surrounding Hamas’ base at UNRWA headquarters.[10]The 3rd Alexandroni Infantry Brigade (Res.) (99th Division) continued clearing operations along the Netzarim Corridor on July 20.[11] Israeli forces raided militia infrastructure along the corridor and directed an airstrike on a building where Palestinian fighters were located.[12] The Mujahideen Movement and the Ansar Brigades—the militant wing of the Palestinian Freedom Movement—launched rockets at Israeli forces located along the Netzarim Corridor.[13]The IDF Air Force struck a building on used by the al Khara Company to facilitate the transfer of funds to Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on July 18.[14] The building was in a humanitarian zone in Deir al Balah.[15] The IDF evacuated the area surrounding the building and used precision guided munitions to minimize civilian casualties. The IDF killed a member of the al Khara Company on July 19 who helped transfer funds for Hamas through the organization.[16]The 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on July 19.[17] The Givati Brigade engaged Palestinian fighters in unspecified areas of Rafah during clearing operations. The 401st Brigade cleared militia infrastructure and targeted Palestinian fighters in Tal al Sultan. Hamas fighters lured Israeli soldiers into a tunnel rigged with explosives in Tel al Sultan and detonated the tunnel.[18] Hamas claimed the explosion killed and wounded the Israeli soldiers inside.[19] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducted a combined RPG attack on an Israeli Merkava tank operating in Shaboura refugee camp, western Rafah City on July 19.[20] The National Resistance Brigades fired an RPG at an armored personnel carrier (APC) operating in Laffat Badr intersection, Tal al Sultan.[21]PIJ mortared Israeli forces at the Nahal Oz site, bordering the Gaza Strip on July 20.[22]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 19.[23]This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Southern Lebanon and Golan HeightsAxis of Resistance objectives:Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into LebanonPrepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaIranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least eight attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 19.[24]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.Iran and Axis of ResistanceThe United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported two attacks targeting an unspecified vessel approximately 64 nautical miles northwest of Mokha, Yemen, on July 20.[25] A drone exploded near the vessel, causing minor damage to the vessel. An uncrewed surface vessel (USV) later exploded near the vessel as well. Crewmembers reported further drone and missile sightings following the initial drone and USV explosions. UKMTO reported that both the vessel and the crew are safe.The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted an attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in Haifa using Arqab cruise missiles on July 19.[26]An Israeli military correspondent reported on July 19 that the IDF intercepted a drone that was launched from Iraq outside of Israeli territory.[27] [1] https://x.com/idf/status/1814697261038788756?s=46&t=1sf9TeAul0X5cDCMsI9AAg ;https://www.axios.com/2024/07/20/israel-yemen-houthis-tel-aviv-drone[2] https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1814696773346033748 ;https://x.com/idf/status/1814697261038788756?s=46&t=1sf9TeAul0X5cDCMsI9AAg[3] https://www.axios.com/2024/07/20/israel-yemen-houthis-tel-aviv-drone[4] https://www.axios.com/2024/07/20/israel-yemen-houthis-tel-aviv-drone[5] https://www.axios.com/2024/07/20/israel-yemen-houthis-tel-aviv-drone ;https://abcnews.go.com/International/us-launches-international-task-force-counter-houthi-attacks/story?id=105788661[6] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1814702953271365722[7] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814646632392048763 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1814646783080845367 ; https://www.idf dot il/217625[8] https://www.idf dot il/217625[9] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1814646439231758493[10] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1814646439231758493 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1814646783080845367[11] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814568227780825168[12] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814568227780825168[13] https://t.me/darebmojahden/4986 ; https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/cd1q2vpng0zo[14] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814617418515292222[15] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814617421073760400[16] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814617423661666525[17] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814568224685527251[18] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2721 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/271902[19] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2721 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/271902[20] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2722 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18351[21] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4360[22] https://t.me/sarayaps/18352[23] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-811088 ; https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/2024-07-20/ty-article-live/palestinian-reports-20-year-old-man-seriously-wounded-from-idf-fire-in-west-bank/00000190-cdf6-dcff-afd4-cffecf350000?liveBlogItemId=91620651&utm_source=site&utm_medium=button&utm_campaign=live_blog_item#91620651 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6862 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6863 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/271981 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2719 ; https://t.me/QudsN/437735[24] https://t.me/mmirleb/5570 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5578 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5579 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1814658704752423090; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1814656390931132696 ; https://t.me/QudsN/437905 ; https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/2024-07-20/ty-article-live/palestinian-reports-20-year-old-man-seriously-wounded-from-idf-fire-in-west-bank/00000190-cdf6-dcff-afd4-cffecf350000?liveBlogItemId=322568523&utm_source=site&utm_medium=button&utm_campaign=live_blog_item#322568523 ; https://t.me/QudsN/437914 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5581 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814554958630429158 ; [25] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1814691804568023124[26] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1226[27] https://t.me/moriahdoron/11948

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 26, 2024

 

at 7/26/24 8:57pm

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans,Davit Gasparyan, and George BarrosJuly 26, 2024, 6:45pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:10pm ET on July 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces transferred the Central Grouping of Forces from the Kreminna area to the Avdiivka direction ahead of the Russian offensive operation to seize Avdiivka from October 2023 to February 2024 and proceeded to concentrate almost all Central Military District (CMD) elements deployed to Ukraine in the area during the offensive operation.[1] The Russian military command established the Central Grouping of Forces as an operational maneuver force along a narrow front in the Avdiivka area following the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 and tasked CMD elements with exploiting Russian tactical advances and pushing as far west as possible before Ukrainian forces established more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area.[2] The Russian Central Grouping of Forces made a notable tactical breakthrough northwest of Avdiivka in mid-April 2024 and achieved significant tactical gains in the area, largely due to Ukrainian materiel constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance.[3] Ukrainian forces have since stabilized the front in the area and slowed the rate of Russian advance, and the Russian Central Grouping of Forces is now advancing at a relatively similar pace as Russian forces elsewhere in Ukraine.Russian forces began an offensive operation towards Toretsk in mid-June 2024 and also tasked the Central Grouping of Forces with the effort, and the Central Grouping of Forces redeployed the majority of the CMD's 27th Motorized Rifle Division from the Avdiivka area to Niu York (south of Toretsk).[4] Responsibility for the Toretsk effort has roughly doubled the length of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR and has already drawn notable manpower away from the Avdiivka effort. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on July 26 that elements of the CMD's 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA]) conducted the Russian reinforced battalion-size mechanized assault southwest of Donetsk City on July 24, although ISW has yet to observe wider reports attributing the attack to the 90th Tank Division.[5] Elements of the Russian Eastern and Southern groupings of forces have previously conducted offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City, and the commitment of CMD elements to the area in one of the largest mechanized assaults since Fall 2023 is a notable inflection.[6] The Central Grouping of Forces previously used elements of the 90th Tank Division as an operational reserve and committed those elements to intensify the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka in March 2024, during which elements of the 90th Tank Division conducted the last observed battalion-size mechanized assault in Ukraine.[7] The reported commitment of elements of the 90th Tank Division to the area southwest of Donetsk City suggests that the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR may be expanding southward as well, although the exact contours of the grouping's responsibilities are unclear. The commitment of elements of the 90th Tank Division to the area would also indicate that the Central Grouping of Forces is willing to allocate considerable manpower and equipment to other tactical and operational objectives outside of its existing operational focus on pursuing tactically significant gains in the Avdiivka area.The expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR indicates that the Russian military command may assess that rapid tactical gains in the Avdiivka area are unlikely. Whether this possible assessment is based on waning Ukrainian materiel and manpower constraints or specifically based on an assessment of the Central Grouping of Forces' failure to achieve its assigned tasks is unclear. An AOR that stretches from southwest of Donetsk City to Toretsk will draw available Russian manpower and materiel away from the existing effort to make tactically significant advances northwest and west of Avdiivka. The Central Grouping of Forces likely lacks the reserves necessary to intensify operations in the Avdiivka area to the degree that would facilitate relatively rapid gains while maintaining offensive pressure in the Toretsk and Donetsk City directions. The Russian military command is currently attempting to maintain consistent offensive pressure throughout the front to prevent Ukraine from contesting the battlefield initiative, and tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with grinding offensive operations along a longer front is more in line with this effort than tasking the grouping with achieving tactically significant gains through relatively rapid maneuver.[8]Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS strike against Saky Airbase in occupied Crimea on the night of July 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against Saky Airbase in occupied Crimea on the night of July 25 to 26.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that it was clarifying the consequences of the strikes but that Russian air defense systems protecting the airbase failed to repel the strike. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 26 that unspecified sources stated that Ukrainian forces launched four ATACMS against occupied Crimea and that Russian forces shot down two of the missiles.[10] Astra reported that Ukrainian ATACMS struck an ammunition depot at Saky Airbase and destroyed a radar station at an air defense deployment site five kilometers from occupied Shelkovychne (northwest of Saky Airbase). A Crimea-based Telegram channel also reported that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot at the airbase.[11]The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov on corruption charges on July 26 – the latest in a concerted Kremlin effort to remove senior Russian defense officials since April 2024.[12] Russian state news agency RIA Novosti reported that a source in Russian law enforcement stated that Bulgakov used his position in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to lobby for the Gryazinsky Food Plant, which the source claimed won catering contracts with the MoD and supplied low-quality food at high prices to the Russian military.[13] Russian authorities arrested top managers of the Gryazinsky Food Plant for embezzling funds from MoD contracts in April 2024, and Kremlin newswire TASS stated on July 26 that Bulgakov's case materials indicate that Bulgakov is a suspect in the same case.[14] Bulgakov oversaw Russian military logistics as Deputy Defense Minister from 2008 to 2022, and the Kremlin awarded Bulgakov the Hero of Russia award in 2016.[15] The Russian MoD relieved Bulgakov of his post in September 2022 and stated that he had been transferred to another, unspecified position.[16] A Russian insider source claimed that Russian authorities have been investigating Bulgakov since 2022 and have previously summoned Bulgakov as a witness in an unspecified number of MoD corruption cases.[17] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there had been talk "in narrow circles" about investigations into Bulgakov since May 2024.[18] Another Russian insider source claimed that Bulgakov was not closely connected to former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.[19] Russian milbloggers celebrated Bulgakov's arrest, who they claimed was responsible for systemic logistics issues at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that are still affecting the Russian military today.[20]The European Union (EU) transferred the first tranche of proceeds from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. European Commission President Ursula von Der Leyen announced on July 26 that the EU transferred 1.5 billion euros (about $1.6 billion) from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as a part of its support for Ukraine’s defense capabilities and reconstruction.[21] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on July 26, claiming that Russia will not leave the European Commission's actions unanswered.[22]The Kremlin continues intensifying efforts to control Russians' internet activities and to create a culture of self-censorship within Russia. Russian authorities are increasingly signaling their intent to eventually block YouTube within Russia and will likely compel Russians to use social media platforms influenced or controlled by the Kremlin. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor accused YouTube of "numerous violations" of Russian legislation and "disrespect" for Russia and its citizens and warned that these acts are grounds for "taking action" against YouTube.[23] Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein stated that YouTube will load up to 40 percent slower in the coming days because Russian data centers cooperating with Google under unspecified "gray [area] schemes" intend to stop these schemes, a shift from Russian telecom giant Rostelecom's recent statement that slow YouTube load times within Russia are due to a lack of Russian servers hosting YouTube.[24] Russian internet authorities will likely throttle YouTube within Russia. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on July 26 citing a source within the Russian presidential administration that Russia aims to replace YouTube with Vkontakte's (VK) Video service and aims to download all Russian-language videos from YouTube to the VK service by Fall 2024.[25] VK is a Russian social media service currently headed by Vladimir Kiriyenko, the son of Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko. Sergei Kiriyenko oversees multiple information operations targeting Russia's domestic information space, Ukraine, and the West.[26]The Kremlin appears to be attempting to create a culture of compliance with the Kremlin's censorship requirements, including only using Kremlin-approved programs and self-censoring opposition or other content unfavorable to the Kremlin's aims. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved a list of Russian software programs that Russian technology manufacturers must pre-install on smartphones, tablets, computers, smart televisions, and similar devices.[27] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated in reference to Russian censorship laws against "discrediting" Russian civil servants and the military that legislation should apply to both "ordinary life" and the internet and that Russian legislation is "expanding" accordingly, which is odd because Russia has prosecuted or otherwise censored many information space voices based on text or footage published online.[28]Russian security forces reportedly detained several unknown actors threatening to blow up an apartment building in the Republic of Dagestan on July 25. Dagestan's security forces told Kremlin newswire TASS that security forces evacuated an apartment building in Kaspiysk and detained an unspecified number of people intending to detonate an improvised explosive device (IED) in the building.[29] Dagestan's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Spokesperson Gayana Gariyeva later announced that security forces completed their operation and that there is no remaining threat to the public.[30] The Russian government appears to be struggling with isolated terrorist activity following several significant terrorist attacks in recent months, including the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack and the June 2024 shootings in Dagestan.[31]Key Takeaways:The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.The expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR indicates that the Russian military command may assess that rapid tactical gains in the Avdiivka area are unlikely.Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS strike against Saky Airbase in occupied Crimea on the night of July 25 to 26.The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov on corruption charges on July 26 – the latest in a concerted Kremlin effort to remove senior Russian defense officials since April 2024.The European Union (EU) transferred the first tranche of proceeds from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine.The Kremlin continues intensifying efforts to control Russians' internet activities and to create a culture of self-censorship within Russia.Russian security forces reportedly detained several unknown actors threatening to blow up an apartment building in the Republic of Dagestan on July 25.Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Svatove, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported on July 22 that the Russian intelligence services appear to have further integrated Russian forces' cyber and conventional capabilities.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are operating in Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City and on the border with Belgorod Oblast). A Russian milblogger claimed on July 25 that Russian forces conducted a cross-border assault and entered Sotnytskyi Kozachok.[32] ISW has not observed recent visual evidence of Russian forces operating in Sotnytskyi Kozachok and continues to assess that Russian forces do not have an enduring presence in the settlement.[33] Another Russian milblogger amplified footage on July 26 purportedly showing four Russian glide bombs striking a Ukrainian military warehouse near Bilopillya, Sumy Oblast.[34] Fighting continued north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian source reiterated claims that Russian forces have completely seized Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) although ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming that Russian forces are operating in western Hlyboke.[35] Positional fighting continued near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on July 25 and 26.[36] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks north of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and near Hlyboke and Tykhe on July 25 and 26.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes near Lyptsi, Hlyboke, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on July 26.[38] Elements of the 11th Separate Guards Engineering Brigade's (Southern Military District [SMD]) "Pheonix" Special Mining Battalion are purportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove and reportedly made further advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 26. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Andriivka (west of Svatove).[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces northwest of Svatove advanced south of Berestove, north of Pishchane, towards Hlushkivka, and into central Stelmakhivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) broke through Ukrainian defenses near Stelmakhivka and are preparing to conduct mechanized assaults in the area.[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Svatove near Stepova Novoselivka, Tabaivka, Pishchane; and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, and Ploshchanka; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on July 25 and 26.[43]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations near Siversk on July 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Ivano-Darivka, and south of Siversk near Mykolaivka on July 25 and 26.[44] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating on the outskirts of Pereizne (south of Siversk), drone operators of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Ivano-Darivka, and elements of the "Sumrak" Battalion are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[45]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, northwest of Chasiv Yar near Mayske, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and near Chasiv Yar itself on July 25 and 26.[46] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near unspecified areas of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently crossed the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal near Kalynivka but that it is unknown if Russian forces consolidated these positions.[48]Russian forces reportedly advanced near Toretsk on July 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 200 meters within Niu York (south of Toretsk), up to 600 meters towards Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk), southwest of Yurivka (south of Toretsk), and within Pivnichne and Zalizne (both east of Toretsk).[49] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Toretsk near Pivnichne and Druzhba, southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne, and south of Toretsk near Niu York on July 25 and 26.[50]Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on July 26. Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows elements of the Russian 1453rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) raising a Russian flag in eastern Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka), indicating that Russian forces have most likely seized all of Yasnobrodivka.[51] Additional geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced near Prohres and Lozuvatske (both northwest of Avdiivka), indicating that Russian forces likely recently seized Lozuvatske.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.3 kilometers wide and 800 meters deep east of Lysychne (northwest of Avdiivka and west of Lozuvatske), up to 1.12 kilometers wide and 700 meters deep east of Vesele (northwest of Avdiivka and west of Prohres), and within Vovche (northwest of Avdiivka and south of Prohres) and Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka).[53] Russian forces also continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Tymofiivka, and Novozhelanne and west of Avdiivka near Karlivka on July 25 and 26.[54] Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Vovche.[55]Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on July 26. Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within northern Krasnohorivka and up to 700 meters in eastern Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[57] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on July 25 and 26.[58] Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Paraskoviivka, and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[59]Russian forces reportedly conducted another mechanized assault in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City) on July 25, following the reinforced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault on July 24 near Kostyantynivka that resulted in significant vehicle losses. The Ukrainian brigade that defended against the July 24 attack later stated that Russian forces conducted a reinforced company-size mechanized assault on July 25 with three tanks, 13 armored combat vehicles, 12 motorcycles, and roughly 200 personnel in the Kurakhove direction and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank and two armored combat vehicles.[60] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight and that constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time.[61]Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 26 near Velyka Novosilka and Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka), but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[62]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued near Robotyne; north of Robotyne near Novoandriivka; northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky and Yurkivka; and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on July 25 and 26.[63] Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 4th Military Base, (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its "Valkyria" drone detachment, are reportedly fighting near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[64] Positional fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky on July 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[65] Elements of the Russian 18th CAA (SMD) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[66]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a limited number of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 22 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and Kursk Oblast.[67] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 20 Shahed drones over Kherson, Sumy, Zhytomyr, and Chernihiv oblasts.[68] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported on July 26 that Russian forces struck Ukrenergo energy facilities in Zhytomyr and Chernihiv oblasts and damaged equipment.[69] Nizhyn Mayor Oleksandr Kodola stated that Russian forces also struck a hostel in Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast with a Shahed drone.[70] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on July 26 purporting to show Russian forces striking a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast with an Iskander-M ballistic missile, and Ukrainian Kramatorsk Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko reported that Russian forces struck industrial facilities within Kramatorsk.[71]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported on July 22 that the Russian intelligence services appear to have further integrated Russian forces' cyber and conventional capabilities. RUSI reported that Russian cyber units have begun prioritizing targeting Ukrainian mobile devices in frontline areas in order to disrupt tactical logistics and operations and have shifted away from targeting Ukrainian civilian targets.[72] RUSI reported that Russian cyber units are attempting to access Ukrainian military devices through malware disguised as official military applications or messages or by hacking encrypted messaging applications (EMAs) like Telegram, Signal, and WhatsApp by siphoning messages and other files from these applications. RUSI assessed that Russian intelligence services likely intend to sabotage Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the future but are currently focused on disrupting tactical-level Ukrainian capabilities.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be cooperating with Rosgvardia to expand and improve medical services available to Russian servicemembers within Russia. The Russian MoD claimed on July 26 that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov signed an agreement allowing military and Rosgvardia personnel to seek medical attention and undergo medical examinations for military medical commissions at both MoD and Rosgvardia medical facilities in Russia.[73] Belousov thanked Zolotov for helping to expand medical services for Russian personnel and claimed that this would improve medical treatment for personnel fighting in Ukraine. Russian deputy defense ministers Pavel Fradkov and Anna Tsivileva also visited a Southern Military District (SMD) military hospital on July 26 and noted that the Russian MoD is preparing to complete construction on the hospital in February 2025.[74] Fradkov emphasized that the Russian MoD views medical infrastructure as "extremely important." The Russian MoD may be concerned about its ability to provide adequate medical treatment to the increasing number of wounded personnel in and returning from Ukraine. Russian military officials, including Tsivileva, have recently tried to portray themselves as providing adequate medical care to Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine after outrage about the Russian military command reportedly sending injured soldiers to fight on the frontline.[75]The Russian MoD continues efforts to improve training capacity for servicemembers. Belousov inspected a training center in the Leningrad Military District (LMD) on July 26, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov reported that instructors who served in Ukraine are conducting all the training exercises at the training grounds of the LMD.[76] Belousov also discussed further improving training programs for Russian servicemembers and constructing additional training grounds in the LMD.Russian federal subjects continue to offer monetary incentives to entice Russians into military service. Rostov Oblast Head Vasily Golubev announced on July 26 that the Rostov Oblast government is increasing its one-time payment to Russian military recruits to 1.2 million rubles ($13,900) if recruits sign a military service contract between July 27 and August 31.[77] Golubev clarified that the Rostov Oblast government will pay the one-time bonus to Rostov Oblast residents and residents of other Russian federal subjects who travel to and sign military service contracts in Rostov Oblast. Other Russian oblasts have recently announced similar monetary incentives for contract military service.[78]Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on July 26 that some banks in the People's Republic of China (PRC) have begun to unofficially label Chinese yuan notes that have been used in transactions with Russian companies as "dirty."[79] A member of the General Council of Delovaya Rossiya, a Russian business association, told Vedomosti that many PRC banks are unwilling to accept yuan with "Russian traces" and that one PRC bank refused to accept yuan notes purchased on the Moscow Exchange. PRC banks previously expressed concern about interactions with Russian entities and entities with ties to the Russian defense industry following the US authorization of secondary sanctions against financial institutes that facilitate Russian sanctions evasion.[80]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian defense manufacturer "Laboratory 13" claimed on July 22 that it created the "Karman" miniature drone suppressor and is testing the portable anti-drone device among Russian forces in Ukraine.[81] "Laboratory 13" claimed that the device can operate autonomously by receiving signals from Laboratory 13's "Oko-P" drone detection devices.[82]Russian drone manufacturer MiS Design Bureau claimed on July 25 that it has started serial production of an analog of the Ukrainian remote mining and bombardier "Baba Yaga" drone.[83] MiS Design Bureau claimed that it will serially produce the MiS-35 strike and reconnaissance hexacopter drone and that the drone will have a maximum payload capacity of 4.5 kilograms and a maximum range of nine kilometers.[84]Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russian officials continue efforts to forcibly integrate occupied Ukraine into Russian structures through economic, infrastructure, and social programs. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on July 24 that Russia allocated more than 1.26 billion rubles (about $14.6 million) to socioeconomic programs in occupied Ukraine in 2023 involving 26 state-owned companies and 82 federal subjects with patronage over occupied areas.[85] Putin claimed that Russia built more than 19,000 new infrastructure objects, 200 medical sites, 1,300 educational institutions, and 8,000 kilometers of roads in 2023.Kremlin officials continue efforts to distance themselves from their roles in the forced deportation and Russification of Ukrainian children. Russian Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova met with Turkish Ambassador to Russia Tanju Bilgic on July 23 and claimed that they discussed reuniting Ukrainian children with their parents in Russia and Ukraine and that Bilgic agreed to maintain contact regarding this issue.[86] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated on July 25 that occupation officials sent an unspecified number of Ukrainian children from Luhansk Oblast to a tent camp in Novosibirsk Oblast.[87]Russian Information Operations and NarrativesNothing significant to report.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued their meeting on Valaam Island, Republic of Karelia on July 26.[88] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar06272024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024 ;[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2063[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01HtV1USdbU2dkJJDmSPiH9YzZFwFR7dT8PpJqYJr7GkmU7STUtVXrufL9EHsw44vl[10] https://t.me/astrapress/60447[11] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/64456[12] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/972628; https://ria dot ru/20240726/istochnik-1962196087.html ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052124; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cg3jx593p0xo[13] https://ria dot ru/20240726/istochnik-1962196087.html[14] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/20604725; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21459387[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/262646[16] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6862341[17] https://t.me/rusbrief/253305[18] https://t.me/rybar/62132[19] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/15638[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131309; https://t.me/milinfolive/126837 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/3465; https://t.me/treugolniklpr/47500 ;[21] https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1816761973574353200?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1816761973574353200%7Ctwgr%5E6cfd4c60441d2ac75720ed29309ae058d9477297%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsuspilne.media%2F799301-es-pererahue-ukraini-15-milarda-evro-vid-zamorozenih-aktiviv-rosii-evrokomisia%2F; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4029[22] https://t.me/tass_agency/262636[23] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21460069[24] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21459685; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21460069[25] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/5343[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-29-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023[27] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/news/2024/07/26/1052193-utverdil-spisok-programm[28] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21455877; https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/russia-journalist-sentenced-to-six-years-in-prison-for-telegram-post; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-bogdanova-vchk-ogpu-foeign-agent/33034773.html; https://www.nuj.org.uk/resource/russia-journalist-sentenced-to-six-years-in-prison-over-telegram-post.html; https://www.npr.org/2024/07/23/nx-s1-5049473/russian-american-journalist-convicted-in-secret-trial; https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-prosecutor-seeks-18-year-sentence-us-journalist-gershkovich-agencies-2024-07-19/; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-girkin-putin-critic-prison/32791526.html; https://meduza dot io/en/news/2023/08/31/blogger-andrey-kurshin-arrested-in-moscow-on-suspicion-of-spreading-fakes-about-russian-army[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/262527 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262530[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/262537[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13072[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/48174; https://t.me/control_sigma/32192[35] https://t.me/basurin_e/12942 ; https://t.me/ugra_ryadom/1941[36]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/372 ; https://t.me/rybar/62115 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48116 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13100 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57773 ;[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/21211 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73251 ; https://t.me/rybar/62115; https://t.me/dva_majors/48116[38]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/21223 ; https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27571.5/4894639/[40] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1816625278258676071; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1816625281664450859; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=488318913784598[41] https://t.me/motopatriot/25446 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25455 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18479 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25454 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13096 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278[42] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18479[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13096 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13101[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl[45] https://t.me/rusich_army/16054; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1816537932247003212; https://t.me/BattalionSIGIRIYA/26 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21218[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211; https://t.me/rusich_army/16051[47] https://t.me/project_nd/127 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131288; https://t.me/rusich_army/16051[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13074[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/48116; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18470; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27396; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27400; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18470; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73254; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278[51] https://x.com/DefMon3/status/1816622324021621043/history; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1816781858220196212; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73276; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6162;[52] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1816859176087273503; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=470081665665454;[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13081; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57778[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278; https://t.me/smotri_z/32831[55] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18468[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6166; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/791[57] https://t.me/motopatriot/25444; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13103[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73246[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73246; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12516[60] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12109 ; https://t.me/odshbr79/245[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0iAx15bVZRcToHfFNBFPen1bVDgZjvEig4TNyvzjio95eBFGreAmgkGQJSPqZV9HUl&id=61558717479769; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/26/na-pivdennomu-napryamku-zafiksuvaly-prolit-ponad-320-rozviduvalnyh-droniv-protyvnyka/[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131265[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid035QBZMFUYS9np91QF5aQ5TpYsa2xRkonNbf6wKEs614Rq6Gb5cYURWkSnfqvgFSSBl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10672; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0iAx15bVZRcToHfFNBFPen1bVDgZjvEig4TNyvzjio95eBFGreAmgkGQJSPqZV9HUl&id=61558717479769; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/26/na-pivdennomu-napryamku-zafiksuvaly-prolit-ponad-320-rozviduvalnyh-droniv-protyvnyka/[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13083[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/16957[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/16957[69] https://www.facebook.com/npcukrenergo/posts/pfbid034BdhVZZEYXxfL3ATTMwdFNuL783sGcu2eLrRDvuBVmViWS3kjoexj1sRLSkA3gyZl?ref=embed_post[70] https://suspilne dot media/799013-zelenskij-obicae-novi-dani-sodo-vbivstva-farion-u-nato-pidtverdili-padinna-v-rumunii-drona-rf-883-den-vijni-onlajn/[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/41409 ; https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko/posts/pfbid02PAFfS32zFK9HiV9gu4CAyWw9GqCDnTRAxrJwBTLhk8xyBg9enTYqsPu78iTkACbql[72] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-cyber-campaign-shifts-ukraines-frontlines[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/41413[74] https://t.me/mod_russia/41393[75] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2024[76] https://t.me/mod_russia/41405[77] https://t.me/golubev_vu/1460[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2024[79] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/finance/articles/2024/07/26/1052157-kitaiskie-banki-otkazivayutsya-prinimat-gryaznie-yuani-iz-rossii[80] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624[81] https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/07/22/v-rossii-sozdali-miniatyurnyy-podavitel-dronov-karman/ ; https://rg dot ru/2024/07/22/miniatiurnyj-podavitel-dronov-karman-sozdali-v-rossii.html ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/07/22/23509033.shtml[82] https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/07/22/v-rossii-sozdali-miniatyurnyy-podavitel-dronov-karman/ ; https://rg dot ru/2024/07/22/miniatiurnyj-podavitel-dronov-karman-sozdali-v-rossii.html ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/07/22/23509033.shtml[83] https://iz dot ru/1732631/2024-07-25/v-rossii-nachalos-seriinoe-proizvodstvo-geksakoptera-mis-35[84] https://iz dot ru/1732631/2024-07-25/v-rossii-nachalos-seriinoe-proizvodstvo-geksakoptera-mis-35[85] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74634[86] https://t.me/malvovabelova/3652[87] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/20285[88] https://t.me/tass_agency/262661; https://t.me/pul_1/13151 ; https://t.me/pul_1/13152

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, July 26, 2024

 

at 7/26/24 8:57pm

Siddhant Kishore, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Marcus Mildenberger, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. A new Iranian-backed Iraqi militia claimed two rocket attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria on July 25. The al Thawriyyun group took responsibility for attacking Ain al Asad Airbase in Iraq and the Conoco Mission Support Site in Syria.[1] US and Iraqi officials confirmed that the attack targeting Ain al Asad Airbase caused no damage.[2] CTP-ISW reported this rocket attack on July 25.[3] A BBC journalist said that unspecified officials confirmed that rockets targeted the Conoco Mission Support Site but did not reach the base.[4] CTP-ISW noted on July 17 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria.[5] The al Thawriyyun group asserted that it is connected to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has mounted attack campaigns against US forces and Israel since October 2023.[6] The militia created a Telegram channel on the day of the attacks to claim responsibility for them.[7] Al Thawriyyun said that their attacks on US forces would persist and become more advanced until US forces withdraw from Iraq.[8] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq paused its attack campaign in February 2024 but militias within the coalition recently threatened to resume their attacks against US forces.[9] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened on or before June 5 to attack US forces in Iraq if the Iraqi prime minister failed to set a date for US troop withdrawal within 40 days, and the militias’ coordinating body also threatened to resume attacks on June 19.[10] Former US President Donald Trump met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Florida on July 26.[11] They discussed ceasefire and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas.[12] Trump called for the immediate release of Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu said that Israel plans to send negotiators to Rome in the coming days. Netanyahu previously met with US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris separately in Washington, DC on July 25.[13]An anonymous Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force official told Kuwaiti media that Iran has delivered “electromagnetic bombs” to Lebanese Hezbollah.[14] It is unclear whether the report is accurate, but the claim is meant to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon. The Quds Force official told al Jarida that the munitions given to Hezbollah carry “explosive electromagnetic warheads” that could disable Israeli communication systems, electricity grids, and radars.[15] The Quds Force official also stated that Iran has tested “dozens” of such weapons through other members of the Axis of Resistance to create a database of weapons that could defeat Israeli air defenses.[16] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance are conducting an information operation through Western and international media to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon.[17] The IRGC has previously used al Jarida to message to external audiences, including about arms transfers to Hezbollah.[18]Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian gave an interview to the official website of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on July 25, in which Pezeshkian discussed regime responsibility in addressing cultural and economic issues.[19] Pezeshkian said that the regime is responsible for defining the national culture and that “we must start with ourselves” to fix cultural challenges. Pezeshkian also emphasized the need for the regime to rely on experts and technocrats to solve economic shortcomings. Pezeshkian also stressed the importance of relying on evidence and science to inform policy. The framing that Pezeshkian presented in his interview diverged notably from the attitudes that former President Ebrahim Raisi expressed in office. Raisi often used a less sympathetic tone in describing the cultural divide between the regime and its people. Raisi also populated his administration with deeply ideological hardliners who sometimes lacked the appropriate credentials for their offices. That Khamenei’s office published the interview with Pezeshkian indicates that Khamenei has endorsed the approach that Pezeshkian described.Pezeshkian also emphasized in the interview his subordination to and close alignment with Khamenei, highlighting Pezeshkian’s limited ability to make fundamental changes to regime policy without Khamenei’s backing.[20] Pezeshkian stated that he is working in close coordination and consultation with Khamenei in preparing his cabinet nominations for Parliament.[21] This statement is consistent with Pezeshkian’s repeated emphasis in recent months about his subordination to Khamenei.[22]Key Takeaways:Iraq: A new Iranian-backed Iraqi militia claimed two rocket attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria. CTP-ISW previously reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to have resumed their attacks targeting US forces.Israel: Former US President Donald Trump met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Florida. They discussed the ongoing ceasefire and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas.Lebanon: An anonymous IRGC Quds Force official claimed that Iran gave electromagnetic munitions to Lebanese Hezbollah. This claim is part of a larger effort by Iran and its Axis of Resistance to deter a major Israeli military offensive into Lebanon.Iran: Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian gave an interview to the official website of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Pezeshkian emphasized regime responsibility in addressing cultural and economic issues while reiterating his subordination to Khamenei.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Gaza Division has conducted clearing operations in Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip in recent days.[23] The IDF Netzah Yehuda Battalion destroyed Hamas anti-tank positions and rigged-to-detonate buildings in Beit Hanoun. The IDF Northern Brigade destroyed a Hamas tunnel that was over one kilometer long in Beit Lahiya. An Israeli Army Radio report said that the tunnel was several hundred meters from the Israel-Gaza Strip border near the Netiv HaAsara area.[24] The Northern Brigade destroyed weapons in the tunnel as well as materials that would have enabled Palestinian fighters to stay underground for long periods.[25]Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) attacked Israeli forces with explosively formed penetrators, rocket-propelled grenades, and sniper fire in Tal al Hawa, south of Gaza City, on July 26.[26] Palestinian sources reported on July 26 that Israeli forces re-entered Tal al Hawa after withdrawing on July 12.[27]PIJ mortared Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on July 26.[28]The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis on July 26. The IDF stated that the IDF 7th and Paratroopers brigades have killed about 100 fighters since the IDF launched a new clearing operation into Khan Younis on July 22.[29] The IDF Air Force struck Palestinian fighters who fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[30] Three Palestinian militias conducted mortar and small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[31]The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on July 26. The IDF Givati and 401st brigades killed several Palestinian fighters and located tunnels and long-range rockets in Tal al Sultan.[32] Israeli forces killed three Palestinian fighters in airstrikes.[33]The IDF Air Force struck over 45 Palestinian militia targets in the Gaza Strip between July 26 and 27.[34] Israel is pushing in the ceasefire and hostage negotiations for a vetting mechanism to facilitate the return of displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip.[35] Israel said that Palestinian civilians should be screened as they return to the north during any ceasefire, according to Western, Egyptian, and Palestinian sources speaking to Reuters. The Egyptian and Palestinian sources said that Hamas rejected this new Israeli demand but added that Hamas had not yet seen the latest Israeli proposal. The sources said that Hamas was expected to receive the latest proposal "in the coming hours."IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Herzi Halevi met with several IDF commanders in Khan Younis on July 25.[36] Halevi met with several commanders, including Southern Command Commander Major General Yaron Finkelman and 98th Division Commander Brigadier General Dan Goldfuss. Halevi discussed the July 24 operation to retrieve hostages’ remains from Khan Younis. Halevi said that “we are pressing to bring about an agreement for the release of abductees” and said that the IDF will not stop fighting Hamas until it destroys “the last battalion.”PIJ launched rockets from the northern Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon on July 26.[37] The IDF said that it intercepted one rocket and that the rest fell in open areas. Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on July 25.[38] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Askar al Jadeed refugee camp, Nablus.[39] PIJ’s Jenin Battalion also fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Jenin.[40] Palestinian fighters detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli forces in Jenin.[41]Israeli forces "mapped” the house belonging to a Palestinian fighter on July 25 in al Ram, near Jerusalem.[42] The Palestinian fighter who owns the house had carried out a complex attack that injured several Israeli soldiers in the Nir Zvi intersection, on July 14. The IDF separately issued a notice to destroy the house of another Palestinian fighter Mahmoud Salit living in Tulkarm for his involvement in an attack near the Einav settlement that killed an IDF officer in November 2023.[43] The IDF has previously destroyed houses of Palestinian fighters who have attacked Israeli forces and civilians in the West Bank. [44]Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces tried to arrest al Quds Brigades’ Tulkarm Battalion Commander Muhammad Jaber (Abu Shuja) in Thabet Thabet Hospital, Tulkarm, on July 26.[45] Hamas released a statement condemning the PA for arresting Jaber.[46] Hamas said that the PA’s attempt to arrest Jaber violates the recent Beijing agreement that calls for a “unified national position” embracing “resistance of all forms.” The PA located Jaber at Thabet Thabet Hospital as he received medical treatment for injuries sustained from a premature IED explosion in Nour Shams refugee camp, Tulkarm.[47] Jaber avoided PA custody after local Palestinians gathered in the hospital to prevent his arrest.[48]Senior Hamas leader Mustafa Abu Arra died in an Israeli prison on July 25. Hamas issued a statement condemning Abu Arra’s death and celebrated him as one of the most prominent Hamas members in the West Bank.[49] Hamas blamed Israeli prison authorities for the alleged medical negligence that led to Abu Arra’s death.[50] Hamas called on Palestinians across the West Bank to attack Israeli forces and civilians with “bullets and explosive devices“ to avenge Abu Arra’s alleged ”assassination”.[51] Palestinians demonstrated to condemn Abu Arra’s death in Tubas with Hamas’ organizational help.[52]This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Southern Lebanon and Golan HeightsAxis of Resistance objectives:Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into LebanonPrepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaLebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 25.[53] Lebanese Hezbollah launched one-way attack drones targeting Israeli forces near Shtula.[54]IDF Northern Command Commander Major General Ori Gordin visited the Golani Brigade’s combat team and spoke with the brigade commanders stationed in northern Israel.[55] Gordin said that the IDF is committed to changing the security situation in northern Israel and that all displaced residents will be able to return to their homes. Gordin said that Israel will launch a “decisive attack” when the time comes. Gordin further claimed that IDF has eliminated more than 500 Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon and destroyed “thousands” of Hezbollah sites. Gordin’s visit comes after IDF Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar discussed a potential Israeli offensive in Lebanon during a meeting with Air Force and Northern Command commanders at the Ramat David airbase on July 25.[56]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.Iran and the Axis of ResistanceIraqi Army Lieutenant General Hamed Mohammad Qamar led a military delegation to Iran’s Supreme National Defense University (SNDU) in Tehran on July 22.[57] Qamar claimed during his visit that senior Iraqi officers graduating from Iranian command and staff courses are more effective than officers taught through NATO military education systems.[58] Qamar discussed increasing Iranian-led training of Iraqi forces with SNDU President Brigadier General Esmail Ahadi Moghaddam.[59] Moghaddam stated that Iran and the SNDU are ready to offer national defense courses to all neighboring Muslim countries.[60] Moghaddam previously traveled to Baghdad, Iraq in December 2023 to discuss security and exchange information between the SDNU and Iraqi security forces with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[61] The United States sanctioned Moghaddam in 2011 for human rights abuses.[62]An Iran-focused Israeli social media account claimed on July 26 that Somaliland forces recently arrested two Houthi members in Somaliland near the Gulf of Aden.[63] The social media account reported that the two Houthi members were part of an IRGC Quds Force-linked smuggling network that moves weapons and people between Iran and Yemen. The report claimed that, based on the passports of the two individuals, the smuggling network is based in Hudaydah, Yemen. US intelligence previously claimed in June 2024 that the Houthis and al Shabaab have discussed a deal for the Houthis to provide weapons to al Shabaab.[64]US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed a Houthi drone launcher in Yemen on July 25.[65] CENTCOM determined that the drone launcher presented an imminent threat to US and coalition forces as well as merchant vessels in the area.Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted four combined airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Karaman island, Yemen, on July 26.[66]Reuters reported that China has been importing and refining Iranian crude oil since late 2023. A freight analytics suite Vortexa confirmed on July 26 that unidentified personnel discharged 23 Iranian oil cargoes, equivalent to 45 million barrels, at Dalian port in northeast China between October 2023 and June 2024.[67] Vortexa reported that Changxing Island, approximately 53 miles northwest of central Dalian, received approximately 28 million of the 45 million barrels of Iranian oil. Another data analytics firm, Kpler, estimated that Dalian port had transferred 34 million barrels of Iranian oil between October 2023 and June 2024.[68] China has continued to serve as Iran’s top oil consumer since 2019 Chinese customs have not officially recorded any Iranian oil imports since June 2022. The Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry informed Reuters that Beijing and Tehran “have always maintained normal and legitimate trade under the international legal framework.” Reuters reported, citing tanker tracking firms, that traders rebrand Iranian oil routed to China with a different origin location, such as Malaysia, Oman, or the United Arab Emirates. Reuters named Hengli Petrochemicals, Liaoning Port Group, and PetroChina as three Chinese companies connected to these Iranian oil shipments. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Petro China Pars Co., PetroChina’s subsidiary registered in Tehran, in 2013.[69] Bloomberg reported on June 7 that Iran had exported 1.54 million barrels of crude oil per day to China in May 2024, marking the highest level of Iranian exports to China since October 2023.[70] Bloomberg’s data, citing Kpler, confirmed that over half of these exports in May 2024 went to independent refiners in Qingdao city, eastern China, opposite Dalian city in the East China Sea. [1] SITE Intelligence Group, “Alleged Unit within IRI Claims Missile Strikes on U.S. Positions in Iraq and Syria,” July 26, 2024, available by subscription atwww.siteintelgroup.com.[2] https://www.foxnews.com/world/rockets-launched-us-forces-stationed-ain-al-asad-airbase-iraq ; https://www.voanews.com/a/rockets-launched-at-bases-hosting-us-troops-in-iraq-and-syria/7713780.html ; https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=198127[3] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate072524[4] https://x.com/nafisehkBBC/status/1816601733109588189[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2024[6] SITE Intelligence Group, “Alleged Unit within IRI Claims Missile Strikes on U.S. Positions in Iraq and Syria,” July 26, 2024, available by subscription atwww.siteintelgroup.com.[7] SITE Intelligence Group, “Alleged Unit within IRI Claims Missile Strikes on U.S. Positions in Iraq and Syria,” July 26, 2024, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.[8] SITE Intelligence Group, “Alleged Unit within IRI Claims Missile Strikes on U.S. Positions in Iraq and Syria,” July 26, 2024, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.[9] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate032224[10] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-40-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86 ;https://t.me/centerkaf/4413[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/26/us/politics/trump-netanyahu.html?smid=url-share[12] https://www.axios.com/2024/07/26/trump-netanyahu-meeting[13]https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/25/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-prime-minister-netanyahu-of-israel/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/25/readout-of-vice-president-harriss-meeting-with-prime-minister-netanyahu-of-israel/[14] https://www.aljarida dot com/article/69721[15] https://www.aljarida dot com/article/69721[16] https://www.aljarida dot com/article/69721[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-3-2024[18] https://aljarida (dot) com/article/39651 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-2-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-11-2023[19] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-dialog?id=57166[20] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-dialog?id=57166[21] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-dialog?id=57166 ; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407116805[22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-7-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-6-2024[23] https://www.idf dot il/218972[24] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12205[25] https://www.idf dot il/218972[26] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31450; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31451; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31452; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31453; https://t.me/sarayaps/18375; https://t.me/sarayaps/18377[27] https://t.me/hamza20300/274634 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/274572 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/274555 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/274558; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-12-2024[28] https://t.me/sarayaps/18370[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816720617749537270; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1816734329516577130[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816720706782023971[31] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6898; https://t.me/alwya2000/6526; https://t.me/sarayaps/18372; https://t.me/sarayaps/18378; https://t.me/sarayaps/18374[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816720713505493199[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816720710573658496[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816720716735078483; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1816734329516577130[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-seeks-changes-gaza-truce-plan-complicating-talks-sources-say-2024-07-25/[36] https://www.idf dot il/218979[37] https://t.me/sarayaps/18373 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12204; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816847372611178536[38] https://t.me/hamza20300/274500 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/274498 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/274489 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/274484 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/274482[39] https://t.me/hamza20300/274500[40] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1383[41] https://t.me/hamza20300/274490[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816840091240628397[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816840095174947173[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2024[45] https://x.com/hod_barel/status/1816805466409959687 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/529[46] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52628 ;[47] https://x.com/hod_barel/status/1816808835304087732[48] https://x.com/hod_barel/status/1816805466409959687 ; https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4681[49] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52619[50] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52622[51] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52625[52] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52622 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/274469[53] https://t.me/mmirleb/5683 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5684 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5686https://t.me/mmirleb/5687 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5691 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5693 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5696 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5697[54] https://t.me/mmirleb/5696[55] https://www.idf dot il/218928[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-25-2024[57] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/501445/Iraqi-military-official-visits-Iran[58] https://baghdadtoday dot news/254262-مسؤول-بالجيش-العراقي-ضباطنا-المتخرجون-من-الاركان-الايرانية-افضل-من-دورة-الناتو.html[59] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/501445/Iraqi-military-official-visits-Iranhttps://baghdadtoday dot news/254262-مسؤول-بالجيش-العراقي-ضباطنا-المتخرجون-من-الاركان-الايرانية-افضل-من-دورة-الناتو.html[60] https://sndu.ac dot ir/en/news/7057/visit-of-the-iraqi-army-deputy-chief-of-education-to-the-supreme-national-defense-university[61] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/501445/Iraqi-military-official-visits-Iranhttps://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2023[62] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sanctioned-person/moghadam-ismail-ahmadi[63] https://x.com/IntelliTimes/status/1816807609376112674[64] https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/11/politics/us-intelligence-houthis-al-shabaab/index.html[65] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1816567367226515619[66] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1816839104098685380[67] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-iranian-crude-imports-find-new-market-northeast-2024-07-26/[68] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-iranian-crude-imports-find-new-market-northeast-2024-07-26/[69] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=36024[70] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-7-2024; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-07/china-s-imports-of-iranian-oil-jump-in-may-on-better-margins?srnd=next-china

[Author: Unknown]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 19, 2024

 

at 7/26/24 12:51am

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey,Davit Gasparyan, and George BarrosJuly 19, 2024, 6:35pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on July 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated the importance of developing an international consensus for pursuing peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated during an interview with the BBC published on July 18 that the world needs to develop a united consensus on a possible end state for the war in Ukraine and present this consensus to Russia in order to encourage Russia to come to the negotiating table.[1] Zelensky added that diplomacy will be an important element of restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity and that Ukraine does not necessarily need to liberate all of its territory "by force" but must significantly weaken Russia's battlefield position in order to develop a stronger negotiating position for future peace negotiations. Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials have consistently presented their vision for a negotiated settlement for the war in Ukraine, which includes the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine's sovereignty and national security against future aggression.[2] Ukrainian officials have not articulated a willingness to concede territory to Russia in exchange for peace, and Zelensky's statements are consistent with this position.[3] Ukrainian officials continue to signal their willingness to participate in good faith peace negotiations with Russian representatives based on Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law, and Kremlin officials continue to frame such negotiations as outlandish and an "ultimatum" and call for a settlement tantamount to Ukrainian surrender.[4]Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban appears to be augmenting several Russian information operations amid continued efforts to present himself as a possible future mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Orban published a report on July 18 detailing his recent "peacekeeping mission" and visits to Ukraine, Russia, China, Turkey, and the United States.[5] Orban notably conceded that Russia, as a belligerent, is uninterested in a ceasefire or peace negotiations with Ukraine, an admission at odds with Kremlin officials’ efforts to pose Russia as amenable to peace negotiations. Kremlin officials have also undermined their efforts to sue for peace by repeatedly signaling an unwillingness to participate in negotiations based on anything less than complete Ukrainian capitulation.[6] Orban may have acknowledged Russia's resistance to negotiations in order to appear impartial as he tries to present himself as a possible mediator. Orban simultaneously attempted to place the onus for negotiations on Ukraine and questioned the longevity of US and European support for Ukraine, both of which are consistent with ongoing Russian information operations intended to discourage Western support for Ukraine and absolve Russia of responsibility for an invasion that Russia started.[7] Orban also called for the European Union (EU) to normalize diplomatic relations and reopen lines of communication with Russia. The Kremlin is attempting to use diplomatic meetings, including meetings with Hungary, to create the impression that Russia is normalizing relations with the West and claim that there is limited Western support for Russia, and Orban's recommendation would support this Kremlin effort and undermine several years of EU policy to address Russian war crimes and aggression towards Ukraine.[8] Orban stated on July 19 that his "peace mission" will continue despite recent criticism from EU leadership and efforts to demonstrate the EU's non-alignment with Orban's positions on Ukraine and peace negotiations.[9]New United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey stated on July 19 that Ukraine can use UK-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia, despite previous reports that the UK had not permitted Ukraine to use UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets within Russia. Healey told BBC on July 19 that the UK is providing weapons to Ukraine to defend their sovereign country and that "does not preclude [UK-provided weapons] hitting targets in Russia."[10] Healey also stated that Ukrainian forces can strike military targets in Russia with UK-provided weapons "within the parameters and the bounds of international humanitarian law." Healey stated that he would not publicly discuss whether the UK is allowing Ukrainian forces to strike Russian missile launch sites in Russia with UK-provided weapons, however. Healey noted that the UK is "continuing very intense discussions" with Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on July 10 that new UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that it is Ukraine's decision how to deploy Storm Shadows missiles for defensive purposes.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in a July 19 meeting with the UK government that Ukraine could defend against Russian offensive operations and secure its forward positions and cities from Russian airstrikes if Ukrainian forces can strike "further than just the border, particularly Russian military airfields."[12] Zelensky also asked the UK to show "leadership"' and convince other partners to remove limits on Ukraine using Western-provided weapons to strike legitimate military targets in Russia. The Telegraph reported on July 11 that unspecified sources in the UK government stated that the UK's policy "had not changed," however, and that the UK had not permitted Ukraine to use UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets within Russia.[13] The exact contours of the UK's policy regarding Ukraine's use of Storm Shadow cruise missiles and other UK-provided weapons remain unclear.The Kremlin is reportedly concerned about the long-term social and political implications of Russian veterans returning from the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on July 19 that a source within the Kremlin and two sources who attended a July 2024 meeting stated that First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko stated during the meeting with Russian officials that Russian war veterans "adapt poorly" to civilian life after returning from Ukraine and that many convict recruits commit violent crimes after returning home.[14] One source who attended the meeting told Meduza that Kiriyenko made it clear that there will be "quite a lot" of veterans returning from the war in Ukraine and that increased crime committed by veterans could cause discontent, fear, or aggression towards veterans among Russian citizens.Kiriyenko reportedly emphasized that the return of veterans from Ukraine will be very different than the period following the Soviet-Afghan war or the Second World War because the Soviet Union suffered fewer personnel losses in Afghanistan and because Soviet society was more widely mobilized and affected by the Second World War than the war in Ukraine. A source told Meduza that Kiriyenko characterized modern Russian society as only seeing the war in Ukraine "on TV" and being unprepared to "understand and accept" veterans. Meduza's source stated that Russian officials are expressing concern that returning veterans will form criminal gangs if they become disillusioned after returning from the frontline, but Meduza's source noted that Kiriyenko did not propose any specific solutions to address these issues. Kiriyenko claimed that the Kremlin's new "Time of Heroes" program could provide a "buffer" between civilians and returning servicemen, but Meduza noted that this program only accepts roughly 100 officers per term and cannot support Russia's wider veteran population.Meduza's sources suggested that Kremlin officials do not yet fully understand the scale of the risk that returning veterans could pose to Russia's internal stability, which supports ISW's ongoing assessment that the Kremlin likely gave little consideration to the long-term social consequences of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine prior to February 2022.[15] The Kremlin already appears to be struggling to quell ongoing interethnic and interreligious conflict in Russia, and the June 2023 Wagner Group armed rebellion highlighted how discontent simmering among Russian military personnel can quickly become an immediate threat to regime stability.[16]The Russian government is reportedly considering stricter measures to directly censor critical voices on Russian social media. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on July 19 that an unspecified source stated that Russian lawmakers are discussing legislation that would force social media account owners with at least 10,000 subscribers to transfer personal identification data to Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor and that would block the channel for noncompliance.[17] Roskomnadzor stated on July 11 that it may require social media account owners with a daily audience of over 1,000 people to provide identifying information and would prohibit Russian companies from advertising on pages whose owners do not provide such information.[18]ISW previously assessed that Roskomnadzor's proposal was part of wider Kremlin efforts to root out critical voices and consolidate control over the Russian information space. Roskomnadzor may have decided that the previous measures that aimed to push critical voices to self-deter out of fear of losing income from advertisements would not have guaranteed the Russian government's ability to directly control the information space as channel administrators that do not rely on income from advertisements would have been able to continue to operate anonymously. The reported new proposals, however, will allow the Russian government to directly censor all larger critical channels that remain anonymous. Roskomnadzor's proposals may be affecting the decision-making of Telegram's administrators. Telegram founder Pavel Durov stated on July 19 that Telegram would begin displaying the month and country in which a channel registered but noted that this was part of efforts to combat scammers on the application.[19] Durov's announcement, however, is notable as he has regularly advertised Telegram as a privacy-oriented, independent, and censored platform since its founding in 2013.[20]Russian authorities continue to propose stricter migration legislation as Russia's ultranationalists continue to espouse xenophobic rhetoric and complain about the Russian government's perceived lenient migration policy. The Russian Investigative Committee stated on July 19 that it sent proposals to the Russian State Duma to more strictly regulate migrants in Russia and the methods for depriving naturalized citizens of their Russian citizenship.[21] The Investigative Committee called for Russian authorities to deprive naturalized citizens of their citizenship if they prepare, attempt, or commission any crimes classified as grave or especially grave. The Investigative Committee also called for increased measures to control foreigners in Russia, including biometric procedures, genomic registration, and fingerprinting, and called for newly naturalized Russian citizens to register for military service at the same time as they receive their Russian passports.Russian State Duma deputy Mikhail Matveyev posted footage on July 18 allegedly showing him intervening in a fight between migrants in Samara and getting hit.[22] Russian authorities charged a citizen of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and a resident of Samara on July 19 for attempting to murder Matveyev.[23] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the incident on July 19, complaining about the government's insufficient actions to respond to migrant crimes and inadequate restrictions on the distribution of Russian passports to migrants.[24] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed on July 19 that it prevented a terrorist attack in Essentuki, Stavropol Krai, and that Russian authorities arrested a citizen of Tajikistan for preparing the attack.[25] Russian ultranationalists responded to the alleged attack by calling for the Russian government, and specifically Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, to greatly restrict entry points into Russia for Central Asian migrants and claimed that Russia does not need migrant workers to supplement its workforce.[26] Bastrykin has notably recently positioned himself as a prominent figure in Russia's ultranationalist community and specifically appeals to ultranationalist animus to migrants.[27]ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is struggling to reconcile its inconsistent policies that attempt to appease Russian ultranationalists' anti-migration position while leveraging migrants to address domestic labor shortages and the Russian military's force generation needs.[28]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated the importance of developing an international consensus for pursuing peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban appears to be augmenting several Russian information operations amid continued efforts to present himself as a possible future mediator between Russia and Ukraine.New United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey stated on July 19 that Ukraine can use UK-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia, despite previous reports that the UK had not permitted Ukraine to use UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets within Russia.The Kremlin is reportedly concerned about the long-term social and political implications of Russian veterans returning from the war in Ukraine.The Russian government is reportedly considering stricter measures to directly censor critical voices on Russian social media.Russian authorities continue to propose stricter migration legislation as Russia's ultranationalists continue to espouse xenophobic rhetoric and complain about the Russian government's perceived lenient migration policy.Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Avdiivka.Disorganization continues to plague Russian efforts to integrate personnel who served in Russian proxy forces in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military bureaucracy.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 18 and 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[29] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Baltic Fleet) are regrouping near Hlyboke and that the Russian military command is preparing to deploy assault groups of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) into combat near Vovchansk.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems are successfully defending against Ukrainian drones in the Kharkiv direction.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya, Vovchansk, Tykhe, and Vovchanskyi-Khutory.[32]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Nevske (northwest of Kreminna), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[33] Fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Berestove, Stelmakhivka, Pishchane, and in the direction of Novoosynove; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, and Terny; west of Kreminna near Torske; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on July 18 and 19.[34] Elements of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kupyansk direction.[35]Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATAMCS missile strike against Luhansk City on July 19. Kremlin newswire TASS and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched three ATACMS missiles against Luhansk City.[36] Geolocated footage published on July 19 shows the remains of a likely ATACMS missile near the former Luhansk Higher Military Aviation School.[37] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor and Russian opposition outlet Astra amplified footage purportedly of a smoke plume in Luhansk City near the Aviation School.[38]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on July 19. Geolocated footage published on July 17 shows elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) raising a Russian flag in Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk) and indicates that Russian forces have seized the settlement as well as Spirne (east of Ivano-Darivka).[39] Russian forces did not make these advances in the previous 24 hours, and it is likely that Russian forces had previously advanced from Spirne towards Ivano-Darivka instead of making rapid tactical gains in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are roughly eight to nine kilometers from Siversk, which is consistent with recently assessed Russian advances in the Ivano-Darivka area.[40] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on July 19.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces south of Siversk destroyed a bridge between Pereizne and Fedorivka (south of Siversk) to slow Russian advances.[42] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[43]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) crossed the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal near Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), although ISW has not seen confirmation of this claim or claims about Russian forces holding specific positions on the western side of the canal in the area.[44] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Novomarkove, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on July 18 and 19.[45] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and the Russian Volunteer Corps reportedly continue to operate near Kalynivka.[46]Russian forces recently advanced east of Toretsk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on July 19. Geolocated footage published on July 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced westward along Petra Velykoho Street in eastern Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[47] Geolocated footage published on July 19 indicates that Russian forces also recently advanced within southern Pivnichne (east of Toretsk).[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 19 that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Yurivka (south of Toretsk).[49] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 19 that Russian forces advanced within central and northeastern Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and within southwestern Niu York (south of Toretsk).[50] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk, Pivnichne, Zalizne, and Niu York on July 19.[51]Russian forces recently advanced northwest and west of Avdiivka and continued offensive operations in the area on July 19. Geolocated footage published on July 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into Prohres (northwest of Avdiivka) and seized the entire settlement.[52] Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along windbreaks immediately southeast of Karlivka (west of Avdiivka).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and southeast of Lozuvatske (northwest of Avdiivka) and west of Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced up to 1.22 kilometers wide and 400 meters deep within Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka).[55] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Avdiivka near Kalynove; northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Prohres, Yevhenivka, and Novoselivka Persha; and west of Avdiivka near Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, and Karlivka on July 18 and 19.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk Peoples Republic [DNR] AC) were responsible for the seizure of Prohres.[57] Elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Yevhenivka, and elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka area.[58]Russian forces reportedly recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area on July 19. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west and northwest of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City) towards Vodyane (southwest of Donetsk City) and the O-0532 highway and seized a forest area north of Mykilske (southwest of Donetsk City).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are also advancing within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and that Russian forces currently control 90 percent of the settlement.[60] ISW currently assesses that Russian forces control roughly 37 percent of Krasnohorivka, although Russian sources are likely referring to a smaller section of the settlement and not its administrative boundaries. Russian forces also continued assaults southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka and Paraskoviivka on July 18 and 19.[61] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City).[62]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on July 18 that Russian forces advanced northeast and northwest of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novoselika), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[63] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD), and 5th Tank Brigade (26th CAA, EMD) with the recent Russian seizure of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[64]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements occurred near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka (both northwest of Robotyne), and Robotyne on July 18 and 19.[65] Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi stated that Russian infantry conducted assaults on motorcycles near Mala Tokmachka.[66] Elements of the Russian "Valkiriya" Special Detachment (4th Military Base, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[67]Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on July 18 and July 19.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Krynky.[69] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces do not have sufficient personnel in the Kherson direction to conduct tactical frontline rotations and that Russian forces fighting on the east bank and on islands in the Dnipro River Delta are fatigued. [70]Russian forces reportedly repelled a Ukrainian drone strike targeting occupied Crimea. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 19 that Russian forces destroyed five drones over the Black Sea and occupied Crimea.[71] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian tourists are traveling on the Kerch Strait Bridge as Russian forces simultaneously use the bridge for military logistics purposes.[72]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted limited missile strikes against Ukraine on July 18 and 19. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down an Iskander ballistic missile that Russian forces launched from occupied Crimea targeting Odesa Oblast on July 18.[73] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 19 that Russian forces conducted two Iskander-M ballistic missile strikes against Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast.[74]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated on July 19 that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Su-25 aircraft in the Pokrovsk (Avdiivka) direction.[75]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Disorganization continues to plague Russian efforts to integrate personnel who served in Russian proxy forces in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military bureaucracy. A former Storm-Z military instructor and Russian milblogger amplified claims on July 18 that Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republic (LNR/DNR) authorities have opened criminal cases against many Russian citizens who joined their proxy forces for "abandoning their units."[76] The milblogger claimed that LNR/DNR authorities likely did not properly register military units and their personnel with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after the Russian military formalized LNR/DNR units and that Russian authorities listed some volunteers serving in these units as mobilized personnel and contract servicemen (kontraktniki). The milblogger claimed that many volunteers in LNR and DNR units did not know that LNR and DNR authorities opened criminal cases against them until they went on leave.Russian milbloggers claimed on July 19 that the Russian Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology (Rosstandart), which operates under the Ministry of Industry and Trade, has failed to standardize defense production. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the Russian defense industry relies on various regulatory acts and requirements to produce quality defense products and should be prioritizing adapting the standards of defense production to fit the military's current needs.[77] The milblogger claimed that Russia has an "unsystematic" and "chaotic" process for implementing regulations in the defense industry, which the milblogger criticized as not properly supporting the "de facto mobilization of the [Russian] economy." The milblogger also criticized former Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov for failing to oversee Rosstandart's efforts to develop standardization measures and regulation of technological and military products.[78] Russian milbloggers previously complained about the inconsistent amounts of gunpowder in Russian artillery shells, which may be a result of insufficient production standardization practices.[79]Russian authorities continue to create Cossack organizations in occupied Ukraine, likely in order to build out Russian military reserves and paramilitary policing services from the populations in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov stated on July 18 that Zaporizhia Oblast occupation authorities announced the creation of "farm and urban Cossack societies" that will be responsible for "maintaining law and order."[80] Ukrainian sources stated on July 8 that Russian occupation officials in occupied Kherson Oblast approved a plan to develop a "Cossack" cooperative that includes all male inhabitants of occupied Kherson Oblast.[81] Russian President Vladimir Putin notably signed a law in March 2024 authorized members of the All-Russian Cossack Society who are in the Russian military and security services reserves to join the mobilization reserve, and Putin transferred control of the Cossack Cadet Corps to the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in June 2024.[82] ISW continues to assess that Cossack organizations in occupied Ukraine will also fall under the control of the MoD.[83]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian drone producer Stratim Design Bureau claimed on July 19 that its "Ivolga" drone with artificial intelligence (AI) that runs on a domestic microprocessor chip successfully passed flight tests.[84] Stratim Design Bureau claimed that the microprocessor allows the drone to use a neural network without having to use a ground station.Russian forces continue to jerry-rig armored vehicles with anti-drone protection systems. Russian and Ukrainian sources posted footage reportedly of a Russian armored vehicle covered with metal spikes to protect against drone strikes.[85]Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)The Russian government continues efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian economy and to populate occupied areas with Russian citizens. Head of the Russian Federal Agency for Sea and Inland Water Transport (Rosmorrechflot) Andrei Tarasenko claimed on July 17 that ports in occupied eastern and southern Ukraine are fully integrated into the Russian transport system and that Russian authorities are building cargo-handling infrastructure.[86] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated on July 18 that Russian authorities have allocated up to one billion rubles (about $11 million) in order to increase one-time payments to medical workers who come to occupied Ukraine from Russia.[87] Mishustin stated that Russian doctors will receive up to two million rubles (about $22,800) and Russian paramedics, nurses, and other mid-level medical specialists will receive up to one million rubles (about $11,400).Russian authorities continue to illegally deport Ukrainian children to Russia and forcibly relocate Ukrainian children deeper into occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor stated on July 18 that Russian occupation authorities sent 91 Ukrainian children from occupied Luhansk Oblast to a children's camp in Volgograd Oblast where they will attend military training classes.[88] The Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) People's Militia claimed on July 19 that occupation authorities, with support from the Tatarstan Republic, deported 99 Ukrainian schoolchildren from occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts to a children's camp in occupied Crimea in July 2024 and previously deported 269 Ukrainian children to the camp in Summer 2024.[89] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on July 18 that Ukrainian authorities have returned 758 out of roughly 20,000 Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities illegally deported and abducted since 2014.[90] Lubinets stated on July 19 that Ukrainian authorities returned 12 Ukrainian children and their families from occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Ukrainian-controlled territory, and Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated on July 19 that Ukrainian authorities returned four families, including four children, from occupied Kherson Oblast to Ukrainian-controlled territory.[91] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration stated on July 17 that it returned two Ukrainian children from occupied Luhansk and Zaporizhia oblasts to Ukrainian-controlled territory.[92]Russian authorities continue efforts to destroy Ukrainian history and identity. Russian occupation authorities reportedly tore down monuments to "Victims of Stalin's Repressions" and "Victims of Holodomor" (Stalin’s man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine in the early 1930s as a result of Soviet agricultural collectivization) in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[93]Russian Information Operations and NarrativesThe Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported on July 19 that Russian Telegram channels are falsely claiming that Ukrainian border guards are mining Ukraine's border with Moldova in order to create domestic discontent in Ukraine towards Ukrainian officials and the Ukrainian military.[94] A Russian milblogger amplified footage attempting to feed into this narrative on July 18.[95]The Russian and Belarusian ministries of foreign affairs (MFA) published a joint report on July 19 about alleged human rights violations in Spain in an attempt to deflect international attention from the Kremlin's ongoing human rights violations and invasion of Ukraine. The Russian and Belarusian MFAs claimed that the Spanish government is violating the rights of migrants and Spanish citizens and is "Russophobic."[96] The Russian and Belarusian MFAs recently accused Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, and Australia of similar human rights violations and "Russophobia."[97]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on July 19 that Belarusian and Kazakh forces concluded the bilateral "Summit of Brotherhood 2024" tactical exercise at the Koktal Training Ground in Zhetysu Region, Kazakhstan.[98] Belarusian Chief of Staff and Spetsnaz First Deputy Commander Colonel Alexander Ilyukevich and Kazakh Airborne Assault Forces Commander Major General Almaz Dzhumakeev observed the exercise. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cxe25prezgzo ; https://unn dot ua/en/news/zelensky-we-can-try-to-end-the-hot-stage-of-the-war-by-the-end-of-the-year ; https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c4ng93y6eyjo[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030924 ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/19/53/32af8d644e6cae41791548fc82ae2d8e_1691483767.pdf[3] https://www.president dot gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/19/53/32af8d644e6cae41791548fc82ae2d8e_1691483767.pdf[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124[5] https://miniszterelnok dot hu/orban-viktor-magyarorszag-miniszterelnoke-jelentese-az-europai-tanacs-elnokenek/[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224[9] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-19/orban-vows-to-continue-ukraine-peace-mission-after-criticism ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524[10] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2024/07/19/defence-secretary-suggests-ukraine-can-use-storm-shadow-mis/ ; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/article/2024/jul/19/uk-will-not-help-ukraine-hit-targets-in-russia-defence-secretary-says ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm52jvn41l7o[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2024 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-10/starmer-says-ukraine-can-use-uk-missiles-to-strike-inside-russia[12] https://www.president.gov.ua/news/nam-potriben-cej-krok-krok-yakij-zmusit-rosiyu-shukati-miru-92297[13] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/07/11/starmer-ukraine-british-storm-shadow-missiles-russia/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2024[14] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/07/19/v-kremle-schitayut-chto-uchastniki-voyny-ploho-adaptiruyutsya-k-mirnoy-zhizni-posle-vozvrascheniya-s-fronta-chinovniki-nazyvayut-ih-novymi-afgantsami-i-boyatsya-rosta-prestupnosti[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071624[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062423[17] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21399921[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124[19] https://t.me/durov/336[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2024[21] https://sledcom dot ru/news/item/1900860/?type=main[22] https://t.me/matveevkomment/8028; https://t.me/matveevkomment/8030[23] https://t.me/sledcom_press/14672[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/47575; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16564[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/261568; https://t.me/tass_agency/261467 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/261472[26] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/18064 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47922 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16570; https://t.me/inners_of_the_politics/7 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47632[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121123; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FaMQ3o73ekLqWEFxM1C93pdv54xP4k5NJuGeH36sPfs4o1cPAHyztbAPpVHWu1gyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0njzrEMUg2NkEvXd89buZWjL8iFBudVn9vGB4j3S73UWL9Tcrt3KdP1MLumdB15EDl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21095 ; https://t.me/rybar/61902[30] https://t.me/otukharkiv/295[31] https://t.me/bayraktar1070/2427 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16560[32]https://t.me/rybar/61902 ; https://t.me/rybar/61906; https://t.me/dva_majors/47584[33] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27322[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FaMQ3o73ekLqWEFxM1C93pdv54xP4k5NJuGeH36sPfs4o1cPAHyztbAPpVHWu1gyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0njzrEMUg2NkEvXd89buZWjL8iFBudVn9vGB4j3S73UWL9Tcrt3KdP1MLumdB15EDl ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18398 ; https://t.me/rybar/61906; https://t.me/dva_majors/47584 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/18187[35] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/37943[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/261462 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/261469 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12857 ;[37] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1814190874663755799 ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9102[38] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/20176 ; https://t.me/astrapress/59965[39] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6105; https://t.me/BattalionSIGIRIYA/15 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1814079033434362200;[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12866[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl ;[42] https://t.me/motopatriot/25069; https://t.me/rusich_army/15900[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12854[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72750[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0njzrEMUg2NkEvXd89buZWjL8iFBudVn9vGB4j3S73UWL9Tcrt3KdP1MLumdB15EDl[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72750[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6111; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=782719370476211  [48] https://x.com/small10space/status/1814277747415400887; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1814295027390075246[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/41186[50] https://t.me/rybar/61914 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72774 ; https://t.me/rybar/61914 ;[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl[52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6109; https://t.me/voenkorkhayrullin/2940[53] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1814027271285383221; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1814027274104222060[54] https://t [dot] me/rybar/61902[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72767[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FaMQ3o73ekLqWEFxM1C93pdv54xP4k5NJuGeH36sPfs4o1cPAHyztbAPpVHWu1gyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0njzrEMUg2NkEvXd89buZWjL8iFBudVn9vGB4j3S73UWL9Tcrt3KdP1MLumdB15EDl ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18410 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12841 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21095 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72787[57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72787 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27341 ;[58] https://t.me/milinfolive/126346[59] https://t.me/rybar/61902 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25028[60] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/25811 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47925 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47584 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21095[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FaMQ3o73ekLqWEFxM1C93pdv54xP4k5NJuGeH36sPfs4o1cPAHyztbAPpVHWu1gyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0njzrEMUg2NkEvXd89buZWjL8iFBudVn9vGB4j3S73UWL9Tcrt3KdP1MLumdB15EDl[62] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12483[63] https://t.me/rybar/61902[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/9824 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/23621 ; https://t.me/TOF_VMF/3497 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/9821 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/9819[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FaMQ3o73ekLqWEFxM1C93pdv54xP4k5NJuGeH36sPfs4o1cPAHyztbAPpVHWu1gyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0njzrEMUg2NkEvXd89buZWjL8iFBudVn9vGB4j3S73UWL9Tcrt3KdP1MLumdB15EDl[66] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/19/motoczykletna-ataka-rosiyan-zavershylasya-nevdacheyu-na-zaporizhzhi/[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72737[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FaMQ3o73ekLqWEFxM1C93pdv54xP4k5NJuGeH36sPfs4o1cPAHyztbAPpVHWu1gyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0njzrEMUg2NkEvXd89buZWjL8iFBudVn9vGB4j3S73UWL9Tcrt3KdP1MLumdB15EDl[69] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27340[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/47650[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/41173[72] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/kurortnyi-sezon-u-krymu-letyt-shkerebert-rosiiany-masovo-skasovuiut-tury.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/4123[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/19/dmytro-pletenchuk-rozpoviv-pro-znakovu-podiyu-na-odeshhyni-yaka-stalasya-vchora/; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10577[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0io6PsZZ4AKgPWk8LWPGNwBabbXfMoBm8UDALPg7EM9GzahnQuc21tM3j1nYqtLQXl  [75] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/743[76] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1137; https://t.me/adirect/21410[77] https://t.me/rybar/61910[78] https://t.me/rybar/61922 ; https://t.me/rybar/61913; https://t.me/dva_majors/47605[79] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2024[80] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/9543[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2024[82] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2024-03-24-PDF-Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024; https://ria dot ru/20240323/putin-1935354519.html[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2024[84] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21399747[85] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/1062; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1814243355548594630; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/11959[86] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21381981[87] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21395531[88] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/20135[89] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/15685[90] https://suspilne dot media/ternopil/793521-povernuli-z-rosii-758-ukrainskih-ditej-dmitro-lubiec-pid-cas-brifingu-v-ternopoli/[91] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/4056; https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/6201[92] https://minre dot gov.ua/2024/07/17/prodovzhuyemo-povertaty-ukrayinskyh-ditej-iz-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytorij/[93] https://t.me/astrapress/59889; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/27820[94] https://t.me/otukharkiv/297[95] https://t.me/notes_veterans/18188[96] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43352[97] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/1957839/#sel=518:1:x0f,618:24:gim ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024[98] https://t.me/modmilby/40532; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/259424

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, July 19, 2024

 

at 7/26/24 12:18am

Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. The Houthis launched a one-way attack drone into Tel Aviv for the first time on July 18, killing one individual and injuring at least another 10.[1] The Houthis appear to have flown the drone from Yemen to the Mediterranean Sea before turning it eastward into Tel Aviv.[2] The drone then struck an apartment building about 100 meters from a US consulate.[3] The Houthis have claimed responsibility for the attack and vowed to continue attacking deep into Israel.[4] The Houthis said that the attack used their new “Yafa” drone, which appears to be a modified variant of the Iranian-designed Samad-3 drone.[5] The Yafa drone carried around 10 kilograms of explosives, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[6]The Houthis have conducted reconnaissance in force against the Israeli air defense network in recent months, which may have enabled the attack into Tel Aviv. The US Army defines reconnaissance in force as “a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[7] The Houthis have conducted regular drone and missile attacks targeting Israel since October 2023 to this end.[8] These attacks could have provided the Houthis with the information needed to evade Israeli air defenses and strike targets in Tel Aviv. The almost daily Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel could be meant to similarly gather information on Israeli air defenses and vulnerabilities.The Houthi reconnaissance-in-force effort against Israeli air defenses reflects more broadly how Iran and its Axis of Resistance are learning from the Israel-Hamas war and accordingly developing new ways of fighting Israel. Senior Iranian military officials have discussed, for instance, how Hamas’ attack into Israel in October 2023 demonstrated how effective and valuable ground incursions into Israel could be.[9] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have similarly experimented throughout the war with how to disrupt the Israeli economy by attacking critical Israeli infrastructure and international shipping.[10]The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on July 19 that there are “increasing indications” that Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif, is dead.[11] The IDF targeted Deif and Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salameh on July 13 by dropping eight 2,000-pound precision munitions on their location in the southern Gaza Strip. The IDF confirmed on July 14 that the strike killed Salameh. The IDF statement on July 19 confirmed that Mohammad Deif was “sitting next to” Salamah at the time of the strike.[12] Hamas has denied that Deif is dead.[13] The IDF has in turn accused Hamas of trying to hide what happened to Deif.[14]US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on July 19 that Iran has reduced its nuclear breakout time to one to two weeks.[15] Senior US officials have previously estimated that the Iranian nuclear breakout time was between 12 days and several months. Blinken’s statement comes as Iran has in recent months expanded its nuclear program and run computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[16] Senior Iranian officials have threatened repeatedly in recent months to pursue a nuclear weapon.[17]The IDF conducted airstrikes into southern Lebanon on July 18, killing two officers from Lebanese Hezbollah’s Radwan unit.[18] The Radwan unit is Hezbollah’s elite commando force and is designed to conduct ground operations into Israel.[19] The IDF airstrike killed two operations officers in the Radwan unit—Ali Jafar Matouq and Mohammad Hassan Mustafa. Both officers were involved in Hezbollah attacks into northern Israel.[20] Matouq had reportedly replaced another Radwan officer, named Ali Ahmed Hussein, whom the IDF killed in April 2024.[21]Hezbollah launched around 65 rockets into northern Israel in retaliation for the IDF killing the two Radwan officers.[22] The IDF intercepted some of the rockets, while the rest fell in open areas. Hezbollah claimed that it attacked three Israeli towns—Abirim, Neve Ziv, and Manot—for the first time as part of its retaliation.[23] These attacks come after Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah threatened on July 17 to expand the geographic scope of attacks into northern Israel.[24]Key Takeaways:Yemen: The Houthis launched a one-way attack drone into Tel Aviv for the first time. The Houthis have conducted reconnaissance in force against Israeli air defenses in recent months, which may have enabled the attack.Gaza Strip: Israel announced that there are “increasing indications” that Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif, is dead. The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Deif in the southern Gaza Strip on July 13.Iran: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that Iran has reduced its nuclear breakout time to one to two weeks. His comments come as Iran has in recent months expanded its nuclear program and run computer simulations that could help build a nuclear weapon.Lebanon: The IDF conducted airstrikes into southern Lebanon, killing two officers from Lebanese Hezbollah’s Radwan unit. The Radwan unit is Hezbollah’s elite commando force and is designed to conduct ground attacks into Israel.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF Air Force killed two high-value Palestinian militia commanders in the Gaza Strip on July 18. The IDF struck and killed Hamas Gaza City Brigade’s intelligence chief, Adil Hamdiya, at UN-affiliated al Falah school in Zaytoun, southern Gaza City.[25] The IDF said that al Falah school served as the Hamas Gaza City Brigade headquarters.[26] Hamdiya had worked as the brigade's intelligence chief since 2019 and was responsible for gathering and disseminating intelligence to Hamas commanders.[27] Hamdiya collected intelligence on Israel to plan for the October 7th attack and assisted Hamas’ targeting of Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip throughout the war.[28]The IDF Air Force also struck and killed the Nasser Salah al Din Brigades Central Governorate Brigade commander, Iyad Abdul Rahim Abu Hasna, in Bureij.[29] The Nasser Salah al Din Brigades is the military wing of the Popular Resistance Committees, a group fighting with Hamas in the war.[30] The IDF did not confirm that it killed Abu Hasna. The absence of IDF confirmation is not particularly surprising, however, given that the IDF infrequently publicizes its strikes against smaller militias. The IDF, in contrast, more regularly announces its activities related to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).The IDF 143rd Division interdicted a Palestinian individual trying to infiltrate into Israel from the southern Gaza Strip on July 18.[31] Israeli reconnaissance forces identified an individual approaching the second layer of the border fence separating the Gaza Strip from Israel after the individual breached the first “old fence.”[32] The individual did not cross into Israeli territory.[33] Israeli forces responded to the site and conducted an airstrike killing the individual.[34] It remains unclear whether the individual was armed or attempted to conduct an attack. Israeli forces have worked to create an additional buffer zone between inhabited areas of the Gaza Strip and Israeli territory since beginning ground operations in the Gaza Strip in late October 2023.[35] Israeli forces have continued to demolish militia infrastructure along the Gaza Strip-Israel border, including in the northern Gaza Strip on July 18.[36]Palestinian militias conducted at least six indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on July 19.[37]Israeli forces likely continued clearing operations in Rafah on July 19. The IDF did not publish information about its operations in Rafah, and Palestinian militias similarly did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces in Rafah. Local reports and video published by Israeli soldiers on social media indicate that Israeli forces continued to operate in Rafah along the Philadelphi Corridor, however.[38] The IDF has deployed combat engineers to demolish buildings within 800 meters of the Philadelphi Corridor.[39] An Israeli combat engineer published a video of him demolishing a school near the corridor in southern Rafah on July 19.[40]Two Palestinian militias conducted a single rocket attack targeting an IDF site in southern Israel on July 19.[41]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank on July 19.[42] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces in Nablus.[43]This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Southern Lebanon and Golan HeightsAxis of Resistance objectives:Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into LebanonPrepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaIranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 17 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 18.[44] The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese Resistance Brigades conducted two attacks targeting Israeli forces in northern Israel.[45]The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure, including weapons depots, in multiple locations in southern Lebanon on July 18 and 19.[46]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.Iran and Axis of ResistanceUS Department of Defense spokesperson Sabrina Singh confirmed on July 18 that an unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia conducted a drone attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on July 16.[47] Singh stated that US forces intercepted one drone while a second drone impacted the base, causing “minimal damage.” Singh added that US forces also intercepted a drone near the al Omar oil field in northeastern Syria on an unspecified date.[48] The July 16 attack marks the first Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack targeting US forces in Iraq or Syria since April 2024.[49] Singh noted that is unclear whether the July 16 attack was a one-off or marked the resumption of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ attack campaign against US forces in Iraq and Syria.[50] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously threatened around June 5 to resume attacking US forces if the Iraqi prime minister failed to set a date for the withdrawal of US troops within 40 days.[51] That 40-day period would have ended around July 15.The Houthis claimed a drone and missile attack targeting the Singaporean-flagged commercial vessel Lobivia in the Gulf of Aden on July 19.[52] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations received a report of an attack 83 nautical miles southeast of Aden, Yemen.[53]US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted preemptive strikes destroying two surface-to-air missiles and four drones in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on July 18.[54] Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian has finished assembling his transition team. The head of the transition team, Mohammad Javad Zarif, announced the members of the council overseeing the transition on July 19.[55] The council has 31 members, at least nine of whom served under former moderate President Hassan Rouhani.[56] Zarif himself was Rouhani’s foreign affairs minister. The council also includes individuals affiliated with prominent reformists Mohammad Khatami and Mir Hossein Mousavi.[57] The council includes three women and a representative for Kurdish and Sunni affairs.[58] Pezeshkian previously vowed that his cabinet would represent all genders, religions, and ethnicities.[59]Unidentified assailants shot and killed an Iranian police officer in a drive-by shooting in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on July 18.[60] Two other police officers were injured in the attack.[61] The attack comes amid an uptick in anti-regime militancy in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since December 2023.The Iranian Artesh Navy is conducting a military exercise with Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea between July 19 and 21.[62] Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Erani previously called for increasing combined exercises between the Artesh and Azerbaijani navies during a visit to Baku, Azerbaijan, in December 2023.[63]  [1] https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-tel-aviv-strike-daa70aa0f6a3248a00997a281c3731ab[2] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1814230903570178332 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/18/us-embassy-tel-aviv-explosion/   [3] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/explosive-drone-hits-tel-aviv-apartment-killing-man-and-wounding-several-others/?utm_source=article_hpsidebar&utm_medium=desktop_site&utm_campaign=liveblog-july-19-2024[4] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1814167726920704342[5] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814125141955420402 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814114989554159936 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1814217715709600255 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/explosive-drone-hits-tel-aviv-apartment-killing-man-and-wounding-several-others/?utm_source=article_hpsidebar&utm_medium=desktop_site&utm_campaign=liveblog-july-19-2024 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/18/us-embassy-tel-aviv-explosion/[6] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1814350682817798225[7] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/adrp/3-90/adrp3_90.pdf[8] https://t.me/moriahdoron/11967 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1814301168543183147[9] https://www.aei.org/articles/how-iran-plans-to-destroy-israel/[10] https://www.aei.org/articles/how-iran-plans-to-destroy-israel/[11] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1814219256491323759[12] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1814219256491323759[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-seeks-proof-of-whether-strike-killed-hamas-military-chief-0f33965d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2[14] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1814219256491323759[15] https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/19/politics/blinken-nuclear-weapon-breakout-time/index.html[16] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-18-2024[17] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-13-2024[18] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814045850240180471; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/commander-hezbollahs-radwan-forces-killed-israeli-strike-south-lebanon-two-2024-07-18/[19] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/15/who-are-radwan-force-hezbollah/[20] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814045850240180471[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/commander-hezbollahs-radwan-forces-killed-israeli-strike-south-lebanon-two-2024-07-18/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-8-2024[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814285100068081985[23] https://t.me/mmirleb/5557[24] https://alahednews dot com.lb/article.php?id=71976[25] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814308142978679110 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814006754587586758 ; https://twitter.com/SuppressedNws/status/1814295914267148459 ; https://twitter.com/QudsNen/status/1814221569733882052[26] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814308142978679110[27] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814308145855910348 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814308148699697305[28] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814308145855910348[29] https://t.me/alwya2000/6499 ; https://t.me/alwya2000/6500[30] https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/popular_resistance_committees/[31] https://t.me/moriahdoron/11927 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/11928 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814023662250676649[32] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814023662250676649 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/11928[33] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814023662250676649[34] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1814023662250676649[35] https://twitter.com/ytirawi/status/1777303693748019416 ;https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/security-aviation/2024-03-28/ty-article-magazine/.premium/buffer-zone-and-control-corridor-what-israeli-armys-entrenchment-in-gaza-looks-like/0000018e-8556-df92-a5ff-e77e0d6a0000[36] https://t.me/moriahdoron/11899 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/11900 ; https://x.com/tom_bike/status/1814001580284494128[37] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14383 ; https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14787 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2715 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4285 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4285 ; https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14788 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18350[38] https://t.me/hamza20300/271649 ; https://twitter.com/ytirawi/status/1814319182319612380 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/271645[39] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1813227004008779956[40] https://twitter.com/ytirawi/status/1814319182319612380[41] https://t.me/sarayaps/18349[42] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6860[43] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6860[44] https://t.me/mmirleb/5538; https://t.me/mmirleb/5545; https://t.me/mmirleb/5545; https://t.me/mmirleb/5547; https://t.me/mmirleb/5549; https://t.me/mmirleb/5551; https://t.me/mmirleb/5552; https://t.me/mmirleb/5553; https://t.me/mmirleb/5555; https://t.me/mmirleb/5557; https://t.me/mmirleb/5559; https://t.me/mmirleb/5560; https://t.me/mmirleb/5561; https://t.me/mmirleb/5562; https://t.me/mmirleb/5563; https://t.me/mmirleb/5564; https://t.me/mmirleb/5565[45] https://t.me/mmirleb/5545[46] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814285096683221309; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1814047627639669139; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814285096683221309[47] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3843602/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing/[48] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3843602/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing/[49] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3843602/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing/[50] https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/07/18/iranian-proxies-attack-us-base-in-iraq-for-the-first-time-in-months/[51] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-40-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86 ;https://t.me/centerkaf/4413[52] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1814291570461491246[53] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1814134989593714837[54] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1814051405285511186[55] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407182260[56] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/679327[57] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/679327[58] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/679327[59] https://iranwire.com/fa/features/131548-%DB%B1%DB%B0-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%DA%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF/[60] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/679321 ;https://www.iranintl.com/202407198449 ;https://x.com/Entekhab_News/status/1814204923220779010[61] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/04/29/3124237[62] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/679288[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-5-2023

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, July 24, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 11:30pm

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Kathryn Tyson, Siddhant Kishore, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 4:00pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint meeting of the US Congress on July 24.[1] Netanyahu described his vision for “a demilitarized and deradicalized” post-war Gaza Strip but did not offer details about how to achieve this vision.[2] Netanyahu further said that Israel would need to ”retain overriding security control” over the Gaza Strip for the ”foreseeable future” to prevent the resurgence of Hamas.[3] Netanyahu added that the Gaza Strip ”should have a civilian administration run by Palestinians.”[4] He did not directly comment on the ongoing ceasefire negotiations but said that the war would end “tomorrow“ if Hamas surrenders, disarms, and returns all the hostages.[5] He said that, if Hamas does not, Israel will fight until Hamas is destroyed militarily, its rule of the Gaza Strip is ended, and Israel frees all the hostages.[6] Netanyahu said that he prefers a diplomatic resolution that returns residents of northern Israel to their homes but that Israel “will do whatever it must do to restore security,” in reference to expectations that Israel may conduct a major military operation into southern Lebanon against Lebanese Hezbollah.[7] Netanyahu also proposed creating a new security alliance of regional Arab states that he termed the ”Abraham Alliance” to balance against Iran and the Axis of Resistance.[8] Netanyahu said that the US-assembled coalition that successfully defended Israel from the April 13 large-scale Iranian drone and missile attack shows the potential of such an alliance.[9]Egypt may agree to a long-term Israeli presence along the Egypt-Gaza Strip border, according to an anonymous Israeli official.[10] Egypt and Israel have not yet reached an agreement on control of the Philadelphi Corridor, however, which separates Egypt from the Gaza Strip. Cairo has vocally opposed in recent months any Israeli presence along the Philadelphi Corridor.[11] Israeli forces took control of the corridor in May 2024 and have since consolidated their position by creating an 800-meter buffer zone. [12] The anonymous Israeli official suggested that recent discussions between Egypt and Israel have made progress toward a long-term arrangement that allows the IDF to remain around the Philadelphi Corridor.An enduring IDF presence along the Philadelphi Corridor would complicate ongoing ceasefire negotiations but provides a better guarantee against Hamas rearming. Hamas has demanded repeatedly that Israeli forces withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor in a ceasefire and hostage exchange deal.[13] But Israeli officials consider controlling the Philadelphi Corridor as necessary to prevent Hamas from importing military materials into the Gaza Strip.[14] Hamas could use such materials to support its larger effort to rebuild its weapons production capacity and reconstitute its forces.[15] The IDF has called the corridor Hamas’ "lifeline” that Hamas needs to replenish its military resources, such as explosive materials, supplies, and weapons.[16]The discussions about a lasting Israeli presence along the Philadelphi Corridor are part of a larger series of conversations about how to manage the corridor in the long term. The United States, Egypt, and Israel have reportedly considered alternative smuggling interdiction methods, such as constructing a high-tech and deep-buried border fence.[17] Israel also reportedly considered involving the United Nations and Gazans who are not connected to Hamas in managing parts of the border, such as the Rafah border crossing.[18] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he would not consider an IDF withdrawal from the corridor on July 12, tabling these alternatives to long-term Israeli control of the corridor.[19]Lebanese Hezbollah published drone footage of an Israeli airbase in northern Israel on July 24 as part of an effort to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon.[20] The drone footage showed the IDF Ramat David airbase, which is about 50 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border. The footage included purported details of the airbase, such as the locations of air defenses, aircraft shelters, and fuel storage units.[21] This video marks the third time in recent months that Hezbollah has published drone footage of critical Israeli sites.[22] These videos are meant to demonstrate Hezbollah’s ability to reach these sites while terrorizing Israeli civilians and military personnel. The videos could also communicate information about critical Israeli targets to other members of the Axis of Resistance.The United States and Iraq continued discussing their bilateral security partnership, which is in conflict with Iranian-backed efforts to expel US forces from Iraq. US and Iraqi delegations concluded their two-day Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue in Washington, DC, on July 23.[23] The dialogue covered ending the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq and transitioning the US presence in Iraq to part of a bilateral security relationship.[24] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated that the United States will continue to develop and strengthen its security partnership with Iraq.[25] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted around over 160 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began in order to compel Washington to withdraw its troops.[26] The militias paused attacks in February 2024 but announced on July 19 that they would resume attacks since Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani had failed to set a timeline for the complete withdrawal of US forces.[27]Key Takeaways:Israel: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint meeting of the US Congress to discuss the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and international efforts to counter Iran and its Axis of Resistance.Gaza Strip: Egypt may agree to a long-term Israeli presence along the Egypt-Gaza Strip border, according to an anonymous Israeli official.Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah published drone footage of an IDF airbase in northern Israel as part of an effort to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon.Iraq: The United States and Iraq continued discussing their bilateral security partnership, which is in conflict with Iranian-backed efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division continued clearing operations in eastern Khan Younis on July 24. The IDF 7th, 89th Commando, and 35th Paratroopers brigades engaged Palestinian fighters with sniper fire and located an underground tunnel in the area.[28] The 89th Commando Brigade identified a Palestinian fighter cell driving a vehicle toward Israeli forces in Bani Suheila.[29] Israeli aircraft and a tank attacked the vehicle and killed the fighters.[30] Hamas fighters have targeted Israeli armor with at least three explosively formed penetrators—a particularly lethal type of improvised explosive device—in Bani Suheila since the start of the IDF operation there on July 22.[31] Hamas’ use of these explosive devices indicates that it retains a stockpile of these dangerous and difficult-to-produce weapons even after four months of IDF operations in Khan Younis. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas fighters also targeted Israeli forces with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars in Bani Suheila and northeast Khan Younis.[32] Hamas released a statement denouncing the IDF’s intense air campaign and destruction of infrastructure in Khan Younis and called upon the international community to pressure Israel to halt the operation.[33] Four Palestinian militias fired mortars and rockets targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on July 24.[34]The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on July 24. Israeli forces raided militia infrastructure, located weapons, and killed Palestinian fighters near Israeli forces.[35] The IDF reported that its 401st Brigade has operated in Tal al Sultan, north of Rafah city, and Shaboura refugee camp, western Rafah city, over the past several weeks.[36] The 401st Brigade’s 52nd Battalion engaged Palestinian fighters in close quarters combat in Tal al Sultan.[37] Israeli forces located a tunnel shaft in a home in the center of Shaboura refugee camp and found unspecified weapons inside the shaft.[38] Palestinian fighters engaged Israeli forces in several sectors of Rafah using rockets, mortars, and RPGs.[39] Hamas fighters detonated a pre-rigged house targeting Israeli forces inside Yabna refugee camp. [40]The IDF Air Force struck dozens of militia targets in the Gaza Strip, including military buildings, observation sites, and Palestinian fighters, on July 24.[41]Two Palestinian militias conducted a single rocket attack targeting an IDF site in southern Israel on July 24.[42]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least eight locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 23.[43]Israeli forces demolished a house belonging to a Palestinian fighter and detained other Palestinian individuals in Qalandiya on July 24.[44] The Palestinian fighter who owned the house had killed two Israeli civilians near Eli settlement, north of Ramallah, in February 2024.[45] Israeli forces tried to disperse crowds that gathered during the Israeli operation in Qalandiya, including, by firing at certain individuals.[46] Hamas claimed that one of its fighters died during the IDF operation.[47]Israeli forces detained two wanted individuals in Tubas on July 24.[48] The IDF engaged Palestinian fighters during the operation and killed an armed Palestinian Authority customs officer. The IDF is investigating the incident. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Tubas.[49]Israeli forces detained five individuals during an overnight raid in Tulkarm on July 23 and 24.[50] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Israeli forces detained two individuals in Seida, Tulkarm, for their involvement in an IED attack in Hermesh, an Israeli settlement west of Jenin, that injured four Israeli civilians on July 18.[51] Israeli forces shot one suspect and arrested three others during the raid[52] The IDF previously conducted overnight raids and a targeted airstrike in Tulkarm on July 22 and 23 that killed two senior militia commanders.[53]This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Southern Lebanon and Golan HeightsAxis of Resistance objectives:Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into LebanonPrepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaLebanese Hezbollah conducted at least two attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 23.[54] A Hezbollah rocket attack wounded an IDF soldier near Mount Dov on July 23.[55]The IDF has completed military exercises simulating fighting in Lebanon in recent days.[56] A reserve unit from the IDF Northern Nahal Brigade practiced maneuvering in mountainous terrain and evacuating wounded soldiers under fire.Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.Iran and the Axis of ResistanceSenior officials from the Axis of Resistance convened in Baghdad on July 23 and 24.[57] Houthi representative to Iraq Abu Idris al Sharafi met with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali. Sharafi also met with Hamas representative to Iraq, Mohammad al Hafy, in Baghdad. These meetings come amid uncorroborated reports claiming that hundreds of Houthi fighters have traveled to Iraq in recent weeks to receive training from Iranian officers and drone and missile experts.[58]The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting Eilat on July 23.[59]US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed three Houthi missile launchers in Houthi-controlled areas  of Yemen on July 23.[60]Iran is continuing to express solidarity with the Houthis following the IDF airstrike that targeted Houthi military targets in al Hudaydah, Yemen on July 20. The IDF conducted the airstrike in retaliation for the July 18 Houthi drone attack that killed one Israeli civilian in Tel Aviv.[61] Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati condemned the IDF airstrike and claimed that Israel could not have conducted the strike without US “cooperation and support” in a phone call with senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdulsalam on July 24.[62] Velayati condemned unspecified Muslim countries for failing to “confront Israeli crimes.” Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani similarly emphasized Iran’s support for the Houthis in a phone call with Abdulsalam on July 22.[63]Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian sent a message to Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah on July 23.[64]  Pezeshkian expressed hope that Palestinians will soon “liberate Jerusalem.” Pezeshkian previously sent similar messages to Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on July 8 and Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Esmail Haniyeh on July 10.[65]Iranian social media users reported on July 24 that Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian will likely nominate prominent moderate politician Ali Larijani as his first vice president.[66] Pezeshkian has not confirmed at the time of this writing whether he will nominate Larijani. Larijani served as both the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator from 2005 to 2007.[67] Larijani also served as Iran’s parliament speaker from 2008 to 2020.[68] Pezeshkian’s nomination of Larijani would be significant given that the Guardian Council barred Larijani from competing in both the August 2021 and June 2024 presidential elections. A senior cleric previously claimed that the Guardian Council disqualified Larijani in June 2024 because allowing Larijani to become president could have increased the chances of his brother, Expediency Discernment Council head Sadegh Amoli Larijani, succeeding Ali Khamenei as Iran’s next supreme leader.[69] The Iranian Constitution does not require Parliament to approve the first vice president.[70]Iranian Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari appointed new commanders to Artesh Ground Forces Northeast and Northwest regional headquarters on July 22. Heydari appointed Brigadier General Second Class Cyrus Amanollahi as the Northeast Regional Headquarters commander.[71] Amanollahi had served previously as the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade commander.[72] The timing of his commandership is noteworthy given its coincidence with when elements of the Artesh Ground Forces, including the 65th Brigade, deployed to Syria in 2016 to defend the Bashar al Assad regime.[73] These deployments marked the first Artesh Ground Forces deployments abroad since the Iran-Iraq War.[74] Amanollahi had most recently served as the Northwest Regional Headquarters commander from September 2023 to his latest appointment.[75] Amanollahi replaced Brigadier General Second Class Reza Azarian, who had served as the Northeast Regional Headquarters commander since March 2017.[76] Heydari separately appointed Brigadier General Second Class Amir Hossein Shafiei to replace Amanollahi as the Northwest Regional Headquarters commander.[77] Shafiei has served as the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade deputy commander, 21st Hamzeh Infantry Division commander, and 25th Special Forces Brigade commander.[78]Amanollahi and Shafiei will face various border security challenges in their respective areas of control. The Artesh Ground Forces Northeast Regional Headquarters recently began constructing a border wall in Khorasan Razavi Province along the Afghanistan-Iran border.[79] The construction of this wall comes amid an uptick in anti-regime militancy in eastern Iran since December 2023.[80] Iran also perceives a threat from Kurdish opposition groups that operate in Iraqi Kurdistan along Iran’s northwestern border.Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the IRGC, Abdollah Hajji Sadeghi, appointed Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini as the IRGC spokesperson and deputy public relations officer on July 24.[81] Naeini previously served as the head of the IRGC Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center.[82] Naeini has held various positions related to Iranian academia and culture in his career. Naeini replaced Ramazan Sharif, who had served as the IRGC spokesperson for over a decade. Sadeghi separately appointed Sadeghi Sharif to replace Naeini as the head of the IRGC Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center.Iranian Judiciary Vice President for International Affairs Kazem Gharib Abadi met with Chinese Ambassador to Iran Cong Peiwu in Tehran on July 23.[84] Gharib Abadi and Peiwu discussed expanding judicial and legal cooperation. Gharib Abadi stated that Iran “does not place any limits on the development of bilateral relations with China.”[85] Gharib Abadi further emphasized the importance of confronting US unilateralism.[86][1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wSttkKdkYg&ab_channel=C-SPAN[2] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/netanyahu-speech-congress-07-24-24#h_4ec9c03360f67a93d2a982401bcfc0d4[3] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/netanyahu-speech-congress-07-24-24#h_4ec9c03360f67a93d2a982401bcfc0d4[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wSttkKdkYg&ab_channel=C-SPAN[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wSttkKdkYg&ab_channel=C-SPAN[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wSttkKdkYg&ab_channel=C-SPAN[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wSttkKdkYg&ab_channel=C-SPAN[8]  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wSttkKdkYg&ab_channel=C-SPAN[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wSttkKdkYg&ab_channel=C-SPAN[10] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/egypt-showing-flexibility-on-idf-staying-along-its-gaza-border-to-block-arms-smuggling/[11] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/11/egypt-threatens-to-suspend-camp-david-accords-if-israel-pushes-into-gaza-border-town-00140838 ; https://apnews.com/article/israel-egypt-peace-treaty-hamas-war-rafah-46df917a975ed4c4f88d5de01a8508e0[12] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1795848320633462978 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1813227006936465551[13] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/قيادي-في-حماس-يكشف-للميادين-تفاصيل-رد-الفصائل-على-مقترح-وقف[14] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1795848320633462978[15] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate062424 ; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31377[16] https://www dot idf.il/205039[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-talks-explore-alternative-israeli-troops-gaza-egypt-border-sources-2024-07-12/ ; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/report-egypt-will-work-with-us-to-build-underground-barrier-at-gaza-border-if-deal-reached/[18] https://www.axios.com/2024/05/30/us-officials-trip-egypt-border-gaza[19] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/netanyahus-office-denies-report-israel-open-to-pullout-from-gaza-egypt-border/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/netanyahu-said-hardening-hostage-deal-stance-based-on-intel-hamas-is-weakened/ ; https://www.axios.com/2024/07/11/netanyahu-gaza-ceasefire-hostage-negotiations[20] https://t.me/mmirleb/5647; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/hezbollah-publishes-drone-footage-of-ramat-david-airbase-in-north/[21] https://t.me/mmirleb/5647; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/hezbollah-publishes-drone-footage-of-ramat-david-airbase-in-north/[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-broadcasts-drone-video-it-says-shows-airbase-deep-israel-2024-07-24/[23] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3847457/austin-meets-with-iraqi-counterpart-after-security-cooperation-dialogue/ ; https://x.com/USAmbIraq/status/1815992011905740905[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2024[25] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3847457/austin-meets-with-iraqi-counterpart-after-security-cooperation-dialogue/[26] https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/feb/01/timeline-proxy-attacks-iraq-syria-and-jordan[27] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-40-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816025433546113474[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816025433546113474[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816025443851509983[31] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2754; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31433; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2742[32] https://t.me/sarayaps/18363 ; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31432[33] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52580[34] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6888; https://t.me/sarayaps/18364; https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14405[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816025443851509983[36] www dot idf.il/218522[37] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1816126165762851085[38] www dot idf.il/218522 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1816126165762851085[39] https://t.me/AymanGouda/6208; https://t.me/nedalps/4299; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31434[40] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31435[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816025447236341762[42] https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14792; https://t.me/darebmojahden/4996[43] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6882 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6883 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6885https://t.me/QudsN/439787[44] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816049921801302081[45]  https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816049921801302081 ; https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1763228108100960632 ;[46] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816049934124171277[47] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52578[48] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816041191818793373[49] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6885 ;[50] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1816015263512351020 ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-811674[51] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1816015263512351020 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1813944967632752833 ;[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2024[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815778813223022642 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815684983526183190[54] https://t.me/mmirleb/5644; https://t.me/mmirleb/5653[55] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1815944346933551603; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/bjjqbz0da[56] https://www dot idf.il/218417[57] https://x.com/Newseast7/status/1815835806495613360 ; https://x.com/Tamerbadawi1/status/1816141624139022491 ; https://www dot i24news.tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-hamas-considering-relocation-from-qatar-to-iraq-report[58] https://x.com/Mikeknightsiraq/status/1816144158324834368; https://x.com/Newseast7/status/1815835806495613360[59] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1230[60] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1815912111874400736[61] https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/21/middleeast/israel-strikes-houthi-rebels-explainer-intl/index.html[62] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/03/3127458/[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2024[64] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/182825/[65] https://en.irna dot ir/news/85535197/Pezeshkian-letter-to-Nasrallah-clear-message-to-resistance-groups ; www.mehrnews dot com/news/6163597[66] https://x.com/eghtesadnia/status/1816163328206471401 ;https://x.com/arash_tehran/status/1816177167224459489[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-31-2024[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-31-2024[69] https://amwaj dot media/article/exclusive-the-real-reason-larijani-s-presidential-bid-was-quashed[70] https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989[71] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1935445[72] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/3761563 ;https://www.hawzahnews dot com/news/1107088[73] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf?x85095[74] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf?x85095[75] https://www.hawzahnews dot com/news/1107088/%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D8%AF[76] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/230353[77] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1935445[78] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/02/3126939[79] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/680114/[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2024 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-4-2024[81] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/218342/Brigadier-Gen-Naeini-appointed-new-IRGC-spokesman[82] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/680426[83] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6175169/[84] https://www.iranintl.com/202407246381[85] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/680311

[Author: ISWKF]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 24, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 11:30pm

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, and George BarrosJuly 24, 2024, 6:45pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the Russian military has significantly increased its manpower and materiel commitments to the war in Ukraine over the last two and a half years, but Syrskyi's statement is not indicative of a sudden increase in the Russian military's presence in Ukraine and is instead representative of the manpower and material disadvantage that Ukrainian forces have faced for over two years. Syrskyi told UK outlet The Guardian in an interview published on July 24 that Russian forces currently have 520,000 personnel committed to the war in Ukraine and that the Russian military aims to have 690,000 personnel committed to the war by the end of 2024.[1] Syrskyi noted that fighting is ongoing along 977 kilometers of the 3,700-kilometer-long frontline and reiterated that the Russian military command continues to pursue tactical gains regardless of significant manpower losses, while Ukrainian forces are attempting to safeguard the lives of Ukrainian troops. Syrskyi stated that Russian forces currently have a two-to-one or three-to-one equipment advantage over Ukrainian forces and that Russian forces have doubled the number of Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers and tripled the number of artillery systems in Ukraine since 2022. Syrskyi's comparison of the current Russian military contingent committed to Ukraine with the initial invasion force underscores the difference between the military force that Russia has gradually staffed and supplied over two and half years for a long war effort and the initial and ill-prepared invasion force that the Kremlin wrongly assessed could quickly depose the Ukrainian government in February 2022. Syrskyi noted that the Ukrainian military command is focused on addressing supply challenges in order to defend against ongoing Russian offensive operations and highlighted the fact that Ukrainian forces are successfully conducting defensive operations despite the materiel disparity between Russian and Ukrainian forces.Russia's ability to continue gradually expanding the amount of manpower and materiel it has committed to Ukraine faces significant constraints in the medium to long term. The Russian military has extensively relied on refurbishing stocks of Soviet-era weapons and military equipment to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in Ukraine in order to avoid fully mobilizing the Russian economy and society to a war-time footing, and Ukrainian authorities have noted that Russia is currently not producing enough to cover its current equipment losses in Ukraine.[2] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank reported in February 2024 that Russia will likely be able to sustain losing over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles annually for at least two or three more years (until about 2026–2027) by refurbishing Soviet-era vehicles in storage.[3] The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough vehicles to sustain a high level of equipment losses even with further economic mobilization. Further economic mobilization will likely be deeply unpopular among Russians who are largely apathetic towards the war so long as it does not impact their daily life, and the policy change could strain domestic support for the war.[4]Russia's ongoing force-generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to sustain their current tempo of offensive operations and maintain their current personnel replacement rate in Ukraine. Russian force-generation efforts so far have not enabled Russian forces to build up a significantly larger force in Ukraine and the Russian military remains incapable of conducting significantly intensified large-scale Russian offensive operations.[5] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in December 2023 that there were 617,000 Russian personnel in the "combat zone," likely referring to all Russian military personnel in the zone of the "special military operation," which includes rear areas and staging areas in Russia’s border areas neighboring Ukraine.[6] Putin stated in June 2024 that there are almost 700,000 Russian personnel in the "special military operation zone."[7] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated that as of May 3 there were roughly between 510,000 and 515,000 Russian personnel deployed to Ukraine.[8] It is unclear how long Russia will be able to sustain its current force generation rates, and Pavlyuk's and Syrskyi's statements further indicate that Russia's force generation efforts are generating roughly enough personnel to maintain Russia's current replacement rate but not significantly increase the number of Russian personnel in Ukraine. Syrskyi's statements highlight that Ukrainian forces have successfully defended and liberated territory in the face of a Russian military with significant manpower and material advantages over the past two and a half years, and ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces can contest the battlefield initiative and eventually set conditions to conduct both limited and large-scale counteroffensive operations with timely and appropriate Western security assistance.[9]Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met with People's Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Guangzhou on July 24 and discussed the war in Ukraine and the PRC's potential role in a future negotiated settlement of the war.[10] Both sides offered slightly divergent interpretations of the talks — Kuleba emphasized that a just peace in Ukraine is in the PRC's strategic interests and that while Ukraine remains ready to negotiate with Russia "at a certain stage," Russia is not yet displaying the readiness to reciprocate.[11] By contrast, Wang emphasized that both Ukraine and Russia have signaled their willingness to negotiate "to varying degrees," but that "conditions and timing are not yet ripe."[12] Wang also stressed the PRC's desire to act as a mediator and highlighted the recent Chinese-Brazilian six-point peace plan that calls for a peace conference on the war that includes both Russia and Ukraine.[13] Wang's suggestion that both Russia and Ukraine are ready to consider some sort of negotiations reflects the PRC's general diplomatic and rhetorical alignment with Russia on the topic of negotiations and helps further the Russian narrative that Ukraine is the party refusing negotiations, whereas ISW has frequently assessed that it is Rus sia that has no interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any terms but the Kremlin's demands for Ukrainian capitulation.[14] Western sources have also noted that the PRC has attempted to undermine Ukraine's ability to secure an international coalition of supporters, further emphasizing the rift between desired outcomes for the PRC, Russia, and Ukraine.[15]The Russian State Duma adopted an amendment on July 24 that will allow Russian commanders to punish subordinates for using personal communication and navigation devices at the frontline, drawing continued backlash from Russian ultranationalists as well as other Duma deputies.[16] Several Russian Duma deputies explicitly opposed the bill and called for Russian officials to allow frontline Russian commanders to inform military policy.[17] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers widely continued to criticize the amendment and expressed concerns that Russian military officials intend to use punishments for personal device usage to settle personal conflicts and censor legitimate complaints from Russian servicemembers, who often use personal devices to record and disseminate complaints.[18] Russian ultranationalists continued to lament the potential impacts of the amendment on the frontline, where Russian forces rely on insecure devices to organize command and control (C2), logistics, and combat operations.[19] Russian-backed former Ukrainian separatist politician Oleg Tsaryov pointedly stated that the amendment will be a serious blow to Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's image and claimed that the amendment is clearly the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) initiative.[20] Other Russian ultranationalists focused their outrage on Russian Duma deputies, particularly on the State Duma Defense Committee and its head Andrei Kartapolov, accusing the deputies of being out of touch with the realities of the war in Ukraine and expressing an animus towards the State Duma that ultranationalists usually reserve for the Russian MoD.[21] It remains unclear if the Russian military command will be able or willing to enforce punishment for the use of personal devices in Ukraine, and the Russian military will likely find it extremely difficult to eliminate its dependence on insecure personal devices for many frontline tasks.[22]The Georgian State Security Service (SUS or SSSG) reiterated standard Kremlin information operations targeting former Georgian opposition figures and former Ukrainian law enforcement officials. The SUS announced on July 24 that it is investigating "former senior Georgian government officials" and "former employees of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies" for organizing and financing attempts to overthrow the government by violent means and terrorist acts, including "preparations to murder [Georgian Dream Party founder and former Georgian Prime Minister] Bidzina Ivanishvili."[23] The SUS recently charged several Georgian volunteers who have served alongside Ukrainian forces with "conspiracy to overthrow the government" and "terrorism."[24] Georgian Legion Commander Mamuka Mamulashvili stated that Georgian authorities placed roughly 300 Georgian citizens who served as volunteers in the Georgian Legion on Georgia's wanted list, although did not specify with which alleged crimes the Georgian Legion volunteers were charged.[25] The SUS blamed Georgians living abroad and fighting in Ukraine and other perceived opposition actors for inciting protests against Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" bill in May 2024.[26] The SUS also made unsubstantiated claims in September 2023 that former Georgian officials, Ukrainian military intelligence officials of Georgian descent, and Georgians fighting with Ukrainian forces in Ukraine were plotting a violent coup.[27] The Kremlin has routinely used the narrative of a “violent coup” in Ukraine to misrepresent Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity and protests for Ukrainian European Union integration and blames external actors for domestic protests, and the SUS' statements increasingly mirror Kremlin rhetoric.The SUS' ongoing information operation alleging that Georgian opposition figures and Ukrainian actors are implicated in a conspiracy to violently overthrow the Georgian government not only advances Kremlin information operations but also aims to grant the Georgian Dream Party carte blanche justifications to suppress domestic political opposition within Georgia in the future. The Georgian Dream Party may seek to implicate Russian actors in such allegations in the future in order to justify authoritarian censorship bills that mirror Russian censorship laws while pandering to the Georgian public, which widely distrusts Russia given Russia's occupation of parts of Georgia among other factors. The Georgian Dream Party may be purposefully centering its information operations around a coup attempt since Georgian Dream could plausibly accuse Russian actors of trying to organize such attempts. The degree of coordination between the Kremlin and the Georgian government on their increasingly similar rhetoric is unclear, although Ivanishvili very likely has ties to the Kremlin.[28] Kremlin actors will seize on Georgian Dream's authoritarian impulses to purposefully derail Georgia’s long-term efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration and advance Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia regardless of whether Georgian Dream is directly coordinating with the Kremlin.An assassination attempt injured a reported senior Russian military intelligence officer in Moscow City on July 24. Russian officials claimed on July 24 that Russian citizen Yevgeny Serebryakov attached an improvised explosive device (IED) to car at about 0230 local time on July 24 and that the IED detonated at about 0630 local time when a man and his wife started the car, severely injuring them.[29] Russian sources reported that the attack injured Andrey Torgashev, allegedly a senior officer of the Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU) who previously served with GRU Unit 45807, a psychological operations unit reportedly directly subordinate to the head of the GRU.[30] Russian sources initially misidentified the victim as another Andrey Torgashev, the Deputy Commander of the 89th Satellite Communications Center (Strategic Missile Forces Central Communications Center), who made a statement to Russian state media that he was not involved or injured in the explosion.[31] Serebryakov fled to Turkey and arrived around 0930 on July 24, upon which Turkish authorities later detained him and are preparing to extradite him to Russia.[32] A Russian court charged Serebryakov with two counts of attempted murder, and Russian media reported that Russian authorities are investigating the involvement of Ukrainian special services in the assassination attempt and that prosecutors may change Serebryakov's charges to terrorism.[33]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the Russian military has significantly increased its manpower and materiel commitments to the war in Ukraine over the last two and a half years, but Syrskyi's statement is not indicative of a sudden increase in the Russian military's presence in Ukraine and is instead representative of the manpower and material disadvantage that Ukrainian forces have faced for over two years.Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met with People's Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Guangzhou on July 24 and discussed the war in Ukraine and the PRC's potential role in a future negotiated settlement of the war.The Russian State Duma adopted an amendment on July 24 that will allow Russian commanders to punish subordinates for using personal communication and navigation devices at the frontline, drawing continued backlash from Russian ultranationalists as well as other Duma deputies.The Georgian State Security Service (SUS or SSSG) reiterated standard Kremlin information operations targeting former Georgian opposition figures and former Ukrainian law enforcement officials.An assassination attempt injured a reported senior Russian military intelligence officer in Moscow City on July 24.Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.Russian officials continue efforts to entice Russians into military service with monetary incentives.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces conducted a limited cross-border attack northwest of Kharkiv City on July 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a ground attack near Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City directly on the border with Belgorod Oblast).[34] ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming that Russian forces gained positions in Sotnytskyi Kozachok as a result of the raid, however, and continues to assess that Russian forces do not have an enduring presence in the settlement.Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City amid continued positional fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 24. Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced westward to Polova Street in western Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[35] Russian sources continue to claim that Russian forces have captured all or nearly all of Hlyboke despite Ukrainian counterattacks, generally consistent with evidence of Russian advances up to Polova Street.[36] Positional fighting continued near Hlyboke, Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), Tykhe (just east of Vovchansk), and Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) July 23 and 24.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Starytsya and that there are small arms battles within Vovchansk near high-rise buildings.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are operating in the Kharkiv direction.[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces reportedly continued to advance southeast of Kupyansk on July 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed on July 24 that Russian forces advanced in fields south and west of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[40] Another milblogger reiterated claims that Russian forces advanced 800 meters deep within Pishchane and assessed that Russian forces will use positions in this area to intensify attacks westward towards the Oskil River, which is currently about nine kilometers away from the furthest extent of ISW's assessment of Russian forces’ forward line of own troops in the area.[41] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) for the seizure of Pishchane and the 13th Tank Regiment (4th Guards Tank Division, 1st GTA, MMD) for the seizure of Andriivka (just west of Svatove), although ISW has not observed visual evidence suggesting that Russian forces are operating in Andriivka at this time.[42] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, Pishchane, Kolesnykivka, and Hlushkivka; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area.[43] Elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating near Nevske.[44]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces reportedly recently advanced amid continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 24 that Russian forces recently achieved some tactical success south of Siversk near Vyimka and Pereizne.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 400 meters westward along a windbreak north of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) and that Russian forces are clearing Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk) and attacking to the north.[46] Russian forces also continued attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on July 23 and 24.[47] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 55th VDV Regiment, are reportedly fighting near Vyimka and Pereizne and elements of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[48]Russian forces did not make confirmed advances amid continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 24. Russian forces continued ground attacks within eastern Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynikva, Novomarkove, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Chasiv Year near Ivanivske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on July 23 and 24.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks south of Kalynivka from positions in a series of windbreaks in the area.[50]Russian forces reportedly recently advanced south of Toretsk amid continued offensive operations near Toretsk on July 24. Russian milbloggers claimed on July 23 and 24 that Russian forces advanced in fields both north and south of Yurivka (south of Toretsk) and that Russian forces also achieved tactical successes within Niu York (south of Toretsk and north of Yurivka) and in fields east of Niu York.[51] Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Pivnichne; southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka on July 23 and 24.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 24 that Russian forces conducted about 80 percent of their attacks in this direction near Pivnichne and Zalizne.[53] Russian milbloggers published footage on July 23 of a Russian Kh-38 missile strike against a bridge near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) on an unspecified date.[54]Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance northwest of Avdiivka amid continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka direction on July 24. Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) have advanced into central and western Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka) from the southeast.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted heavy airstrikes against Ukrainian near-rear areas in Novoselivka Persha and Zhelanne (west of Novoselivka Persha across the Vovcha River) overnight on July 23 to 24, after which Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defensive lines within central and southern Novoselivka Persha and seized most of the settlement except for two streets within western Novoselivka Persha.[56] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Novoselivka Persha, advanced in fields west of Prohres and Lozuvatske, and entered northern Vovche (all northwest of Novoselivka Persha) but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[57] Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are beginning to withdraw from Vovche and near Prohres to avoid a Russian tactical encirclement.[58] Russian forces also continued attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka and Novooleksandrivka, west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka, and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on July 23 and 24.[59]Russian forces reportedly advanced southwest of Donetsk City on July 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses and reached the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and that Russian forces have also established fire (artillery) control over the T0524 Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar road.[60] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sources have confirmed that Russian forces entered Kostyantynivka, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating on the outskirts of this settlement.[61] Milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces are advancing in Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces advanced up to 800 meters within the settlement and are 500 meters from Krasnohorivka's western entrance.[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, Vodyane, and Vuhledar.[63] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 110th and 5th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating in Krasnohorivka.[64]Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 24 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[65] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are attacking from positions along the Mokryi Yaly River towards Urozhaine and Blahodatne (all south of Velyka Novosilka), while elements of the 394th and 144th motorized rifle regiments and 218th Tank Regiment (all of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are trying to break through from Staromayorske towards Makarivka (also south of Velyka Novosilka).[66] Elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are also reportedly operating near Urozhaine, while elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are operating in an unspecified area of the southern Donetsk Oblast direction (generally the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[67]Geolocated footage published on July 23 shows a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against a Russian "Yastreb-AV" counterbattery radar station northeast of Zuhres (east of Donetsk City).[68]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on July 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[69]Russian forces continued assaults in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky and on the islands of the Dnipro River delta, on July 24.[70] Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[71]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 23 that Ukrainian forces damaged the "Slavyanin" ferry at the port of Kavkaz, Krasnodar Krai during a drone strike on the night of July 22 to 23.[72] The Ukrainian General Staff specified that Russian forces used the ferry to transport railway cars, vehicles, and containers for military purposes and that this was the last functioning ferry of three ferries that Russian forces used in the area to cross the Kerch Strait. Russian forces routinely use ferries in the area to relieve pressures on the Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea across the Kerch Strait Bridge.[73]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces launched missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 23 to 24. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile and a missile of an unknown type at Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast and 23 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea.[74] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces downed 17 Shahed drones, mostly over Odesa Oblast. Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that a Russian missile strike against Kharkiv City damaged the office of the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action in Nemyshlyanskyi Raion.[75] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated that Russian drone strikes damaged port infrastructure in Izmailskyi Raion on July 24.[76]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on July 24 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting an Iskander-M ballistic missile strike against a Ukrainian command post near Lyman, Donetsk Oblast.[77] ISW has not observed any independent confirmation of this alleged strike.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian officials continue efforts to entice Russians into military service with monetary incentives. A Russian Telegram channel dedicated to military recruitment in St. Petersburg published a recruitment ad for the Russian 76th Guards Airborne Assault (VDV) Division and the 44th "Leningrad" Brigade (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit) and claimed that recruits can receive a one-time payment of 1.7 million rubles (roughly $19,700) and a monthly salary beginning at 210,000 rubles (roughly $2,400) for signing a military service contract with these formations.[78] The channel claimed that recruits can receive an additional 50,000 rubles (roughly $580) for each destroyed piece of Ukrainian military equipment or each kilometer that the servicemember's unit advances on the frontline. The channel noted that recruits and their families will receive benefits and social support and that recruits will receive an additional 15 days of leave.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.Russian Information Operations and NarrativesThe Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 24 that Russian forces prevented United Kingdom (UK) Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft from entering Russian "airspace" over the Black Sea, likely to support information operations threatening escalation with the West over Western support for Ukraine.[79] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces sortied a Su-27 fixed-wing aircraft after identifying two RAF aircraft approaching Russian airspace over the Black Sea and that the two RAF aircraft then turned around.[80] Kremlin newswire TASS editorialized the Russian MoD's claims and alleged that the Su-27 escorted the two RAF aircraft away from Russian airspace.[81] Russian sources did not specify where the incident occurred, but Russian claims about violations of airspace over the Black Sea likely also intend to legitimize Russia's illegal occupation of Crimea and the associated (and illegal) expanded Russian claims to airspace over the Black Sea.Russian sources amplified a Ukrainian official's criticisms of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi on July 24 in order to weaken Ukrainian trust in Ukrainian military leadership.[82]Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova continues to use rhetorical allusions to Ukraine to threaten Moldova. Zakharova claimed on July 24 that Moldovan authorities are pursuing a policy of "Romanianization" and "Ukrainization" under the guise of European integration and accused Moldovan President Maia Sandu of promoting anti-Russian sentiments.[83] Kremlin officials routinely allege that Moldova's aspirations for European integration will lead to the erasure of Moldovan identity as part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova's European Union (EU) accession.[84]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/24/i-know-we-will-win-and-how-ukraines-top-general-on-turning-the-tables-against-russia[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-is-pumping-out-weaponsbut-can-it-keep-it-up-ba30bb04 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050824[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/6784 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024[8] ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060524[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224[10] https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/dmitro-kuleba-spravedlivij-mir-v-ukrayini-vidpovidaye-strategichnim-interesam-kitayu; https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202407/t20240724_11459443.shtml; https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-top-diplomat-meets-chinas-wang-yi-talks-guangzhou-2024-07-24/[11] https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/dmitro-kuleba-spravedlivij-mir-v-ukrayini-vidpovidaye-strategichnim-interesam-kitayu[12] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202407/t20240724_11459443.shtml[13] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202405/t20240523_11310698.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/china-pushes-rival-ukraine-peace-plan-before-swiss-summit-diplomats-say-2024-06-13/; https://www.gov dot br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/05/brazil-and-china-present-joint-proposal-for-peace-negotiations-with-the-participation-of-russia-and-ukraine[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224[15] https://www.ft.com/content/f7a34e3e-bce9-4db9-ac49-a092f382c526; https://www.reuters.com/world/china-pushes-rival-ukraine-peace-plan-before-swiss-summit-diplomats-say-2024-06-13[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/262279 ; https://sozd.duma dot gov.ru/bill/289614-8[17] https://t.me/deputatdvkuznetsov/2230 ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/07/23/23519845.shtml[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/47994; https://t.me/zhivoff/15855; https://t.me/mig41/35454; https://t.me/AlexCarrier/8025; https://t.me/dva_majors/47987; https://t.me/olegtsarov/14172; https://t.me/dva_majors/47991; https://t.me/dva_majors/47982; https://t.me/dva_majors/48002; https://t.me/epoddubny/20488; https://t.me/dva_majors/48003; https://t.me/dva_majors/48004; https://t.me/dva_majors/48005; https://t.me/dva_majors/48008 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48010; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/38170; https://t.me/dva_majors/48011; https://t.me/dva_mjors_kOrtiZoL/119 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21190 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1145 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47997 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20488 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20490 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20492; https://t.me/sashakots/48000[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2024 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21190 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48001; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/18118 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/126692 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47997 ;[20] https://t.me/olegtsarov/14173[21] https://t.me/rusengineer/4693 ; https://t.me/rybar/62049 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1145 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47997 ; https://t.me/vrogov/16709; https://t.me/yurasumy/16553 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18457[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072324[23] https://www.facebook.com/sssgeo/posts/pfbid02Z5gSZRTJ9VGLAXYsENzqu8M6hHdYXy9EpFLeKzWE5q4rqmmoK2bQmRMiyPJmVNPDl ; https://agenda dot ge/en/news/2024/39957[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2024[25] ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2024[26] https://www.facebook.com/sssgeo/posts/pfbid02pprPC9JTY6t2ATZYxGRVTyRNh9RxPtHp4qmo4nhM6ywKeec48DUxNYxBXtveMX2cl ; https://www.ekhokavkaza dot com/a/32937747.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2024[27] https://www.radiotavisupleba dot ge/a/32597360.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2024[28] https://ecfr dot eu/publication/broken-dream-the-oligarch-russia-and-georgias-drift-from-europe/ ; https://www.cfr.org/article/dangers-democratic-backsliding-georgia ; https://www.politico.eu/article/who-is-running-georgia-tbilisi-ukraine-russia-war-vladimir-putin-sanctions-georgian-dream/ ; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0239_EN.pdf[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/262208 ; https://t.me/severrealii/26251 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/83911 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/68125; https://t.me/tass_agency/262208 ; https://t.me/severrealii/26251 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/83911 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/68125[30] https://t.me/agentstvonews/6680; https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/07/24/v-moskve-vzorvali-mashinu-ofitsera-gru-sledstvie-ischet-ukrainskiy-sled-kiev-svoyu-prichastnost-otritsaet; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6851186; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2018/09/23/yeah-it-s-the-gru-hq-so-what; https://t.me/astrapress/60345[31] https://t.me/astrapress/60307 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47972; https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/07/24/v-moskve-vzorvali-mashinu-ofitsera-gru-sledstvie-ischet-ukrainskiy-sled-kiev-svoyu-prichastnost-otritsaet; https://ria dot ru/20240724/torgashov-1961665681.html; https://t.me/rt_russian/209803; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6851351; https://theins dot ru/news/273312[32] https://t.me/tass_agency/262315 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262316 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21187; https://t.me/breakingmash/56079; https://t.me/tass_agency/262315 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262316 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21187; https://t.me/breakingmash/56079; https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1816121276148187158; https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1816121276148187158[33] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6851186[34]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl[35] https://t [dot] me/Assault_Battalion_1/160; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1816148227051139077; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1816147755393298913; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1816147319747658037[36] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18448; https://t.me/motopatriot/25373; https://t.me/motopatriot/25374; https://t.me/motopatriot/25375; https://t.me/motopatriot/25374[37]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02RDWYasvgM1JDfmRx1Ttiqe6eSXwCR2Bp337t5W2428v5YvjDPWcx9Yr4oQRFrbHVl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47961[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13026[39] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18448;[40] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27377; https://t.me/motopatriot/25364[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/47961[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/41320[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13011 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13013;https://t.me/rusich_army/16008[44] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16629[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/47961[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02RDWYasvgM1JDfmRx1Ttiqe6eSXwCR2Bp337t5W2428v5YvjDPWcx9Yr4oQRFrbHVl[48] https://t.me/motopatriot/25369; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/25908 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37976; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13027; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13027[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://t.me/project_nd/126 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131089; https://t.me/motopatriot/25368[50] https://t.me/project_nd/126 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131089[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12994; https://t.me/wargonzo/21179; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27375;[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73071; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12994[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131059; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57726[55] https://t.me/VoZmezdie2022/23317; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6144[56] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18455; https://t.me/dva_majors/48007[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13021; https://t.me/motopatriot/25393 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25395; https://t.me/motopatriot/25393 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25395; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73048; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13021; https://t.me/motopatriot/25385; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131042; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18456[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131063; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73069; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73071[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02RDWYasvgM1JDfmRx1Ttiqe6eSXwCR2Bp337t5W2428v5YvjDPWcx9Yr4oQRFrbHVl[60] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18453; https://t.me/motopatriot/25388; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18454[61] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18454[62] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37972; https://t.me/dva_majors/47961; https://t.me/wargonzo/21179[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl[64] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37972; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12500[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2051 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0SJXRw3JoSyuyS5SMuYG6tCihF22U8ptNzEngHxGyTCwWjDuV2sid6frxMgBPvX9Gl[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/9913 (Urozhaine); https://t.me/voin_dv/9916 (border area)[68] https://t.me/ermaka2022/5052; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1815740052405624882; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1815792378009080309;[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10652[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/47961 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10652 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ciEp5PUwUYsPkhypWh1mGUsJa57teGCvQRRdWkK48nXGkHQggFyUwro2UWoEUvCHl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zCet2SGkxT4Ei2x7dstUwjENZvjhUTdMX33288ZJKMsS1m5kKLiVMVQEJrX2atuNl[71] https://t.me/Ratnik2nd/5630 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37957[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/16318[73] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2024[74] https://t.me/ComAFUA/355[75] https://t.me/otukharkiv/349[76] https://t.me/odeskaODA/6080[77] https://t.me/mod_russia/41333[78] https://t.me/basurin_e/12888 ; https://t.me/budni_voennogo/59[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/41337[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/41337[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/262318[82] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73091 ; https://t.me/marybezuhla/1860 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16016[83] https://t.me/tass_agency/262264 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43465[84] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424

[Author: ISWKF]

— Iran Update, July 23, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 10:16pm

Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Hamas, Fatah and other unspecified Palestinian political factions agreed on a vision for post-war governance of the Gaza Strip on July 23 during “intra-Palestinian reconciliation” talks in Beijing.[1] The factions signed a joint declaration setting out their intention to form “a temporary national unity government” responsible for governing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[2] The agreement stipulates that a government partly influenced by Hamas would rule the Gaza Strip and West Bank until elections could be held at an unspecified future date.[3] The declaration reportedly does not address what party maintains security control over the Gaza Strip, and Hamas has been adamant it will keep its military wing.[4] Hamas, Fatah, and China have not disclosed the full text of the declaration at the time of this writing. Senior Hamas official Hossam Badran claimed that unity government would supervise the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, manage the affairs of the Palestinian people, and provide a “formidable barrier” against regional and international intervention in the governance of the Gaza Strip.[5] Hamas and Fatah have previously signed a series of unimplemented reconciliation agreements.[6] The former Palestinian Authority prime minister and top Fatah official Mohammad Shtayyeh said that Hamas and Fatah must continue discussions to advance the declaration’s framework.[7] CTP-ISW will publish more in-depth analysis and coverage of this development as more details of the agreement become available.The United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are separately advancing an alternative post-war governance vision for the Gaza Strip that conflicts with the Beijing meeting’s vision.[8] Israeli sources said that Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah Bin Zayed organized a meeting with top US and Israeli officials, including Israeli defense officials responsible for “day-after plans” for the Gaza Strip, on July 18.[9] Abdullah Bin Zayed’s special envoy to the United Nations published a proposal for post-war governance of the Gaza Strip shortly before the meeting and indicated that the UAE could send armed forces to support a multinational “stabilization” mission in the Gaza Strip.[10] The UAE specified that it would only send forces if it was invited by the Palestinian Authority and the United States held a leadership role in the post-war Gaza Strip.[11] Part of the UAE’s plan involves appointing a reformed Palestinian Authority led by an independent prime minister to govern the post-war Gaza Strip.[12] The Palestinian Authority remains most influenced by Fatah, which just signed a unity government declaration with Hamas. The UAE is pushing for non-Fatah officials, such as former Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad, to head the government, however.[13]The US-Israeli-UAE plan could move towards accomplishing Israeli war aims by protecting nascent, non-Hamas alternatives in the Gaza Strip. The non-Israeli, non-Hamas, and UAE-supported security forces described in this plan could successfully maintain security in the Gaza Strip if Hamas were militarily defeated. This force or one with similar features is necessary to accomplish Israeli war aims because it would be able to suppress Hamas military remnants and begin the process of transitioning to a non-Hamas authority. This transition would take a considerable amount of time.  This plan stands in stark contrast with the Beijing proposal, which would probably result in Hamas retaining at minimum a monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip. A monopoly on violence would give Hamas excessive influence over governance of the Gaza Strip even if under a nominally muti-party structure. CTP-ISW previously assessed Hamas would similarly take over a technocratic government if the group retains a monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip.[14] The Beijing proposal, if successful, would result in an Israeli defeat because it would result in at least de-facto—if not de jure—Hamas control in the Gaza Strip. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on July 19 that a ceasefire agreement without an interim governance plan for the Gaza Strip would create a void that is filed by Hamas resurgence, Israeli military presence, or “chaos.”[15]Four unspecified Iraqi sources cited by Reuters on July 22 claimed that an Iraqi delegation in Washington, DC, has requested the United States begin withdrawing its forces from Iraq starting in September 2024.[16] The unspecified Iraqi sources claimed that the delegation has asked the coalition to begin withdrawing its forces in September 2024 in order to end the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq by September 2025. US and Iraqi officials began talks on July 22 in Washington, DC, to continue negotiations over the end of the International Coalitions mission in Iraq.[17] The United States and Iraq are evaluating a timeline to end the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq based on threats posed by ISIS in Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capabilities to conduct independent counter-ISIS operations.CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partners in Iraq and Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that a US withdrawal from Syria would very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence there within 12 to 24 months that would then spill into Iraq.[18] Iraqi security forces still face significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that would impede their ability to eliminate ISIS and other domestic threats alone.[19] The US presence in Iraq logistically sustains the presence in Syria.[20] This is consistent with CENTCOM’s previous and current reporting about the state of ISIS. US Central Command commander Gen. Michael Kurilla said in March 2024 that a US withdrawal from Iraq before the Iraqi Security Forces could successfully ”stand on their own” would ”all but guarantee” ISIS’s return.[21] Kurilla’s statements echo his 2023 Congressional Testimony, when he reported that he assessed ISIS would reconstitute within 12 to 24 months without a US presence in Iraq and Syria.[22] CENTCOM reported on July 16 that ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria are on track to double from 2023 to over 153 attacks in 2024.[23] CENTCOM noted that the rate of attacks suggests that ISIS is attempting to reconstitute itself. CENTCOM’s report is consistent with CTP-ISW assessment that the United States and its partners in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS.Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech to Parliament in which he implicitly called on Parliament not to obstruct potential efforts by President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. Khamenei simultaneously encouraged Parliament to work to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions.[24] Khamenei voiced support for both “lifting and neutralizing” western sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program while impressing upon Parliament the importance of unity within government and acting with a “united voice” with President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian voiced support for increased international engagement with Western actors and endorsed a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) throughout his campaign.[25] Iran’s Parliament will not play a direct role in negotiations, though it is responsible for approving any agreement, and Iran’s recently-elected Parliament is dominated by hardline politicians who have obstructed nuclear negotiations in the past.[26] Khamenei implicitly called on hardliners to allow Pezeshkian to pursue nuclear talks by encouraging unity, but his comment about ”neutralizing” sanctions simultaneously encourages hardliners to work to mitigate the effects of sanctions. Neutralizing and mitigating the effect of sanctions has been a long-held foreign policy objective for Iran. This effort includes improving relations with non-Western countries and improving Iran’s own economic self-reliance.[27]Khamenei also defended the Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect Iranian Nation’s Interests, but his statements on the Strategic Action Plan probably sought to placate hardliners in parliament. Khamenei said that passing the Strategic Action Law “was the right thing to do.“[28] This 2020 legislation mandated that Iran increase uranium enrichment and reduce IAEA inspections if the United States did not lift sanctions.[29]The pursuit of nuclear negotiations to lift sanctions caused by the nuclear program and an effort to mitigate the effects of sanctions in general are not mutually exclusive.  Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei previously urged Raisi administration officials to counter the impact of economic sanctions and simultaneously expressed approval of sanctions-lifting nuclear negotiations.[30] It does not necessarily follow that a new nuclear deal would cause the United States and its partners to lift all of the sanctions they have imposed on Iran, such as sanctions tied to Iran’s drone and missile programs.[31]The Houthis appear to have successfully coerced Saudi Arabia into stopping a Yemeni government effort to cut Houthi access to the international finance system. The Central Bank of Yemen based in Aden (CBY-Aden) had been considering a plan in early July to remove several banks from the SWIFT system.[32] CBY-Aden also suspended at least 26 money exchange companies from operating in government-controlled Yemen between late June and early July.[33] Banning the Houthis from SWIFT would disrupt the ability for these banks to send and receive money from outside Houthi-controlled areas, which could severely damage the economy in Houthi-controlled areas.[34]The Houthis responded by threatening Saudi Arabia as part of an effort to pressure Riyadh to reverse the Yemeni government’s decision. The Yemeni government is based in Riyadh, and Saudi Arabia can exert significant amounts of pressure on the Yemeni government to secure Yemeni agreement in negotiations. The Houthis threatened to target Saudi Arabia on July 8, one week after plans to remove several banks in Houthi-controlled areas from the SWIFT system leaked.[35] The Houthis published drone footage of airports and ports in Saudi Arabia, and the Houthi leader threatened that ”if [Saudi Arabia] wants good for [itself], stability [for itself] and [its] economy,” Saudi Arabia would need to stop conspiring against Yemen and cease cooperation with the United States.[36]Saudi Arabia likely pressured the Yemeni government to cancel its decisions to prevent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. The United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen noted that Saudi Arabia played a “significant role” in securing a Houthi-Yemeni government agreement to “cancel all recent decisions and procedures against banks” on July 23, suggesting that Saudi Arabia pressured the Yemeni government into reversing its decisions in the banking sector.[37] Saudi Arabia has previously undermined its Yemeni allies’ position by either negotiating with the Houthis without the Yemeni government or by pressuring the Yemeni government to agree to disadvantageous deals with the Houthis.[38] The CBY-Aden governor resigned after the agreement was signed.[39]Key Takeaways:Gaza Strip: The United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are separately advancing an alternative post-war governance vision for the Gaza Strip that conflicts with a separate Chinese-mediated proposal for a unity government between Hamas and Fatah. The US-Israeli-UAE plan could move towards accomplishing Israeli war aims by protecting nascent, non-Hamas alternatives in the Gaza Strip. The Beijing proposal would amount to an Israeli defeat, if implemented.Iraq: Four unspecified Iraqi sources cited by Reuters on July 22 claimed that an Iraqi delegation in Washington, DC, has requested the United States begin withdrawing its forces from Iraq starting in September 2024. CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partners in Iraq and Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that a US withdrawal from Syria would very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence there within 12 to 24 months that would then spill into Iraq.Iran:Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech to Parliament in which he implicitly called on Parliament not to obstruct potential efforts by President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. Khamenei simultaneously encouraged Parliament to work to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions. The pursuit of nuclear negotiations to lift sanctions caused by the nuclear program and an effort to mitigate the effects of sanctions in general are not mutually exclusive.Houthi Attacks on Israel: Unspecified military sources in Sanaa told Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar on July 23 that the Houthis will target new civilian sites in Israel, which is consistent with the Houthi leader’s statements on July 21.Houthi Threats Against Saudi Arabia: The Houthis appear to have successfully coerced Saudi Arabia into stopping a Yemeni government effort to cut Houthi access to the international finance system. Saudi Arabia likely pressured the Yemeni government to cancel its decisions to prevent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah may be expanding the locations it targets in northern Israel. This expansion follows threats by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to expand the group’s targets on July 17.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division continued a new clearing operation in eastern Khan Younis on July 23.[40] The IDF reported that on July 22 that Hamas fighters had infiltrated into previously cleared areas of Khan Younis and had re-established militia infrastructure in the area, necessitating the re-clearing operation.[41] The IDF issued evacuation orders for civilians in Khan Younis on July 22.[42] Three IDF brigades concentrated their Khan Younis operations in Qarara, Bani Suheila, and Hamad.[43] The IDF 7th, 89th (Commando), and 35th (Paratroopers) Brigades engaged Palestinian fighters and cleared infrastructure in eastern Khan Younis.[44] Local sources reported on July 23 that Israeli forces were stationed in central Bani Suhelia.[45] Hamas targeted Israeli armor with rocket propelled grenades in Bani Suheila, east of Khan Younis.[46] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on July 23 that Israeli forces have not experienced ”significant resistance” from Palestinian fighters on the ground and noted that there have been no IDF casualties yet.[47]Three Palestinian militias conducted separate mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on July 23.[48] Hamas mortared Israeli forces near Juhor ad Dik, which is northeast of the Netzarim Corridor.[49]The IDF identified several rockets that Hamas attempted to fire into Israeli territory from al Maghazi, central Gaza Strip, on July 23.[50] The IDF said the rockets fell short of crossing into Israel and struck a school in Nuseirat.[51]The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on July 23.[52] Israeli forces killed dozens of Palestinian fighters through airstrikes and close-range engagements.[53] Palestinian fighters mortared Israeli forces in Tal al Sultan.[54]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe IDF conducted an overnight “counter-terrorism operation” in Tulkarm from July 22 to 23 in response to recent Palestinian militia shooting attacks targeting Bet Hefer.[55] Israeli forces destroyed an apartment complex that belonged to the head of Hamas in Tulkarm.[56] The IDF reported that the building was rigged with explosives and posed a threat to Israeli forces operating in the area..[57] The IDF also conducted an airstrike that killed a senior Hamas commander in Tulkarm and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades Tulkarm battalion commander on July 23.[58] An Israeli military correspondent assessed that the IDF is eliminating West Bank militia commanders “one by one”, prompting these militia groups to expedite the promotion of “junior-level” fighters to battalion-level commanders.[59] The IDF claimed that it has launched more than fifty “operations” in Tulkarm since October 7.[60]Hamas, PIJ, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces operating in Tulkarm with small arms and IEDs.[61] PIJ detonated an IED in a building on al Murabba Street, Tulkarm, as Israeli forces were operating inside.[62]Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on July 22.[63] Hamas mourned the death of two fighters who died during clashes with Israeli forces on July 23 in Sair, Hebron.[64] Hamas fighters detonated an IED on the border fence between Jalbul, in the West Bank, and Meirav, in Israel. The fighters then  waited for Israeli forces to arrive to repair the fence before detonating a second IED. Hamas then waited for an IDF medic team to arrive at the scene before detonating a third IED.[65]  Israeli forces searched the area following the explosions.[66]  Palestinians held demonstrations in Nablus, Ramallah, and Jenin on July 23 to show support for Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons.[67] This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Southern Lebanon and Golan HeightsAxis of Resistance objectives:Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into LebanonPrepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaLebanese Hezbollah may be expanding the locations it targets in northern Israel. This expansion follows threats by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to expand the group’s targets on July 17.[68] Hezbollah launched “dozens” of rockets targeting Tzuriel, in northern Israel on July 22, injuring at least two civilians.[69] Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah threatened to strike new locations inside Israel during a speech on July 17 if Israel ”continues to target civilians.” [70] Hezbollah has struck at least five new targets since issuing this threat.[71]Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least ten attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on July 22, including the attack on Zuriel.[72] Hezbollah claimed that it launched a large number of one-way attack drones targeting an IDF Golani Brigade battalion headquarters in Mount Neira.[73] The IDF intercepted “some” of the drones and reported that the attack resulted in no casualties.[74]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.Iran and the Axis of ResistanceActing Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani condemned the July 20 Israeli retaliatory airstrike on Hudaydah, Yemen, in separate phone calls with a senior Houthi diplomatic official and the Omani Foreign Minister on July 22.[75] Bagheri Kani reiterated Iran’s solidarity with the Houthis in a phone call with senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdulsalam on July 22.[76] Abdulsalam thanked Bagheri Kani for Iran’s support to the Houthis in its fight against Israel. Bagheri Kani separately claimed that Israel is the main cause of regional insecurity in his phone call with Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi.[77]Iran announced on July 23 that the construction on a 300-kilometer border wall on Iran’s northeastern border with Afghanistan is underway.[78] The border wall will be approximately four meters tall and one meter thick. Construction is underway in Razavi Khorasan Province, Iran. Previous reporting suggested the border wall will cost approximately $3.2 billion.[79] The construction of this border wall likely serves to limit the flow of refugees and cross-border smuggling from Afghanistan into Iran, but it is probably also meant to help prevent Islamic State Khorasan Province fighters from entering Iran.[80] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf promised to build a wall on Iran’s eastern border to curb illegal immigration from Afghanistan and Pakistan during a presidential debate on June 20.[81]Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian held phone calls with the Kazakh president and Japanese prime minister on July 22 and 23 respectively.[82] Pezeshkian expressed willingness to increase cooperation with Kazakhstan in the fields of energy, transit and commercial exchanges during his phone call with Kazakh President Kassym Jomart Tokayev.[83] Pezeshkian stated that Iran is ready to engage in ”any dialogue” in the field of nuclear talks during his phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.[84] Pezeshkian blamed the United States for withdrawing from the JCPOA and stressed that the United States must be the one to resume nuclear talks with Iran in his phone call with Kishida. Kishida expressed readiness on behalf of Japan to help mediate nuclear talks between Iran and the United States.A senior leader in the Iranian Assembly of Experts, Alireza Arafi, met with Russian Duma First Vice Chairman Alexander Zhukov at the Russian Duma in Moscow, Russia, on July 23.[85] Arafi stated that Iran and Russia have established a ”new era” in bilateral relations. Arafi travelled to Russia on July 21 to participate in the Eurasian Scholars Summit in Kazan, Russia, scheduled to be held on July 26.[86] Arafi, who also serves as the head of a university that aims to spread the principles of the Islamic Revolution to non-Iranian students, separately visited Moscow State Library on July 23.[87] Arafi called for deepening cultural, religious and scholarly ties with Russia during this visit.[88]Houthi media published video and images on July 23 of the Jaffa drone that the Houthis used to target Tel Aviv, Israel, on July 19.[89] An analyst focused on missile and drone systems reported that the Jaffa drone is an Iranian-designed Sammad-3 drone modified with a new engine for increased range.[90] The Jaffa drone flew at least 1,110 kilometers further than the maximum range of a standard Iranian Sammad-3 in its flight from Yemen to Israel.[91] An Israeli military correspondent previously stated that the Jaffa drone carried around 10 kilograms of explosives.[92] A standard Sammad-3 can carry up to 40 kilograms of explosives, suggesting that the Houthis may have sacrificed the explosive payload to increase the range or to accommodate a larger engine.Unspecified military sources in Sanaa told Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar on July 23 that the Houthis will target new civilian sites in Israel, which is consistent with the Houthi leader’s statements on July 21.[93] The unspecified military and political sources said that the Houthis have defined their targets for the fifth phase of escalation against Israel after a major Israeli airstrike on the port of Hudaydah on July 20.[94] The Houthis reportedly intend to target power plants in Ashdod, Ashkelon, Hadera, and Haifa, and several Israeli natural gas fields in the Mediterranean Sea and Dead Sea.[95] The unspecified military sources also said that the Houthis intend to target "[Israeli] maritime supplies” in the Indian Ocean.[96] CTP-ISW cannot verify Al Akhbar’s reporting. 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[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 19, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 10:16pm

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Jackson Karas of the Institute for the Study of War;Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise InstituteEditors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise InstituteData Cutoff: July 16, 2024The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.Key Takeaways  Taiwan Affairs Office Spokesperson Chen Binhua accused the DPP of intentionally distorting information about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) recent legal guidelines for punishing Taiwanese separatism and generating undeserved fear among the Taiwanese public.Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Sun Li-fang warned about the PRC’s weaponization of AI and deepfakes to conduct cognitive warfare operations.PRC state media promoted “high-quality development,” self-reliance, and overcoming “obstacles” to economic reform ahead of the CCP Central Committee’s Third Plenum. The CCP is trying to shore up perceptions of a weak economy and lay the groundwork for upcoming economic reforms because its domestic legitimacy increasingly rests on its ability to deliver economic prosperity.A PRC-Philippine agreement signed after the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on July 2 set up a direct presidential-level line of communication for bilateral crisis management. The hotline may provide a mechanism for escalation management but does not indicate a change in the PRC’s aggressive posture in the South China Sea.The PRC and Russia conducted joint naval exercises in the South China Sea concurrently with a joint naval patrol in the North Pacific.Cross-Strait RelationsTaiwanTaiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Spokesperson Chen Binhua accused the DPP of intentionally distorting information about the PRC’s recent legal guidelines for punishing Taiwanese separatism and generating undeserved fear among the Taiwanese public.[1] Chen stated that the recent regulations outlining severe punishment for “Taiwan independence forces” are not targeted at the vast majority of Taiwanese people but only against specific “die-hard elements.” Chen cited recent cross-strait exchanges as proof that the general public does not identify with the DPP’s alleged separatist policies.The TAO announcement aims to assuage concerns with the legal guidelines that caused alarm in Taiwan over the prospect of arbitrary incarceration and prosecution for those who travel to the mainland. Chen’s specification regarding the focus of the legal guidelines aims to clarify the target of the PRC’s recent ire following intensifying coercion towards Taiwan after the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te, a DPP member whom the PRC regards as a separatist advancing Taiwanese sovereignty.The guidelines follow a series of actions by the PRC to escalate pressure on Taiwan since the new administration, including large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in May, increasing encroachment on Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) by military aircraft, and the erosion of Taiwanese jurisdiction in waters around its outer islands. The PRC’s messaging toward the DPP directly links the aggressive PRC behavior to the DPP. The PRC justified its most recent military exercises, which took place three days after Lai’s inauguration, as a “strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces.”[2]There were at least 325 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ in June and 289 in May, the second and third-highest monthly totals on record, respectively. The June total is the highest for any month without a large-scale PLA exercise. The heightened number of ADIZ violations reflects an intensified PRC pressure campaign against Taiwan under Lai’s administration. The high frequency of ADIZ violations drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ violations, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed. Four Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen on July 11.[3] The four ships approached the outer limits of Kinmen’s restricted waters in four different locations and simultaneously sailed across the boundary an hour later. This is the second instance that CCG ships have sailed simultaneously in multiple locations since a state media-affiliated social media account Yuyuan Tantian stated that the CCG was pursuing a “new model” of law enforcement patrols around Kinmen in June.[4] The social media account claimed that CCG patrols since June have moved away from fixed routes and to new formations consisting of single ships and pairs, which will increase the number of patrol areas. Yuyuan Tantian also stated that the CCG has increased the intensity of patrols and is conducting them around the clock. Violating Taiwan’s jurisdiction in multiple areas at once with individual CCG ships stretches Taiwanese Coast Guard resources and reduces its ability to respond to incursions, similar to ADIZ incursions.Yuyuan Tantian stated that the original purpose of the CCG patrols was to defy Taiwan’s control over its restricted and prohibited waters. This contradicts the CCG’s stated purpose of their patrols in Kinmen’s waters, which is to “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese fishermen, including Taiwan… and ensure normal navigation and operation in Kinmen-Xiamen waters.”[5] Taiwan does not formally claim any territorial waters around Kinmen partly due to its proximity to the PRC, but it designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around Kinmen, which it treats as equivalent to "territorial waters" and a "contiguous zone," respectively. The PRC does not officially recognize the existence of any restricted or prohibited waters around Taiwan’s outlying islands and claims the right to conduct law enforcement activities there, however.  The Taiwan Affairs Office of Shanghai is holding an annual summer program that provides Taiwanese college students with internships at prestigious companies in Shanghai’s central business district.[6] The program is one of countless sociocultural exchanges under the coordination of the PRC’s United Front agencies that aim to strengthen young Taiwanese people’s connection to the mainland and promote Chinese identity. The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and win the hearts and minds of the Chinese people by forming a thorough alliance between the CCP and the rest of society.The program’s name, the “Stars Project,” mimics a well-respected Taiwanese program by the same name that helps promising high school students apply to universities in Taiwan.[7] The name is designed to leverage Taiwanese students’ association of the term with a prestigious program and encourage participation.President of the Taiwan Professors Association Chen Li-fu stated that the PRC’s United Front activities directed at Taiwan’s youth aim to influence their national identity.[8] Chen warned that the focus of the PRC’s United Front work against Taiwan has shifted to young people after the Sunflower Movement in 2014. The Sunflower Movement was a primarily student-led wave of political activism in 2014 that rejected integration policies with the PRC and championed Taiwanese identity.China-Taiwan Net, a news outlet that the TAO runs, features a constant stream of youth-focused cross-straits exchanges, demonstrating the emphasis of the PRC’s United Front work on reaching young Taiwanese people.[9] The PRC held the Cross-Strait Youth Summit in Beijing on July 3 and the Cross-Strait Youth Development Forum in Hangzhou and other cities on July 6.[10] The forums are annual events that the TAO and other United Front agencies host to promote cross-strait youth exchanges while pressuring attendees to adopt PRC-aligned political narratives, such as opposition to Taiwan's independence and acceptance of a shared national identity.Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Sun Li-fang warned about the PRC’s weaponization of AI and deepfakes to conduct cognitive warfare operations. Sun stated that the PRC’s cognitive warfare strategy is not limited to disseminating disinformation, but is closely integrated with the military operations of the PLA. The MND invited Academia Sinica Director of the Institute of Information and Communications Technology Huang Chin-i to advise on the PLA’s use of AI and disinformation to degrade the situational awareness and morale of its targets. Sun cited past examples of PRC disinformation targeted at Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise, including that the purpose of the exercises was for the commander-in-chief to plan an escape route, officers and soldiers defected due to the pressure of the exercises, and the equipment malfunctions casualties.[11]Huang also detailed the PLA’s goal to use AI-enabled disinformation to create political polarization among the public and incite divisions. The PRC’s political warfare against Taiwan features constant information operations that aim to degrade support for the DPP and suppress Taiwanese sovereignty and identity. Governments and threat intelligence organizations have called repeated attention to sprawling PRC disinformation operations in coordinated campaigns such as Spamouflage.[12] A report from DoubleThink Labs, a Taiwanese firm that researches PRC influence operations, released a report in January that detailed the wide range of narratives that PRC threat actors propagate to negatively influence Taiwanese people’s perception of the DPP. The narratives opportunistically seize on topical controversies in Taiwanese politics to amplify criticism of the DPP government, including egg and pork import scandals, fraud cases related to Taiwan’s domestic submarine production, compulsory military service extensions, Indian migrant worker inflows, and false rumors about President Lai Ching-te’s supposed illegitimate child.[13]ChinaPRC state media promoted “high-quality development,” self-reliance, and overcoming “obstacles” to economic reform ahead of the CCP Central Committee’s Third Plenum. The CCP’s 20th Central Committee held its Third Plenary Session from July 15-18. The Third Plenum for each CCP Central Committee, convened roughly every five years, sets the top economic policy agenda for the CCP’s next economic Five-Year Plan.[14] PRC state media including Xinhua and the CCP Central Party School journal Study Times called for the country to open itself to deeper economic reforms and to overcome “ideological rigidity” as well as “institutional and mechanistic” obstacles to reform.[15] A Study Times article on July 15, the first day of the Third Plenum, called for the party to push back on “misinterpretations” including the idea that reforms have stagnated.[16] An issue of the CCP theoretical magazine Qiushi released on the same day featured a series of excerpts from speeches by Xi Jinping that championed self-reliance and self-confidence.[17]CCP leaders at the Third Plenum are likely trying to address of major economic challenges the PRC is facing, including a spiraling housing market, high local government debt, low consumer demand, weakening investor confidence, and slowing economic growth.[18] The PRC’s National Bureau of Statistics released new economic numbers on July 15 that showed that the economy grew 5.3% in the first quarter and 4.7% in the second quarter, underperforming expectations. A spokesperson for the bureau framed the economy’s performance as “relatively good” and stable. The spokesperson blamed the second-quarter slowdown in growth on recent floods as well as insufficient domestic demand and “lack of smoothness in domestic circulation.”[19] A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) called the semi-annual economic report “remarkable” and said it showed that the PRC withstood the pressures of global instability and continued its “steady and positive” trend of “high-quality development” and “high-level opening-up.”[20]The CCP is trying to shore up perceptions of a weak economy and lay the groundwork for upcoming economic reforms because its legitimacy as the PRC’s one-party government increasingly rests on its ability to deliver economic prosperity. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report on July 9 based on surveys of PRC citizens that showed that the PRC populace increasingly blames unequal opportunity and an unfair economic system for poverty, while citing “connections” and generational wealth as the top two reasons for a person to be rich. The results show a dramatic change since 2014, when surveyed people cited talent and hard work as the top two reasons for wealth, while lack of ability and effort were the top two reasons given for poverty.[21]The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced new sanctions on six US defense firms over arms sales to Taiwan. The MFA announced on July 12 that it was imposing “countermeasures” on six US defense firms and five senior executives for arms sales to Taiwan. The sanctions freeze the PRC-based assets of Anduril Industries, Maritime Tactical Systems, Pacific Rim Defense, AEVEX Aerospace, LKD Aerospace, and Summit Technologies Inc. They also bar three Anduril executives and two executives of the drone manufacturer AeroVironment from entering the PRC and freeze any PRC-based assets they hold The MFA announcement said that US arms sales to Taiwan “seriously violated the one-China principle,” interfered in China’s domestic affairs, and damaged China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[22] The PRC has imposed sanctions on at least nine other US firms and their executives for the same reason in 2024, including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, and General Dynamics Land Systems.[23] A 2023 report by the German think tank Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) found that the PRC has significantly increased its use of unilateral sanctions since 2018 against US individuals, groups, or companies it perceives to be interfering in its internal affairs.[24] The PRC has repeatedly expressed opposition to unilateral sanctions in general, however, including US sanctions against it and other countries such as Russia and Iran.[25]Southeast AsiaPhilippinesA PRC-Philippine agreement signed after the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on July 2 set up a direct presidential-level line of communication for bilateral crisis management. Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Undersecretary Maria Theresa Lazaro and PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong met in Manila on July 2 for talks about the PRC-Philippine disputes in the South China Sea as part of the ninth round of BCM talks. The two countries signed the Arrangement on Improving Philippines-China Maritime Communication Mechanisms.[26] The Associated Press reported on July 16 that the agreement included the opening of a direct line of communication between the presidential offices of both countries to better manage disputes in the South China Sea.[27] The PRC and the Philippines have had a series of tense confrontations over the past several months over control of disputed islands and maritime features in the South China Sea. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) has used increasingly aggressive tactics including ramming and water cannons to prevent Philippine government ships from reaching Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has controlled Scarborough Shoal since 2012 but has not built any facilities there. The Philippines controls the Second Thomas Shoal using a beached derelict warship as an outpost. Both sides have avoided directly attacking each other’s personnel with weapons to prevent the dispute from escalating into a violent conflict, which could trigger the US-Philippine mutual defense treaty.The establishment of a presidential-level hotline with the Philippines may provide a mechanism for escalation management but does not indicate a change in the PRC’s aggressive posture in the South China Sea. The PRC has continued its rhetoric regarding the Philippines’ “provocations” around PRC-claimed territories in the South China Sea since the July 2 agreement. It anchored its largest CCG vessel, CCG-5901, less than 800 yards from the Philippine Coast Guard ship at the Philippine-controlled Sabina Shoal on July 3, released a report on July 8 blaming the Philippine warship on Second Thomas Shoal for environmental damage, and deployed CCG vessels to assert PRC claims to Second Thomas Shoal while “allowing” the Philippines to perform a medical evacuation on July 9.[28] Additionally, it is unclear how or whether the PRC will use the new hotline to defuse crises. The Philippines said that it was unable to reach PRC officials through a preexisting “maritime communication mechanism” during a confrontation at Second Thomas Shoal in August 2023.[29] An unspecified “highly placed” Philippine source told the South China Morning Post that the pre-existing hotline has never been used during Philippine resupply missions, a common flashpoint for conflict with the PRC, but has been used to coordinate with the PRC for search-and-rescue missions.[30]North AmericaCanadaThe PRC denied Canada’s accusations that the PRC set up clandestine overseas police stations in Toronto to harass Chinese expatriates. A July 13 Bloomberg article cited two anonymous sources within Canada’s government who stated that Canada has mapped out the locations of clandestine PRC police stations in its territory including in three majority-Chinese areas of Toronto.[31] The anonymous sources stated that Canada intends to coordinate its response to covert overseas PRC police stations with other members of the G7. Among the G7, the United States, Germany, Italy, and the UK have each expressed concern about overseas PRC police presence in their territory in the previous two years.[32] The United States and Canada released a joint communique on July 12 that highlighted common concerns of foreign interference including “transnational repression-related cases” such as the 2022 indictment of 5 US persons accused of working for the PRC government to silence expatriate criticism of the PRC.[33]Spain-based human rights organization Safeguard Defenders claimed in a 2022 report that the PRC operates 54 overseas police stations on 5 continents.[34] The report further stated that these covert police stations formed a part of a PRC campaign to establish extraterritorial control over Chinese expatriates while circumventing formal legal structures that would provide protection to the expatriates. Safeguard Defenders additionally noted that the PRC instead uses these covert police stations to threaten and harass expatriates to pressure them to return to the PRC. The location of the alleged PRC police bases in Chinese-majority areas of Toronto indicates that the PRC police presence in Canada is likely a component of the PRC’s wider effort to monitor and influence its expatriate community both extraterritorially and extralegally.PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian denied the existence of overseas PRC police stations and urged Canada to stop “smearing” the PRC in his daily remarks on July 15.[35] The PRC Embassy in Ottawa likewise claimed that the PRC offices in Toronto are staffed by volunteers and aid Chinese people with documentation and stated that the PRC respects the “judicial sovereignty” of all nations.[36] These statements mirror recent PRC criticisms of the United States and its allies of overselling the “China threat theory” as an excuse to heighten cooperation targeted at the PRC’s influence abroad. The PRC also has painted itself as the victim of a growing “anti-China” coalition in the West.[37] The PRC response reflects growing concern over what the PRC views as increasing Western cooperation to "contain” the PRC, particularly if a joint-G7 effort to combat clandestine PRC police action abroad materializes.RussiaThe PRC and Russia conducted joint naval exercises in the South China Sea concurrently with a joint naval patrol in the North Pacific. The “Joint-Sea 2024” exercises began on July 14 at a port in Zhanjiang, Guangdong, the headquarters of the PLAN South Sea Fleet.[38] The joint exercises included air defense drills, anti-submarine drills, live-fire drills, and rescue training.[39]  The Russian Navy corvettes Gromkiy and Rezkiy, Russian fleet oiler Irkut, PLAN destroyer Nanning, PLAN frigates Xianning and Dali, and PLAN supply ship Weishanhu, participated in the exercises.[40]Joint patrols began in the East China Sea, near South Korea’s Jeju Islands, and transited through Japan’s Osumi Strait before sailing to the South China Sea. The joint China-Russia Naval Patrol entered the South China Sea through the Balintang Channel located near the Luzon Strait.[41] The Chinese Ministry of Defense (MOD) reported that the joint patrol was carried out by the PLAN destroyer Yinchuan, PLAN frigate Hengshui, Russian frigate Sovershennyi, and PLAN supply ship Weishanhu.[42] The participating vessels also participated in “search and arrest” and supply replenishment exercises.[43]The PRC MOD denied that these exercises were in response to the recent NATO summit and stated that they were not intended to target any third party.[44] Instead, the PRC characterized them as a normal instance of cooperation between two militaries.Annual “Joint-Sea” exercises have been an element of China-Russia military cooperation since 2012 and have focused on enhancing joint maritime operations and responding to security threats facing the two countries.[45] To date, 10 of the 13 ”Joint-Sea” exercises have transited through the Indo-Pacific, most commonly the Sea of Japan and East China Seas, strategically important locations for China and Russia.[46] “Joint-Sea 2016” was the only exercise before “Joint-Sea 2024” to occur in the South China Sea, taking place a few months after the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea were invalid.[47]  “Joint-Sea 2024” occurred after the end of the United States, Japan, and South Korean trilateral “Freedom Edge” exercise in the East China Sea near Jeju Island and amid escalating tensions between the PRC and the Philippines. A Meeting between PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Zhao Leji and Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized Sino-Russian strategic consensus. On July 13 Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Zhao Leji met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.[48] The two discussed the strategic partnership between China and Russia, and the benefits that it has brought to both countries. Putin and Xi Jinping met earlier this month at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Astana and reportedly reached several consensuses, which Putin reiterated in his meeting with Zhao.[49] Given Zhao’s leadership position within the NPC, his affirmation of these points of consensus suggests continued Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation at the legislative level.        [1] http://www.npc.gov dot cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm[2] https://english.news dot cn/20240523/2e8ebbb3171a4f4e96e0147f35fd1df4/c.html[3] https://www.cga dot gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=160899&ctNode=650&mp=999[4] https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/-eR2DJZ08L6SvG-mDnZbpw[5] https://www.ccg dot gov.cn/hjyw/202406/t20240625_2323.html[6] https://bajiahao.baidu dot com/s?id=1803380743032209364&wfr=spider&for=pc[7] http://www.nthu.edu.tw/newsphoto/hottitle-2007.htm[8] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4736857[9] http://www.taiwan dot 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com/news/story/10930/8098838[12]  https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage_breakout.pdfhttps://medium.com/doublethinklab-tw/%E5%81%87%E8%A8%8A%E6%81%AF%E5%B0%8D%E9%81%B8%E6%B0%91%E7%9A%84%E5%BD%B1%E9%9F%BF%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90-2df9df307ca5[13] https://www.voacantonese.com/a/china-s-information-manipulation-and-interference-made-gains-in-influencing-tw-voters-20240119/7456603.html[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/what-is-chinas-third-plenum-2024-07-15/[15] http://www.news dot cn/politics/leaders/20240715/9cff4fc3bd734cdba2a06c7b76e7b9a8/c.htmlhttp://www.news dot cn/politics/leaders/20240716/dea3df3259b94eaabd94db6ff4a9a27b/c.htmlhttps://paper.cntheory dot com/html/2024-07/15/nw.D110000xxsb_20240715_3-A3.htm[16] https://paper.cntheory dot com/html/2024-07/15/nw.D110000xxsb_20240715_3-A1.htm[17]http://www.qstheory dot 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gov.cn/wjbzhd/202201/t20220115_10495894.shtmlhttps://english.news dot cn/20230510/59b65259fcdf477993992b392f819eb7/c.html[26] https://mb.com dot ph/2024/7/2/philippines-to-be-relentless-to-china-in-fight-for-west-ph-sea[27] https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-disputes-china-philippines-7ace0fe583baec202026e027f7c7cf1d  [28] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-anchors-monster-ship-in-south-china-sea-philippine-coast-guard-says-2024-07-06/https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1809161219259162791http://www.news dot cn/world/20240708/9c8576aaccd945d5ad68efd9f1b13b1d/c.htmlhttps://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1810883059253923980[29] https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-disputes-china-philippines-7ace0fe583baec202026e027f7c7cf1d[30] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3270819/south-china-sea-hotlines-exist-philippines-says-beijing-does-not-answer[31] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-13/canada-said-to-have-mapped-out-secret-chinese-police-operations?srnd=asia-politics; https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/rcmp-investigating-chinese-police-stations-canada-1.6627166[32] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-19/uk-expresses-great-concern-over-secret-chinese-police-stations; https://www.euronews.com/2022/12/23/italy-to-investigate-unofficial-chinese-police-stations.; https://www.politico.eu/article/china-shadow-police-stations-germany/.[33] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-communique-2024-us-canada-cross-border-crime-forum-cbcf; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-men-indicted-crimes-related-transnational-repression-scheme-silence-critics-people-s[34] https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/230000-policing-expands[35] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240715_11454130.shtml[36] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-13/canada-said-to-have-mapped-out-secret-chinese-police-operations?srnd=asia-politics[37] https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240711_11452358.shtml[38] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/sy/rt/16324540.html; https://news.usni.org/2024/07/15/joint-chinese-russian-naval-drills-start-in-south-china-sea[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/china-russia-kick-off-live-fire-naval-exercises-south-china-sea-2024-07-17/; https://news.usni.org/2024/07/15/joint-chinese-russian-naval-drills-start-in-south-china-sea[40] https://news.usni.org/2024/07/15/joint-chinese-russian-naval-drills-start-in-south-china-sea[41] https://www.newsweek.com/russia-china-multiple-warships-south-china-sea-1925108[42] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16324642.html[43] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3270529/china-russia-sea-drill-starts-after-flotilla-sails-past-japan-south-korea-and-philippines[44] http://www.news dot cn/milpro/20240715/ad70bee8d3a74212ba3c434baf6ae428/c.html[45] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/sy/rt/16324540.html[46] https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2019C26_pau.pdf[47] https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary057e.pdf[48]https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202407/t20240713_11453350.shtml[49] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202407/t20240714_11453530.html

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 8:58pm

Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Andie Parry, and George BarrosJuly 25, 2024, 7:30pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine since October 2023 in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24. Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows that Ukrainian forces stopped a reinforced battalion size Russian mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) after Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of the settlement.[1] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction reported that Russian forces attacked simultaneously with 11 tanks, 45 armored combat vehicles, a rare "Terminator" armored fighting vehicle (of which Russia has reportedly manufactured only 23 as of December 2023), 12 motorcycles, and roughly 200 personnel from several tactical directions at dawn on July 24.[2] The brigade reported that Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance identified the mechanized columns from a distance and that Ukrainian forces used artillery, drones, and minefields to blunt the Russian assault. The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed six Russian tanks, seven armored combat vehicles, and all 12 motorcycles and that Russian forces retreated after Ukrainian forces destroyed the first wave of vehicles. ISW last observed Russian forces conduct a battalion-sized mechanized attack in Donetsk Oblast in March 2024. Russian forces have not conducted larger mechanized assaults in Ukraine since the first days of Russia's four-month long operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023.[3] Russian forces likely intended to advance further into Kostyantynivka as part of their efforts to seize the settlement and cut the Vuhledar-Kostyantynivka T-0524 highway. Russian sources have long identified interdicting the T-0524 highway and disrupting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Vuhledar as a primary tactical objective in this direction. Russian milblogger recently suggested that Russian forces would intensify operations south of Kostyantynivka in support of this objective and force Ukrainian forces to retreat from positions in and around Vuhledar.[4] Russian forces likely will not make operationally significant advances in this area of the frontline in the near term even if they achieve tactically significant advances and prompt Ukrainian forces to retreat from nearby positions, as the surrounding area has no operationally significant objectives and is largely comprised of fields and isolated, small settlements and no significant nearby tactical heights. The Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight, and constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time. The Russian military has extensively relied on refurbishing stocks of Soviet-era weapons and military equipment, particularly armored vehicles, to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in Ukraine.[5] The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough vehicles to sustain a high level of equipment losses even with further economic mobilization.[6] Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight stated on July 25 that it observed Russian forces moving hundreds of pieces of equipment, primarily restored old, armored vehicles such as T-62 and T-55 tanks, to the front in June and early July 2024.[7] Frontelligence Insight noted that these restored vehicles have yet to appear on the battlefield and assessed that Russia may be preparing to use them in later 2024. Frontelligence Insight reported that internal Russia documents show that Russian tanks damaged within the past six months (since about January 2024) are widely waiting for replacement parts and that widespread engine shortages have led to the increasing cannibalization of more modern T-80 tanks to conduct repairs. Russia currently has enough armored vehicles to conduct periodic company-sized and larger mechanized assaults throughout the frontline for the foreseeable future, however. The Russian military command's continued willingness to suffer high armored vehicle losses for minor tactical gains instead of conserving armored vehicles for operations that pursue operationally significant objectives will impose increasingly significant costs on Russian forces as the Russian military's equipment constraints worsen over the coming years. The Russian military may be attempting to restore maneuver to the battlefield and pursue rapid gains through mechanized maneuver, although continued large scale frontal mechanized assaults indicate that the Russian military command has not fully internalized lessons about the difficulties of mechanized maneuver in the nearly transparent battlespace in Ukraine.[8]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) indicated that Lieutenant General Sergey Kobylash has become Deputy Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). The Russian MoD updated its list of VKS leadership as of July 24 to include Kobylash as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces.[9] Kobylash previously served as the Commander of the VKS Long-Range Aviation before his recent appointment.[10] The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant against Kobylash in March 2024 for war crimes perpetuated during Russian rear-area strike campaigns in Ukraine from October 2022 to at least March 2023.[11] Major General Sergey Kuvaldin replaced Kobylash as Commander of the VKS Long Range Aviation.[12]Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov attempted to frame Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate, while demonstrating the Kremlin's own unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations by reinvigorating Russian information operations falsely portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an "illegitimate" leader of Ukraine. Peskov claimed on July 25 that Russia "is open to achieving [its] goals through negotiations" but that there are obstacles to negotiations, including the false assertion that Zelensky is an illegitimate president and that Ukraine imposed a "de facto legislative ban on any contacts and negotiations with the Russian side."[13] Peskov claimed that Russia needs to understand "how ready Ukraine is, the government of the country, the Ukrainian side, and how much permission [Ukraine] has for [negotiations] from its curators" and that Ukraine has been offering "very different statements" on these issues.[14]Ukraine has clearly presented its plan for a lasting peace based on international law as part of preparations for eventual negotiations with Russia, and Ukrainian officials have openly invited a Russian representative to attend Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024.[15] The Kremlin, on the other hand, has repeatedly falsely claimed that it is open to negotiations while simultaneously indicating that it is only interested in a negotiated settlement that results in complete Ukrainian capitulation.[16] Peskov's statements, contrary to inaccurate reporting by select Western outlets, did not indicate that Russia is ready to negotiate with Zelensky, but rather that the Kremlin remains committed to its false narrative that Russia cannot negotiate with Zelensky, as Zelensky is supposedly Ukraine's "illegitimate" president.[17] ISW has extensively detailed how the Kremlin has been misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws to support these Russian narratives about Zelensky's illegitimacy.[18] Peskov also misrepresented the Ukrainian law concerning negotiations with Russia. Zelensky signed a decree in October 2022 that stated that negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin are "impossible" but did not outright ban "any contacts and negotiations with the Russian side," as Peskov claimed.[19]The Kremlin continues to strengthen its ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived at the ASEAN summit in Laos on July 25 and held a series of bilateral meetings with delegations from East Timor, Indonesia, Cambodia, Brunei, Laos, and the PRC.[20] Lavrov and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized the importance of Russia's and China's role in developing ASEAN and defending southeast Asia from "interference" by "extra-regional forces."[21] Russia and China may be posturing themselves as "defenders" of ASEAN member states in order to encourage deeper cooperation and dependence. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnor and PRC Prosecutor General Ying Yong also signed a cooperation agreement at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting on July 25, which will increase Russian-PRC judicial cooperation.[22] Krasnov characterized the agreement as part of Russia and the PRC's efforts to improve the "fight against transnational crime." Russia recently signed a similar agreement with North Korea, and ISW noted that the Kremlin may be interested in further consolidating control over the Russian information space and implementing measures similar to the North Korean and PRC governments.[23]The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and National Police announced that they neutralized a group connected to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) that had been preparing to commit arson against civilian objects in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.[24] Ukrainian authorities stated on July 25 that law enforcement detained 19 individuals based throughout Ukraine who had been preparing to commit arson against places of mass gatherings — including shopping centers, gas stations, pharmacies, and markets — in Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states.[25] Ukrainian authorities stated that the Russian FSB recruited the group with promises of monetary rewards, coordinated the group's activities remotely, and planned to transport group members to European Union (EU) member states with fake documents.[26] Ukrainian authorities stated that the FSB instructed the group to film the attacks for the FSB to use as propaganda to destabilize the social and political situation within the EU.[27] Russian actors and proxies have been intensifying hybrid military operations against NATO states to deter and disrupt Western military assistance to Ukraine, and these reported plans to commit arson against civilian objects may be in part to discourage Western states from providing Ukraine with further assistance.[28]Select Russian officials continue to call for measures targeting diaspora groups while the Russian government continues efforts to extend its control over migrants in Russia. Russian State Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveyev submitted a draft bill to the Russian State Duma on July 24 that seeks to limit the "political influence" of minority and diaspora communities in Russia by amending Russia's law on "national-cultural autonomies."[29] The current law provides for "certain ethnic communities" in Russia to organize public organizations that address issues of preserving a community's culture and identity, "harmonizing" the community with Russian society, and helping migrants adapt and integrate into Russian society.[30] Matveyev claimed that Russian "national-cultural autonomies" have an outsized influence on the Russian government and that the law deprives ethnic Russians of the right to form similar organizations.[31] Matveyev's draft bill proposes a series of amendments that would limit the rights and powers of the cultural organizations, including prohibiting these organizations from "interfere[ing]" in government policy. Alexander Dyukov, a member of the Commission for Monitoring and Resolving Conflict Situations in the Sphere of Interethnic Relations on Russian President Vladimir Putin's Council on Interethnic Relations, declared his support for Matveyev's bill on July 25 and echoed Matveyev's concerns about the outsized influence of "diasporas" on the Russian government.[32] Dyukov blamed deceased Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev for implementing problematic migration policies and for leaving future generations to solve these issues. Matveyev recently placed himself at the center of scandal intended to stir up anti-migrant sentiments among Russian ultranationalists and appears to be now turning his attention to limiting the rights of Russia's minority groups.[33]The Russian Investigative Committee announced a proposal on July 24 to create a unified interdepartmental database for registering migrants and foreign citizens coming into Russia and a "roadmap" for replacing Russia's dependence on labor migrants with jobs for Russian citizens.[34] The Russian Investigative Committee also proposed requiring migrants to obtain Russian SIM cards upon entering Russia and use the associated phone number to register with the Russian government. Several Russian federal subjects (regions) have recently barred migrants from working in the food service and transportation industries, and these initiatives likely intend to discourage migration into Russia by making daily life more difficult for migrants despite Russia's evidenced dependence on migrant labor to address its labor and force generation shortages.[35]Syrian President Bashar al Assad met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 24.[36] [NOTE: A version of this text appears in ISW-CTP's July 25 Iran Update] Assad and Putin discussed escalating tensions in the Middle East, including in Syria.[37] The leaders also discussed improving bilateral economic relations.[38] Assad last met with Putin in Russia in March 2023 during which they reached over 40 agreements on promoting economic cooperation.[39] It remains unclear if Syria and Russia have advanced the 2023 agreements since then.Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine since October 2023 in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24.The Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight, and constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) indicated that Lieutenant General Sergey Kobylash has become Deputy Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS).Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov attempted to frame Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate, while demonstrating the Kremlin's own unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations by reinvigorating Russian information operations falsely portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an "illegitimate" leader of Ukraine.The Kremlin continues to strengthen its ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states.The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and National Police announced that they neutralized a group connected to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) that had been preparing to commit arson against civilian objects in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.Select Russian officials continue to call for measures targeting diaspora groups while the Russian government continues efforts to extend its control over migrants in Russia.Syrian President Bashar al Assad met with Russian President Vladmir Putin in Moscow on July 24.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Robotyne, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Toretsk, Donetsk City, and Robotyne.Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on July 24 granting deferments from military conscription to employees of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and Investigative Committee who have higher education and special ranks starting in September 2024. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 24 and 25 that Russian forces attacked near Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City and on the border with Belgorod Oblast).[40] Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups have recently operated within Sotnytskyi Kozachok, but ISW assessed as of July 17 that Russian forces no longer maintained a presence in the border settlement.[41]  Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City amid continued assaults north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 25. Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized all of Hlyboke over the last 24 hours, but ISW has not observed confirmation of Russian forces operating in the western part of the settlement.[43] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that fighting is ongoing north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City within Vovchansk and near Starytsya and Tykhe.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 28 glide bombs at targets north of Kharkiv City near Ruska Lozova, Pytomnik, Vesele, Lyptsi, and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya and Vovchanski Khutory over the last day.[45]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 24 and 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Stelmakhivka and Petropavlivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka and Nevske; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on July 24 and 25.[46] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Nevske.[47] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Rozdolivka towards Pereizne (both south of Siversk), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[48] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Ivano-Dariivka, and south of Siversk near Mykolaivka on July 24 and 25.[49] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 25 but did not make any confirmed gains. Russian forces continued assaults near Chasiv Yar and Novyi Microraion in eastern Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, Mayske, Hryhorivka, and Novomarkove; and east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske on July 24 and 25.[51] Elements of the Russian "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Novyi Microraion, and elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC), and "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are operating near Chasiv Yar.[52] Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and continued offensive operations in the area on July 25. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Slavna Street within northern Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and along Zaporizka Street in central Zalizne.[53] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Toretsk near Dachne; east of Toretsk near Pivnichne and Druzhba; southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne; and south of Toretsk near Niu York on July 24 and 25.[54] Russian forces reportedly continued to advance northwest of Avdiivka on July 25, but there were no confirmed changes in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) seized Vovche (northwest of Avdiivka) and advanced further north and west of Prohres (immediately north of Vovche).[55] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Lozuvatske (northwest of Avdiivka), within southwestern Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka), and northeast of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka).[56] Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Vesele, Ivanivka, Novoselivka Persha, Vozdvyzhenka, and Vovche; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka and Novozhelanne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on July 24 and 25.[57] Russian forces recently advanced during a reinforced battalion-size mechanized assault southwest of Donetsk City and continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on July 25. Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) during a reinforced battalion-size mechanized assault.[58] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on July 24 and 25.[59] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC]) are reportedly operating within Krasnohorivka.[60] Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 25. The commander of a Russian assault detachment claimed on July 24 that Russian forces seized several Ukrainian positions north of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[61] Russian forces also conducted ground assaults near Novodarivka on July 25 (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[62]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian and Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced amid continued positional fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 25. Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced northeast of Robotyne and that Russian forces marginally advanced south of Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields even further south of Mala Tokmachka and pushed Ukrainian forces away from the H-08 Orikhiv-Polohy highway, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[64] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Robotyne, near Mala Tokmachka, and northwest of Robotyne near Yurkivka, Novoandriivka, and Shcherbaky on July 24 and 25.[65] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on July 24 that Russian forces have accumulated 90,000 personnel total between different operational directions and throughout the entire operational depth of Russian defenses in Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] Lykhovyi emphasized that Ukrainian forces have not observed Russian forces forming an offensive group in Zaporizhia Oblast. Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly fighting southwest of Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne), and elements of the Russian 1429th and 1430th motorized rifle regiments (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[67] Positional fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on July 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[68] Elements of the Russian 25th Spetsnaz Regiment (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[69] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 24 to 25. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 38 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and targeted critical infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and central Ukraine on the night of July 24 to 25.[70] Oleshchuk stated that Ukrainian forces downed 25 Shahed drones and that three Shahed drones were "lost" when the drones entered Romanian airspace. The Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Romanian authorities discovered the remains of a Russian Shahed drone near Plauru (along the Romanian-Ukrainian border across from Izmail, Odesa Oblast).[71] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated that Russian drones damaged an administrative building in Izmail Raion, Odesa Oblast, and the Izmail Raion Military Administration reported that 11 Russian drones struck port infrastructure and a home near Vylkove.[72] Ukraine's State Emergency Service reported that debris from Russian Shahed drones damaged infrastructure in Zhytomyr Oblast.[73] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian military concentration area and the Kharkiv Armored Plant, which produces tanks and armored vehicles, in Kharkiv City with an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles on July 25.[74]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on July 24 granting deferments from military conscription to employees of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and Investigative Committee who have higher education and special ranks starting in September 2024.[75] The law also allows the Russian military to dismiss Russian contract servicemembers (kontraktniki) early if they transfer to working in the Prosecutor General's Office or the Investigative Committee. The Russian government has previously issued deferments to employees with higher education and special ranks who work in Rosgvardia, the State Fire Service, agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and penal colony and customs agencies.[76]The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on July 24 in its second and third readings that allows for the transfer of confiscated civilian weapons and ammunition cartridges to Rosgvardia, the Ministry of Defense (MoD), or other state paramilitary organizations operating in Ukraine.[77]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces must overcome organization and guidance issues before fielding small aircraft or training aircraft equipped with small arms to intercept Ukrainian drones within Russia.[78] The milblogger claimed that these changes are necessary to prevent Russian air defense from shooting down Russian aircraft in friendly fire incidents and to ensure Russian pilots can accurately target enemy drones. A Russian aviation expert claimed on July 22 that Ukrainian forces started using "small air defense aircraft" to combat Russian drones but that Russian forces have yet to field this adaptation due to administrative hurdles within the Russian military bureaucracy.[79]Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.Russian Information Operations and NarrativesRussian officials continue to threaten former Soviet states as Russian ultranationalists continue to criticize these countries for forming relations with the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 24 in response to the European Union (EU) military assistance to Armenia that Armenia is a brotherly country to Russia and that Russia hopes that Armenia will not follow the "path of Ukraine" in its search for international partners.[80] Peskov's statement is an implied threat to Armenia against pursuing additional ties with Western partners and pulling away from Russia. A prominent Russian milblogger continued to criticize Armenia as weak and claimed that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is attempting to degrade Armenia's military capabilities.[81] The milblogger also dismissed reports of Armenian-Iranian military cooperation.[82] The milblogger also criticized a Kazakh effort to establish new national values and symbology as pulling away from its historical ties to the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[83]Russian officials continue to exert authority over other sovereign states through criminal proceedings. The Russian Investigative Committee sent materials to a Russian court on July 25 to support the conviction of a former Ukrainian diplomat in absentia for statements against Russia.[84]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on Valaam Island, Republic of Karelia on July 25 to discuss the development of the Russian-Belarusian Union State and regional security issues.[85] Lukashenko also met with St. Petersburg Oblast Governor Alexander Beglov in St. Petersburg on July 25 and reportedly discussed trade and cooperation between St. Petersburg and Belarus.[86]Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov met with North Korean Prime Minister Kim Tok Hun on July 25 in Pyongyang and discussed intensifying bilateral cooperation in education, healthcare, and agriculture, and foreign policy.[87]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6151; https://t.me/odshbr79/244[2] https://t.me/odshbr79/244[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102223[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-is-pumping-out-weaponsbut-can-it-keep-it-up-ba30bb04 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2024[7] https://frontelligence.substack dot com/p/summer-2024-frontline-dynamics-overview[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110123[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/262364; https://t.me/tass_agency/262365; https://t.me/tass_agency/262366; https://kommersant [dot] ru/doc/6851769[10] https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-sergei-ivanovich-kobylash-and[11] https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-sergei-ivanovich-kobylash-and[12] https://kommersant dot ru/doc/6851769[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/21448527; https://tass dot ru/politika/21448959; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/972433; https://ria dot ru/20240725/peregovory-1961921129.html[14] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/972433[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061624[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-russia-is-open-talks-with-ukraine-while-zelenskiy-is-power-needs-2024-07-25/[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824[19] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/6792022-44249; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2022/10/4/7370293/[20] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43501 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43502 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43504 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43505 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43507 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43510 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43511[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/262478 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43510 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262483 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43516[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/21445637 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262401[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072224[24] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-i-natspolitsiia-zneshkodyly-ahenturnu-hrupu-fsb-yaka-hotuvala-pidpaly-torhovykh-tsentriv-u-yevrosoiuzi-video[25] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-i-natspolitsiia-zneshkodyly-ahenturnu-hrupu-fsb-yaka-hotuvala-pidpaly-torhovykh-tsentriv-u-yevrosoiuzi-video[26] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-i-natspolitsiia-zneshkodyly-ahenturnu-hrupu-fsb-yaka-hotuvala-pidpaly-torhovykh-tsentriv-u-yevrosoiuzi-video[27] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-i-natspolitsiia-zneshkodyly-ahenturnu-hrupu-fsb-yaka-hotuvala-pidpaly-torhovykh-tsentriv-u-yevrosoiuzi-video[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052724[29] https://t.me/matveevkomment/8136 ; https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/680189-8[30] https://base dot garant.ru/135765/1cafb24d049dcd1e7707a22d98e9858f/#friends[31] https://t.me/matveevkomment/8136[32] https://t.me/historiographe/14477[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024[34] https://t.me/sledcom_press/14769 ; https://t.me/sledcom_press/14768 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21443153 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262346 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73156[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024 ; https://ria dot ru/20240718/oblast-1960413042.html ; https://tlt dot ru/region/v-samarskoj-oblasti-vvodyat-novye-zaprety-na-rabotu-migrantov/2238013/ ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/social/news/2024/04/27/22884889.shtml[36] https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-assad-syria-e0e411c100d70862dfea3528c3a1c6bb ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74637; https://www.sana dot sy/?p=2118363[37] https://t.me/tass_agency/262408[38] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74637[39] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2023/03/al-assad-offers-putin-what-left-of-syria/ ; https://www.syria dot tv/%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88 ;[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6152; https://t.me/ASPIDGroup/107[43] https://t.me/dva_majors/48036; https://t.me/rybar/62082[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48036; https://t.me/rybar/62082 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21199 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13068[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl[46]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl; https://t.me/motopatriot/25416; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/20285; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl; https://t.me/rusich_army/16026[47] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16634[48] https://t.me/motopatriot/25406 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13058[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131209[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48036; https://t.me/rybar/62082 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21199[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/9917 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131166 ; https://t.me/modeatti/28 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25410 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73204[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6156; https://t.me/voron1OO/40[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48036; https://t.me/rybar/62082 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21199[55] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18459; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27391 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73139[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13063 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13065 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48036; https://t.me/rybar/62082[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6151; https://t.me/odshbr79/244[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48036; https://t.me/rybar/62082[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73165[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/41347[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl[63] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6153; https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/3689; https://x.com/moklasen/status/181622191066702652 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1816222182068142409; https://t.me/polk1430_1429/4536[64] https://t.me/rybar/62101[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl[66] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/25/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-chy-gotuyut-rosiyany-nastupalne-ugrupovannya-na-zaporizhzhi/[67] https://t.me/motopatriot/25418; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1816222182068142409; https://t.me/polk1430_1429/4536[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jm7zhRbBYE3oHBXWUzu6Y22jDuFgidkbt9mB7V3JH3dU76rayco7y7B6Q7J97fhtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zYRPkMX4q9zgko6AwyHZJTyvb96VcReHyNEq2wCVobgW5BgLCEwRtY2DXCWaescNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zcThSdYZkWRaKCp3MZijo8xe5XP3bMMcSjaq8RQZh6XwMp5nQaBttsLL5iEbNChfl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10662[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/48032[70] https://t.me/ComAFUA/356[71] https://www.digi24 dot ro/stiri/actualitate/seful-fortelor-aeriene-ucrainene-afirma-ca-trei-drone-rusesti-au-trecut-frontiera-de-stat-in-romania-2872043 ; https://twitter.com/Odobes1Luminita/status/1816411760229843383[72] https://t.me/odeskaODA/6095 ; https://www.facebook.com/izmail.rda/posts/pfbid0EghXTpETFJTV87QfjAqS6WzkKayS51HAazpygywo7dbBvbbjkD1XPKWDJUAnREwgl?locale=uk_UA[73] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/30579[74] https://t.me/mod_russia/41366 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41363[75] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/news/74641[76] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2024/07/24/1051949-putin-podpisal-zakon[77] https://t.me/Hinshtein/7265 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21437637[78] https://t.me/rybar/62094[79] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2024[80] https://t.me/tass_agency/262352 ; https://ria dot ru/20240724/peskov-1961805436.html?in=t; https://ria dot ru/20240724/armenija-1961804729.html[81] https://t.me/rybar/62086[82] https://t.me/rybar/62093[83] https://t.me/rybar/62067[84] https://t.me/tass_agency/262434 ; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21447251[85] https://t.me/pul_1/13147 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262497 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262420; https://t.me/tass_agency/262421 ; https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/posesenie-valaama[86] https://t.me/pul_1/13144 ; https://78 dot ru/news/2024-07-25/lukashenko-priletel-v-peterburg-na-vstrechu-s-putinim; https://president dot gov.by/ru/events/rabocij-vizit-v-rossijskuu-federaciu[87] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/260379 ; https://www.belta dot by/politics/view/glava-mid-belarusi-vstretilsja-s-premjer-ministrom-kndr-650252-2024/ 

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 8:58pm

Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, and George BarrosJuly 23, 2024, 7pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Russian State Duma proposed an amendment that would allow commanders to punish subordinates for using personal communications and navigation devices at the frontline, prompting significant milblogger backlash and highlighting how Russian forces continue to struggle with command and control (C2) issues and overreliance on insecure technologies to conduct combat operations in Ukraine. The Russian State Duma Defense Committee announced its support on July 23 for an amendment that will make wearing "gadgets" (personal phones and electronic devices) in the combat zone a "gross disciplinary offense" and will allow Russian commanders to arrest servicemembers in violation of such offenses without a court order and detain violating servicemembers for up to 10 days.[1] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov claimed that punishments would not be applicable to servicemembers using devices for combat operations and noted that the amendment is based on a previous bill that generally banned the use of private devices in Ukraine.[2] Kartapolov claimed that the main goal of this amendment is to protect Russian servicemembers against security risks associated with improper cell phone usage.[3]Russian milbloggers widely criticized this amendment and claimed that punishing soldiers for using personal devices will significantly complicate Russian logistics, C2, and operations in general. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian servicemembers significantly rely on their personal devices to transmit target coordinates to call for fire from Russian artillerymen and drone operators, to navigate frontline areas, and to coordinate between units.[4] A prominent Russian milblogger published a formal appeal to Kartapolov and claimed that the amendment would result in the "paralysis" of the Russian military's C2 bodies and called on the Russian Duma Defense Committee to amend the bill to cohere more realistically with how Russian forces use personal devices in Ukraine.[5] Several Russian milbloggers called on the Russian government to provide secure communications and navigation devices to Russian servicemembers before instituting punishment for the ad hoc use of personal devices and criticized Russian Duma deputies for being out of touch with frontline realities.[6] Russian milbloggers also called on Duma deputies to work with the Russian Armed Forces on the proposed amendments and future legislation in order to ensure that laws are in accordance with frontline realities and urged deputies to visit the frontline in Ukraine.[7] One critical Russian milblogger accused Kartapolov and his team of committing treason and pursuing this policy in order to help Ukraine win the war.[8]It remains unclear if the Russian military command will be able or willing to enforce punishment for the use of personal devices in Ukraine, however, emphasizing the Russian military’s high level of dependency on insecure communications systems. Russian milbloggers questioned how Russian officials intend to differentiate between devices that are and are not used for combat operations and sarcastically noted that Russian officials may intend to implement a complicated (and likely ineffective or unenforceable) bureaucratic system to differential between devices.[9] One Russian milblogger claimed that either the Russian military command will attempt to make commanders enforce the unpopular ban or commanders and their subordinates will pretend to follow the ban while continuing to use their personal devices.[10] Another Russian milblogger complained that the amendment would be another arbitrary rule that commanders can use to justify punishing careless conscripts or disliked subordinates.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) previously attempted to restrict the use of personal devices in the combat zone in Ukraine following a Ukrainian strike on Russian barracks in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast (which Ukrainian forces were able to target by tracking Russian cell phone signals) and was met with similar criticism in January 2023.[12] The Russian MoD is unlikely to be significantly more successful at this time given that the MoD has failed to address Russian forces' dependency on insecure personal devices for communication and navigation and provide secure alternatives. The Russian military will likely find it extremely difficult to remove its dependence on insecure personal devices for a large suite of ordinary frontline tasks.Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against a ferry crossing in Kavkaz, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 22 to 23. Krasnodar Krai officials claimed that Ukrainian drones struck a ferry in the port of Kavkaz, causing a temporary fire.[13] The ferry crossing in Kavkaz is roughly 15 kilometers from occupied Kerch, Crimea across the Kerch Strait, and Russian forces routinely use ferries in the area to relieve pressures on the Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea across the Kerch Strait Bridge.[14]Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed a new Deputy Head of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Services on July 22, and there were several personnel changes within the Russian State Duma on July 23. Putin appointed former Moscow Oblast Roszdravnadzor (Federal Healthcare Surveillance Service) Head Roman Kurynin as Deputy Head of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Services, replacing Lieutenant General Alexei Serko, who held the position since 2018.[15] The Russian State Duma dismissed Duma Deputy Speaker Sergei Neverov, Pavel Zavalny, and Dmitri Svishchev as heads of the Duma committees on energy and physical education and sports, respectively, on July 23.[16] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin stated that the Duma will also consider proposals for the heads of the Duma's culture and nationalities committees.[17] A prominent Russian insider source claimed that Neverov's dismissal suggests that Volodin may be losing some of his control over the State Duma.[18]Key Takeaways:The Russian State Duma proposed an amendment that would allow commanders to punish subordinates for using personal communications and navigation devices at the frontline, prompting significant milblogger backlash and highlighting how Russian forces continue to struggle with command and control (C2) issues and overreliance on insecure technologies to conduct combat operations in Ukraine.Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against a ferry crossing in Kavkaz, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 22 to 23.Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed a new Deputy Head of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Services on July 22, and there were several personnel changes within the Russian State Duma on July 23.Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Siversk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.Russian regional officials are continuing to increase financial incentives to entice more men to fight in Ukraine.Russian occupation officials continue to rely on Russian security organs for law enforcement and filtration functions in occupied Ukraine aimed at degrading pro-Ukrainian sentiment. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued localized offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 22 and 23. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces completely out of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) and back by up to one kilometer, although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence confirming that Russian forces control all of Hlyboke.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted airstrikes between Lyptsi and Hlyboke, causing Ukrainian forces to pull back and replenish reserves.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian artillery and first-person view (FPV) drone strikes repelled several attempted Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hlyboke area.[21] The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) reportedly conducted an ODAB-1500 volumetric detonating aerial bomb strike against Ukrainian forces near Borshchova (north of Kharkiv City and south of Hlyboke).[22] Positional fighting continued near Hlyboke, Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe (both just east of Vovchansk) on July 22 and 23.[23]  A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are becoming more active near Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk).[24] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaliy Sarantsev stated on July 23 that Russian forces are concentrating their main efforts near Hlyboke and Vovchansk and that Russian forces continue to regroup to conduct assaults but are not preparing for a new offensive operation.[25] The Kharkiv Oblast Group of Forces stated that elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are preparing to resume offensive operations near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City).[26] Elements of the 128th Motorized Brigade (44th AC, LMD), 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD), 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th AC, Baltic Sea Fleet), and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) of the Russian forces are operating in the Kharkiv direction.[27] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued ground assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently seized positions on the northwestern outskirts of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) but denied claims that Russian forces are operating within central Synkivka.[28] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced over 800 meters within Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), northwest of Kreminna near Nevske, and west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka.[29] Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, Hlushkivka, Kolisnykivka, Berestove, and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka; southwest of Svatove near Makiivka and Novoserhiivka; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on July 22 and 23.[30] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued Russian ground attacks in the area on July 23. Geolocated footage published on July 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[31] Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on July 22 and 23.[32] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Siversk direction stated on July 22 that Russian and Ukrainian forces have been using more drones and less artillery in the area, but that Ukrainian forces currently have the advantage in drone improvements and adaptations.[33] The battalion commander also reported that Russian forces operate large electronic warfare (EW) systems roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline and activate them when Russian forces conduct assaults to interfere with Ukrainian drones. Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating near Pereizne; and elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) reportedly continue operating in the Siversk direction.[34]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 23 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Kalynivka and near Hryhorivka (both north of Chasiv Yar), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff continued to report a higher number of Russian attacks in the Chasiv Yar direction as of 0800 local time on July 23, particularly north of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka, Minkivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Hryhorivka, Kalynivka, and Bohdanivka,.[36] Fighting also continued north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Bila Hora on July 22 and 23.[37] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on July 23 that elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are operating near Chasiv Yar, suggesting that the Russian command has committed elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade to combat operations in both the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions.[38] Voloshyn also reported that Russian forces plan to strengthen units operating in the Chasiv Yar direction with elements of two additional unspecified brigades. Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 23 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and in central Niu York (south of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[39] Fighting continued near Toretsk; southeast of Toretsk near Pivnichne and Zalizne; and south of Toretsk near Niu York and Panteleymonivka on July 22 and 23.[40] Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka on July 23 amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area. Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to Molodizhna Street in southwestern Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka).[41] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on July 23 that Russian forces have advanced up to six kilometers within the past week in the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk direction (northwest of Avdiivka) and noted that Russian forces are 14 kilometers away from Myrnohrad, consistent with ISW's assessment of Russian advances in the area.[42] Butusov stated that Ukrainian forces are in a "critically difficult" situation in the Pokrovsk (Avdiivka) direction and noted that Russian forces are attempting to attack the most degraded Ukrainian units in the area instead of targeting the weakest defensive positions. Butusov also stated that Russian forces are conducting small infantry-led frontal assaults in the Avdiivka direction. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Vovche (northwest of Avdiivka) and on the northern and southern banks of the Karlivske Reservoir (west of Avdiivka), although ISW has not seen visual evidence of Russian gains in these areas.[43] Fighting continued north of Avdiivka near Kalynove; northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Ivanivka, Tymofiivka, Lozuvatske, Prohres, Novoselivka Persha, and Vovche; and west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka, Umanske, and Karlivka on July 22 and 23.[44] Ukrainian military sources published footage on July 23 showing Ukrainian forces shooting down a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft in the Pokrovsk direction.[45] Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on July 23. Geolocated footage published on July 22 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced to Slovyanska Street in Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[46] A Ukrainian source published footage on July 22 showing Ukrainian forces repelling part of a reportedly roughly reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified location in the Donetsk direction on an unspecified date.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Vodyane (southwest of Donetsk City) and advanced up to 3.1 kilometers in central and eastern Maksymilyanivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[48] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka, and southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka, Paraskoviivka, and Kostyantynivka on July 22 and 23.[49] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), "Grachi" Spetsnaz detachment, and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) reportedly continue operating near Krasnohorivka.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 23 that Russian forces are conducting assaults in the direction of Makarivka and Blahodatne (both south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[51] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces with tank support recently advanced near Vremivka (just southwest of Velyka Novoselika).[52] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces were using buggies and dirt bikes to attack Ukrainian positions near Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[53]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne, east of Robotyne near Verbove, and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on July 22 and 23.[54] Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[55] Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD), and the 89th Separate Rifle Regiment (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[56] Positional fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on July 22 and 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 23 that fighting continued on islands in the Dnipro River and that Ukrainian drones continue to pose a significant threat to Russian forces in the area.[58] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted occupied Crimea on the night of July 22 to 23. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces destroyed 21 Ukrainian drones over occupied Crimea and the Black Sea, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed 15 of the Ukrainian drones near occupied Sevastopol.[59] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that a Ukrainian drone struck a Russian Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) radio station near Sevastopol, although ISW cannot confirm this report.[60]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 22 to 23. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched a Kh-69 cruise missile and eight Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast at targets in Sumy Oblast.[61] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian mobile fire groups and electronic warfare (EW) units downed seven Shahed drones and that Ukrainian "active countermeasures" prevented the Kh-69 missile from striking its target. The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces conducted an air strike against critical infrastructure facilities in Shostka Hromada.[62] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched a missile, likely an Iskander-M ballistic missile, from occupied Crimea and struck Odesa Oblast on July 22.[63]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian regional officials are continuing to increase financial incentives to entice more men to fight in Ukraine. Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin signed a bill on July 23 offering recruits from Moscow a one-time enlistment bonus of 1.9 million rubles (about $21,600) if they sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for one year of military service.[64] Sobyanin’s press service reported that Russian contract servicemen will receive 5.2 million rubles (about $59,150) during the first year of military service.[65] ISW continues to assess that such high financial incentives will continue to generate sufficient manpower to sustain Russia’s current offensive tempo but are likely to impose high long-term costs on Russia's regional and federal budgets. Russian ultranationalist recruitment network the Union of Donbas Volunteers also announced the recruitment of volunteers into the 7th “Saint Grigoriy” Assault Brigade (Redut private military company [PMC]).[66]The Russian government is also attempting to incentivize military service by removing the eligibility requirements for Russian servicemen and Ukrainian residents of occupied territories to receive veteran status. The Russian State Duma approved in the first reading a law on July 23 that will grant combat veteran status to Russian servicemen and Ukrainian residents fighting in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts if they have resided and fought in southern Ukraine with Russian forces since Russia’s illegal annexation of these oblasts on September 30, 2022.[67] A Russian deputy defense minister claimed that this provision would not require additional expenditures from the budget, despite the fact that the expansion of veteran statuses to more servicemen commits Russia to long-term expenditures such as military pensions, medical support, and other social benefits.A close affiliate of arrested Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin amplified a post on July 22 recounting complaints from Russian service members and their relatives about the Russian MoD failing to pay them and mislabeling active personnel as missing.[68] The post outlined the experience of a drone operator of the 138th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), who volunteered to fight in Ukraine in November 2023 and deployed to the Vovchansk direction (northeast of Kharkiv City) as part of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) and the Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) in May 2024. The post noted that the drone operator stopped receiving his monthly salary in March 2024 and began receiving only 30,000 to 50,000 rubles ($340 to $570) alongside his fellow service members. The post noted that Russian military authorities listed the drone operator and other frontline troops as missing and that the Russian MoD owed the drone operator 600,000 rubles ($6,800) for his service. The drone operator’s relatives reportedly issued several appeals to the Russian government, resulting in the drone operator receiving a portion of the promised compensation from a different Russian military unit than the one he serves in. The post noted that similar problems are impacting many Russian service members and their families and demonstrates the persistent Russian issues with military bureaucracy and compensation.The Russian State Duma adopted several other bills regarding force generation and military service benefits. The Russian State Duma adopted in the second and third reading a bill allowing employers to transfer information about employees liable for military service to military enlistment centers, which will likely support efforts to improve Russia's reserve call-up system.[69] The Russian State Duma adopted a law in the second and third readings that will ban Russian officials from collecting bankruptcy payments from Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine.[70]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)A Russian aviation expert published an essay on July 22 arguing that the widespread use of drones in the war in Ukraine prompted Ukrainian forces to start using what the expert classified as “small air defense aircraft,” but that Russian forces have yet to field this adaptation due to administrative hurdles with the Russian military bureaucracy.[71] The expert claimed that Ukrainian forces pioneered the use of light aircraft to repel drones after they shot down a Russian “Orlan-10” reconnaissance drone with a Ukrainian two-seater Yakovlev Yak-52 trainer aircraft over Odesa Oblast in April 2024. The expert argued that Ukrainian forces continued to use “small air defense aircraft” against Russian drones and are also using Ukrainian Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat two-seat ultralight aircraft for this purpose. The expert claimed that Russian forces have not yet used small aviation for air defense purposes and that Russia lacks the necessary aircraft of this class for such operations. The expert noted that civilian aviators train on the Diamond DA40 four-seat light aircraft, the design of which prevents Russian forces from using these planes to intercept drones. The expert added that Russian cadets train on the L-39 trainer jets, which he characterized as unsuitable to match Ukrainian capabilities. The expert noted that the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) and its private owners have around 25 Yak-52 aircraft and that Russia’s aviation sector has approximately the same amount of A-22s and the A-32 variant. The expert noted that Russia has problems with maintaining the A-32 aircraft because it is a Ukrainian product and that Russia would need to seize aircraft from private owners under mobilization law to maintain such aircraft. The expert added that Russian private owners and DOSAAF also have approximately 250 various Cessna class two-seat training aircraft and that Russia has at most a dozen Yak-12 aircraft that can intercept drones, but that Russia’s Yak-18T aircraft is not suitable for such operations due to its structure.A Russian serviceperson reportedly revealed to a Russian milblogger on July 22 that his regiment is using Russian Rex-1 anti-drone guns, but that this gun is unable to disrupt targets that operate at frequencies below 2.4 GHz.[72]Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russian occupation officials continue to rely on Russian security organs for law enforcement and filtration functions in occupied Ukraine aimed at degrading pro-Ukrainian sentiment. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration warned residents of occupied Kherson Oblast that FSB border guard elements are working a security checkpoint to conduct "special control methods" for those planning to fly out of occupied Kherson Oblast.[73] These control methods include document checks and verbal interviews and will take longer for those with Ukrainian citizenship. Russian occupation security structures frequently use such "special control measures" to carry out filtration practices aimed at identifying, detaining, and prosecuting people deemed to be pro-Ukrainian or a threat to the occupation regime.[74] Other Russian security structures, such as Rosgvardia, have become increasingly active in occupied Ukraine for similar reasons.[75]Russia continues to pursue infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine aimed at increasing connectivity and economic integration between Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian media project Center for Journalistic Investigations published a report on July 19 detailing how Russia is constructing two parallel pipelines running from Taganrog, Rostov Oblast through occupied Mariupol, Berdyansk, and Melitopol.[76] The Center for Journalistic Investigations analyzed open-source data showing the gradual construction of the pipelines since 2022 and speculated that Russian officials plan to use gas distribution stations in occupied Mariupol to act as central supply nodes for the pipelines. Regardless of whether the pipelines will be used for gas, water, or fuel, they will further increase occupied Ukraine's reliance on supplies from Russia, further integrating occupied Ukraine into the Russian economy and generating long-term dependencies on the Russian system.Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to sponsor the forced relocation of Ukrainian children. The Luhansk Oblast occupation Ministry of Health reported on July 19 that Russia's Ulyanovsk Oblast Administration organized a "holiday" for 300 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast at the "Gagarin" children's camp in occupied Crimea.[77] The "Gagarin" camp is located in occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea, and runs the "Avangrad" center for youth military-patriotic education.[78] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets warned in October 2023 that Russian authorities are forcibly re-educating Ukrainian children at the "Gagarin" camp.[79] Russian regions frequently sponsor relocation and deportation programs—ISW previously reported on July 19 that Tatarstan provided support to the Luhansk Oblast occupation administration in relocating 99 children from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to a children's camp in Crimea in the first two weeks of July alone.[80]Russian Information Operations and NarrativesRussian investigative outlet Dossier Center reported on July 23 that internal documents show that the head of the Presidential Administration's department for public projects, Sergei Novikov, developed a new cultural policy at the end of 2023 that aims to make the war in Ukraine a central theme in Russian art and popular media in order to increase domestic support for the war.[81] Novikov and members of the Presidential Administration reportedly expressed concern about decreasing domestic support for the war in Ukraine at the time, specifically among middle-class urban youth.[82] Dossier Center reported that Russian Orthodox Church Metropolitan Tikhon Shevkunov, Deputy Minister of Culture Andrei Malyshev, and Deputy General Director of Russian State news station Channel One Andrei Pisarev are responsible for "ideological control" of the Kremlin's cultural management program, which aims to promote pro-war themes through federal grants.[83] The Presidential Administration reportedly attempts to promote pro-war themes through grants connected to the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives, the Russian Federal Agency of Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh), the Institute for Internet Development, the Cinema Fund, the Regional Cinema Development Fund, the Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of Education.[84] At least half of all grants earmarked for 2024 to 2025 reportedly must sponsor works that promote traditional values and the war in Ukraine.[85] The Russian Presidential Administration also reportedly plans to form a literary magazine for Russian writers who travel to occupied Ukraine and write about Kremlin narratives concerning the war.[86] The Ukrainian Resistance Center similarly reported on July 23 that the Russian public non-profit "Znanie" held propaganda lectures to promote Kremlin narratives about occupied Ukraine from July 19 to 22.[87] "Znanie" notably offers educational programs to Russian writers.Russian milbloggers seized on former Ukrainian Command-in-Chief and Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom General Valerii Zaluzhnyi's statements at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Land War Conference 2024 on July 22 to reiterate ongoing Russian information operations intended to discourage Western support for Ukraine. Zaluzhnyi stated during the RUSI conference that the West can achieve technological breakthroughs by combining Ukraine's battlefield experience with the West's resources and by "test[ing]" new weapons in Ukraine.[88] Russian milbloggers attempted to manipulate Zaluzhnyi's statement to claim that Western companies are only interested in supporting Ukraine because it offers a "testing ground" for weapons and invoked an ongoing, absurd Russian information operation that the United States is sponsoring biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine.[89]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://t.me/tass_agency/261998 ; https://sozd.duma.gov dot ru/bill/289614-8 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/07/23/v-gosdume-predlozhili-bez-suda-otpravlyat-voennyh-na-gauptvahtu-za-ispolzovanie-smartfona[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/262067 ; https://t.me/bbbreaking/186624 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/25432 ; https://t.me/gazetaru/39050[3] https://t.me/gazetaru/39050[4] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/18102 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72997 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72997  ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/175240  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47884 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12984 ; https://t.me/rogozin_do/6131 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47887 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/38102 ; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10939 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/11927 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11049 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47923  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47936  [5] https://t.me/dva_majors/47885[6] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/175240  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47884 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12984 ; https://t.me/rogozin_do/6131 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47887 ; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10939 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/11927 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/18261 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/15987 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/15991 ; https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/3255  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47928  [7] https://t.me/zhivoff/15814 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47905 ; https://t.me/frontbird/11611 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47910 ; https://t.me/t3mny/2107; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1144 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47913 ; https://t.me/designersmil/8542 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47892  [8] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10939[9] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/18102  ; https://t.me/rogozin_do/6135 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47915  [10] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16612  [11] https://t.me/milinfolive/126562[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011823[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/262038 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262041 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262057 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262116[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061024[15] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/669eb6059a79470a9fb5b603[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/262063 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262064 [17] https://t.me/tass_agency/262066 [18] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/15605[19] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72999 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130936[20] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12986[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12986[22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12986[23]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wbk24HyQ9dELv4DHfZZdd6xwdM6bMQWaPkorVNV8SM8i3NTsCzzpyffCYR4Tj6uWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aTx6xNSi69zwL3py4tWtErZm1b6igcJEcRdYRw5iADWxhxu2Ws8NuzTQ4CK3n9Qtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol; https://t.me/wargonzo/21161 ; https://t.me/rybar/62019[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12990[25] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/23/otu-harkiv-nemaye-informacziyi-pro-pidgotovku-vorogom-novogo-nastupu/[26] https://t.me/otukharkiv/321[27] https://t.me/otukharkiv/321; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/23/otu-harkiv-nemaye-informacziyi-pro-pidgotovku-vorogom-novogo-nastupu/[28] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18445  ; https://t.me/rybar/62019 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25254 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25255  [29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72999 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25266  ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12970  [30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wbk24HyQ9dELv4DHfZZdd6xwdM6bMQWaPkorVNV8SM8i3NTsCzzpyffCYR4Tj6uWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aTx6xNSi69zwL3py4tWtErZm1b6igcJEcRdYRw5iADWxhxu2Ws8NuzTQ4CK3n9Qtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72999[31] https://t.me/rian_ru/254288; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6138[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wbk24HyQ9dELv4DHfZZdd6xwdM6bMQWaPkorVNV8SM8i3NTsCzzpyffCYR4Tj6uWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aTx6xNSi69zwL3py4tWtErZm1b6igcJEcRdYRw5iADWxhxu2Ws8NuzTQ4CK3n9Qtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol[33] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/22/na-siverskomu-napryamku-stalo-menshe-vorozhoyi-artyleriyi-ale-bilshe-droniv/[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/41314 ; https://t.me/sons_fatherland/15756[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72999 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12981[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aTx6xNSi69zwL3py4tWtErZm1b6igcJEcRdYRw5iADWxhxu2Ws8NuzTQ4CK3n9Qtl[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wbk24HyQ9dELv4DHfZZdd6xwdM6bMQWaPkorVNV8SM8i3NTsCzzpyffCYR4Tj6uWl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21161[38] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/23/u-dyversijno-rozviduvalnyh-grupah-okupantiv-prysutni-zhinky/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72977 ; https://t.me/rybar/62019 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47883 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21161[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wbk24HyQ9dELv4DHfZZdd6xwdM6bMQWaPkorVNV8SM8i3NTsCzzpyffCYR4Tj6uWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aTx6xNSi69zwL3py4tWtErZm1b6igcJEcRdYRw5iADWxhxu2Ws8NuzTQ4CK3n9Qtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6142 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1815734122507088182[42] https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/pfbid02bReTHGpWHbw8VWzJSeQfhYdHRLnk1AT1QkgzR2LYzXJQ9CDBnKktiAquFL2KaLcxl[43] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18442 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25342 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12982[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wbk24HyQ9dELv4DHfZZdd6xwdM6bMQWaPkorVNV8SM8i3NTsCzzpyffCYR4Tj6uWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aTx6xNSi69zwL3py4tWtErZm1b6igcJEcRdYRw5iADWxhxu2Ws8NuzTQ4CK3n9Qtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18437 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18442 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12982 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21161[45] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/772 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1054699299551430[46] https://t.me/smertvorogy/919; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6137[47] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/22/na-doneczkomu-napryamku-vidbyly-velykyj-vorozhyj-shturm/[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130937 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73021 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18443[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wbk24HyQ9dELv4DHfZZdd6xwdM6bMQWaPkorVNV8SM8i3NTsCzzpyffCYR4Tj6uWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aTx6xNSi69zwL3py4tWtErZm1b6igcJEcRdYRw5iADWxhxu2Ws8NuzTQ4CK3n9Qtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21161 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47883 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18446 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12993[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12498 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73022[51] https://t.me/rybar/62019 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47883[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/41301[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/41282[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/21161  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aTx6xNSi69zwL3py4tWtErZm1b6igcJEcRdYRw5iADWxhxu2Ws8NuzTQ4CK3n9Qtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wbk24HyQ9dELv4DHfZZdd6xwdM6bMQWaPkorVNV8SM8i3NTsCzzpyffCYR4Tj6uWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73025[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/47871 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47904  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47918[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MZruJrsQvEodAyeNbeK4xZJmT5K9rKzKxugpy5xWaEHhXcXXrKRVz6CTiPs4UMbol ;[58] https://t.me/rybar/62019 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47883[59] https://t.me/rybar/62019 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47883 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41290[60] https://t.me/astrapress/60245[61] https://t.me/ComAFUA/354  [62] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/28383[63] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10634  [64] https://t.me/tass_agency/262085 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/18221 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37942 ; https://www.mos dot ru/mayor/themes/1299/11512050/ ; https://t.me/sotaproject/83874 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/68092 ; https://t.me/astrapress/60255 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19526[65] https://t.me/tass_agency/262089[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/21155; https://t.me/sddonbassa/32396[67] https://life dot ru/p/1674419; https://iz dot ru/export/google/amp/1731737[68] https://t.me/soldat_prav/5673[69] https://t.me/tass_agency/262113[70] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21429753[71] https://telegra dot ph/Malaya-aviaciya--aviaciya-PVO--malaya-aviaciya-PVO-07-22[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12966[73] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/23587[74] https://www.state.gov/russias-filtration-operations-and-forced-relocations/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052123; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJune26; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust21; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept10[75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2024[76] https://investigator.org.ua/ua/publication/south-articles/268470/[77] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/15694[78] https://www.evpat dot ru/detskij-otdykh-detskie-lagerya-detskie-sanatorii/detskij-lager-gagarin.html; https://t.me/demidova_evp/3414 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18887679[79] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/3912[80] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024[81] https://dossier dot center/svo-culture/[82] https://dossier dot center/svo-culture/[83] https://dossier dot center/svo-culture/[84] https://dossier dot center/svo-culture/[85] https://dossier dot center/svo-culture/[86] https://dossier dot center/svo-culture/[87] https://znanierussia dot ru/ ; https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/rosiyany-gotuyut-novyh-lektoriv-dlya-promyvannya-mizkiv-meshkantsyam-tot/[88] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/07/22/west-third-world-war-world-improves-weapons-ukraine-general/ ; https://archive dot is/nN4Ai#selection-2749.58-2749.115 ; https://english.nv dot ua/nation/ex-ukrainian-commander-in-chief-urges-comprehensive-war-preparation-at-london-conference-50436801.html ; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/07/23/wake-up[89] https://t.me/rybar/62028 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47979 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2024

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Africa File Special Edition: One Year After Niger’s Coup

 

at 7/25/24 7:40pm

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.Author: Liam KarrData Cutoff: July 19, 2024The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.Methodology Note: CTP classified insurgent attacks as all events in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project database labeled as political violence where insurgent groups initiated the event, as well as events involving the forcible looting of civilians that were not branded as taxation.Key Takeaways:Nigerien Military and Diplomatic Activity. Niger’s junta has significantly altered its international and regional partnerships away from the West in its first year of power. Al Qaeda and IS militants have carried out deadlier attacks and consolidated control over more territory since the junta took power by taking advantage of security force limitations that the withdrawal of Western support has contributed to. ISSP’s advance creates more opportunities for it to contribute to transnational IS activity. The Nigerien junta’s counterinsurgency approach will likely increase communal violence and civilian casualties more broadly, and Niger’s new security partners will likely be unable to fully address Niger’s capacity and capability gaps to overcome this poor strategy.Nigerien Economic Activity. The Nigerien junta has also sought to address economic challenges that could threaten regime stability by working with China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey to secure quick revenue.ISSP. The Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) is consolidating control over a growing hub in the northeastern Tillaberi region that extends into the neighboring Tahoua region, across the border into Mali, and wraps around Niamey’s eastern flank. The group is predominantly targeting civilians across other areas of northern Tillaberi to play on ethnic tensions but is facing political and physical resistance from civilians and security forces.JNIM. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is making inroads into southwestern Niger along two axes and encroaching on Niamey despite strong government efforts to degrade its havens along the Burkinabe border. Nigerien security forces have given top priority to degrading JNIM’s support zones along the Burkinabe border between these two areas and likely degraded JNIM’s freedom of movement.Assessments:Nigerien Military and Diplomatic ActivityNiger’s junta has significantly altered its international and regional partnerships away from the West in its first year of power. The Nigerien presidential guards launched a coup against democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26, 2023.[1] Niger’s other security forces fell in line over the next 24 hours despite the largely isolated initial motivations of the junta leader Abdirahmane Tiani.[2] The junta played upon preexisting anti-French grievances and popular backlash against punitive coup sanctions and French-backed threats of a regional invasion to topple the junta to consolidate control over the following weeks.[3]Niger’s junta has gradually replaced Western security partners with alternatives, such as Russia and Turkey. The junta began to explore contracting Russian forces immediately after taking power and annulled defense deals with the EU and France, leading to the departure of 1,500 French troops in December 2023.[4] The junta signed agreements with Russia in December and January that resulted in 100 Russian soldiers arriving in Niger in April 2024.[5] These deals and Nigerien outreach to Iran contributed to a breakdown in Niger’s relationship with the United States, leading the junta to revoke its defense agreement with the United States in March 2024 and the withdrawal of all US forces by September 15, 2024.[6] The junta has also continued to rely on at least six Turkish drones and has reportedly contracted over a thousand Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries since December 2023, according to the UK-based human rights watchdog Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).[7] CTP cannot verify the figures in this claim, although the BBC and France24 have spoken with Syrian recruits.[8]The junta has also tightened its relationship with the juntas in neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali. The regimes signed a mutual defense pact called the Alliance of Sahel States in September 2023 to deter a military intervention from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional West African political bloc that threatened to forcibly depose the nascent Nigerien junta.[9] The juntas announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2024 and created the Confederation of Sahel States, and ECOWAS-like alternative, in July 2024.[10] CTP previously wrote about how the confederation expanded the operational scope of the alliance from a mutual defense agreement to a body that aims to coordinate diplomatic, economic, and security policies.[11]Figure 1. Niger Diversifies Its Military PartnersNote: CTP based the trajectory assessments on the rate and depth of reported discussions and agreements.Source: Liam Karr.Al Qaeda and IS militants have carried out deadlier attacks and consolidated control over more territory since the junta took power by taking advantage of security force limitations that the withdrawal of Western support has contributed to. Insurgent groups are concentrating their forces to carry out increasingly lethal attacks against civilian and military targets. Attacks have decreased by over 20 percent in the first year of junta rule, and neither group has significantly expanded the geographic area of its operations.[12] However, civilian and military fatalities have more than doubled in the first year of junta rule compared with the previous year of democratic rule.[13] Insurgents have carried out nearly five times as many large-scale attacks that have killed 10 or more people during the past year compared with the previous year.[14]Figure 2. Salafi-Jihadi Insurgents Intensify Attacks in Post-Coup Niger, 2023–24Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.Figure 3. Salafi-Jihadi Groups Establish Support in Post-Coup Niger, 2023–24Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.The junta does not have the capacity and capability to degrade the support zones that the insurgents use to conduct their attacks. Nigerien forces lack the manpower to escalate ground operations in response to the onslaught. Security forces initiated the exact same number of ground engagements with insurgents in the first year under the junta as they did in the previous year despite the increasing severity of attacks.[15] The junta instead increased its use of drone strikes, carrying out nine times as many drone strikes targeting insurgents across western Niger in the first year of the junta than the previous year.[16] However, the high rate of large insurgent attacks indicates that the introduction of more drone strikes has failed to degrade insurgents’ ability to gather and stage highly deadly attacks. Repeated drone strikes in some of the same locations also indicate that the drone strikes are not preventing insurgents from returning to targeted areas due to a lack of government presence.[17]The loss of Western support has also contributed to the junta’s inability to disrupt and contain the insurgents. Roughly 1,500 French troops actively participated in counterinsurgency operations alongside Nigerien forces before they abruptly withdrew in December 2023.[18] Another 1,100 US troops were helping train Nigerien soldiers and conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in support of French and Nigerien troops. These losses degraded the overall capacity and the ISR capabilities of counterinsurgency forces in Niger, which has almost certainly given the militants much greater freedom of movement and directly helped them stage larger and deadlier attacks.Insurgent groups are taking advantage of these security gaps to consolidate large support zones in southwestern Niger, which is likely helping them conduct more lethal attacks. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded nearly 24 times as many reports of insurgent groups freely roaming western Niger in the first year of junta rule than it did the prior year.[19] ACLED also recorded a 25 percent increase in reports of insurgents extorting zakat “taxes” from Nigerien civilians.[20] Many of these reports also came from ISSP-dominated areas east of Niamey, in the Abala department and Tahoua region, and a JNIM enclave in the Tillaberi region, southwest of Niamey. These support zones let insurgents gather in greater numbers and access the requisite materials and space to make more sophisticated weapons, such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.Figure 4. Major Salafi-Jihadi Developments in NigerSource: Liam Karr and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.The growing emergence of an IS hub in the Sahel increases the group’s transnational threat risk. ISSP had already consolidated control over parts of northeastern Mali’s Menaka region after fighting JNIM in 2022 and 2023; JNIM had been the group’s primary challenger in the region since French forces withdrew from Mali in 2022.[21] The group’s expanding support zone in Niger connects across the border to these preexisting control zones. ISSP has also implemented governance measures across this swath of territory, such as shari’a punishments, repatriation of displaced civilians, infrastructure projects, and other health and security initiatives.[22] The group has encircled the regional capital and regularly attacks heavily armed Malian and Russian convoys that try to keep open the roads running west to Gao and south to Niger.[23]IS can leverage ISSP’s growing control and resources to contribute to external plots in Europe. IS coordinates external activity through its General Directorate of Provinces.[24] The General Directorate of Provinces has regional offices that help coordinate this activity on the regional level. ISSP is part of the West Africa office, Maktab al Furqan.[25] IS has repeatedly used these offices to coordinate resources from multiple provinces to help fund, recruit, or otherwise facilitate external activity.[26] Spain disrupted an IS cell operating out of Morocco and Spain in 2021 that had links to ISSP, IS Khorasan Province in Afghanistan, and IS cells in Middle East and Europe.[27] ISSP’s location along migration and smuggling routes that run north to Europe create opportunities to continue using the group to support activity in Europe.ISSP’s territorial gains have also attracted foreign fighters. The UN Security Council reported in August 2023 that IS recruiters and facilitators had established transit corridors between southern Europe and the Sahel.[28] Moroccan security forces have since disrupted three IS cells facilitating foreign fighters’ travel to ISSP in Mali in October 2023 and January–February 2024.[29]The presence of foreign fighters historically has led to an increase in Salafi-jihadi groups’ external attack plots.[30] Foreign fighters are more hardened ideologues that ascribe to transnational Salafi-jihadism and are not as interested in the local aims or grievances that motivate local militants. Many foreign fighters have also demonstrated an interest in returning to their countries of origin to organize attacks after being further radicalized in an active conflict theater.[31] The IS network in northwest Africa has also already shown an interest in organizing external activity, given that the UN Security Council reported that IS had organized a now-disrupted cell with links to ISSP operating out of Morocco and Spain.[32]The Nigerien junta’s counterinsurgency approach will likely increase communal violence and civilian casualties more broadly, which will benefit the insurgent groups. The Nigerien junta has adopted a military-first approach that emphasizes military action over dialogue. The military leaders have ended aspects of a preexisting defection program, decreasing the appeal to defectors and potential future defectors.[33] Communal militias have been more active in the year since the junta took power, although the junta has not made a coordinated effort to mobilize militias. Nigerien security forces have also engaged in greater indiscriminate violence, including drone strikes.[34] This strategy risks leading to similar outcomes to Niger’s allies in Burkina Faso and Mali, where state security forces and civilian militias have carried out widespread human rights abuses and indiscriminate violence against civilians since taking power.[35] Greater violence against civilians leads locals to cooperate with or support the insurgent groups for protection and revenge.[36]Niger’s former civilian government used dialogue with local communities and insurgents to help better contain violence and the spread of the insurgency. Western Niger has a history of ethnic violence and communal mobilization, which ISSP has previously taken advantage of to recruit.[37] Niger’s former civilian government emphasized the importance of local peace deals as part of its counterinsurgency strategy to limit this kind of violence and radicalization.[38] These agreements have contributed to a decrease in violence and support for ISSP in parts of northern Tillaberi. The prior government also attempted to engage in insurgents directly. Niger ran a strong defection program, had negotiation channels with insurgents to deal with hostage negotiations, and even sought to open direct dialogue with jihadist leaders.[39] The efforts with leadership never led to any breakthroughs, but similar discussions have helped moderate violence against civilians at the local level in Mali.Niger’s new security partners will likely be unable to fully address Niger’s capacity and capability gaps and overcome the junta’s poor strategy that is strengthening the insurgent groups. Russia has been ineffective at supporting regional counterterrorism operations and faces significant capacity challenges, including its ongoing war in Ukraine, that will limit its ability to send more soldiers to Niger. Wagner Group forces failed to slow the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in Mozambique in 2019, and the 1,000–2,000 Russian soldiers in Mali have not degraded the insurgency there.[40] Russian soldiers’ brutal tactics are also counterproductive, as they exacerbate human rights abuses against civilians that insurgent groups use to gain popular support.[41]Africa Corps has faced recruitment issues that a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger said delayed its initial deployment to Niger.[42] The Kremlin halved its initial recruiting goal for the Ministry of Defense–affiliated Africa Corps, from 40,000 soldiers by the end of 2023 to 20,000, after Africa Corps subsumed Wagner Group’s Africa operations in August 2023, but it still failed to meet the adjusted goal.[43] The Kremlin has also deployed Africa Corps personnel to participate in its war in Ukraine in 2024, underscoring that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine limits its capacity to expand its operations across Africa.[44] Africa Corps is continuing recruitment efforts and is increasing its force presence in Africa. For example, Africa Corps sent thousands of reinforcements to Libya in 2024 that CTP previously assessed will likely be redeployed to sub-Saharan Africa.[45]Turkish drones and mercenaries are improving the government’s ability to compensate for its manpower shortages but are still not enough to enable the junta to disrupt or degrade insurgent operations across all of western Niger. Turkish drones help the government challenge insurgent-controlled areas or areas where state forces are absent. However, drone strikes without a ground component allow insurgents to reenter the area and are not a sustainable counterinsurgency tool alone. Niger and Turkey also discussed strengthening intelligence and defense cooperation following a Turkish ministerial visit on July 17.[46]SOHR reported in January 2024 that an initial batch of 300 Turkish-recruited, Turkish-trained, salaried Syrian mercenaries from the Sadat International Defense Consultancy deployed in Burkina Faso and Niger in December 2023.[47] SOHR claimed in May that this number had risen to at least 1,100 in Niger.[48] Sadat is a Turkish private military company run by a former intelligence officer with close ties to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[49] The mercenaries are reportedly primarily tasked with protecting crucial economic sites where the Turkish government has a shared stake, such as mines.[50] This enables the army to redirect its forces to engage in more offensive counterinsurgency operations. However, the Nigerien junta’s military-first strategy limits the effectiveness of such operations.CTP cannot confirm SOHR’s figures that there are over 1,000 Syrian mercenaries in Niger. The BBC and France24 spoke with Syrian recruits to confirm their presence in Niger, but there has been a general lack of evidence of their activity in Niger across social and traditional media.[51] This lack of information indicates that the mercenaries are not present on this scale or are unusually discreet. BBC reported that commanders in Niger confiscate recruits’ phones, which clarifies some of the lack of information.[52] However, this does not explain the general lack of coverage on local or social media about the presence of foreign Arab mercenaries operating in the country.Russian and Turkish support is not large enough or of high enough quality to effectively replace the departure of French and US support. The alleged 1,100 Turkish mercenaries and roughly 100 Russian troops that arrived in Niger in 2024 are fewer than the 2,600 Western forces that the junta has kicked out. Russia and Turkey also do not provide the same quality of ISR support as Western forces, which has almost certainly given the militants much greater freedom of movement and directly contributed to their ability to stage larger and deadlier attacks.Nigerien Economic ActivityThe Nigerien junta also faces economic challenges that could threaten regime stability. The junta is still experiencing significant economic shortfalls after the regional West African economic bloc lifted sanctions in February. The sanctions severely harmed the already-weak Nigerien economy by closing nearly all borders and trade with Niger, suspending the government’s financial transactions, and freezing the country’s assets in external banks.[53] The fallout led the junta to slash its 2023 budget by 40 percent and default on four debt payments totaling $519 million since taking power, in July 2023.[54] The World Bank projected Niger’s economic growth in 2024 to be 45 percent less than pre-coup estimates.[55] These issues have inflated food prices and contributed to at least 1.1 million Nigeriens falling below the extreme poverty threshold since the coup, bringing the total number to 14.1 million people—roughly 54 percent of the population.[56]Ongoing military and diplomatic disputes are compounding the junta’s economic struggles. Anti-junta rebels have attacked and disabled some segments of an oil pipeline that exports Niger’s oil to shippers in the Gulf of Guinea.[57] A diplomatic dispute with Benin, which the pipeline runs through, is also preventing oil exports.[58]Niger leaving ECOWAS would eliminate free trade and visa-free living and work provisions between Niger and ECOWAS countries.[59] This would harm cross-border economies and already-marginalized border communities, especially along the 1,000-mile-long Niger-Nigeria border.[60] The elimination of free trade provisions would also potentially lead to tariff barriers and other transaction costs. Tariffs would disproportionately affect Niger as an import-dependent and landlocked country.[61]The junta has sought to address its economic woes by working with China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey to secure quick revenue. Russia and Turkey are interested in obtaining mining permits for two uranium mines that the junta withdrew from Western companies in July 2024. The junta withdrew the permits from French state-owned Orano and Canadian-owned GoviEx in June and July 2024 over disagreements with the firms’ proposed timelines and target areas.[62]  Bloomberg reported that the Russian state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom and Turkey are seeking to take over these uranium assets in Niger and are in initial talks with the Nigerien junta.[63] Unspecified Russian energy investors also visited Niger as part of a larger Kremlin delegation in early June, which could refer to Rosatom representatives given Rosatom’s prominence in Russia’s energy policy in Africa.[64] Turkey is heavily dependent on Rosatom for its nuclear power ambitions, as it signed deals with Rosatom to build the three planned power plants and provide fuel.[65]Figure 5. Niger Diversifies Its Economic PartnersNote: CTP based the trajectory assessments on the rate and depth of reported discussions and agreements.Source: Liam Karr.Turkey is also trying to strengthen other economic ties with Niger. Turkey has historically focused on Niger as an investment target for the Turkish defense and industrial sectors. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan led a diplomatic charge in the Sahel in 2012 and 2013 that laid the foundation for significant infrastructure investment in 2019 and a defense deal in 2020.[66] A high-ranking Turkish delegation visited Niger on July 17 to resume and strengthen this cooperation.[67] Turkey and Niger signed a declaration of intent to support and encourage more Turkish companies to invest in developing oil and natural gas fields in Niger.[68] Turkish and Nigerien officials also agreed to create working groups to focus on energy and mining partnerships, as well as economic and trade cooperation.[69]China is already heavily cooperating with Niger on petroleum production. Niger has had a joint petroleum production agreement with China since 2008. China owns a majority stake in crucial Nigerien facilities, such as Niger’s largest oil field, its lone refinery, and the oil pipeline to Benin.[70] The Nigerien junta signed an agreement in March with a Chinese state-owned company to receive a $400 million advance on its share of future oil sales through the pipeline in Niger.[71] The junta reportedly plans to use the money to repay part of its regional debt.[72] China is also working on several infrastructure projects in Niger.[73]Iran has shown interest in being an economic and defense ally to Niger but has not made as much progress as Niger’s other partners. French media reported in May that the junta has engaged in direct uranium-for-arms talks with Iran since the end of 2023.[74] A March Wall Street Journal report supports these claims and notes that US officials warned Niger against selling Iran uranium.[75] Iran also signed several agreements on energy and economic cooperation with Niger in January 2024 and held follow-up meetings in March.[76] However, CTP has not observed any implementation of these plans, and follow-through has previously been an issue for Iranian engagement in Africa.[77]ISSPISSP is consolidating control over a growing hub in the northeastern Tillaberi region that extends into the neighboring Tahoua region, across the border into Mali, and wraps around Niamey’s eastern flank. ISSP is consolidating control over a large area covering part of the Tahoua region and extending west into Tillaberi’s Abala department. ACLED recorded 45 instances of ISSP movement in this area in the first year of junta rule after recording no such activity in the previous year.[78] CTP cannot verify whether a methodological or source change in the ACLED database contributed to this change. However, ACLED recorded other insurgent movements in the year before the coup, indicating this is a genuine development.[79]Figure 6. ISSP Strengthens and Expands Support Zones in Western NigerSource: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.Increased reports of zakat extortion and religious regulation support the assessment that ISSP is consolidating control in these areas. ISSP was already extorting civilians throughout Tahoua in the year before the coup, but this activity increased by 30 percent according to ACLED.[80] ISSP began taxing civilians in Abala more extensively under the junta, as the reported instances jumped from two in the year before the coup to nine in the first year of junta rule.[81] ISSP also dictated local Eid celebrations in northern Abala in April 2024 and claimed to carry out shari’a punishments near the Mali-Niger border.[82]Figure 7. ISSP Strengthens Support near the Malian Border in Post-Coup NigerNote: Data are from Tahoua region and Abala department, Tillaberi region.Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.ISSP has also carried out increasingly lethal attacks against the Nigerien military in Tahoua, likely to keep security forces out of these support zones. Nigerien security force fatalities in Tahoua more than tripled under the first year of junta rule.[83] This spike is mostly due to a massive ISSP ambush in October 2023 that local sources claimed killed over 100 soldiers and involved sophisticated weaponry such as suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.[84] All these factors indicate the area is part of or near to an ISSP support zone that would be required to stage such an attack.Security forces have decreased their rate of activity in Tahoua, likely due to a lack of capacity and will. Nigerien security forces in Tahoua reportedly refused to leave their bases after the deadly October ambush, presumably contributing to the decrease in activity in the region.[85] The 1,500 French troops that withdrew from Niger were also focused on supporting Nigerien soldiers to degrade ISSP along the Malian border.[86] The 1,100 US personnel in Niger before the coup conducted ISR support for these operations.[87] The Nigerien junta has increased its activity in other areas of Niger along the Burkinabe border, indicating it is giving priority to those areas and cannot compensate for the capacity cuts following the French and US withdrawals.[88]Figure 8. ISSP Intensifies Attacks in the Tahoua Region in Post-Coup NigerSource: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.ISSP is increasingly extending this support zone farther south down Niamey’s eastern flank into the Dosso region. ISSP carried out its first-ever attacks on the road connecting the department capitals Balleyara and Filingue in the past year.[89] ISSP already had a quiet presence near the borders with Tillaberi, Tahoua, and northeastern Dosso before the coup and carried out occasional zakat extortion.[90] The reported instances of zakat extortion have decreased since the coup, but these reports moved farther west near Loga, which is closer to Niamey.[91] Meanwhile, the group has enjoyed much greater freedom of movement throughout Dosso and faced little resistance in the areas it had been collecting zakat before.[92] These trends indicate that it has consolidated a degree of control in the area, which would contribute to suppressed reports coming out of the area.ISSP is predominantly targeting civilians in the tri-border region covering parts of the Niger River Valley and the Burkinabe and Malian borders in northwestern Tillaberi to play on ethnic tensions, but it faces resistance from civilians and security forces. ISSP has decreased its overall attacks by 36 percent across Ayorou, Bankilare, Tera, and Tillaberi departments but more than tripled the number of fatalities it has inflicted in these attacks.[93] Over 70 percent of both attacks and fatalities are from targeting civilians or civilian militias.[94] This ratio is consistent with the pre-coup period. ISSP has regularly targeted civilians in this area to play on ethnic grievances between the traditionally nomadic Fulani ethnic group that it primarily recruits from and other traditionally sedentary ethnic groups in the region.[95]Figure 9. ISSP Targets Civilians in the Niger River Valley and Tri-Border AreaNote: Data are from Ayorou, Baniklare, Tera, and Tillaberi departments, Tillaberi region, Niger from July 2023 to July 2024.Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.The junta has given greater priority to contesting ISSP in the Tera department over other parts of the country. Security force activity across all four departments has decreased by over 30 percent.[96] However, nearly one-quarter of all ground operations in the post-coup period have occurred in Tera.[97] This activity and communal mobilization efforts have possibly contributed to the failure of ISSP to establish strong support zones in most of this area. Zakat and movement reports have both decreased in the post-coup period.[98] However, increasingly high civilian casualties risk spiraling into even greater communal violence that risks further increasing civilian casualties or breaking civilian resistance.Figure 10. ISSP Focuses on Civilian Targets in the Tri-Border Region and Niger River ValleySource: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.Local peace agreements signed under Niger’s democratic government likely contributed to sharp decreases in fatalities and attacks in northern Tillaberi over the past year. ISSP has decreased its attacks across Banibangou and Ouallam departments in the post-coup period as it has elsewhere across Niger.[99] However, ISSP fatalities in this area have also generally lowered, unlike in many other parts of the country.[100] ISSP has killed only three civilians in Banibangou department since January 2023, all of whom it described as military spies.[101] ACLED did not record any ISSP attacks in Ouallam department between July and November 2023.[102] The group has resorted to mostly targeting civilians in small-scale looting attacks across both departments and has not developed stronger support zones throughout the area.[103]This decrease in ISSP activity aligns with the signing of peace agreements in Banibangou in January 2023 and Ouallam in June 2023.[104] Such peace agreements limit ISSP’s ability to appeal to ethnic grievances to recruit and mobilize locals. Nigerien security forces are likely not responsible for the dampened ISSP activity. Nigerien forces have not increased their ground activity and initiated ground engagements with ISSP only three times in the first year of junta rule.[105] The junta introduced drone strikes in the area but only conducted six such strikes.[106] This low total number indicates that those strikes are not primarily responsible for the downturn in ISSP activity.JNIMJNIM is making inroads into southwestern Niger along two axes and encroaching on Niamey despite strong government efforts to degrade its havens along the Burkinabe border. JNIM launched an offensive against security forces and local militias in Gotheye department between Gotheye city and the Samira mine near the Burkinabe border in early 2024. The campaign has subsided since February, but JNIM has regularly attacked Nigerien security forces attempting to reach Samira since April.[107] This activity pattern indicates that JNIM has established some control, degraded local militias, and is now trying to keep security forces from re-entering the area.This offensive contributed to an increase in both the number of attacks and fatalities in the area in the post-junta period. JNIM significantly increased improvised explosive device (IED) attacks targeting security forces traveling the road in the area, attacked local communal militias, and expanded attacks closer to Gotheye city than it had previously.[108] One of the militia clashes in February killed at least 34 militiamen, which is more than six times the total number of casualties across Gotheye in the year before the coup.[109]Figure 11. JNIM Escalates Attacks in Western Niger in 2024Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.JNIM is also heavily contesting the Ouro Gueladjo area between the department capitals of Torodi and Say. JNIM was already present in the area before the coup and had evicted several nearby villages in early July 2023.[110] JNIM has since significantly increased IED and ambush attacks on security forces in the vicinity of Ouro Gueladjo.[111] These attacks signal a JNIM effort to isolate the security forces in the town and protect the support zones established in July 2023. The continued pace of JNIM attacks further indicates the group has been successful and that security forces have not degraded its capabilities in the area.[112]CTP previously assessed that JNIM aims to consolidate support zones in this area to amplify pressure on the roads surrounding Niamey.[113] JNIM’s attack campaigns near Samira and Ouro Gueladjo are near key roads leading to the capital. JNIM has already used its havens around Ouro Gueladjo and the Torodi district to attack the RN6 connecting Torodi town and Niamey. Militants can use the same havens they use to attack Ouro Gueladjo to facilitate attacks on the RN27, which connects Say and Niamey. JNIM support zones in the Gotheye department would also enable the group to conduct attacks along the RN1 or RN4 highways that run along the Niger River and connect several department capitals in northwestern Niger to Niamey.Degrading Nigerien lines of communication around the capital fits JNIM’s historical pattern of avoiding decisive battles for large population centers in favor of siege tactics that isolate security forces and spur favorable negotiations.[114] JNIM has been conducting such an attack campaign around the Malian capital since early 2023.[115]Nigerien security forces have given top priority to degrading JNIM’s support zones along the Burkinabe border between these two axes and likely degraded JNIM’s freedom of movement. Security forces have doubled the number of ground engagements with JNIM along the border in Torodi department since the junta took power.[116] These efforts included large-scale operations in January 2024 that Nigerien officials claimed resulted in more than 50 militant fatalities and over 30 IEDs seized.[117] Nigerien forces have also most heavily leveraged drone strikes in this area. The junta launched at least nine drone strikes targeting JNIM support zones along the Burkinabe border, which amounts to one-third of all Nigerien drone strikes against insurgents in the past year.[118] Over half of these strikes have targeted the Koloukolou area roughly a mile from the Burkinabe border.[119]These efforts have likely degraded JNIM’s ability to sustain support zones farther into Niger. Widespread reports of JNIM zakat extortion in November 2023 indicate that JNIM had established a support zone farther inland between its two campaign axes.[120] However, there has been no reported JNIM activity from the area since then outside of a sporadic IED attack.[121] This pattern indicates that the security force pressure on JNIM’s border havens has degraded their ability to reach or sustain a presence in this area. However, the heightened pressure has not degraded JNIM’s attack capabilities. JNIM claimed that it killed 41 soldiers in an attack on a Nigerien army base near the Burkinabe border in May 2024.[122] Local sources estimated an even higher death toll and claimed that the junta was contemplating closing the base, which would undermine security forces’ ability to sustain pressure on the border area.[123]JNIM’s growing strength across the border in eastern Burkina Faso also limits the Nigerien junta’s ability to degrade the areas JNIM uses to support its campaigns in Niger. JNIM has carried out increasingly large and deadly attacks in eastern Burkina Faso throughout 2024. Hundreds of JNIM fighters killed at least 20 security forces and civilians in an attack on May 5.[124] This attack builds on another attack that overran a Burkinabe base and a nearby town on March 31.[125] Increased reports of zakat collection following the March attack indicate that JNIM is using these attacks to isolate government-controlled population centers and consolidate support zones in rural areas along the border, which can use to support its campaigns in Niger.[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/soldiers-nigers-presidential-guard-blockade-presidents-office-security-sources-2023-07-26; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/soldiers-holding-niger-president-inside-palace-security-source; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1467056/politique/au-niger-tentative-de-coup-detat-contre-mohamed-bazoum[2] https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/122/489/587/7564826[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66398639; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/huge-protests-niger-call-french-forces-leave-after-coup-2023-09-02; https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230810-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-us-backs-ecowas-efforts-to-restore-order-in-niger; https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/focus/20230412-niger-france-military-cooperation-an-inside-look-at-operation-almahaou; https://www.barrons.com/news/france-backs-ecowas-summit-conclusions-on-niger-ministry-8739dc91[4] https://apnews.com/article/niger-france-sahel-coup-troops-security-macron-97c8ccfe880169832965c33e96d7befe; https://twitter.com/SimNasr/status/1686725855408496640?s=20; https://twitter.com/casusbellii/status/1686639253231398912?s=20; https://twitter.com/criticalthreats/status/1684668764623720448?s=20; https://apnews.com/article/niger-junta-eu-russia-security-73e8ed801478fa65b01818dd53df0c0e[5] https://x.com/fabsenbln/status/1747037814942765163?s=20; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-niger-military-delegation/32713468.html; https://t.me/mod_russia/34737; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-niger-cuts-the-united-states-for-russia-and-iran; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-january-18-2024; https://t.me/africaninitiative/2979[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/16/niger-junta-end-us-military; https://www.ft.com/content/ceb60f8c-59fa-43e1-bb0c-a333b9a5e621; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1548848/politique/entre-le-niger-et-les-etats-unis-les-raisons-de-la-rupture[7] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220524-la-turquie-livre-six-drones-bayraktar-tb2-au-niger; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjer5ewr34jo; https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-sends-syrian-mercenaries-to-niger-to-secure-strategic-interests-/7616771.html[8] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjer5ewr34jo; https://youtu.be/5ntFZari2s0?si=TWRMG0lz8FS3YcYm[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16[10] https://www.voaafrica.com/a/withdrawals-from-ecowas-a-threat-to-west-african-security-analysts-say/7461391.html[11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-july-11-2024-sahelian-juntas-vs-ecowas-us-base-in-cote-divoire#WestAfrica[12] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) database, available at www.acleddata.com.[13] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[14] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[15] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[16] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[17] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[18] https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/focus/20230412-niger-france-military-cooperation-an-inside-look-at-operation-almahaou[19] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[20] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[21] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1389689/politique/mali-le-jnim-et-les-combattants-touaregs-cote-a-cote-face-a-leigs; https://acleddata.com/2023/01/13/actor-profile-the-islamic-state-sahel-province; 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https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/213168/FM-Amir-Abdollahian-stresses-strengthening-ties-with-Niger[77] https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-iran-morocco-joust-for-greater-role-in-sahel-e9b6da85[78] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[79] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[80] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[81] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[82] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[83] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[84] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66991696; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1709537007335075968?s=20[85] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66991696; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1709537007335075968?s=20; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1710790788345401388?s=20[86] https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/focus/20230412-niger-france-military-cooperation-an-inside-look-at-operation-almahaou[87] https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-military-drone-missions-niger-halted[88] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[89] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[90] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[91] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[92] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[93] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[94] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[95] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/b172-murder-tillabery-calming-nigers-emerging-communal-crisis[96] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[97] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[98] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[99] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[100] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[101] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[102] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[103] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[104] https://hdcentre.org/news/hd-brokers-peace-agreement-by-communities-from-banibangou-in-nigers-tillabery-region-text-and-video; https://hdcentre.org/news/hd-supports-peace-accord-by-communities-in-ouallam-department-in-nigers-tillaberi-region[105] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[106] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[107] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[108] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[109] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[110] https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/ocha-niger-mouvement-de-population-dans-le-departement-de-say-update-1-situation-des-deplacements-au-10-juillet-2023; https://www.barrons.com/news/thousands-flee-homes-in-jihadist-hit-niger-295e0755[111] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[112] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[113] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-april-11-2024-kremlins-africa-corps-nears-niger-ethiopia-somalia-rift-widens-al-qaeda-affiliates-strengthen-in-the-sahel-and-horn#Niger[114] https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-displacement-violence-jihadis-3e2890c3c08f634019a63288daf1200a; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/burkina-faso-crisis-continues-to-spiral; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-enabling-dialogue-jihadist-coalition-jnim[115] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-march-22-2024-niger-cuts-the-us-jnim-encroaches-on-guinea-al-shabaab-hotel-attack#Mali[116] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[117] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[118] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[119] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[120] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[121] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.[122] SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Takes Credit for 10 Attacks in 1 Week in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, Killing Over 60 Soldiers,” May 28, 2024, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.[123] https://x.com/ighazer/status/1794660813698945320[124] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1787837770544672945[125] https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/burkina-faso-nuovo-attacco-dei-miliziani-di-al-qaeda-almeno-73-morti-fra-civili-militari-e-volontari-arruolati

[Author: ISWKF]

— Iran Update, July 25, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 6:25pm

Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Kathrine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 6:30pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.US President Joe Biden met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 25.[1] Biden and Netanyahu discussed Biden’s “ironclad commitment” to Israeli security, as well as “developments in Gaza, including efforts to reach a ceasefire.” An unspecified US official said that the administration believes that the deal “is in the closing stages.”US Vice President Kamala Harris said that she told Netanyahu that it is “time for this war to end” and that “it is time to get this [ceasefire] deal done.”[2] Harris met with Netanyahu on July 25 following Netanyahu’s meeting with Joe Biden. Harris added that the war must “end in a way that ensures Israel’s security.” Harris called her conversation with Netanyahu ”frank and constructive,” and added that she will continue to support Israel against Iran and its partners. US officials emphasized that Harris has been involved in “every call“ with Netanyahu since October 7.[3]US, Israeli, and Arab officials are reportedly considering former Fatah leader Mohammad Dahlan as an interim leader of Palestinian security forces in the post-war Gaza Strip. Dahlan is a former Fatah official who was a close advisor to former Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Yasser Arafat. The Wall Street Journal reported on July 25 that under the plan, Dahlan would oversee an interim security force of 2,500 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip after Israeli troops withdraw, citing Arab officials.[4] The United States, Israel, and Egypt would vet the Palestinian personnel, who would work in coordination with unspecified international forces and even private Western security firms. The Palestinian security force would not be directly affiliated with the PA. International mediators have recently considered multiple alternative proposals that have recommended sending non-Israeli, non-Hamas, and UAE-supported security forces to maintain security in the Gaza Strip.[5] The Arab officials also said that the Palestinian force could assist with the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip if it operates successfully.Dahlan could be a “palatable figure” to Israel, the United States, Gulf states, and potentially Hamas who may be capable of leading post-war Palestinian security forces.[6] Dahlan organized Fatah-led PA forces against Hamas’ 2007 takeover in the Gaza Strip.[7] Hamas destroyed the Fatah-led PA forces in the Gaza Strip during that takeover. Dahlan left the Palestinian territories for the UAE after Fatah party leadership expelled him in 2011.[8] Dahlan maintains an active political party in the West Bank and he has connections to armed Palestinian networks on the ground, however.[9] Dahlan has publicly argued in recent months that a lasting solution requires a new Palestinian leader within a transitional government until parliamentary elections can be held.[10] Dahlan stated that this cannot be reached without Hamas’ consent.[11] Notably, Hamas has reportedly indicated to meditators in recent weeks that it has “softened” its hostility towards Dahlan and could accept him as an interim security leader.[12] Dahlan has repeatedly met with top Hamas officials since the beginning of the war, initially to coordinate aid distribution.[13] Arab and Hamas officials said that Dahlan has presented himself in recent conversations with Hamas as someone who could oversee aid distribution within a new Palestinian system in Gaza.[14]The proposed 2,500-strong Palestinian security force is probably insufficient to counter Hamas’ future attempts to reassert control in the Gaza Strip, regardless of who leads the force. Hamas would need to agree to Dahlan or any other leader unless Hamas is militarily defeated and unable to resist a transitional force. Failing to defeat Hamas militarily will risk a resumption of de-facto or de-jure Hamas control in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would almost certainly act to suppress the authority of any non-Hamas security force attempting to assume Hamas’ former security responsibilities in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has a long history of violently countering attempts from other Palestinian factions to assert authority in the Gaza Strip, including defeating Dahlan’s PA forces in the Gaza Strip in 2007.[15] A 2,500-strong interim security force would likely be insufficient to challenge Hamas’ long-standing monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip. Dahlan, who is currently based in the UAE, has not expressed explicit public interest in assuming the position.[16] Hamas’ reported acceptance of Dahlan also indicates that Hamas assesses it could maintain significant influence under his rule.Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Mohammad Eslami claimed that Iran had exported nuclear materials and expertise to various unspecified countries in an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on July 22.[17] Eslami stated that Iranian nuclear experts had “exported services” to unnamed countries during an unspecified timeframe. Eslami added that an AEOI technical group had travelled to an unspecified Latin American country within the past four months for “consultations” and that Iran was “continuously receiving” similar requests from other countries. Eslami also stated that Iran had exported domestically-produced heavy water—a substance that serves as a moderator and coolant in nuclear reactors—without providing further details. Eslami‘s statements focused on the development and export of Iranian pharmaceutical nuclear capabilities. Khamenei publicly called on the AEOI in June 2023 to commercialize nuclear products—specifically heavy water and nuclear isotopes—and services.[18] Khamenei.ir published Eslami’s interview on a new page titled “A Strong Iran with an Advanced Nuclear Industry,” underscoring the extent to which the supreme leader seeks to promote Iranian indigenous nuclear capabilities.[19]It is unclear to what extent Iran has previously provided nuclear expertise to other actors, although Iranian officials have previously expressed their readiness to do so. Eslami stressed Iran’s willingness to help Saudi Arabia develop its nuclear program in May 2024.[20] Iran sold heavy water to the US in 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[21] Iranian officials have since claimed that the US purchased and requested the purchase of Iranian heavy water in recent years.[22] One Iranian official stated that Iran discussed heavy waters sales with Russia in 2016, although it is unclear if these discussions resulted in the purchase of such materials.[23]Key Takeaways:Netanyahu Visits Washington, DC: US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris met separately with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 25. Harris told Netanyahu that it is “time for this war to end” and that “it is time to get this [ceasefire] deal done.Gaza Strip: US, Israeli, and Arab officials are reportedly considering former Fatah leader Mohammad Dahlan, who could be palatable to all parties, as an interim leader of Palestinian security forces in the post-war Gaza Strip. The proposed 2,500-strong Palestinian security force is probably insufficient to counter Hamas’ future attempts to reassert control in the Gaza Strip, regardless of who leads the force. Hamas would need to agree to Dahlan or any other leader unless it is militarily defeated and unable to resist that force. Failing to defeat Hamas militarily will risk a resumption of de-facto or de-jure Hamas control in the Gaza Strip.Iraq: Two unspecified security officials cited by Reuters reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched four rockets at Ain al Asad Airbase, Anbar, on July 25.Iran: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Mohammad Eslami claimed that Iran had exported nuclear materials and expertise to various unspecified countries in an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on July 22.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripIsraeli forces recovered the bodies of five hostages in Khan Younis on July 24.[24] Hamas fighters killed the hostages during the October 7, 2023, attack before taking the bodies into the Gaza Strip.[25] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division), Egoz Unit, Yahalam special operations engineers, and Shin Bet forces located the hostages in a 200-meter-long, 20-meter-deep tunnel in Bani Suheila.[26] The tunnel was located within an area that the IDF ordered civilians to evacuate on July 22 prior to beginning operations in Khan Younis.[27] Palestinian fighters did not engage Israeli forces inside the tunnel.[28]The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in eastern Khan Younis on July 25. The IDF 7th, 89th Commando, and 35th Paratroopers brigades engaged and killed Palestinian fighters and destroyed over 50 militia sites over the past days.[29] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF killed 30 Palestinian fighters in Bani Suheila.[30] Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces in several sectors of Khan Younis with mortars, sniper fire, and rocket propelled grenades (RPG).[31] Hamas fighters targeted an Israeli tank with an explosively formed penetrator.[32] Hamas and PIJ claimed two combined attacks targeting Israeli personnel and armor in Sheikh Nasser, Khan Younis City, and east of Khan Younis.[33]The IDF said that Hamas attempted to fire several rockets into Israeli territory from the humanitarian zone in Khan Younis.[34] The rockets fell near the UNRWA-run al Qarara school in Khan Younis.[35] The rocket strike injured several civilians and killed two near the school.[36] The IDF transferred the injured civilians to a field hospital established in the Deir al Balah region.[37]The 3rd “Alexandroni” Infantry Brigade (Res.) (99th Division) continued clearing operations along the Netzarim Corridor on July 25.[38] The Alexandroni Brigade cooperated with the IDF Air Force to destroy militia sites near the corridor.[39]The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on July 25.[40] The IDF Givati and 401st Brigades continue to operate in the area.[41] The Givati Brigade directed an airstrike on two Palestinian fighters.[42] Hamas fighters detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in two tunnels in Yabna refugee camp.[43] Hamas fighters also targeted an IDF bulldozer with RPGs in al Salam, eastern Rafah.[44]The IDF Air Force struck over 60 militia targets in the Gaza Strip in the past 24 hours.[45]The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a single rocket attack targeting an IDF site in southern Israel on July 25.[46]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelPalestinian fighters attacked Israeli forces in seven locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut off on July 24.[47] The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli forces at three locations in Nablus.[48] PIJ’s Balata Battalion also fired small arms targeting Israeli forces at Mount Gerizim, Nablus.[49] The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also fired small arms at Karmei Tzur settlement, north of Hebron.[50] Unspecified Palestinian fighters detonated an IED targeting an IDF checkpoint in Qalandiya, West Bank.[51]Unspecified Palestinian fighters fired small arms targeting an IDF vehicle on Highway 55 in Qalqilya on July 25.[52] The IDF claimed that the fighters opened fire from a moving vehicle and escaped after conducting the attack.[53] Israeli forces imposed a blockade around Qalqilya city in search of the perpetrators. Israeli forces also raided three locations in Qalqilya governorate in search of the perpetrators.[54] Hamas praised the attack and called it a ”natural response” against ongoing Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and the settler violence in West Bank.[55]Australia imposed sanctions on seven individual Israeli settlers and one settler group for their involvement in settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.[56] The Australian government levied the sanctions on the individuals and group for perpetrating violence against Palestinian communities in the West Bank.This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Southern Lebanon and Golan HeightsAxis of Resistance objectives:Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into LebanonPrepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaLebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 12 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 24.[57]IDF Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar discussed a potential Israeli offensive in Lebanon during a meeting with Air Force and Northern Command commanders at the Ramat David airbase on July 25.[58] Bar said that Israel is ”ready for war” and added that the Israeli strike on Hudaydah port in Yemen on July 20 targeted not only on the Houthis but "the entire Middle East,” including Hezbollah and Iran.[59] The meeting comes after Hezbollah published drone footage of the Ramat David airbase on July 24 with details of the base, such as the locations of air defenses, aircraft shelters, and fuel storage units.[60] This video marked the third time in recent months that Hezbollah has published drone footage of critical Israeli sites.[61]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.Iran and the Axis of ResistanceTwo unspecified security officials cited by Reuters reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched four rockets at Ain al Asad Airbase, Anbar, on July 25.[62] No group has claimed the attack at the time of this writing. Unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously launched two one-way attack drones at Ain al Asad Airbase on July 16.[63]Asaib Ahl al Haq-run news outlet al Ahad reported on July 25 that Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi outlined some general information about the development of a US-Iraqi bilateral security relationship.[64] Abbasi stated that the United States and Iraq will continue discussions to develop a framework and mechanism to “ensure the enduring defeat” of ISIS. The United States and Iraq discussed ways to continue developing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through military cooperation programs, foreign military sales, and foreign military financing. US-Iraq foreign military sales are likely meant to support maintenance of US systems used by the ISF for counter-ISIS missions. The United States has historically supported maintenance for some systems. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have sometimes targeted US contractors responsible for maintaining some ISF equipment, such as F16, forcing US maintainers to withdraw and limiting the US ability to provide maintenance, however.[65] Abbasi added that during the Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue, the United States and Iraq discussed “opportunities” to expand Iraq’s participation in regional CENTCOM exercises and to strengthen Iraq’s military relations with CENTCOM component commands.[66]Asaib Ahl al Haq-run Al Ahad news outlet claimed on July 24 that the United States is pressuring the Syrian Democratic Forces to release displaced persons from al Hol refugee camp.[67] Al Ahad asserted that the United States released 400 “Iraqi ISIS” members from al Hol refugee camp under the General Amnesty program to create “chaos.” Al Ahed claimed that the United States is attempting to exacerbate the threat posed by ISIS as it negotiates a withdrawal of International Coalition forces from Iraq based on the threat that ISIS poses.[68] CTP-ISW has not observed reports verifying al Ahad’s claims nor reports that suggest any displaced persons were repatriated from al Hol to Iraq.Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian met with Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Supreme Leader and Expediency Council member Ali Akbar Velayati on July 25.[69]  Velayati congratulated Pezeshkian on his win in the meeting. The senior officials also discussed regional security and the current state of global politics.Reuters reported that Iran has released the oil cargo from the Saint Nikolas tanker, citing an unnamed source on July 25.[70] The Saint Nikolas is a Greek-owned and Marshall Islands-flagged vessel that the Iranian Artesh Navy seized in the Gulf of Oman on January 11, 2024.[71] The vessel was carrying one million barrels of Iraqi crude oil, and it was on its way to Turkey, according to Reuters. The article’s source added that ”the cargo was released earlier this week after negotiations,” but Iran was still holding the vessel and the source did not disclose whether Iran released all of the oil.[72] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-controlled media, citing the Iranian Artesh Navy, explained that the Artesh seized the vessel in retaliation for the US Navy‘s seizure of the same tanker and then offloaded the tanker‘s Iranian oil in April and August 2023.[73] The Saint Nikolas was formerly known as the Suez Rajan. The United States seized the Suez Rajan in April 2023 and offloaded its oil in August 2023 to enforce US unilateral sanctions on Iranian oil exports.[74] Senior Iranian military officials vowed in July and September 2023 that Iran would retaliate against the United States after the US Navy seized and offloaded Iranian oil from the tanker in April and August 2023.[75]Syrian President Bashar al Assad met with Russian President Vladmir Putin in Moscow on July 24.[76] Assad and Putin discussed escalating tensions in the Middle East, including in Syria.[77] The leaders also discussed improving bilateral economic relations.[78] Assad last met with Putin in Russia in March 2023 and reached over 40 agreements promoting economic cooperation.[79] It remains unclear if Syria and Russia have advanced the 2023 agreements since then.US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed two loaded Houthi missile launchers in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on July 24.[80] US CENTCOM determined that the loaded Houthi missile launchers presented an imminent threat to US, coalition forces, and merchant vessels in the region. [1] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-harris-meet-separately-netanyahu-white-house-rcna163590[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rdfexgm0DsM[3] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-harris-meet-separately-netanyahu-white-house-rcna163590[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/once-hamass-sworn-enemy-mohammed-dahlan-rises-as-a-postwar-strongman-f64676b1?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2024[6] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/once-hamass-sworn-enemy-mohammed-dahlan-rises-as-a-postwar-strongman-f64676b1?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/26/world/middleeast/26cnd-mideast.html[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/14/world/middleeast/mohammed-dahlan-interview-gaza-uae.html; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-trying-shape-day-after-gaza[9] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/once-hamass-sworn-enemy-mohammed-dahlan-rises-as-a-postwar-strongman-f64676b1?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/once-hamass-sworn-enemy-mohammed-dahlan-rises-as-a-postwar-strongman-f64676b1?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/14/world/middleeast/mohammed-dahlan-interview-gaza-uae.html[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/14/world/middleeast/mohammed-dahlan-interview-gaza-uae.html; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-trying-shape-day-after-gaza[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/once-hamass-sworn-enemy-mohammed-dahlan-rises-as-a-postwar-strongman-f64676b1?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2[13] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-trying-shape-day-after-gaza;  https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/once-hamass-sworn-enemy-mohammed-dahlan-rises-as-a-postwar-strongman-f64676b1?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2[14] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/once-hamass-sworn-enemy-mohammed-dahlan-rises-as-a-postwar-strongman-f64676b1?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2[15] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/hamas-said-to-execute-leader-of-gazas-powerful-doghmush-clan/[16] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-trying-shape-day-after-gaza; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1816454342775332935[17] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-dialog?id=57114[18] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/595935[19] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-special?id=56019[20] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/214831/Iran-ready-to-coop-with-Saudi-Arabia-in-nuclear-field[21] https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-buy-material-used-in-iran-nuclear-program-1461319381[22] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/americas/iran-says-it-sells-heavy-water-with-us-among-buyers-despite-sanctions/3080603[23] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iran-in-talks-with-russia-on-heavy-water-sales-idUSKCN0XM16Q/; https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-05/news-briefs/us-purchases-iranian-heavy-water[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816484922330058807; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1816333072058441863[25] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1816316806170034435; https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1816334136799338687[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816484922330058807; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12189; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1816333072058441863[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816484965963403491; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2024[28] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1816359494365880368[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816359153851363341[30] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1816359494365880368[31] https://t.me/nedalps/4301; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31437; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31438;https://t.me/AymanGouda/6209; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31443; https://t.me/sarayaps/18368; https://t.me/sarayaps/18369[32] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31442[33] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31438; https://t.me/sarayaps/18369[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816407874714603538[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816407874714603538 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816407878913200451[36] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816407874714603538 [37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816407882784485845[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816359157395558522[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816359157395558522[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816359153851363341[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816359153851363341[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816359157395558522[43] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31439[44] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31444[45] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816359159912075338[46] https://t.me/nedalps/4300[47] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6891 ; https://t.me/QudsN/440159 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6894 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6894[48] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6891 ; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3212[49] https://t.me/QudsN/440159[50] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6892[51] https://t.me/QudsN/440150 ;[52] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816387658106511812[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816387658106511812[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1816464904502555022 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1816374550981923148[55] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52601[56] https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/human-right-sanctions-response-israeli-settler-violence-west-bank[57] https://t.me/mmirleb/5655; https://t.me/mmirleb/5658; https://t.me/mmirleb/5659; https://t.me/mmirleb/5660; https://t.me/mmirleb/5663; https://t.me/mmirleb/5662; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1816349375137722818; https://t.me/mmirleb/5667; https://t.me/mmirleb/5669; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1816494555094458799; https://t.me/mmirleb/5673[58] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1816445107207389446[59]https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814756937830961179; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1816445107207389446[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/5647; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/hezbollah-publishes-drone-footage-of-ramat-david-airbase-in-north/[61] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-broadcasts-drone-video-it-says-shows-airbase-deep-israel-2024-07-24/[62] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/four-missiles-launched-iraqs-ain-al-asad-airbase-security-sources-say-2024-07-25/[63] https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/islamic-state-attacks-track-double-iraq-syria-compared-112019184#:~:text=On%20Tuesday%2C%20two,requests%20for%20comment[64] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=198059[65] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/world/middleeast/iraq-f-16s-lockheed-martin.html#:~:text=BAGHDAD%20%E2%80%94%20Lockheed%20Martin%20said%20on,of%20being%20backed%20by%20Iran.[66] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=198059[67] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=198022[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2024[69] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/04/3128015[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-releases-cargo-oil-tanker-st-nikolas-shipping-source-says-2024-07-25/[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-11-2024[72] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-releases-cargo-oil-tanker-st-nikolas-shipping-source-says-2024-07-25/[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-11-2024;https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/uk-shipping-authority-receives-report-vessel-boarded-by-armed-persons-off-oman-2024-01-11/[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/21/3021465; https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021021000530/; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/644413[75] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/29/2928597; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85175663;   https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1703036380350238820?s=20 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-18-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-20-2023-64b9d7ab38bc6[76] https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-assad-syria-e0e411c100d70862dfea3528c3a1c6bb ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74637; https://www.sana dot sy/?p=2118363[77] https://t.me/tass_agency/262408[78] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74637[79] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2023/03/al-assad-offers-putin-what-left-of-syria/ ; https://www.syria dot tv/%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88 ;[80] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1816255346190524818

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 25, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 5:21pm

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Matthew Egger of the Institute for the Study of War;Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise InstituteEditors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise InstituteData Cutoff: July 24, 2024The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.Key TakeawaysThe CCG continued to expand its “law enforcement activities” to assert the PRC’s claim over the Taiwan Strait. The CCG intruded into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen and tried to expel Taiwanese fishing vessels near the middle of the Strait.Taiwan and the PRC agreed to resume negotiations about the February 14 capsizing incident that killed two PRC fishermen fleeing the Taiwanese Coast Guard near Kinmen.PRC officials and media slammed Taiwan’s Han Kuang military exercises as a futile attempt to “resist reunification.”The PRC held the Third Plenum of the 20th Party Congress, which focused on promoting economic development in alignment with national strategic goals.The PRC and Philippines reached a “provisional arrangement” for rotation and resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal, though significant points of disagreement remain.The PRC hosted a “reconciliation dialogue” for Palestinian factions in which Hamas and Fatah signed a joint declaration that stated their intention to form a temporary post-war unity government in Gaza and the West Bank.Cross-Strait RelationsTaiwanThe CCG continued to expand its “law enforcement activities” to assert the PRC’s claim over the Taiwan Strait. Four CCG ships entered restricted waters in four different locations around Taiwan’s Kinmen island group on July 19. Kinmen is a Taiwanese island chain located just 10 kilometers (6 miles) from the PRC’s coast. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) said this was the 32nd such incursion into Kinmen’s restricted waters in 2024.[1] On the same day, the CGA also discovered a CCG ship trying to expel Taiwanese fishing boats near the middle of the Taiwan Strait, around 48 miles west of Huayu Island of Taiwan’s Penghu archipelago.[2] The PRC claims Taiwan and all its associated waters to be Chinese territory and denies the existence of any restricted or prohibited waters around Taiwanese islands such as Kinmen. It claims the entire Taiwan Strait to be part of its Exclusive Economic Zone. TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian accused Taiwanese media that reported on CCG harassment of Taiwanese fishing boats of trying to “intimidate” Taiwanese fishermen and provoke cross-strait hostility by “distorting and smearing” normal law enforcement activities to enforce a summer fishing moratorium.[3]The PRC began regular CCG patrols around Kinmen and incursions into Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited since February 2024 to assert its sovereignty over those waters and to punish Taiwan for electing President Lai Ching-te, whom the PRC considers a dangerous separatist. It substantially increased the frequency of incursions in May, around the time of Lai’s inauguration, and shifted from fixed-line patrols into Kinmen waters to designating “patrol areas” within which individual CCG ships can patrol in a less predictable pattern. Taiwanese media has also reported occasional instances of CCG ships harassing Taiwanese fishermen near the Penghu Islands, including one incident on July 5 that occurred 3.5 miles east of the Taiwan Strait median line.[4] The expansion of CCG “law enforcement” activities into Taiwan-controlled waters around Kinmen and eastward into international waters near Taiwan shows an intensifying PRC campaign to assert control over the waters near and around Taiwan. Taiwan and the PRC agreed to resume negotiations about the February 14 capsizing incident that killed two PRC fishermen fleeing the Taiwanese Coast Guard (CGA) near Kinmen. The ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) announced on July 23 that it will meet with PRC authorities at a hotel in Kinmen to further discuss a speedboat crash that killed two PRC fishers on February 14. Typhoon Gaemi's landfall in Taiwan and the PRC on July 23-24, however, halted ferry service between Xiamen and Kinmen, delaying negotiations as relatives of the deceased fishermen and other members of the PRC delegation were unable to travel to Kinmen on the day of negotiations. An MAC press release stated negotiations will continue once the PRC and ROC agree on a suitable date.[5] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Zhu Fenglian said on July 24 that the PRC hoped to “resolve the relevant issues through proper negotiation” but did not provide further details about the talks.[6]The focus of the negotiation surrounds an incident on February 14, 2024, when a PRC fishing boat in Taiwanese waters near Kinmen, a Taiwanese island around ten kilometers away from the PRC city of Xiamen, capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwan Coast Guard pursuit. The incident resulted in the deaths of two of the fishing boat’s four crewmembers. The ROC took custody of the boat and the bodies. ROC and PRC representatives have held 15 rounds of negotiations to resolve disputes caused by the incident. Unresolved PRC demands from previous negotiations include the ROC revealing the truth behind the incident, returning the dead fishermen’s bodies and their boat to the PRC, and apologizing for the incident. According to Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA), however, negotiations failed because the PRC demanded to interrogate CGA personnel and did not respect Taiwan’s maritime boundaries and law enforcement rights.[7] The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) began patrolling the waters around Kinmen and making occasional incursions into Kinmen’s restricted or prohibited waters in the months after the incident, claiming it has the jurisdiction and responsibility to do so to protect the rights and safety of fishermen from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.The PRC seeks to secure through negotiations the deceased fishermen’s bodies and boat, an apology from the ROC, and the release of detailed information about the February 14 incident and its causes.[8][9] The PRC blames Taiwan for the deaths and claimed in March that the negotiations would be postponed until after the conclusion of Taiwan’s judicial investigation into the incident concludes.[10]The new round of negotiations may be an attempted quid pro quo by the ROC to free Taiwanese nationals detained by the PRC. Kinmen Kuomintang (KMT) Legislator Jessica Chen Yu-jen expressed hopes that the new round of negotiations could lead to an ROC fisherman surnamed Hu’s release from PRC detainment or PRC authorities allowing PRC tourists to visit Kinmen.[11] The CCG detained Hu in March after his boat ran out of fuel and drifted into PRC waters near Kinmen. Chen has negotiated with PRC officials to allow Hu’s family to visit him in Quanzhou, a PRC city near Kinmen, though there is no indication she will participate in the new round of negotiations.[12] The delayed negotiations were also scheduled to occur roughly three weeks after the CCG detained a Taiwanese fishing boat and its five-man crew in PRC territorial waters near Weitou, Fujian Province. The crew, three of which are ROC nationals, is still in detainment in Fujian despite ROC efforts to secure their release.[13]PRC officials and media slammed Taiwan’s Han Kuang military exercises as a futile attempt to “resist reunification.” The ROC began its annual Han Kuang military exercises on July 22 and will hold them until July 26. The 2024 exercises are “unscripted” and will test Taiwan’s ability to protect critical infrastructure and conduct supply-delivery missions amid a PRC blockade.[14] The exercises also feature live-fire drills on Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu.[15] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning blamed tension in the Taiwan Strait on the DPP “provocation” and “seeking independence” with help from foreign forces. She stressed that any attempt to “seek independence by force” or “resist reunification by force” will inevitably fail.[16] An article in PRC state media Xinhua claimed that changes to make the exercises unscripted and decentralized, to make them better simulate the unpredictable conditions of real combat, were superficial changes that further “hijack” the lives and safety of Taiwanese people. MND spokesperson Senior Col. Wu Qian said on June 27 that the annual Han Kuang exercises were simply a “show” that cannot change the outcome of a war.[17] TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian accused the DPP on July 24 of exaggerating the threat from the PRC, squandering Taiwanese people’s money to buy weapons from the United States, tying Taiwan to the “‘Taiwan independence’ chariot” and using the Taiwanese people as “cannon fodder for Taiwan independence.”[18] State media Global Times cited PRC military expert Zhang Junshe who called the exercises a “show” and claimed the drills actually aim to ensure the survival of the DPP authorities, use the Taiwanese “general public” as shields, and await foreign reinforcements.[19]Taiwan’s Constitutional Court issued an injunction on July 19 to temporarily suspend the implementation of most provisions of a controversial legislative reform law. The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which hold a combined majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY), passed the set of reforms on May 28 despite opposition from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). President Lai Ching-te of the DPP signed the bill into law on June 24 after the LY overrode his request for “reconsideration,” but the DPP filed for a “constitutional interpretation” of the law in hopes of preventing its implementation. The new law grants the LY enhanced oversight powers over the government. The law permits the LY to call on any public official to testify before an investigative committee, confirm political appointments, and impose fines or criminal charges for “contempt of legislature” against anyone who lies, refuses to answer questions, or talks back while testifying before the legislature. The law also requires the president of Taiwan to deliver a State of the Nation address and submit to a question-and-answer session by the LY.[20] The Constitutional Court ruled 13-2 to issue injunctions on the implementation of almost all these provisions while it completes a review of their constitutionality. There is no set date for the final decision. The Constitutional Court expressed concern that provisions in the new law could infringe upon the separation of powers between the LY and other branches of government, force people to express opinions or provide documents against their will, and grant the LY investigative powers that the Constitution does not stipulate.[21]The court’s injunction order and the reasoning behind it suggest that it will find some or all of the suspended provisions unconstitutional in the final ruling. The KMT legislative caucus described the injunction ruling as “the death of judicial independence” and said it did not believe the justices who ruled to issue the injunction would be able to rule impartially on the law’s constitutionality.[22] TPP Chair Ko Wen-je called the injunction a “declaration of war” on the parliamentary system.[23] If the reforms pass constitutional review, they will increase the KMT and TPP opposition’s ability to check, investigate, and hinder the agenda and operation of President Lai’s DPP administration. The KMT and TPP together hold a majority of seats in the LY.ChinaThe PRC held the Third Plenum of the 20th Party Congress, which focused on promoting economic development in alignment with national strategic goals. The Third Plenum is one of seven meetings that the Central Committee of the CCP holds once every five years to chart a path for the PRC’s major economic and social policies. The unifying theme of the plenum was deepening comprehensive reform, ranging from fiscal policy, urban development, industrial policy, and more. The purpose of the reforms is to advance the PRC’s goal of achieving “socialist modernization” by 2035, which is a CCP-designated milestone that entails strengthening the PRC’s national power through the advancement of economic, military, and political influence.The focus of the reforms reflects the PRC’s prioritization of calibrating the economy’s trajectory to support national security objectives. The PRC released a resolution on July 21 that summarized the plenum’s goals and planned reforms.[24] The resolution made frequent references to “high-quality development,” which is an emerging slogan that entails investment in innovation to drive growth, climbing the value chain in technology and manufacturing, and deepening market reforms for a more balanced economy. The PRC’s modernization drive is rooted in the construction of the so-called “integrated national strategy system,” which seeks to coordinate and harmonize economic development with national defense. This concept is a product of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s pervasive “Overall National Security Outlook,” in which national security concerns permeate all facets of society.The resolution stressed numerous priorities that reflect the PRC’s urgent drive to securitize economic growth to support national defense capabilities. The resolution highlighted scientific and technological frontiers as the “main battlefield” of the economy and called for concentrating state capital in important industries related to national security. These “strategic industries” include AI, aerospace, new energy and resources, advanced technology, and quantum computing. The resolution also called for hastening the progression of independent supply chains to enhance security in integrated circuits, industrial equipment, and other advanced technology. One of the measures to achieve supply chain security included transferring critical industries within the PRC and building a “national strategic hinterland.” The resolution also highlighted the need to improve access and production of “strategic minerals,” which are inputs in various technologies important to national and economic security.These priorities are consistent with the PRC’s focus on insulating areas of strategic importance from what it sees as escalating efforts from hostile countries to suppress the PRC. The resolution acknowledged a “complex domestic and international situation,” and called for reforms to coordinate the two. In an explainer of the resolution released alongside it, Xi Jinping urged the PRC to adapt to the challenging global environment that is characterized by growing “external attempts to suppress and contain China.”[25] Xi claimed that deepening reform will help the PRC win the strategic initiative as challenges arise. The PRC began a drive to foster technology industries domestically in 2020 after the United States took measures to limit the PRC’s access to dual-use technologies that are critical for achieving the PRC’s ongoing militarization. Dual-use technologies are a cornerstone of the PRC’s military-civil fusion strategy, which aims to ensure that economic development supports military development.The PRC removed sanctions from US satellite communications firm Viasat, which it had sanctioned for aiding Taiwan’s military. PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning announced on July 22 that the PRC has lifted its sanctions against the US communications company Viasat “since the circumstances based on which the countermeasures were issued have changed.” She did not comment on media reports that Viasat is seeking cooperation with PRC firms.[26] The PRC originally imposed sanctions on Viasat in January 2024 along with four other defense firms in response to the United States announcing a $300 million sale of equipment to Taiwan to help maintain Taiwan’s tactical information systems.[27] The sanctions froze the companies’ assets in the PRC and prohibited PRC organizations and individuals from doing business with them.[28] Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CNA) reported that this is the first time the PRC publicly announced the lifting of sanctions on a firm that sold military equipment to Taiwan.[29] Viasat’s PRC business has included a 2019 partnership with China Satellite Communications Co. to provide inflight wi-fi to PRC airlines and a sale of equipment to Sichuan Airlines in 2022. Viasat also acquired the British satellite communications company Inmarsat in 2023, which provided satellite services to China Central Television (CCTV).[30] It is unclear what “circumstances” changed to trigger the lifting of sanctions. Viasat has not commented on the removal of the sanctions as of July 24.The PRC suspended arms control and non-proliferation talks with the United States, citing US arms sales to Taiwan. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian cited repeated US arms sales to Taiwan as the reason for suspending negotiations.[31] The PRC has long been uninterested in the talks, however. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan commented on the PRC’s disinterest in “substantive dialogue” on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation in June 2023. Sullivan stated that the PRC had little willingness to “compartmentalize strategic stability from broader issues in the relationship.”[32] Sullivan stated that the PRC has not shown interest in discussions regarding the changes it is making to its nuclear forces.[33]The United States and the PRC held the last instance of arms control negotiations in Washington in November 2023 after a five-year hiatus.[34] The meeting occurred a week before President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping held a summit in San Francisco to stabilize bilateral relations. An unnamed US official familiar with the talks described the PRC’s level of engagement during that meeting as not substantive.[35] The US Under Secretary for Arms Control Bonnie Jenkins stated in Congressional testimony in May that the PRC declined a follow-on meeting and did not provide a substantive response to the risk reduction suggestions that the US side put forth during that meeting.[36] Lin rejected the notion that the PRC was dragging its feet and stated that the PRC is willing to uphold communication with the US on arms control on the condition that the US respects its “core interests.”[37]The PRC frequently uses security dialogue as a bargaining chip to influence US behavior, rather than viewing it as a necessary aspect of bilateral relations. The PRC cut off high-level military talks with the United States after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. The PRC agreed to resume them at the presidential summit between US President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in San Francisco in November 2023.Southeast AsiaPhilippinesThe PRC and Philippines reached a “provisional arrangement” for rotation and resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal, though significant points of disagreement remain. The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) released a statement on July 21, saying that this agreement was part of an effort to de-escalate the situation with China around the Second Thomas Shoal.[38] Tensions have been high since a territorial dispute occurred in June of this year when a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel collided with a Philippine supply ship during a routine transport mission to the grounded Sierra Madre.[39] Subsequent statements from both sides indicate that significant points of disagreement remain, however.Neither the PRC nor the Philippines have released the details of the agreement, which has enabled the PRC to begin shaping the information environment to blame the Philippines for any failure to implement the agreement. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning remarked at a July 22 press conference that the Philippines and China had just completed a series of consultations on managing the situation at the Second Thomas Shoal, and had reached an agreement with the Philippines on humanitarian resupply activities based on three points guiding the PRC’s “principled position” on this issue.[40] First, China reiterates that the grounding of the Sierra Madre is a violation of PRC sovereign rights, and again calls for it to be removed from its current location. Second, China will allow humanitarian supply missions to the Sierra Madre if the Philippines informs China in advance and allows Chinese monitoring throughout the process. Third, China will not allow the Philippines to send construction materials to the Sierra Madre and/or attempt to build a permanent outpost in contested waters.The DFA stated on July 22 that the MFA inaccurately characterized the agreement. The DFA contested that the Philippines must provide prior notification to the PRC and receive on-site confirmation before humanitarian supply missions can occur.[41] The DFA stated that the Philippines will continue to assert its rights within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including in the Second Thomas Shoal. However, the DFA made it clear that it is still ready to implement the agreement on rotation and resupply efforts.VietnamVietnam filed a claim at the United Nations to extend its continental shelf in the South China Sea. The claim aims to extend the continental shelf beyond the current 200 nautical miles, but not exceeding 350 nautical miles, from baselines in its territorial waters.[42] Vietnam also seeks through the submission to reaffirm its sovereignty over the disputed Paracel and Spratly archipelagos one month after the Philippines filed a similar claim. The DFA released a statement reaffirming the Philippines’ claims on its extended continental shelf but acknowledged that Vietnam has a right to submit claims establishing the limits of the continental shelf in accordance with UNCLOS.[43] The Philippines stated its desire to engage with Vietnam on possible ways to achieve a mutually beneficial solution to issues in the South China Sea.The PRC MFA stated that it “firmly opposes” Vietnam’s filing.[44] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian stated that such actions by Vietnam and the Philippines infringe on China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests and will only serve to intensify existing conflicts.[45]RussiaPRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba from July 23-25. Wang stated that “both Ukraine and Russia have sent signals of willingness to negotiate to varying degrees,” but that the “timing is not yet ripe.”[46] The PRC readout stated that Ukraine appreciated the “positive and constructive role played by China in promoting peace and maintaining international order.” The Ukrainian readout of the meeting did not mirror the sentiments from the PRC readout, however. The Ukrainian readout stated only that Kuleba expressed conviction that peace in Ukraine corresponds to the PRC’s strategic interests and called the PRC’s role as a global force for peace important.[47]The PRC’s readout aims to assert the narrative that Ukraine has confidence in the PRC to help negotiate an end to the war. The PRC released a vague 12-point peace plan in February 2023 that advocated for a political settlement to the war in Ukraine. Ukraine and Western allies regarded it as a non-starter due to its failure to demand Russia’s withdrawal from occupied territory. The PRC readout highlighted Ukraine’s regard for the PRC’s six-point “consensus” to reach a political solution that it jointly issued with Brazil on May 23, which lacks the same precondition for starting negotiations as the 12-point plan.[48] The PRC skipped a Ukraine peace summit in June in protest of Russia’s exclusion.[49]The PRC’s efforts to showcase international support for its role as a mediator aim to rebuke NATO's accusations that the PRC is supporting Russia in the war against Ukraine. The PRC also seeks to promote its peace plan as an alternative outcome to the war than the resolution that NATO and Ukraine advocate for, which is Russia’s full withdrawal from Ukrainian territory.PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian expressed support to Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on July 17 for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s peace efforts, referring to the latter’s recent shuttle diplomacy between Ukraine and Russia.[50] The PRC highlighted alignment on the issue of Ukraine between the PRC and Hungary, an EU and NATO member, during a meeting between Xi Jinping and Orbán on July 8.[51] Lin used Orban’s appeal to European Council President Charles Michel to include the PRC in future EU peace negotiations by advocating for Russia’s involvement.The PRC is taking parallel actions to undermine NATO on the world stage alongside its diplomatic efforts to influence the Ukraine crisis. The PRC conducted joint military exercises with Belarus near the Polish and Ukrainian border that simulated the seizure of an airport, which the two countries called “anti-terrorism operations.”[52] The exercises began on July 8, during the week of the NATO summit in Washington in which NATO heads of state labeled the PRC a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine.”[53] Lin Jian criticized NATO for reports that member states are considering nationalizing PRC-owned infrastructure and accused it of trying to expand its influence.[54] The PRC Ambassador to the UN Fu Cong also accused NATO of expansionism during a speech at a UN sustainability forum and stated that “history has amply proved that wherever NATO hands extend, turmoil and chaos will ensue.”[55]Israel-PalestineThe PRC hosted a “reconciliation dialogue” for Palestinian factions in which Hamas and Fatah signed a joint declaration that stated their intention to form a temporary post-war unity government in Gaza and the West Bank.[56] Fatah is the dominant party in the Palestinian Authority (PA), which governs the West Bank. The eight-point declaration stipulates that a government involving Hamas would rule the Gaza Strip and West Bank until elections could be held at an unspecified future date.[57] The declaration reportedly does not address how or when the government will be formed, nor which party will maintain security in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has been adamant that it will keep its military wing.[58] The declaration stands in contrast to the position of the United States and other Western countries, which oppose Hamas’ involvement in the Palestinian government unless it recognizes Israel.[59] Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz accused Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas of embracing terrorism by engaging with Hamas and denied that the government will form because Israel would crush Hamas.[60] The full text of the agreement has not been released at the time of writing.PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi lauded the declaration as a “historic moment for the cause of Palestinian liberation.[61] Wang stated that the PRC has never had any selfish interests in the Palestinian issue and has contributed “Chinese wisdom and solutions” through various proposals under Xi Jinping. Wang outlined a three-step process for resolving the current conflict, which entailed an immediate ceasefire, the international community’s acceptance of a post-war Palestinian government in Gaza, and Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations to begin working toward a two-state solution. PRC state media highlighted congratulations from the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Sven Koopmans.[62]The PRC’s early portrayal of the deal as a success is not easily reconcilable with the historic obstacles to the unification of the Palestinian factions. Past deals have failed to bring about substantive cooperation between Fatah and Hamas.[63] PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning responded to public skepticism over the declaration’s role in facilitating reconciliation and stated that “peace will not be achieved overnight.”[64]The PRC is using engagement with Palestinian factions to portray itself as a successful global mediator that can resolve conflicts where the United States has failed. Hosting the intra-Palestinian talks is a relatively low-cost, low-risk way for the PRC to bolster its diplomatic reputation. A failure to bring about Fatah-Hamas reconciliation would amount to maintenance of the status quo and would not draw significant criticism of the PRC. Even without a material improvement in relations between Fatah and Hamas, the negotiations provide the PRC with an opportunity to tout its diplomatic credentials in a similar way to the Beijing-mediated Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement in March 2023.The PRC’s diplomatic engagement could facilitate greater PRC economic and political influence in the Levant. The PRC first hosted intra-Palestinian reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas in Beijing on April 26.[65] MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated on April 26 that the PRC supports strengthening the authority of the PA, which signals its intent to establish relations with the Palestinian factions that have roles in governing Gaza after the war. [66] Post-war reconstruction offers a path for the PRC to grow its economic influence. The PRC pledged $83 million to reconstruction efforts and humanitarian aid as of May.[67] Senior Hamas official Hassam Badran stated that a Palestinian unity government would oversee reconstruction efforts under the joint agreement that the PRC facilitated.[68] [1] https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=160987&ctNode=650&mp=999[2] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202407200085.aspx[3] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202407/t20240724_12637768.htm[4] https://news.ltn.com dot tw/news/politics/paper/1655032[5] https://www.mac dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=05B73310C5C3A632&sms=1A40B00E4C745211&s=FAB5C2F0A87A9300[6] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202407/t20240724_12637766.htm[7] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/paper/1634162[8] https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202402260113.aspx[9] http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202402/t20240221_12601135.htm[10] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/acn/202402210305.aspx; https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/acn/202403080290.aspx; https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4604817; http://www.gwytb dot gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202403/t20240313_12605907.htm[11] https://www.facebook.com/KinmenMyLove/posts/pfbid02JZfpGPAijkCBo4E5L6ZoZKuqT1CpGWG1r3Nx4unX5bdPUbjFm7TAckFcipttUYRdl?locale=zh_TW[12] https://www.ctee dot com.tw/news/20240626701020-430801[13] https://udn dot com/news/story/7331/8102001[14] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202407210004https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3271439/taiwan-kicks-han-kuang-war-games-live-fire-drills-closer-mainland-china[15] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202407150018[16] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240722_11457963.shtml[17] http://www.news dot cn/milpro/20240722/43d63ff416574c47b8bc2d621dd55612/c.html[18] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202407/t20240724_12637766.htm[19] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202407/1316491.shtml[20] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202405280017[21] https://news.ltn.com dot tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4742037https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202407190015[22] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202407190015[23] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20240719005021-260407?chdtv[24] https://www.gov dot cn/zhengce/202407/content_6963770.htm[25] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202407/content_6963773.htm[26] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240722_11457963.shtml[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-approves-300-mln-support-taiwans-tactical-information-systems-2023-12-16/[28] http://us.china-embassy.gov dot cn/eng/lcbt/wjbfyrbt/202401/t20240107_11219409.htm[29] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/acn/202407220296.aspx[30] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-22/china-drops-sanctions-on-us-communications-firm-in-rare-reversal[31] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/202407/t20240717_11455286.shtml[32] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-aca-annual-forum/[33] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-aca-annual-forum/[34] https://www.state.gov/assistant-secretary-mallory-stewarts-meeting-with-the-peoples-republic-of-chinas-prc-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-director-general-of-arms-control-sun-xiaobo/https://editorials.voa.gov/a/prc-suspends-nuclear-arms-talks-with-the-united-states/7704962.html[35] https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-11-07/us-chinese-officials-held-arms-control-talks-on-monday-state-dept[36] https://www.state.gov/testimony-before-the-senate-foreign-relations-committee-the-future-of-arms-control-and-deterrence/[37] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240717_11455286.shtml[38] https://x.com/UsecLazaro/status/1814995996570755457[39] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3267279/south-china-sea-photos-show-chinese-coastguard-encircled-boarded-philippine-boat[40] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202407/t20240722_11457495.html[41] https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=832046102411964&set=a.170032678613313[42] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-files-un-claim-extended-continental-shelf-south-china-sea-2024-07-18/[43] https://globalnation.inquirer dot net/243103/ph-affirms-claim-on-extended-continental-shelf-in-south-china-sea[44] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240718_11456253.shtml[45] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240718_11456253.shtml[46] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202407/t20240724_11459443.shtml[47] https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/dmitro-kuleba-spravedlivij-mir-v-ukrayini-vidpovidaye-strategichnim-interesam-kitayu[48] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202405/content_6953287.htm[49] https://www.reuters.com/world/china-pushes-rival-ukraine-peace-plan-before-swiss-summit-diplomats-say-2024-06-13/[50] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240717_11455286.shtml[51] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202407/content_6961959.htm[52] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3271117/chinese-and-belarussian-troops-practice-seizing-airport-drill-near-ukrainian-and-polish-borders?module=top_story&pgtype=subsectionhttps://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/43-t001jaPEGdv6VZyDHHg[53] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm#:~:text=26.,and%20to%20Euro%2DAtlantic%20security.[54] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240719_11456798.shtml[55] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202407/1316244.shtml[56] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-hamas-fatah-declaration-ending-decadeslong-rift-israel-hamas-war-rcna163166[57] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-hamas-fatah-declaration-ending-decadeslong-rift-israel-hamas-war-rcna163166[58] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/23/world/middleeast/fatah-hamas-china-statement.html[59] https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/hamas-fatah-agree-form-government-palestinian-groups-112205927#:~:text=Israel%20denounced%20the%20deal%20hours,unless%20it%20expressly%20recognizes%20Israel.[60] https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/1815670709378560503?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet[61] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/zyjh_673099/202407/t20240723_11458728.shtml[62] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/202407/t20240724_11459442.htmlhttps://english.news dot cn/20240724/de51451ebcdc4993850231be75e6062b/c.html#:~:text=UN%20Secretary%2DGeneral%20Antonio%20Guterres,regular%20daily%20briefing%20on%20Tuesday.[63] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/world/middleeast/palestinians-fatah-hamas-gaza.html[64] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240724_11459539.shtml[65] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3260508/china-hosts-talks-between-rival-palestinian-factions-hamas-and-fatah-bid-end-internal-divisions?module=top_story&pgtype=section[66] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202404/t20240426_11289913.shtml[67] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Middle-East-crisis/China-s-Xi-tells-Arab-leaders-Gaza-war-can-t-continue-indefinitely[68] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-war-china-palestinians-hamas-fatah-unity-government/

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, July 22, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 6:24am

  Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The modified Houthi drone that struck Tel Aviv flew at least 2,600 kilometers, demonstrating how Iran and its partners have expanded the geographic range of their weapon systems to target the eastern Mediterranean and other areas.[1] The modified Sammad-3 drone traveled east-to-west from Yemen, crossing into Eritrea before turning north and flying through Sudan and Egypt and then turning east to target Tel Aviv from the west. A standard Sammad-3 can travel 1,500 kilometers. Israeli air defense operations failed to identify the drone as a threat because it traveled in civilian flight corridors and dropped off and on the Israeli radar system. The Houthi attack approached Israeli air space at the same time as a second drone that came from Iraq. The IDF concluded that there was no operational coordination between the Houthis and the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia. The Iraqi drone arrived near Israel at the same time, but it was not launched simultaneously, given the much shorter flight time from Yemen.[2]Iran and the Houthis have both said that they aim to develop the ability to attack targets in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. The capability to strike a target over 2,500 kilometers from Yemen demonstrates that the Houthis can launch drones targeting areas as far north as Cyprus—ranging all of Israel—and as far south as the southeastern coast of Tanzania, ranging large portions of the Indian Ocean. The Houthis have expressed an intent to expand their targeting into both areas.[3]This Houthi attack is part of a broader Axis of Resistance reconnaissance-in-force effort against Israeli air defenses, which aims to better understand the strengths and weakness of Israeli air defense, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed. These lessons can be shared across the Axis, given that the Houthis and Axis of Resistance almost certainly communicate about their attacks and lessons learned. The Houthi supreme leader, Abdulmalik al Houthi, noted that the Houthis and Iraqi groups continue to coordinate, for example.[4]US and Iraqi officials began talks on July 22 in Washington, DC, to continue negotiations over the end of the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq.[5] Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder announced that the Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue met at the Pentagon to discuss the future of the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq and security cooperation between the United States and Iraq.[6] Participants from US CENTCOM, the Joint Staff, the State Department, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the National Security Council attended as part of the US delegation, and the Iraqi delegation included representatives from the Iraqi Defense Ministry, Iraqi Security Forces, Counterterrorism Service, and Kurdish Peshmerga.[7] Ryder said that Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue will consider recommendations from the US-Iraq Higher Military Commission (HMC).[8] The Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue will meet again on July 23.[9] The United States and Iraq have been evaluating a timeline to withdraw International Coalition forces from Iraq following the January 2024 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack that killed three US servicemembers.[10]The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division launched a new clearing operation in Khan Younis on July 22 to disrupt Hamas’ efforts to reconstitute in the governorate.[11] The IDF issued evacuation orders for civilians in Khan Younis, including eastern portions of the humanitarian zone in Khan Younis, on July 22.[12] Approximately 400,000 civilians reside in the areas identified under the new evacuation orders.[13] The IDF reported that Hamas fighters had infiltrated into previously cleared areas of Khan Younis and had re-established militia infrastructure in the area.[14] The IDF reported that Hamas has also used areas within the humanitarian zone to launch indirect fire attacks into Israel.[15]The 214th Artillery Brigade (98th Division) and the IDF Air Force struck over 30 militia infrastructure targets in Khan Younis on July 22.[16] The IDF Air Force struck Hamas military depots, observation posts, underground shafts, and buildings used by Hamas.[17] An Israeli military correspondent and local Palestinian reports claimed Israeli armored vehicles advanced through Abasan al Jadida and reached Bani Suhaila.[18] A Palestinian journalist reported “violent clashes” and artillery shelling in Bani Suhaila and unspecified areas of eastern Khan Younis.[19] Hamas targeted Israeli tanks advancing in Bani Suhail with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs).[20]The IDF reported that Hamas fighters planned to take control of a humanitarian aid route in Rafah. An Israeli military correspondent posted IDF footage on July 22 that showed a group of Palestinian fighters hijacking a humanitarian aid truck along a designated aid route in Rafah.[21] The military correspondent reported that the IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) raided a school adjacent to the humanitarian corridor in the past week and identified several fighters planning to hijack vehicles and “take control” of the aid convoy route.[22] The Nahal Brigade directed drone strikes against the fighters and identified a tunnel shaft in the school’s courtyard.[23] CTP-ISW cannot verify the location of the video or the school. This incident likely took place along an IDF-designated aid corridor that stretches from the Kerem Shalom crossing to southern Khan Younis, however. The IDF established the corridor in June 2024 to facilitate aid convoys’ safe travel through the Gaza Strip.[24] The United Nations and international aid groups have alleged that the IDF has not protected its designated aid route, creating a corridor that is unstable and vulnerable to frequent hijacking by armed groups.[25] The IDF acknowledged that Hamas fighters often attempt to stop and hijack aid convoys along the designated route.[26]Key Takeaways:Yemen: The modified Houthi drone that struck Tel Aviv flew at least 2,600 kilometers, demonstrating how Iran and its partners have expanded the geographic range of their weapon systems to target the eastern Mediterranean and other areas.Iraq: US and Iraqi officials began talks on July 22 in Washington, DC, to continue negotiations over the end of the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq.Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division launched a new clearing operation in Khan Younis on July 22 to disrupt Hamas’ efforts to reconstitute in the governorate.West Bank: The Shin Bet said on July 22 that it uncovered a plot by Palestinian fighters to kidnap IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians in the West Bank.Lebanon: A Wall Street Journal report on July 22 highlighted challenges that Israel faces intercepting drones targeting northern Israel.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe 3rd “Alexandroni” Infantry Brigade (Res.) (99th Division) continued clearing operations along the Netzarim Corridor on July 22.[27] Three Palestinian militias conducted separate rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor.[28]Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine mortared Israeli forces northeast of Bureij camp in the central Gaza Strip.[29]The 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on July 22.[30] The IDF 401st Brigade engaged and killed Palestinian fighters in close quarters combat and directed IAF airstrikes against fighters in Tal al Sultan.[31] The IDF Givati Brigade also engaged and killed Palestinian fighters, including an armed cell.[32] Hamas fighters engaged Israeli forces in several complex attacks in al Furqan neighborhood in Tal al Sultan.[33] Hamas fighters detonated a pre-rigged tunnel that Israeli forces and engineers were attempting to clear.[34] Hamas fighters also targeted Israeli armor with an EFP and RPGs.[35]The Israeli Air Force struck approximately 35 militia targets in the Gaza Strip in the past 24 hours.[36] The IDF targeted military buildings, Palestinian fighters, and a rocket launcher in Khan Younis aimed at southern Israel.[37] A Palestinian journalist reported on July 22 that the IDF issued evacuation orders to residents on a residential block of Jaffa Street in Deir al Balah.[38] The IAF conducted airstrikes on the block shortly after.[39]Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and National Resistance Brigades fighters mortared three Israeli military sites in southern Israel on July 22.[40] Israeli military correspondents reported that unspecified fighters also launched at least two rockets into southern Israel from the Khan Younis area.[41] The rockets set off warnings in Nir Izhak and Sufa but landed in open areas.[42]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 21.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) in Tulkarm.[44]The Shin Bet said on July 22 that it uncovered a plot by Palestinian fighters to kidnap IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians in the West Bank.[45] Israeli forces detained two individuals in the Aqabat Jabr refugee camp near Jericho who the IDF suspected of planning the attack.[46] The IDF reported that the two fighters recruited other unspecified individuals to support the planned kidnapping. The fighters dug a hole underground near one fighter’s house where they planned to hide the hostages. The IDF confiscated small arms and military gear during the arrests.[47]The IDF said on July 21 that it thwarted a Hamas shooting in the West Bank.[48] The IDF detained five individuals near Ramallah suspected of planning the attack. The IDF also confiscated weapons and funds.[49] The IDF said that a Hamas cell in Turkey provided the Hamas fighters with instructions and funds.This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Southern Lebanon and Golan HeightsAxis of Resistance objectives:Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into LebanonPrepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaLebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks into northern Israel on July 22.[50] The IDF intercepted seven drones over the Golan Heights on July 22.[51] Hezbollah said that it launched a drone targeting Israeli forces at a position near Malikiyah in northern Israel on July 22.[52] The IDF intercepted a drone over the Upper Galilee area, likely referring to the Hezbollah drone attack on near Malikiyah.[53]A Wall Street Journal report on July 22 highlighted challenges that Israel faces intercepting drones targeting northern Israel.[54] The deputy security officer of Kiryat Shmona told the Wall Street Journal that drone attacks are the “main threat” that the IDF is facing in northern Israel. The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel’s Iron Dome has struggled to intercept drones and that the IDF has relied on fighter jets to destroy the drones instead, which forces pilots to fly low in mountainous terrain and exposes them to Hezbollah’s anti-aircraft systems. It is unsurprising that the drone threat forces the IDF Air Force to use fighter aircraft to intercept the drones. Saudi Arabia frequently employed aircraft to intercept Houthi drones during the Saudi involvement in Yemen.[55] Israeli soldiers are instructed to use rifles to destroy the drones when other interception methods fail, according to anonymous Israeli military and defense officials. Israeli officials have discussed in recent months an offensive into Lebanon amid an increase in Hezbollah drone attacks targeting northern Israel.[56] Hezbollah doubled its drone attacks targeting northern Israel between April and May 2024.[57]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe spokesperson for the Asaib Ahl al Haq’s parliamentary bloc criticized the international community for ignoring US, Turkish, and Israeli violations against Iraqi sovereignty on July 21.[58] The spokesperson, Mohammad al Baldawi, blamed “American interference” for Turkey’s recent operation in northern Iraq and claimed that the Interational Coalition should be responsible for patrolling Iraq borders.[59] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Asaib Ahl al Haq, have demanded that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani set a timeline for the withdrawal of all US forces from Iraq.[60] US military personnel are currently in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government under Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in an advisory role to support Iraqi security forces conducting counter-ISIS operations.[61]Iran and Sudan restored diplomatic relations on July 21 after an eight-year hiatus.[62] The new Iranian Ambassador to Sudan, Hassan Shah Hosseini, presented his credentials to Sudan’s de-facto leader Sudanese Army chief Abdel Fattah al Burhan in Port Sudan on July 21.The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) intercepted the Betelgeuse, a Togo-flagged, UAE-managed products tanker, on July 21.[63] The tanker was carrying 1,500 tons of marine gas oil according to British maritime security firm Ambrey.[64] Iranian media claimed that the IRGC seized a 74-meter-long oil tanker smuggling approximately 1,400 tons of diesel fuel and its 12 Indian and Sri Lankan crew members.[65] The incident occurred approximately 61 nautical miles southwest of Iran’s Bushehr port.[66] Ambrey assessed that the IRGC likely intercepted the tanker as part of a counter-smuggling operation.US Central Command (CENTCOM) intercepted four Houthi naval attack drones in the Red Sea on July 21.[67][1] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1814895997358645295 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815023848313549042[2] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1814895997358645295[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-3-2024[4] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1791107826347040833; https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3351322.htm[5] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3845967/us-iraqi-officials-hold-pentagon-meeting-to-discuss-security-cooperation; https://x.com/USAmbIraq/status/1815291590610501836[6] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3845967/us-iraqi-officials-hold-pentagon-meeting-to-discuss-security-cooperation/[7] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3845967/us-iraqi-officials-hold-pentagon-meeting-to-discuss-security-cooperation/[8] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3845967/us-iraqi-officials-hold-pentagon-meeting-to-discuss-security-cooperation/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-25-2024[9] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3845967/us-iraqi-officials-hold-pentagon-meeting-to-discuss-security-cooperation/[10] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3655790/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-the-start-of-working-gr/[11] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815428708175671787[12] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815248777269153853 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1815247774117433358 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-calls-on-eastern-part-gaza-humanitarian-zone-to-evacuate/ ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-811340 ;[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-orders-evacuation-part-gazas-khan-younis-after-renewed-rocket-fire-2024-07-22/[14] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815428708175671787[15] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12038[16] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815428711409504420[17] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815428714567475304[18] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12063 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/272648 ;[19] https://t.me/hamza20300/272655 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/272703 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/272642 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/272623 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-orders-evacuation-part-gazas-khan-younis-after-renewed-rocket-fire-2024-07-22/ ; https://t.me/hamza20300/272636 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12062[20] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2742[21] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815393952045961501[22] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815393952045961501[23] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815393952045961501[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-16-2024[25] https://apnews.com/article/gaza-rafah-crime-hamas-israel-988f2919d00339ded5a18f26feafda6f[26] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815393952045961501[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815263487360213485[28] https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14790; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6871; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2730[29] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2731; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2735[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815263472222921090[31] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815263472222921090[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815263472222921090[33] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2732; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2734; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2737; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2738; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2739[34] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2738[35] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2732; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2734; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2739[36][37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815263487360213485[38] https://t.me/hamza20300/272662[39] https://t.me/hamza20300/272672; https://t.me/hamza20300/272675[40] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4362; https://t.me/sarayaps/18356; https://t.me/sarayaps/18356[41] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12064; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815339814520262916[42] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815339814520262916[43] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6868; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6869; https://t.me/hamza20300/272455; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6872; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6873[44] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6872; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6873[45] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12065; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815371433591120237[46] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12065[47] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12065; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12066; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12067[48] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1814962124063412634; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/shin-bet-says-it-foiled-west-bank-shooting-attack-plot-directed-by-hamas-members-in-turkey/[49] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1814962124063412634; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/shin-bet-says-it-foiled-west-bank-shooting-attack-plot-directed-by-hamas-members-in-turkey/[50] https://t.me/mmirleb/5611; https://t.me/mmirleb/5616; https://t.me/mmirleb/5618; https://t.me/mmirleb/5620[51] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815392604516737107; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12071[52] https://t.me/mmirleb/5611[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815451243872952484[54] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/a-rubiks-cube-in-the-sky-israel-struggles-to-defend-against-drones-14062f76?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2[55] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/gulf/saudi-arabia/watch-saudi-fighter-jets-shoot-down-a-houthi-drone-in-air-to-air-kill-1.1180074[56] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-5-2024[57] https://t.me/moriahdoron/10699[58] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=197775; https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=186468[59] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=197775[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-24-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2024[61] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3655790/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-the-start-of-working-gr/[62] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202407216834 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-21/war-torn-sudan-fully-restores-iran-ties-with-ambassador-swap[63] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/680001/ ; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:654120/mmsi:671418100/imo:8706741/vessel:BETELGEUSE[64] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-intercepted-an-uae-managed-tanker-ambrey-says-2024-07-22/[65] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/680001/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-intercepted-an-uae-managed-tanker-ambrey-says-2024-07-22/[66] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-intercepted-an-uae-managed-tanker-ambrey-says-2024-07-22/[67] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1815178599151882616

[Author: ISWKF]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 5:21am

Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and George BarrosJuly 22, 2024, 7:30pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on July 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russia and North Korea are pursuing increased cooperation in the judicial sphere. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov arrived in Pyongyang, North Korea and met with his North Korean counterpart Kim Chol Won on July 22, marking the first time that a Russian Prosecutor General has visited North Korea.[1] Krasnov and Kim reportedly discussed avenues for continued cooperation and signed an agreement for joint work between the Russian and North Korean prosecutor generals' offices for 2024–2026.[2] The Russian and North Korean prosecutor general's offices have notably maintained dialogue since 2010 through a separate cooperation agreement, but the new agreement will likely be much more focused in scope, reflecting intensified Russo–North Korean cooperation over the past year.[3] Krasnov emphasized the importance of "establishing a regular exchange of legislative acts" between Russia and North Korea and noted that Russia is ready to share its own experience in developing judicial practice with North Korea while also learning about North Korean judicial practice, particularly in the spheres of communication and information technology.[4] Both countries have pursued increased military, political, diplomatic, and economic cooperation over the past year, as ISW has reported, but the apparent desire to align judicial and prosecutorial agendas is particularly noteworthy.[5] ISW previously noted that the Russian Prosecutor General's Office weaponizes administrative laws to strengthen the judicial system's control over Russian society, and Krasnov's recent foreign engagements (including with Iraqi and Central African Republic officials) likely aim in part to share such judicial control and law enforcement tactics with friendly states in exchange for increasing Russia's own arsenal of domestic control methods.[6] Russia's interest in North Korean judicial expertise in communications and information technologies is likely a reflection of the Kremlin's desire to consolidate control over the Russian information space, including via messaging platforms and virtual private network (VPN) services.[7]Russia is taking steps to codify terms broadly expanding the Russian official definition of prosecutable extremism as part of its ongoing effort to criminally prosecute and stymie domestic opposition to the Kremlin and its war in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) published on July 22 the draft of a new Russian counterterrorism strategy, which establishes legal definitions for "Russophobia" and "xenophobia" and modifies the definitions of "radicalism," "countering extremism," and "subjects of countering extremism."[8] These newly modified legal definitions significantly expand the Kremlin's ability to criminally prosecute anyone who opposes the Kremlin by classifying domestic opposition under a number of nebulous and broad definitions that are linked to existing Russian information operations that both aim to discredit international actors and promote self-censorship domestically. The new strategy defines "Russophobia" as the "manifestation of hatred, hostility, or hostile attitude to citizens of Russia, Russian language and culture" through "aggressive attitudes and actions" from "individual representatives and political forces as well as discriminatory actions on the part of authorities of states unfriendly to Russia."[9] The new strategy defines "xenophobia" as a "manifestation of hatred, hostility, or intolerance towards certain social groups and communicates of people;" and defines "radicalism" as "adherence to an ideology of violence characterized by the desire for a decisive and radical change in the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation [and] the violation of the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation."[10] These definitions, particularly the provision defining supporting change to the Russian Constitution as "radicalism," seek to informationally link and even define opposition to the Russian government's current actions and structure as ethnic intolerance against the Russians who do support the Kremlin's policies and war in Ukraine, a hatred of Russian culture and history, and supportive of states "unfriendly" to Russia in the minds of Russians. The Kremlin also likely seeks to use these definitions and subsequent prosecutions to curry favor with Russian ultranationalists, as the Kremlin has recently been cracking down on illegal migration amid ethnic tensions under the guise of counter-extremism while failing to adequately address the threat of Islamic extremism within Russia.[11]The Kremlin's recent efforts to expand the prosecutable definition of extremism and information space crackdowns have likely aimed to promote self-censorship among dissident Russians, and the new draft counterterrorism strategy likely also seeks to convince Russians that opposition to the Kremlin's policies and war are instead opposition to broader Russian society, culture, and ideals.[12] The explanatory note of the draft counterterrorism strategy states that the "solution" to domestic extremism requires modifications in "all areas of state policy, including national, migration, youth, cultural, and informational [policy]."[13] The note also emphasizes the importance of "strengthening traditional Russian legal and moral values" while countering the spread of "radical nationalism and neo-Nazism in the context of the special military operation [war in Ukraine] and the inclusion of new territories [illegally-occupied Ukrainian lands]."[14] The Kremlin will likely lean into narratives and ideologies promoting domestic nationalism to set informational conditions for its prolonged war effort in Ukraine and its future hostility towards other states the Kremlin deems hostile under the "Russophobic" and other extremist labels.Kursk Oblast officials appointed a critical Russian milblogger to an advisory role within the regional government, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to appease critical commentators by granting them certain reputational concessions in exchange for their increased informational loyalty. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov announced that he appointed Russian milblogger Roman Alekhin as one of his volunteer advisors.[15] Alekhin claimed on July 22 during his announcement of his position that he would now be able to implement "all of his ideas" about security and the development of the area.[16] Alekhin also implied that his appointment demonstrates that he is taking responsibility for and acting upon his previous criticisms of the Kursk Oblast government. Alekhin notably rhetorically attacked Smirnov on July 21 for reportedly accusing a rural official in Kursk Oblast of discrediting the Russian military after the official spoke about Ukrainian strikes in the area.[17] Alekhin was born in Kursk Oblast and claimed in 2022 that Kursk Oblast authorities mobilized him after he criticized the regional authorities, despite the fact that Alekhin is over the age limit for mobilization and has a severe spinal injury.[18] The Kremlin has co-opted Russian milbloggers who have voiced criticisms before by promoting and rewarding them. Such milbloggers include Alexander "Sasha" Kots, who became a member of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights in 2022; and Mikhail Zvinchuk, whom Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) awarded in November and December 2023.[19]Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and a military air base in Rostov Oblast on July 22. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on July 22 that sources in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai and damaged refinery infrastructure.[20] Footage published on July 22 reportedly shows a fire at the Tuapse oil refinery.[21] Tuapse Raion Head Sergei Boyko claimed on July 22 that falling drone debris damaged infrastructure at the oil refinery.[22] Russian milbloggers responded to the Tuapse strike and complained about the Russian government's inability to sufficiently protect critical infrastructure facilities from Ukrainian strikes.[23] Geolocated footage published on July 22 shows a drone strike against Morozovsk Air Base in Rostov Oblast.[24] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces launched at least ten drones targeting the Morozovsk Air Base and damaged infrastructure facilities.[25] Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev claimed that falling drone debris caused a fire in northern Rostov Oblast.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces destroyed 47 drones over Rostov Oblast and eight drones over Krasnodar Krai.[27]Georgian authorities reportedly placed roughly 300 Georgian citizens who have served as volunteers in the Georgian Legion alongside Ukrainian forces on Georgia's wanted list. Georgian Legion Commander Mamuka Mamulashvili told Russian-language investigative outlet the Insider on July 21 that Georgian authorities placed roughly 300 volunteers affiliated with the Georgian Legion, most of whom are currently in Ukraine, on Georgia's wanted list.[28] Mamulashvili did not state what alleged crimes the Georgian government charged the volunteers with. Mamulashvili noted that he did not know the two Georgian volunteers that Georgia's State Security Service (SUS or SSSG) reportedly recently summoned for questioning on charges of "conspiracy to overthrow the government" and "terrorism."[29] The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) charged over 70 volunteers in the Georgian Legion, including Mamulashvili, in absentia with "recruiting and participating military operations of mercenaries on the side of Ukrainian forces" in July 2023 and put Mamulashvili on Russia's wanted list in October 2023.[30] Mamulashvili claimed that the Russian government placed Georgian Legion volunteers on its wanted list so that the Georgian government would have grounds to arrest them and reported that Georgian special services have advised many Georgian Legion volunteers returning to Georgia from Ukraine to leave Georgia.[31] The SUS blamed Georgian volunteers serving alongside Ukrainian forces, among other perceived opposition actors, for plotting a violent coup in October 2023 and for inciting protests against Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" bill in May 2024.[32] The Kremlin has routinely used the narrative of a “violent coup” in Ukraine to misrepresent Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity and protests for Ukrainian European Union integration and blames external actors for domestic protests, and the SUS' statements increasingly mirror Kremlin rhetoric. Increasingly overt efforts to censor pro-Western and pro-Ukraine voices in Georgia suggests that the Georgian Dream ruling party intends to purposefully derail long-term Georgian efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration, which plays into continued Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.Key Takeaways:Russia and North Korea are pursuing increased cooperation in the judicial sphere.Russia is taking steps to codify terms broadly expanding the Russian official definition of prosecutable extremism as part of its ongoing effort to criminally prosecute and stymie domestic opposition to the Kremlin and its war in Ukraine.Kursk Oblast officials appointed a critical Russian milblogger to an advisory role within the regional government, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to appease critical commentators by granting them certain reputational concessions in exchange for their increased informational loyalty.Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and a military air base in Rostov Oblast on July 22.Georgian authorities reportedly placed roughly 300 Georgian citizens who have served as volunteers in the Georgian Legion alongside Ukrainian forces on Georgia's wanted list.Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Donetsk City.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City amid continued fighting north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 22. Geolocated footage published on July 22 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within Vovchansk, up to 100 meters in the forest area west of Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City and southwest of Vovchansk), and north of Starytsya (north of Kharkiv City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[34] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces only maintain control of the northern part of Hlyboke, although a Russian source claimed that Russian forces drove Ukrainian forces out of northern Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) and regained control over most of the settlement.[35] Another Russian source claimed that Hlyboke is a contested "gray zone."[36] Mashovets stated that a Russian assault group maintains positions in the Aggregate Plant within central Vovchansk.[37] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Hlyboke and Vovchansk on July 21 and 22.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hlyboke and within Vovchansk.[39] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that Russian forces are regrouping personnel and conducting drone reconnaissance near Hlyboke and Vovchansk to prepare for future offensive operations.[40] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces also reported that Russian forces are now on the defensive near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps, LMD), and an unspecified number of combined tactical detachments from the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GUR]) are operating within Vovchansk.[41] Mashovets stated that elements of up to three battalions of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in the Vovchansk direction and that one of these three battalions is uncommitted to battle and currently located in Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 22 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting clearing operations on the outskirts of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) and advanced north and west of the settlement.[42] Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka, Kolisnykivka, Berestove, and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novoserhiivka, Makiivka, Nevske, and Terny; west of Kreminna near Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area.[43]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Siversk. Geolocated footage published on July 19 indicates that Russian forces have made gains along Nezalezhnosti Street in central Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[44] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka, Vyimka and Spirne; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka and Pereizne on July 22.[45] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) reportedly continue operating in the Siversk direction.[46]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 22 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces have advanced in the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal area near Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces operating on the opposing (west) bank of the canal.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported a relatively higher number of attacks in the area north and northeast of Chasiv Yar, particularly near Bohdanivka, Minkivka, Vasyukivka, and Hryhorivka, as of 1600 local time on July 22, suggesting that Russian forces may have intensified localized ground attacks in this area.[48] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue operating near Kalynivka.[49]Russian forces recently made significant tactical advances within Niu York (south of Toretsk). Geolocated footage published on July 22 shows that Russian forces have advanced in southwestern Niu York up to Yesenina Street along Dekabrystiv and Lva Tolstoho streets.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced within central Niu York as far north as Horlivska Street, although ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating this deep into central Niu York.[51] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces have advanced southwestward in Zalizne and within Pivnichne (both just southeast of Niu York), but ISW has also not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[52] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Toretsk noted that Russian forces typically attack in squad-sized assault groups of about 10 soldiers and that they conduct between five and seven squad-sized attacks per day.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Toretsk, Niu York, Pivnichne, and Zalizne.[54]Russian forces reportedly made marginal gains northwest and southwest of Avdiivka and continued offensive operations on this axis on July 22. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields north of Novooleksandrivka, on the northern and western outskirts of Prohres, and in fields east of Vovche (all northwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these claims.[55] One milblogger noted that Russia forces are trying to even the frontline between Prohres and Lozuvatske (northeast of Prohres) to prevent a Russian salient in the area.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also recently seized Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not seen visual evidence that Russian forces control the whole settlement.[57] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Avdiivka near Kalynove and Panteleymonivka and northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Novoselivka Persha, Lozuvatske, Prohres, Umanske, and Tymofiivka.[58] Elements of the Russian 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) and the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly fighting west of Prohres.[59]Russian forces recently advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on July 22 shows that Russian forces have advanced along Slovyanska and Chkalova streets in western Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[60] Additional geolocated footage published on July 22 shows that Russian forces have advanced up to Tsentralna Street in eastern Maksymilyanivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Paraskoviivka.[62] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue operating southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka.[63]Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 22 and are reportedly heavily bombing the frontline in this area.[64] Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating east of Velyka Novosilka.[65]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued near Robotyne; east of Robotyne near Verbove; north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka; and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on July 21 and 22.[66] Elements of the Russian "Valkiriya" Special Detachment (4th Military Base, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne); and elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating near Verbove.[67]Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on July 21 and 22, including near Krynky, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[68] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are clearing the islands near Krynky and already control "some percentage” of them, but did not specify which islands Russian forces are currently operating on. [69] A Russian milblogger amplified a complaint from a subscriber who is reportedly fighting in the Kherson direction claiming that Russian units face issues like delayed evacuations, low discipline, and water and equipment shortages.[70] The subscriber noted that Russian soldiers are afraid to speak out to their commanders during inspections.Russian opposition outlet ASTRA reported that the July 20-21 Ukrainian drone and ATACMS strike against occupied Novostepove, Crimea damaged unknown Russian military equipment, which Russian forces are currently trying to repair. [71] ASTRA claimed that Ukrainian forces used four ATACMS in the strike.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against a civilian object in Odesa Oblast on July 22. [72]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Nothing significant to report.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian forces appear to be improving their capability to use first-person view (FPV) drones to intercept Ukrainian remote mining and bombardier drones mid-air. Russian milbloggers posted footage on July 22 purportedly of Russian FPV drones intercepting a Ukrainian baba yaga drone mid-flight in unspecified areas of the frontline.[73] Russian forces appear to be improving their capability to use FPV drones to intercept other drones at the tactical level evidenced by select instances of Russian FPV drones intercepting heavier, larger, and slower-moving Ukrainian munition-dropping and longer-range reconnaissance drones. ISW recently assessed that Ukrainian drone operators appear to be improving their capabilities to interdict longer-range Russian drones in mid-air.[74] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 22 that Ukrainian forces are mastering new methods of destroying Russian reconnaissance drones using only FPV drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems.[75] Russian forces are likely experimenting and innovating to adapt to successful Ukrainian drone usage against Russian FPV drones and some longer-range drones.Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)Ukraine's partners continue to sign bilateral security agreements with Ukraine and provide Ukraine with military assistance. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on July 16 that the first 50,000 artillery shells from the Czech-led artillery ammunition initiative have arrived in Ukraine and that some have reached the frontlines.[76] Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky announced on July 22 that Czechia intends to deliver 100,000 shells to Ukraine through the initiative in July and August 2024, and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen stated on July 18 that the Czech-led shell initiative aims to deliver nearly 500,000 artillery rounds to Ukraine by the end of 2024.[77] Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds stated on July 22 that a package of over 500 drones is en route to Ukraine as part of the Latvian and UK-led drone coalition for Ukraine.[78]Ukraine continues to build out its domestic defense capabilities and sign joint production agreements with defense companies in partner countries. The Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency announced on July 18 that it has signed over 20 contracts with leading international defense manufacturers, and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Dmytro Klimenkov noted that Ukraine needs to diversify its weapons suppliers.[79] Ukrainian state-owned defense firm Ukroboronprom signed cooperation agreements with two Czech companies on July 16 on the supply of goods and services to construct a new small arms ammunition production factory in Ukraine.[80] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and UK Defense Minister John Healey signed an agreement on July 19 on the provision of a two-billion-pound (about $2.58 billion) loan to strengthen Ukraine's defensive capabilities, including purchasing new weapons.[81]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Russian Information Operations and NarrativesUkraine's Center for Strategic Communications released on July 22 a list of the top five most prevalent Russian information operations of the past week.[82] All five information operations are clearly intended to cause domestic discontent within Ukraine and drive a wedge between Ukraine and its Western partners.The Russian and Belarusian ministries of foreign affairs (MFA) continue to publish joint reports alleging human rights violations committed by Ukraine's international coalition of partners likely to draw attention away from Russia's and Belarus' well-documented human rights violations. The Russian and Belarusian MFAs July 22 reports accused both Germany and Denmark of various human rights violations and "Russophobia."[83] Russia and Belarus have lobbed similar accusations at Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, and Australia in recent weeks.[84]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/261937; https://t.me/tass_agency/261847[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/261937; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/669dfb529a794763534ace0f; https://epp.genproc dot gov.ru/web/gprf/mass-media/news?item=96516687[3] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/669dfb529a794763534ace0f[4] https://t.me/genprocrf/3941; https://t.me/genprocrf/3949[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091223; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar06272024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-21-2024; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42780[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111223; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2024[8] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21420895; https://regulation.gov dot ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=149268[9] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21420895; https://regulation.gov dot ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=149268[10] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21420895; https://regulation.gov dot ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=149268[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070124;[13] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21420895; https://regulation.gov dot ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=149268[14] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21420895; https://regulation.gov dot ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=149268[15] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6850147; https://kursk-news dot net/society/2024/07/22/353782.html; https://kursk-news dot net/society/2024/07/22/353778.html; https://riakursk dot ru/u-vrio-gubernatora-kurskoy-oblasti-poyavilis-2-novykh-sovetnika/[16] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10930[17] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10924[18] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/63636ac29a7947136124bf05; https://rtvi dot com/stories/volonterskaya-rabota-derzhitsya-na-tom-u-kogo-est-zhelanie-pobedit-kurskij-biznesmen-roman-alehin-o-pomoshhi-frontu-otnosheniyah-s-vlastyami-i-svoej-mobilizaczii/[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111722; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2023; 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ttps://www.radiotavisupleba dot ge/a/32597360.html[33] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1815390208818372680; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/1661[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/47816; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57701; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12963[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2048; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57701[36] https://t.me/motopatriot/25207[37] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2048[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QhNG4ULgSNJ1E3rnJUsGbXsk49P1FoDeNjAJ8WznWbSe7FtmoD8qgZ5RoyCTJHJGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpYASJUBAH7ozTc26HyuNmHwFxLdsiirDFLBPn1AeL1BniHVveTksus86WvzWm8xl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FBrevzBsmAwWn1bjqNCsnP8munLuobqcqPTTE8u4zLwFxEnQ8eN3MpVCHU7sZYDnl; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11045;[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72928; https://t.me/dva_majors/47816 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21139[40] https://t.me/otukharkiv/315[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2048[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12957 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27367[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QhNG4ULgSNJ1E3rnJUsGbXsk49P1FoDeNjAJ8WznWbSe7FtmoD8qgZ5RoyCTJHJGl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpYASJUBAH7ozTc26HyuNmHwFxLdsiirDFLBPn1AeL1BniHVveTksus86WvzWm8xl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FBrevzBsmAwWn1bjqNCsnP8munLuobqcqPTTE8u4zLwFxEnQ8eN3MpVCHU7sZYDnl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47816 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12957 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57701 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/18246[44] https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1815166241465614459; https://t.me/vremjazov/872[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QhNG4ULgSNJ1E3rnJUsGbXsk49P1FoDeNjAJ8WznWbSe7FtmoD8qgZ5RoyCTJHJGl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57701[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/47851; https://t.me/ZSU_Hunter_2_0/2661; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130791; https://t.me/sons_fatherland/15741[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12955; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57701[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QhNG4ULgSNJ1E3rnJUsGbXsk49P1FoDeNjAJ8WznWbSe7FtmoD8qgZ5RoyCTJHJGl[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12955[50] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1815424767081455705 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1815424910019142074 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1815425894418370843 ; https://t.me/skalabatalion/196[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/47820; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72944; https://t.me/motopatriot/25217; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27362; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130818; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57701[52] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27365; https://t.me/dva_majors/47816; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57701[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/22/bytva-za-toreczk-poliski-desantnyky-rozpovily-yak-peremelyuyut-okupantiv/; https://t.me/ua_dshv/3285[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QhNG4ULgSNJ1E3rnJUsGbXsk49P1FoDeNjAJ8WznWbSe7FtmoD8qgZ5RoyCTJHJGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FBrevzBsmAwWn1bjqNCsnP8munLuobqcqPTTE8u4zLwFxEnQ8eN3MpVCHU7sZYDnl[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130818; https://t.me/rybar/61992; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72944; https://t.me/motopatriot/25202[56] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72944[57] ttps://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57681[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QhNG4ULgSNJ1E3rnJUsGbXsk49P1FoDeNjAJ8WznWbSe7FtmoD8qgZ5RoyCTJHJGl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpYASJUBAH7ozTc26HyuNmHwFxLdsiirDFLBPn1AeL1BniHVveTksus86WvzWm8xl[59] https://t.me/motopatriot/25202[60] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1815398327464124527; https://x.com/strategicbakery/status/1815405770856382745; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1815398331100586301; https://t.me/smertvorogy/919[61] https://t.me/zluki_bobry/53; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6135[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QhNG4ULgSNJ1E3rnJUsGbXsk49P1FoDeNjAJ8WznWbSe7FtmoD8qgZ5RoyCTJHJGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpYASJUBAH7ozTc26HyuNmHwFxLdsiirDFLBPn1AeL1BniHVveTksus86WvzWm8xl[63] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12490[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpYASJUBAH7ozTc26HyuNmHwFxLdsiirDFLBPn1AeL1BniHVveTksus86WvzWm8xl[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/9885[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QhNG4ULgSNJ1E3rnJUsGbXsk49P1FoDeNjAJ8WznWbSe7FtmoD8qgZ5RoyCTJHJGl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpYASJUBAH7ozTc26HyuNmHwFxLdsiirDFLBPn1AeL1BniHVveTksus86WvzWm8xl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FBrevzBsmAwWn1bjqNCsnP8munLuobqcqPTTE8u4zLwFxEnQ8eN3MpVCHU7sZYDnl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57701 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47816[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72962 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25223[68]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QhNG4ULgSNJ1E3rnJUsGbXsk49P1FoDeNjAJ8WznWbSe7FtmoD8qgZ5RoyCTJHJGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpYASJUBAH7ozTc26HyuNmHwFxLdsiirDFLBPn1AeL1BniHVveTksus86WvzWm8xl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FBrevzBsmAwWn1bjqNCsnP8munLuobqcqPTTE8u4zLwFxEnQ8eN3MpVCHU7sZYDnl[69] https://t.me/motopatriot/25220[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/47806[71] https://t.me/astrapress/60196; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2024[72] https://t.me/odeskaODA/6067[73] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72953 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16596[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2024[75] https://t.me/osirskiy/774[76] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/16/cheski-snaryady-vzhe-vbyvayut-okupantiv/[77] https://www.ceskenoviny dot cz/zpravy/lipavsky-na-ukrajinu-bude-dodano-100000-kusu-munice/2546117; https://ruski.radio dot cz/blagodarya-cheshskoy-iniciative-v-techenie-iyulya-i-avgusta-v-ukrainu-budet-8823455; https://suspilne dot media/793503-premerka-danii-skazala-so-do-kinca-roku-ukraini-maut-prijti-piv-miljona-snaradiv-ceskoi-iniciativi/[78] https://x.com/AndrisSpruds/status/1815358957080158547[79] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/18/agencziya-oboronnyh-zakupivel-minoborony-uklala-ponad-20-pryamyh-kontraktiv-zi-svitovymy-vyrobnykamy-ozbroyennya/[80] https://www.kmu.gov dot ua/news/boieprypasy-ta-striletska-zbroia-ukroboronprom-domovyvsia-pro-spivpratsiu-z-dvoma-cheskymy-kompaniiamy ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/16/ukroboronprom-domovyvsya-pro-spivpraczyu-z-dvoma-cheskymy-kompaniyamy/ ; https://ukroboronprom.com dot ua/news/ukroboronprom-u-partnerstvi-z-ceskimi-zbroyarami-rozvivaje-vitciznyane-virobnictvo-bojepripasiv-i-strileckoyi-zbroyi[81] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/19/velyka-brytaniya-dast-v-kredyt-2-mlrd-funtiv-na-oboronu-ukrayiny/[82] https://t.me/spravdi/40309[83] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43397; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43404[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/1957839/#_Toc166858728; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024

[Author: ISWKF]

— Iran Update, July 18, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 4:07am

  Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Members of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle told Western Media that Khamenei sought to promote the candidacy of Masoud Pezeshkian due to Pezeshkian’s ability to “foster unity.”[1] Individuals close to the supreme leader told Western media that Khamenei received intelligence reports in May 2024 revealing that only 13 percent of Iranians would participate in the snap presidential election following former President Ebrahim Raisi’s death. Unnamed regime insiders stated that Khamenei subsequently "orchestrated” the election to result in the victory of moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian due to Khamenei’s fear that low voter turnout would “damage the clerical establishment’s credibility.” Regime insiders told Western media that Khamenei stated Iran needed a president who could “appeal to different layers of society” while “foster[ing] unity among those in power” and without challenging Iran’s ruling theocracy. This may be part of an effort to emphasize the regime’s stability and message to the West that attempts to undermine the regime will fail and that negotiations will prove the only successful way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Iranian officials believe that the United States and the West have used and are using media and other non-military means to fight a “soft war” against Iran to subvert the regime and eventually overthrow it. These Iranian officials, by presenting the facade of stability, appear to be attempting to discourage these efforts.The Western media report is inconsistent with the regime’s previous stances vis-a-vis Pezeshkian throughout the election campaign period. Khamenei’s statements and IRGC meetings suggest that Pezeshkian’s rise to the presidency was unplanned. Khamenei and the Iranian regime writ large did not appear to publicly rally around Masoud Pezeshkian prior to Pezeshkian winning the presidential election. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implicitly criticized Pezeshkian’s support for increasing Iranian engagement with the West in a speech on June 25, stating that politicians who are “attached to America” cannot be “good managers.” Khamenei’s statement came after Pezeshkian’s expression of support for improving relations with the West during the June 24 foreign policy debate.[2] Senior leaders of the IRGC similarly expressed support for hardline candidates over Pezeshkian throughout the 2024 campaign season. The IRGC tried to unite the hardline camp against Pezeshkian, according to unverified social media rumors. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly met with hardline candidates Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili in Mashhad on June 26 to form a consensus between them.[3] Two unspecified Iranian officials later confirmed to the New York Times on June 28 that Ghaani called on Jalili to withdraw from the race during an emergency meeting with Jalili and Ghalibaf in Mashhad, Iran, on June 26.[4] The New York Times later deleted its report. The Telegraph reported in early June 2024 that some senior IRGC commanders, including former IRGC Air Force Commander Hossein Dehghan, supported Ghalibaf instead of Pezeshkian.[5] The reports of IRGC support for hardline candidates call into question to what extent the supreme leader fully engineered the election beginning from the start of the campaign in May, as Western media report suggests.Key Takeaways:Iran: Members of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle told Western Media that Khamenei sought to promote the candidacy of Masoud Pezeshkian due to Pezeshkian’s ability to “foster unity.” Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force killed two Hamas commanders and one PIJ commander in the Gaza Strip on July 18. Lebanon: The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes that killed one Hamas leader and one Hezbollah member in southern Lebanon on July 18.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force killed two Hamas commanders and one PIJ commander in the Gaza Strip on July 18. The IDF Air Force killed a platoon commander from Hamas’ Shati Battalion.[6] The commander had conducted multiple sniper attacks targeting Israeli forces, including one attack that killed an IDF non-commissioned officer during the IDF raid on UNRWA headquarters in Tal al Hawa, Gaza City.[7] IDF airstrikes also killed a member of Hamas’ Nukhba Forces who participated in Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel.[8] The Nukhba Forces is Hamas’ special operations unit responsible for ground operations into Israel. It was responsible for the October 7 attack. The IDF also killed the commander of Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) naval forces for the Gaza City area.[9]Palestinian militias conducted at least three indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces and command centers along the Netzarim Corridor on July 18.[10]The IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in Rafah on July 18. Israeli forces identified tunnel networks and directed airstrikes on Palestinian fighters in the area.[11] The IDF reported that a Hamas fighter fired a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) at Israeli forces from a humanitarian corridor while aid trucks were traveling along the route.[12] Israeli forces closed the route for “several hours” to pursue the fighter before reopening the road for aid to travel along.[13] The National Resistance Brigades targeted an Israeli armored personnel carrier with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Kaf al Mashrou, east of Rafah City, and claimed that the explosion destroyed the vehicle.[14] Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees mortared Israeli forces in al Izba, southwest of Tal al Sultan.[15]Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on July 18 that Israeli control over the Philadelphi corridor and the Rafah crossing are essential for pressuring Hamas to reach a ceasefire deal.[16] Netanyahu made the statements during a meeting with IDF soldiers in Rafah. Netanyahu said that Israeli control over the areas helps Israel advance the ceasefire deal, including Israel’s demand to release the “maximum” number of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu previously dismissed reports on July 12 that Israeli troops may withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor as part of a ceasefire and hostage deal.[17]The US military ended its mission to deliver aid via a US-built aid pier in Gaza. US CENTCOM Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated on July 17 that the US-built aid pier has been shut down.[18] CENTCOM assessed that the pier achieved the intended effect to “surge a very high volume of aid” into Gaza.[19] The US-built pier was reportedly in service for only 20 days since it began operations on May 17.[20] Cooper said that aid will now be sent through the port of Ashdod in Israel. [21]The al Quds Brigades launched a barrage of rockets targeted Mefalsim and Nir Am in southern Israel on July 18.[22]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on July 17.[23] Unspecified fighters detonated an IED near Hermesh, an Israeli settlement west of Jenin, on July 18.[24] The attack wounded two off-duty IDF soldiers and two Israeli civilians.[25]The IDF detained seven wanted individuals and confiscated weapons and funds in operations across the West Bank on July 18.[26]Palestinian security forces destroyed a planted IED in Tubas.[27]This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Southern Lebanon and Golan HeightsAxis of Resistance objectives:Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into LebanonPrepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaThe IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes that killed one Hamas leader and one Hezbollah member in southern Lebanon on July 18.[28] Israeli aircraft struck and killed senior Hamas leader Mohammed Jabara in Ghazzeh, Bekaa Valley.[29] The IDF stated Jabara supported Hezbollah indirect fire attacks from southern Lebanon into Israel and coordinated several attacks with al Jamaa al Islamiyah in Lebanon.[30] An Israeli open source social media account claimed Jabar previously led the Khaled Ali unit under the Hamas Construction Bureau, which the social media account said is responsible for manufacturing rockets in southern Lebanon.[31] Hamas and al Jamaa al Islamiyah both claimed Jabara was a commander in both militias.[32] Hamas and al Jamaa al Islamiyah are both Muslim Brotherhood organizations, so cross-pollination between the two organization is possible.[33] Jabara’s participation in both groups underscores Hamas’ close relationship with al Jamaa al Islamiyah, which has closely cooperated with Hezbollah during the current war. The IAF separately conducted an airstrike that killed a member of Hezbollah’s engineering unit, Hassan Ali Muhanna, in Qana.[34] The IDF reported that Muhanna was responsible for “planning and implementing various terrorist operations” against Israel.[35]Hezbollah launched an unspecified large number of one-way attack drones targeting the headquarters of IDF 210th Division in Rosh Pinna.[36] Hezbollah claimed that the attack was a response to Israeli airstrikes that killed a Jabara and Muhanna on July 18.[37]Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks into northern Israel, including the Rosh Pinna attack, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 18.[38] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted Israeli “espionage equipment” established in Yiron and Metulla using an anti-tank missile and “appropriate weapons” on July 18. [39]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.Iran and Axis of ResistanceIraqi Ambassador to Russia Haider Mansour al Adhari discussed Russo-Iraqi defense cooperation with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin in Moscow on July 17.[40] Adhari and Fomin discussed Russian support for Iraqi counterterrorism campaigns and the conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip.[41] Adhari and Fomin’s meeting in Moscow follows a series of meetings between senior Russian and Iraqi military and political officials to discuss increasing Russo-Iraqi security cooperation since January 2024.[42] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.[43]Three unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios that the Biden Administration had sent a private warning to Iran “several weeks ago” regarding Iran’s suspicious nuclear activities.[44] The Biden administration communicated its message through a third country and direct channels. Iran stated that it had not changed its nuclear policy and provided explanations for its nuclear activities. Iranian nuclear policy is centered on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's 2003 fatwa against nuclear weapons.[45] The unspecified US and Israeli sources said that the US and Israeli intelligence communities still assess that Iran is not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon.[46] An unspecified US official reiterated that the United States remains concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. US and Israeli intelligence services collected information on Iranian scientists interacting with computer models and metallurgical research in March that could be used for the development of nuclear weapons, but the purpose of the computer modeling was unclear.Law Enforcement Command Commander (LEC) Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan replaced Sistan and Baluchistan Provincial LEC Commander Brigadier General Doust Ali Jalilian with LEC Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Eshagi on July 18.[47] LEC spokesperson General Saeed Montazerul Mahdi made the announcement on July 18 but did not provide an explanation for the leadership change. Radan had appointed General Doust Ali Jalilian on February 26, 2023.[48] Anti-regime militants, including those affiliated with Salafi-jihadi groups, have conducted several attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan since December 2023. These attacks and the local security forces’ inability to stop them may have triggered the change.[49] Eshagi was previously the LEC commander of Kerman province between 2006 and 2010, the LEC commander of Khuzestan province between 2010 and 2016, and LEC commander of Gilan province between 2018 and 2024.[50] Anti-regime media observed that Eshagi had led previous crackdowns on provincial protests, particularly the April 2011 Khuzestan protests led by Arab Iranian citizens and 2018 protests against the mandatory veiling laws in Gilan province.[51]Interim Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani met with Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib on the sidelines of the United Nations Security Council meetings in New York on July 17.[52] Bagheri Kani reiterated Iran’s support for Lebanon’s “stability and security.” Bagheri Kani declared that Iran is trying to prevent Israeli military operations from spreading into Lebanese territory. Bagheri Kani also called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and the establishment of a single sovereign Palestinian state. Bou Habib concurred with the need to prevent a regional expansion of Israel–Hamas war.The US Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals, five entities, and five vessels for facilitating commodity shipments and financial transactions for the Houthis and the IRGC Quds Force on June 18.[53] This is the ninth round of sanctions targeting the Iran-based, IRGC-backed Houthi financier Said al Jamal network of front companies and vessels since October 2023.[54] The US Treasury Department last sanctioned the Said al Jamal network on June 17.[55]OFAC sanctioned the following entities, individuals, and vessels connected to the Said al Jamal network:[56]Indonesia-based illicit shipment facilitator and dual Malaysian-Singaporean national Mohammad Roslan bin AhmadChina-based businessman Zhuang Liang (Zhuang)Seychelles-registered, Thailand- and Singapore-based Ascent General Insurance CompanyUAE-based Fornacis Energy Trading Co. LLCUAE-based Alpha Shine Marine Services LLCMarshall Islands-registered and UAE-based Barco Ship Management Inc (Barco)Marshall Islands-registered Sea Knot Shipping Inc.Panama-flagged vessel Oceanic IIPanama-flagged vessel TirexPanama-flagged vessel Mirova DynamicPanama-flagged vessel KasperHouthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted an airstrike targeting Hudaydah International Airport on July 18.[57][1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-khamenei-elevated-little-known-moderate-presidency-2024-07-18/[2] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=56781 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2024[3] https://x.com/aqolizadeh/status/1806279199537430614 ; https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1806254866370555926 ; https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1806360418342097190[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-27-2024[5] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/06/03/mohammad-bagher-ghalibaf-president-election-ebrahim-raisi/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-25-2024[6] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813892215682514978[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-9-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-12-2024; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813892219646169522[8] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813892223362363473[9] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813799746177560999 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1813815429908824081[10] https://t.me/darebmojahden/4980; https://t.me/sarayaps/18348; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6859[11] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813799755023282240[12] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813799755023282240[13] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813799758903013868[14] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4358[15] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2708[16] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/r16z63iu0?utm_source=ynet.co.il&utm_medium=Share&utm_campaign=mail&utm_term=r16z63iu0&utm_content=Flash[17] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/netanyahus-office-denies-report-israel-open-to-pullout-from-gaza-egypt-border/[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-military-ends-gaza-pier-mission-2024-07-17/[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-military-ends-gaza-pier-mission-2024-07-17/[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-military-ends-gaza-pier-mission-2024-07-17; https://apnews.com/article/military-pier-gaza-israel-humanitarian-aid-c4d464cb01bdf86e71c38519fb635cde; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-19-2024[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-military-ends-gaza-pier-mission-2024-07-17/[22] https://t.me/sarayaps/18343[23] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6849; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6852; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6853; https://t.me/QudsN/437013[24] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-two-off-duty-soldiers-two-civilians-wounded-in-blast-near-west-bank-settlement-hermesh/[25] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814001012216349119; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-two-off-duty-soldiers-two-civilians-wounded-in-blast-near-west-bank-settlement-hermesh/[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813909939578192067; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813909952681193507[27] https://t.me/QudsN/436685[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813870453846593814 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1813947602032787906[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813870453846593814 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israeli-drone-strike-in-lebanon-killed-hamas-commander-behind-attacks-on-israel[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813870453846593814[31] https://x.com/IntelliTimes/status/1813925467579203801[32] https://x.com/AljamaaLeb/status/1813849924095946962 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2710[33] https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/62740 ; https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/doctrine-hamas[34] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1813947602032787906[35] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1813947602032787906[36] https://t.me/mmirleb/5532[37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813870453846593814 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1813947602032787906[38] https://t.me/mmirleb/5524 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5526 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5528 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5529; https://t.me/mmirleb/5530 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5531 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5532 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5534[39] https://t.me/mmirleb/5524 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5526[40] mofa dot gov.iq/2024/48107/[41] mofa dot gov.iq/2024/48107/[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-20-2024; https://x.com/Iraqimofa/status/1799748916453519669;[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-20-2024[44] https://www.axios.com/2024/07/17/iran-nuclear-program-research-warning[45] https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/12/supreme-leader-nuclear-weapons-diplomacy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-the-ayatollah-said-no-to-nukes/[46] https://www.axios.com/2024/07/17/iran-nuclear-program-research-warning[47] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/182081:https://www.irna dot ir/news/85541900[48] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2023[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-february-3-2023;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2024[50] https://www.irna dot ir/news/6259397;https://www.iranintl.com/202407181031;https://www.irna dot ir/news/82648056[51] https://www.iranintl.com/202407181031;https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/29/iran-investigate-reported-killings-demonstrators[52] www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/749896[53] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2469[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-17-2024 ; https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240617[55] https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240617[56] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2469[57] https://english.almasirah dot net.ye/post/41219/US-UK-Aggression-Conducts-Three-Airstrikes-on-Hodeidah-Airport

[Author: ISWKF]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 3:36am

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George BarrosJuly 21, 2024, 5:45pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin recently visited Nicaragua and Cuba, likely as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to project its influence in the Western hemisphere and rally states against the US and the West. Volodin met with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo in Managua, Nicaragua on July 20 and relayed a message from Russian President Vladimir Putin stating that Russo-Nicaraguan relations are "developing dynamically" and that the two states' coordination efforts in international affairs are "yielding good results."[1] Ortega condemned Western sanctions against Russia and reiterated Kremlin narratives claiming that NATO support for Ukraine is aggravating the war. Volodin met with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel in Havana, Cuba on July 21 and relayed a similar message from Putin that Russo-Cuban relations are "developing dynamically."[2] Diaz-Canel thanked Russia for its support to end the US blockade against Cuba.[3] Volodin told journalists on July 21 that the Russian State Duma will send observers to the Venezuelan presidential election on July 28.[4] Russia has increasingly been trying to demonstrate its influence in the Western hemisphere, including by signing a memorandum of understanding with Venezuela aimed at countering "coercive measures" and conducting naval exercises near and port calls to Cuba and Venezuela in June 2024.[5] Cuba and Nicaragua were also notably among the eight Russian "ally" states that voted against a recent United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution demanding that Russia withdraw its forces from the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and return the plant to full Ukrainian control.[6] Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have recently expressed interest in joining BRICS, and Putin has recently identified BRICS as a pillar of his envisioned "Eurasian security architecture" that is aimed at undermining NATO.[7]Volodin's visits to Nicaragua and Cuba immediately followed Belarusian Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko's visits to Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, during which Golovchenko signed multiple bilateral economic and trade agreements, possibly as part of Russian schemes that use Belarus to help Russia evade Western sanctions. Golovchenko visited Venezuela from July 14 to 16 and met with Venezuelan officials, including Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.[8] Golovchenko stated that his visit aimed to discuss trade and the economic sphere and expressed Belarus' unwavering support for Maduro.[9] Golovechenko also visited Cuba from July 16 to 17, during which he signed contracts worth "millions of dollars" to supply unspecified Belarusian goods to Cuba in exchange for Cuban exports to Belarus.[10] Golovchenko visited Nicaragua from July 18 to 19 and signed contracts worth $85 million aimed at bilateral economic cooperation, including the Belarusian Development Bank's agreement to finance the delivery of more than 700 pieces of unspecified equipment to Nicaragua.[11] Belarus may provide goods, equipment, or technology to Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba in exchange for goods that Belarus and/or Russia cannot themselves acquire due to Western sanctions.The Georgian State Security Service (SUS or SSSG) reportedly recently summoned several Georgian citizens who had served as volunteers alongside Ukrainian forces for questioning on charges of "conspiracy to overthrow the government" and "terrorism." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Georgian service Ekho Kavkaza reported on July 20 that the SUS summoned a Georgian activist and former volunteer in Ukraine, Lasha Chigladze, for questioning in the presence of a Tbilisi City Court judge on July 19.[12] Pro-ruling party Georgian Dream media outlet Imedi TV reported that Georgian authorities charged Chigladze with conspiracy to overthrow the government and "preparing [acts of] terrorism."[13] Chigladze's lawyer told Georgian opposition outlet Mtavari TV that he assessed that Georgian authorities summoned Chigladze because he fought in Ukraine against Russia.[14] Another Georgian citizen who volunteered alongside Ukrainian forces, Nadim Khmaladze, stated on his Facebook page on July 20 that the SUS had summoned him for questioning on charges of planning a "coup d'etat" and "terrorism."[15] Khmaladze told Georgian outlet Batumelebi that the SUS summoned a third Georgian citizen who volunteered with Ukrainian forces for questioning.[16] Article 410 of Georgia's criminal code forbids mercenarism, but Georgian authorities notably did not charge these former volunteers under that article, nor hundreds of other Georgian volunteers who have fought in support of Ukraine since 2014.[17]The SUS previously employed standard Kremlin information operations against Georgians protesting Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" bill in May 2024 and particularly blamed Georgians living abroad and fighting in Ukraine, and other perceived opposition actors for provocations and inciting protests.[18] The SUS also claimed in September 2023 that former Georgian officials, Ukrainian military intelligence officials of Georgian descent, and Georgians fighting with Ukrainian forces in Ukraine were plotting a violent coup.[19] The Kremlin routinely uses the narrative of a “violent coup” in Ukraine to misrepresent Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity and protests for Ukrainian European integration, and the SUS’ activities increasingly mirror Kremlin rhetoric. Georgian authorities and the SUS' decision to question and charge its citizens who have fought in Ukraine indicate that the Georgian Dream ruling party likely intends to purposefully derail long-term Georgian efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration, which plays into continued Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia. A recent Caucasus Barometer (a network of affiliated research centers in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) poll of Georgian citizens, however, indicates that 69 percent of respondents identify Russia as Georgia's "main enemy," and a National Democratic Institute poll of Georgian citizens published in February 2023 found that 81 percent of respondents support Georgia's membership in the European Union (EU) and 73 percent of respondents support Georgia's membership in NATO.[20]Geolocated imagery confirms that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged infrastructure at the Millerovo Airbase in Rostov Oblast overnight from July 19 to 20.[21] Geolocated satellite imagery collected on July 21 shows that Ukrainian strikes destroyed the Millerovo Airbase's maintenance hangar, damaged a fuel depot, and sparked a fire in a nearby field.[22] It is unclear whether the Ukrainian drone strike damaged Russian aircraft at the Millerovo Airbase.Key Takeaways:Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin recently visited Nicaragua and Cuba, likely as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to project its influence in the Western hemisphere and rally states against the US and the West.The Georgian State Security Service (SUS or SSSG) reportedly recently summoned several Georgian citizens, who had served as volunteers alongside Ukrainian forces, for questioning on charges of "conspiracy to overthrow the government" and "terrorism."Geolocated imagery confirms that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged infrastructure at the Millerovo Airbase in Rostov Oblast overnight on July 19 to 20.Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka.Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 20 to 21.Russian federal subjects are intensifying non-standard monetary incentives for contract service with the Russian military.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued localized offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 20 and 21 but did not advance. Russian forces reportedly attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk, and Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked near Hlyboke on July 20 and 21.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to prevent Ukrainian forces from crossing the Travyanske Reservoir (northwest of Lyptsi).[24]The Russian military command continues to reinforce Russian forces near Hlyboke and Vovchansk to sustain offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction. The Ukrainian Kharkiv Operational-Tactical Group of Forces (GoF) reported on July 21 that the Russian military command deployed additional assault groups of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near Hlyboke.[25] The Ukrainian Kharkiv GoF added that the Russian military command is regrouping assault groups of the Russian 41st Motorized Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD), 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD), and 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC) to continue assaults in central and eastern Vovchansk. The Ukrainian Kharkiv GoF added that Russian forces withdrew the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) for reconstitution and that elements of the 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz detachment assumed the regiment’s positions. The Ukrainian Kharkiv GoF reported on July 13 that the Russian command was preparing elements of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment to launch attacks within Vovchansk.[26] A deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian servicemen train for two to six weeks before deploying to the Kharkiv frontline and do not receive accurate information about the real situation on this frontline before fighting as part of the Russian assault groups.[27] A Ukrainian official amplified a screenshot of a complaint from the wife of a Russian servicemember from the 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division), claiming that her husband is currently fighting in the Lyptsi area (north of Kharkiv City) without water and food.[28]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces reportedly advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area on July 21. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Andriivka (west of Svatove) and Pishchane (northwest of Svatove).[29] ISW previously assessed on July 20 that geolocated footage indicated that Russian forces recently seized Pishchane.[30] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on July 21, however, that Russian forces do not fully control Pishchane and that Russian forces' presence in Andriivka is unconfirmed.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced further west of Pishchane, towards Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk), and up to 1.75 kilometers east of Andriivka and Myasozharivka (west of Svatove).[32] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka, Hlushkivka, Pishchane, and Berestove; and west of Svatove Andriivka on July 20 and 21.[33] Elements of a Russian reconnaissance company of the 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[34]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction on July 21 but did not make any confirmed advances in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on July 20 and 21.[35]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that there are reports that Russian forces crossed the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal on an unspecified flank of Chasiv Yar, although ISW currently assesses that Russian forces have not established enduring positions on the west side of the canal in or near Chasiv Yar.[36] Fighting continued near Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and Kalynivka; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on July 20 and 21.[37] Assault elements of the Russian 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) claimed that they are conducting assaults near Chasiv Yar on motorcycles.[38] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[39]Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk on July 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Pivdenne Mine and Poltavska Street east of Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[40] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer deep in Niu York (south of Toretsk).[41] Fighting continued east of Toretsk near Pivnichne and Druzhba; southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne and Pivdenne; and south of Toretsk near Niu York on July 20 and 21.[42]Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations west of Avdiivka on July 21. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka).[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Prohres and south and up to 500 meters west of Lozuvatske (both northwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[44]  Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Vovche and seized Novoselivka Persha (both northwest of Avdiivka), but one milblogger continued to claim that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions on the outskirts of Novoselivka Persha.[45] Fighting continued north of Avdiivka near Kalynove; northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Lozuvatske, Novooleksandrivka, Prohres, and Novoselivka Persha; and west of Avdiivka near Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, and Karlivka on July 20 and 21.[46] Elements of the Russian 1st detachment of the “Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade, Vostok-V Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Rosgvardia), and 116th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka).[47] Elements of the Russian "Black Hussars" detachment (15th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd AC, CMD), 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD), and 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Prohres.[48]Russian forces continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on July 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north along Vidrodzhennya, Michurina, and Haharina streets in central Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[49] Geolocated footage published on July 21 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault south of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[50] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka, Paraskoviivka, and Kostyantynivka on July 20 and 21.[51] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), "Grachi" Spetsnaz detachment, and 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[52] Drone operators of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka, and elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vuheldar direction.[53]Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) on July 20 and 21.[54]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne, northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka, north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka, and northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky on July 20 and 21.[55]Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky and Kozachi Laheri, on July 20 and 21.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing unspecified islands in the Dnipro River Delta and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Kruhlyk Lake (west of Oleshky).[57]Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone and ATACMS strikes against occupied Crimea on the night of July 20 to 21 and on the morning of July 21. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed five drones over the Black Sea, and Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Russian forces intercepted two ATACMS missiles flying towards occupied Crimea on the morning of July 21.[58]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 20 to 21. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated that Russian forces launched 39 Shahed 136/131 drones from the Kursk, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, and occupied Crimea directions and three Iskander-M ballistic missiles and two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast overnight.[59] Oleshchuk stated that Ukrainian forces shot down 35 Shaheds and that unspecified Ukrainian countermeasures, likely referring to electronic warfare (EW), prevented the Kh-59/69 missiles from striking their targets.[60] The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported that a Russian missile strike damaged critical infrastructure in Shostkynskyi Raion, Sumy Oblast, and the Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration reported that a Russian missile strike started a fire at an agricultural infrastructure object in Bashtanskyi Raion, Mykolaiv Oblast.[61] Kyiv City Military Administration reported that Russian forces targeted Kyiv for the fifth time over the past two weeks but that Ukrainian forces shot down all drones on the approaches to the city.[62]Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces used a new type of strike drone in strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 19 to 20. Ukrainian media outlets circulated imagery of drone wreckage and claimed that this is the unspecified strike drone that Ukrainian officials reported on July 20.[63] Ukrainian media cited unspecified sources as saying this drone flew at a low altitude of only 20-30 meters and speculated that the drone resembles the Russian ZALA 421-20 reconnaissance drone.[64] One Ukrainian source claimed that this new Russian drone contains both Russian and Chinese-produced parts.[65] ISW remains unable to verify any of these reports, however.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian federal subjects are intensifying non-standard monetary incentives for contract service with the Russian military. Yaroslavl Oblast Head Mikhail Yevraev announced on July 16 a new initiative offering 100,000 rubles (about $1,150) to any person who brings a friend to a military registration and recruitment center if the friend signs a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for military service.[66] The Republic of Tatarstan also started a similar initiative as of July 11.[67] Russian State Duma Committee on State Construction and Legislation Deputy Chairperson Yuri Sinelshchikov stated that this new recruitment mechanism is risky and that Russians can abuse this system, especially if other federal subjects adopt similar mechanisms.[68] Sinelshchikov called for this mechanism to be codified in Russian legal regulations and expressed concern about whether Russian federal subjects can sustain funding for such initiatives. Russian opposition source Cherta reported that some Russians are signing contracts to earn money to pay off gambling debts after interviewing several gamblers and their families.[69]Russian forces are reportedly developing and formalizing a military motorcycle specialty, likely in response to increased Ukrainian drone strikes and aerial reconnaissance forcing Russian forces to use small and fast vehicles for frontline logistics and transport. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 21 that the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) is establishing its own military motorcycle school and that other Russian brigades are similarly handling this issue "at a high level."[70] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces also plan to introduce a military motorcycle specialty and that the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) will begin training motorcycle specialists on October 1.[71]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  Tikhiye Krylya (Quiet Wings) Group, a subsidiary of Russian joint-stock arms manufacturing company Kalashnikov Concern, claimed on July 17 that it successfully tested the "Legionnaire E33k" unmanned aircraft that can deliver cargo.[72] The Legionnaire E33k reportedly weighs 29.9 kilograms, has a wingspan of four meters, has a range of 200 kilometers with a payload of three kilograms and 50 kilometers with a payload of 10 kilograms, and can fly for up to 150 minutes (2 and a half hours).Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Russian Information Operations and NarrativesUkrainian broadcaster Suspilne and Russian online technology outlet Kod Durova reported on July 21 that unknown hackers distributed an identical message with pro-Kremlin narratives and a call for Ukrainian forces to lay down their arms across 273 prominent Ukrainian Telegram channels.[73] The message accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky of starting the war with Russia and re-amplified a false Russian narrative that Ukraine’s First Lady Olena Zelenska purchased a luxury sports car. The message called on Ukrainians to “lay down [their] arms” and “choose the path of dialogue and understanding.” Ukrainian media consultant Igor Palchikovsky told Suspilne that the message appeared on several prominent Ukrainian Telegram channels with over one million followers each and on Ukrainian regional Telegram channels. Palchikovsky added that this message appeared across 1,964 Telegram channels, most of which were Russian Telegram channels, but that the affected Ukrainian channels had large followings while the affected Russian channels had small audiences. Kod Durova found that the message largely targeted Ukrainian Telegram channels, however.[74] An official Telegram channel of the Russian Airborne (VDV) and Spetsnaz forces (1.1 million followers) claimed that hackers posted the same message on their page via the Russian “FleepBot” and “Crosser Bot” Telegram bots, which are used for auto-posting and audience interaction analysis, respectively.[75] The Ukrainian State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection announced that hackers used the FleepBot function and advised Ukrainian Telegram channels to remove the bot.[76] FleepBot representatives claimed that the incident was the result of “unauthorized access” and promised to contact law enforcement.[77] Kod Durova reported that a similar incident occurred in March 2022 with Crosser Bot.Russian state media is likely attempting to establish a network of claimed pro-Russian voices in Ukraine to erode public trust in the Ukrainian government and demoralize Ukrainian society. Kremlin newswire TASS interviewed an alleged member of the pro-Russian underground movement in Ukraine who amplified several false Kremlin claims, such as the presence of Western mercenaries in different Ukrainian regions, ungrounded accusations of Ukrainian forces committing crimes against civilians, and narratives about domestic and mobilization problems.[78] The Kremlin may be attempting to infiltrate the Ukrainian information space with such claimed Ukrainian, pro-Russian narratives.Kremlin state media continues to deliberately misrepresent Zelensky’s discussions about the second Global Peace Summit and possible talks with Russia on the condition of the Kremlin’s serious considerations of Ukrainian demands as a violation of Ukrainian laws against talks with Russia.[79] TASS claimed that Zelensky stated in a BBC interview that Ukraine could negotiate with Russia and claimed that a Ukrainian decree previously banned such negotiations. The Kremlin state media is deliberately misrepresenting Zelensky and the Ukrainian government’s statements to suggest that the Ukrainian government is violating Ukrainian laws and the will of the Ukrainian people.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43382[2] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43388; https://tass dot ru/politika/21412007[3] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43388[4] https://www.interfax dot ru/world/971759[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062524; ] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024; https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/russian-warships-leave-havanas-port-after-5-day-111192438[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224[7] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/21078215 ; https://ria dot ru/20240607/nikaragua-1951373387.html ; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20878267; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2024   ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024[8] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/golovchenko-na-vstreche-s-ministrom-inostrannyh-del-venesuely-etot-vizit-dlja-nas-osobennyj-647801-2024/; https://www.belta dot by/society/view/golovchenko-belarus-i-venesuela-ne-tolko-realizujut-prezhnie-dogovorennosti-no-i-vyjdut-na-novye-648122-2024/; https://www.belta dot by/politics/view/golovchenko-pribyl-v-venesuelu-647774-2024/ ; https://www.belta dot by/society/view/golovchenko-obsudil-s-prezidentom-venesuely-razvitie-stran-v-uslovijah-sektsionnogo-davlenija-648099-2024/[9] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/golovchenko-na-vstreche-s-ministrom-inostrannyh-del-venesuely-etot-vizit-dlja-nas-osobennyj-647801-2024/[10] https://belta dot by/society/view/golovchenko-pribyl-s-ofitsialnym-vizitom-na-kubu-648360-2024/; https://www.belta dot by/economics/view/golovchenko-nesmotrja-na-slozhnosti-izyskali-vozmozhnosti-dlja-postavok-belorusskoj-produktsii-na-kubu-649435-2024/[11] https://belta dot by/economics/view/kontrakty-na-85-mln-podpisany-vo-vremja-vizita-golovchenko-v-nikaragua-648961-2024/; https://belta dot by/society/view/golovchenko-pribyl-s-ofitsialnym-vizitom-v-nikaragua-648680-2024[12] https://www.ekhokavkaza dot com/a/sgb-nachala-vyzyvatj-na-oprosy-gruzinskih-dobrovoljtsev-voevavshih-v-ukraine/33044220.html[13] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1698943197592613 ; https://www.ekhokavkaza dot com/a/sgb-nachala-vyzyvatj-na-oprosy-gruzinskih-dobrovoljtsev-voevavshih-v-ukraine/33044220.html[14] https://mtavari dot tv/news/161459-zedapiruli-kitkhvebi-iqo-tvalshi-vechkhirebit ; https://www.ekhokavkaza dot com/a/sgb-nachala-vyzyvatj-na-oprosy-gruzinskih-dobrovoljtsev-voevavshih-v-ukraine/33044220.html[15] https://www.facebook.com/N.D.khmala/posts/pfbid02qTojnTT3mHpLq7nzK6sqeeDYp31tHm9LtbqZ4AkT7imYMggFNhHQks24DTnFB3c9l ; https://www.ekhokavkaza dot com/a/sgb-nachala-vyzyvatj-na-oprosy-gruzinskih-dobrovoljtsev-voevavshih-v-ukraine/33044220.html[16] https://batumelebi dot netgazeti.ge/slideshow/536072/[17] https://matsne.gov dot ge/en/document/view/16426?publication=262[18] https://www.facebook.com/sssgeo/posts/pfbid02pprPC9JTY6t2ATZYxGRVTyRNh9RxPtHp4qmo4nhM6ywKeec48DUxNYxBXtveMX2cl ; https://www.ekhokavkaza dot com/a/32937747.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2024[19] https://www.radiotavisupleba dot ge/a/32597360.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2024[20] https://www.caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2024ge/MAINENEM/ ; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/opros-pochti-70-gruzin-nazvali-rossiyu-vragom-svoey-strany-/33044801.html ; https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-eu-membership-support-increases-indicating-georgians-unwavering-support[21] https://x.com/kromark/status/1815026901510946821; https://x.com/kromark/status/1814912166589304847; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2024[22] https://x.com/kromark/status/1815026901510946821; https://x.com/kromark/status/1814912166589304847[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Au5MU5GB6eLZN2ziHC9JgUoXNmeTUVVEaFhDMkjD3LKyDdC8WC4DgVR476PX9jVSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl https://t.me/synegubov/10444; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl; https://t.me/wargonzo/21128; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12931 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72890[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12931[25] https://t.me/otukharkiv/310[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2024[27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/21/zastupnyk-komandyra-3-yi-shturmovoyi-rozpoviv-hto-proty-nyh-voyuye-na-harkivskomu-napryamku/[28] https://t.me/andriyshTime/24896?single[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/41241[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2024[31] https://t.me/rybar/61960[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72890; https://t.me/motopatriot/25187[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Au5MU5GB6eLZN2ziHC9JgUoXNmeTUVVEaFhDMkjD3LKyDdC8WC4DgVR476PX9jVSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl; https://t.me/rybar/61960[34] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/38021; https://t.me/dva_majors/47737 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130719; https://t.me/epoddubny/20456 ; https://t.me/brussinf/7790[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Au5MU5GB6eLZN2ziHC9JgUoXNmeTUVVEaFhDMkjD3LKyDdC8WC4DgVR476PX9jVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl[36] https://t.me/motopatriot/25177[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Au5MU5GB6eLZN2ziHC9JgUoXNmeTUVVEaFhDMkjD3LKyDdC8WC4DgVR476PX9jVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72876 ;[38] https://t.me/spainrus/1463 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1815018565793206450[39] https://t.me/rusich_army/15943 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12916 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25173 ; https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/3334[40] https://t.me/rybar/61968[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12929[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Au5MU5GB6eLZN2ziHC9JgUoXNmeTUVVEaFhDMkjD3LKyDdC8WC4DgVR476PX9jVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72870 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21128[43] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6128; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/754[44] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27352 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72890[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72868 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21128 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57670 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18426 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18423[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Au5MU5GB6eLZN2ziHC9JgUoXNmeTUVVEaFhDMkjD3LKyDdC8WC4DgVR476PX9jVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12930 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21128 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57670[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130698[48] https://t.me/motopatriot/25159 ; https://t.me/voenkorkhayrullin/2950 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25184 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18424[49] https://t.me/rybar/61954 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72874 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72890 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21128[50] https://x.com/klinger66/status/1814997212335604019; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1814989050501042438[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Au5MU5GB6eLZN2ziHC9JgUoXNmeTUVVEaFhDMkjD3LKyDdC8WC4DgVR476PX9jVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl ; https://t.me/rybar/61954[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130682 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11035[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/9853 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/9858[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Au5MU5GB6eLZN2ziHC9JgUoXNmeTUVVEaFhDMkjD3LKyDdC8WC4DgVR476PX9jVSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QdYaG8YXhNo1njMSmQ13roUimEkqybycqqDtXoVErkMesDhfzGhvdstrTekjTMkQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zrSQjcrNpEKV1gn7HWpxqKCVQi3GmhAt9e9pUG4vB2efSctBRpagi1f11wkvYwCZl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10604[57] https://t.me/motopatriot/25142; https://t.me/motopatriot/25151; https://t.me/russian_airborne/6533 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/9846; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12920[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/41228; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/3825[59] https://t.me/ComAFUA/352 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/21/syly-ppo-zbyly-vnochi-35-shahediv/ ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0igDR4VvZBzJyE3mW7nsPJ6ty6rXYpuoGZtx4dAcqkTmb1QRLc5edjuuozGn3nNz8l ;[60] https://t.me/ComAFUA/352 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/21/syly-ppo-zbyly-vnochi-35-shahediv/ ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0igDR4VvZBzJyE3mW7nsPJ6ty6rXYpuoGZtx4dAcqkTmb1QRLc5edjuuozGn3nNz8l ;[61] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/10664; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/10664[62] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/7008 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/21/vorog-vnochi-atakuvav-kyyiv-udarnymy-bpla-vsi-zbyti-na-pidstupah-do-stolyczi/; https://t.me/kyivoda/18819[63] https://t.me/bbcrussian/68000 ; https://t.me/defenseexpress_ua/7730; https://t.me/war_home/2032; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/na-kyyivshhyni-zbyly-udarnyj-dron-novogo-typu/[64] https://t.me/bbcrussian/68000 ; https://t.me/defenseexpress_ua/7730; https://t.me/war_home/2032; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/na-kyyivshhyni-zbyly-udarnyj-dron-novogo-typu/[65] https://t.me/war_home/2032;[66] https://sevastopol dot su/news/gubernator-poobeschal-platit-za-privlechenie-kontraktnikov-100-tysyach-rubley[67] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2024; https://www.marimedia dot ru/news/army/item/175258/; https://pg12 dot ru/news/83469[68] https://www.penzainform dot ru/news/global/2024/07/12/v_gosdume_ukazali_na_risk_v_idee_viplat_za_privedennih_v_voenkomat_blizkih.html[69] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19500[70] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11036[71] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11036[72] https://kalashnikovgroup dot ru/news/kalashnikov-_provel_pokazatelnye_polety_samoleta_-legioner_e33k[73] https://suspilne dot media/795165-ataka-na-ukrainski-energoobekti-svitlo-vidklucatimut-vprodovz-dobi-878-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1721559282&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/795365-zaklik-sklasti-zbrou-nizku-ukrainskih-telegram-kanaliv-zlamali-ekspert-poasniv-ak-ce-stalosa/; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/07/21/hakery-poluchili-dostup-k-sotnyam-ukrainskih-telegram-kanalov-i-opublikovali-soobscheniya-s-prizyvom-slozhit-oruzhie ; https://t.me/sotaproject/83777; https://t.me/astrapress/60116[74] https://t.me/d_code/19711[75] https://t.me/rusich_army/15939[76] https://www.facebook.com/dsszzi/posts/pfbid02mF4rMWjD8PhpYgErTrsZSLLtbJz3s5smqqJXMEzzVEe93BvbdMsE3RiLYMgYBPuKl[77] https://t.me/fleepnews/313[78] https://t.me/tass_agency/261738; https://t.me/tass_agency/261744; https://t.me/tass_agency/261747; https://t.me/tass_agency/261755 [79] https://t.me/tass_agency/261785 

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, July 21, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 2:44am

Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The IDF reported that its airstrikes targeting Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 20 sought to disrupt the Iranian weapons supply route to the Houthis and damage dual-use infrastructure.[1] The IDF said that it intended to disrupt an Iranian weapons supply route to the Houthis and a critical source of Houthi financing by targeting dual-use energy infrastructure and the port’s cargo unloading capabilities.[2] The IDF estimated that 70% of goods that enter the port of Hudaydah reach the Houthis.[3] Israeli F15s and F35s struck 20 fuel depots, large container cranes used to unload goods from ships, and unspecified energy infrastructure.[4] The strikes set fire to the port and the fire is expected to continue burning for several days.[5] Houthi-affiliated media reported that 84 people were wounded in the airstrikes.[6] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF assessed that the port of Hudaydah’s ability to receive goods has been “completely shut down” by the airstrikes.[7]  The IDF stated that this operation was the longest-range operation conducted by the IDF Air Force.[8] The IDF said that the Houthis did not attempt to shoot missiles at incoming Israeli aircraft.[9]A senior security official told an Israeli Army Radio correspondent that Israel needs to “project power towards the entire region” after the Houthi drone hit Tel Aviv.[10] A senior security official told an Israeli Army Radio correspondent that the IDF may need to conduct further attacks in Yemen in the near future.[11] The IDF conducted the July 20 airstrikes in retaliation for the July 18 Houthi drone attack that targeted Tel Aviv and killed one Israeli citizen, but the IDF added that the airstrikes were also a response to “hundreds of [Houthi] aerial threats” targeting Israel in recent months.[12] US and coalition airstrikes have previously targeted military sites and targets within Houthi-controlled Yemen.[13] An Israeli military correspondent noted that Hudaydah port is also used to import humanitarian aid into Yemen.[14] The July 20 airstrike was the first Israeli strike targeting the Houthis.Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi announced the start of the fifth phase of Houthi escalations against Israel known as “Operation Jaffa” in a speech on July 21.[15] Abdulmalik’s speech follows the IDF‘s retaliatory strike on the port of Hudaydah, Yemen on July 20. Abdulmalik claimed that Israelis are no longer safe in main population centers of Israel, including Tel Aviv. Abdulmalik added that Israel will not re-establish deterrence vis-a-vis the Houthis by launching attacks on Yemen. Abdulmalik denied that the “Jaffa” drone that the Houthis used in its July 18 attack on Tel Aviv was foreign-made and referred to it as “purely“ Yemeni made.[16] The Jaffa drone, however, appears to be a modified variant of the Iranian-designed Samad-3 drone.[17] The Houthis presumably modified the Samad-3 in order to extend its range. Abdulmalik denied that the Houthis are conducting operations to benefit Iran and reiterated that the Houthis are operating in support of the Palestinians.[18] Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea separately said in a televised statement on July 20 that the Houthis will respond to this “blatant Israeli aggression and will not hesitate to strike the enemy’s vital targets.”[19]The IDF said it intercepted a surface-to-surface missile approaching Israeli territory from Yemen on July 21.[20] The missile did not cross into Israeli territory.[21] The Houthis have not claimed the attack as of this writing.Key Takeaways:Yemen: Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi announced the start of the fifth phase of Houthi escalations against Israel known as “Operation Jaffa,” claiming that Israelis are no longer safe in Israel’s main population centers.Gaza Strip: The IDF confirmed on July 21 that it killed a prominent Hamas fighter and the Gaza Brigade commander in the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in an airstrike on an unspecified date.West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 20.Lebanon: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 20.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF confirmed on July 21 that it killed a prominent Hamas fighter and the Gaza Brigade commander in the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in an airstrike on an unspecified date.[22] The IDF said that the two fighters’ deaths followed the IDF‘s airstrikes that killed two Hamas commanders, one PIJ commander, and 20 Shati Battalion members in the Gaza Strip.[23] The IDF said on July 21 that it also killed Hamas fighter Nimr Hamida.[24] Hamida planned and participated in an October 2003 shooting attack that killed three IDF soldiers near Ein Yabrud in the West Bank.[25] Hamida was exiled to the Gaza Strip in the 2011 Gilad Shalit deal, in which Israel traded 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for an IDF soldier captured in 2006 by Palestinian militias.[26] Hamida served as a member of Hamas’ West Bank Headquarters‘ Ramallah Committee.[27] The West Bank Headquarters is a Hamas unit based in the Gaza Strip that planned attacks against Israel from or within the West Bank.[28]The IDF also confirmed on July 21 that it killed the Gaza Brigade commander of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Izz al Din Akila on an unspecified date.[29] The IDF said that Akila had facilitated al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades attacks against the IDF throughout the war.[30]  CTP-ISW previously reported that Akila was killed in an airstrike targeting Shati camp on July 13.[31]The 3rd Alexandroni Infantry Brigade (Res.) (99th Division) continued clearing operations along the Netzarim Corridor on July 21. Israeli forces raided militia infrastructure and located weapons near the corridor.[32]  Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades fired rockets and mortars targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor.[33]The 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on July 20. The IDF Givati Brigade identified and killed an armed cell of Palestinian fighters approaching Israeli forces.[34] The Givati Brigade also located and destroyed mortar shells that were ready to be launched at Israeli forces.[35] The IDF 401st Brigade destroyed tunnel shafts and underground infrastructure in Tal al Sultan.[36] Hamas fighters targeted Israeli armor with rocket propelled grenades and anti-personnel improvised explosive devices east of Rafah city.[37]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 20.[38] All clashes occurred within Tubas. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) detonated an IED targeting IDF vehicles in Tayasir in the West Bank on July 21.[39] The IDF did not report any injuries.[40]A video reportedly showing masked Israeli settlers attacking Israeli activists, foreign volunteers, and Palestinian civilians with clubs near Nablus circulated on social media on July 21.[41] Israeli media reported the settlers attacked the civilians while they were planting trees. The settlers injured an unknown number of civilians, including American volunteers.[42] The settlers fled when the IDF arrived at the scene.[43] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated that the Israeli Air Force may increase its activities to combat terrorism in the West Bank during a situational assessment with IDF Central Command on July 21.[44] Gallant stated that terrorism in the West Bank is increasing.This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Southern Lebanon and Golan HeightsAxis of Resistance objectives:Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into LebanonPrepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaIranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 20.[45]Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.Iran and Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting a “vital target” in Eilat, Israel on July 21.[46] The IDF has not acknowledged the incident at the time of writing.Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted six joint airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Hajjah and Hudaydah Governorates, Yemen on July 21.[47] Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes in Midi district, Hajjah Governorate. Houthi-affiliated media also claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted four joint airstrikes targeting Ras Isa, Salif District, Hudaydah Governorate.United States Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed one Houthi drone over the Red Sea on July 21.[48] CENTCOM determined that the drone presented an imminent threat to US and coalition forces, and merchant vessels in the region.The Houthis claimed a drone and missile attack on the Liberian-flagged container ship Pumba in the Red Sea on July 21.[49] CTP-ISW cannot verify that the attacks occurred at the time of writing.[1] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814756937830961179[2] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814756940888543335; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1814895997358645295[3] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1814705798070600185[4] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815023584504316281; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1815024162420707534[5] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12027; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1814895997358645295[6] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1814762366946447723[7] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1814705798070600185[8] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814756943963066527[9] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815023584504316281; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12024[10] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1814895997358645295[11] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1814895997358645295[12] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814756937830961179[13]https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2024;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-19-2024;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-9-2024;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-23-2024[14] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1815023584504316281[15] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3351322.htm[16] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1815019111732101338[17] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-19-2024[18] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3351322.htm[19] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1814727108977172917; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1814727888203051070[20] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814869331819557257; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814869331819557257[21] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814869331819557257[22] https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1815019146163216443 [23] https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1815019146163216443; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813892215682514978; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-18-2024[24] https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1815019146163216443[25] https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1815019146163216443; www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-hamas-operative-killed-in-recent-gaza-city-strike-was-behind-deadly-west-bank-attack-in-2003[26] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-hamas-operative-killed-in-recent-gaza-city-strike-was-behind-deadly-west-bank-attack-in-2003/[27] https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1815019146163216443[28] www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-hamas-operative-killed-in-recent-gaza-city-strike-was-behind-deadly-west-bank-attack-in-2003[29] https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1815019146163216443 [30] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1815018533329236366[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2024[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814906430048108771[33] https://t.me/sarayaps/18355;https://t.me/nedalps/4291;https://t.me/nedalps/4292[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814906423987331532[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814906423987331532[36] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1814906430048108771[37] https://t.me/hamaswestbank1/4045[38] https://t.me/QudsN/438115https://t.me/hamza20300/272205https://t.me/hamza20300/272207https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6865https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6865[39] https://t.me/hamza20300/272212; https://t.me/QudsN/438129[40] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-811160[41] https://x.com/kann_news/status/1815037185441005632[42] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1814976978467917908[43] https://x.com/kann_news/status/1815037185441005632[44] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-811264[45] https://t.me/mmirleb/5583https://t.me/mmirleb/5589https://t.me/mmirleb/5592https://t.me/mmirleb/5594https://t.me/mmirleb/5597https://t.me/mmirleb/5601https://t.me/mmirleb/5599[46] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1228[47] https://www.saba.ye/en/news3351295.htm[48] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1814760480377823239[49] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1814906815190098260/photo/1 

[Author: Unknown]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2024

 

at 7/25/24 1:59am

 Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, and George BarrosJuly 18, 2024, 7:15 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on July 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian coast guard base in occupied Crimea on the night of July 17 to 18. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on July 18 that sources in Ukrainian law enforcement stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted a naval and aerial drone strike during a Russian military exercise at a Russian coast guard base near occupied Lake Donuzlav, Crimea on the night of July 17 to 18 and damaged and disabled a headquarters with a control point, a warehouse with ammunition and equipment, an electric substation, technical facilities, and Russian firing positions.[1] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 31st Air Force and Air Defense Division (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army) shot down at least 33 aerial drones but that debris from falling drones caused insignificant damage near occupied Yevpatoria.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 18 that elements of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) destroyed 10 naval drones in the Black Sea.[3]European countries continue to display their commitment to Ukraine and unity in the face of Russian aggression. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during the plenary session of the European Political Community summit in the United Kingdom (UK) on July 18 that Russian President Vladimir Putin has failed to divide Europe and thanked Ukraine's Western partners for easing restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian border areas north of Kharkiv Oblast.[4] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have stopped the Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast and noted that Ukrainian strikes against military targets in Belgorod Oblast play a role in Ukraine's ability to repel this offensive. Zelensky called on Western states to further lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia to help defend Ukrainian civilians from Russian air, drone, and missile strikes. Zelensky will have additional meetings with UK officials and defense company representatives on July 19 and announced an intergovernmental agreement to support Ukraine's defense industry on July 18.[5] Ukraine also signed bilateral agreements with Czechia and Slovenia on July 18.[6] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that NATO will open a command center in Germany to oversee and coordinate NATO's military assistance and training projects that support the Ukrainian Armed Forces and that the command center will be operational in September 2024.[7] Stoltenberg stated that 700 personnel will staff the command center and help coordinate NATO member states' support for Ukraine. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on July 18 that she hopes to launch a "European Defense Union" during her second term to help address cross-border threats within the European Union (EU), beginning with new "European Air Shield" and cyber defense programs.[8]Rosgvardia made an unprecedented proposal on July 17 to grant Russian Central Bank leadership the right to carry automatic weapons and handguns.[9] Rosgvardia — a security agency tasked with protecting Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s regime from internal threats and safeguarding some critical infrastructure — submitted a draft bill, which explained that Russian Central Bank leadership needs the right to carry weapons, including pistols, assault rifles, and submachine and machine guns,” to strengthen the protection and security of [Russian] infrastructure facilities.”[10] The Central Bank’s press service added that this proposal will allow the Central Bank to ensure the protection of the Russian Bank’s facilities and employees in occupied Ukraine.[11] The draft bill proposed allowing deputy chairpersons, their advisers, and department directors and deputies to carry pistols and submachine guns. The draft bill specified that security guards and employees of the departments involved in cash collection and weapons circulation at Central Bank facilities would receive assault rifles and machine guns if the bill passes. The draft bill did not list the Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina as a potential recipient of weapons, however.[12] ISW previously observed reports that Putin trusts Nabiullina and even granted her the “exclusive right” to voice her true opinions about the real economic situation in Russia. The reason for her exclusion from this proposal is unclear.[13] It is possible that she was excluded from the list because she does not work in high-risk areas, such as Russia’s border regions or occupied Ukraine. Russian military and political bloggers expressed frustration that Rosgvardia is considering allocating weapons to Central Bank employees despite the fact that these weapons are needed on the frontlines and Russian officers and contract servicemen are not allowed to carry short-barreled weapons.[14] Rosgvardia may have proposed to arm Central Bank leadership as part of its ongoing efforts to expand Rosgvardia’s authority in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[15] Rosgvardia may have also proposed to arm Central Bank employees to establish patronage networks over the banking sector in Russia and occupied Ukraine.Kremlin officials continue to expand the geographic scope of Russia's proposed alternative "Eurasian security architecture." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed at a press conference at the United Nations (UN) on July 17 that Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are advocating within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (an economic union comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture.[16] Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of an alternative Eurasian security system with support from PRC President Xi Jinping on June 14. Putin has recently specifically highlighted that Russia is ready to discuss Eurasian security issues with the SCO and that Russia wants to develop dialogue with ASEAN .[17] Putin has labelled Vietnam — a country not typically included in political conceptions of Eurasia — as part of his proposed Eurasian security system.[18] The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; and Russia appears to consider the Gulf states as potential members of Russia's envisioned "Eurasian" system.The US continues efforts to build out a partnership with Armenia, sparking critical reactions from Kremlin officials. US Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya traveled to Yerevan, Armenia on July 13 and announced that the US has allocated roughly $16 million to the formation of a patrol police force in Armenia and is working with Armenia to pursue law enforcement reforms.[19] Zeya also highlighted the joint US–Armenian "Eagle Partner" military exercise, which began on July 16, and confirmed that a US Army resident advisor will soon be attached to the Armenia Ministry of Defense.[20] Zeya noted that Armenia's participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) remains an Armenian choice that the US will respect but that the US has seen no evidence suggesting that "Russia's military presence contributes to a more peaceful and stable South Caucasus region." Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused the US of using visits to Armenia to pursue anti-Russian activities in the Caucasus.[21] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger responded to Zeya's visit to Armenia and claimed that the US is trying to "intrude" on Armenia's law enforcement in order to "take control" of Armenia.[22] Armenia's relationship with the West has been particularly neuralgic for Russia as Armenia has taken concrete steps to distance itself from the Kremlin over the past months.[23]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian coast guard base in occupied Crimea on the night of July 17 to 18.European countries continue to display their commitment to Ukraine and unity in the face of Russian aggression.Rosgvardia made an unprecedented proposal on July 17 to grant Russian Central Bank leadership the right to carry automatic weapons and handguns.Kremlin officials continue to expand the geographic scope of Russia's proposed alternative "Eurasian security architecture."The US continues efforts to build out a partnership with Armenia, sparking critical reactions from Kremlin officials.Russian forces recently marginally advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and near Kharkiv City, Toretsk, Avdiivka, and Hulyaipole.Russian officials continue efforts to expand the Russian Armed Forces' training capacity and address force generation issues.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusRussian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces reportedly conducted a limited and unsuccessful cross-border raid into Sumy Oblast on July 16. A Ukrainian soldier reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group tried to break through to Chuikivka, Rozhkovychi, and Sytne (all in northeastern Sumy Oblast within five kilometers of the international border with Russia).[24] The Ukrainian soldier stated that the Russian group launched the attack after intensive artillery and mortar shelling but noted that Ukrainian forces later repelled the attempt.Russian forces recently made a marginal confirmed advance north of Kharkiv City amid continued positional fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 18. Geolocated footage published on July 17 shows that Russian forces advanced in western Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[25] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in Hlyboke.[26] Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed on July 18 that Russian forces control the "first line of high-rise buildings" in Vovchansk, although it is unclear to which specific high-rise buildings he was referring.[27] Fighting otherwise continued within Vovchansk and in the direction of Tykhe (east of Vovchansk).[28] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade continue fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[29]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk, southwest of Svatove, and west of Kreminna. Geolocated footage published on July 17 and 18 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk), northeast of Makiivka (southwest of Svatove), and east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made additional advances east of Terny, but ISW has not observed visual evidence to support this claim.[31] Russian forces reportedly attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Berestove, Pishchane, and Novoosynove; west of Svatove near Stelmakhivka and Andriivka; southwest of Svatove near Makiivka, Hrekivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on July 17 and 18.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian river crossing and several Ukrainian positions in Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) overnight on July 17-18.[33] Elements of the Russian reconnaissance company of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kyslivka (southeast of Kupyansk), and elements of the Russian 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division) are reportedly operating near Kyslivka and Stepova Novoselivka.[34]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Siversk direction on July 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[35] Russian forces continued assaults southeast of Siversk near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka, and Berestove and south of Siversk near Pereizne on July 17 and 18.[36]Russian forces reportedly advanced near Chasiv Yar on July 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 11th VDV Brigade, and 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced up to the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal within eastern Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and attacked towards the intersection of the canal and the T-0504 highway southeast of Chasiv Yar.[37] Mashovets and Russian milbloggers noted that Russian forces are unsuccessfully trying to cross the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal near Chasiv Yar, but Mashovets suggested that Russian forces may be able to cross the canal just south of Kalynivka or south of Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar) where the canal flows underground.[38] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd AC unsuccessfully attacked near the railway line between Klishchiivka and Andriivka (both southeast of Chasiv Yar). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Kalynivka and in a forest area southwest of Klishchiivka.[39] Russian forces continued assaults north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Novomarkove, near Chasiv Yar itself, and east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske.[40] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Hryhorivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[41]Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Toretsk amid continued assaults in the Toretsk direction on July 18. Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Russian forces with armored vehicle support recently advanced within eastern Niu York (south of Toretsk).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to Kooperatyvna street within Niu York, Petra Velykoho street within eastern Druzhba (east of Toretsk), and the intersection of Kalynova and Kutusova streets within northeastern Pivnichne (east of Toretsk).[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced within Zalizne (east of Toretsk).[44]Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Avdiivka amid continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on July 18. Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced into central Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka).[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing northwest of Avdiivka near Yevhenivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Lozuvatske, Prohres, and Novoselivka Persha and southwest of Avdiivka near the Karlivske Reservoir.[46] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) recently advanced up to the Vovcha River west of Voskhod (northwest of Avdiivka).[47] Mashovets stated that elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division's 433rd, 589th, and 433rd motorized rifle regiments are attacking towards Vovche (northwest of Avdiivka) and Prohres from Yevhenivka and towards Novoselivka Persha from the north. Russian forces also reportedly continued assaults northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove and Novooleksandrivka and west of Avdiivka near Umanske on July 17 and 18.[48] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) are operating near Avdiivka.[49]Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka and Kostyantynivka on July 17 and 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[50] A Ukrainian military observer posted footage showing a reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area of the Kurakhove direction but did not specify when the assault occurred.[51] The military observer reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault and damaged Russian three tanks and two armored personnel carriers. Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction, and elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City).[52]Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Donbas on July 18 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka) after Russian shelling destroyed Ukrainian positions within Urozhaine, indicating the Russian forces recently seized the entire settlement and are also likely operating in the fields east of Urozhaine.[53] ISW has not recently observed footage of Ukrainian forces operating in the fields east of Urozhaine, and it would likely be untenable for Ukrainian forces to hold positions within those fields given that Russian forces likely now occupy Urozhaine and Novodonetske (southeast of Velyka Novosilka). Voloshyn stated that the Ukrainian command ordered the withdrawal from Urozhaine to preserve Ukrainian servicemembers; lives but noted that Ukrainian forces maintain control over the situation in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[54]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Geolocated footage published on July 17 indicated that Russian forces advanced in the fields south of Hulyaipole.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Marfopil (southeast of Hulyaipole).[56]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Robotyne; northeast of Robotyne on the Verbove-Mala Tokmachka line; and northwest of Robotyne on the Nesteryanka-Novoandriivka line.[57] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces launched roughly 100 unguided air bombs along the entire frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[58] Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division and reconnaissance elements of the Russian 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit) continued operating in the Orikhiv and Zaporizhia directions, respectively.[59]Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko observed on July 18 that Russian forces began concentrating troops in western Zaporizhia Oblast from different regions and hypothesized that Russian forces may be planning to launch a new attack on the region.[60] Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces are redeploying troops from Novoazovsk (east of Mariupol), Donetsk City, and unspecified oblasts. Andryushchenko added that these Russian forces are moving closer to the frontline in the direction of Rozivka (northwest of Mariupol) - Polohy (south of Hulyaipole) and Tokmak, instead of moving along the Sea of Azov via Berdyansk and Prymorsk. Andryushenko noted that Russian forces are simultaneously deploying reserves and units that they have previously taken off the frontline for replenishment and training along the Sea of Azov coast to support offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast. Andryushchenko specified that these reserves were originally located in the Mariupol-Beryansk agglomeration, Prymorsk, and Kyrylivka. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal visited Ukrainian fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast on July 18.[61]Ukrainian military officials indirectly acknowledged on July 17 that Ukrainian forces are likely no longer operating in Krynky, but are continuing combat operations near Krynky and elsewhere in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[62] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command stated that intense and prolonged Russian artillery fire destroyed the main Ukrainian positions in Krynky and nearly destroyed the entire settlement.[63] Ukraine's Operational Command noted that Ukrainian forces are continuing to carry out combat operations in east bank Kherson Oblast and near Krynky and will continue operating at designated positions and bridgeheads on the east bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian investigative outlet Slidstvo.Info reported on July 17 that Ukrainian forces are currently fighting for the islands in the Dnipro River Delta near Krynky after Russian forces destroyed Ukrainian positions in the settlement over the span of eight months.[64] Slidstvo.Info spoke with a dozen Ukrainian sailors and medics from Ukrainian naval infantry brigades who operated in Krynky or transported Ukrainian forces to the area and who described the defense of the settlement as an extremely challenging task conducted with limited resources.[65] Some Ukrainian servicemembers told Slidstvo.Info that Ukrainian forces at first were able to defend the village and even try to expand the bridgehead until Russian forces destroyed everything in the settlement.A Ukrainian platoon commander of an amphibious assault company that fought in Krynky for two months described Russian attacks on Ukrainian positions in the settlement as “meat assaults” and noted that Russian forces conducted seven to eight attacks per day.[66] The platoon commander added that during the platoon’s deployment to Krynky, the number of Russian personnel in assault groups decreased from six to seven people per group to three to four people, and that many Russian servicemembers refused to fight. The platoon commander added that Russian assault groups are composed of highly qualified and trained military personnel such as paratroopers and elements of Russian Spetsnaz. The platoon commander observed that Russian forces also operated in a coordinated matter in the Krynky area.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 17 of 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 16 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and one Kh-35 anti-ship missile from occupied southern Ukraine.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 16 of the Shahed drones and two Kh-59/69 missiles over Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Zaporizhia, Kyiv, and Kharkiv oblasts. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak stated that Russian forces struck Synelnykivskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[68] Russian sources claimed that a Russian Kh-35 missile struck a Ukrainian P-18 radar near Tarasivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[69]Ukraine's Eastern Air Command reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed over 2,100 Russian air targets, including 500 missiles, 51 combat aircraft, 14 helicopters, and more than 1,500 strike and reconnaissance drones, over the area of responsibility of the Eastern Air Command since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[70]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian officials continue efforts to expand the Russian Armed Forces' training capacity and address force generation issues. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Defense Minister Viktor Goremykin, and Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative of the Central Federal Okrug Igor Shchegolev visited the Pogonovo military training ground in Voronezh Oblast on July 17.[71] The officials met with Russian contract servicemembers to discuss staffing issues in the Russian Armed Forces and inspected military equipment and the training ground's barracks.Russian sources continue to highlight tension between Russian forces and former Wagner Group personnel. A Russian insider source claimed on July 18 that Russian special forces raided the camp of the "Istra" Regiment (a battalion comprised of former Wagner personnel with organizational support from Moscow Oblast officials) and beat and imprisoned the battalion's command in a ditch for stealing humanitarian assistance and other crimes sometime in April-May 2024.[72] The insider source claimed that the special forces detachment eventually released the battalion's command, whom Russian military authorities later transferred to other units, and told the command that "Wagner's time is over."Russian forces are reportedly removing Soviet-era artillery systems from storage for use in Ukraine. Russian opposition media outlet Astra reported on July 14 that a Russian truck towing a Soviet-era M-46 130mm artillery system ran into a passenger car in Russia, indicating that Russian forces are moving these systems from storage.[73] Astra noted that North Korea is supplying Russia with 130mm shells and estimated that Russia has around 600 M-46 systems in storage. A Russian milblogger amplified footage of another Russian truck moving an M-46 from storage and claimed that, despite its age, the M-46 is an effective and powerful artillery system.[74] The milblogger claimed that Iran, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea produce 130mm shells and that Russia could import the shells from these countries.Russian-state owned and defense industrial focused Promsvyazbank (PSB) claimed on July 18 that PSB's Era investment fund will help Russian developers supply the Russian military with several thousand reconnaissance, reconnaissance-strike, strike, and aircraft type drones by the end of 2024.[75]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec stated on July 18 that its subsidiary, Roselectronics, developed the "Leshy" mobile drone countermeasure system to protect military and service vehicles and industrial facilities from drone strikes.[76] Rostec claimed that the "Leshy" system has a range of at least 250 meters and can work effectively when the vehicle is moving or stationary.Press service of the Russian space agency Roscosmos claimed that its subsidiary Gonets Satellite System and Russian drone manufacturer Geoscan successfully operated a drone via satellite for the first time in Russia.[77]Russian developer VessoLink reportedly created a hardware and software system with artificial intelligence (AI) that can count and determine the location of objects and instantly transmit this data to a ground station.[78] The system reportedly weighs one kilogram, and any type of drone (except small-sized drones) can carry the system.Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.Russian Information Operations and NarrativesRussian officials continue to weaponize false invocations of international law to discredit Ukraine and deflect from Russia's well-documented violations of international law. The Kharkiv Oblast occupation deputy head Yevhen Lisnayk claimed on July 18 that the Kharkiv Oblast occupation administration has opened a genocide case against Ukrainian forces in connection with the shelling of Kharkiv Oblast.[79] The Russian Criminal Code uses the same definition of genocide as the Geneva Convention, so Lisnyak is essentially weaponizing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[80] Russian authorities similarly used allegations of genocide in an attempt to justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, despite international recognition that there were false and fabricated accusations, for which Russia was unable to provide any evidence for.[81] ISW extensively reported on Russia's apparent violations of international law and previously assessed that Russian officials frequently accuse Ukraine of war crimes or other violations of international law to deflect from evidence of the Kremlin's own violations.[82]Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 17 that Russia is engaging with unspecified American "political scientists" in a dialogue related to the war in Ukraine.[83] Lavrov made this comment during a press conference at the United Nations in New York City following the UN Security Council meetings, likely to generate the impression that Russia is interested in Western opinions on peace negotiations and forecasts of a post-settlement situation in Ukraine.[84] Select Russian officials routinely invoke the narrative that Russia is prepared to talk to the West and that the West and Ukraine are responsible for refusing such discourse, despite the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has made it clear that Russia has no intentions of talking with the West or Ukraine in good faith.[85]Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov utilized boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling rhetoric to threaten nuclear escalation in response to reports that the White House will begin the gradual deployment of long-range weapons to Germany.[86] Ryabkov suggested that Russia may deploy missiles, including missiles equipped with nuclear warheads in response to the deployment of American weapons in Germany.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Belarus continues to strengthen its bilateral relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on July 17 that Belarusian and People's Liberation Army (PLA) airborne search and attack formations participated in the "Attack Falcon 2024" joint exercises at the Brest Training Ground.[87] Belarusian Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko and PLA Corps Deputy Chief of Staff Senior Colonel Liu Zhen observed the exercises, which included training with unguided air and MLRS strikes against a simulated enemy and parachute operations.[88]The Belarusian MoD announced on July 17 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko appointed Major General Alexander Naumenko as a Deputy Defense Minister and dismissed Major General Andrei Zhuk due to his age.[89] Lukashenko appointed Major General Alexander Bas as commander of Belarusian Northwestern Operational Command to replace Naumenko.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://suspilne dot media/793437-droni-sbu-urazili-bazu-beregovoi-ohoroni-na-ozeri-donuzlav-u-krimu-dzerela/[2] https://t.me/rybar/61896[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/41155[4] https://suspilne dot media/793417-zelenskij-cim-mense-bude-obmezen-dla-ukraini-na-vikoristanna-zbroi-tim-aktivnise-rosia-pragnutime-miru/ ; https://www.youtube.com/live/qOgjrSPh3NU ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/18/vijskovi-aerodrom-misczya-zapusku-rosijskyh-raket-use-cze-maye-buty-znyshheno-prezydent/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/11160[5] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/18/zelenskyj-prybuv-do-velykoyi-brytaniyi-shhob-pidpysaty-ugodu-pro-pidtrymku-ukrayinskogo-opk/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/11154[6] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ukrayina-ta-sloveniya-uklali-bezpekovu-ugodu-92257 ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ukrayina-ta-chehiya-uklali-bezpekovu-ugodu-spilne-virobnictv-92253[7] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_227512.htm[8] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/18/russia-warns-eu-chiefs-plans-for-new-defence-union-signal-confrontation ; https://www.cnbc.com/2024/07/18/eu-commission-head-von-der-leyen-elected-for-second-term.html ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-18/eu-s-von-der-leyen-keeps-climate-goals-ahead-of-parliament-vote[9] https://regulation dot gov.ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=149108[10] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/17/07/2024/6697cc919a794770eeb60a69?from=short_news; https://ria dot ru/20240717/oruzhie-1960295189.html[11] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/17/07/2024/6697cc919a794770eeb60a69?from=short_news[12] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/17/07/2024/6697cc919a794770eeb60a69?from=short_news[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2024[14] https://t.me/rybar/61873; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37763 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/49338; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11014;https://t.me/tactical_13/5557; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/11889[15] http://duma.gov dot ru/news/57538/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2023[16] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1962428/#sel=20:1:y,20:1:y[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062124; http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/74345[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024[19] https://news dot am/rus/news/834291.html#google_vignette; https://x.com/UnderSecStateJ/status/1813284199765581967[20] https://hetq dot am/en/article/168189[21] https://verelq dot am/ru/node/147900[22] https://t.me/rybar/61889[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030624[24] https://x.com/strashniy_ser/status/1813519228810715236[25] https://t.me/spc_division/171; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/17350[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZfRXoQBx8rrJFeVnhcVNesWN2QuunkeaapFt4rqmSbv9ouN6ogDh9Nn169k3v4tkl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hi5YZPRzekHxqMpSpr5rExLfBrNCkX3poAe3n1DRYLX8AkBz8kkZvsooSJgmk23El; https://t.me/otukharkiv/285; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12817; https://t.me/dva_majors/47529[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/261335[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/47529; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12827; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72707; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130402;[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130362[30] https://x.com/WarArmor13/status/1813535274951234039; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/727; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/734; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6099; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6098; https://t.me/duk67ombr/1353; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27320[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27320[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZfRXoQBx8rrJFeVnhcVNesWN2QuunkeaapFt4rqmSbv9ouN6ogDh9Nn169k3v4tkl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hi5YZPRzekHxqMpSpr5rExLfBrNCkX3poAe3n1DRYLX8AkBz8kkZvsooSJgmk23El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TmV9NNqPjWCWBuwNkxgPJm5cMUkpTrBJRLTL87Hw36fKmEobLe7zXWoTdUgTyg13l;[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130423[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/47558; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/37925 (Kyslivka); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130348 (Kyslivka and Stepova Novoselivka)[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130357 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47529 ; https://t.me/rybar/61891[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZfRXoQBx8rrJFeVnhcVNesWN2QuunkeaapFt4rqmSbv9ouN6ogDh9Nn169k3v4tkl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hi5YZPRzekHxqMpSpr5rExLfBrNCkX3poAe3n1DRYLX8AkBz8kkZvsooSJgmk23El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TmV9NNqPjWCWBuwNkxgPJm5cMUkpTrBJRLTL87Hw36fKmEobLe7zXWoTdUgTyg13l ; https://t.me/rybar/61891 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47529[37] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2041 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid031wT5QPsmhCYonoLKLP1eSSNE5sXY9gZSQQhoQCZ73kvLrrbT2R4cf9qHSvAYfu2Xl[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2041 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid031wT5QPsmhCYonoLKLP1eSSNE5sXY9gZSQQhoQCZ73kvLrrbT2R4cf9qHSvAYfu2Xl ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25014[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12824 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72707 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130357 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130397 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/15886 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12816 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72707[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZfRXoQBx8rrJFeVnhcVNesWN2QuunkeaapFt4rqmSbv9ouN6ogDh9Nn169k3v4tkl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hi5YZPRzekHxqMpSpr5rExLfBrNCkX3poAe3n1DRYLX8AkBz8kkZvsooSJgmk23El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TmV9NNqPjWCWBuwNkxgPJm5cMUkpTrBJRLTL87Hw36fKmEobLe7zXWoTdUgTyg13l[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130392[42] https://t.me/marmuletik/25782; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6100[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12825[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12825[45] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1813907032497369222; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1813903019651572045; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6101;https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1813957841436484017; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1813954155813429313; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1813960150350172671[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12819 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72707 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12826 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/47529 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72692 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24987 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130357 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57629[47] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2042 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid031wT5QPsmhCYonoLKLP1eSSNE5sXY9gZSQQhoQCZ73kvLrrbT2R4cf9qHSvAYfu2Xl[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZfRXoQBx8rrJFeVnhcVNesWN2QuunkeaapFt4rqmSbv9ouN6ogDh9Nn169k3v4tkl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hi5YZPRzekHxqMpSpr5rExLfBrNCkX3poAe3n1DRYLX8AkBz8kkZvsooSJgmk23El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TmV9NNqPjWCWBuwNkxgPJm5cMUkpTrBJRLTL87Hw36fKmEobLe7zXWoTdUgTyg13l[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/41147[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZfRXoQBx8rrJFeVnhcVNesWN2QuunkeaapFt4rqmSbv9ouN6ogDh9Nn169k3v4tkl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hi5YZPRzekHxqMpSpr5rExLfBrNCkX3poAe3n1DRYLX8AkBz8kkZvsooSJgmk23El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TmV9NNqPjWCWBuwNkxgPJm5cMUkpTrBJRLTL87Hw36fKmEobLe7zXWoTdUgTyg13l[51] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/11933[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130389 (Kurakove) ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/72703 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/9803 (Vuhledar)[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/793289-dla-zberezenna-zitta-vijskovih-sili-oboroni-vidijsli-vid-pozicij-v-urozajnomu-pidtverdili-v-osuv-hortica/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[54] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/793289-dla-zberezenna-zitta-vijskovih-sili-oboroni-vidijsli-vid-pozicij-v-urozajnomu-pidtverdili-v-osuv-hortica/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[55] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1813737267099562098; https://t.me/tokyofpv/24; https://t.me/arkan_102/27; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1813737270694019581[56] https://t.me/motopatriot/24983[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZfRXoQBx8rrJFeVnhcVNesWN2QuunkeaapFt4rqmSbv9ouN6ogDh9Nn169k3v4tkl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hi5YZPRzekHxqMpSpr5rExLfBrNCkX3poAe3n1DRYLX8AkBz8kkZvsooSJgmk23El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TmV9NNqPjWCWBuwNkxgPJm5cMUkpTrBJRLTL87Hw36fKmEobLe7zXWoTdUgTyg13l[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hi5YZPRzekHxqMpSpr5rExLfBrNCkX3poAe3n1DRYLX8AkBz8kkZvsooSJgmk23El[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/41156 (Orikhiv); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130386 (Zaporizhia direction)[60] https://espreso dot tv/viyna-z-rosiyeyu-skhozhe-shcho-rosiyani-gotuyutsya-do-pochatku-novoi-khvili-nastupu-na-zaporizku-oblast-andryushchenko[61] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/18/denys-shmygal-pereviryv-proczesom-budivnycztva-fortyfikaczij-u-zaporizkij-oblasti/[62] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122130327230290582&id=61558717479769&mibextid=WC7FNe&rdid=NriB8IYrnshs3EoR[63] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122130327230290582&id=61558717479769&mibextid=WC7FNe&rdid=NriB8IYrnshs3EoR[64] https://www.slidstvo dot info/warnews/ya-bachyv-peklo-i-nazva-yomu-krynky-biytsi-iaki-utrymuvaly-selo-na-livomu-berezi-i-znykly-tam-bezvisty/; https://t.me/rybar/61877; https://t.me/voenacher/68855; https://t.me/milinfolive/126274[65] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2024/07/17/7466202/; https://www.slidstvo dot info/warnews/ya-bachyv-peklo-i-nazva-yomu-krynky-biytsi-iaki-utrymuvaly-selo-na-livomu-berezi-i-znykly-tam-bezvisty/[66] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/18/my-lyasnuly-odnu-grupu-a-za-nymy-pre-shhe-odna-boyecz-kot-pro-boyi-u-krynkah/; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10559[67] https://t.me/ComAFUA/350[68] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/14615[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/130398; https://t.me/milinfolive/126291[70] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/18/sotni-raket-udarni-bpla-ta-litaky-pvk-shid-znyshhylo-2100-czilej-z-pochatku-shyrokomasshtabnogo-vtorgnennya/; https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid02835EPrcBBkTkG3Je1oojmtyNMrjAaijcTXo3rBXHYWjnRofTc7fteE82Lui4n8HSl?locale=uk_UA[71] https://iz dot ru/1729080/2024-07-17/medvedev-posetil-voennyi-poligon-v-voronezhskoi-oblasti ; https://tass dot ru/politika/21386613 ; https://vk dot com/dm?w=wall53083705_54938&ysclid=lypyzudezj501453485[72] https://t.me/vchkogpu/49334[73] https://t.me/astrapress/59664[74] https://t.me/milinfolive/126292[75] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21390053[76] https://rostec dot ru/news/rostekh-razrabotal-mobilnyy-antidron-leshiy-dlya-zashchity-transporta-i-promyshlennykh-obektov/[77] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21381475[78] https://ria dot ru/20240717/dron-1960271092.html[79] https://t.me/tass_agency/261373[80] https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/b21e235ab7f2ffdb9921d73f1d1828628780cf10/; https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-3; https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf[82] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824; https://isw.pub/UkrWarO22124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011823; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf[83] https://t.me/tass_agency/261261; https://ria dot ru/20240717/lavrov-1960360411.html[84] https://tass dot ru/politika/21388351[85] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070624[86] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/10/joint-statement-from-united-states-and-germany-on-long-range-fires-deployment-in-germany/; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/07/18/mid-rf-dopustil-razvertyvanie-raket-s-yadernym-osnascheniem-v-otvet-na-razmeschenie-amerikanskogo-oruzhiya-v-germanii[87] https://t.me/modmilby/40473 ; https://t.me/modmilby/40495 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/259132[88] https://t.me/modmilby/40485 ; https://t.me/modmilby/40495[89] https://t.me/modmilby/40472

[Author: ISWKF]

As of 7/27/24 12:00am. Last new 7/26/24 9:34pm.