- — Iran Update, February 6, 2025
- Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Victoria Penza, Avery Borens, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Many of the most prominent Iraqi Sunni political parties have emphasized the need for political action to achieve long-standing Sunni political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. A member of the Progress Party, which is led by former Parliament Speaker and key Sunni politician Mohammad al Halbousi, warned on February 5 that the Progress Party could boycott parliament in response to the recent Iraqi Federal Supreme Court decision to temporarily suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[1] The Federal Supreme Court, which is responsible for interpreting the constitution and determining the constitutionality of laws and regulations, temporarily suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law on February 3. This law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law. The Progress Party holds 39 seats in parliament, which is far below the number of seats needed to block a quorum.[2] A Progress Party-affiliated adviser to the Anbar Provincial Council similarly called on Sunni parliamentarians to boycott the political process and start “large” demonstrations in response to the Federal Supreme Court decision.[3]These statements come after the Sunni Azm Alliance called on February 5 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution.[4] Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai is a member of the newly-formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition.[5] Halbousi is not a member of this new Sunni political coalition, and the United Sunni Leadership Coalition appears to be an alternative Sunni political party to Halbousi’s Progress Party. It is therefore notable that both the Progress Party and parts of the United Sunni Leadership Coalition have called for political action to protest the Federal Supreme Court decision. Some Sunni politicians have accused State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki of pushing the Federal Supreme Court to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[6] Maliki previously used the court to target political opposition, particularly Sunnis, during his term as prime minister between May 2006 and September 2014.[7] Maliki’s rumored involvement in the Federal Supreme Court decision is consistent with recent sectarian, anti-Sunni statements he has made.[8] Maliki stated on February 1 that “we will not allow terrorists to leave prisons,” about the individuals who would be released from prison under the General Amnesty Law. Iranian-backed actors have claimed that the General Amnesty Law would release ”terrorists” and ”murderers” into society to try to prevent the approval and implementation of this law. [9]There are early indications of fissures between Iran-backed Shia political parties and figures ahead of the parliamentary elections in October 2025. Iraqi media reported on February 6 that the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework appears “divided” due to an ongoing dispute between Maliki and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim.[10] The dispute is reportedly over Maliki’s outsized influence in the Shia Coordination Framework and the removal of the Dhi Qar governor, who is a member of Hakim’s party. Iraqi media reported on January 30 that Hakim has boycotted several Shia Coordination Framework meetings because Maliki orchestrated the removal of the Dhi Qar governor.[11] Unidentified sources told Iraqi media on February 6 that Shia Coordination Framework members discussed unifying Shia factions and resolving tensions with Hakim on February 5.[12] Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani reportedly convinced Hakim to resume his participation in Shia Coordination Framework meetings in return for the appointment of Hakim-backed figures to government positions.Syrian interim government forces have deployed to areas previously controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) as armed factions have started to integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. Interim government security forces deployed to Afrin and Jandairis, north of Aleppo, on February 6.[13] The SNA has controlled and administered these areas since 2018.[14] Kurdish media claimed that the interim government would take control of SNA territory and dismantle barracks and other military infrastructure in the area.[15] Interim government-affiliated Public Security forces deployed to checkpoints near the entrances to Manbij, Aleppo Province, on February 5, demonstrating that the deployment of interim government forces extends across SNA-controlled territory.[16]These interim government deployments will likely continue as former opposition groups integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry. It is unclear how extensive the integration of armed groups across Syria will be or the pace at which this integration will occur. It is also unclear to what extent groups that integrate into the Defense Ministry will subordinate themselves to largely HTS-dominated command structures. Syrian media circulated reports on February 3 that the Syrian Defense Ministry appointed two SNA leaders as division commanders within the new Syrian armed forces.[17] It is unclear if these commanders will recruit their divisions directly from their militias. The Syrian interim government said that it dissolved all former rebel and armed groups, including factions of the SNA, on January 29, but the fact that SNA groups continue to fight against the SDF along the Euphrates River suggests that the SNA groups have been dissolved in name only.[18] The interim government deployments come after Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, on February 4.[19] Turkey closely coordinates with and provides air support to the SNA. Shara and Erdogan may have discussed the integration of SNA factions into the new Syrian armed forces.Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 6 to prepare a plan for the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.[20] Katz said that the plan will include “special arrangements” for Gazans to relocate to “any country willing to receive them" via air, sea, or land. Katz discussed the plan with senior Israeli defense officials, including IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi.[21] Katz’s statement comes after US President Donald Trump suggested that Gazans should relocate to Egypt and Jordan.[22]US President Donald Trump said on February 6 that the Gaza Strip should be “turned over” to the United States by Israel after the “conclusion of fighting.”[23] Trump suggested that Gazans could relocate to other areas in the Middle East while the United States rebuilds the Gaza Strip. Trump said that no US troops would participate in this plan.Key Takeaways:Iraqi Politics: Many of the most prominent Iraqi Sunni political parties have emphasized the need for political action to achieve long-standing Sunni political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki is attempting to block Sunni political action, which has caused some Sunni political parties to threaten additional political moves, including demonstrations.Control of Syria: Syrian interim government forces have deployed to areas previously controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) as armed factions have started to integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. These interim government deployments will likely continue as former opposition groups integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 6 to prepare a plan for the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. US President Donald Trump said on February 6 that the Gaza Strip should be “turned over” to the United States by Israel after the “conclusion of fighting.”SyriaThe HTS-led interim government is attempting to secure sanctions relief. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed sanctions relief in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron on February 5, which is part of a broader effort by Shara and his government to secure sanctions relief for Syria.[24] Macron invited Shara to visit France in the coming weeks.[25] French shipping company CGM-CMA signed an agreement with the interim government on February 5 to manage container operations at Latakia Port.[26] The European Union previously approved a “road map” to lift select sanctions on Syria for one year on January 27.[27]The SDF has engaged SNA forces and positions near the Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 5. The SDF seized an SNA position at Tal Syriatel, northwest of Tishreen Dam, on February 5.[28] The SNA previously seized Tal Syriatel from the SDF on January 10.[29] The SNA used its position on the hill to fire at SDF positions near the dam.[30] The SDF also reported that its forces targeted a gathering of SNA fighters north of the dam.[31] The SDF fired rockets and mortars targeting likely SNA positions in the SNA-controlled villages of Aloush, al Saideen, al Balasha, and al Kadro, near the Tishreen Dam.[32]The SDF conducted two separate operations targeting SNA fighters on Qara Qozak Hill and Nawruz Hill on February 6.[33] The operations wounded three SNA fighters.[34]The SDF reported that Turkey continued to conduct air and drone strikes targeting SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam on February 6.[35] Turkish drones targeted an SDF position near Khirbet Tueni, likely in support of SNA operations in the area.[36] The strike killed an SDF fighter.[37]Turkey and the SNA have continued to target SDF positions along key supply lines to the western bank of the Euphrates River since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 5. Turkish drones struck an SDF position near Ain Issa on February 6.[38] Turkey and the SNA conducted airstrikes and fired artillery targeting SDF positions along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[39] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Turkish and SNA attacks on SDF ground lines of communication are meant to interdict supplies and reinforcements from eastern Syria and isolate SDF forces at Qara Qozak Bridge and Tishreen Dam.[40]HTS-led Syrian interim government border security forces engaged Lebanese smugglers roughly 16 kilometers northeast of Qusayr, Homs Province, during a counter-smuggling operation on February 6.[41] The smugglers kidnapped two HTS fighters during the operation in Hawik, Homs Province. Lebanese smugglers are reportedly part of a Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated smuggling network run by internationally sanctioned drug lord Nouh Zaiter.[42] Zaiter’s smuggling network cooperated on the Lebanon-Syria border with the Assad regime to smuggle Captagon.[43] The Syrian Department of Military Operations deployed to Hawik, northeast of Qusayr, following the kidnapping incident.[44] Geolocated footage posted on February 6 appears to show Department of Military Operations vehicles and a tank entering Lebanese territory.[45] Unverified reports claimed that Department of Military Operations forces engaged Lebanese smugglers near Hermel, Lebanon.[46] Hermel is 10 kilometers south of the Syria-Lebanon border and 16 kilometers south of Hawik. Syrian media reported that the Department of Military Operations forces also launched clearing operations in Syrian border towns to target drug smugglers.[47] Syrian forces arrested around 18 Lebanese smugglers during the operations.[48]A former Republican Guard commander, Muqdad Fatiha (also known as Abu Jaafar), announced the formation of a new anti-HTS armed group named the Shield of the Coast Brigade on February 6.[49] The group threatened to conduct attacks on Syrian government forces in retaliation for alleged attacks on members of the Alawite community. The Assad regime attempted to establish a Shield of the Coast Brigade under the Republican Guard in 2015 to guard Alawite communities against Syrian opposition attacks.[50] The Republican Guard was an elite force that was responsible for protecting the Assad regime against internal threats.[51] Muqdad Fatiha likely established the Shield of the Coast Brigade using resources and human networks developed under the Assad regime.IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentTurkey conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions in Sulaymaniyah Province, northern Iraq, on February 6. The Kurdistan Regional Government reported that Turkish drones struck two vehicles and a PKK site near Galala village, killing an unspecified military official and two PKK fighters.[52] Kurdish and Iraqi media reported that Turkish drones also struck several areas near Sharbazar, causing damage and casualties.[53]Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov met with senior Iraqi and Kurdish officials on February 5 and 6. Bogdanov met with Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri in Baghdad on February 5 and Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government President Nechirvan Barzani in Erbil on February 6.[54] Bogdanov and Ameri discussed recent developments in Syria and strengthening relations between Iraq and Russia.[55] Bogdanov and Barzani separately discussed strengthening relations between Russia and Iraqi Kurdistan, including Russian investment in Iraqi Kurdistan’s energy sector.[56]Iranian Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on February 5 and 6. Zarif discussed strengthening coordination between Iran and Iraq to strengthen international security and stability in a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[57] Zarif separately discussed regional developments and opportunities to improve regional stability in meetings with National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim, Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid, and UN Special Representative for Iraq Mohammad al Hassan.[58]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripNothing significant to report.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripUS Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the United States will continue to deliver munitions to Israel to help it confront adversaries.[59] Hegseth previously approved the delivery of 1,800 2,000-pound bombs to Israel on January 25.[60]LebanonLebanese media reported on February 6 that the IDF demolished infrastructure in Kfar Kila, southeastern Lebanon.[61] West BankThe IDF continued its counterterrorism operation in Nablus and Tubas governorates in the northern West Bank on February 6.[62] The IDF destroyed an explosives manufacturing site and detained two Palestinian militia fighters in Nablus.[63] The IDF detained at least 25 fighters and located weapons, weapons laboratories, and explosives in Tammun and Fara, Tubas Governorate.[64]The Shin Bet announced on February 6 that it previously arrested a cell of Hamas and Fatah fighters who planned to conduct a “bomb attack” targeting a bus in Jerusalem in November and December 2024.[65] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the cell of five operatives was based in the Ramallah area.[66] Ramallah is located around 10 kilometers north of Jerusalem. The Shin Bet confiscated a makeshift automatic weapon and an explosive device that the fighters planned to detonate remotely.[67]Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy unveiled the Shahid Bahman Bagheri drone carrier in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on February 6.[68] The drone carrier is a modified commercial vessel, and it can reportedly support long-range drone operations. The IRGC Navy also unveiled the Ghaher drone, which looks visually similar to the Ghaher-313 fighter jet that Iran unveiled in February 2013.[69] The IRGC Navy did not prove that the drone was operable. The Shahid Bahman Bagheri can host drones and helicopters. The vessel carries eight anti-ship cruise missiles and Kowsar air defense missiles. IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri claimed that the drone carrier has a 22,000-mile operational range and can remain at sea for up to a year without refueling. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami stated that Iran developed the Shahid Bahman Bagheri drone carrier to extend Iran’s defense capabilities far beyond its borders.[70]The US Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned an international shipping network on February 6 that has facilitated “hundreds of millions of dollars” worth of Iranian crude oil exports to China.[71] OFAC sanctioned seven Hong Kong, China, India, and Seychelles-based companies, five Iranian nationals, one Indian national, and five multinational vessels. All of the sanctioned entities and members of the network falsified maritime documents on behalf of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff’s front company, Sepehr Energy. OFAC previously sanctioned Sepehr Energy in November 2023 for supporting the Iranian Defense Ministry.[72]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. 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https://x.com/AlawiteLeague/status/1887449211714650226 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1887472607311634807 ; https://x.com/anasanas84/status/1887454082652082413[50] https://www.syria dot tv/%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88 ; https://syrianobserver dot com/syrian-actors/regime_announces_formation_coast_shield_brigade.html ; https://joshualandis dot com/blog/the-coastal-shield-brigade-a-new-pro-assad-militia/ ; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/insight-syrian-insurgents-carve-out-fiefdoms-in-de-facto-partition-idUSKCN0P91J4/[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SyrianArmy-DocOOB.pdf[52] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ckb/story/823490/%D8%AF%DA%98%DB%95%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%86%D8%B1%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%DB%95%D9%87%DB%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%DB%86%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%A8%DB%95%D8%B1%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8E%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%B3%DB%95%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%88-%DA%86%DB%95%DA%A9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%95%DA%A9%DB%95%DA%A9%DB%95-%DA%A9%D9%88%DA%98%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86[53] https://baghdadtoday dot news/267425-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%DA%98%DB%8E%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9.html[54] https://t.me/platformB/3386; https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/060220253 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AB%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85[55] https://t.me/platformB/3386[56] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/060220253 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AB%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85[57] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%81-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A[58] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6370318/ ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6370136 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%81-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A[59] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4055561/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-greets-israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netany/[60] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/25/trump-israel-bomb-shipment-hold-gaza[61] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113351[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1887476976731971680 ; https://www.idf dot il/268462[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1887476976731971680[64] https://www.idf dot il/268462[65] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1887458387241165232 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1887465860895285650[66] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1887465860895285650[67] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/shin-bet-says-it-foiled-jerusalem-bus-bombing-late-last-year/[68] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/18/3252456[69] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/18/3252524;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/11/30/2855590[70] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/18/3252459[71] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0015[72] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1932
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2025
- Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, and George BarrosFebruary 6, 2025, 6:30 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on February 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and north and east of Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and seized Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya Konopelka) and Fanaseyevka (just southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in several waves in the direction of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok (southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka along the 38K-028 highway) with up to two mechanized battalions' worth of armored vehicles and that Russian forces repelled the attack.[2] Russian milbloggers estimated that Ukrainian forces attacked with 30 to 50 armored vehicles and claimed that one group of Ukrainian forces successfully attacked from Makhnovka towards Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok and that Russian forces repelled another Ukrainian group that attacked from Dmitriukov (just east of Makhnovka) towards Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha).[3] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Cherkasskaya Konopelka, but two other milbloggers denied this claim.[4] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through to or even seized Ulanok, but other sources also denied these claims.[5] ISW has not yet observed geolocated evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces are operating in Ulanok. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 6 indicating that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in a forested area southwest of Kurilovka.[6]A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Kruglenkoye (northwest of Sudzha), but ISW did not observe additional claims of Ukrainian activity in this area or north of Sudzha near Berdin where Ukrainian forces attacked in early January 2025.[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attacks southeast of Sudzha during poor weather conditions that complicated Russian drone operations in the area.[8] Some Russian milbloggers expressed concern that further Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast could threaten rear areas of the Russian force grouping attacking Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and complicate Russia's ability to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) within the Ukrainian salient.[9] Russian sources acknowledged that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and Chechen Akhmat drone operators are the main forces defending against the Ukrainian attacks southeast of Sudzha.[10] Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations defending in Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024. Putin stated during a meeting with acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 106th VDV Division, 76th VDV Division, and other Russian forces are still operating in Kursk Oblast and will be rewarded for their service in the future.[11] Putin's statement underlines the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned elements of these relatively elite formations in Kursk Oblast for the last six months, depriving Russia of the opportunity to redeploy these forces to higher priority areas of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[12] ISW recently noted that the Russian military command has gathered around 78,000 troops, including 11,000 North Koreans and elements of most of Russia's elite VDV and naval infantry formations, to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[13] Putin has yet to prioritize expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast over continuing his gradual advances in Donetsk Oblast and continues to drag out the liberation of Kursk's border areas, despite domestic discontent.Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) commemorated the milestone on February 6 by acknowledging that small SSO units infiltrated Russia's rear in Kursk Oblast as early as June 2024 — two months before the main incursion began in August 2024.[14] The SSO forces advanced behind Russian lines in Kursk Oblast to prepare for the Ukrainian incursion, conducting reconnaissance and targeted strikes to dismantle key elements of Russia's border defenses. The SSO noted that Ukrainian forces systematically destroyed Russian air defense and ammunition depots, limiting Russia's ability to respond to the Ukrainian incursion. The SSO also provided a detailed account of the operation and the technological adaptations the Ukrainian forces employed during the Kursk incursion. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also awarded honors to the Ukrainian personnel involved in the Kursk incursion for the anniversary, offering the first official Ukrainian statement regarding a comprehensive composition of Ukraine's force deployment in Kursk Oblast.[15] Zelensky reiterated that the incursion aimed to prevent a new Russian offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Zelensky noted that the Kursk incursion reinforced his "peace through strength" principle, provided Ukraine with a significant replenishment of POW "exchange funds," and forced Russia to divert elite military units to Kursk Oblast — impairing Russian operations elsewhere along the front. Ukrainian officials have previously noted that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled several Russian plans to attack northern Ukraine and complicated Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations in northern Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[16]A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) released results on February 6 of a survey of 1,600 Russians conducted from January 28 to February 2, showing that 67 percent of the people polled support Russia’s war in Ukraine and that 65 percent believe that the war is "going well" for Russia.[17] VCIOM’s Political Research Director Mikhail Mamonov stated that the public demands a swift, favorable conclusion to the war and supports measures that advance these goals while resenting Russian setbacks like the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast incursion, slow territorial gains, and economic hardship. VCIOM’s findings likely reflect Kremlin views and narratives and likely inflate the level of public support for the war, however. These results come amid rising casualties, Russian command controversies, and immense economic strain on the Russian economy during the war.[18] Successful renewed Ukrainian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast may also negatively impact the Russian public’s view of the war in the coming weeks.North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities. Reuters, citing two Ukrainian military-affiliated sources, reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have shown significantly improved accuracy.[19] These North Korean missiles, previously accurate within 1 to 3 kilometers, can now strike within 50 to 100 meters of their intended targets. One Ukrainian source noted that Russia has launched over 20 North Korean missiles in recent weeks, all demonstrating enhanced precision. Reuters’ sources speculated that North Korea may have upgraded the navigation systems of its missiles, incorporated new steering mechanisms, or received improved targeting data and guidance components from Russia, although the exact modifications remain unclear. The North Korean missiles not only serve to bolster Russia’s arsenal but also likely allow North Korea to refine its capabilities for possible future military operations elsewhere. Other Russian allies, such as Iran, likely can improve their strike systems’ performance by leveraging Russia’s lessons learned from operations in Ukraine.Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base, causing an explosion and resulting in a fire at the facility.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces use the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base to store, prepare, and launch Shahed drones against Ukraine and to conduct maintenance for aircraft operating over occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of the explosion at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk air base.[21]Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on February 6 that France transferred an unspecified number of French Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets to Ukraine — the first batch of Mirage jets Ukraine has received.[22] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6, 2024 that France would provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train several pilots to operate the jets.[23] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on February 6 that the Netherlands recently delivered an unspecified number of US-made F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine.[24]Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.[25] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 6 that Bakanov's appointment is part of a regular personnel rotation.[26] Several Russian milbloggers characterized the reshuffling, however, as a result of Kremlin officials' dissatisfaction with Roscosmos's underperformance under Borisov's leadership, including Borisov's inability to accelerate the development of a full-fledged portable satellite communications system for the Russian military by 2026.[27] A Russian insider source noted that Borisov served as Deputy Minister of Defense under former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu from 2018-2022 and was one of the last remaining nodes of Shoigu's patronal network that controlled the Russian Ministry of Defense prior to widespread arrests of Ministry of Defense officials in Summer 2024.[28] Bakanov previously served as the head of Russia's Gonets communication satellite program from 2011-2019.[29] Gonets is a possible civilian analogue to Western Starlink terminals.[30]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations defending Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024.Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion.A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges.North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities.Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and recaptured lost positions near Kurakhove.Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.Russian authorities continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian military personnel likely to support ongoing recruitment efforts. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationSee topline text for reports of battlefield activity in Kursk Oblast and Ukrainian strikes in Russia.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City along the international border near Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 5 and 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional fighting is ongoing in Vovchansk itself and east of Vovchansk near Tykhe.[32] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are amassing forces north of Kharkiv City near northern Lyptsi to prepare for future Russian attacks.Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 5 that Russian forces advanced the fields south of Hlyboke (northeast of Kharkiv City).[33] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 6. Russian forces continued attacking east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 5 and 6.[34]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the west bank of the Oskil River along the O-210921 highway, into Fyholivka (northeast of Kupyansk and north of Dvorichna), and seized the settlement.[35] Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 5 and 6 that Russian forces advanced north, northwest, and south of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk); crossed the Oskil River near Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk and along the international border) and consolidated positions on the west (right) bank of the river; and advanced south and southwest of Topoli.[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are developing an offensive south of Zapadne alongside the Oskil River.[37] The milblogger claimed that small groups of Russian forces are attempting to encircle Ukrainian forces in Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk). A Ukrainian brigade commander operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to create a bridgehead on the banks of the Oskil River but have failed to make significant advances in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) thus far.[38] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to attack near Dvorichna.[39] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army ([GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk.[40]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 6 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Pishchane, Zahryzove, Kolisnykivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Lozova; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and Kopanky; and southeast of Borovva near Novoyehorivka, Novoserhiivka, and Hrekivka on February 5 and 6.[41]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Zahryzove and advanced west of Lozova and south and west of Zelenyi Hai.[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Ukrainian forces damaged a Russian tank and two armored vehicles transporting Russian infantry to forward positions near Zahryzove.[43] The Khortytsia Group of Forces also stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed four tanks and two armored vehicles involved in a Russian assault near Kopanky.[44]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 6 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking north of Lyman near Nove and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on February 5 and 6.[45]A Ukrainian battalion officer operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces use a large number of drones, including fiber-optic drones, in the Lyman direction in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics routes. The battalion officer stated that Russian forces bring in reinforcements of 30 to 40 personnel weekly in the direction, which the officer stated suggests that Russian forces may be preparing for a larger-scale offensive operation in the area.[46] The officer noted that Terny, Ivanovka (northeast of Lyman), and the Serebryanske forest area (east of Lyman) are the most active areas of the frontline in this direction.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Shram" Group reportedly continue operating in the Lyman direction.[47]|Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 6 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on February 5 and 6.[48] Ukraine's Khortytsia Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces are using armored vehicles, civilian vehicles, and motorcycles to transport personnel near Verkhnokamyanske.[49] Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 2nd Guards Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Verkhnokamyanske.[50]Russian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and to the south near Stupochky on February 5 and 6.[51] Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of the central Refractory Plant in Chasiv Yar and likely seized the remainder of the Refractory Plant.[52]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northward to the fields north of Pivnichnyi Microraion in Chasiv Yar and westward to the fields south of Chasiv Yar.[53] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces forced Ukrainian forces out of the Avanhard Stadium in central Chasiv Yar.[54] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on February 6 that Russian forces are accumulating forces in northern Chasiv Yar and noted that Russian forces are concentrating manpower in the Pivichnyi Microraion and no longer have to move through the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal's pipes.[55] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are using more four-wheelers and buggies in the area and noted that Ukrainian forces destroyed at least 10 units of Russian armored vehicles in January 2025. Successful and costly Ukrainian strikes against Russian armored vehicles in the area may have prompted Russian forces to use less-costly, alternative modes of transport more frequently. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian forces defending the T-05-04 highway and preparing to attack along the highway toward Stupochky.[56]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment and of the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[57]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 6 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 5 and 6.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing for the waste heap west of the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk.[59] Order of Battle: Elements of the "Maksim Krivonos" volunteer detachment, allegedly formed by former members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who defected to fight for Russia, are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[60]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk on February 6 but did not advance. Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Uspenivka, Sribne, and Zaporizhzhia on February 5 and 6.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked with armored vehicle support near Pishchane and Nadiivka.[62] Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Kotlyne towards Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), northeast of Pishchane and Udachne, north and south of Nadiivka, and in the fields north of Arkhanhelske (east of Pokrovsk) and Vidrozhennya (south of Porkovsk, formerly Novyi Trud).[63]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces lost 7,000 killed in action (KIA) and 15,000 wounded in action (WIA) in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025.[64]Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are attacking towards Zaporizhzhia (west of Sribne).[65]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced west of Kurakhove amid ongoing offensive operations in the area on February 6. Russian forces continued attacks northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka, west of Kurakhove near Dachne and Kostyantynopil, and southwest of Kurakhove near Ulakly on February 5 and 6.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking towards the H-15 Kurakhove-Pokrovske highway and Bahatyr (further west of Kurakhove) while trying to seize positions along the highway, but that Ukrainian forces have thus far repelled these attacks.[67] Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[68]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) recently advanced into northwestern Dachne, seized Dachne, and likely pushed Ukrainian forces from positions in the fields immediately north and south of the settlement.[69]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing in central and northern Andriivka, southeast of Kostyantynopil, and along the T-0515 Kostyantynopil-Pokrovsk highway between Andriivka and Kostyantynopil.[70] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized a bridge (likely the bridge over the Vovcha River near Andriivka) along the T-0515 highway.[71]Russian forces continued assault northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on February 5 and 6 but did not advance in the area.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka).[73]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Velyka Novosilka.[74]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Polohy direction on February 6.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[75]Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 6, but Russian forces did not advance.[76] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces published footage on February 5 of Ukrainian forces destroying a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in an unspecified location in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, likely referring to the same strike that the Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 6 that Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian Starlink terminals in Zaporizhia Oblast.[78]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on February 6. Russian Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Habr" drone detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Antonivka (immediately east of Kherson City).[79]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 77 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast and two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 56 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Vinnytsia oblasts; that 18 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Cherkasy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian officials stated on February 5 and 6 that Russian drones struck a market in Kyivskyi raion, Kharkiv City, causing a fire at a nearby pavilion and that a Russian drone struck a residential building in Saltivskyi raion, Kharkiv City.[81] BBC Russia reported on February 5 that a Russian missiles strike struck a residential building in Odesa raion, Odesa Oblast.[82]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian authorities continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian military personnel likely to support ongoing recruitment efforts. Russian State Duma deputy Igor Antropenko proposed simplifying the process for relatives of Rosgvardia personnel to obtain military service certificates recognizing their relatives' service in Ukraine in a document addressed to Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov on February 6.[83] Russian personnel must have these certificates to receive social benefits as veterans of the war. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on February 6 that improves social benefits to veterans who served in the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic (DNR and LNR) militias, including pensions for personnel wounded in combat, disability pensions without applications, and paying pensions to relatives of deceased personnel.[84]Russian milbloggers complained on February 6 that Russian personnel first mobilized during the Fall 2022 partial reserve call up have low morale. A milblogger complained that allowing Russian mobilized personnel to take temporary leave would improve their morale and claimed that Russia has enough contract personnel to completely demobilize these personnel but that Russia will not demobilize these troops until after the war.[85] A second milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor disagreed, claiming that the Russian military command wants to get rid of all mobilized personnel in costly, infantry assaults in Ukraine.[86] The second milblogger claimed that the Russian "Dnepr" and Southern groupings of forces ordered frontline commanders to "agitate" these personnel to persuade them to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to inflate recruitment numbers and avoid paying mobilized personnel for injuries and deaths.Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on February 6 that it analyzed Russian dog tag numbers with the prefix "AB" and determined that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruited roughly 30,000 penal recruits for "Storm-Z" units from roughly 108 penal colonies from February to August 2023.[87]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. 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https://t.me/otukharkiv/4146 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23511 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23505[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23505[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl[35] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25404; https://t.me/rubak112/146[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23487; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85718; https://t.me/tass_agency/299325[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23487[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/06/berut-doshhechky-lyagayut-i-plyvut-yak-rosiyany-namagayutsya-forsuvaty-oskil-i-shho-z-togo-vyhodyt/[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85718; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85720[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153678[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23487[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4982[44] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4982[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/06/zayihav-czikavishyj-pidrozdil-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-rizhe-logistychni-arteriyi/[47] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18766; https://t.me/epoddubny/22375; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5468[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl[49] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4982[50] https://t.me/epoddubny/22378[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24669 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20951[52] https://x.com/Noobieshunta_/status/1887543794783916130 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1887533081080324179[53] https://t.me/yurasumy/20951/ ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23500[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85734 [55] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/06/protyvnyk-zrobyv-try-prohody-v-kanali-v-chasovomu-yaru-vorog-atakuye-z-pivnochi-na-pivden/[56] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85734 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20951[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23499 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23499 ; https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/6053[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24669[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23502[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85731[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61935 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63936 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153779 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20949[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61935 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20947 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20948[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61935 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20949 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20948 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20947[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/06/sim-tysyach-zagyblyh-za-misyacz-pid-pokrovskom-zagynulo-bilshe-rosiyan-nizh-pid-chas-drugoyi-chechenskoyi-vijny/[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85714[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61932 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20946[68] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25397 ; https://fb.watch/xAvUPwT8J3/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8297[69] https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/1887497852726702145; https://t.me/wargonzo/24686; https://x.com/SimonMarek66/status/1887455135338471662[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61932 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153779[71] https://t.me/yurasumy/20946[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl[73] https://t.me/wargonzo/24669 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153779[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/13239[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/13237[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/24669[77] https://t.me/usf_army/386; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/941997-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-sili-bezpilotnih-sistem-znisili-zrk-buk-m3-armii-rf/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20595[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/63936[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23506[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/28224[81] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2113; https://t.me/synegubov/12998; https://t.me/synegubov/12997 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13002 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2116[82] https://t.me/bbcrussian/76233 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8489;[83] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23065741[84] https://t.me/government_rus/18675[85] https://t.me/vault8pro/52368[86] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1964; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1965[87] https://t.me/istories_media/8905; https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/stories/2025/02/06/v-otryadi-shtorm-z-mogli-zaverbovat-do-29-tisyach-zaklyuchennikh/index.html
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2025
- Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans,and George BarrosFebruary 8, 2025, 5:00pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:40am ET on February 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and mass-producing various types of drones in exchange for North Korean forces supporting Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.[1] NHK noted that Russia remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons, fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on February 8 that Russia is specifically spreading modern technology to North Korea, including drone technology, and told Reuters on February 7 that thousands of North Korean troops have returned to active combat in Kursk Oblast after a brief pause.[2] A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast published a video on February 8 reportedly showing North Korean forces conducting assaults alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[3] South Korean sources recently reported that Russia withdrew North Korean troops from the battlefield in Kursk Oblast in mid-January 2025, possibly for rest and reconstitution or to rethink how Russia is using these troops.[4] ISW assesses that North Korea is using the war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its own military capabilities.[5] Reuters reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have demonstrated significantly improved accuracy, likely an example of North Korean capability enhancement gained through the North Korea-Russia alliance.[6]Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that Russian forces are forming new military divisions, building additional defense-industrial base (DIB) facilities, planning to increase military personnel by over 100,000 soldiers, and deepening military cooperations with North Korea.[7] Then–Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that Russia would create 14 new military divisions, but ISW is unable to assess whether Zelensky is referring to these previously announced plans or the creation of additional new divisions.[8] ISW also cannot verify the status of the formation of the 14 divisions Shoigu previously announced. Zelensky highlighted that Russia's force-generation, restructuring, and defense-production efforts make it clear that Putin is not interested in negotiations with Ukraine and seeks to continue Russia’s war.[9] Such Russian plans suggest that Russia, not Ukraine, is the party refusing good-faith negotiations and actively pushing for protracted war rather than peace, while also setting conditions to prepare for a potential broader conflict with NATO.[10] Russian officials and information space have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as a part of a larger confrontation with the West.[11]The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025. A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment (possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[12] ISW has not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February 8, however.[13] A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.[14]The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU). Western sources reported on February 7 and 8 that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania disconnected from the centralized Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (BRELL) energy network on February 8 as part of a long-planned effort to integrate more closely with the EU and strengthen regional security.[15] The three countries are temporarily operating independently from the grid and, pending final tests, will synchronize with the EU’s grid on February 9. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas wrote on X (formerly Twitter) on February 7 that this move ensures Russia can no longer use energy as a “tool of blackmail”- something Russia has repeatedly leveraged against countries reliant on Russian energy, including Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine.[16] Russia’s Ministry of Energy reported on February 8 that Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast, located on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, has also transitioned to autonomous power generation as a result of the Baltic states' decision.[17] Kaliningrad Oblast possesses three gas-fueled and one coal-fired power plant and can reportedly generate a total capacity of 1.88 gigawatts, which the Russian Ministry of Energy claimed is more than twice Kaliningrad's peak energy consumption.[18] It is unclear if Kaliningrad’s transition to autonomous power generation will impact daily life or Russian military activity in the region.Key Takeaways:Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU).Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces maintain positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) amid ongoing activity in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka, Cherkasskaya Konopelka, and Fanaseyevka and that Russian forces are clearing nearby forested areas.[19] Two Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces control Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, but another milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces both maintain positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[20]Russian-assessed advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces maintain positions in southern Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha).[21]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions at the Lotos gas station along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway southeast of Sudzha.[22] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from strongholds near Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha).[23]ORBAT: Drone operators of the Chechen "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[24] Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), and "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating southeast of Sudzha.[25] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are operating near Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[26] Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat-Russia" Motorized Rifle Regiment, Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion, the "Grom" detachment, and Rosgvardia’s 116th Special Purpose “Stalhaya" Brigade are operating in Kursk's border areas.[27]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported on February 7 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group consisting of 13 personnel and partially pushed them back over the international Ukraine-Russia border near Serednya-Buda, Sumy Oblast.[28]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 8 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 7 and 8.[29]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 8. Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 7 and 8.[30] A Ukrainian brigade reported that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) unsuccessfully conducted an at least company-sized mechanized assault near Pershotraveneve (east of Kupyansk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 10 armored vehicles during the assault.[31]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west and northeast of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[32]Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces only occupy some areas in the northern part of the settlement.[33]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), with support from elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps, are operating near Dvorichna and advanced 250 to 300 meters southward along the Oskil River towards Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[34] Elements of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[35]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 8 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahyrzove and Lovoza, east of Borova near Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka on February 7 and 8.[36] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces attacked Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) with one tank and three armored personnel carriers and that Ukrainian forces destroyed the vehicles.[37] A Ukrainian regiment reported that Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Lozova direction on the morning of February 7 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two infantry fighting vehicles and one tank during the assault.[38]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are operating near Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[39] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are also reportedly operating near Makiivka.[40]Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 8. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Novolyubivka and towards Nove on February 7 and 8.[41]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman) and seized the fields east of the settlement.[42] Mashovets reported on February 8 that Russian forces recently seized Terny (northeast of Lyman).[43]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman).[44]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 8 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 7 and 8.[45]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 8 that Russian forces attacked near Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanske with motorized and armored vehicle support and that Ukrainian forces destroyed five armored personnel carriers and 11 motorcycles during the attack.[46] A Ukrainian brigade commander operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces use tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, buggies, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to attack when frozen ground provides more stable terrain and favor smaller infantry assaults in warmer weather when softer soil makes vehicle movement more difficult.[47]Ukrainian forces recently regain lost positions in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the direction on February 8. Russian forces continued attacking within and near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Bila Hora on February 7 and 8.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continues in Shevchenko and Tsekh No. 2 microraions in southern Chasiv Yar and that Russian forces are concentrating attacks towards the T-0504 highway.[49]Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced along the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway south of Chasiv Yar.[50]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 8 that Russian forces advanced in an area 3.5 kilometers wide and over 1.5 kilometers in depth south of Chasiv Yar and seized the Stupki and Krinichki tracts in the area.[51] The milblogger noted that Russian forces continue to clear Novopivnichnyi Microraion (western Chasiv Yar) and positions south of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1065th Airborne (VDV) Artillery Regiment, 299th VDV Regiment, and the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[52]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the direction on February 8. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk and northeast of Toretsk near Krymske on February 7 and 8.[53]Russian assessed advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Kuzanva, Molodoi Hvardii, and Zhovtneva streets in northern Toretsk.[54]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigades (all part of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are conducting clearing operations in Toretsk, Druzhba (east of Toretsk), and Krymske and that Russian forces are only 10 kilometers away from Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk and southwest of Chasiv Yar).[55] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.A Russian milblogger claimed on February 8 that Ukrainian forces hold isolated defensive positions in Toretsk and that Russian forces may spend several weeks clearing Ukrainian forces from the town.[56] A Ukrainian brigade officer operating in Toretsk reported on February 8 that his units are holding in their positions in Toretsk.[57]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Toretsk.[58]Ukrainian military officials reported on February 8 that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft on the outskirts of Toretsk.[59] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Ukrainian forces also likely used first-person view (FPV) drones to damage a Russian Mi-8 helicopter that tried to evacuate the Su-25 pilot.[60] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces used Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) to down the plane.[61]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 8. Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novooleksandrivka, Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Uspenivka, Kotlyne Pishchane, Nadiivka, Udachne, Novoserhiivka, and Zaporizhzhia on February 7 and 8.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne, Kotlyne and Pishchane.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Kotlyne.[64]Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 8 indicating that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novokalynove and in central Baranivka (both east of Pokrovsk).[65]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups and are conducting fewer mechanized assaults due to foggy weather conditions.[66] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that the number of Russian assaults south of Pokrovsk has decreased but that fighting remains intense.[67] The officer stated that Russian forces are trying to reach the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway that runs west of Pokrovsk.Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) suffered significant losses south and southwest of Pokrovsk and that the Russian military command replaced the brigade with part of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD).[68] Mashovets stated that elements of the 433rd and 506th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA), 239th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA), 87th Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division), and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk. Mashovets stated that elements of the 6th and 80th tank regiments and 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (all of the 90th Tank Division) are operating along the Nadiivka-Sribne line southwest of Pokrovsk.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 8 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil; south of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka on February 7 and 8.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in western and northwestern Andriivka.[70]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy central Andriivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[71]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 67th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division) are operating on the eastern outskirts of Andriivka and that elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) are operating along the Shevchenko-Andriivka line.[72] Elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[73] See topline text for additional details about the evolving order of battle in the Kurakhove direction and how the Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction. Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on January 8 but did not advance.[74]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 8 but Russian forces did not advance.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked with armored vehicle support near Stepove and Kamyanske (both northwest of Robotyne).[76]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Kherson direction on February 8. Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[77]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 7 and 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 139 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 67 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Odesa oblasts and that 71 decoy drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[79]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military. Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed on February 8 the Russian Cabinet of Ministers and the Prosecutor General’s Office to take measures to preserve government entitlements granting Russian military personnel fighting in the war to live in government housing.[80]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www3.nhk.or dot jp/nhkworld/en/news/20250208_05/ ; https://t.me/istories_media/8924 https://t.me/bbcrussian/76348[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/zelenskiy-says-lets-do-deal-offering-trump-mineral-partnership-seeking-security-2025-02-07/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13270 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/putin-gotuyetsya-zovsim-ne-do-peremovyn-prezydent-zustrivsya-z-novym-glavoyu-vijskovogo-komitetu-nato/[3] https://t.me/brygada47/1228[4] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250204006600315?section=nk/nk; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2025[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2025; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sees-marked-improvement-accuracy-russias-north-korean-missiles-2025-02-06/[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13270 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/putin-gotuyetsya-zovsim-ne-do-peremovyn-prezydent-zustrivsya-z-novym-glavoyu-vijskovogo-komitetu-nato/[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023[9] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13270[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2024[12] https://t.me/supernova_plus/35958 ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/02/08/poka-vs-rf-gotovyat-novye-nastupleniya-vsu-poshli-v-kontrataku-v-kurskoy-oblasti-i-u-pokrovska-udalos-li-im-ottesnit-rossiyskie-voyska[13] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31930;[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lithuania-cuts-russian-power-grid-ties-baltics-prepare-link-with-eu-2025-02-08/ ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/baltics-brace-cut-decades-old-ties-russian-grid-2025-02-07/ ; https://www.freiheit.org/era-russian-energy-manipulations-over ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/08/baltic-states-leave-russian-power-grid-in-closer-eu-integration[16] https://x.com/kajakallas/status/1887762594779279740[17] https://t.me/MID_Russia/51765[18] https://www.euractiv dot com/section/eet/news/baltic-grid-divorce-will-further-isolate-russian-exclave-in-the-eu/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/51765[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/64174 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31951; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4120 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24714 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20703[20] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21836 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31924 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20995[21] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1888001111598186867; https://t.me/dshp78/290[22] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31924[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/64150[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/299716 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85877 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23567 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153885[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85854; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85857 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31951; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4120 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20685[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/64146[27] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5473 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5474[28] https://www.facebook.com/sumska.oda/posts/pfbid037FyVvYpGHwzj7sy6XkrXsxrRjPuss4tqPQwvqAdiV2fs2swHdt8SQK1UDjwMy8z8l?ref=embed_post ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/943601-castkovo-znisena-ukrainski-vijskovi-vidbili-rosijsku-drg-na-sumsini-ova/[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060[31] https://t.me/ab3army/5208[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8334; https://www.facebook.com/151OMBr/videos/1129442275638345/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8337; https://t.me/ceroke24/1954[33] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2545[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2545[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153912[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060[37] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060[38] https://t.me/fedorenkoys/955[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2548[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153938[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8323; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=498280896623269[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2548[44] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2548[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl[46] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060[47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/boloto-cze-klyuchova-perepona-na-siverskomu-napryamku-meteozalezhni-shturmy/[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85878[50] https://x.com/jkmncz/status/1887961714999611653; https://t.me/Sever_Z/9753[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85878[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23567[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl[54] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/590; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1888262140823294016; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1888250620152287502; https://www.tiktok.com/@polk.dnipro1.npu/video/7467842147694185733 [55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23590[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/21004[57] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/07/russia-ukraine-war-toretsk-donetsk/bf7d201a-e55c-11ef-ab83-bb30e4340014_story.html[58] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85901[59] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5071; https://t.me/ombr_28/1796[60] https://t.me/ombr_28/1796[61] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/17260[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61977; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23587; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21837; https://t.me/yurasumy/21001[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61977[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31955[65] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=973066108339801&set=pcb.973066381673107[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/zdijsnyuyut-sproby-zavershyty-svoye-zhyttya-samostijno-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-zapekli-boyi/[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/pihota-yide-na-legkovyh-avtomobilyah-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-kudy-rvetsya-vorog-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2546[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61975; https://t.me/dva_majors/64150; https://t.me/wargonzo/24714; https://t.me/yurasumy/20998[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61975; https://t.me/yurasumy/20998[71] https://t.me/yurasumy/20998[72] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2547[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153908[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l[75] https://t.me/wargonzo/24714[76] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85895[77] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43556[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/28328[79] https://t.me/police_su_region/25771; https://t.me/kyivoda/25092 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/28328[80] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23087787 ; http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/76233
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2025
- Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and George Barros with Nate TrotterFebruary 5, 2025, 6:10pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on February 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory.[1] Zelensky stated that he is willing to negotiate directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin but warned that any peace agreement that significantly weakens Ukraine's ability to defend itself in the future risks another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will never recognize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and emphasized that there can be no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will eventually retake all its territory militarily and diplomatically but noted that the liberation of all Ukrainian territory from Russian occupation will take time. Zelensky called on Ukraine's allies to pressure Putin and demand that Russian forces withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine wants peace and that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia must all be represented in future peace negotiations. Zelensky's statements highlight that Putin's unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations is the true impediment to the end of the war, despite Putin's recent efforts to falsely blame Zelensky and Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine.[2]Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukraine would have to change its constitution to hold an election outside of peace time and asked how Ukrainian servicemembers, citizens living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian refugees and expatriates living abroad would be able to vote in the election before the Ukrainian government lifts martial law. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "definitely" hold elections after the war ends but that Ukraine currently must focus on defending itself from Russian aggression. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[4] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[5]Prominent Kremlin-linked figures continue to clearly articulate Russia's disinterest in negotiations while Putin propagates the information operation accusing Ukraine of being the unwilling party. Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk, a close personal ally of Putin and father of Putin's goddaughter, reinforced the Kremlin's efforts to delegitimize Ukrainian statehood in a February 4 article, arguing that Russia must reclaim its so-called "historical lands."[6] Medvedchuk published an accompanying map depicting all Ukrainian territory east of Lviv, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts as part of "historical Russia." Medvedchuk claimed that Western support for Ukraine aims solely to collapse Russia from within and labeled Ukrainians as "modern barbarians" whom Russia must save through integration into the Russian state. Medvedchuk denied Ukraine's historical legitimacy, insisting that modern Ukraine is inherently Russian - a narrative consistently promoted by Kremlin officials and the Russian information space to justify Russia's war and occupation of Ukraine. Medvedchuk's rhetoric as a member of the Russian elite with extensive ties to Putin are representative of the Kremlin's systemic refusal to act in good faith regarding negotiations with Ukraine and the West and the Kremlin's core unwillingness to negotiate with Ukraine - a state and government it considers illegitimate.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7] Zelensky added that Russian military personnel suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio because Russian field medicine is poor, and Russian forces struggle to evacuate wounded personnel from the battlefield. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were KIA.[8] Zelensky's and Syrskyi's figures indicate that the Russian military suffered roughly 41 to 48 percent of its total casualties in Ukraine since 2022 in 2024 alone. The highest range of Zelensky's estimates are notably larger than recent Russian casualty figures from the Ukrainian General Staff and former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.[9] Zelensky also stated that roughly 50,000 to 70,000 Russian soldiers have been classified as missing in action (MIA) since February 2022.Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Services (SBU) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Albashneft LLC oil depot in Novominskaya, Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire at the facility.[10] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of fire at the Albashneft oil depot and noted that the depot supplies straight-run gasoline (crude oil distillate), diesel fuel, and fuel oil to the Russian military.[11] Geolocated footage published on February 5 shows a fire at the Albashneft oil depot.[12] Krasnodar Krai Governor Venyamin Kondratyev claimed on February 5 that drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified oil tank near Novominskaya.[13]The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on February 5 revoking Russian military district's "interservice status" and removing naval and Aerospace Forces (VKS) units from subordination to Russian military districts.[14] The decree replaces the "joint strategic command" of each military district with a "directorate" that presumably will exclusively oversee ground forces and appears to disaggregate naval and VKS assets back to the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy and VKS command, respectively. The decree states that military districts will also be involved in helping Russian citizens enter the "mobilization manpower reserve" of the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed reorganizing military districts to optimize the army's command structure in June 2024.[15]The Kremlin appears to be attempting to re-establish military districts primarily as headquarters for Russian ground forces and disaggregate the peacetime administrative headquarters for Russia’s Navy and Air Force. Joint Russian operational groups will likely continue to be led by a combined-arms operational military command in wartime.[16] Disaggregating administrative control for Russian naval and air forces from the headquarters responsible for administrative control for ground forces would likely free up bureaucratic bottlenecks during peacetime and allow military district commanders to focus on training and preparing Russian ground forces for combat operations. Russia's efforts to refocus military districts on purely overseeing ground force assets could also help simplify and expedite Russia's activation of its ground forces during a future conflict. Russian forces will very likely continue to form and operate in interoperable joint force groupings under unified operational commanders during wartime, including during ongoing combat operations in Ukraine. It is unclear how or if this administrative restructuring will impact Russia's campaign in Ukraine in the long-term. Such a change is unlikely to affect the near-term battlefield situation since many Russian forces operating in Ukraine are currently organized under interservice groupings of forces. This restructuring may help Russian forces reconstitute multiple services more quickly than they otherwise could, as Russian ground, naval, and the air forces may not need to compete over the administrative resources of a single military district.The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) announced on February 4 that it will enact a new migration regime that imposes severe restrictions on migrants residing in Russia starting on February 5.[17] The law requires migrants who have committed a criminal offense or are undocumented to register with Russian authorities, regularly share geolocated photos to the MVD, and obtain MVD approval for basic activities including buying property, driving a car, accessing banking services, and traveling outside their region. The law gives the MVD the right to deport migrants who violate these restrictions without a court hearing and penalizes those who provide undocumented migrants with services. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin reported that migrant-related crimes remain a "serious concern" for Russian authorities and the public and claimed that there was an 18 percent increase in court cases against migrants in 2024.[18] Bastrykin's statements reinforce Russian ultra-nationalist narratives that migrants pose a security threat by supposedly violating laws, moving "uncontrollably" within Russia, and committing crimes. The new MVD migration regime and Bastrykin's rhetoric demonstrate that Russian authorities are increasingly prioritizing efforts to appease particularly pro-war, xenophobic Russian ultranationalists and mitigate potential domestic security risks linked to rising anti-migrant sentiment rather than offsetting Russia's labor shortages and ongoing economic struggles, in part, with migrant labor.Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on February 5. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on February 5 that Ukraine repatriated 150 Ukrainian POWs and stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[19] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that the returned Ukrainian POWs suffer from serious injuries and illnesses.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia also received 150 Russian POWs.[21]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run.Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts.The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages.Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on February 5.Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued ground attacks in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacks northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo and Malaya Loknya and southwest of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[22]Russian-claimed advances: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sverdlikovo and Nikolaevo-Darino (both northwest of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[23]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha), and elements of the Russian “Shadow” Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[24]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City along the international border near Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 4 and 5 but did not make any confirmed advances.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk.[26]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 5. Russian forces continued attacking north of Kupyansk toward Kindrashivka and Doroshivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on February 4 and 5.[27]Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 5 that Russian forces seized Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[28]Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 5 that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk (northeast of Kupyansk), but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 31.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Novomlynsk had a population of roughly 15 people before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kalynove (north of Kupyansk), south of Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk and along the international border), southwest of Dvorichna, west of Synkivka (both northeast of Kupyansk), and north of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[31]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are using convict recruits and mobilized personnel – some of whom have only one to two weeks of training – in infantry assaults in the area.[32]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk).[33]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Lozova and east of Borova near Kopanky on February 4 and 5.[34]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Serhiivka and near Zelenyi Hai (both east of Borova), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[35]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova on February 4 and 5.[36]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Torske, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[37]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking towards Siversk and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 5.[38]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Verkhnokamyanske, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[39]The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Siversk direction stated on February 5 that Russan forces are conducting assaults and accumulating forces and personnel in the area.[40] The commander noted that Russian forces are conducting assaults during the day and at night and are prioritizing targeting Ukrainian drone operator positions with artillery and drone strikes.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 5 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking within and near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on February 4 and 5.[41]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing in central Chasiv Yar and into Shevchenko Microraion (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces have become more active in the northern part of Chasiv Yar and that they are trying to advance to central Chasiv Yar near the Avanhard Stadium.[43] Zaporozhets noted that the number of Russian assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction has increased by 97 percent compared to December 2024. Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are conducting frontal assaults in central Chasiv Yar and noted that Russian forces are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles despite muddy ground conditions. Russian forces are also conducting highly attritional attacks with civilian vehicles.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[44]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area of February 5. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk; on the northern outskirts of Toretsk; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 4 and 5.[45]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Sierova and Hryhoriia Skovorody streets in northern Toretsk.[46]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in a forest area southeast of Torske, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[47]Zaporozhets noted that the number of Russian assaults in the Toretsk direction has increased by 30 percent compared to December 2024 and that Russian forces are increasingly conducting frontal assaults in Toretsk.[48]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[49]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid ongoing Russian offensive operations in the area on February 5. Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Kalynove, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Uspenivka on January 4 and 5.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Sribne-Zaporizhzhia-Nadiivka line (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[51] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces used vehicles to transfer assault groups to forward positions north of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven Russian vehicles.[52]Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[53]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and likely seized the settlement.[54] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on February 4 that Russian forceslikely seized Sribne.[55]Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 5 that Russian forces seized Baranivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating in the settlement.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers along the railway line from Kotlyne towards Pokrovsk, marginally advanced northeast of Udachne, and that unspecified Russian VDV forces consolidated positions near Sribne and Zaporizhzhia.[57]Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Kurakhove amid ongoing offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 5. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Uspenivka and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, and Rozlyv; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka on January 4 and 5.[58]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in a field southwest of Dachne.[59]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Dachne, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have seized the settlement.[60] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Dachne and that fighting for the settlement continues.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced up to the T-0515 Kostyantynopil-Andriivka-Pokrovsk highway northwest of Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove), and up to the northeastern outskirts of Andriivka.[62]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on February 5 that the situation near Dachne remains very tense and that Russian forces are using reconnaissance, first person-view (FPV), and fiber-optic drones in this direction.[63] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are losing up to a platoon's worth of infantry in the Kurakhove direction each day and are using fewer armored vehicles in the area.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 68th Tank Regiment and 381st Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, are reportedly operating near Dachne and Kurakhove.[64] Elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil, and elements of the 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating west of Kurakhove).[65]Russian forces continued attacks west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[66]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 5 but did not advance. Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on February 4 and 5.[67]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 5 that Russian forces advanced in fields northwest of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole and northeast of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[68]The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces and Armed Forces struck a Russian Buk air defense system in an unspecified location in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on February 4 to 5.[69]Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi stated on February 5 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) postponed a planned personnel rotation of its mission at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in occupied Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast due to a lack of security guarantees from Russia for the rotation.[70]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on February 5.Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and five Starlink terminals operated by Russian forces in southern Ukraine in the past day.[71]Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[72]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 104 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts and two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast on the night of February 4 to 5.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 drones over Poltava, Kharkiv, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, and Cherkasy oblasts, and that 42 drones were ”locally lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on February 4 that Russian Shahed drones struck the Saltivskyi and Osnovyanskyi raions of Kharkiv City.[74] Kirovohrad Oblast Military Administration Head Andriy Raykovych stated on February 5 that Russian drone debris damaged a residential area in the oblast.[75]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian soldiers and their relatives continue to complain of poor treatment by the Russian military command and poor provisioning among frontline units. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on February 5 that over 160 people, most of whom are relatives of soldiers of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) signed a petition addressed to Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov demanding an investigation into the brigade regarding illegal transfers of personnel between units and demanding the removal of the brigade's commander.[76] The Russian military command reportedly replaced the command of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade in November 2024 following a scandal in which the brigade's command submitted inaccurate reports of Russian advances in the Siversk direction, where the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade is currently operating.[77] Soldiers of the 9th Company, 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) also recently recorded an appeal for assistance claiming that they lack adequate food, clothing, and medical supplies, and that their command threatened to conduct drone strikes against their subordinates for failing to report on time.[78] A soldier of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) claimed that his commander beat him after he refused to rotate to a frontline position in the Zaporizhia direction under artillery fire.[79]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod published footage of a Russian T-90 tank on February 5, and a Russian milblogger claimed that the footage shows a T-90 equipped with an active protection system that can reportedly intercept first-person view (FPV) drones, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).[80] ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a draft bill to the Russian State Duma on February 5 to ratify the Russian-Belarusian security agreement that Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed on December 6, 2024.[81]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCJRwlH948E ; https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46632[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCJRwlH948E ; https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46632[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024 ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/ua/documents/constitution/konstituciya-ukrayini-rozdil-v ; https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm/cph/experts/ukraine/ukr.constitution.e.pdf[6] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27660/5045245/[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCJRwlH948E ; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/46632[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/20/sotni-tysyach-soldativ-golovnokomanduvach-zsu-nazvav-vtraty-armiyi-rf-mynulogo-roku/[9] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20575 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120924[10] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20595 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jwHAD4BFMDeYoY1De5DGvRnGnmr31cfV56cyWZELYuMbUGPvFivnubniFqPWtgWZl[11] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8754 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8755[12] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11009; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25360; https://t.me/dva_majors/63865; https://t.me/milinfolive/141340; https://t.me/bazabazon/34831[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/299122 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/299123 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/299157 ; https://t.me/kondratyevvi/8428[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/299228 ; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202502050007 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/05/02/2025/67a366509a79472bd62fc9e9 ; https://iz dot ru/1834296/2025-02-05/putin-otmenil-mezhvidovoi-status-voennykh-okrugov-v-rossii ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1006470[15] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/24/06/2024/66794f549a7947208052aa55[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2023-0 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2024[17] https://t.me/mediamvd/36335 ; https://t.me/mediamvd/36336; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/v-rossii-vstupil-v-silu-rezhim-spetsvysylki-migrantov/33304315.html[18] https://sledcom dot ru/news/item/1951309/[19] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13230; https://suspilne dot media/941561-ukraina-i-rf-proveli-obmin-polonenimi/[20] https://koordshtab.gov dot ua/posts/ukrayina-povernula-z-rosiyskoyi-nevoli-150-zakhysnykiv-1889; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/10645[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/48574[22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23431; https://t.me/dva_majors/63861; https://t.me/yurasumy/20939[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/299175; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23431; https://t.me/yurasumy/20939[24] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85677; https://t.me/tass_agency/299173[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23434[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2538[28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2538[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/48568 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025[30] https://t.me/sashakots/51715[31] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85709 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20937[32] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/04/u-nyh-systema-pobudovana-na-vtratah-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-na-kupyanshhyni-vidpravlyayut-pomyraty-vtemnu/[33] https://t.me/voin_dv/13214[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/299142 ; https://t [dot] tme/DnevnikDesantnika/2344[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/2344[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23436[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/05/syly-oborony-na-siverskomu-napryamku-kozhen-metr-cze-borotba/[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85678; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23432; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85678; https://t.me/wargonzo/24655[43] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/05/vulychni-boyi-ta-bandzaj-ataky-yak-tryvaye-bytva-za-chasiv-yar-i-toreczk/[44] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5466 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23432; https://t.me/mod_russia/48561[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l[46] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1886756420382593114; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/1886851695310680459; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/1886860436026384828[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/2344[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/05/vulychni-boyi-ta-bandzaj-ataky-yak-tryvaye-bytva-za-chasiv-yar-i-toreczk/[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/48567[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20935[51] https://t.me/yurasumy/20928[52] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936[53] https://x.com/SibirPrizrak/status/1887124860800843826; https://t.me/urga_74/3428; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8293?single; https://t.me/rusich_army/20587[54] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=636703722216235; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8296[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2537; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/48568[57] https://t.me/yurasumy/20928 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23441[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20927[59] https://t.me/mechanized33/739; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8292[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/20945[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/63861 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61905[62]https://t.me/z_arhiv/30813[63] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/05/novopavlivskyj-napryamok-rosiyany-shturmuyut-na-bagi-ale-finishuyut-u-chornyh-paketah/[64] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13343 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13351[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/13229 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51717[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l[68] https://t.me/wargonzo/24655[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20595[70] https://mfa.gov doot ua/news/komentar-rechnika-mzs-georgiya-tihogo-shchodo-vidterminuvannya-rotaciyi-magate-na-zaes; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/941491-cerez-vidsutnist-bezpekovih-garantij-z-boku-rf-magate-vidterminuvalo-rotaciu-misii-na-zaes-mzs-ukraini/[71] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XGd4eUSENGAYX4Aj7YDq8GkjetQqR8cHfqs9aRHa6VP9ZgwUXpaToKyUaRLbBm45l[72] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43453[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/28101[74] https://t.me/synegubov/12968 ; https://suspilne dot media/941043-zelenskij-nazvav-kilkist-zagiblih-na-vijni-ukrainciv-zsu-znisili-komandnij-punkt-u-kurskij-oblasti-1078-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1738739630&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[75] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BHRKFwZbi/; https://suspilne dot media/941043-zelenskij-nazvav-kilkist-zagiblih-na-vijni-ukrainciv-zsu-znisili-komandnij-punkt-u-kurskij-oblasti-1078-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1738740702&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[76] https://t.me/astrapress/73832[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024; https://t.me/rybar/67725[78] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21957[79] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21941[80] https://t.me/milinfolive/141343 ; https://t.me/uvznews/2832[81] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1006495
- — Iran Update, February 5, 2025
- Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei,Avery Borens, Brian Carter, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran is downplaying the significance of US “maximum pressure” sanctions while signaling some openness to nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that the maximum pressure policy is a “failed experiment” in response to US President Donald Trump’s announcing on February 4 his intent to re-enforce extensive sanctions on Iran.[1] Senior Iranian officials separately expressed willingness to engage in nuclear negotiations, emphasizing the Iranian policy against building and using nuclear weapons. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Mohammad Eslami similarly said that Iran has no plans to develop nuclear weapons.[2] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on February 5 that Iran is ready to give the United States a chance to resolve disputes.[3] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ultimately will decide whether Iran negotiates with the West or tries to build a nuclear weapon, however. Trump said on February 5 that he would like to pursue a “verified nuclear peace agreement” with Iran “immediately.”[4] Reuters reported on February 5 that Trump ordered his administration to work with allies to "complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran,” likely referring to discussions with the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran.[5] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[6] The E3 previously stated that it is prepared to impose snapback sanctions on Iran.[7] The E3 has until October 2025 to do so.[8]The US Defense Department is preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria.[9] No order has been given to proceed with the withdrawal at the time of this writing, however. A US withdrawal would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute. SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami said on February 5 that ISIS is waiting for a US withdrawal to reactivate and restore its physical so-called “caliphate.”[10] Shami confirmed that the SDF had received no warning from the United States about plans to withdraw.[11]A US withdrawal from Syria would very likely create opportunities for ISIS to rebuild itself in northeastern Syria in particular. The United States provides critical functions that enable the SDF to secure detention facilities in northeastern Syria that hold 10,000 ISIS fighters, whom US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla has called “an ISIS army-in-waiting.”[12] A US withdrawal from Syria would significantly increase the likelihood that the SDF would be unable to secure these ISIS fighters due to pressure from Turkey and Turkish-backed forces. The distraction and chaos caused by a US withdrawal from northeastern Syria would provide ISIS an opening to launch a major attack against some of these detention facilities. ISIS attacked al Sinaa Prison—a detention facility in southern Hasakah City—in January 2022 and freed up to 300 ISIS fighters.[13] Some of these fighters infiltrated back to regime-held areas in the central Syrian desert, which likely spurred an increase in attacks in the central Syrian desert in early 2023.[14]Iraqi Sunni political parties are increasingly vocalizing long-held political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party leader Mohamed al Halbousi called for “massive demonstrations” on February 4 to protest the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[15] The Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law and two other laws that the Iraqi Parliament passed on January 21 in order to determine the constitutionality of the laws.[16] The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[17] The Anbar, Salah al Din, and Ninewa provincial governors and Kirkuk Provincial Council chairman suspended work in protest of the court decision.[18] Multiple independent Iraqi parliamentarians urged Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to ask Parliament to remove the provincial governors due to their “rebellion.”[19] The Sunni Azm Alliance party separately called for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution on February 5.[20] The Azm Alliance added that a referendum on unspecified amendments should occur on the same day as the parliamentary elections. The Iraqi constitution stipulates two alternate mechanisms for adding constitutional amendments that both require a vote in Parliament and a public referendum.[21] Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai is a member of the newly formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition that called for the Sudani administration to implement nine longstanding Sunni demands on January 18.[22]Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia officials are continuing to use inflammatory and sectarian rhetoric in response to these Sunni demands. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada secretary general, Abu Alaa al Walai, compared the people “attacking” the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to those who “brought down a third of Iraq,” likely referring to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[23] Walai’s rhetoric mirrors Iranian-backed Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s anti-Sunni sectarian statements on February 1.[24] Maliki implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government. The Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework has expressed support for the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[25]US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, DC, on February 4 in order to discuss Iran, Israeli–Saudi normalization, and the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[26] Trump later said in a joint press conference that the United States would “take over” and “own” the Gaza Strip and rebuild it.[27] Trump added that the United States will clear destroyed infrastructure and remove unexploded ordinance. Trump also suggested that Egypt and Jordan could accept Palestinian refugees, despite the two countries previously rejecting the possibility.[28]Key Takeaways:Iran: Senior Iranian officials are downplaying the significance of US “maximum pressure” sanctions while signaling some openness to nuclear negotiations with the West.Syria: The United States is drafting plans to withdraw its forces from Syria, which ISIS would exploit to resurge in Syria.Iraq: Iraqi Sunni political parties are increasingly vocalizing long-held demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.Gaza Strip: US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, DC, in order to discuss Iran, the Gaza Strip, and Israeli-Saudi normalization.SyriaTurkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) conducted air and artillery strikes targeting the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near Tishreen Dam on February 5.[29] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA and SDF engaged in mutual shelling near the dam.[30] Turkish aircraft also struck several SDF sites near the Tishreen Dam.[31] Turkey has consistently struck SDF positions near the dam since December 2024.[32]Turkey and the SNA continued to target SDF assets near Peace Spring territory on February 5. Anti-SDF media reported that Turkish drones struck an SDF vehicle near Twal Abaa, south of the M4 Highway in Raqqa.[33] Anti-SDF media also reported that the SNA shelled SDF positions near Tal Tamr and Abu Rasin, north of Hasakah.[34]Anti-SDF media reported on February 5 that interim government-affiliated Public Security forces deployed to checkpoints near the entrances to Manbij, Aleppo Province.[35] Several Syrian sources previously posted photos of Public Security officers that deployed to Manbij on January 26.[36] Anti-SDF media claimed on February 5 that Public Security forces’ deployments near the entrances to Manbij follow residents’ demands that police monitor vehicles entering and exiting the city.[37] Unknown actors detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) outside of Manbij and killed at least 19 people on February 3.[38]Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated Turkish threats against the SDF on February 5.[39] Fidan called for the “Syrian state” to either repatriate or kill all foreign national “PKK” members to ensure Syrian national unity.[40] Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. This statement comes a day after Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey.[41] Turkey has repeatedly threatened to conduct a military offensive into northern Syria in order to “eliminate” the SDF but has refrained from doing so while HTS negotiates with the SDF.The Kurdish National Council in Syria (KNC) intends to establish a “unified Kurdish delegation” to negotiate with the Syrian interim government in Damascus.[42] KNC Executive Member and spokesperson Faisal Youssef said on February 5 that Kurdish political groups are working toward establishing a “unified Kurdish delegation” to engage with the Syrian interim government.[43] The Kurdish National Council is a coalition of Syrian Kurdish political parties. SDF commander Mazloum Abid’s recent meetings with KNC officials suggest that this delegation may include elements from the SDF. Abdi met with prominent Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (KDP-S)—a member party of the KNC—leader Mustafa Juma on February 5 to discuss efforts to form a “unified” delegation to negotiate with Damascus.[44] Abdi also previously met with KNC officials on January 28.[45] Abdi’s potential coordination with KNC officials follows recent efforts by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to pressure the SDF to cooperate with minority Syrian Kurdish political parties in negotiations with the HTS-led interim government.[46]A likely Axis of Resistance-affiliated group that identified itself as Kataib Awlia al Haq (Guardians of the Truth Brigades) announced that it would begin unspecified operations in a video statement on February 4.[47] Group members in the video carried small arms and held portraits of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, and former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, suggesting that the group is affiliated with the Axis of Resistance.[48]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentUS President Donald Trump signed an executive order on February 4 to “modify or rescind” existing sanctions waivers that provide Iran with financial and economic relief.[49] The United States has repeatedly extended a sanctions waver since 2018 that allows Iraq to import electricity from Iran.[50] The United States most recently extended the waiver for 120 days in November 2024. The waiver will expire in March 2025. Iranian gas and electricity exports to Iraq account for around 40 percent of Iraq’s power supply.[51] Iraq and Turkey accounted for 87 percent of Iran’s natural gas exports in 2023.[52]Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on February 5. Bogdanov discussed the situation in Syria and energy cooperation with Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[53] Mashhadani said that Iraq does not seek to interfere in Syrian affairs. Bogdanov recently met with HTS-led interim government officials in Syria on January 28.[54] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani separately agreed to attend the upcoming Arab-Russian summit in Moscow during a meeting with Bogdanov.[55]The Iraqi federal government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) reached an agreement on February 3 for the federal government to resume salary payments for KRG employees.[56] The KRG Finance and Economy Ministry announced that the Iraqi federal government transferred around 958 billion Iraqi dinars (around 731 million US dollars) to the KRG and that the KRG would begin distributing salaries for January 2025 on February 5.[57] The KRG Council of Ministers also reportedly agreed to “begin procedures” to resume oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan, according to a source in the KRG Council of Ministers speaking to Kurdish media on February 5.[58] These reports come after the Iraqi parliament passed a budget amendment on February 2 to provide salaries for KRG employees and resume oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan.[59]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripNothing significant to report.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripUS President Donald Trump signed an executive order on February 4 to halt US funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).[60] The United States, under Joe Biden, previously stopped funding UNRWA after Israel accused UNRWA staffers of participating in the Hamas-led October 7 attacks.[61] The Biden administration-imposed hold on UNRWA funding was meant to remain in effect until March 2025. Israel suspended UNRWA operation in Israel and the West Bank in January 2025.[62]Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will convene a security cabinet meeting in the coming days to discuss the second phase of the ceasefire with Hamas.[63] An Israeli delegation will travel to Doha on February 8 and 9 to negotiate the second phase.[64]LebanonLebanese media reported on February 5 that the IDF conducted operations around Kfar Chouba, southeastern Lebanon. Lebanese media reported that Israeli vehicles advanced northeast from Kfar Chouba toward Jabal al Sadana.[65] Lebanese media separately reported that the IDF advanced northwestward from Kfar Chouba into Kfar Hamam and conducted search operations before returning to Kfar Chouba.[66]Lebanese media reported on February 5 that the IDF operated in three locations in Marjaayoun District. Lebanese media reported the IDF established a position in Mays al Jabal.[67] Lebanese media separately reported that the IDF detonated explosives in Kfar Kila and Rab al Thalatheen.[68]Lebanese media reported on February 5 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 5th Infantry Brigade cleared roads in Aita al Shaab, southwestern Lebanon.[69] The LAF deployed to Aita al Shaab on January 26.[70] Lebanese media separately reported that the LAF advanced toward and established positions around Ramyeh.[71] The LAF deployed to Marwahin, west of Ramyeh, on January 28, and Aita al Shaab, east of Ramyeh, on January 26.[72] The LAF has not confirmed its presence in Ramyeh at the time of this writing.West BankNothing significant to report.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyIranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert to discuss the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire in Tehran on February 4.[73] Araghchi stated that the United Nations should pressure Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon. The United States announced that the ceasefire has been extended to February 18.[74]The Iranian Artesh Air Defense Force claimed the successful test of the Iranian-made Bavar-373 air defense system during the final phase of the “Eghtedar 1403” exercise on February 4.[75] The Bavar-373 reportedly detected and destroyed a high-altitude target after receiving data from the integrated air defense network. The Sayyad 4-B missile was used in the interception. The Bavar-373 system reportedly can track 60 targets and engage six simultaneously.[76] This test came shortly after Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reviewed the Iranian air defense system during his visit to Iran’s aerospace defense industries on February 2.[77]Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi met with Turkish officials in Ankara on February 4 to address political issues and economic cooperation.[78] Ravanchi held separate talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yilmaz, Presidential Adviser Akif Cagatay Kilic, and Turkish media on bilateral cooperation and regional developments.[79]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei affirmed his support for Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem by naming Qassem his “representative” in Lebanon on February 5.[80] Former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah previously held this title. Qassem will handle “non-litigious matters” and religious affairs for Khamenei in Lebanon, according to Iranian media.Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Vahid Jalal Zadeh met with the new Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iran Meshal Ahmed Mohammad al Mansour in Tehran on February 5.[81] The officials discussed the implementation of the 21-article agreement, which the two states signed at their sixth joint consular committee meeting in December 2024, covering political, legal, and maritime affairs as well as the prisoner transfers.[82]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-says-trumps-concern-about-nuclear-weapons-can-be-resolved-2025-02-05/[2] https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1738753514324810661/AEOI-Chief%3A-Iran-Not-Seeking-Nuclear-Weapons[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-is-willing-give-trump-diplomacy-another-chance-senior-iranian-official-says-2025-02-05/[4] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113950996936674770[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-set-reimpose-maximum-pressure-iran-official-says-2025-02-04/[6] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf p 20[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/europeans-tell-un-ready-snap-back-iran-sanctions-if-needed-2024-12-11/[8] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf[9] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/dod-drafting-plans-withdraw-us-troops-syria-recent-trump-comments-rcna190726[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sdf-says-it-has-not-received-any-plans-us-forces-withdraw-2025-02-05/[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sdf-says-it-has-not-received-any-plans-us-forces-withdraw-2025-02-05/[12] https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kurilla%20APQ%20responses.pdf[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/03/syria-hasakah-isis-prison-attack/[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-april-19-2023[15] https://x.com/AlHaLboosii/status/1886773790987763821[16] https://almadapaper dot net/395212/[17] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-parliament-debates-controversial-amendment-amnesty-law[18] https://almadapaper dot net/395220/ ; 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https://knc-geneva.ezks dot org/?page_id=49&lang=en[45] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/736411/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%8A/[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025[47] https://t.me/katayib_awlia_alhaqi/1165[48] https://t.me/katayib_awlia_alhaqi/1165[49] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-2/[50] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-admin-extends-10b-iran-sanctions-waiver-2-days-after-trump-election-win[51] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/iraq-trade-crude-oil-iranian-gas-resolve-power-debt-pm-2023-07-11/ ;https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-power-problem-part-2-implications-new-oil-gas-deal-iran[52] https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/irn[53] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1183996[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2025[55] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9[56] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823154/%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A[57] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823154/%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A[58] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823281/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7[59] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2025[60] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-from-anti-american-un-organizations/[61] https://www.axios.com/2025/02/03/trump-united-nations-human-rights-withdraw[62] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/30/world/middleeast/israel-ban-unrwa-palestinians.html[63] https://apnews.com/article/trump-netanyahu-washington-ceasefire-1c8deec4dd46177e08e07d669d595ed3[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025[65] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113282[66] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113282[67] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113289[68] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129171 ;https://t.me/dahieh4all/49610[69] https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/justice-law/757177/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%A7[70] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1883439041577718111[71] https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/justice-law/757149/%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AB%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A9[72] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1884269615003619489 ; https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1883439041577718111[73] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/760871[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-27-2025[75] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/724561[76] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/14/3249556 ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2025[77] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/14/3249468 ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/14/3249476;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2025[78] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/211654 ;https://x.com/TakhtRavanchi/status/1886904660398653768[79] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/211654[80] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/ar/news/2025/02/05/3251783[81] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/760886[82] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/760886; https://en.mfa dot gov.ir/portal/newsview/758303#:~:text=The%20Sixth%20Joint%20Consular%20Commission,December%2016%E2%80%9317%2C%202024
- — Iran Update, February 8, 2025
- Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.NOTE: CTP and ISW publish abbreviated updates on Saturdays and Sundays as of February 8, 2025. We may publish full updates as events warrant, however.Hamas released three male Israeli hostages on February 8.[1] Hamas gave the hostages to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip.[2] Israel, in exchange, released 183 Palestinian prisoners, including 111 whom the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) detained in the Gaza Strip during the October 7 War.[3] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office vowed that it would take unspecified “actions” in response to the frail and weak condition of the Israeli hostages.[4]Key Takeaways:Gaza Strip: Hamas released three Israeli hostages. Israel, in exchange, released 183 Palestinian prisoners.Syria: The US-backed SDF attacked Turkish and Turkish-backed SNA positions north of Tishreen Dam.Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with senior Hamas officials in Tehran and discussed fighting in the Gaza Strip.The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have attacked Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) positions north of Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on February 7. The SDF conducted a drone attack targeting Turkish forces on Qara Qozak Hill, causing casualties.[5] The Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) fired an anti-tank guided munition targeting a Turkey-SNA position on Qara Qozak hill, killing 10 SNA fighters and wounding 14 SNA fighters and three Turkish soldiers.[6]The SDF conducted a drone attack targeting an SNA transport vehicle near Deir Hafer on February 7.[7] The SDF reported that the attack led to an unknown number of SNA casualties.Turkey and the SNA have conducted indirect fire attacks targeting the SDF on the eastern bank of Euphrates River since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on February 7.[8] Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led forces neutralized an improvised explosive device (IED)-laden car that was prepared to detonate at a market in al Bab, northeast of Aleppo, on February 8.[9] CTP-ISW has recorded several vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks in SNA-controlled territory since late December 2024.[10]The pro-Assad Syrian Popular Resistance claimed on February 7 that it fired small arms at an HTS checkpoint in al Haffah, Latakia countryside.[11] The Syrian Popular Resistance has claimed several attacks over the past several weeks targeting HTS forces in Latakia Province.[12] It remains unclear whether the group has any real involvement in these attacks beyond the claims on social media, however.The HTS-led Homs Security Directorate arrested Duraid Ahmad Abbas--a key figure in the Assad regime--on February 7.[13] Abbas reportedly participated in the Kafr Shams massacre in al Houla, Homs Governorate, where Assad forces besieged and bombarded the town in 2012.[14] His arrest follows an ongoing campaign targeting former regime elements in Idlib Governorate, focusing on those who refused to settle their status with the interim government.[15]The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployed to northern and eastern Lebanese borders on February 8 in response to recent fighting between Lebanese smugglers and HTS-led forces.[16] The LAF stated that it responded to gunfire and shelling into Lebanese territory. The Syrian Department of Military Operations deployed to Hawik, northeast of Qusayr, on February 6 after smugglers kidnapped HTS fighters during a counter-smuggling operation.[17] Geolocated footage posted to X (Twitter) showed HTS-led forces firing an anti-tank guided missile from a rooftop in western Hawik on February 6.[18] Lebanese media reported that HTS-led forces fired artillery and rockets into Lebanon near the Syria-Lebanon border.[19The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting a Hamas weapons depot in Deir Ali in southern Syria on February 8.[20] The IDF stated that Hamas planned to use weapons at the site to attack Israeli forces. The IDF stated that it will continue to attack Hamas “wherever it establishes itself.”Syrian media footage posted on February 8 showed a small protest in Damascus City calling on the HTS-led interim government to quickly convene the National Dialogue Conference.[21] Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara announced the formation of a preparatory committee for the National Dialogue Conference, which will reportedly represent “different points of view.”[22]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentNothing significant to report.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripNothing significant to report.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripSee topline section.LebanonLebanese Hezbollah media reported on February 8 that the IDF demolished houses in Aadaysit Marjaayoun, southeastern Lebanon.[23] Lebanese media last reported Israeli demolition in the area on January 29.[24]The IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah fighters in Bekka Valley on February 8.[25] The IDF stated that the fighters were working at a production and storage site for unspecified “strategic” weapons.[26]West BankThe IDF continued its counterterrorism operation in the northern West Bank on January 8.[27] The IDF destroyed explosives in a building in Nablus.[28] Israeli forces also arrested a Palestinian fighter and seized a weapon. The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) attacked Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Jenin governorates with IED and small arms.[29] Hamas, PIJ, and the “Youth of Revenge and Liberation” claimed to fire small arms in a combined attack targeting the IDF in Tulkarm on January 7.[30] PIJ announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters.[31]Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyIranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with senior Hamas officials in Tehran on February 8.[32] Hamas Shura Council head Mohammad Darwish called the fighting in the Gaza Strip a “great victory” for the Axis of Resistance. Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya described the victory as “shared” between Iran and Hamas. Khamenei reiterated his commitment to supporting Palestinian militias against Israel. Hamas Deputy Leader in the West Bank Zaher Jabarin briefed Khamenei on the situation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and expressed appreciation for continued Iranian support.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israeli-hostages-freed-by-hamas-appear-frail-after-long-captivity-596749c1?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1[2] https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/1888132629628645458[3] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-frees-183-palestinian-security-prisoners-including-18-serving-life-sentences/[4] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/pms-office-action-will-be-taken-as-needed-after-hostages-released-looking-emaciated/[5] https://t.me/sdf_press/3782 ; https://t.me/sdf_press/3781[6] https://t.me/sdf_press/3783 ; https://t.me/sdf_press/3781[7] https://t.me/sdf_press/3781 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1888247874581877237[8] https://t.me/sdf_press/3781 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1887964431050559636 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1888239432928493971[9] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1888248130933801078 ;https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135364[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-2-2025[11] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5816[12] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5772 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5697 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5561[13] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122681[14] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/2/8/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-25-2025;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-29-2025[16] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1888247822018900193[17] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-6-2025[18] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1887740042547810422[19] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113398 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113429 ; https://t.me/dahieh4all/49692 ; https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/1887844244817072162[20] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1888221054834794713[21] https://x.com/NPA_Arabic/status/1888139784725381350[22] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122256; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122250; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122251 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2025[23] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13421 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13422[24] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/128725[25] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1888259487078781427 ; https://www dot al manar.com.lb/13124586[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1888259487078781427[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1888271825043390824[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1888271825043390824[29] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8249 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8250 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/2086 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/2087 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/2088[30] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/954 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8248[31] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-22-2025[32] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27965
- — China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 13, 2025
- Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe of the Institute for the Study of War;Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise InstituteEditors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise InstituteData Cutoff: February 11, 2025The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.Key Takeaways Taiwanese civil society groups have now submitted recall petitions targeting 31 opposition Kuomintang (KMT) legislators and 13 legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Recall efforts could shift the balance of power within the Legislative Yuan (LY) by reducing the KMT-led majority.Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) investigated claims that Taiwanese and PRC companies helped Taiwanese nationals illegally procure PRC identification cards in support of an expansion of CCP United Front soft power operations against Taiwan.The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported sighting six PRC high-altitude balloons near Taiwan in one day, with one passing directly over the main island.The PRC’s new directive restricting online publication of military-related information reflects the PRC’s heightened sensitivity to leaks that expose military capabilities and the reinforcement of CCP control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by silencing narratives that challenge party authority.PRC General Secretary Xi Jinping met with South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province on February 7, 2025. The meeting reflects the PRC’s growing efforts to strengthen ties with South Korea amid its escalating trade war with the U.S. and political instability in South Korea.The PRC’s appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European Affairs signals that Beijing intends to take a more aggressive posture in negotiations with the European Union.Cross-Strait RelationsTaiwanTaiwanese civil society groups have now submitted recall petitions targeting 31 opposition Kuomintang (KMT) legislators and 13 legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Recall efforts could shift the balance of power within the Legislative Yuan (LY) by reducing the KMT-led majority. These 44 recall petitions have received signatures from more than 1 percent of the eligible voters in their electoral district, clearing the first threshold to initiate a recall election.[1] The next step is for recall petitioners to get signatures from at least 10 percent of eligible voters within the relevant electoral district within 60 days. Once Taiwan’s Central Election Commission verifies these signatures, the recall vote can commence. If a majority of voters vote to recall the elected official, and this majority exceeds 25 percent of eligible voters in the district, a special election must be held within three months to fill the vacated seat. The LY currently has no majority party, with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holding 8 seats. The opposition has a majority in practice, however, because the KMT and TPP have typically aligned on key issues. The DPP could regain control of the LY if its supporters can successfully recall and replace six KMT legislators and maintain all contested DPP legislative seats. KMT- and TPP-backed amendments to Taiwan’s Public Officials Election and Recall Act could make recall efforts more difficult, however. The opposition parties passed an amendment on December 20, 2024, requiring those who propose or sign a recall initiative to provide a copy of their ID card instead of their ID numbers and addresses.[2] The Executive Yuan requested a reexamination of the amendment in January 2025, but the LY voted along party lines to preserve the amendment on February 11.[3] The TPP, though not facing a potential recall of its elected legislators, has voiced its opposition to the mass recall campaign. Acting TPP Chairman Huang Kuo-chang called DPP efforts to recall KMT legislators an act of “green authoritarianism,” a reference to the DPP official party color. [4] President William Lai Ching-te has 10 days to sign the bill into law after the LY sends it to him. Petitions that complete both rounds of signature collection before the bill is signed into law will not be subject to the amendment, though it is possible that the KMT may use this amendment as an opportunity to challenge the legality of recall proceedings.Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) investigated claims that Taiwanese and PRC companies helped Taiwanese nationals illegally procure PRC identification cards in support of an expansion of CCP United Front soft power operations against Taiwan. The MOI initiated its investigation after Taiwanese Youtuber Pa Chiung made a video documentary alleging that between three to five Taiwanese travel companies and public relations firms, as well as two PRC companies, helped Taiwanese citizens apply for PRC ID cards during trips to the PRC.[5] Taiwanese media described Pa as an “anti-CCP” Youtuber, whose content investigates PRC United Front activity targeting Taiwanese nationals.[6]The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of Chinese society. United Front activities against Taiwan support PRC efforts to politically assimilate Taiwan, particularly by inculcating in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan is a part of that China. United Front work can also support covert and clandestine activities, such as infiltration, manipulation, co-optation, and intelligence gathering on target groups.[7]The MOI is investigating whether the Taiwanese companies assisted the Taiwanese nationals in illegally obtaining the ID cards in breach of Taiwan’s Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.[8] The MOI also aims to determine whether the Taiwanese companies’ actions “were purely commercial” or part of a larger United Front operation to promote the PRC’s annexation of Taiwan, as Taiwan designates commercial activities by Taiwanese companies in the PRC as permissible by law.[9] Taiwan’s Interior Minister Liu Shyh-fang stated that Taiwan's and the PRC’s citizenship registration systems “are mutually exclusive,” making it illegal for Taiwanese citizens to simultaneously hold PRC citizenship documents or household registrations.[10] The MOI has interviewed over 30 individuals it identified as possessing PRC ID cards as part of its investigation, though Pa Chiung made an unverified claimed that up to 200,000 Taiwanese citizens may have obtained PRC IDs in the last decade.[11] Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau called Pa’s claims exaggerated.[12] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council also announced that three Taiwanese nationals have had their citizenship revoked due to possession of illegal PRC ID cards since it began its investigation in January.[13]The PRC’s issuance of IDs to Taiwanese nationals dovetails with efforts to encourage people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and the PRC to promote the PRC’s political incorporation of Taiwan.[14] The Fujian United Front Work Department announced a plan in January to promote further Taiwanese visits to the PRC by increasing professional exchanges in various fields, adding more flights between Taiwan and Fujian Province, and encouraging first-time visitors to find jobs in the province.[15] Fujian is central to Beijing’s “peaceful reunification” efforts because it is the site of the “Fujian Cross-Strait Integration Zone,” which the PRC unveiled in 2023 to strengthen ties between Fujian and Taiwan and facilitate the integration of Taiwanese nationals into Fujian’s society, economy, and governance.[16] The issuance of PRC ID cards to Taiwanese people is one of many policies intended to make it easier for Taiwanese to live, work, study, invest, and travel in Fujian and elsewhere in the PRC.These efforts may represent PRC “passportization” efforts against Taiwan, wherein the PRC seeks to legitimize its claim on the island by granting PRC documents to Taiwanese nationals and support rhetoric identifying Taiwan as a part of China. The PRC could attempt to use Taiwanese citizens’ possession of PRC ID cards as justification for intervention in Taiwan under the pretense of protecting “PRC citizens” from oppression under the DPP government. The passportization campaign against Taiwan bears similarities with Russia’s passportization campaign in occupied Ukrainian territory, wherein Russia uses those who have “willfully” adopted Russian citizenship to support assertions that its territorial claims “are incontrovertible and irreversible,” providing further justification for Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine.[17] Residents of Taiwan’s Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos, which the PRC consider to be part of Fujian province, may be particularly vulnerable to such “passportization” efforts. The islands’ residents rely on the PRC economically and often travel to and from the PRC mainland. Pa Chiung’s documentary showed that Taiwanese citizens who take the ferry from Kinmen to Xiamen, Fujian, are encouraged to register for a Taiwan Compatriot Certificate, which enables them to travel freely to the PRC, buy property and establish a bank account, the first steps in obtaining residency in the PRC.[18] Kinmen in particular is a target of United Front efforts, including an initiative called the “Kinmen-Xiamen Common Living Circle,” which seeks to promote economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and the PRC. National Chengchi University Taiwan-China affairs researcher Soong Kuo-cheng stated that with further economic and integration through transport links, the PRC could integrate Kinmen into Fujian province and demonstrate that the ‘one country, two systems’ policy could be replicated with all of Taiwan.[19] The islands’ reliance on the PRC and the PRC’s emphasis on economic integration makes it likely that the PRC’s passportization program has disproportionately affected the residents of the islands.The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported sighting six PRC high-altitude balloons near Taiwan in one day, with one passing directly over the main island. This marked the highest number of PRC balloons in Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in one day since February 10, 2024.[20] The MND reported nine PRC military aircraft, two official ships, and six warships — a “normal” number of non-balloon ADIZ incursions — near Taiwan during the same period as the balloon sightings (February 6–7).[21] The MND began reporting PRC balloons in its ADIZ in December 2023. Balloon activity spiked in volume and increased to daily frequency during the weeks leading up to Taiwan’s election on January 13, 2024, then gradually tapered off until April 2024.[22] MND began reporting balloon sightings again in November 2024, which gradually increased in subsequent months.[23] At least 16 PRC balloons flew through Taiwan’s ADIZ in January 2025, including seven that flew directly over Taiwan, and 13 in February as of the time of writing (at least two of them over Taiwan).[24] The balloon overflights are part of a broader PRC effort to harass Taiwan, degrade its response capabilities, and strain its resources, consistent with the effect of normalizing ADIZ incursions more generally.[25] Balloons are able to enter Taiwan’s airspace without triggering a Taiwanese military response, unlike military aircraft.The PRC balloons over Taiwan also likely serve surveillance and other data collection purposes that may help the PRC plan military activities such as airstrikes. The PRC has maintained that balloons sighted over Taiwan are “mostly” weather balloons.[26] Reuters reported that most weather balloons fly 80,000–120,000 ft above the ground; the balloons spotted in Taiwan between December 2023 and April 2024 flew between altitudes of 10,000–40,000 ft, however.[27] A similar PRC spy balloon crossed the United States in February 2023 at an altitude of 60,000 ft.[28] PRC surveillance balloons could provide the PRC with a low-cost, deniable means of collecting intelligence on Taiwan’s topography and meteorology, among other things.The PRC is using its political influence in developing countries to create the impression of widespread international support for its goals to annex Taiwan. Studies by the Economist and the Lowy Institute found that dozens of “Global South” countries, especially in Africa, adopted language in support of “all” PRC efforts to achieve “national reunification” in the last two years. The Australian think tank The Lowy Institute’s January 2025 study broke UN member states into five distinct categories based on their stances on the status of Taiwan. No countries can have diplomatic relations with both the PRC and Taiwan due to Beijing’s insistence on its “one-China principle.” Only 11 UN states, plus Vatican City, formally recognize the ROC over the PRC. 40 countries, including the United States, recognize the PRC government in Beijing but stop short of recognizing the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. 142 countries explicitly recognize the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan; of these, 119 have endorsed Beijing’s one-China Principle directly. A further subset of 89 “Beijing backer” countries recognize the PRC, support the one-China principle, and support the PRC’s actions to “achieve national reunification” without specifying a preference for peaceful means.[29] The Economist published a similar study on February 9 that identified 70 countries that recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan as well as “all” efforts by the PRC to achieve national reunification. The study noted that 97% of those 70 countries were in the Global South, and that the vast majority of them adopted that new wording in the past 18 months.[30] Many African countries joined this category for the first time during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in September 2024, when 53 African states signed a joint statement that said “Africa […] firmly supports all efforts by the Chinese government to achieve national reunification.”[31]The PRC has sought to cultivate pro-PRC sentiment globally by portraying itself as a leader of the Global South and has used this diplomatic goodwill to garner support for its stance against the ROC. The PRC’s efforts to garner support for Taiwan “reunification” efforts suggests that the PRC is prioritizing information operations designed to create the appearance of a global consensus. PRC foreign policy officials likely understand that very few of the Global South countries that have expressed approval for reunification efforts would substantively aid either side in an invasion of Taiwan. The PRC likely aims instead to use the rhetorical support it has created among Global South countries to create the appearance of legitimacy for any actions it chooses to take against Taiwan. Beijing wishes to take a leadership role in the international system, including in existing institutions, and it needs the support of as many countries as possible. Gaining rhetorical support from a growing number of countries for “all efforts” at “reunification” can help insulate the PRC from some of the reputational damage it may incur if it takes aggressive action against Taiwan.The Lowy Institute and Economist studies also reveal that the degree of “international consensus” behind the PRC stance on Taiwan is less overwhelming than it claims. The PRC often claims that the 180 UN member states that recognize the PRC rather than Taiwan, as well as UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, constitute an overwhelming international consensus in support of its “one China principle” that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRC. UNGA 2758 was the 1971 resolution that expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” (i.e., the ROC) from the United Nations and gave “China’s” UN seat to the PRC instead. The resolution does not mention the status of Taiwan, however. PRC officials reference this supposed consensus in response to any countries that they perceive to be supporting Taiwan’s independence or opposing the PRC’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan. Not all countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan explicitly recognize Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan, however. Even countries that recognize Beijing’s sovereignty claims do not necessarily endorse “reunification” by force. The UN as an institution has clarified that it does not endorse Beijing pursuing “reunification” by any means it wishes.[32] ChinaThe PRC’s new directive restricting online publication of military-related information reflects the PRC’s heightened sensitivity to leaks that expose military capabilities and the reinforcement of CCP control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by silencing narratives that challenge party authority. The PRC published directives on February 8 that limit the information that PRC military bloggers and media outlets are permitted to share online regarding the PLA.[33] The directive prohibits online military information providers from “producing, copying, publishing, or disseminating” previously undisclosed information about the military, including troop activities, the development, testing, and deployment of weapons and equipment; information about military facilities, and more. The stated aims of the directives, according to the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), are to strengthen the management of information to prevent the leaking of military secrets, manage public opinion relating to the military, and stop the spread of disinformation.[34] Tighter restrictions on what content is allowed to be published online imply greater challenges for monitoring PRC military developments in the open source.The directive signals the PRC’s increasing sensitivity over leaks that threaten to expose certain capabilities and possible intentions amid the PRC’s ongoing development of new military technology and equipment. The rules apply to any entities that publish online information about the military, such as media outlets, military units and departments, security-related education institutions, and individual scholars and bloggers. PRC military bloggers and social media users have previously circulated footage of military hardware that potentially undermines the confidentiality of PLA capabilities. PRC netizens shared pictures and videos of a previously unknown sixth generation stealth combat aircraft flying above Chengdu on December 26.[35]The directive, which takes effect on March 1, also focuses on maintaining the CCP’s control over the PLA. The directive emphasizes the responsibility of publishers of military-related content not to spread notions that contradict the CCP’s absolute authority over the PLA and the CMC Chairman Responsibility System. The CMC Chairman Responsibility System refers to a concept that emphasizes the CMC Chairman (Xi Jinping)’s centrality in the military hierarchy and command structure.[36] The directive encourages publishers of military-related content to endorse Xi Jinping’s political theory, including Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military. This doctrine promotes the notion that Xi’s organizational reforms of the PLA, orientation of the CCP around Xi, and emphasis on strict CCP control of the PLA are necessary to strengthen the PLA as a fighting force. The explicit connection indicates that Xi regards insufficient consensus over the CCP’s governance of the military as an inhibitor of the PLA’s warfighting capability.The issuance of the directive follows several recent incidents that may indicate tension in the PLA regarding party-military relations. The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced on November 28 that it had suspended Director of the Political Work Department of the CMC Miao Hua amid his investigation for suspected “serious violations of discipline.”[37] Miao Hua was the highest-ranking political commissar in the PLA, a position that carries the ultimate responsibility of instilling Xi’s vision of political loyalty throughout the military. Multiple PLA affiliated organizations published articles in December 2024 that emphasized tenets of collective leadership and intra-party democracy as the guiding principles of the party’s governance of the military, which is inconsistent with Xi’s vision of centralized hierarchy.[38] The CMC subsequently replaced the political commissar of the PLA Ground Force on December 23, possibly signaling that Xi held other high-ranking officers responsible for perceived failures to achieve his version of political loyalty.[39] The new directive outlined plans to increase scrutiny over public agencies and military commands’ dissemination of military-related content through media training.The directive’s focus on silencing undesirable views regarding the CCP’s control over the military amid instability in the highest echelons of the PLA’s political commissars signals that the CCP perceives the sources of these narratives as threats that ultimately inhibit the PLA’s effectiveness as a fighting force.Northeast AsiaJapanThe PRC strongly condemned a joint statement by US President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba for its comments on Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands. Trump and Ishiba met in Washington, DC, on February 7 for their first bilateral summit. A joint statement from the two leaders encouraged the “peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues” and “opposed any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion.”[40] Japanese newspaper Nikkei reported that this was the first time the United States’ and Japan’s stated position on the Taiwan Strait explicitly opposed changes to the cross-strait status quo through “coercion.”[41] The joint statement also expressed support for Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in international organizations.[42] PRC MFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that the PRC was “strongly dissatisfied” and lodged “solemn representations” with the US and Japanese governments over the statement, which he claimed “blatantly interferes in China's internal affairs, attacks and smears China, and exaggerates regional tensions.” He said that “the Taiwan issue is purely China's internal affairs and the core of China's core interests,” stressing that Japan, in particular, “should be more cautious in its words and deeds” due to its history of colonizing Taiwan. He argued that Japan and the United States should abide by the one-China principle and clearly oppose Taiwan’s independence if they truly want peace. He further stated that Taiwan “has no basis, reason or right” to participate in international organizations that only admit sovereign states.[43]The PRC also objected to Trump's and Ishiba’s statements about the Senkaku Islands, a disputed but Japan-administered uninhabited archipelago in the East China Sea. Trump and Ishiba reaffirmed in their joint statement that the US-Japan mutual defense treaty of 1960 applies to the Senkaku Islands, which means that an attack on the islands would trigger US military intervention to aid Japan. The United States has held this position since 1972. The two leaders also stated their “strong opposition to any action that seeks to undermine Japan’s longstanding and peaceful administration of the Senkaku Islands.”[44] The PRC and Taiwan also claim the Senkaku Islands under the name “Diaoyu Islands,” and PRC coast guard vessels patrolled within the islands’ contiguous zone nearly every day of 2024 and 2023 to assert PRC legal jurisdiction there.[45] MFA spokesperson Guo stated that “the Diaoyu Islands and their affiliated islands are China's inherent territory. China's activities in the relevant waters are completely legitimate and legal.”[46]The PRC’s especially strong objection to the Trump-Ishiba comments on Taiwan likely results from the fact that the comments signaled a new level of US-Japan alignment in opposition to what the PRC perceives to be its core interests. The US and Japanese opposition to cross-strait reunification by force is longstanding. The addition of “coercion” in the language of the joint statement, however, extends that opposition to a greatly expanded range of PRC “gray zone” activities including coast guard patrols around Taiwanese territory, coercive economic measures, cyberattacks, and other nonviolent means that the PRC has employed to intimidate or pressure Taiwan. The inclusion of “coercion” in the language also brings the joint statement more in line with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, which stipulates that the United States shall maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”[47] The Trump-Ishiba joint statement did not include concrete commitments of action against PRC coercion but signified an intent by Japan and the United States to more strongly challenge tactics that the PRC regularly uses to advance its eventual goal of “reunification.” Beijing also views US-Japan rhetorical alignment on the Taiwan issue as part of a trend of anti-PRC coalition-building within the PRC’s home region. The PRC very likely fears that such a coalition will reduce its chance of successfully annexing Taiwan and will be used to “contain” the PRC within the First Island Chain. The PRC MFA’s reaction to the Senkaku Islands statement was relatively mild, by contrast, both because the US-Japanese position on that subject is not new and because the Senkaku Islands are of lesser importance to the PRC than Taiwan.North KoreaA PRC regional bank is reportedly involved in facilitating financial transactions related to North Korean minerals, potentially enabling North Korea to circumvent international sanctions. South Korean media outlet Daily NK reported on February 5, citing sources in the PRC, that “Bank A” has been handling payments for mineral trade transactions between PRC companies and North Korean trading firms since January 23.[48] The UN Security Council’s sanctions under Resolution 2371 prohibit the export of North Korean minerals. The report claims that North Korea is earning “tens of thousands of yuan in monthly operating profit, with a 0.5-1% commission per transaction.” The report also accused the bank of “falsifying transaction records” to conceal large transfers of money from the PRC to North Korea and disguising the nature of the items traded. The report suggested that local PRC government officials may be cooperating with North Korean firms as import-export businesses are required to report their activities to the local authorities. Despite this, the PRC maintains that it “faithfully fulfills its due international obligations.”[49] The report’s allegations, nevertheless, would point to ongoing efforts by the PRC to help North Korea circumvent international sanctions and generate illicit revenues for its regime.South KoreaPRC General Secretary Xi Jinping met with South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province on February 7, 2025.[50] The meeting reflects the PRC’s growing efforts to strengthen ties with South Korea amid its escalating trade war with the U.S. and political instability in South Korea. Woo, in China for the Asian Winter Games, invited Xi to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea in October. Xi indicated that he would seriously consider the invitation, which would mark his first visit to South Korea in 11 years.[51] Woo also addressed the PRC’s export restrictions on South Korean films and games, imposed in retaliation for South Korea’s deployment of the US-provided Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2017.[52] Xi acknowledged the importance of cultural exchange in bilateral relations and said that it should not be hindered by unnecessary complications. The meeting could signal Xi’s efforts to leverage South Korea’s political instability to strengthen economic ties with South Korea amid the PRC’s intensifying trade war with the United States. US President Donald Trump imposed 10% duties on all PRC imports, to which the PRC responded with retaliatory duties.[53] South Korea, a key-US ally, is especially important to PRC efforts to weaken a US-led economic coalition. South Korea faces a leadership vacuum and an expected early presidential election in June after President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment. The potential presidency of Lee Jae-myung, the opposition party leader, could signal a South Korean foreign policy shift from a pro-US stance to a more balanced approach between the PRC and the United States. Xi’s meeting with Woo may indicate the PRC’s strategy to position itself favorably ahead of potential leadership changes in South Korea.South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) accused the PRC’s artificial intelligence (AI) start-up DeekSeek of “excessively” collecting and storing user data on February 10.[54] The NIS said, “unlike other generative AI services, it has been confirmed that chat records are transferable as it includes a function to collect keyboard input patterns that can identify individuals and communicate with Chinese companies’ servers.” Several South Korean government agencies such as the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy; Ministry of National Defense; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and state-run Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power restricted or blocked access to DeepSeek for their employees due to security concerns on February 6.[55] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said the PRC “attaches great importance to and legally protects data privacy and security,” adding that the PRC has “never demanded, nor will it require, enterprises or individuals to collect or store data in an illegal manner,” in response to the South Korean government agencies’ ban on the app.[56] South Korea joins a growing list of countries, including the United States , Australia, Italy, and the ROC, that have banned the app for government employees due to security risks.[57] The concerns are linked to the PRC’s National Intelligence Law, which could allow the state to access corporate data.[58]OceaniaThe PRC appears to be exploiting divisions between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, which have a free association arrangement.[59] The Cook Islands will sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with the PRC as the PRC seeks to expand influence and access in the South Pacific. PRC MFA spokesman Guo Jiakun said that the Cook Islands has been “an important partner of China in the South Pacific region” since relations were established in 1997 and that bilateral ties are “not directed against any third party” in a regular press conference on February 10.[60] The MFA has not released information detailing the terms of the comprehensive strategic partnership at the time of writing. A Cook Islands government readout detailed that Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown would travel to Beijing from February 10–14 to sign the agreement, which “presents an opportunity to enhance cooperation across key sectors, including trade, investment, and tourism; infrastructure; climate resilience and renewable energy; agriculture; maritime and oceans, including shipping and seabed minerals development.”[61]New Zealand and the Cook Islands have maintained a compact of free association, through which New Zealand funds aid and defense for the Cook Islands. The Cook Islands were administered by New Zealand until 1965. The islands are now self-governing, but citizens have New Zealand passports and citizenship, and the country does not have a UN seat. The United States recognizes the Cook Islands as an independent state, however. The Cook Islands and New Zealand agreed in 2001 to maintain regular discussions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest.[62] New Zealand officials expressed surprise amid the Cook Islands’ decision to sign a deal with the PRC. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of New Zealand Winston Peters said that New Zealand was “blindsided” by the development.[63] Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown argued that the Cook Islands were not obligated to inform New Zealand because the agreement with the PRC was not germane to policing or security issues.[64] Brown also rejected accusations of “secretive” Cook Islands-PRC engagement and argued that the agreement was in the Cook Islands’ “best interest.”[65]ISW has tracked PRC diplomatic outreach in the South Pacific and noted that foreign direct investment (FDI), security cooperation, and military diplomacy can all offer the PRC a path to improve its power projection in Oceania.[66] The Solomon Islands signed a security agreement with the PRC in March 2022 that included granting the PRC access and replenishment rights to Solomon Islands ports, as well as the right to use its armed forces to protect Chinese projects and personnel in the Solomon Islands.[67] PRC agreements with other Pacific Island states have not included such overt concessions to PRC military interests but serve to expand PRC political influence in the countries to advance Beijing’s strategic ambitions and in some cases convince the countries to abandon their support for Taiwan. A comprehensive strategic partnership with the Cook Islands could present the PRC with an opportunity to make political inroads with a country located close to New Zealand and the US territory of American Samoa. The Cook Islands has shown a willingness to reduce its dependence on New Zealand, including an announcement by Mark Brown on February 7 that the country could issue its own passports.[68]PRC efforts to expand influence in the Pacific have faced backlash from the Five Eyes intelligence sharing group, most notably the United States and Australia. New Zealand is a Five Eyes member state but has faced criticism for taking a softer approach toward the PRC than its counterparts.[69] Current New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters expressed interest in expanding engagement with the Five Eyes and led the development of the Pacific Reset strategy, which sought to cultivate New Zealand’s ties with Pacific neighbors.[70] EuropeThe PRC’s appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European Affairs signals that Beijing intends to take a more aggressive posture in negotiations with the European Union. Lu Shaye was the PRC’s ambassador to France from July 2019 to December 2024. He was one of Beijing’s most controversial ambassadors due to his combative “wolf warrior” style, a term Lu embraced. The French foreign ministry summoned Lu seven times in his five-year tenure over various high-profile disputes, including his comment in April 2023 that ex-Soviet states do not have “effective status” under international law, which he made when asked whether he considered Crimea to be part of Ukraine. The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post cited “people familiar with the case” who said Lu had lost access to any relevant French government organs by the time he left Paris.[71] Lu replaced Wu Hongbo as the PRC Special Representative for European Affairs, a role that Wu held since it was created in 2019.[72] Lu’s special representative role is distinct from the post of PRC Ambassador to the EU, which is held by another diplomat. “Special representative” is an ad hoc role that the PRC MFA creates when it sees a need to have one chief negotiator responsible for a broad region or issue area, such as European affairs, the Korean Peninsula, or climate change.Lu’s appointment follows signs from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that the EU may be softening its stance on the PRC. Von der Leyen, widely described in Western and PRC media as a prominent “China hawk” for her efforts to reduce the EU’s reliance on the PRC, said in a speech at the EU Ambassadors Conference on February 3 that there is “room to engage constructively with China — and find solutions in our mutual interest,” including “agreements that could even expand our trade and investment ties.”[73] She said the EU would continue “de-risking” policies to “rebalance” EU-PRC trade and investment relations, however.[74] Von der Leyen’s apparent shift toward the PRC may stem from uncertainty about the future of the US-EU economic relationship in the near term, as US President Donald Trump had promised tariffs on EU goods.[75] Trump announced on February 11 that the United States would raise tariffs on foreign aluminum and steel to 25%, prompting condemnation and a promise of “firm and proportionate countermeasures” from von der Leyen.[76]The PRC’s promotion of Lu Shaye as its top representative to the EU likely signals Beijing’s intent to aggressively negotiate against European “de-risking” policies. The PRC may seek to take advantage of the shakiness of the EU’s economic relationship with the United States, its largest trading partner.[77] Lu’s “wolf warrior” approach is more likely to offend and alienate his European interlocutors, however, than to improve the EU-PRC trade relationship.Lu’s appointment may also portend the PRC taking a more overtly pro-Russia stance on the war in Ukraine. The PRC’s main negotiator on the Ukraine War is Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui, but Lu Shaye’s new role may position him as an important voice as well.[78] The PRC has consistently claimed to be an impartial mediator and voice for peace in the war in Ukraine, despite providing dual-use goods and economic support to Russia throughout the war. It has refrained from overtly endorsing Russia’s invasion and political aims, but has adopted Russian framing in many ways including defending Russia’s “legitimate security concerns” about NATO expansion, criticizing Western aid to Ukraine for “adding fuel to the fire,” opposing unilateral sanctions on Russia, proposing peace plans that do not call for withdrawing Russian troops, and refusing to call the war a war.[79] The PRC distanced itself at the time from Lu’s comments undermining the sovereignty of former Soviet states.[80] Its elevation of Lu to such a key position may signal a tacit acceptance of his views, however.PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to visit the UK on February 13 to hold talks with British Foreign Secretary David Lammy for the first UK-China Strategic Dialogue since 2018.[81] The UK under Conservative leadership experienced strained relations with the PRC over issues such as the Hong Kong crackdown and allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[82] The Labour Party has made improving relations with the PRC one of its main foreign policy objectives.[83] The party acted on this rhetoric by holding numerous meetings between top UK and PRC officials since Prime Minister Keir Starmer took power in July 2024. Lammy visited Beijing in mid-October where he met with Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.[84] PRC President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kier Starmer met at the G20 summit in November 2024, the first meeting between a British PM and Xi since 2018 — the press statement stated that talks would continue.[85] British finance minister Rachel Reeves visited Beijing in mid-January in an effort to revive economic and financial talks, which were last held in 2019.[86] PRC-UK relations appear to be warming as a result of increased diplomatic engagement, which contrasts with the appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European Affairs due to his combative approach to foreign policy. 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- — Iran Update, February 4, 2025
- Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moorman, Christina Harward, Avery Borens, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran is conducting nuclear research that would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a period of months. The New York Times reported on February 3 that a "secret team" of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is "exploring" a faster approach to build a nuclear weapon in a "matter of months.”[1] The engineers and scientists could be from the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (SPND), which, under a different name, played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003. The new approach would decrease the time Iran needs to turn weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched to 90 percent) into a nuclear weapon. This approach would significantly reduce the time that the International Atomic Energy Agency would have to detect Iranian weaponization activity. It would also reduce the time that the United States or Israel would have to take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran currently possesses near weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched to 60 percent), but Western estimates indicate that Iran could further enrich this material to weapons-grade levels within days. Unspecified US officials said that Iran could build an "older-style nuclear weapon" using the new approach, but that such a weapon would not fit on a ballistic missile and would likely be less reliable than a modern weapon. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time.Iran’s nuclear weapons research comes as Israel has eroded key elements of Iran’s deterrence since October 2024. The IDF has defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip and degraded Hezbollah.[2] The IDF also disabled Iranian air defenses and disrupted Iranian missile production capabilities in its airstrikes on Iran in October 2024.[3] The New York Times reported that Iran is exploring “new options” to deter US or Israeli strikes, citing unspecified intelligence.[4] Some Iranian hardliners have publicly called for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon to restore deterrence vis-a-vis Israel.[5] CTP-ISW has previously observed that some Iranian hardliners are trying to pressure the Supreme Leader to revoke his 2003 fatwa that bans the production and use of nuclear weapons.US President Donald Trump ordered the re-enforcement of “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran on February 4 to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. Trump signed an executive order that targets Iranian oil sales to other countries.[6] Trump previously withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran during his first term as president. Trump told reporters that he is open to a deal with Iran and would be willing to meet with Iranian officials.“Maximum pressure” sanctions will likely cause further deterioration of the Iranian economy. The Iranian budget relies heavily on oil export revenues. Iran previously exported around 2.5 million barrels of oil per day in April 2018—one month before Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[7] Iranian oil exports fell dramatically in the following years, but oil exports began to slowly increase beginning in 2020, though Iran still only exported 400,000 barrels per day in 2020.[8] Iran will likely try to continue to export oil illicitly but will likely not be able to maintain current oil export levels.[9] Oil exports are also insufficient to resolve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy. These issues will remain regardless of the imposition of sanctions. These economic issues include widespread corruption, nepotism, and the outsized role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and parastatal foundations, known as bonyads, in the economy.[11]Iran is attempting to improve its air defense abilities possibly in preparation for a conventional conflict with the United States or Israel. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, with the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, appointed Artesh Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as the commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters on February 4.[12] Sabahi Fard will continue to serve as the Artesh Air Defense Force commander as well. Sabahi Fard replaced Brigadier General Ghader Rahim Zadeh, who had commanded the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters since April 2021.[13] Khamenei appointed Rahim Zadeh as an adviser to Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi.[14] Iran established the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters in 2008. Khamenei restructured the Iranian air defense structure in 2019, delegating air defense operations to the Artesh Air Defense Force and elevating the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters to a higher echelon of command. The Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and IRGC. Sabahi Fard previously commanded the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters from May 2018 to May 2019 before Khamenei restructured it.[15]These military leadership changes come as Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent weeks, specifically around Iranian nuclear facilities.[16] The Artesh Air Defense Force most recently conducted an exercise in southwestern Iran on February 4.[17] The Artesh Air Defense Force tested Iranian-made radar systems, an expanded surveillance network, and the ”Majid” and “Joshan” missile systems, which Iranian media claims can intercept a large-scale drone attack.[18] These exercises reflect Iran’s efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities and concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.An Israeli delegation will travel to Doha on February 8 and 9 to negotiate the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage agreement.[19] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced that the delegation would travel to Doha after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, DC on February 4. The ceasefire agreement required Israel and Hamas to begin negotiations for the second phase on February 3.[20] Reuters reported on January 19 that the second phase of the ceasefire "is expected“ to include the release of the remaining Israeli hostages, a complete Israel Defense Forces withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and a permanent ceasefire.[21]Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, on February 4.[22] Shara announced that Syria is forming a “joint strategy” with Turkey to confront regional security threats and ensure lasting stability in the two countries.[23] Neither Shara nor Erdogan provided details about this strategy. Several unspecified officials and security sources told Reuters on February 4 that Shara and Erdogan would likely discuss the creation of a joint defense pact that would allow Turkey to use airbases in the central Syrian desert and take a “lead role” in training the new Syrian army.[24] Shara and Erdogan did not announce a defense pact during their joint press conference.A defense pact between Syria and Turkey would be consistent with current Syrian objectives. Syrian leaders have said that they will pursue “strategic relations” with Turkey and have frequently included Turkish-backed factions and commanders in meetings about the establishment of the new Syrian government and military.[25] The presence of Turkish forces at Syrian airbases in the central Syrian desert would in theory enable Turkey to defend Syrian airspace in the event of a future attack, according to several officials, including one Syrian security official.[26] The Assad regime previously acquired and used Russian and Iranian air defense systems, such as the Russian Pantsir missile system.[27] Israeli airstrikes before and after the fall of the regime likely destroyed the majority of these systems.[28] The Syrian government is likely eager to obtain temporary Turkish protection from potential threats in the absence of a functional military and active air defense systems. The new Syrian army also needs military equipment and training, both of which Russia and Iran previously provided to Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA).[29] Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra noted during a recent interview that the Defense Ministry needs critical ”infrastructure” to repair or replace aircraft, tanks, and radars.[30] The new Syrian army units, which the interim government is forming from various armed factions, will require training to become organized and disciplined units.A defense pact between Syria and Turkey would similarly enable Turkey to pursue its strategic objectives in Syria by increasing its influence in Syria. Turkish officials have repeatedly stated that Turkey seeks to “eliminate” the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[31] An unspecified regional intelligence official stated that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Palmyra military airport and the Tiyas airbase to send a “message” to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria.[32]Formalized Turkish military involvement in Syria would also likely be part of Turkey and HTS’s efforts to coerce the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry. Shara and Erdogan likely discussed recent developments in HTS’s ongoing negotiations with the SDF. Shara recently told Western media that he is not very optimistic about the possibility of an agreement with the SDF but that negotiations continue.[33] Imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan is expected to make an imminent ”historic call” for the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) to disarm. Turkish officials expect that such a call would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government.[34] Turkey has repeatedly threatened to conduct a military offensive into northern Syria in order to “eliminate” the SDF but has refrained from doing so while HTS negotiates with the SDF. HTS and Turkey may calculate that a formal Turkey-Syria defense agreement and an increased Turkish military presence in Syria could pressure the SDF to concede to HTS and Turkish demands. The SDF is unlikely to disarm, however, as it actively engages Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in northern Syria.A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contact on "all issues," including Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus.[35] Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4.[36] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.[37] Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025.[38] The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya, though Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025, as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported.[39] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II at Tartus.[40] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria—a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet.”[41]Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran is conducting nuclear research that would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a period of months. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time. Iran’s nuclear weapons research comes as Israel has eroded key elements of Iran’s deterrence since October 2024.Maximum Pressure: US President Donald Trump ordered the re-enforcement of “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran on February 4 to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. “Maximum pressure” sanctions will likely cause further deterioration of the Iranian economy.Iranian Air Defense: Iran is attempting to improve its air defense abilities possibly in preparation for a conventional conflict with the United States or Israel. These military leadership changes come as Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent weeks, specifically around Iranian nuclear facilities.Gaza Strip Ceasefire: An Israeli delegation will travel to Doha on February 8 and 9 to negotiate the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage agreement.Syria-Turkey Relations: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, on February 4. A defense pact between Syria and Turkey would be consistent with current Syrian objectives, and it would similarly enable Turkey to pursue its strategic objectives in Syria by increasing its influence in Syria.Russia in Syria: A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.SyriaTurkey continued to target SDF positions with airstrikes and artillery along key ground lines of communication to isolate the SDF at Qara Qozak Bridge.[42] The SDF reported on February 4 that Turkish aircraft struck multiple villages along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, including Ghasq, al Tineh, Dukan, Jaada, and Sarrin.[43] The SDF also reported that Turkish artillery shelled villages near Qara Qozak Bridge.[44] Turkish airstrikes have concentrated recent attacks on SDF positions east of the Qara Qozak Bridge, likely to isolate SDF units operating at the bridgehead.[45]The SDF reported that Turkish drones struck an SDF position near Deir Hafer on February 4.[46] The SDF reported that the drone strikes killed two SDF fighters.[47] Turkey has targeted SDF positions in and around Deir Hafer in recent days.[48]The SDF attacked SNA forces near the Qara Qozak Bridge and Tishreen Dam on February 4.[49] The SDF spokesperson reported that the SDF conducted an operation that targeted two separate groups of SNA fighters near Tishreen Dam.[50] The SDF killed two SNA fighters during the operation.[51] The SDF also reported that SDF destroyed unspecified SNA sites near Qara Qozak Hill.[52] Turkey conducted several airstrikes that targeted SDF units near the Tishreen Dam.[53]Anti-SDF media reported on February 4 that the SNA shelled SDF positions near Tal Tamr along the SNA-SDF frontline in Hasakah Province.[54]Armed Syrian factions have expressed varying degrees of willingness to integrate into the interim Syrian Defense Ministry. The interim Syrian government announced on January 29 that “all military factions, political, and civil revolutionary bodies will be dissolved and integrated into state institutions.”[55] US-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) Commander Salem Antari, who controls US-backed ”Free Syrian Army” forces in the al Tanf zone, stated on February 3 that the FSA is negotiating with the interim government to integrate into the interim Defense Ministry.[56] Antari added that the FSA is prepared to assume any duties assigned to it by the new Defense Ministry.[57]The Druze, Suwayda Province-based Men of Dignity Movement expressed support for the interim government’s efforts to build a Syrian state based on the rule of law but did not pledge its support or allegiance to the new interim government. The head of the Men of Dignity Movement, Sheikh Abu Hassan Yahya al Hajjar, announced that the movement will cooperate with the Interior Ministry’s new police and security forces.[58] Hajjar added that only those “charged with protecting institutions” or executing “official duties” will be permitted to carry weapons.[59] An unspecified senior Druze official from Suwayda Province claimed that armed groups in the province will not disarm until the interim government establishes a state and constitution based on a decentralized system.[60] The Wall Street Journal reported that the Men of Dignity Movement has thus far prevented the entry of HTS-led forces into Suwayda Province.[61]Israeli forces likely continued operations in southern Syria on February 4. Syrian media reported that a convoy of Israeli military vehicles briefly entered al Maalaqa, Quneitra Province, on February 4.[62] CTP-ISW cannot verify local reporting. Israeli forces remained stationed in several positions within the disengagement zone between Syria and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[63]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentThe Iraqi Federal Supreme Court temporarily suspended the implementation of three laws that the Iraqi parliament passed on January 21.[64] The Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the general amnesty, personal status, and property restitution laws in order to determine the “constitutionality of [these] laws [that are] subject to lawsuits.” Some parliamentarians claimed that parliament illegally passed these laws because it voted on the three laws simultaneously rather than separately.[65] The State of Law Coalition, which is led by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, announced on January 23 that it would file a complaint with the Federal Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of the January 21 parliamentary session.[66] The Federal Supreme Court is headed by Jassem Mohammad Aboud, who is close to Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri.[67] Ameri has previously expressed opposition to the General Amnesty Law, claiming that it would allow “terrorist organizations” to “circumvent the state’s constitution and escape the grip of justice.”[68] Maliki recently similarly claimed that the General Amnesty Law would release “murderers and criminals” from prison.[69] The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) killed five ISIS fighters in airstrikes near Kirkuk, northern Iraq, on January 31.[70] US Central Command (CENTCOM) provided technical support and intelligence to the ISF to conduct the strikes. CENTCOM reported that the fighters had multiple suicide vests and other unspecified materials.Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani met with Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Major General Kevin Leahy on February 4.[71] Barzani and Leahy discussed the importance of joint cooperation between federal Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan with the US-led international coalition to combat ISIS. Barzani and Leahy also discussed the “unification” of the Peshmerga and the situation in Syria. Barzani formally placed the Peshmerga 3rd and 4th Infantry divisions under the KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs on February 4 as part of the Peshmerga “unification process.”[72]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripNothing significant to report.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripThe IDF Air Force struck a vehicle as it traveled toward the northern Gaza Strip on an unauthorized route on February 4.[73] Palestinian vehicles can only travel to the northern Gaza Strip on the Salah al Din Road after undergoing inspection at the Netzarim Corridor.[74] US and Egyptian private security contractors have operated a checkpoint at the Netzarim Corridor to inspect vehicles since January 27.[75]The Palestinian Authority (PA) formed a committee to manage civilian affairs in the Gaza Strip on February 4.[76] The committee includes technocrats and “independent individuals” from the Gaza Strip, according to an unspecified PA official. Hamas and the PA agreed in early December 2024 to form a committee comprised of 10-15 technocrats to manage post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[77] It is not clear if the PA involved Hamas when PA officials selected the committee.Egypt is planning to host an international conference in cooperation with the United Nations to discuss reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip.[78] Several foreign ministers from Arab countries met in Cairo on February 1 to discuss how to rapidly improve the situation in the Gaza Strip before reconstruction begins.[79] The Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage agreement stipulates that Egypt, Qatar, and the United Nations will supervise reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip.[80]LebanonLebanese media reported that the IDF advanced near Kfar Hamam, southeastern Lebanon, on February 4.[81] Geolocated footage shows that IDF mechanized units advanced southward onto the Kfar Hamam-Kfar Chouba road and later withdrew from the road.[82] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) reportedly deployed to the area to block the IDF advance.[83] Lebanese media reported that LAF forces entered the outskirts of Kfar Hamam on January 21.[84] The LAF and UNIFIL backfilled IDF positions in Kfar Chouba on January 22.[85]Lebanese media reported on February 4 that the IDF detonated explosives in Kfar Kila, Odaisseh, Houla, and Blida in Marjaayoun District.[86]The LAF backfilled IDF positions in Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon, on February 4.[87] Lebanese media reported that the IDF destroyed homes in Taybeh and Rab al Thalatheen, north of Taybeh before LAF forces arrived in the area.[88]Lebanese media reported on February 4 that the IDF detonated explosives in Yaroun and Aitaroun in Bint Jbeil District.[89] Hezbollah-affiliated media claimed that Israeli forces raided homes and fired small arms in eastern Yaroun.[90] Lebanese state media reported that the IDF detonated homes in Aitaroun on February 4.[91] The LAF backfilled an IDF position in Aitaroun on February 1.[92] The LAF first deployed to Aitaroun on January 11.[93]West BankA Palestinian militia fighter attacked an IDF outpost near the Tayasir checkpoint in the northern West Bank on February 4, killing two IDF soldiers and injuring eight.[94] Israeli forces killed the fighter as he tried to run away.[95] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi visited the Tayasir checkpoint and stated that the IDF will expand its counterterrorism operation in the West Bank to new areas.[96] No militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.The IDF continued its counterterrorism operation in the West Bank on February 4. The IDF has killed 55 fighters and detained 380 fighters since January 21.[97] Israeli forces have also seized several weapons and improvised explosive devices (IED). The IDF is currently operating in Jenin, Tulkarm, and Tubas governorates in the northern West Bank.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyA Saudi-owned, London-based outlet reported that Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Vahid Jalalzadeh traveled to Beirut on February 1 to facilitate the evacuation of Iranians from Damascus to Tehran via Rafic Hariri International Airport.[98] The outlet reported that Iran seeks to repatriate Iranians with Syrian citizenship to Tehran, citing an unspecified security source. The outlet also reported that Jalalzadeh called for international assistance to settle Syrian refugees in Lebanon during meetings with Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib and General Security Chief Major General Elias al Bayssari.Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani met with Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani in Tehran on February 4.[99] Mashhadani presented a proposal to establish a conference for “neighboring Arab and Islamic countries” to support Syria. Larijani stated that “Tehran would be the first country to participate in this conference.”The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/03/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapon.html?auth=login-google1tap&login=google1tap[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-reshaping-of-irans-axis-of-resistance[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/israeli-retaliatory-strikes-on-iran[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/03/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapon.html?auth=login-google1tap&login=google1tap[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-23-2024[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-set-reimpose-maximum-pressure-iran-official-says-2025-02-04/[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-22-2023[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-22-2023[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-18-2024 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-16-2024[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024#:~:text=%5B68%5D%20The%20US%20Energy%20Information,including%20proxies%20and%20regional%20operations; https://www.mei.edu/publications/iranian-para-governmental-organizations-bonyads[12] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/16/3251391[13] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1400/02/08/2493628[14] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/724229[15] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/860003 ;https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/145826[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-12-2025[17] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/16/3250905[18] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/16/3251205/ ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/16/3250973[19] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1886631832508129566[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-are-main-elements-gaza-ceasefire-deal-2025-01-15/[21] https://understandingwar-my.sharepoint.com/:w:/g/personal/ncarl_understandingwar_org/EV9iAJpWGAVJmwFme948hMIBPrn2v5SNpAOzDtdX4Ss63g?rtime=PTfUv2JF3Ug[22] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/04/world/middleeast/syria-turkey-al-shara-erdogan.html[23] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1886836607853969844[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sharaa-discuss-defense-pact-with-turkeys-erdogan-sources-say-2025-02-04/[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122504[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sharaa-discuss-defense-pact-with-turkeys-erdogan-sources-say-2025-02-04/[27] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/02/politics/syrias-assad-hezbollah-wagner-missile-system/index.html; https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2025/01/27/for-generations-russia-was-syrias-main-arms-supplier-that-may-be-over/[28] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdx921zreweo[29] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/03/the-efficiency-of-the-syrian-armed-forces-an-analysis-of-russian-assistance?lang=en¢er=middle-east ; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iranian-commandos-deployed-to-syria-as-advisers-officer-idUSKCN0X11D4/#:~:text=Iran%20has%20sent%20commandos%20to%20Syria%20as%20advisers%2C,Bashar%20al-Assad%27s%20forces%20in%20the%20country%27s%20civil%20war.[30] https://www.newarab.com/news/syria-defence-chief-new-arab-above-all-we-want-peace[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sharaa-discuss-defense-pact-with-turkeys-erdogan-sources-say-2025-02-04/[33] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/02/03/an-interview-with-ahmed-al-sharaa-syrias-president[34] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A/%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%85-%D8%B3%D8%B3-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%8A[35] https://tass dot ru/politika/23039715[36] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:365758/mmsi:273389870/imo:9268710/vessel:SPARTA; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:362360/mmsi:273394890/imo:9160994/vessel:SPARTA_II[37] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1886852538282152050[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-january-24-2025-russia-continues-pivot-libya-and-mali-saf-advances-khartoum[40] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/ukrayina-kontrolyuye-ruh-rosijskyh-suden-yaki-vozyat-zbroyu-iz-syriyi/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012825[41] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/ukrayina-kontrolyuye-ruh-rosijskyh-suden-yaki-vozyat-zbroyu-iz-syriyi/[42] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1884901218511712355; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/13457; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1884936863087026331; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1884619857678762252; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1884179907124813920; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134382; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134375; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1883935832459055174; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134344; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1883797128335474785; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1883797128335474785; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1883462431374258202; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1883059538045145449; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2025[43] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886675957001417106[44] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886675957001417106[45] https://www.iswresearch.org/2025/02/iran-update-february-3-2025.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2025[46] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886675957001417106[47] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886675957001417106[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2025[49] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886675957001417106[50] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886675957001417106[51] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886675957001417106[52] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886675957001417106[53] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886675957001417106; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1886702074232025130; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134990[54] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1886510969276248495; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134973[55] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122157[56] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134960[57] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134960[58] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1886768092673347951 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7GvONDElz7c[59] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1886768092673347951[60] https://www.wsj.com/opinion/syria-has-a-new-governmentor-does-it-al-sharaa-hts-islamist-0f938cc5?mod=opinion_lead_pos12[61] https://www.wsj.com/opinion/syria-has-a-new-governmentor-does-it-al-sharaa-hts-islamist-0f938cc5?mod=opinion_lead_pos12[62] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1886690011040436249, www dot npasyria.com/204486, https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1886737927088038374[63] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/02/israel-syria-golan-ceasefire-line/[64] https://almadapaper dot net/395212/[65] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1181645 ;https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9 ;https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%82%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9[66] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1181645[67] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-iraqi-federal-supreme-courthttps://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/822258https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-16-2024[68] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/4539866-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A[69] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/514883/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC[70] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1886735178799919389[71] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%8A[72] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/kurdistan/040220253[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1886789121290510843[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1884146694880698745[75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-27-2025[76] https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-gaza-ceasefire-news-02-04-2025-763f7874199e84926f75f5a513087137[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-3-2024[78] https://www.egypttoday dot com/Article/1/138142/Egypt%E2%80%99s-FM-UN-Senior-Humanitarian-and-Reconstruction-Coordinator-for-Gaza[79] https://www dot kan.org.il/content/kan-news/politic/855781[80] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-are-main-elements-gaza-ceasefire-deal-2025-01-15/[81] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129085 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13409 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/193630[82] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129085 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13409 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/193630[83] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129092[84] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111782[85] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1882094582164550050 ; https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1882085831558447386[86] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129082 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13408 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113234 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113211[87] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1886747158138826916[88] https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1886711031918895501[89] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113249 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113254 ; https://www.nna-leb dot gov dot lb/ar/justice-law/756973/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86[90] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13411[91] https://www.nna-leb dot gov dot lb/ar/justice-law/756973/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86[92] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1885726039193813250[93] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1878083413623652491[94] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1886700296929189993 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1886731977304293820 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1886731980336771370[95] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1886700296929189993[96] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1886823387030249598[97] https://www.idf dot il/268007[98] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5107369-iran-seeks-protect-syrians-fleeing-lebanon-after-assad%E2%80%99s-fall[99] https://ina dot iq/eng/38135-al-mashhadani-suggests-that-iraq-hold-a-conference-to-promote-the-stability-of-syria.html;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/16/3251147
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2025
- Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate TrotterFebruary 4, 2025, 7:15 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on February 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.[1] Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply disruption could cause a nuclear accident.[2] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne noted that the Kyivska Electrical Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with power.[3] Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024.[4] Grossi reported that the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves.[5] Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy procurement), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall specialized equipment, including auto transformers.[6] Another Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.[7]Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage."[8] Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that 740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse" because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the frontline.[9] Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting new personnel.[10] These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial involuntary reserve call up.The Russian military may be struggling to recruit enough new military personnel, however. ISW observed reports in late 2024 and January 2025 that the Russian military's monthly recruitment rate is likely equal to or below the quantity needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one.[11] ISW also observed reports that select Russian federal subjects are failing to meet their monthly recruitment quotas as citizens are less willing to volunteer to fight.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed a draft amendment on February 3 to reclassify some illnesses, diseases, and disorders for conscripts and those signing military service contracts. The Russian MoD proposed reclassifying syphilis, hypertension, central nervous system atrophy disorders, skin diseases, schizophrenia, psychotic disorders, affective disorders, and other health problems as more minor ailments that do not disqualify someone from service.[13] Radio Svoboda, citing the Russian Movement of Conscientious Objectors, reported that the Russian MoD's proposal would make it more difficult for conscripts to obtain military service exemptions for health reasons and would complicate dismissal procedures for mobilized personnel and servicemembers who signed a military service contract.[14]Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claim that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in an interview with Russian state news wire RIA Novosti published on February 4 that Kharkiv Oblast is "strategically" and politically significant for Russia.[15] Ganchev claimed that he was "certain" that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast because Russia needed a "sanitary zone" to protect Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts from Ukrainian shelling. Ganchev called on Russian forces to drive Ukrainian forces "as far west as possible." Ganchev claimed that occupation authorities in Kharkiv Oblast had a plan in August 2022 to hold a "referendum" on Russia's annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but that the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in early September 2022 prevented the referendum. Ganchev claimed that if it were not for the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Kharkiv Oblast would have become the "fifth oblast to join Russia on September 30." Russian forces currently occupy parts of northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, but Russia has not attempted to illegally annex Kharkiv Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin notably did not include Kharkiv Oblast in his June 2024 demands that Ukraine cede Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even territories that Russian forces do not occupy in these regions.[16]A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus.[17] Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4.[18] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.[19] Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025.[20] The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported.[21] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II at Tartus.[22] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet."[23]Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria. The Ukrainian Resistance Center posted video evidence showing that it had gained access to the "Mosaik" system, an internal system that Russia reportedly uses to track Russian ship routes and cargo.[24] Data from the "Mosaik" system shows that the Sparta IV traveled between Tartus, Syria, and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai via the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in April 2023. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Oboronlogistika logistics company owns the Sparta, Sparta II, and Sparta IV cargo ships.[25] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian vessels stopped traveling between Russia and Syria via the Black Sea in Spring 2024, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian naval drone strikes in the Black Sea.[26] Russian ships instead reportedly started traveling from Russian ports in the Baltic Sea to Syria via the Atlantic Ocean despite the fact that this route is several times longer than the Black Sea route. The appearance of Russian vessels in the Mediterranean Sea on February 4 is consistent with reports that Russian ships are now traveling between Syria and Russia via the Atlantic.Russia has also reportedly used vessels belonging to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that it gained access to correspondence between an unspecified branch of the Russian Administration of Sea Ports and the Sparta's captain in which Russian authorities asked the Sparta and Sparta II to monitor Latvian patrol ships in the Baltic Sea off the western coast of Latvia in April 2023.[27] NATO notably conducted its Aurora 23 exercise near Sweden in April and May 2024.[28]Key Takeaways:International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilitiesRussian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties.Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.Russia has also reportedly used vessels belonging to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea.Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued ground attacks in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 4 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacks northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo, north of Sudzha near Nikolayevka, and south of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[29] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Sudzha near Nikolayevo-Darino and Sverdlikovo and south of Sudzha near Makhnovka and Kurilovka.[30]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Staraya Sorochina, Novaya Sorochina (both northwest of Sudzha), Russkoye Porechnoye, and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (both north of Suzhda) and pushed Ukrainian forces from the northern outskirts of Sverdlikovo.[31]A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are taking a "temporary operational pause" in the Kursk direction.[32] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces' efforts to seize Makhnovka throughout January 2025 ceased due to a combination of Ukrainian drone operations and poor weather conditions and that Russian forces ultimately withdrew from the settlement. The milblogger assessed that fighting for Makhnovka will likely resume when the ground either freezes again or completely dries out. Another milblogger also claimed that Russian forces failed to secure a foothold near Makhnovka.[33]South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed recent reports that North Korean forces have not been conducting combat operations in Kursk Oblast since mid-January 2025.[34] The NIS assessed that North Korean forces have likely withdrawn from combat due to high casualties. The New York Times (NYT) recently reported that North Korean forces were no longer participating in combat operations in Kursk Oblast, and a senior US defense official told the NYT that additional North Korean forces would arrive in Russia "within the next two months" (roughly mid-March 2025).[35] North Korean forces' pause in participating in combat operations may have influenced the alleged Russian "temporary operational pause" in Kursk Oblast.Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division), assault elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[36]The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike against an unspecified Russian command post near Novoivanovka (northwest of Sudzha) on February 3.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike inflicted significant casualties. The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported Ukrainian strikes on command posts of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], SMD) near Lgov, Belaya, and Rylsk, Kursk Oblast on December 25, 2024, and January 7 and 31, 2025, respectively.[38]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kharkiv direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 3 and 4.[39] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyptsi.[40]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated that Russian forces are conducting constant artillery, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), guided glide bomb, and drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and are concentrated in northern Vovchansk north of the Vovcha River.[41]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 4. Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on February 3 and 4.[42]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[43]Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed on February 4 that Russia's potential seizure of Dvorichna and Zapadne will allow Russian forces to advance towards Kupyansk and towards Velykyi Burluk (northwest of Kupyansk) and Vovchansk (northwest of Velykyi Burluk).[44] Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian sources have also recently indicated that Russian forces may intend to leverage advances near Dvorichna and Vovchansk to advance on Velykyi Burluk from the northwest and southeast.[45]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating near Dvorichna and Novomlynsk (both north of Kupyansk).[46] Elements of the Russian 375th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[47]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahyrzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, Kolisnykivka, and Lozova and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka on February 3 and 4.[48]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st Tank Regiment and the 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (all of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) are attacking near Kolisnykivka and Zahryzove.[49] Mashovets stated that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating in the Makiivka-Hrekivka direction (southeast of Borova).[50] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly operating near Lozova.[51]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Novolyubivka, Ivanivka, and Terny and east of Lyman near Dibrova on February 3 and 4.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces periodically conduct reconnaissance-in-force missions near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Torske (east of Lyman).[53]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced northwest, west, and southwest of Ivanivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[54]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 3 that Russian forces have lost an unspecified number of armored vehicles and are increasingly relying on civilian vehicles.[55]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are operating in the Terny-Yampolivka and Ivanivka-Kolodyazi direction.[56] [57]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 4 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 3 and 4.[58]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[59]A Russian milblogger posted footage on February 4 of Russian forces purportedly conducting a drone strike against a Ukrainian railway bridge near Siversk.[60]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating southeast of Siversk.[61]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking within and near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on February 3 and 4.[62]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[63]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[64] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Novopivnichnyi Microraion (western Chasiv Yar).[65] Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones near Predtechyne.[66]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk, on the northern outskirts of Toretsk, northeast of Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 3 and 4.[67]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 4 but did not make confirmed advances. A Ukrainian brigade published footage on February 4 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction.[68] Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, Myrolyubivka, Malynivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyarivka, Yelyzavetivka, Udachne, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Sribne; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on February 3 and 4.[69] Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight noted on February 3 that Russian forces have been attacking into Zvirove and that Zvirove's urban area is connected to Pokrovsk's urban area.[70]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kotlyne, northeast of Udachne, and northwest of Vodyane Druhe.[72] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on February 4 that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction and prefer to use swift and maneuverable vehicles, including buggies and motorcycles.[73] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction similarly noted that Russian forces transport infantry for assaults using civilian cars and motorcycles.[74] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are launching dozens of FPV drones and conduct 10 to 20 small infantry assaults per day in the area but noted that the overall tempo of Russian offensive operations has decreased.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Atlant" Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[75] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are operating south of Pokrovsk and that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are operating along the Vozdvyzhenka-Baranivka line (east of Pokrovsk).[76]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 4 but did not advance. Trehubov stated on February 4 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Bahatyr (west of Kostyantynopil) that consisted of two Russian columns of tanks and armored fighting vehicles.[77] Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv, Zelenivka, Yantarne, and Rozdolne on February 3 and 4.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Dachne.[79]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced in central Dachne and advanced in Andriivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[80]A Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian forces are increasingly using fiber-optic FPV drones west of Kurakhove.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that central Dachne is a contested "gray zone."[82]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 67th Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are operating in Andriivka, that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Zelenivka, and that elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Dachne.[83] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[84]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Velyka Novosilka itself, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on February 3 and 4.[85] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 4 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault near Velyka Novosilka and destroyed two tanks and two armored personnel carriers.[86]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to two kilometers deep and 1.5 kilometers wide north and west of Velyka Novosilka.[87] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novyi Komar.[88]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Zaporizhia direction on February 4 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) and Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne) on February 3 and 4.[89]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Myrne (northeast of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[90]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating in the Orikhiv direction.[91]Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction immediately east of Kherson City near Antonivka and Prydniprovske on February 3 and 4 but did not advance.[92]The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship cruise missile over the Sea of Azov on the night of February 3 to 4.[93] ISW has not observed independent confirmation of this claim.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 3 to 4 and a missile strike on February 4. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 65 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts on the night of February 3 to 4.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 37 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Cherkasy oblasts and that 28 drones were ”locally lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, and Sumy oblasts.[95] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that Russian forces launched a ballistic missile, likely an Iskander-M ballistic missile, against Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast on the morning of February 4, damaging part of a city council building and killing five civilians.[96]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.[97] The milblogger complained that Russian field commanders in the Siversk direction continue creating false reports that exaggerate or falsely represent Russian successes. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command changed the commander of the 3rd Combined Arms Army ([CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) and the commanders of the 3rd CAA's 7th, 85th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades due to a recent scandal about false reports of Russian advances.[98] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command did not change the leadership of the 3rd CAA's 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade, which the milblogger claimed continues to conduct "suicidal," attritional, infantry-led assaults with poorly-trained and poorly-supplied personnel.[99]Russian authorities continue to militarize the Russian government through the "Time of Heroes" veterans' program. The Time of Heroes program announced on February 4 that one of its participants, veteran Nikolai Sergienko, became the Novgorod Oblast Deputy Minister of Construction.[100] Russian news outlet Vedomosti reported on February 4 that authorities are considering appointing Time of Heroes participant and veteran Boris Dudko as the Director of the Department of State Policy in the Sphere of Upbringing, Supplementary Education and Children's Recreation within the Ministry of Education.[101]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate military equipment and weapons for Russian forces to use in Ukraine. The Russian 88th “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly tested the "Erika" radio communications system on the frontline and a soldier within the brigade claimed that this system could become the basis for brigade-level communications and digital management systems.[102] The soldier requested that Ural Plant, the manufacturer of the Erika system, configure the system for lower radio frequencies to better evade Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, however. A soldier in the Russian "Tyen" ("Shadow") Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), which is reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, claimed that his detachment received the first all-terrain vehicle (ATV) assembled from Russian-produced Lada passenger car components.[103]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak announced on February 3 that Ukraine returned 12 Ukrainian children to Ukrainian-held territory from Russian-occupied Ukraine.[104] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Children's Issues Daria Herasymchuk reported on February 2 that Russia has illegally deported at least 20,000 Ukrainian children since 2022.[105]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://x.com/rafaelmgrossi/status/1886483727917703512 ; https://x.com/rafaelmgrossi/status/1886716850286780675[2] https://x.com/rafaelmgrossi/status/1886716850286780675[3] https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/940575-gendirektor-magate-vidvidav-elektropidstanciu-kiivska/[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024[6] https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-shortage-energy-russia-missile-attack-nuclear-infrastructure-research/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2024[7] https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-shortage-energy-russia-missile-attack-nuclear-infrastructure-research/[8] https://t.me/rtvimain/107877 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7479182[9] https://t.me/rtvimain/107877 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7479182[10] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21934[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025[13] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23045717 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/society/03/02/2025/67a11df79a794781e1da0c29[14] https://www.svoboda dot org/a/minoborony-rf-hochet-uslozhnitj-osvobozhdenie-ot-armii-po-zdorovjyu/33302595.html ; https://t.me/stoparmy/5573[15] https://ria dot ru/20250204/ganchev-1997287840.html;[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024[17] https://tass dot ru/politika/23039715[18] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:365758/mmsi:273389870/imo:9268710/vessel:SPARTA; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:362360/mmsi:273394890/imo:9160994/vessel:SPARTA_II[19] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1886852538282152050[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-january-24-2025-russia-continues-pivot-libya-and-mali-saf-advances-khartoum[22] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/ukrayina-kontrolyuye-ruh-rosijskyh-suden-yaki-vozyat-zbroyu-iz-syriyi/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012825[23] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/ukrayina-kontrolyuye-ruh-rosijskyh-suden-yaki-vozyat-zbroyu-iz-syriyi/[24] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/ukrayina-kontrolyuye-ruh-rosijskyh-suden-yaki-vozyat-zbroyu-iz-syriyi/[25] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/ukrayina-kontrolyuye-ruh-rosijskyh-suden-yaki-vozyat-zbroyu-iz-syriyi/ ; https://war-sanctions.gur dot gov.ua/en/transport/ships/209 ; https://war-sanctions.gur.gov dot ua/en/transport/ships/212 ; https://war-sanctions.gur dot gov.ua/en/transport/ships/214; https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20173/v173.pdf[26] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/ukrayina-kontrolyuye-ruh-rosijskyh-suden-yaki-vozyat-zbroyu-iz-syriyi/[27] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/ukrayina-kontrolyuye-ruh-rosijskyh-suden-yaki-vozyat-zbroyu-iz-syriyi/[28] https://shape.nato.int/partnerships/latest-news/2023/swedish-armed-forces-and-partners-conclude-exercise-aurora-23; https://www.forsvarsmakten dot se/en/news/2023/04/armed-forces-exercise-aurora-23-about-to-start/[29] https://t.me/rusich_army/20583[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23364; https://t.me/dva_majors/63775[31] https://t.me/rusich_army/20583; https://t.me/dva_majors/63775[32] https://t.me/rybar/67704[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/63775[34] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250204006600315?section=nk/nk[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012325; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/30/world/europe/north-korea-troops-ukraine-russia.html ; https://archive.ph/kHCuA[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23360; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85610; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85635[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20571[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/04/roboty-vykuryuyut-rosiyan-z-glybokyh-nir-same-tak-vyglyadaye-prosuvannya-syl-oborony-na-harkivshhyni/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/04/lyudmy-rozkyduyutsya-yak-rozhidnym-materialom-u-vovchansku-vorog-ne-lyshaye-sprob-atakuvaty/; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4896[40] https://t.me/tass_agency/298979[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/04/lyudmy-rozkyduyutsya-yak-rozhidnym-materialom-u-vovchansku-vorog-ne-lyshaye-sprob-atakuvaty/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20570 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4896[43] https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/8289; https:// t.me/ceroke24/1907[44] https://ria dot ru/20250204/ganchev-1997287840.html[45] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2535; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2536[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153524[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20570 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2535[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2536[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85643[52] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4896 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20570[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153523[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153549; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153509 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61880 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153523[55] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1207082474379442 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/04/bezstrashna-buhanka-proty-ukrayinskogo-drona-spojler-vona-zgorila/[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2536[57] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18750[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4897 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23389 ; https://t.me/rybar/67725[59] https:// t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23389[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23366[61] https://t.me/epoddubny/22360[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20570 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4896 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23374[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23374[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23360[65] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23374[66] https://t.me/sashakots/51689 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18753[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20570 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63775 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24640 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4896[68] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1379288976390801&rdid=nc9ScBAyiRZXaghB ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/04/syly-oborony-vidbyly-nastup-rosijskoyi-kolony-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20570 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4896 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61874 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61888 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61891[70] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1886632200268919040 ; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1886632222410645955[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/63775 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153509 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61891 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2537[72] https://t.me/rybar/67704 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61888[73] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/940489-zupinivsa-pomer-comu-armia-rf-pocala-vikoristovuvati-mense-bronetehniki-na-doneccini-poasnenna-vid-osuv-hortica/[74] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/04/dzyzhchannya-dronovyh-royiv-poblyzu-pokrovska-vorog-vypuskaye-bpla-desyatkamy/[75] https://t.me/mod_russia/48539[76] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2536[77] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/940489-zupinivsa-pomer-comu-armia-rf-pocala-vikoristovuvati-mense-bronetehniki-na-doneccini-poasnenna-vid-osuv-hortica/[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20570 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4897 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61881[79] https://t.me/sashakots/51693[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61881 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63775 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85622 ; https://x.com/War_Mapper/status/1886538334966534628 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51693 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24640[81] https://t.me/myro_shnykov/7025[82] https://t.me/sashakots/51693[83] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2537[84] https://t.me/sashakots/51698[85] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4897 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20570[86] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4897[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/13198[88] https://x.com/WarUnitObserver/status/1886559636419178708; https://t.me/burpobeda/10418 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13198[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20570 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ;[90] https://t.me/wargonzo/24640[91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23360[92] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0251U5mQcF8SHCpodZwve3SfyCbjQ4k8Gc7i1rsW81yw5fw4VtQwGL6cuMHiquntq3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Tc5iA2uigQwAmdpCsCL2MVCmTCRkrdB4y5ZYKzeJ9fPPYQ8VKqvXYH9MTua7uchl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0cdDSUPd4yQvJFpqK9nJSt3KQYfTdCU9vWVCH5B8Z8Jwuc7HenRmQabeSLNHt4XVZl[93] https://t.me/mod_russia/48526[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/28037[95] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4078; https://suspilne dot media/940151-ssa-hocut-otrimati-vid-ukraini-ridkozemelni-metali-zsu-perehodat-na-novu-korpusnu-sistemu-1077-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1738651428&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/940293-pokazali-naslidki-vlucan-u-privatni-pidpriemstva-u-cerkasah-4-lutogo/; https://suspilne dot media/940151-ssa-hocut-otrimati-vid-ukraini-ridkozemelni-metali-zsu-perehodat-na-novu-korpusnu-sistemu-1077-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1738655109&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18caQNmaj2/; https://t.me/sumy_mva/104; https://suspilne dot media/940151-ssa-hocut-otrimati-vid-ukraini-ridkozemelni-metali-zsu-perehodat-na-novu-korpusnu-sistemu-1077-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1738647932&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[96] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/940449-udar-balistikou-po-izumu-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/; https://suspilne dot media/940151-ssa-hocut-otrimati-vid-ukraini-ridkozemelni-metali-zsu-perehodat-na-novu-korpusnu-sistemu-1077-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1738669827&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/synegubov/12957 ; https://t.me/synegubov/12965 ; https://t.me/synegubov/12966 ; https://t.me/u_now/152909; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1259549251802623&rdid=IBLO59LEO5b6kEmo; https://t.me/synegubov/12966 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/76175 ; https://t.me/synegubov/12965[97] https://t.me/rybar/67725[98] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024; https://t.me/rybar/67725[99] https://t.me/rybar/67725[100] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85633 ; https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/790[101] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/career/articles/2025/02/04/1090140-departament-minprosvescheniya-vozglavit; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/02/04/nedelyu-nazad-chinovnitsa-minprosvescheniya-predlagaet-vernut-shkolnye-diskoteki-dlya-romanticheskih-otnosheniy-seychas-ee-mesto-zanimaet-uchastnik-voyny; https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/256[102] https://newizv dot ru/news/2025-02-04/gde-nayti-radiosvyaz-435782 ; https://t.me/dimsmirnov175/89664[103] https://t.me/tass_agency/299056[104] https://suspilne dot media/940087-ukraina-povernula-12-ditej-z-rosijskoi-okupacii/; https://t.me/ermaka2022/5814[105] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2025 ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/937491-ak-rosia-vikradae-ukrainskih-ditej-istoria-pidlitka-akogo-primusovo-vivezli-do-krimu/
- — Iran Update, February 12, 2025
- Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Alexandra Braverman, Davit Gasparyan, Victoria Penza, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara formed a preparatory committee on February 12 that is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara.[1] The composition of this committee suggests that it will likely make decisions that align with Shara’s views and objectives. Shara announced on January 30 that he would form a preparatory committee to facilitate “deliberations” and “consultations” about the National Dialogue Conference.[2] The National Dialogue Conference will reportedly represent all segments of Syrian society and facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.[3] It is unclear what role the preparatory committee will play in organizing and overseeing the conference. Shara also stated on January 30 that the Syrian interim government would unveil a “Constitutional Declaration” after the formation of a preparatory committee.[4] The preparatory committee is comprised of five males and two females and does not appear to include representatives of the Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and Shia communities. The committee includes the following individuals:Yousef al Hajer: Hajer is from al Shuhail, Deir ez Zor Province, which was a Jabhat al Nusra stronghold until ISIS declared the formation of a caliphate in June 2014.[5] Hajar was injured in an April 2024 attack that targeted Abu Maria al Qahtani, one of the founders of Jabhat al Nusra.[6] Hajer previously served as the head of the HTS Political Bureau and as a member of the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) Shura Council in northwestern Syria.[7]Hassan al Daghim: Daghim is Sunni and previously headed the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army’s (SNA) Moral Guidance Department.[8] Daghim and other SNA members met with Shara in late December 2024 to discuss the integration of armed groups into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[9] Daghim stated on January 31 that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is “one of the Syrian components and cannot be distinguished from other [components].”[10] Daghim was previously a strong critic of Shara but reconciled with Shara in 2024.[11]Hind Qabawat: Qabawat is a Christian who has spent years promoting interfaith tolerance, women’s rights, and conflict resolution in Syria.[12] Qabawat serves as the director of interfaith peacebuilding at George Mason University’s Center for World Religions, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution. Qabawat is also a member of the High Negotiations Committee for Syria in Geneva. Qabawat founded the Syrian Center for Dialogue, Peace, and Reconciliation in Toronto.Maher Alloush: Alloush is Sunni and close to Ahrar al Sham, which is an Islamist opposition group that has been close to HTS and its predecessor organizations since the mid-2010s.[13] Alloush previously mediated an internal dispute in Ahrar al Sham that resulted in the appointment of Abu Obeida as leader of Ahram al Sham in January 2019.[14] Alloush met with Shara in December 2024.[15]Mustafa Musa: Musa is a member of HTS and served as the head of the SSG Shura Council from April 2020 until the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[16] Musa, who is a trained pharmacist, also previously headed the SSG Shura Council health committee.[17]Mohammad Mastat: Mastat previously served as the director of primary healthcare in the SSG Health Ministry.[18] Mastat is affiliated with Faylaq al Sham, which is a Muslim Brotherhood-influenced Islamist militia that has been a longtime HTS partner.[19]Huda al Attasi: Attasi is a Turkish citizen and is the co-founder and director of International Humanitarian Relief.[20] Attasi has spent years helping Syrian women, orphans, and displaced individuals. Attasi is a founding member of the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity, which advocates for the rights of displaced Syrians.[21]The Syrian interim government has continued to attempt to consolidate its control over groups in southern Syria that have not yet joined the Defense Ministry. Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with southern military commanders Naseem Abu Ara and Ali Bash in Damascus on February 12.[22] Ali Bash is the deputy of Ahmed al Awda, the current Southern Operations Room commander who previously led the Eighth Brigade, a group comprised of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime and reorganized themselves as the ”Eighth Brigade.”[23] Abu Ara is an Eighth Brigade commander.[24] An unspecified source told southern Syria-based media that Abu Ara and Bash agreed to hold future meetings with Damascus to ”follow up” on steps to integrate Southern Operations Room fighters into the Syrian Defense Ministry. Qasra recently told the Wall Street Journal that Awda had resisted attempts to bring his units under the Defense Ministry.[25] Abu Ara denied Qasra’s allegations in a video statement on February 10 and argued that the people of the south were among the first to call for the Defense Ministry’s establishment.[26] Qasra’s meeting with Abu Ara and Ali Bash suggests that southern leaders, such as Awda, will continue to discuss their integration into the Defense Ministry, although it does not appear that Awda or his subordinates have made any explicit commitments.The HTS-led Department of Military Operations also deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12.[27] The government forces deployed to “contain tensions” following the murder of a Syrian man in al Thaala.[28] This is the Syrian government’s first official deployment in Suwayda Province.[29] The Wall Street Journal reported that the Men of Dignity Movement--a prominent Druze militia based in Suwayda--has thus far prevented the entry of HTS-led forces into Suwayda Province.[30] The head of the Men of Dignity Movement, Sheikh Abu Hassan Yahya al Hajjar, announced that the movement will cooperate with the Interior Ministry’s new police and security forces.[31] It is unclear if Damascus and the Men of Dignity or another group coordinated the deployment of the Military Operations Department. The Syrian interim government likely seeks to cultivate goodwill among Suwayda residents by showing its abilities to ensure security in the region, however.Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara held his first official call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12, suggesting that Syria seeks to maintain a future relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria. The Kremlin reported that Putin and Shara discussed recent negotiations over Russian basing rights in Syria between the Syrian government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January 28.[32] This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government.[33] It does not appear that Shara’s call with Putin led to any agreement on Russia's continued military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus. The direct communication between Shara and Putin, however, suggests that the Syrian interim government will continue to attempt to maintain a relationship with the Russian government and that negotiations over Russia’s presence in Syria have not concluded. Senior Syrian officials have adopted a more positive position towards Russia in recent days, even as Russian forces have continued to withdraw from Syrian territory.[34] Shara stressed Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during the phone call with Putin, according to an official Syrian government report, and Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu recently suggested that Syria is open to Russian air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[35] Syrian officials’ public posture towards Russia suggests that Syria will continue to engage with Russia, particularly as Syrian officials hope Western countries will lift sanctions imposed upon the Assad regime. Putin stressed the need to lift economic sanctions on Syria during the call, echoing a recent call from Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and North Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on several unspecified countries to lift all unilateral sanctions imposed on Syria.[36] Syria could use its continued engagement with Russia as leverage with the West as Syria attempts to secure sanctions relief from the West.Egyptian state media reported on February 12 that mediators from Egypt and Qatar are “intensifying” diplomatic efforts to prevent the breakdown of Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[37] Unspecified Egyptian sources told Reuters that Qatar and Egypt discussed efforts to prevent the collapse of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire on February 12.[38] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened on February 11 to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip after Hamas said it would postpone the planned release of Israeli hostages on February 15, which would violate the ceasefire.[39] A third IDF division entered the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip boundary on February 11, and the IDF recalled reservists as part of preparations for resumed operations in the Gaza Strip.[40] Israeli officials have indicated that Israel will continue to meet its obligations under the first phase of the ceasefire if Hamas releases Israeli hostages on February 15, however.[41]Jordanian King Abdullah II agreed to accept 2,000 sick Gazan children but refused to host additional Palestinian refugees during a meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on January 11.[42] King Abdullah II stated that "everyone“ should prioritize rebuilding the Gaza Strip.[43] Egypt and Jordan are developing a plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip without relocating Gazans.[44]Key Takeaways:Syrian Transition: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara formed a preparatory committee on February 12 that is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara. The composition of this committee suggests that it will likely make decisions that align with Shara’s views and objectives. Syrian Defense Ministry: The Syrian interim government has continued to attempt to consolidate its control over groups in southern Syria that have not yet joined the Defense Ministry. The HTS-led Department of Military Operations also deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12.Syria-Russia Relations: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara held his first official call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12, suggesting that Syria seeks to maintain a future relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria.Gaza Strip: Egyptian state media reported on February 12 that mediators from Egypt and Qatar are “intensifying” diplomatic efforts to prevent the breakdown of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.SyriaKurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) executive committee member Murat Karayilan said that the PKK must hold a conference to discuss disarmament before imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan can call on the PKK to disarm.[45] Ocalan is expected to make an imminent “historic” call for the PKK to disarm on February 15.[46] Karayilan’s statement conflicts with Turkey’s theory that Ocalan will call for disarmament on February 15 and that the call will pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry. CTP-ISW assessed on January 28 that the SDF is unlikely to willingly give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active Turkish-backed military attacks, regardless of Ocalan’s position.[47]Turkey continued to target SDF positions along the western bank of the Euphrates River on February 12.[48] Turkish aircraft struck several SDF positions along the western bank of the Euphrates River on February 12.[49] Turkish aircraft also struck SDF positions near the Qara Qozak Bridge and Tishreen Dam, likely to isolate SDF units operating at the bridgehead.[50]Anti-SDF media reported that Turkey and the SNA continued to target SDF positions with airstrikes and rockets along the Peace Spring frontlines.[51] Turkish aircraft struck a reported SDF position at a power station near Ain Issa on February 12.[52] The SNA also fired rockets targeting SDF positions west of Tal Abyad on February 12.[53]ISIS fighters may have attacked an SDF-affiliated municipality center near al Karamah, Raqqa Province, on February 11.[54] The SDF deployed forces to the area following the attack.[55] This is the third time that unspecified individuals attacked SDF positions in al Karamah since February 7.[56] ISIS has long had a presence around Al Karamah. The SDF arrested an ISIS smuggler in al Karamah in November 2023, for example.[57] Syrian media reported on February 12 that Syrian interim government forces started to seize checkpoints at the entrance to Afrin, an area that the Turkish-backed SNA previously controlled.[58] Interim government security forces deployed to Afrin and Jandairis, north of Aleppo, on February 6.[59] The SNA has controlled and administered these areas since 2018.[60] CTP-ISW assessed on February 6 that these interim government deployments will likely continue as former opposition groups integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense.[61]The IDF continued to operate along the Golan Heights in southern Syria. Syrian media reported that Israeli forces entered Saida to establish checkpoints along the Syria-Israel border on February 11.[62] Syrian media also reported that the IDF advanced toward Kodna, Quneitra Province.[63]Two leading Syrian opposition groups agreed to dissolve and join the Syrian interim government on February 11.[64] The Syrian National Coalition and the Syrian Negotiation Commission agreed to dissolve and work with the Syrian interim government after meeting with Shara. A Turkish analyst reported that Shara had declined to meet with Syrian National Coalition head Hadi al Bahra “for a while.”[65] The Syrian National Coalition has long worked with various opposition groups and umbrella organizations of opposition groups.[66] The Syrian National Coalition announced its willingness to work with the HTS-led interim government in December 2024.[67] The Syrian Negotiation Commission is an umbrella institution created to negotiate on behalf of the Syrian opposition with the Assad regime within the framework of UNSCR 2254.[68]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentUnspecified fighters detonated an adhesive improvised explosive device (IED) that they had attached to a vehicle in al Qaim, Anbar Province, Iraq, on February 12, possibly as part of an internal dispute among Iraqi smuggling groups.[69] The attack targeted Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Tribal Mobilization 1st al Qaim Regiment Commander Salam Suleiman al Mahlawi.[70] The Iraqi government formed the Tribal Mobilization forces as part of the PMF in 2014. Sunnis and other minority groups make up the Tribal Mobilization.[71] Iraqi police arrested a relative of Mahlawi in June 2024 for smuggling after the police discovered weapons, ammunition, and narcotics in his home.[72] The al Qaim border crossing is a major smuggling route used by Iranian-backed militias and other actors to transport goods and narcotics to the Gulf states and to Europe.[73]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripHouthi Foreign Minister Jamal Amer said on February 2 that the Houthis did not cause the explosion on a Hong Kong-flagged container ship in the Red Sea on January 28, 2025.[74] Amer said that the Houthis will not resume attacks on vessels in the Red Sea unless the Israel-Hamas ceasefire collapses.[75] Amer added that the ship was carrying 1290 tons of unspecified hazardous material to Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia and suggested that the material caused the explosion. Amer also called on the international community to conduct a transparent investigation into the incident. An unspecified maritime source also told Reuters on January 29 that the cause of the fire was the hazardous cargo on board.[76] The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Joint Maritime Information Center has only reported one non-attack-related incident for vessels transiting the Red Sea since the start of 2025, which is likely this incident.[77] CTP-ISW has not observed any Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea since November 2024.[78]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripSee the topline section.LebanonLebanese media reported that the IDF has destroyed infrastructure in seven towns in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 11.[79]Lebanese media reported on February 12 that the IDF shelled unspecified targets in the Shebaa Valley.[80]Lebanese media reported on February 12 that the IDF established a “military center” near Houla.[81]Lebanon mainAn Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on February 12 that the IDF is establishing a new territorial brigade along the Israel-Lebanon border ahead of the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon.[82] This brigade will be larger than brigades that previously served on the border before the Israel-Lebanon war. The extended ceasefire agreement requires Israel to withdraw by February 18.[83]IDF Northern Command Commander Major General Ori Gordin stated on February 12 that he believes the IDF will withdraw from southern Lebanon by February 18.[84] IDF Northern Command is responsible for maintaining border security on the Israel-Lebanon border.[85] Gordin separately stated that the IDF severely damaged Hezbollah’s intelligence-gathering capabilities and ability to rearm itself through Syria.[86] Gordin stated that the IDF eliminated the ”serious threat” posed by Hezbollah to residents of northern Israel. Gordin stressed that the biggest challenge the IDF faces in northern Israel is to maintain the current security status quo.West BankThe IDF continued its counterterrorism operation in the northern West Bank on February 12.[87] The IDF continued to destroy Palestinian militia infrastructure and seize weapons. Israeli forces clashed with militia fighters in Nour Shams refugee camp and killed one fighter in Tulkarm.[88] The IDF stated that fighters injured an Israeli soldier.[89] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades attacked Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Jenin governorates with small arms and improvised explosive devices (IED) on February 12.[90] PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades claimed that they conducted combined small arms attacks targeting the IDF in Tulkarm on February 11 and 12.[91] PIJ announced on January 22 the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters.[92]Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyUS sanctions on Iranian entities and vessels involved in Iranian oil shipments to China have made it more difficult for Iran to export oil to China. Reuters reported that Iran has struggled to acquire new vessels to replace those sanctioned by the United States.[93] A British shipbroker reported that the United States has sanctioned 57 percent of the 126 oil tankers involved in Iranian crude oil trade to China.[94] China's Shandong Port Group also banned sanctioned tankers from ports in Shandong Province on January 6, where many of the sanctioned vessels unloaded Iranian oil.[95] This has made it impossible for Iran to trade tens of millions of barrels of oil and has left the oil in floating storage. This situation may worsen under US President Donald Trump’s ”maximum pressure” policy, which targets Iranian oil sales.[96] These oil shipment disruptions have caused Iranian crude oil prices to rise. One of the attractions of Iranian oil to China is its cheap cost.[97] A decrease in Iranian oil exports to China could badly damage the Iranian economy, which relies heavily on oil exports.Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s rejection of direct negotiations with the United States may have caused further devaluation of the rial. Iranian opposition media reported that Iran’s currency fell to its lowest value, reaching nearly 940,000 rials per USD on February 10, after Khamenei’s recent speech on February 7 about negotiations with the United States.[98]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei visited the Iran Armed Forces exhibition “Eghtedar 1403” in Tehran on February 12.[99] The exhibition displayed equipment and new technologies in air defense, ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, and naval vessels. Khamenei emphasized the importance of continuous innovation in defense.[100] Khamenei separately met with officials and experts in the defense industry and emphasized the importance of national defense and security. Khamenei’s visit likely highlights Iranian efforts to address air defense vulnerabilities and reinforce military capabilities amid potential external threats, particularly in light of recent setbacks for the Axis of Resistance.[101]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/494[2] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122251[3] https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/syria/2024/12/29/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%B1%D9%82-4-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA- ;https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2024/12/30/%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1[4] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122252[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/JN%20Final.pdf; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1889698791453843780[6] https://mei.edu/publications/long-rise-and-sudden-death-jihadist-leader-abu-maria-al-qahtani[7] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/2/12/%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9; 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https://t.me/damascusv011/28670[37] https://alqaheranews dot net/news/116854/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-qatar-intensify-efforts-save-gaza-ceasefire-egypt-tv-says-2025-02-12/[39] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1889377668677718474[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/senior-arab-officials-warn-that-trump-gaza-plan-would-inflame-middle-east-2025-02-12/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-11-2025[41] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/report-israel-will-adhere-to-ceasefire-if-hamas-releases-sixth-round-of-hostages-saturday/ ; https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1889735087840751997[42] https://x.com/KingAbdullahII/status/1889396977064145105 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-wants-jordans-help-with-gaza-its-king-is-looking-for-a-way-to-say-no-0958ad69?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2[43] https://x.com/KingAbdullahII/status/1889396977064145105[44] https://x.com/MfaEgypt/status/1889447692553633962 ; https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1889449832873378272 ; https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1889412876726899157[45] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889582778678698432[46] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate012825[47] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate012825[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-11-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-10-2025[49] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135706; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119964[50] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135711; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889658404391563533[51] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889748414688067591; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889676439269621949; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-10-2025[52] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889676439269621949[53] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889748414688067591[54] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889389056393404714[55] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889400589676663158[56] https://t.me/nahermedia/44779;https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1887915202982588532[57] https://baladi-news dot com/ar/articles/99232; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1727775031579586988?s=20; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1727775031579586988?s=20[58] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889656441620828458[59] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135186 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135181 ; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1887441282697425204 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/44664 ; https://x.com/NPA_English/status/1887498708771590349 ; https://x.com/Military_OSTX/status/1887452402930098337[60] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkish-military-and-allied-rebels-in-total-control-of-syrias-afrin-erdogan/2018/03/18/875e6b29-5a4b-439d-9b99-a92ad82264dc_story.html[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2025[62] https://t.me/damascusv011/28709 ; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119958[63] https://t.me/damascusv011/28737[64] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/492 ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/syrias-temp-government-forms-national-dialogue-committee[65] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1889424468633612384[66] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-opposition-leader-says-lebanon-truce-opened-door-aleppo-assault-2024-12-02/[67] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20241218-syrian-coalition-calls-for-comprehensive-non-sectarian-transitional-government/[68] https://www.newarab dot com/news/syrias-temp-government-forms-national-dialogue-committee[69] https://aljeebal dot com/posts/3603 ; https://x.com/Omdoha15/status/1889755051549196410 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889658698311627110[70] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889658698311627110 ; https://x.com/AlArabiya_Iraq/status/1889615460045303850[71] https://euaa.europa dot eu/country-guidance-iraq-2022/12-popular-mobilisation-forces-and-tribal-mobilisation-militias[72] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2024/06/09/11395[73] https://alfasselnews dot com/en_GB/articles/gc1/features/2024/02/14/feature-01 ; https://en.majalla dot com/node/322827/business-economy/how-iraq-became-key-conduit-global-drug-trade[74] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02pP215FD7RpBmMFFSVhzEvmA3NEsGvoZuwqyz4bpe6LMGbLb77wJxfNsLCz75T4Enl&id=100000612691633&rdid=RUqTp7ZBSJypCPdr ;https://www.reuters.com/world/crew-abandon-hk-flagged-container-ship-red-sea-after-fire-sources-say-2025-01-28/[75] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02pP215FD7RpBmMFFSVhzEvmA3NEsGvoZuwqyz4bpe6LMGbLb77wJxfNsLCz75T4Enl&id=100000612691633&rdid=RUqTp7ZBSJypCPdr[76] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-fire-red-sea-not-linked-houthi-attacks-maritime-center-says-2025-01-29/[77] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic-week-06-dashboard-02---08-feb-2025.pdf?rev=deb327b4d39344cd9868528ad92c1381[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-4-2024[79] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129579 ; https://www dot nna-leb dot gov dot lb/en/justice-law/758535/israeli-enemy-burns-houses-in-south-lebanon-s-mark ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113902 ; https://www.nna-leb dot gov dot lb/en/justice-law/758736/israeli-enemy-burns-homes-conducts-explosions-in-s ; https://www.nna-leb dot gov dot lb/en/justice-law/758775/israeli-forces-open-fire-near-bint-jbeil-detonate ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129626[80] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129613[81] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129635[82] https://x.com/amirbarshalom/status/1889582915845013871[83] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/26/israel-lebanon-ceasefire-extended-trump-white-house[84] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1889676719855944080[85] https://www.idf dot il/en/mini-sites/regional-commands/northern-command/northern-command/[86] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1889704056140009547[87] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1889648190137221164[88] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1889648200014803279[89] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1889648204553023858[90] https://t.me/sarayajneen/2096 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/982 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/983 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/984 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/987 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/827[91] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/981 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/988 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8268[92] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-22-2025[93] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctions-strand-iran-russia-oil-tankers-driving-up-crude-costs-2025-02-12/ ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2758; https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241203; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2644[94] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctions-strand-iran-russia-oil-tankers-driving-up-crude-costs-2025-02-12/[95] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-shandong-port-group-blacklists-us-sanctioned-oil-vessels-say-traders-2025-01-07/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-13-2024; https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-iran-south-china-sea-oil-trade/[96] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctions-strand-iran-russia-oil-tankers-driving-up-crude-costs-2025-02-12/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025[97] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-cheap-iranian-oil-supply-risk-tighter-trump-sanctions-2024-11-06/[98] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502117959 ;https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-7-2025[99] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/24/3256809[100] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27980[101] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 12, 2025
- Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. KaganFebruary 12, 2025, 6pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on February 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12. Trump stated on February 12 that he discussed the war in Ukraine with Putin and that he and Putin agreed that their administrations will "immediately" begin negotiations.[1] Trump added that he planned to "inform [Zelensky] of the conversation" after his call with Putin. The official Kremlin readout of the call claimed that Putin emphasized the need to "eliminate the root causes" of the war and that Putin "agreed with" Trump that "a long-term settlement could be achieved through peaceful negotiations."[2] Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[3] Trump confirmed his phone call with Zelensky and stated that they discussed the war and the upcoming February 14 meeting between Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference.[4] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed opportunities to achieve peace, readiness to work together, and Ukraine's technological capabilities — including drones.[5] Zelensky stated that Trump shared the details of his conversation with Putin and that he and Trump agreed to plan future bilateral meetings.Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.[6] Medvedev stated that it would be "nonsense" to swap Russian and Ukrainian territory, and Peskov stated that Russia will "never discuss" exchanging its territory. Medvedev's and Peskov's statements further support ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in making any compromises during future peace negotiations and will only comply with a peace agreement that fulfills all of Putin's maximalist demands in Ukraine.[7]Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The DDIS published a declassified intelligence assessment on February 11 detailing the growing Russian threat to Denmark and NATO members.[8] The intelligence assessment notes that Russia is rebuilding its military to fight NATO on an equal footing, aided by financial and material support from the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran. The intelligence assessment states that Russia's willingness to risk war with NATO may increase if European countries do not simultaneously build up their military capabilities in response to Russian capacity building efforts. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported on February 12 that Europe spent $457 billion on defense in 2024, while Russia by itself spent $462 billion on defense in last year.[9] The DDIS intelligence assessment notes that Russia has not yet decided to launch a full-scale war against NATO but is expanding its military capabilities to maintain that option.[10] Russia is currently avoiding actions that could trigger NATO's Article 5 — the commitment to mutual self-defense — but may take greater risks if it perceives a shift in the balance of power in its favor. The DDIS assessment states that if Russia deems NATO weakened either militarily or politically it could be more willing to attack a European NATO member, particularly if Russia doubts US military support to Europe. The intelligence assessment notably warns that a cessation or freeze of the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia will free up significant Russian military resources for their involvement in another future conventional conflict — consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment. The DDIS assessment outlines a timeline for Russia's growing military threat in the event of an end of hostilities in Ukraine: Russia could wage a local war against a neighboring state other than Ukraine within six months; Russia could credibly threaten NATO countries in the Baltic region in two years; and Russia could be prepared for a large-scale war in Europe, assuming NATO does not rearm at the same pace as Russia, in five years. ISW previously assessed that Russia's efforts to restructure the Russian military, revive the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, and create long-term mechanisms to militarize and radicalize Russian society against Western ideals and values indicate that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO.[11]Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike mainly targeting Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of February 11 and 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from Bryansk Oblast and occupied Crimea and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[12] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian missiles targeted Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six missiles and 71 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 71 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported on February 12 that Russian missiles damaged buildings in the Obolonskyi, Svyatoshynskyi, Darnytskyi, and Holosiivskyi raions of Kyiv City and Boryspil, Kyiv Oblast, and caused five casualties.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 12 that Russian ballistic missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure and killed at least one person in Kyiv City.[14] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on February 12 that a Russian missile struck central Kryvyi Rih and damaged civilian infrastructure.[15] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat emphasized that Ukraine needs US-provided Patriot air defense missile systems to counter ballistic missile strikes.[16]The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[17] The Ukrainian MoD officially launched the program on February 11 and noted that the program offers 18- to 24-year-olds the ability to join the military under a one-year contract and the option to either reenlist after one year or return to civilian life. The Ukrainian MoD will pay volunteers 200,000 UAH ($4,700) upon signing a one-year contract and an additional 800,000 UAH ($19,120) during their service in addition to a monthly salary of 120,000 UAH ($2,870). Volunteers will receive three months of training before deploying to the frontline. The Ukrainian government will subsidize future mortgages, education, and medical care for volunteers and will permit volunteers to travel abroad after their one year of service. The program also exempts volunteers from mobilization for 12 months after their one-year contract ends. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the "Contract 18-24" program is part of Ukraine's ongoing efforts to create a professional military. Ukrainian MoD Spokesperson Dmytro Lazutkin stated that the MoD will pay one million UAH (about $23,900) to any Ukrainian servicemembers who were under the age of 25 when they signed a voluntary military service contract.[18]Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Putin affirmed Russia's support for Syria's unity and territorial integrity and emphasized the need for a dialogue among political and ethno-religious groups within Syria. Putin pledged continued socio-economic aid to, and economic cooperation with Syria, and Putin and al Shara discussed recent negotiations between the interim Syrian government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January 28.[19] This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government on Russian military basing rights at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus, however.[20] Russia likely continues to engage with the interim Syrian government in an effort to secure its presence at these bases.The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).[21] Several Armenian civic organizations initiated the bill via a petition that garnered enough support (at least 50,000 signatures) for parliamentary consideration.[22] The legislation calls on Armenian authorities to launch EU accession talks in accordance with the will of the Armenian people.[23] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged Armenia’s “sovereign right” to pursue EU membership but urged Armenians to consider whether the EU shares this goal.[24] Peskov also emphasized the "benefits" Armenia gains as a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[25] Russian officials and information space commentators previously claimed that Armenia’s move toward EU membership signaled its withdrawal from the EAEU.[26] Armenia continues to strengthen its ties with the EU and the broader West amid escalating tensions with Russia and concerns that Russia is an unreliable security partner to Armenia.Key Takeaways:US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12.Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be declining. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near Nikolskyi; east of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka; and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled five Ukrainian attacks near Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[28] A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast posted footage on February 12 showing the brigade repelling a platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast.[29] Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest and northeast of Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault in the area.[30]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Russian forces advanced into western Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha) on the west (right) bank of the Loknya River.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced in Sverdlikovo.[32]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast west of Sudzha near Nikolayevo-Darino, Nizhnyi Klin, and Sverdlikovo, and northwest of Sudzha near Aleksandriya and Viktorovka.[33]A Ukrainian platoon commander operating in Kursk Oblast stated that North Korean troops recently began attacking in groups of 15 to 20 personnel instead of larger groups of 50 personnel but continue to suffer significant losses.[34]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[35] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[36]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported Russian ground attacks in the Kharkiv direction on February 12. Russian sources claimed on February 11 and 12 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on February 12 that Russian forces have increased drone operations in this direction, including the use of fiber-optic drones, since mid-December 2024.[38] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 12 but did not advance. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 11 and 12.[39]Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Zeleny Hai, Novoyehoriivka, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Novomykhailivka on February 11 and 12.[40] A Ukrainian commander operating in the Borova direction reported on February 12 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon in this direction.[41] Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[42] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 12 but did not advance. Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman towards Nove; and northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka on February 11 and 12.[43]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces expanded their bridgehead on the western bank of the Zherebets River and advanced southwest of Kreminna (northeast of Lyman).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the outskirts of Yampolivka and south of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman).[45]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Lyman direction.[46] Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two Russian armored personnel carriers.Order of Battle: Elements of the "Shrama" Detachment of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[47]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk.[48]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates Russian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna street on the western outskirts of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[49] Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 12 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking near and within Chasiv Yar; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka and Hryhorivka; north of Chasiv Yar toward Minkivka and Mayske; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on February 11 and 12.[51]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields north of Chasiv Yar.[52]Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk. Russian forces continued attacking near and within Toretsk; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka on February 11 and 12.[53] Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretska Mine area (northern Toretsk).[54]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk.[55]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[56]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, Yelyazvetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, Nadiivka and Uspenivka.[57] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces published footage on February 12 showing Russian forces conducting at least a platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked the eastern outskirts of Vovkove (south of Pokrovsk and west of Pishchane), presumably from Pishchane, and that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back to the outskirts of Kotlyne.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking near Pishchane, Zvirove, and Vodyane Druhe.[60] Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Vodyane Druhe and in eastern Pishchane.[61]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Nadiivka, east of Myrne (northeast of Pokrovsk), and south of Berezivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[62]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka and west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr.[63]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Dachne.[64]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer north of Andriivka, near Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove), and towards Kostyantynopil.[65]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Dachne.[66]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on February 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Velyka Novosilka towards Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on February 11 and 12.[67]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vremivka (just west of Velyka Novosilka).[68] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 12 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne) and Charivne (northeast of Robotyne) on February 12.[69] Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 12. Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be declining. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on February 12 that Russia's Shahed drone production facility in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan produced over 6,000 Shahed drones and "thousands" of decoy drones in 2024.[70] ISW previously reported that the production facility had produced 5,760 Shahed drones between January and September 2024, and Kovalenko's report suggests that the facility failed to produce many more drones from October 2024 through December 2024.[71] The facility may be struggling to source enough materials to maintain high Shahed production rates, as Russia either still relies on Iran to provide components for the drones or is attempting to source high-tech components from abroad by circumventing Western sanctions. The Russian defense industrial base could also be struggling to figure out how to produce drone components domestically using Iranian production licenses. Russia may alternatively be prioritizing production of decoy drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses instead of focusing on more costly Shahed strike drones.[72]The Russian Armed Forces are intensifying efforts to coerce mobilized personnel to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 12 that Russian commanders are forcing personnel mobilized in 2022 to sign contracts with the MoD, but that it is unclear if the MoD will honor the end-dates provided in such contracts.[73] Commanders are threatening subordinates who refuse to sign the contracts with redeployment to separate assault companies for highly-attritional infantry-led "meat assaults." Verstka reported that one mobilized soldier emphasized that the Russian command is aware of high rates of demoralization and fatigue among personnel and is concerned that large numbers of mobilized personnel will leave service without a contract mechanism in place.Russian regional occupation officials continue to support the Kremlin-directed mandate of expanding programs to prepare Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine for government positions. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev announced on February 12 the "Sevastopol – City of Heroes" educational program that is designed to prepare Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine for leadership positions in local government and state-owned enterprises.[74] The "Sevastopol - City of Heroes" program is likely an analogue to Russia's "Time of Heroes" program, which also works to install Kremlin-selected veterans of the war into positions of power within the Russian government and business sector.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1889576538166735205[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154267[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl[58] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5224[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32140 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21092[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154282 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62073 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64368[61] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1889414000959693280 ; https://t.me/tankova_brugada/2473 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1889372185103352134 ; https://t.me/sokoly_foksa_47/160[62] https://t.me/yurasumy/21093 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21092[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21090 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64368 [64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8378; https://t.me/wargonzo/24766[65] https://t.me/wargonzo/24760 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23764 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13363[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154284[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13363 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21089[68] https://t.me/wargonzo/24760; https://t.me/yurasumy/21089[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl[70] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8804[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[73] https://verstka dot media/peace_negotiation_perpetual-contract_svo_news[74] https://t.me/razvozhaev/10151
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 7, 2025
- Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Johanna Moore, and George BarrosFebruary 7, 2025, 6:15 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on February 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and in the fields east of Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during the February 6 attacks.[1] Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and on the night of February 6 to 7 but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (north of Fanaseyevka), Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok (east of Fanaseyevka).[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha) but that Ukrainian forces did not launch new attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka during the day on February 7.[3] Russian milbloggers continued to issue conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized the settlement, while others claimed that Ukrainian forces bypassed the settlement or that Russian forces have retaken the settlement.[4] ISW cannot independently verify Russian claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are effectively using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to counter Ukrainian forces attacking in the area.[5]Russian sources provided additional information about the Russian force grouping defending southeast of Sudzha. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), and drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are defending in the area.[6] Russian milbloggers widely credited drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces with defending against the Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and 7 and complained that the Russian MoD did not acknowledge the Chechen drone operators.[7] Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Russian military command reportedly removed the 11th VDV Brigade's commander and that the MoD is blaming the commander for failing to sufficiently man and defend Russian positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[8]The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met on February 7 with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the state of the Russian economy.[9] Mishustin claimed that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) rose in 2024 by 4.1 percent largely due to "intensive" growth in Russia's manufacturing industry – likely referring to Russia's boost of its defense industrial base (DIB) since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Mishustin claimed that the main contributors to the growth in Russia's manufacturing sector were the machine-building, transport engineering, automotive, and computer and electronic equipment sectors.Mishustin claimed that inflation in Russia reached 9.52 percent in 2024, and Putin claimed that inflation was already 9.9 percent as of February 3, 2025. Russia's true inflation is quite higher than the official statistics the Kremlin is willing to publicize, however. (Several studies indicate that Russia’s inflation rate is closer to 20 percent.[10]) Mishustin highlighted Russia's low 2024 unemployment rate of 2.5 percent but only briefly acknowledged Russia's significant labor shortages, which are the reason for Russia's low unemployment.Mishustin noted that Russian economic growth might be less significant in 2025 as it is very important to stop inflation and ensure long-term economic growth – likely a signal to prepare the Russian population to expect economic hardships in 2025. Mishustin and Putin also attempted to posture Russia's economy as stable in the face of international economic pressure. Mishustin claimed that Russia's fuel and energy complex is adapting and finding new markets.Mishustin claimed that Russia's economy has "successfully managed" with "unprecedented sanctions pressure" in recent years and that anti-Russian sanctions are hurting the states that imposed the sanctions more than the sanctions are hurting Russia. Putin similarly attempted to posture Russia's economy as stronger and growing more rapidly than economies in the West. Mishustin and Putin notably did not mention how the Russian Central Bank raised the interest rate to 21 percent in October 2024 or how Russia has been drawing from its National Welfare Fund to finance its war effort over the last three years.[11] The liquidity portion of Russia’s National Welfare fund may run out by Fall 2025.[12]Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian advances in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine’s First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated on February 7 that Ukraine outperforms Russia in first-person view (FPV) drone production and that drone development is expanding rapidly in Ukraine.[13] Havrylyuk stated that Ukraine has introduced over 1,300 new weapon models, most of which are drones and drone munitions, since February 2022 and that Ukrainian officials approved more than 250 new drone models for use by Ukrainian forces in 2024 alone. Havrylyuk stated that while drones have become a crucial substitute for long-range missiles, Ukrainian forces require continued innovation to counter Russian defenses and stressed that international military assistance is critical for Ukraine, particularly for weapons where Ukrainian domestic production falls short.A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on February 7 that Ukrainian drone strikes significantly disrupt Russian operations in this direction.[14] The battalion commander noted that Ukrainian drone operators hold some areas of their defense lines in the Pokrovsk direction almost completely independent from infantry support. The commander stated that growing drone supplies have helped sustain Ukraine’s defenses despite Russian forces outnumbering Ukrainians ten-to-one in the Pokrovsk direction. The commander highlighted that Ukrainian forces are reportedly inflicting a seven-to-one casualty ratio on Russian troops in the area but need more personnel to fully stop Russian advances in that direction.ISW previously noted that Ukrainian drone operations have been key in defending against Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction and throughout the frontline, although Ukraine must address its morale, force generation, and training issues to completely stall the Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast.[15]Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[16] NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's February 7 Iran Update. Qasra is very likely referencing some form of economic relief to help improve Syria’s dire economic situation. The interim Syrian government has lobbied for economic relief from various sources since the fall of the Assad regime.[17] Cooperation with Russia could hinder European Union (EU) plans to lift sanctions on Syria, which are contingent on the new Syrian government pursuing a peaceful political future without extremism or involvement from Russia and Iran.[18] An unspecified Russian source told Bloomberg on January 28 that talks on Russian basing are “stuck.”[19] Russia has continued to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid ongoing negotiations with the interim Syrian government.[20]Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Aktau, Kazakhstan. Azerbaijani outlet APA News, citing sources familiar with the matter, reported on February 5 that Azerbaijan is preparing to take legal action against Russia in an international court, citing recent clear evidence identifying unspecified Russian actors responsible for the crash and Russia's failure to take responsibility for the crash.[21] Azerbaijan’s intent to sue follows the Azerbaijani Ministry of Digital Development and Transport's February 4 briefing of the initial investigation results attributing the AZAL crash to unspecified "foreign objects."[22]Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev previously accused Russia of attempting to cover up the incident, calling the Kremlin’s response “surprising, regrettable, and infuriating.”[23] Russian President Vladimir Putin apologized to Aliyev on December 28 that the crash occurred in Russian airspace but stopped short of admitting Russia’s fault in the crash and taking action against those responsible – demands Aliyev set forth following the crash.[24] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced on February 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to make another statement regarding the AZAL plane crash.[25]Azerbaijani outlet Report.az noted on February 6 that Azerbaijani officials have also formally notified the Kremlin of the closure of the local branch of the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), a Russian cultural diplomacy agency, citing national security concerns and a move away from “external interference.”[26] Russia currently has over 80 Rossotrudnichestvo branches concentrated in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.[27] Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use the branches to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[28]Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Moysiuk earlier on February 7 from his previous role as Special Envoy for the Implementation of International Security Assurances and Development of the Defense Forces of Ukraine.[30] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Moysiuk will focus on developing Ukraine's Defense Forces, particularly regarding mobilization processes and military training, and Churkin will lead the charge on defense innovations and technological development for Ukraine's military.[31]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy.Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Aktau, KazakhstanUkraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government positions.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationPlease see topline text for updates on Ukrainian operations in Russia.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 6 and 7.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 7 that there is fighting near Mali Prokhody and Velyki Prokhody (both north of Kharkiv City and west of Lyptsi), but ISW has not observed confirmation or other Russian reporting of fighting in this area.[33]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 6 and 7.[34]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Novomlynsk and Fyholivka (both north of Kupyansk).[35] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Dovhenke (north of Kupyansk and northwest of Dvorichna).[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on February 7 that Russian forces are deploying tanks with trawlers alongside several lightly armored vehicles in order to transport infantry to the frontline.[37] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are systematically attempting to cross the Oskil River near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) by transporting two to eight personnel on a rubber boat across the river, accumulating in forested areas on the west bank of the river, and then attacking neighboring settlements.[38]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Fyholikva, and drone operators from the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[39]Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 7. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, Zeleny Hai, and Lozova; west of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Novoserhiivka, and Hrekivka on February 6 and 7.[40]Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[41]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Lyman towards Nove, Katerynivka, and Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Terny, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka on February 6 and 7.[42] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) entered the forested area south of Yampolivka but that Ukrainian forces repelled the attack, making the area a contested "gray zone."[43]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Yampolivka.[44] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 7 that Russian forces are deploying small infantry teams consisting of two to three people in a "conveyor belt mode" all day and night.[45] The spokesperson added that the Russian command deployed poorly trained prison recruits or those from disadvantaged families to identify Ukrainian firing points, after which well-trained Russian personnel began to attack.[46] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing a senior Ukrainian lieutenant, reported on February 7 that Russian forces have suffered over 1,000 casualties in assaults against Terny in an unspecified time frame but are now deploying small assault groups that are harder for Ukrainian drones to detect.[47] The WSJ reported that rain and fog hamper drone usage for Russians and Ukrainians, which provides opportunities for Russian forces to conduct large assaults with armored vehicles.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampolivka, and elements of the "Shrama" detachment of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[48]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 6 and 7.[49]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 1L219M "Zoopark-1" counter-battery radar system – which Russian forces use to identify Ukrainian firing positions – in the Siversk direction.[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself on February 7 but did not advance in this direction.[51]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian source claimed on February 7 that Russian forces seized the Avanhard Stadium and Hospital No. 3 in central Chasiv Yar and three residential areas in western Chasiv Yar.[52] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on February 7 that Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar with armored vehicle support, but Ukrainian forces destroyed a tank and an armored vehicle and damaged two additional armored vehicles during the assault.[53]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[54] Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[55]Russian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk amid claims that Russian forces seized Toretsk as of February 7. Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka on February 6 and 7.[56]Russian-assessed advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Puzanova Street in northern Toretsk.[57]Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 7 that elements of the Russian 109th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] [formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Druzhba (east of Toretsk) and that elements of the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigades (all part of the 51st CAA) alongside elements of the Russian "Veterany" assault detachment (likely referring to the "Veterany" Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade [Volunteer Assault Corps]) seized Toretsk.[58] A Russian milblogger also claimed on February 7 that Russian forces seized the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk.[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however, and has not observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces from some positions on the outskirts of Toretsk. A Russian milblogger noted on February 7 that the Russian MoD does not consider Krymske or the Toretska mine (northeast and north of Toretsk respectively) within the administrative boundaries of Toretsk according to their maps and assessments of Russian advances.[60]The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces intend to leverage advances in Toretsk to push towards Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk and southwest of Chasiv Yar).[61] Geolocated footage published on February 6 shows Ukrainian forces raiding Russian positions along Hryhoriia Skovorody streets in northern Toretsk, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions on the outskirts of Toretsk.[62] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would likely leverage advances west of Toretsk and the seizure of Toretsk to push towards Kostyantynivka and pressure Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[63]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, Myrolyubivka, Promin, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, and Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Pishchane, Novooleksandriivka, Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Udachne, Novoserhiivka, and Uspenivka on February 6 and 7.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Pishchane, Nadiivka, and Zvirove.[65]A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are accumulating near Baranivka (east of Pokrovsk) ahead of offensive operations against Tarasivka (north of Barasivka).[66] Ukrainian military expert Petro Chernyk stated on February 7 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction lost about 300-360 personnel per day in early January 2025 but that Russian casualty numbers have decreased recently.[67] A Ukrainian platoon commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated to the Wall Street Journal that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces ten-to-one but that Russian forces are losing at least seven personnel for every one Ukrainian loss.[68] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that the number of Russian attacks this week (February 1 to 7) decreased compared to last week (January 25 to 31) but that fighting remains intense.[69]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko, west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka, and southwest of Kurakhove near Dachne on February 6 and 7.[70]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove, and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[71]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on February 7 bud did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne on February 6 and 7.[72]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Velyka Novosilka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[73]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 7, but Russian forces did not advance.[74] Geolocated footage published on February 5 shows Russian forces repelling a platoon-sized Ukrainian mechanized assault near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[75]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Anti-Tank Battalion (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[76]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on February 7.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 81 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts; that 31 decoy drones were "lost;" and that Russian drones struck Sumy, Kyiv, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat reported on February 7 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a guided glide bomb over Zaporizhia Oblast but did not specify the means that Ukrainian forces used.[78] Unconfirmed reports suggested that Ukrainian forces used Zu-23-2 anti-aircraft guns to shoot down the guided glide bomb, though ISW is unable to verify such reports. [79]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government positions. The Time of Heroes program announced on February 7 that Russian authorities appointed program participant Nursultan Mussagaleev as acting Orenburg Oblast Deputy Minister of Regional and Information Policy.[80] Orenburg Oblast Governor Denis Pasler expressed confidence that Mussagaleev's military experience in Ukraine will be an asset for the regional government. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported in October 2023 that Mussagaleev participated in the execution of civilians in Bucha.[81] Time of Heroes reported that the program has appointed 23 participants to government and business positions in Russia.[82]Russia's labor shortage continues to hinder ongoing efforts to expand its defense industrial production. Ukraine’s First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk told Ukrainian outlet Ukriform on February 7 that Russia has over 1,300 defense industrial facilities with roughly two million employees, but that Russia continues to lack hundreds of thousands of workers.[83] Havrylyuk stated that Russia's efforts to significantly increase weapons production have exacerbated Russia's labor shortage, but that Russia has increased its production of some weapons three- to six-fold since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022 despite this. Havrylyuk noted that Russia is still not able to produce enough weapons to meet the military's needs in Ukraine and is thus relying on Iran and North Korea to supply additional weapons. About 60 percent of Russia’s shells fired against Ukraine reportedly are sourced from North Korea as of December 2024, for example.[84] Havrylyuk noted that Russia is working to increase and diversify its domestic drone production.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)The independent Belarusian monitoring group Belarusian Hajun announced on February 7 that it is suspending operations, likely due to the Belarusian government’s crackdown against the group.[85] Belarusian authorities had designated the Belarusian Hajun, which tracked military activity in Belarus and reported on Russian troop movements since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as an extremist organization in March 2022.[86] The Belarusian Hajun’s telegram page first reported on February 5 an unauthorized entry into the page that compromised user and owner data.[87] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on February 7 that Belarusian security forces detained at least one person in connection to the page shortly after the leak.[88]Belarusian officials continue to highlight increasing military cooperation with Russia. Chairman of the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Dmitry Pantus claimed on February 7 that Belarus' military-technical cooperation with Russia is at a "maximum" and highlighted the increasing number of ventures including joint aircraft manufacturing projects.[89] Pantus also noted that Belarus is actively working on organizing mass first-person view (FPV) drone production and is incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) into domestic technological developments.[90] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8310; https://t.me/dva_majors/63979; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1887542437943394694 ; https://t.me/rybar/67820[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/48626 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48645 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85830 ; https://t.me/rybar/67802 ; https://t.me/rybar/67810 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61959 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23539 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23542 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20973 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23562[3] https://t.me/rybar/67802 ; https://t.me/rybar/67810[4] https://t.me/romanov_92/46033 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1887738919980085543 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61959 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23528 ; https://t.me/rybar/67798 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23528 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20977[5] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61937[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/48626 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85779 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48663[7] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43531 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61936 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20972 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12417 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020625[8] https://t.me/dva_majors/64056 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/49110 ; https://t.me/RSaponkov/10375[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76227[10] https://swedenherald.com/article/svantesson-wants-to-expose-russian-economic-bluff[11] https://warontherocks.com/2024/09/russia-is-on-a-slow-path-to-bankruptcy-but-how-slow/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424[12] https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economy-wealth-fund-reserves-ukraine-war-moscow-inflation-stagflation-2025-1 ; https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-stagflation-rising-inflation-weak-growth-dwindling-liquid-reserves-by-anders-aslund-2025-01[13] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3957184-ivan-gavriluk-persij-zastupnik-ministra-oboroni-ukraini.html ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/07/ukrayina-perevazhaye-rosiyu-u-vygotovlenni-fpv-droniv-ivan-gavrylyuk/ ; https://suspilne dot media/943305-ukraina-perevazae-rosiu-u-virobnictvi-fpv-droniv-gavriluk/[14] https://archive.ph/INbWX ; https://www.wsj.com/world/its-russian-men-against-ukrainian-machines-on-the-battlefields-in-ukraine-fcbe1592[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624[16] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/06/syria-defense-minister-russia-bases/[17] https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/syria-eu-sanctions-relief-crucial-why ; https://apnews.com/article/eu-syria-sanctions-easing-lifted-hts-875dc2a6dec5d54b459f580baa1426eb[18] https://apnews.com/article/eu-syria-sanctions-easing-lifted-hts-875dc2a6dec5d54b459f580baa1426eb[19] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-28/russia-s-hopes-to-keep-syria-bases-fade-with-talks-stalled[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025[21] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/07/azerbaijan-escalates-rare-standoff-russia-downing-passenger-plane; https://en.apa dot az/political/russia-wants-to-make-second-malaysian-boeing-incident-happen-azerbaijan-is-preparing-to-appeal-to-international-court-459893[22] https://azertag dot az/en/xeber/brief_of_the_preliminary_report_of_the_investigation_regarding_crash_of_azal_owned_aircraft_near_aktau_released-3403727[23] https://aze dot media/ilham-aliyev-the-russian-side-must-apologize-to-azerbaijan/; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/07/azerbaijan-escalates-rare-standoff-russia-downing-passenger-plane[24] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/28/putin-apologises-for-azerbaijan-plane-crash-without-admitting-russia-at-fault; https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20241229-azerbaijan-says-russia-shot-at-plane-before-crash-demands-it-admit[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/299563[26] https://report dot az/ru/vneshnyaya-politika/rossijskoj-storone-napravleno-oficialnoe-uvedomlenie-o-prekrashenii-deyatelnosti-rossotrudnichestva/[27] https://rs dot gov.ru/predstavitelstva-za-rubezhom/ ; https://ruskidom dot rs/россотрудничество-ру/[28] https://glavcom dot ua/ru/interview/set-russkih-domov-kak-agentura-putina-prodolzhaet-nasilovat-evropu-853255.html ; https://eadaily dot com/ru/news/2023/08/02/v-moldavii-trebuyut-zakryt-russkiy-dom-za-propagandu-i-podryvnuyu-rabotu[29] https://suspilne dot media/943339-zelenskij-zvilniv-general-lejtenanta-mojsuka-z-posadi-upovnovazenogo-z-garantij-bezpeki/; https://t.me/tmelnychuk/5629 ; https://suspilne dot media/943435-general-lejtenanta-mojsuka-priznaceno-zastupnikom-ministra-oboroni-ukraini/; https://unn dot ua/en/news/umerov-gets-two-new-deputies-who-they-are-and-what-they-will-be-responsible-for[30] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/742025-53745[31] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/11744[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl ;[33] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12421[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61946; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31917[36] https://t.me/yurasumy/20981[37] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/07/obrazyly-skryvdyly-zlamaly-karusel-poblyzu-kupyanska-vshhent-roztroshhyly-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/07/forsuvannya-dlya-forsu-rosiyany-postijno-stvoryuyut-placzdarmy-na-berezi-oskolu-ale-zhyvut-vony-nedovgo/[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31917 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12421 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16938[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25426 ; https://t.me/osb878/157[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31922[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153840[45] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/07/lovlyat-nashyh-hlopcziv-na-svoyih-zhyvcziv-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-napiv-mehanizovani-shturmy-ta-ataky-pryrechenyh/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/943181-pocali-agresivno-sturmuvati-v-60-i-brigadi-rozkazali-pro-posilenna-tisku-na-limanskomu-fronti/[46] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24480[47] https://www.wsj.com/world/its-russian-men-against-ukrainian-machines-on-the-battlefields-in-ukraine-fcbe1592?mod=WSJ_Euronews[48] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5472 ; https://t.me/specnazahmat/1143 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31922 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18775[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030[50] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5014[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/299513[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/943403-boi-trivaut-u-miskij-zabudovi-osuv-hortica-pro-situaciu-u-torecku/[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23536[55] https://t.me/epoddubny/22388[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8306; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/590[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/48654 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48665; https://t.me/mod_russia/48648; https://t.me/mod_russia/48649[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61965[60] https://t.me/rybar/67819[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/299617; https://t.me/tass_agency/299627 ;https://t.me/sashakots/51773[62] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1887793908739973313; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1887797476263854474;[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61958; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153791 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153791[65] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61955; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61958[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153791[67] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/07/velyka-mobilizacziya-v-rf-nevdalyj-pivnichnokorejskyj-debyut-ta-minus-46-000-rosiyan-ekspert-pro-boyi-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/[68] https://www.wsj.com/world/its-russian-men-against-ukrainian-machines-on-the-battlefields-in-ukraine-fcbe1592[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/07/cze-yak-temperatura-vpala-z-500-do-450-gradusiv-u-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-pid-pokrovskom-pomenshalo-atak-rf/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030; https://t.me/wargonzo/24702[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153816; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13357; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13356[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/64055; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl; https://t.me/wargonzo/24702[73] https://t.me/wargonzo/24702[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/24702[75] https://t.me/Taiga_tot_samyj/1346; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1887632620487315708;[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/64072; https://t.me/wargonzo/24711[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/28274[78] https://unn dot ua/en/news/the-air-force-on-the-downing-of-a-uav-in-zaporizhzhia-we-do-not-disclose-the-method[79] https://defence-ua dot com/weapon_and_tech/scho_vidomo_pro_tajemnichij_zasib_jakim_ukrajina_zbivaje_rosijski_kabi_ta_chi_mozhe_dopomogti_konkurs_nato-17927.html ; https://t.me/soniah_hub/9085[80] https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/805[81] https://ssu dot gov.ua/novyny/sbu-povidomyla-pro-pidozru-rashystu-yakyi-otrymav-heroia-rosii-za-vbyvstvo-myrnykh-zhyteliv-u-buchi-video[82] https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/805[83] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3957184-ivan-gavriluk-persij-zastupnik-ministra-oboroni-ukraini.html[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024[85] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8378[86] https://t.me/astrapress/74014; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-poland-say-wagner-fighters-arrive-belarus-2023-07-16/[87] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8373[88] https://t.me/astrapress/74014[89] https://belta dot by/society/view/pantus-programma-voenno-tehnicheskogo-sotrudnichestva-belarusi-i-rossii-do-2030-goda-uzhe-formiruetsja-694348-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/293651[90] https://belta dot by/society/view/pantus-my-rabotaem-nad-organizatsiej-serijnogo-proizvodstva-fpv-dronov-694366-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/293661
- — Iran Update, February 11, 2025
- Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry,Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld,and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if Hamas fails to release Israeli hostages on February 15.[1] Netanyahu made this announcement after he convened a security cabinet meeting on February 11 to discuss the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[2] Hamas stated on February 10 that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement.[3] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 10 to prepare for any “possible scenario” in the Gaza Strip.[4] The IDF deployed its 252nd Division to the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip boundary on February 11, bringing the total number of divisions there to three.[5] Hamas could use the remaining hostages to pressure Netanyahu to negotiate again if the IDF resumed operations in the Gaza Strip.Hamas is trying to set informational conditions to be able to blame Israel for a potential breakdown of the ceasefire. Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said on February 10 that Hamas’ decision to postpone the release of hostages is a “warning” to Israel.[6] Hamdan claimed that Hamas will comply with its ceasefire obligations so long as Israel fulfills its obligations. This statement seeks to preemptively blame any breakdown in the ceasefire on an alleged Israeli failure to fulfill its ceasefire obligations. Hamas has, however, itself violated the ceasefire agreement by postponing the release of Israeli hostages.The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court rejected on February 11 recent lawsuits that sought to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[7] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court temporarily suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, the Personal Status Law, and the Property Restitution Law on February 4 after several parliamentarians, including members of the Iranian-backed State of Law Coalition, submitted lawsuits to the Federal Supreme Court.[8] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[9] The Federal Supreme Court’s rejection of the lawsuits is notable given that the court has historically delivered rulings in favor of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and politicians.[10]Iranian-backed Shia political parties will very likely continue to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, despite the court ruling. State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki stated on February 1 that “we will not allow terrorists to leave prisons,” in reference to the individuals who would be released from prison under the General Amnesty Law.[11] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri has also previously expressed strong opposition to the General Amnesty Law.[12] These Iranian-backed militia leaders’ statements about the General Amnesty Law suggest that they will strongly challenge the Federal Supreme Court ruling.The recent Federal Supreme Court ruling highlights existing fissures between the various judicial institutions in Iraq. The Supreme Judicial Council, which is constitutionally responsible for managing Iraqi courts, supervising judges, and forming policies to govern judicial operations, rejected on February 5 the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to temporarily suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty, Personal Status, and Property Restitution laws.[13] The Court of Cassation, which legally reports to the Supreme Judicial Council, reportedly overturned the Federal Supreme Court’s February 4 decision on February 10.[14] The Supreme Judicial Council is led by Iranian-backed Judge Faiq Zayden.[15] Federal Supreme Court head Judge Jasem Mohammad Abbood is tied to the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Badr Organization and Maliki.[16]Some Iraqi Sunni political actors are attempting to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed Shia parties in Ninewa Province, northern Iraq. Iraqi media reported on February 8 that the United Ninewa Bloc attempted to remove Ninewa Provincial Council Chairman Ahmed al Hasoud.[17] The United Ninewa Bloc is an alliance of Sunni parties that includes the Azm Alliance (led by Muthanna al Samarrai), Sovereignty Alliance (led by Khamis al Khanjar), and Progress Party (led by Mohammad al Halbousi).[18] Hasoud is a member of the National Contract Bloc, which is led by Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[19] The Ninewa Future Bloc, which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, opposed the efforts to remove Hasoud.[20] Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish groups have long vied for control in Ninewa Province. Sunni and Kurdish residents have long been resentful of Shia groups’ presence and influence in areas of the province. The Popular Mobilization Forces control some positions along the border between Syria and Ninewa Province.[21]Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani met with Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar to discuss developments in Iraq and KRG-Iraqi federal government relations on February 8.[22]Key Takeaways:Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if Hamas fails to release Israeli hostages on February 15. Hamas is trying to set informational conditions to be able to blame Israel for a potential breakdown of the ceasefire.Iraq: The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court rejected on February 11 recent lawsuits that sought to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law. Iranian-backed Shia political parties will very likely continue to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, despite the court ruling.Iraq: Some Iraqi Sunni political actors are attempting to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed Shia parties in Ninewa Province, northern Iraq.SyriaThe Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge east of Aleppo since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 10.[23] The SNA and SDF exchanged artillery fire on both sides of the bridge and dam.[24] Turkish aircraft conducted at least 15 airstrikes targeting SDF positions near the bridge and dam.[25] Turkish drones also targeted SDF positions east of the dam.[26] An anti-SDF source reported that SNA forces advanced to the eastern side of Qara Qozak Bridge before withdrawing.[27]Three IDF brigades will remain in southern Syria indefinitely, according to a correspondent for the state-funded, IDF-supported Israeli Army Radio.[28] The correspondent visited IDF outposts in Yarmouk Valley along the Syria-Golan Heights-Jordan border with the 890th Paratroopers Brigade on February 11.[29] The correspondent reported that the IDF is constructing nine outposts along the Syria-Golan Heights border.[30] Israeli forces are staying in abandoned Assad regime military infrastructure during the construction.[31] The IDF has placed markers to indicate the boundaries of closed military zones and established checkpoints at the entrances of Syrian villages to ”direct movements.”[32] The correspondent said that Israeli forces have ”quiet, unofficial coordination” with local security forces and coordinate fully with Jordanian border forces.[33] Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara emphasized in January 2025 that Israeli forces must return to the 1974 disengagement line in the Golan Heights and that UN forces should deploy to the buffer zone.[34]Lebanese media reported on February 11 that HTS-led Syrian interim government forces sent reinforcements to three locations along the Syria-Lebanon border.[35] HTS-led forces deployed to the Syria-Lebanon border on February 6 after smugglers kidnapped HTS fighters during a counter-smuggling operation.[36] HTS-led forces and smugglers have clashed near the border since February 6.[37] Lebanese media reported that the Lebanese Armed Forces closed the Qald al Sabaa border crossing between Lebanon and Syria on February 11.[38]Lebanese media claimed on February 11 that HTS fighters killed Lebanese national Khader Karam Zaiter after kidnapping him for ransom.[39] Khader Karam Zaiter was the nephew of Lebanese parliamentarian and Amal movement member Ghazi Zaiter. Both men are members of the al Zaiter clan.[40] French-language Lebanese media reported on February 11 that armed members of the al Zaiter clan and al Jaafar clan gathered in northern Hermel in response to the kidnapping.[41] Both clans have reportedly been involved in drug and weapons smuggling and reportedly have ties to Hezbollah.[42]Syrian media circulated reports on February 11 that the Syrian Defense Ministry appointed two non-Syrian HTS loyalists to senior military positions. The Defense Ministry reportedly appointed HTS Shura Council member Brigadier General Abdul Rahman al Khatib as commander of the Republican Guard in Damascus.[43] The Republican Guard was a majority Alawite elite force under the Assad regime and was responsible for protecting the regime against internal threats.[44] The Defense Ministry also reportedly appointed the former head of the ”Deterrence Aggression” operation room, which led the overthrow of the Assad regime, as the head of the “Damascus Division.” This division possibly refers to the Syrian Arab Army 4th Division.[45]Anti-SDF media reported on February 11 that 45 Iraqi families left al Roj camp in Hasakah Province.[46] Many Iraqi and Syrian nationals, as well as individuals who traveled to or were born in Islamic State-controlled territory in Syria, reside in al Roj camp.[47] US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Michael Kurilla visited the al Hol internally displaced persons camp in Hasakah Province on January 16 and emphasized CENTCOM’s support for the repatriation of al Hol and al Roj residents.[48] CTP-ISW previously reported that the mass release of displaced persons risks providing new opportunities to ISIS by dispersing a vulnerable population into areas where ISIS is active.[49]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentThe Iraqi federal government is “facing difficulties” in its efforts to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias due to militia demands for senior positions in the government, according to unspecified sources speaking to Iraqi media on February 11.[50] The militias reportedly seek senior positions in the Iraqi security establishment, including national security adviser, National Intelligence Service head, and Popular Mobilization Commitee chairman. The sources claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have inflated the number of militia members who would join the Iraqi security establishment during negotiations with the Iraqi federal government. The sources added that most members of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework support the integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the security establishment..[51] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment would increase Iranian influence therein and fail to reduce the threat that these militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East.[52]Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid filed a lawsuit against Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Finance Minister Taif Sami due to the Iraqi federal government’s failure to pay Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) employee salaries.[53] Rashid filed the lawsuit on January 20, before the Iraqi federal government and KRG agreed on February 3 for the federal government to resume salary payments for KRG employees.[54] Rashid may have announced his lawsuit to appeal to his Kurdish base. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai condemned Rashid’s lawsuit on February 11.[55]Iraqi media reported on February 11 that Turkey struck Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions in Gargash Village, northern Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan.[56] Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripNothing significant to report.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripSee topline section.LebanonLebanese media reported on February 11 that the IDF moved to a valley south of Aita al Shaab, Bint Jbeil District, along the Israel-Lebanon border.[57] Lebanese media reported that the IDF demolished infrastructure in Aita al Shaab.[58]Israeli media reported on February 11 that the United States rejected an Israeli request to further extend the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement, which would enable the IDF to maintain positions in Lebanon.[59] The United States announced on January 25 a ceasefire extension that requires the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon by February 18.[60]West BankThe IDF continued its counterterrorism operation in the northern West Bank on February 11.[61] The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AAMB)and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) attacked Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Jenin governorates with improvised explosive devices (IED) and small arms.[62] Hamas, PIJ, and the “Youth of Revenge and Liberation” claimed that they fired small arms in a combined attack targeting the IDF in Tulkarm on February 10.[63] PIJ announced on January 22 the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank with Hamas and AAMB fighters.[64]Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian Parliament began interpellating Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Abdol Naser Hemmati on February 11.[65] Interpellation is a formal parliamentary request for a government minister to appear before Parliament to justify government policy, which may result in a vote of no confidence against the relevant minister.[66] Hemmati's interpellation comes amid worsening economic conditions in Iran. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States in a speech on February 7, after which the value of the Iranian rial dropped to 940,000 rials per one US dollar.[67] Parliament frequently interpellates ministers and previously interpellated former Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Ehsan Khandouzi in 2021.[68]Senior Iranian military officials emphasized on February 11 that the Iranian regime will resist US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy.[69] Supreme Leader Military Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi emphasized that Iran has increased non-oil exports by five percent and expanded the number of countries that it exports oil to despite international sanctions.[70] Safavi highlighted Iranian involvement in economic alliances, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, as well as Iran’s strategic agreements with China and Russia. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Intelligence Organization Chief Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi separately emphasized this organization’s willingness to help the Iranian regime and private sector mitigate the impact of sanctions.[71]Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri met with Omani Armed Forces Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Abdullah bin Khamis al Raisi in Tehran on February 11 to discuss strengthening military ties.[72] Bagheri emphasized the need for greater military cooperation between Iran and Oman.[73] Bagheri invited Oman to participate in the Marine Security Belt exercise and emphasized the importance of securing the Strait of Hormuz and Sea of Oman.[74] The Marine Security Belt exercise is a joint naval exercise that includes Iran, Russia, and China and aims to enhance maritime security and improve naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman.[75] Raisi will visit an Iranian armed forces exhibition and meet with other unspecified military officials during his visit to Iran.Anti-regime media circulated videos on February 10 of anti-regime protests in Dehdasht, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province, Iran. The protesters reportedly chanted “Death to the Islamic Republic” and "Death to Khamenei."[76] Anti-regime media reported that Iranian security forces clashed with the protestors and arrested at least two individuals. Social media users reported road closures and internet disruptions in the area.[77] Some social media users claimed that the protests started on February 8.[78] CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm these reports. The protests coincide with the 46th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. The protests also come amid worsening economic conditions and US President Donald Trump’s reimposition of ”maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran.[79]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1889377668677718474[2] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1889377637295935943[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-10-2025[4] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1888990097669849471[5] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1889372691062501379[6] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1889035343187333168[7] Https://almadapaper dot net/395935/[8] https://almadapaper dot net/395212/ ; https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1181645 ;https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9 ;https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%82%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9[9] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-parliament-debates-controversial-amendment-amnesty-law[10] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-iraqi-federal-supreme-court[11] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-parliament-debates-controversial-amendment-amnesty-law ; 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https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-ninevehs-municipal-council-reveals-about-iran-turkey-power-struggle-iraq[22] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/080220253[23] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889039815762690518 ;[24] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135560 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135569 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135557[25] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135569 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135603[26] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889039815762690518[27] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889039815762690518/history[28] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1889245368719659297 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/19327[29] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19307[30] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19308[31] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19308[32] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19315[33] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19317 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/19322[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025[35] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113821[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-6-2025[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-6-2025 ; 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https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-24-2025[50] https://almadapaper dot net/395929/[51] https://almadapaper dot net/395929/[52] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate010925[53] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823974/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9[54] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823154/%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823974/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9[55] https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1889234401310941685[56] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83[57] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113795[58] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113809[59] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/israel-asked-to-extend-idf-deployment-in-lebanon-but-us-plans-to-stick-to-feb-18-deadline-official-says/[60] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/26/israel-lebanon-ceasefire-extended-trump-white-house[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1889341814441709789[62] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/979 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/980 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8261 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8264[63] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8259 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8260[64] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-22-2025[65] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/23/3255975[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-17-2023[67] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-7-2025 ;https://www.rferl dot org/a/33311057.html;https://alanchand dot com/en/currencies-price/usd[68] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202112305037[69] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/23683; https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/23678; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025[70] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/23683[71] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/23678[72] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/23/3255914[73] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/23/3256150[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/23/3256150[75] https://apnews.com/article/iran-russia-china-joint-naval-drill-53a1b3a6f9fd2c4199d2ad7d8cd5a49e[76] https://x.com/chawshin_83/status/1889370463819747389 ; https://x.com/IranIntl_Ar/status/1889240224330330232[77] https://x.com/xBx73mOl77qBATH/status/1889057878801088688 ; https://x.com/Yasmin4freedom/status/1889107216990396827[78] https://x.com/chawshin_83/status/1889370463819747389 ; https://x.com/Strand123/status/1889407932540002615 ; https://x.com/ashk_shadi/status/1888318463967375682 ; https://x.com/Yasmin4freedom/status/1889107216990396827[79] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-4-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-23-2024
- — Iran Update, February 7, 2025
- Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States during a speech to Iranian military personnel in Tehran on February 7.[1] This marks the first time Khamenei has so explicitly opposed negotiations with the United States since the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Khamenei stated that negotiations with the United States are "unwise, unintelligent, and dishonorable" and "no one should negotiate" with them.[2] Khamenei stated that Iran is not opposed to negotiations with any state ”except” the United States.[3] Several Friday prayer leaders echoed Khamenei's statements and criticized negotiations with the United States as "futile."[4] Friday prayer leaders receive guidance for the content of their Friday sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader, which suggests that their comments are likely a coordinated messaging campaign. Khamenei also stated that negotiating with the United States "will not solve any problems [in Iran], including economic and livelihood difficulties."[5] CTP-ISW previously assessed that US "maximum pressure” sanctions would likely further deteriorate the Iranian economy, which is already facing underlying economic issues.[6]Khamenei's opposition to negotiations with the United States appears inconsistent with the hypothesis that Iran is expanding its nuclear program to gain leverage in future negotiations. Iran is conducting nuclear research and expanding its stockpile of enriched uranium, which are both steps that could enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a period of months.[7] One plausible reason for Iran's continued development of its nuclear program is to strengthen its position and increase leverage for future nuclear talks in order to secure more favorable terms. This would, in theory, enable Iran to extract concessions (such as sanctions relief) during negotiations by offering to decrease its stockpile of enriched uranium. Khamenei’s recent statements are inconsistent with this hypothesis, however, because Iran has no reason to increase its leverage with the West if it does not intend to negotiate with the United States. Some senior Iranian officials have recently signaled a willingness to engage in nuclear negotiations with the West, but Khamenei ultimately will decide whether Iran will negotiate, try to build a nuclear weapon, or retain a rapid nuclear breakout capability.[8]The Egyptian government continues to oppose US President Donald Trump’s suggestion to relocate Gazans to Egypt and Jordan. An unidentified Cairo-based Western diplomat told the Associated Press on February 6 that Egypt views Trump’s idea as a threat to Egypt’s national security.[9] Egypt officials have warned that Trump’s proposal is a “blatant violation” of international law and could undermine the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty.[10] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 6 to prepare a plan for the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.[11]Some Sunni political parties have continued to collaborate with more sectarian Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties on a local level, despite national-level disagreements over the General Amnesty Law. Members of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi’s Sunni Progress Party in the Baghdad Provincial Council voted on February 6 to dismiss Baghdad Provincial Council Chairman Ammar al Qaisi.[12] Qaisi is a member of the Sunni Azm Alliance, which is led by Muthanna al Samarrai.[13] Samarrai is a longtime political rival of Halbousi and a competitor for political influence among Sunni Iraqis. The Baghdad Provincial Council dismissed Qaisi because he recently dismissed the governor of Baghdad, Abdul Muttalib al Alawi.[14] Alawi is a member of the State of Law Coalition.[15] A member of the State of Law coalition stated on February 2 that this coalition is “entitle[d]” to the Baghdad governor position and will “certainly have a candidate” to replace Alawi.[16] Sunni members of the Baghdad Provincial Council have reportedly agreed to elect Ammar al Hamdani, who is a member of the Progress Party, to replace Qaisi.[17]Maliki and Halbousi probably reached a quid-pro-quo in which the State of Law and the Progress Party would remove the Azm Alliance’s Provincial Council head to restore State of Law’s control of Baghdad’s governorship and give control of the Provincial Council to Halbousi. Halbousi is one of the only top Sunni Iraqi politicians who is not included in the new United Sunni Leadership Coalition, which was formed by Halbousi’s rivals.Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[18] Qasra is very likely referencing some form of economic relief to help improve Syria’s dire economic situation. The interim Syrian government has lobbied for economic relief from various sources since the fall of the Assad regime.[19] Cooperation with Russia could hinder European Union plans to lift sanctions on Syria, which are contingent on the new Syrian government pursuing a peaceful political future without extremism or involvement from Russia and Iran.[20] An unspecified Russian source told Bloomberg on January 28 that talks on Russian basing are “stuck.”[21] Russia has continued to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid ongoing negotiations with the interim Syrian government.[22]Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Policy: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States during a speech to Iranian military personnel in Tehran on February 7. This marks the first time Khamenei has so explicitly opposed negotiations with the United States since the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Khamenei's opposition to negotiations with the United States appears inconsistent with the hypothesis that Iran is expanding its nuclear program to gain leverage in future negotiations.Egyptian Response to US Gaza Plan: The Egyptian government continues to oppose US President Donald Trump’s suggestion to relocate Gazans to Egypt and Jordan.Iraqi Politics: Some Sunni political parties have continued to collaborate with more sectarian Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties on a local level, despite national-level disagreements over the General Amnesty Law. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and former Parliament Speaker Halbousi probably reached a quid-pro-quo to benefit both political parties in Baghdad.Russia in Syria: Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria. Qasra is very likely referencing some form of economic relief to help improve Syria’s dire economic situation.SyriaThe pro-Assad Syrian Popular Resistance claimed on February 6 that it killed several HTS fighters and HTS-led security force members.[23] The Syrian Popular Resistance claimed its fighters killed nine fighters, including an HTS and East Turkestan Movement commander, an HTS official, and a Deir ez Zor militia commander.[24] The Syrian Popular Resistance has claimed attacks over the past several weeks targeting HTS forces.[25] It remains unclear whether the group has had any real involvement in these attacks beyond the claims on social media, however.The Syrian National Army (SNA) conducted two assaults against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) around Tal Syriatel, northwest of the Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on February 7. The SDF posted footage showing its fighters firing on an SNA position near Tal Syriatel. The SDF claimed that the SNA fighters fled their position.[26] An SDF-linked spokesperson said that the SNA attempted to assault the position twice and failed.[27] Anti-SDF reporting contradicted SDF claims about the two assaults and asserted that its forces conducted a counter-attack against SDF fighters attempting to take the position and defended against three infiltration attempts.[28]The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)-dominated Kurdish National Council (KNC) announced on February 7 that it is interested in forming a united delegation with its political rival, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), to negotiate with the interim Syrian government.[29] The KNC is a political coalition of Syrian Kurdish parties that is dominated by the KDP, which is one of two major parties that control Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government. The PYD is the political wing of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which forms the core of the SDF. The KDP-backed KNC and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-affiliated PYD both seek to achieve some sort of Kurdish administration for Syrian Kurds in the wake of the Assad regime but differ in their approach.[30] The KNC seeks a ”federal system” similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government and the PYD has historically sought an autonomous zone.[31] The KNC has historically cooperated with other Syrian opposition groups while the PYD has sought to establish itself as a third, neutral force in Syria. The PYD never seriously engaged the broader Syrian opposition to Assad, which has caused many Syrians to oppose the PYD.[32] The KNC and PYD aim to create a unified negotiating position but may find it difficult to do so.[33] The KNC and PYD have long been rivals in northeastern Syria, with the PYD controlling northeastern Syria due to their much larger military forces.[34]The head of the SDF Media Center Farhad Shami reported that Kurdish parties are still engaged in negotiations with the interim Syrian government.[35] Shami claimed that the Kurdish parties had reached several agreements with the interim government, but he claimed that Turkey had intervened before the agreement could be signed. Shami claimed that the SDF can govern itself in northern and eastern Syria. The SDF has so far refused to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry and has instead called for a “decentralized” system that would allow the SDF to join the new Syrian armed forces as a “bloc” and remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[36] Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara said that Syrian sovereignty “under one authority and on one land” is a priority of the HTS-led interim government on January 30.[37] Shara recently told Western media that he is not very optimistic about the possibility of an agreement with the SDF, but negotiations continue.[38]HTS-led Syrian interim government border security forces continued to engage Lebanese smugglers in Hawik, Homs Province, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 6. Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on February 7 that interim government forces “launched an attack” on Hawik, a predominantly Lebanese village in Syria, on February 6.[39] There is no evidence of this ”attack” other than the Syrian interim government’s response to illegal smuggling along the border. A Syrian journalist reported on February 7 that interim government security forces reinforced their position south of Hawik, northeast of Qusayr.[40] The Syrian Department of Military Operations deployed to Hawik, northeast of Qusayr after smugglers kidnapped HTS fighters during a counter-smuggling operation on February 6.[41] Lebanese media reported that the Lebanese ”clans“ that were holding three HTS fighters captive reached an agreement and returned the HTS fighters to Syrian forces at the Jusiyah border crossing on February 6.[42]A Syrian journalist reported that Syrian interim government security forces later advanced on the border with Lebanon during operations against Hezbollah-affiliated smuggling groups.[43] Geolocated footage posted to X (Twitter) showed Syrian interim government forces firing an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) from a rooftop in western Hawik on February 6.[44] Lebanese media reported that interim government rockets and artillery fire from Syria hit three locations in Lebanese territory on the Syria-Lebanon border.[45] A Syrian Arab media outlet posted footage on February 7 that reportedly showed HTS fighters in Jarmash, Lebanon.[46] CTP-ISW cannot confirm the presence of HTS fighters in Lebanon at the time of this writing. A Syrian journalist reported that four Lebanese nationals belonging to the Jaafar clan were killed in clashes with interim government forces on the Syria-Lebanon border.[47] The Jaafar clan is active in drug and weapons smuggling in the Bekaa region.[48] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Syrian interim President Ahmed al Shara agreed to coordinate to control the situation on the Lebanon-Syria border in a phone call on February 7.[49]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentSome Iraqi courts have begun implementing the General Amnesty Law despite the recent Federal Supreme Court decision to temporarily suspend the implementation of this law.[50] The Federal Supreme Court temporarily suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law on February 4 to determine the constitutionality of the parliament session in which parliament approved the law.[51] This law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[52] Courts in Najaf and Qadisiyah provinces in southern Iraq announced on February 6 that they had begun implementing the General Amnesty Law.[53] These announcements are noteworthy given that the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority in Iraq and, according to the Iraqi constitution, the Federal Supreme Court’s decisions are “final and binding for all authorities.”[54]Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov continued his visit to Iraq on February 6 and 7. Bogdanov met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani on February 6.[55] Bogdanov and Barzani discussed the agreement between the Iraqi federal government and the KRG for the KRG to resume oil exports. Bogdanov traveled to Najaf in southern Iraq on February 7 and met with Najaf Governor Yousef Kanawi.[56] Kanawi is a member of Ammar al Hakim’s National Wisdom Movement.[57] Russian media reported that the Russian delegation headed by Bogdanov included officials from the Russian foreign affairs and defense ministries, as well as representatives of unspecified oil and energy companies.[58]Turkey conducted airstrikes on February 7 that targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions in northern Dohuk Province, Iraqi Kurdistan, killing eight PKK fighters.[59] Turkey claimed that it killed a member of the PKK’s special forces unit in Iraqi Kurdistan.[60]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripNothing significant to report.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed elements of the 162nd, 143rd, and 99th Divisions to unidentified areas in the Gaza Strip, presumably in the buffer zone, on February 7 to better defend Israelis in the Gaza Envelope.[61] The IDF 162nd Division withdrew from the northern Gaza Strip and deployed to the IDF-designated buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s northeastern boundary on January 18.[62] The IDF reported that the three divisions moved into new locations to ”strengthen the layer of defense for [Israelis] in the western Negev,” which suggests that the IDF deployed these divisions in the buffer zone. The western Negev describes the area along the Gaza Strip-Israel border that includes the Israeli towns in the Gaza Envelope that Hamas attacked on October 7, 2023. A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF 143rd Division withdrew from some areas of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on January 18.[63] The IDF 99th Division withdrew from the northern Gaza Strip on January 5.[64] Several Southern Command commanders held situational assessments with the soldiers prior to the release of the next set of hostages.[65] The next release will take place on February 8, according to the ceasefire agreement.Israeli media reported on February 7 that Hamas gave Israel the names of the three male hostages expected to be released on February 8.[66] Unidentified Israeli officials told Israeli media on February 7 that Hamas would likely delay sharing the names of the hostages due to Hamas’ dissatisfaction with Israel’s implementation of humanitarian aid.[67] Hamas officials have previously accused Israel of delays in aid delivery to the Gaza Strip.[68] A UN humanitarian aid official said on February 6 that over 10,000 aid trucks have entered the Gaza Strip since the ceasefire went into effect on January 19.[69] The official did not provide an exact number of trucks that have entered the strip since January 19, though 10,800 trucks in total would be required to meet the 600-truck daily quota under the ceasefire agreement. Over 10,000 trucks in the eighteen days between January 19 and February 6 means Israel has allowed more than 555 aid trucks on average every day of the ceasefire.Geolocated footage posted on February 7 shows purportedly over 50 Hamas fighters standing in formation in an empty lot on al Jalaa Street, Zaytoun neighborhood, Gaza City.[70] The presence of Hamas fighters in Gaza City does not by itself indicate that Hamas has reconstituted itself as a military organization in the Gaza Strip. The existence of these groups of fighters does not inherently imply that these fighters are part of an organized military force with a clear chain of command, nor does it imply that these fighters can conduct effective military operations.[71] This is consistent with the CTP-ISW assessment that Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war.LebanonThe IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes on February 6 that targeted Hezbollah weapons caches in Nabatieh District and Baalbek District, Lebanon.[72] An Israeli source told Israel Army Radio that the strike followed Hezbollah ceasefire violations and attempts to smuggle weapons from the Syria border area.[73] Lebanese and Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that IDF airstrikes targeted two locations in Nabatieh District, approximately 20 km north of Israel.[74] The IDF previously conducted an airstrike that targeted a vehicle transporting Hezbollah weapons in Nabatieh District on January 28.[75] Geolocated footage posted to X (Twitter), Lebanese, and Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that the IDF struck five locations near Janta, Baalbek District, on the Lebanon-Syria border.[76] The IDF has repeatedly struck Hezbollah military sites near the Lebanon-Syria border in recent months.[77]The IDF Arabic language spokesperson said on February 7 that a Hezbollah field commander accidentally killed himself when he detonated a Hezbollah explosive device in Tayr Harfa, southwestern Lebanon.[78] The spokesperson reported that the field commander intended to use the device to conduct an attack but inadvertently detonated the device. The explosion killed the field commander and his family. Hezbollah-owned media reported on February 7 that unexploded IDF ordnance killed unspecified individuals in Tyre Harfa.[79]Lebanese and Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on February 7 that the IDF demolished infrastructure in Kfar Kila.[80]US Deputy Special Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in Beirut on February 7.[81] Ortagus conveyed a US “red line” to Aoun that Hezbollah should not be a member of the next Lebanese government. Ortagus reiterated that Hezbollah has been “defeated militarily.”[82] Ortagus separately stated that the IDF must complete its withdrawal from Lebanon by February 18. The United States previously announced the extension of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement to February 18.[83]West BankNothing significant to report.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian Artesh Navy participated in the ninth multinational AMAN-25 naval exercise in Karachi, Pakistan, on February 7 alongside 60 other countries.[84] Pakistan holds the AMAN naval exercise every two years to display its naval and military capabilities. The exercise runs until February 11. This marks the first participation in the AMAN exercise for an Iranian naval vessel. The Iranian Artesh Navy delegation will also attend the AMAN Dialogue Conference on maritime cooperation and meet with Pakistani military officials. Iran and Pakistan last conducted a joint naval exercise in January 2024.[85] The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964[2] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964[3] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964[4] https://farsnews dot ir/farhad/1738931439839364630[5] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-4-2025[7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-4-2025[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-5-2025[9] https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-egypt-trump-displacement-bc1c43f80655190824a5de4eb1d310cc[10] https://www.cairo24 dot com/2159420#goog_rewarded ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hy8ktup8hHg ; https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-egypt-trump-displacement-bc1c43f80655190824a5de4eb1d310cc[11] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19152 ; https://wapo.st/412L8Xw[12] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Baghdad-Council-ousts-Chairman-Al-Qaisi ;https://baghdadtoday dot news/267485-%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A.html ;https://alsharqiya dot com/en/news/the-head-of-the-progress-party-participates-in-the-celebrations-of-the-people-of-anbar ;https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/822612/al-maliki-warns-against-repeating-the-syrian-scenario-in-iraq[13] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Baghdad-Council-ousts-Chairman-Al-Qaisi[14] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Baghdad-s-Council-agrees-to-replace-Chairman[15] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1[16] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/SLC-slams-Baghdad-Governor-s-retirement-vows-legal-challenge ;https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1[17] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A ;https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1771514693424358[18] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/06/syria-defense-minister-russia-bases/[19] https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/syria-eu-sanctions-relief-crucial-why ; 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https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5718[26] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1887823051569438928[27] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1887823051569438928[28] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1887833788618555528[29] https://www.rudaw dot net/arabic/kurdistan/070220251 ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823652/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_SyrianKurds.pdf[31] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kurdish-unity-efforts-gain-momentum-amid-uncertain-future-syria[32] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kurdish-unity-efforts-gain-momentum-amid-uncertain-future-syria[33] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kurdish-unity-efforts-gain-momentum-amid-uncertain-future-syria[34] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kurdish-unity-efforts-gain-momentum-amid-uncertain-future-syria[35] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1887596925077115290[36] https://asharq dot com/politics/113001/قسد-اللامركزية-الخيار-الأنسب-سوريا/ ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/820456[37] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122256[38] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/02/03/an-interview-with-ahmed-al-sharaa-syrias-president[39] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13119339[40] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1887853819918217622[41] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-6-2025[42] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113380[43] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1887893458452394134[44] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1887740042547810422[45] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113398 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113429 ; https://t.me/dahieh4all/49692 ; https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/1887844244817072162[46] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135281 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135280[47] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1887942572464652761[48] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1887942572464652761[49] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119819 ; https://www.presidency dot gov.lb/Arabic/News/Pages/Details.aspx?nid=27440[50] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%84-%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85[51] https://almadapaper dot net/395212/[52] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-parliament-debates-controversial-amendment-amnesty-law[53] https://aljeebal dot com/posts/3478[54] https://www.constituteproject dot org/constitution/Iraq_2005[55] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823507/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9[56] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1184253[57] https://almashhad dot com/article/773112298002792-News/605993621355675-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%81-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%88-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%81-%D9%83%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A/[58] https://arabic.rt dot com/middle_east/1644367-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%81-%D9%8A%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%85-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%81-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%82%D9%89-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1/[59] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1184274 ;https://shafaq dot com/en/Kurdistan/Turkish-airstrikes-target-PKK-positions-in-northern-Duhok-4-5[60] https://www.dailysabah dot com/politics/war-on-terror/turkish-strike-eliminates-pkks-special-forces-member-in-iraq[61] https://www.idf dot il/268619[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18536 ; 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- — China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 7, 2025
- Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise InstituteEditors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise InstituteData Cutoff: February 4, 2025The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.Key Takeaways Taiwanese civil society groups are leading a large-scale recall campaign targeting legislators from the KMT opposition party. These recalls could erode the current KMT-led majority in the LY.The PLA flew aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ 255 times in January 2025. The PRC has normalized over 200 ADIZ incursions per month, degrading Taiwan’s threat awareness and response threshold.PRC-based DeepSeek’s newly released reasoning model demonstrates the ineffectiveness of current US export controls to prevent PRC access to advanced semiconductors.The PRC’s export controls on critical minerals will impede US access to materials that are essential to economic and national security.The PLA is increasing its air and naval presence around the disputed Scarborough Shoal to solidify PRC control amid perceived encroachment by the Philippines and its allies.Panama announced that it would withdraw from the PRC’s BRI and consider canceling PRC contracts for two ports on the Panama Canal.Cross-Strait RelationsTaiwanTaiwanese civil society groups are leading a large-scale recall campaign targeting legislators from the Kuomintang (KMT) opposition party. These recalls could erode the current KMT-led majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY). The Central Election Commission (CEC) has received recall petitions against 19 KMT legislators.[1] The legislative minority leader of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Ker Chien-ming, has called for mass recalls against all 41 KMT and KMT-aligned legislators in response to the KMT and its allies passing controversial cuts and freezes to the national budget, which could paralyze the government, and measures that are temporarily preventing the Constitutional Court from functioning ordinarily.[2] The DPP has criticized the budget cuts and freezes and measures against the Constitution Court, describing these actions as damaging to Taiwan’s ability to resist PRC efforts to undermine its sovereignty. The KMT retaliated by initiating recall petitions against four DPP legislators, two of which have received enough signatures to be submitted to the CEC. [3]Taiwanese billionaire and United Microelectronics founder Robert Tsao has helped lead the anti-KMT recall campaign.[4] Tsao has previously accused the KMT and its allies of “sabotaging” the government to the benefit of the PRC. Tsao is an active supporter of strengthening Taiwan’s resilience against a potential PRC invasion, which is also a primary focus of President Lai Ching-te’s administration.The CEC is reviewing the petitions at time of writing to assess whether they meet the threshold to initiate a recall election. Recall petitions meet the threshold if 1 percent of the electorate submits a valid signature. Any recall petitions that got the requisite number of signatures will trigger a recall election. The next step is to pass the recall motion in the recall election. The CEC currently mandates that a recall motion is passed “if the number of valid votes in favor is greater than the number of votes against” and “the number of votes in favor reaches more than one-quarter of the total number of voters in the original electoral district.”[5] Not every legislator targeted by recall petitions is from a politically competitive district; it is thus likely that many recall elections will fail to remove the targeted official.Successful recalls of KMT legislators could empower the DPP in the LY and neutralize the opposition parties’ efforts to counter Lai’s agenda. Recall efforts offer the DPP the opportunity to regain control of the LY for the first time since the January 2024 elections. The LY currently has no majority party, with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holding eight seats. The TPP has aligned with the KMT in the LY, giving the opposition a majority in practice.[6] The DPP needs to flip at least six seats (for a total of 57) in order to gain control of the LY; a mere plurality would be insufficient as long as the TPP continues to vote with the KMT.KMT and TPP-sponsored amendments to the Public Officials Election and Recall Act may help preserve their influence in the LY, however. They passed an amendment that requires citizens to provide copies of their ID cards — rather than just their ID numbers and addresses — when initiating or signing recall petitions. The DPP-controlled Executive Yuan returned this amendment to the LY for reconsideration on February 2, which is unlikely to prevent the amendment’s passage again but will buy additional time for recall petitions to move forward before the ID requirement is in place. The LY has 15 days to pass a bill on a second review, after which President Lai must sign the bill within 10 days.[7] KMT legislators have also proposed (but not yet passed) an amendment to raise the threshold for a recall to succeed. The amendment stipulates that a recall will only remove an official from power if more voters vote to recall the official than voted to elect the official originally.[8]Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) blocked 13 Shanghai officials from entering Taiwan for the Taipei Lantern Festival in response to allegations that the PRC obstructed PRC-based Taiwanese businesspeople from returning to Taiwan for cross-strait events. The 13 officials included the director of Shanghai’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Jin Mei. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Chiu Chui-cheng said that the decision to block the Shanghai delegation was largely based on the PRC obstructing Taiwanese businesspeople living in the PRC from returning home to join activities organized by the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). The SEF is a semi-official Taiwanese group that organizes cross-strait exchanges and often invites PRC-based Taiwanese businesspeople to its Lunar New Year events. Chiu said that Taiwanese businesspeople based in Shanghai should logically be the largest portion of PRC-based Taiwanese who participate in such events, as Shanghai is home to many Taiwanese businesses, but there have been “very few” in recent years. Chiu added that he asked the Shanghai TAO to freely allow Shanghai-based Taiwanese to join SEF events in Taiwan the last time Shanghai officials were “testing the waters” in a cross-strait event--likely a reference to the Taipei-Shanghai Twin Cities Forum in December 2024--but there has been no improvement.[9] The SEF hosted a Spring Festival (Lunar New Year) event for PRC-based Taiwanese businesspeople on February 3 in Taipei but saw reduced attendance compared to previous years.[10] Chiu also said that the TAO delegation submitted its application to enter Taiwan too late for the MAC to review before the festival.[11] The Taipei Lantern Festival is taking place from February 2 to 16.[12] The MAC previously blocked Jin and nine PRC media figures from entering Taiwan for the Taipei-Shanghai Twin Cities Forum, citing the PRC’s military and legal coercion against Taiwan in 2024.[13]The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flew aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 255 times in January 2025. The PRC has normalized over 200 ADIZ incursions per month since President Lai’s inauguration in May 2024 in order to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness and raise the threshold for its threat response. PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have exceeded 200 per month every month since May 2024 but only did so four times prior to 2024. The volume of ADIZ incursions in January was the second lowest since May but was still significantly higher than the pre-2024 average. ADIZ incursion numbers do not include PLA activity around Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which are west of the median line of the Taiwan Strait.[14]This “new normal” volume of ADIZ incursions raises the threshold of coercive activity that will trigger a Taiwanese response, making it more difficult for Taiwan to detect and respond to a real threat in time. Taiwan must put personnel on standby to respond to each ADIZ incursion if necessary, which strains resources and exhausts the personnel. Taiwan does not typically scramble its own aircraft to respond to such incursions, however, because the incursions are so frequent. Taiwanese media revealed in late 2024 that the Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of National Defense (MND) quietly shortened the warning distance for air raid warnings from 70 to 24 nautical miles at the end of 2022 because the increased volume of PLA activity would have required near-daily air raid alerts under the previous threshold. The new threshold would give residents of some Taiwanese regions just three minutes to seek shelter in a real air raid, however.[15]The MND also detected 16 PRC high-altitude balloons in Taiwan’s ADIZ in January, including seven that flew directly over Taiwan, over a total of 10 days of the month. The PRC has resumed and gradually escalated such balloon incursions since November 2024, after carrying out a much higher-volume campaign of balloon incursions in the winter of 2023–2024. The MND reported 57 balloons in Taiwan’s ADIZ in January 2024, including incursions nearly every day of the month.[16] The greatly reduced volume of balloon activity this January compared to last year strengthens ISW’s previous assessment that the 2024 balloon incursions were in part politically motivated to influence Taiwan’s election in January 2024. The balloons also support the broader ADIZ incursion campaign of wearing down Taiwan’s threat awareness, however, and may be conducting reconnaissance. The PRC TAO claimed in January 2024 that the balloons were “mostly” meteorological and “mostly” launched by private enterprises, even though they flew much lower than most meteorological balloons.[17] The balloons’ true purpose and intelligence gathering potential remains unclear, but even collecting standard meteorological data over Taiwan can be useful for planning missile strikes.[18] ChinaThe success of PRC-based artificial intelligence (AI) company DeepSeek’s newly released reasoning model demonstrates the ineffectiveness of current US export controls to prevent PRC access to advanced semiconductors. DeepSeek released its new reasoning model called R1 in January. R1 demonstrated competitive performance that is on par with leading models from the United States, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT. One of the primary goals of US export controls on advanced semiconductors to the PRC is to inhibit the PRC’s development of AI to support its military modernization efforts, including applying AI to improve the speed and accuracy of military decision making, planning, and logistics.[19]US government entities, including the White House, Department of Commerce, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are investigating whether DeepSeek used semiconductors that are subject to PRC-focused export restrictions to develop R1.[20] Investigating agencies are specifically trying to determine whether DeepSeek used intermediaries in Singapore to circumvent US export controls and purchase Nvidia chips, according to Bloomberg.[21] Nvidia is the dominant provider of advanced semiconductors that are optimized to train generative AI models, maintaining a market share of approximately 80 percent.[22]Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) stated on February 1 that many of Nvidia’s customers use their business entities in Singapore to purchase chips that are produced for consumption in the United States and Western countries.[23] Nvidia’s financial and regulatory statements disclosed that approximately 22 percent of the company’s revenue was attributed to shipments to Singapore in 2024 but that “most shipments associated with Singapore were to locations other than Singapore, and shipments to Singapore were insignificant.”[24] Nvidia’s financial and regulatory statements disclosed that approximately 22 percent of the company’s revenue was attributed to shipments to Singapore in 2024 but that “most shipments associated with Singapore were to locations other than Singapore, and shipments to Singapore were insignificant.”[25] MTI stated that it expects US companies to comply with US export controls and that Singapore’s customs and law enforcement agencies would continue to work with US counterparts to uphold the restrictions.[26] MTI noted in the same statement that “Nvidia has also stated that there is no reason to believe that DeepSeek obtained any export-controlled products from Singapore.”The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implemented expanded export controls in October 2023 on advanced semiconductors to more than 40 additional countries that presented a risk of diversion to the PRC, but this list did not include Singapore.[27] US legislators John Moolenaar and Raja Krishnamoorthi of the House Select Committee on the CCP wrote in a January 30 letter to National Security Advisor Mike Waltz that “countries like Singapore should be subject to strict licensing requirements absent a willingness to crack down on PRC transshipment through their territory.”[28] BIS placed additional entities from the PRC and Singapore on the Entity List on January 15 for violating US export controls on advanced semiconductors, however.[29]DeepSeek’s development of R1 could have used either chips that were shipped before export restrictions were implemented or chips that are currently excluded from export restrictions, which would demonstrate the need to further tighten the performance limits of chips that currently qualify for shipment to the PRC. Nvidia released two downgraded variants of its top AI semiconductors, the H800 and H20, to accommodate increasingly stringent performance limits for the chips that it can sell to the PRC. The United States expanded export restrictions in October 2023 to include Nvidia’s H800 chips.[30] DeepSeek’s researchers stated in a December 27 report that the company used 2,048 H800 chips to train its V3 model, which it may have legally purchased before October 2023.[31] The H20 chip is currently outside the scope of US export controls and accessible to PRC companies, such as DeepSeek.DeepSeek’s competitive AI performance highlights the failure of current semiconductor export controls against the PRC in inhibiting AI development, whether due to illegal trans-shipment or insufficiently inclusive restrictions.The PRC is constructing a massive military complex in western Beijing that is estimated to be ten times the size of the Pentagon, according to anonymous current and former US officials that spoke to the Financial Times (FT).[32] US intelligence officials are reportedly examining satellite images of the approximately 1,500-acre construction project, which began in mid-2024. The exact purpose of the facility is still unclear. Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) geospatial intelligence analyst Decker Eveleth noted that the satellite imagery suggests significant portions of the facility will be underground.[33] Taiwanese security experts expressed doubts about the facility’s utility as a bunker, however. Hsu Yen-chi of the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies, a Taiwan-based think tank, speculated that the new military facility could serve administrative or training purposes due to its size.[34]The PRC currently lacks an equivalent to the Pentagon or a centralized Ministry of Defense facility that integrates facilities across domains. These new facilities could reflect a PRC effort to integrate command and control as the PLA works to improve interoperability across domains. An unnamed US official told FT that the facility will likely replace the PRC’s Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Operations Command Center in the Western Hills of Beijing, which is currently near the top of the chain of command to alert or use nuclear weapons.[35] This would align with ongoing PRC efforts to centralize and streamline the command and control of the PLA. The US Department of Defense (DoD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) assessed that the PLA is working toward improving its ability to conduct joint operations.[36] The PRC has taken several measures to this end in recent years, including the creation of a new military support branch in April 2024 that is focused on optimizing information networks to achieve rapid and informed decision-making.The PRC announced retaliatory economic measures against the United States on February 4 in response to the US implementation of 10 percent tariffs on PRC imports. The PRC’s measures include a 15 percent tariff on US coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG) products and a 10 percent tariff on crude oil, agricultural machinery, large-displacement cars, and pickup trucks.[37] The tariffs will take effect on February 10. The comparatively narrow scope of PRC tariffs on US imports indicates the PRC’s reluctance to enact reciprocal measures, which likely stems from a desire to limit the impact of trade tensions on domestic consumption. The PRC Ministry of Commerce stated its intent to file a lawsuit against the United States with the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the grounds that the US 10 percent tariffs on PRC imports violate WTO rules and disrupt global supply chains. The PRC’s appeal to a supranational authority and framing of US tariffs as detrimental to the global economy is consistent with PRC narratives that aim to portray it as a champion of multilateralism and free trade while characterizing the United States as protectionist and unilateral.[38]The PRC State Administration for Market Regulation announced an anti-monopoly investigation against Google the same day.[39] The PRC also added biotechnology company Illumina and PVH, the holding company for clothing brands such as Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger, to the “unreliable entity list” for “discriminatory measures against Chinese enterprises,” which could potentially subject the companies to fines and sanctions. [40]The PRC’s export controls on critical minerals will inhibit US access to materials that are essential to economic and national security. The PRC implemented export controls on 25 products related to bismuth, indium, molybdenum, tellurium, and tungsten on February 4, likely as part of its retaliation for US tariffs. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) framed the measures as a legitimate and “internationally accepted practice” taken out of concern for national security.[41]The US Department of Interior designates all five of these minerals as critical minerals. These minerals have a range of applications in civilian and defense production. Tungsten is used in military-grade steel production, aerospace components, armor-piercing munitions, missiles, and ground vehicle armor.[42] Molybdenum is used in the production of aerospace parts, heat radiation shields, jet engines, missiles, vehicle and body armor, and as an alloying agent to strengthen steel.[43] Indium is used in the production of phone screens, television displays, fiber optics, solar cells, control rods for nuclear reactors, and semiconductors.[44] Bismuth is used in the production of ammunition, thermoelectric devices, solder, and as an alloying agent.[45] Tellurium is used in the production of night vision and thermal imaging devices, solar batteries, radar, explosives detectors, and thermoelectric devices.[46] Unclassified inventories of US National Defense Stockpiles (NDS) of critical minerals did not include bismuth, indium, molybdenum, or tellurium as of September 2022.[47] The PRC is the dominant producer for all five of these critical minerals, and in some cases, the largest source supplier of US imports.[48]The PRC’s dominant position in the supply chain extends to a variety of other critical minerals, many of which already have restricted US access. The PRC issued an outright ban on the export of critical minerals gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials to the United States and implemented tighter controls on exports of graphite on December 3 in response to US semiconductor export restrictions directed at the PRC.[49] The United States’ annual demand for some of those critical minerals, such as antimony, exceeds any other single country’s mining production.[50] The PRC’s latest export controls on critical minerals are likely part of its asymmetric response to US tariffs that aims to use targeted measures to pressure the United States without escalating into a trade war. Southeast AsiaPhilippinesThe Philippines National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested five PRC nationals from January 24–25 for spying on Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ships and photographing military bases while posing as Taiwanese tourists.[51] The PRC nationals allegedly installed surveillance cameras on coconut trees facing the sea to monitor PCG activity, operated drones without authorization, and photographed military facilities.[52] Philippine authorities recovered footage from the drones and military-grade, high-resolution video cameras disguised to look like CCTV. Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner Jr. said during a press conference on January 30 that the recovered video footage was sent in real time to a remote location.[53] NBI Director James Santiago said that the alleged spies monitored the activities of a naval detachment, coast guard ships, an air base, a naval base, and a dockyard in the Philippines’ Palawan province. Palawan the closest major landmass to the Spratly Islands, which is a group of islands in the South China Sea that the Philippines contests with the PRC. Philippine officials discovered photographs in the suspects’ mobile devices of a PCG station, small navy crafts and assets, and PCG vessels BRP Teresa Magbanua and BRP Gabriela Silang.[54] The former PCG vessel is frequently deployed to the South China Sea and is the victim of aggressive PRC coercion tactics during confrontational encounters near disputed features.[55]Philippine authorities suspect the PRC nationals operated in a spy network and are trying to identify other potential accomplices. The NBI stated that the five individuals in this case were working with PRC national Deng Yuanqing, who was arrested on January 17 on espionage charges for driving around a car that transmitted topographic information as well as for surveilling military bases and other critical infrastructure in the Philippine island of Luzon.[56] The five PRC nationals arrested on January 24-25 claimed to be members of civic groups Qiaoxing Volunteer Group of the Philippines and the Philippine-China Association of Promotion of Peace and Friendship. NBI Director Santiago said that they also befriended local officials.[57]The PRC condemned the Philippine military’s announcement that the US-supplied Typhon missile system would be used during unilateral drills in mid-February. The PRC views the missile system, which is stationed in Luzon, as a threat to its security. The upcoming Philippine exercise, which is a continuation of previous drills from 2024, will help to prepare Philippine forces for larger, joint drills with the United States that are scheduled for later this year.[58] The United Stated began deploying the Typhon missile system within the Philippines for joint operations as part of the Balikatan Exercise in April 2024.[59] The system was placed on the north side of the island of Luzon and has remained deployed there despite criticism from the PRC and premature announcements from Philippine officials that it would be removed.[60] The Philippines said in December 2024 that it plans to acquire the missile system from the United States.[61]The PRC has stated that the system’s deployment could represent a new regional arms race that could jeopardize regional security and increase geopolitical confrontation.[62] The PRC likely views the Typhon system’s deployment as a threat to potential future naval operations, as the system can launch Tomahawk missiles with the range to reach targets in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the mainland PRC.[63] The PRC views expanding US-Philippines military cooperation more broadly as undermining its long-term strategy of achieving regional hegemony and solidifying control of its claimed territory, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.[64]Philippine President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Romualdez Marcos Jr in response to ongoing PRC criticism said on January 31 that he was willing to remove the Typhon system from the Philippines if the PRC would cease its operations in the West Philippine Sea--the part of the South China Sea where the Philippines claims territory.[65] Marcos called on the PRC to “Stop claiming our territory, stop harassing our fishermen and let them have a living, stop ramming our boats, stop water cannoning our people, stop firing lasers at us, and stop your aggressive and coercive behavior, and we’ll return the Typhon missiles.”[66] PRC officials have yet to comment on the statement from Marcos.The PLA is increasing its air and naval presence around the disputed Scarborough Shoal to solidify PRC control amid perceived encroachment by the Philippines and its allies. The PLA Southern Theater Command (STC) conducted “combat readiness patrols” in the territorial sea and airspace around Scarborough Shoal on January 31. It conducted additional “routine patrols” on February 4 and 5.[67] The STC stated that it has “consistently enhanced patrols and vigilance in the surrounding waters and airspace of Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal)” since the beginning of January to strengthen the PRC’s control over the area.[68] The PLA air patrol on February 4 coincided with a joint US-Philippine air patrol and interception drill over the South China Sea, including near Scarborough Shoal.[69] STC spokesperson Tian Junli accused the Philippines of “collud[ing] with a foreign country to organize a so-called ‘joint patrol’ to deliberately undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea.” There were no reports of confrontations between the militaries, however. The PLA previously confronted Philippine aircraft on patrol near Scarborough Shoal in August 2024 and fired flares in their flight path, triggering condemnation from the Philippine government.[70] The increased PLA activity around Scarborough Shoal is in addition to the China Coast Guard’s continuous presence west of the Philippine province of Zambales, which is near Scarborough Shoal, since the beginning of 2025.[71]Scarborough Shoal is an uninhabited atoll that the Philippines, PRC, and ROC all claim. The PRC seized the shoal from the Philippines in 2012 by surrounding it with coast guard vessels to block Philippine entry. It has not built any infrastructure on the shoal, however, apparently in keeping with the 2002 PRC-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which stated that signatories shall not inhabit any previously uninhabited islands, reefs, or other features in the sea.[72] The Philippines has attempted to reassert control over Scarborough Shoal by conducting air and sea patrols in the area as well as using government ships to resupply Philippine fishermen that maintain a consistent presence in the area. The PRC has opposed such efforts with its own coast guard and military forces, including by blasting Philippine ships with water cannons and warding off Philippine planes with air interceptions and flares.A PLA destroyer sailed through the Basilan Strait between the Philippine islands of Mindanao and Basilan for the first time. A PLA Navy (PLAN) Type 055 stealth missile destroyer, a type 054A frigate, and a Type 903 replenishment ship sailed through the Basilan Strait toward the Sulu Sea on February 2. PRC state broadcaster CCTV later aired footage of the ships carrying out far-seas combat training at an undisclosed location in the Pacific Ocean. Philippine officials expressed concern about the PLA warships so close to Philippine territory, while the Philippines’ Western Mindanao Command stated that it was tracking the three ships in what it described as “Philippine waters.”[73] STC spokesperson Tian Junli disputed the Philippine characterization of the transit and criticized the Philippines for “hyping” what he called a “normal transit” that was “fully in line with international law.”[74] RussiaA US-sanctioned tanker unloaded Russian oil in the PRC after being forced to change its destination from Shandong Province, whose main port authority banned sanctioned tankers at its ports. The threat of US secondary sanctions is increasing PRC sanctions compliance and raising costs on sanctioned countries that trade with the PRC. Bloomberg reported that the tanker Huihai Pacific unloaded 770,000 of crude oil from the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline at the major PRC port of Tianjin after an unusually long sea journey of nearly four weeks. The ship loaded its cargo at the Russian Pacific port of Kozmino on January 5 and departed for the port of Dongjiakou in the PRC’s Shandong province, a journey that typically takes about one week.[75] Reuters reported on January 7 that the Shandong Port Group, a provincial state-owned enterprise that operates Shandong’s major ports, banned US-sanctioned tankers from unloading goods at its ports. The Huihai Pacific was not on that sanctions list when it left Kozmino. The US Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on the Huihai Pacific on January 10, however, as one of 183 oil tankers that it identified as part of Russia’s “shadow fleet.” The Huihai Pacific is registered in Panama and owned by a Hong Kong company, which until recently allowed it to operate unhindered by the sanctions imposed on Russia.[76] The tanker ultimately had to change its destination from Shandong to another PRC port, which greatly delayed its journey.Shandong is home to many independent oil refiners that are the biggest importers of oil from US-sanctioned countries in the PRC. Shandong imported about 1.74 million barrels per day of oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela in 2024, accounting for about 17 percent of the PRC’s oil imports.[77] The Shandong Port Group controls many major Chinese ports, including Yantai, Rizhao, and Qingdao. The threat of secondary sanctions, including the potential loss of access to the US financial system, has been effective at compelling some PRC entities, such as Shandong Port Group and many banks, to cease business with sanctioned Russian entities. Shandong’s compliance with US sanctions will increase shipping costs for independent refiners, possibly to the point of making them unprofitable, since many of them operate on thin margins and buy sanctioned oil because it is sold at a discount. It will also make it more difficult and less profitable for US-sanctioned countries, such as Russia, to sell oil in the PRC. The sanctions will likely push Chinese oil refineries to seek alternative sources elsewhere in the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas and curb the PRC’s access to cheap oil resources.[78] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Guo Jiakun claimed on January 8 to be unaware of Shandong Port Group’s ban but stated that the PRC opposes “illegal unilateral sanctions” by the United States.[79] AfricaSouth AfricaSouth Africa demanded that Taiwan's representative office leave the administrative capital of Pretoria by the end of March in an effort by South Africa to strengthen ties with the PRC. The Taiwanese foreign ministry stated that it received a letter in late January from the South African government reiterating demands for the de-facto Taiwanese embassy, the Taipei Liaison Office, to leave Pretoria and rename itself as a trade office.[80] South Africa and Taiwan have no formal diplomatic relations but maintain unofficial ties. South Africa first verbally requested that the Taipei Liaison Office move from Pretoria in December 2023, then issued another request in April 2024, before finally giving an ultimatum on October 7, 2024, for the office to move or close.[81] The Taiwanese foreign ministry suggested that the renewed demands are a result of the PRC sanctioning the federal chairman of the South Africa’s Democratic Alliance, Ivan Meyer, after he visited Taiwan in January 2025.[82] The Democratic Alliance is a major political party in South Africa that has been part of the ruling coalition with the African National Congress (ANC) since the 2024 elections.Latin AmericaPanamaPanama announced that it would withdraw from the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and consider canceling contracts that allow a Hong Kong-based company to operate two ports on the Panama Canal after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned Panama to curtail PRC influence in the country. Rubio told Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino during a meeting between the two in Panama City on February 2 that the United States would “take measures necessary to protect its rights” if Panama failed to curtail PRC influence over the Panama Canal.[83] The Donald Trump administration has accused the PRC of undue influence over the canal, a strategic waterway through which up to 40 percent of US seaborne trade passes.[84] Bloomberg estimated that 75 percent of the cargo passing through the canal is traveling to or from the United States.[85] A US State Department readout stated that “President Trump has made a preliminary determination that the current position of influence and control of the Chinese Communist Party over the Panama Canal area is a threat to the canal and represents a violation of the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal.”[86] The 1977 treaty, which returned the Panama Canal from the United States to Panama, stipulates that the United States may intervene militarily if a conflict or foreign power affects the canal’s operations.[87] Rubio and the Trump administration specifically objected to the presence of two Panama Canal ports controlled by a Hong-Kong based company, which they claimed violated the treaty.[88] Ports situated at either end of the canal—Cristobal and Balboa—are run by Panama Ports Co., which is part of Hutchison Ports, a subsidiary of Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Holdings.[89] US Senator Ted Cruz objected to the construction of a PRC-funded bridge over the Panama Canal as well, arguing that the PRC could use the bridge to block the canal without warning.[90]PRC MFA spokeswoman Mao Ning stated in a press conference on January 22 that “China does not participate in the management and operation of the canal and never interferes in canal affairs.”[91] Hutchison is not a state-owned enterprise and does not control access to the canal. It is responsible only for supplying and loading container ships at its ports.[92] Hutchison’s involvement in the port also predates BRI, which PRC President Xi Jinping inaugurated in 2013. Hutchison has provided logistical services at the two ports since 1997.[93] There are three other ports in the Panama Canal, which are owned and operated by US, Singaporean, and Taiwanese companies.Panama’s withdrawal from BRI represents a loss of one of the PRC’s key soft power tools in Latin America. Panama was the first Latin American country to sign onto BRI in 2017, shortly after it switched its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Panama renewed this memorandum of understanding in 2020 and 2023. Panamanian President Mulino, after his meeting with Rubio, said that Panama will not renew its participation in 2026, the next time it comes up for renewal, and will consider early withdrawal.[94] Twenty-two Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Panama, were formal BRI members at the end of 2024.[95] Western observers have accused the PRC of using BRI to spread its influence and advance its model of governance and portray itself as a leader of the Global South.[96] PRC economic and political influence in Panama via BRI contributes to US concerns over neutrality in a place where the United States has significant economic security concerns.[97]The impact of Panama’s withdrawal from BRI on existing infrastructure projects, as well as projects currently under construction, is unclear. Rubio’s visit appears to have set in motion controversies against CK Hutchison, however. Two Panamanian lawyers accused the Hutchison subsidiary of violating Panama’s constitution and failing to pay taxes and benefits; they filed to cancel this 1997 concession on February 4.[98] Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino has also announced that Panama is considering cancelling Hutchison’s contracts over its two Panama Canal ports.[99] The PRC-backed bridge over the canal is still under construction at the time of writing, however. PRC MFA spokesman Lin Jian deflected a question about Panama’s withdrawal from BRI and said that PRC-Panama cooperation was “proceeding normally” in a regular press conference on February 5.[100] A spokesperson for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) said that the Hong Kong government does not interfere in the affairs of Hong Kong businesses and that Hong Kong opposes any country’s interference in normal business operations.[101] [1] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6030202[2] https://tw.news.yahoo dot com/%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E6%87%B6%E4%BA%BA%E5%8C%85%EF%BC%9A%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E9%80%A3%E7%BD%B2%E6%80%8E%E9%BA%BC%E5%81%9A%EF%BC%9F%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E6%88%90%E7%AB%8B%E9%9C%80%E5%A4%9A%E5%B0%91%E9%80%A3%E7%BD%B2%EF%BC%9F%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E9%80%9A%E9%81%8E%E9%96%80%E6%AA%BB%E7%82%BA%E4%BD%95%EF%BC%9F%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E4%BA%94%E5%A4%A7qa%E4%B8%80%E6%AC%A1%E7%9C%8B%EF%BC%81-090902655.html[3] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6027388[4] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6028165; https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6022045[5] https://www.cec.gov dot tw/central/article/31568[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-30-2025[7] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202412200015[8] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/03/2003831263[9] https://news.ltn.com dot tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4939727[10] https://www.worldjournal dot com/wj/story/121220/8526046[11] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6028149https://news.ltn.com dot tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4939727[12] https://news.immigration.gov dot tw/NewsSection/Detail/C293A963-3352-4E6A-9CEA-85404FF510B2?lang=EN[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-20-2024[14] https://x.com/MoNDefensehttps://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?pli=1&gid=1177684118#gid=1177684118[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-5-2024[16] https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?pli=1&gid=1177684118#gid=1177684118[17] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/speech/202401/t20240131_12597322.htm https://reuters.com/graphics/TAIWAN-CHINA/BALLOONS/lbpglrgwwvq/[18] https://reuters.com/graphics/TAIWAN-CHINA/BALLOONS/lbpglrgwwvq/[19] https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-restrictions-advanced-computing-semiconductors-enhance-foundry[20] https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-looking-into-whether-deepseek-used-restricted-ai-chips-source-says-2025-01-31/[21] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-31/us-probing-whether-deepseek-got-nvidia-chips-through-singapore[22] https://www.fool.com/investing/2025/02/03/deepseek-shocked-the-ai-market-last-week-heres-why/[23] https://www.mti dot 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https://www.ft.com/content/f3763e51-8607-42b9-9ef9-5789d5bf353d[33] https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1885349922666434761 ; https://x.com/dex_eve/status/1885341080247230895?s=46[34] https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/china-military-biggest-military-command-centre-in-beijing-01312025054209.html?encoding=simplified; https://www.ft.com/content/f3763e51-8607-42b9-9ef9-5789d5bf353d[35] https://www.ft.com/content/f3763e51-8607-42b9-9ef9-5789d5bf353dhttps://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/Phillip_Saunders_Testimony.pdf[36] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF[37] https://www.mof dot gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/202502/t20250204_3955222.htm[38] https://www.ft.com/content/eb169eab-dde1-4f1b-a6dd-76d83c31b0c1https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202502/t20250202_11548194.shtmlhttps://www.mofcom dot 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https://www.refractorymetal.org/innovations-in-molybdenum-alloys-for-defense-and-military-applications.html#:~:text=Molybdenum%20alloys%20are%20at%20the,the%20safety%20of%20military%20personnel.https://www.efineametals.com/refractory-metal-supplier/molybdenum/molybdenum-applications-rod-sheet-plate-threaded-rod-nuts/#:~:text=Molybdenum%20Applications,largest%20technical%20professional%20organizations%20worldwide.https://themarketbull.com.au/2023/11/13/molybdenum-the-overlooked-critical-mineral/[44] https://www.refractorymetal.org/uses-of-indium.htmlhttps://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/what-are-five-new-critical-metal-exports-restricted-by-china-2025-02-04/[45] https://www.dla.mil/Strategic-Materials/Materials/[46] https://www.dla.mil/Strategic-Materials/Materials/#:~:text=Automotive%20electronics,IED%20detectors[47] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47833[48] https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-tungsten.pdfhttps://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-molybdenum.pdfhttps://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-indium.pdfhttps://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-tellurium.pdfhttps://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-bismuth.pdf[49] http://www.mofcom dot gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2024/art_3d5e990b43424e60828030f58a547b60.html[50] https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-antimony.pdf[51] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6025644https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2025/01/31/2003831096[52] https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1243005[53] https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1243005[54] https://www.abs-cbn dot com/news/nation/2025/1/30/alleged-chinese-spies-posed-as-tourists-in-palawan-official-0920[55] https://news.usni.org/2024/12/03/chinese-warships-cutters-harass-philippine-patrol-near-scarborough-shoal-say-officials[56] https://cebudailynews.inquirer dot net/620390/nbi-arrests-5-suspected-chinese-spies-in-palawanhttps://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-arrests-chinese-national-suspicion-espionage-2025-01-20/https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3295612/philippines-arrest-chinese-sleeper-agent-sparks-fears-widespread-spying[57] https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1243005[58] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12135[59] https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/04/16/us-army-deploys-midrange-missile-for-first-time-in-philippines/https://ph.usembassy.gov/philippine-u-s-troops-to-kick-off-exercise-balikatan-2024/[60] DNGTS: https://www.eurasiantimes.com/the-philippine-army-confirms-withdrawal/https://apnews.com/article/us-philippines-china-military-typhon-midrange-missile-system-69242b99335eb55032894fbc83d75135[61] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/philippines-us-typhon-missile-system-warnings-from-china/[62] https://www.newsweek.com/us-news-army-missile-system-china-doorstep-hits-moving-target-fire-test-2015063[63] https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/why-tensions-south-china-sea-are-bolstering-us-philippines-alliancehttps://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-5-2024[64] https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific/[65] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/philippine-president-offers-a-deal-to-china-stop-sea-aggression-and-ill-return-missiles-to-us/ar-AA1y7aij?ocid=BingNewsSerp[66] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/philippine-president-offers-a-deal-to-china-stop-sea-aggression-and-ill-return-missiles-to-us/ar-AA1y7aij?ocid=BingNewsSerp[67] http://www.81 dot cn/fyr/16367745.htmlhttp://www.81 dot cn/fyr/16367743.htmlhttps://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202502/1327740.shtml[68] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202502/1327740.shtmlhttps://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3297077/pla-holds-combat-readiness-patrols-around-hotly-disputed-south-china-sea-shoal[69] https://apnews.com/article/philippines-us-joint-patrol-scarborough-shoal-843b68e5833dd640fc9336ac415705c3[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-16-2024[71] https://qa.philstar dot com/headlines/2025/02/03/2418957/china-coast-guard-presence-near-zambales-reaches-month[72] https://asean dot org/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2/[73] https://globalnation.inquirer dot net/238824/fwd-break-2-chinese-navy-warships-monitored-in-basilan-straithttps://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3297247/chinese-military-disputes-manilas-version-south-china-sea-naval-crossing?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection[74] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202502/1327787.shtml[75] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russia-oil-trade-china-india-stalls-sanctions-drive-up-shipping-costs-2025-01-28/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-31/sanctioned-ship-unloads-russian-oil-in-china-after-long-journey?srnd=next-china[76] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2777[77] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-shandong-port-group-blacklists-us-sanctioned-oil-vessels-say-traders-2025-01-07/[78] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/tougher-us-sanctions-curb-russian-oil-supply-china-india-2025-01-12/[79] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202501/t20250110_11530934.shtml[80] https://www.reuters.com/world/taiwan-says-safrica-gives-march-deadline-move-office-pretoria-2025-02-03/https://www.mofa dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=119073[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-23-2024https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20241022002848-260407?chdtvhttps://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202410210006[82] https://www.mofa dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=119073https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3297201/south-africa-presses-taiwan-vacate-liaison-office-pretoria?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection[83] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/02/americas/panama-china-belt-and-road-initiative-rubio-visits-intl-latam/index.html[84] https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2025/1/examining-the-panama-canal-and-its-impact-on-u-s-trade-and-national-security/2bd42caa-e77a-440f-9693-5db9a3ebed01[85] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-04/panama-said-to-mull-canceling-port-deal-with-hong-kong-firm[86] https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-meeting-with-panamanian-president-mulino/[87] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/02/americas/panama-china-belt-and-road-initiative-rubio-visits-intl-latam/index.html[88] https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/rubio-panama-canal-migration-talks-he-begins-latin-america-trip-2025-02-02/[89] https://www.newsweek.com/china-news-reacts-trump-panama-canal-control-2018816[90] https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2025/1/sen-cruz-evidence-shows-panama-may-be-in-violation-of-canal-treaty[91] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202501/t20250122_11542823.shtml[92] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/02/americas/panama-china-belt-and-road-initiative-rubio-visits-intl-latam/index.html; https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/31/americas/panama-canal-china-rubio-explainer-intl-latam/index.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/15/world/asia/china-panama-explained.html[93] https://www.scmp dot com/news/world/americas/article/3297324/panama-court-urged-cancel-hong-kong-firms-canal-contract-amid-trump-threat;[94] https://www.voachinese.com/a/china-s-reaction-to-panama-s-decision-of-quitting-the-bri-initiative-20250203/7960959.html[95] 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- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2025
- Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate TrotterFebruary 11, 2025, 7:45pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on February 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security. Zelensky stated during an interview with UK outlet The Guardian on February 11 that Europe will not be able to completely meet Ukraine's military needs and provide adequate security guarantees without US involvement.[1] Zelensky called for the West to provide Ukraine with additional Patriot air-defense systems and noted that the United States has an irreplaceable role in supplying these systems to Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Ukraine's allies can help rebuild and restore Ukraine alongside Ukrainian companies and that Ukraine is prepared to discuss such plans in detail. Zelensky stated that he will provide US President Donald Trump during their next meeting with a more detailed plan for how the United States can be involved in Ukraine's reconstruction and the joint extraction of natural resources. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has Europe's largest uranium and titanium reserves and suggested that the West should not let these resources fall under Russia's control. Zelensky told Reuters on February 7 that he floated the idea of giving allies the opportunity to invest in critical mineral extraction during closed meetings in Fall 2024.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is offering its partners a "mutually beneficial partnership" to jointly develop Ukrainian resources and is not proposing "giving away" Ukraine's resources. Zelensky stated that the United States will receive prioritized access to this opportunity and that the United States and Ukraine are considering storing US liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Ukraine's underground gas storage sites.Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory. Several Russian milbloggers who regularly criticize the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine claimed on February 10 and 11 that unspecified actors are calling for Russian authorities to charge the milbloggers with discrediting the Russian military after the milbloggers reported about recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.[3] The milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command is targeting them for publishing information about successful Ukrainian attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, and one milblogger claimed that the recent Ukrainian attacks forced the Russian military command to delay plans for a future offensive operation in the area. The latter claim indicates that the Russian military command may have been planning to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sudzha, a prominent gas transit hub and the main town that Ukrainian forces control in Kursk Oblast.The Russian military appears increasingly anxious to consolidate control over reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast as Zelensky continues to express his intent to leverage Russian territory in future peace negotiations. Zelensky stated during his interview with The Guardian that he intends to use Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk Oblast to secure the return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or "something else" during future peace negotiations with Russia.[4] Zelensky noted that it is important to retake all of occupied Ukraine and did not speculate on which area of occupied Ukraine he would consider trading Russian territory for. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to expel Ukraine from Kursk Oblast, or at least from Sudzha, before beginning peace negotiations in order to avoid having to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for Russian territory.Russian forces continued to test new strike tactics and packages in a series of missile and drone strikes targeting energy infrastructure in Ukraine on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 19 sea-, air-, and land-based missiles against a gas production facility in Poltava Oblast and 124 Shahed and decoy drones against Ukraine from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 Shahed and other drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts and that 67 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that strikes damaged infrastructure in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts and facilities at a Naftogaz gas production plant in Poltava Oblast.[6] Russian forces notably launched all the missiles in this strike package against a single target. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes forced Ukrainian energy operators to restrict electricity.[7] Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi stated that that Russian forces first launched Shahed drones, then launched cruise and ballistic missiles - including Kalibr cruise missiles - at a single target in order to complicate Ukrainian air defenses' abilities to intercept all incoming projectiles.[8] Khrapchynskyi stated that Russian forces recently began reducing their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles, which are launched from Tu-22 (Backfire) and Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic aircraft and are increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles launched from tactical Sukhoi aircraft. The Russians presumably prefer not to risk their strategic bombers in such strikes. Khrapchynskyi also stated that Russian forces are adapting their strike tactics following the provision of F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine and are prioritizing striking frontline and border areas where Ukrainian forces are less likely to operate F-16s.Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and the Ukrainian military struck the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City causing a fire.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Saratov Oil Refinery produces gasoline, diesel fuel, and over 20 types of petroleum products and provides fuel to the Russian military. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin stated that a drone strike caused a fire at an industrial plant in Saratov Oblast.[10] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in November 2024 and January 2025.[11] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied that Ukrainian forces also struck Engels Air Base, and Russian sources published footage purportedly showing Russian air defense operating in the area.[12]The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11. Russian Duma deputies submitted the proposal to remove Gurulev from the Defense Committee and transfer him to the Regional Policy and Local Government Committee on February 7, and Gurulev expressed support for this move but did not claim responsibility for the initiative.[13] Kremlin-affiliated business outlet Kommersant reported on February 7 that some of its sources stated that Gurulev's removal is due to his controversial statements that reflect badly on the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[14] Gurulev has made statements that include proposing to introduce a tax on childless Russians and notably leaked the audio message of former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (SMD) Major General Ivan Popov in July 2023 in which Popov claimed that the Russian command dismissed him for expressing grievances over the lack of support for Russian forces, resulting in an ongoing criminal case against Popov.[15]The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false-flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on February 11 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with assistance from unspecified Western countries intend to blow up a foreign vessel in the Baltic Sea to prompt NATO to block Russia's access to the Baltic Sea and start a direct armed conflict between Russia and NATO.[16] The SVR claimed that unspecified European intelligence services and Ukraine's GUR also plan to assassinate Russian opposition figures living abroad and blame Russia for the assassinations to undermine future peace negotiations. Russia's SVR has previously accused Ukraine and other Western states of planning false flag attacks to discredit Ukraine and drive a wedge in Western unity behind Ukraine, particularly at critical moments in Western discussions regarding support for Ukraine and a possible peace plan.[17]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security.Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory.Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11.The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11.The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Hulyaipole.Russian regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments for Russian soldiers who received minor injuries due to regional budget deficits.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continued in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 11. A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continues northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki; west of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo; southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka, Cherkasskaya Konopelka, and Fanaseyevka.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha) and Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[19]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha) and Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently regained positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[21]Order of Battle: Artillery units of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the Chechen "Khokhla" Detachment of the 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[22]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 10 and 11.[23] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces are slowly advancing near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv) and using drone operators to destroy Russian positions and logistics to compensate for Russian artillery advantages in the area.[24]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing east of Vovchansk.[25]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz’s “Grom” Detachment and the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[26]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 11 but did not make any confirmed gains. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka on February 10 and 11.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian positions between Kupyansk and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[29]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and reached the outskirts of Doroshivka (north of Kupyansk and west of Zapadne).[30] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in the international border area near Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk).[31]Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction on February 11. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Zeleny Hai, Novoyehoriivka, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on February 10 and 11.[32] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zahryzove.[33]Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 11 indicating that Russian forces likely recently advanced in fields north of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[34]Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Kolodyazi, Yampolivka, Ivanivka and Terny on February 10 and 11.[35]Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 11 indicating that Russian forces likely advanced in fields northwest of Ivanivka.[36]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced about one kilometer in depth south of Ivanivka as well as within, west of, and southeast of Yampolivka.[37]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 11 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Siversk near Serebryanka; northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka; and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 10 and 11.[38]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted ground attacks within Chasiv Yar, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on February 10 and 11.[39]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and advanced south of Chasiv Yar and towards Minkivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[40]A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating near Chasiv Yar reported that Russian forces are using armored vehicles to transport infantry to basements in Chasiv Yar and that Russian soldiers in the area are either volunteers or convict recruits.[41] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces simultaneously operate in many small infantry groups in the Chasiv Yar area.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[42] Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[43]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces conducted ground attacks within Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 10 and 11.[44]Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 and 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Druzhba, in northern Toretsk, and in central Leonidivka (west of Toretsk).[45]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced in western Toretsk.[46]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Spetsnaz Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Leonidivka.[47]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe and Berezivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Baranivka, Myrolyubivka, Zelene Pole, and Tarasivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Shevchenko and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Preobrazhenka, Zaporizhzhia, Novooleksandriivka, Sribne, and Molodetske on February 10 and 11.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to attack Pishchane, and some claimed that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) with remote-controlled machine guns near Pishchane and Zvirove.[50]Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 11 that Russian forces seized Baranivka.[51] Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Udachne.[52]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zaporizhzhia and advanced southwest of Nadiivka.[53] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 11 that Russian forces seized Yasenove, but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 17.[54]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces have conducted successful counterattacks near Pokrovsk and noted that Russian personnel continue to outnumber Ukrainian personnel in the area.[55] Trehubov added that Russian forces suffered roughly 7,000 personnel killed in action (KIA) in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025.[56] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February 3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties in January 2025, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian military personnel suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio along the entire frontline.[57] These figures suggest that Russian forces suffered roughly 21,000 casualties or roughly 43 percent of their total casualties in January 2025 near Pokrovsk.Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1195th and 1438th motorized rifle regiments (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating north of Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[58] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has concentrated elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA); elements of the 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA); most of the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD); up to two battalions of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division); and elements of the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA) southwest of Pokrovsk.Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka on February 10 and 11.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the southwestern outskirts of Dachne.[60]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 and 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Andriivka and along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynopil highway west of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove).[61]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) seized all or most of Andriivka and that Russian forces advanced north of Andriivka and near Zelenivka and Kostyantynopil.[62] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Slovyanka.[63]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to identify vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive lines, but that rainy and foggy weather conditions are softening the ground and preventing Russian forces from using equipment in the area.[64]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dachne, and elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kurakhove direction.[65] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[66]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction. Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Velyka Novosilka in the direction of Novoocheretuvate; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka and Novosilka; and northwest of Velyka Novosilka in the direction of Burlatske on February 10 and 11.[67]Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 11 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields northwest of Vremivka.[68]Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 300 meters near Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka), in an area one kilometer in depth and three kilometers wide northwest of Vremivka, and in an area one kilometer in depth and 1.5 kilometers wide north of the Vremivka-Temyrivka area (west of Velyka Novosilka).[69]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 11 indicating that Russian forces likely recently advanced in fields west of Marfopil (southeast of Hulyaipole).[70]A Russian milblogger claimed that positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 11.[71] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[72]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 11. Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[73]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments for Russian soldiers who received minor injuries due to regional budget deficits. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 11 that at least 42 Russian federal subjects and occupation authorities in Crimea introduced a reduced payment for Russian soldiers who sustained minor injuries.[74] Russian authorities previously offered a 500,000-ruble ($5,181) payment to all wounded Russian soldiers regardless of the severity of the injury. The Russian federal government published a decree in November 2024 establishing reduced payments for Russian soldiers who receive only minor injuries in battle rather than providing blanket payments to all injured personnel. Verstka noted that some Russian federal subjects, including Kamchatka Krai, changed their injury compensation system to align with the federal system in recent months, while others, including Amur Oblast, already had payment systems similar to the federal government's new system. The Kremlin has recently taken measures to reduce various payments to Russian soldiers, including one-time recruitment bonuses, amid other indicators that the Kremlin is concerned about the long-term costs of the war and ongoing wartime pressures on the Russian economy.[75]Russian federal subjects continue to establish regional analogues of the Russian "Time of Heroes" veteran program as part of the Kremlin's efforts to militarize all levels of Russian government. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin announced on February 11 that the "Our Heroes" program, the Saratov Oblast analogue to the "Time of Heroes" program, has begun functioning and will begin accepting applications from Russian veterans at the end of February 2025.[76]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://t.me/z_arhiv/30849; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30837 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30837; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30849[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/48769 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48770 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2025[55] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/945915-e-prikladi-kontratak-ci-maut-zsu-uspihi-na-pokrovskomu-fronti-vidpovid-osuv-hortica/[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/11/desyatky-tysyach-bezpovorotnyh-vtrat-spalennya-pihoty-v-shturmah-poblyzu-pokrovska-vzhe-dayetsya-okupantam-vznaky/[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2552[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20834 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0555PnSAskaXQH3hmA7FbEkiYMRHLThsWfwn3vDSFGmgG7nMyPaFgTm8FkjuHULTLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YhxDB1A1qf6cffsgk3QGpWk1qXXVPM8eJfiwfFTLANYTgECbuMw927nhCfcBSEj5l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5184[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154185[61] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8364; https://t.me/zluki_bobry/125 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8366; https://t.me/ok_pivnich1/12570[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/64291 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62034 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32108 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154231 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62052 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24745 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23718 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21076 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13329 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51849[63] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30849; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30837[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/11/mashalaty-buly-bilymy-plyamamy-na-siromu-foni-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-okupantiv-vbyvaye-navit-pogoda/[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86070 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24750 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13372[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/13334[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0555PnSAskaXQH3hmA7FbEkiYMRHLThsWfwn3vDSFGmgG7nMyPaFgTm8FkjuHULTLl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YhxDB1A1qf6cffsgk3QGpWk1qXXVPM8eJfiwfFTLANYTgECbuMw927nhCfcBSEj5l; 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- — Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia’s War in Ukraine
- By Nataliya BugayovaFebruary 11, 2025Executive Summary Some peace deals lead to peace, others to more war. The Minsk II deal aimed to end Russia’s limited invasion of Ukraine in 2015 but instead laid the groundwork for the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. The United States must learn from the Minsk deal or risk a direct Russia-NATO conflict that puts American lives at risk.Minsk II was a weak deal. It demanded nothing of the invader— Russia. It strengthened the Kremlin’s aggressive worldview that had driven the conflict to begin with. It masked Russian military weakness. It gave the Kremlin time and space to prepare for a larger invasion. The West could have helped Ukraine reach a stronger deal in 2015.Minsk II gave Russian President Vladimir Putin hope that he could win in Ukraine without war. Russia sought and failed to control Ukraine in 2014 by military means. Minsk II gave Putin a way to demand that Ukraine — an independent state —give Russia control over its internal policies. Putin failed at that too and turned to the full-scale invasion in 2022.Minsk II helped Putin mask his demands for Ukraine’s surrender behind false calls for peace. The West has repeatedly failed to call out and counter the real Russian demands since 2014. Minsk II reinforced Western delusions that Putin might simply settle if he received some land or if the West metered support to Ukraine or tried harder to negotiate with Putin. The deal also gave an excuse to those who understood the Kremlin’s goals but sought to restore ties with Russia anyway.Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s close adviser in 2014, said in 2024 that Minsk II “legitimized the first partition of Ukraine.” Surkov’s words confirm Russia’s goal to destroy Ukraine as a state and to use the Minsk deal to do so.[1] He added that “peace is nothing more than the continuation of war by other means.”Another weak deal today would validate Putin’s 2022 full-scale invasion and give Putin hope to gain more over time. Hope for Putin means more war. More war means a larger war: An absolved Russia that bears little or no cost for its invasion will want more and will rebuild its capability to do more. A larger war would mean a higher cost for the United States, risk to American lives, and risk of a catastrophic escalation.The Trump Administration has a historic opportunity to break Russia’s cycle of overt war and war through “peace” in Ukraine. To do so, the United States must learn the lessons from the Minsk deal:Russia will seek to transfer the responsibility and cost for its war onto someone else’s balance sheet.Putin’s demands are stand-ins for his goals – controlling Ukraine and making the United States bend to Putin’s demands to create a world order that favors Russia.Putin will fight as long as he believes he can outlast the West and Ukraine. Ending the war requires stripping Putin of hope that he can destroy Ukraine as a state in his lifetime — militarily or through a “peace deal.”Russia can accept failure.Minsk II ContextPutin has tried to control Ukraine in increasingly extreme ways since he came to power in 2000. Russia tried and failed to pressure Ukraine into a Russia-led economic union in 2003.[2] Russia tried and failed to dominate Ukraine’s politics in the mid-2000s.[3] Russia expanded its influence over Ukraine’s politics in the mid-2010s through its favorite Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych. Ukrainians drove out the increasingly authoritarian Yanukovych in the pro-democracy Euromaidan Revolution in 2014.As Ukraine was stabilizing after Euromaidan, Russia used the moment of Ukraine’s vulnerability to seize Ukrainian land. Russian military forces illegally occupied Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in March 2014. Russia then tried to take control of at least six southeastern regions of Ukraine.[4] Russia seized parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the east, but Ukraine’s resistance thwarted the Kremlin’s plans to seize more.[5]The Kremlin used Russia’s regular military and the irregular forces that Russia created in Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk [DNR] and Luhansk [LNR] Peoples’ Republics) during the 2014 invasion of Ukraine.[6]The 2015 Minsk II agreement attempted to end the conflict through a ceasefire and political measures. Representatives from Ukraine, the so-called DNR and LNR, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) signed Minsk II in February 2015.[7] The Normandy Four format (Germany, France, Ukraine, Russia) facilitated the Minsk II agreement.[8]Kremlin-controlled forces repeatedly violated the ceasefire.[9] Russia decisively broke the deal when it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.Russia’s Goals in Ukraine Winning in Ukraine for Putin has always meant more than seizing territory, forcing Ukraine into neutrality, or countering NATO.Putin is not after a portion of Ukraine. Seizing Crimea and portions of two eastern regions in Ukraine in 2014 was not enough for Putin. He reinvaded in 2022.It is not about neutrality. Russia’s own actions have made Ukraine less neutral. Ukraine was a non-aligned state in 2014 even after the EuroMaidan Revolution. Ukraine renounced its non-aligned status only in December of 2014 — as a direct result of the Russian invasion.[10]Nor is it about Ukraine’s NATO membership per se. Russia made Ukraine want NATO more. A minority of Ukrainians supported NATO membership before 2014; the majority of support came after Russia invaded.[11] Russian fears of imminent Ukrainian NATO membership did not drive the 2022 invasion either. Putin had effectively blocked Ukrainian accession to NATO by 2022.[12] Putin also explicitly said in 2024 that Biden offered to postpone consideration of Ukraine's membership in NATO for 10 years, but Putin rejected that.[13] Putin invaded anyway even knowing that NATO membership was very far from imminent or even assured.Russia is not protecting Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Russia has destroyed predominantly Russian-speaking cities in Ukraine.[14] Russian-speaking Ukrainians fought fiercely against his invasions, undermining Putin’s claim of some common ethnic bond that justifies his actions. Russian forces killed, tortured, and made refugees of many Russian-speaking Ukrainians.[15] Russia is forcefully deporting and indoctrinating Russian-speaking Ukrainian children.[16]What Putin cares about is control of Ukraine. Kyiv and what Kyiv stands for have been Putin’s goals in Ukraine from the outset. The Kremlin has been working to remove Ukraine’s ability to make free political and foreign policy choices for years. In other words, Ukraine’s sovereignty is Russia’s target. Putin has been explicit in word and action that he does not believe Ukraine is or has a right to be a sovereign state that can choose its alliances.[17]For the Kremlin, the war in Ukraine is also about a new world order that favors Russia. Putin seeks a world in which he can impose Russia’s will on other countries without any pushback, and the United States is an obstacle to Putin’s vision. The United States helped Ukraine stop Russia from imposing its will militarily. The Kremlin has been investing in trying to diminish America’s will to act - the fastest way for Putin to achieve his goals.[18] NATO is an obstacle too - by being more appealing than Russia to countries that Putin wants to control. Putin has long tried to break NATO’s unity. He also sought to use the invasion of Ukraine to force NATO to abandon its principles, such as the Open Door Policy – an objective Putin still pursues.[19]Minsk II Flaws Minsk II absolved the invader. The deal let Russia pose as a mediator in a conflict that it started and prolonged. Ukraine was conflict-free until 2014. Then Russia invaded.Russia falsely framed its war as internal to Ukraine. The DNR and LNR were not independent, however. The Kremlin not only controlled and resourced the DNR and LNR — it kept them alive; both would have ceased to exist without Russian support.[20] Putin had to deploy regular Russian forces to Ukraine in 2014 to prevent the DNR and LNR from losing to Ukrainian forces.[21]The Minsk II deal nevertheless imposed no obligations on Russia – only on Ukraine and on “armed formations of certain regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions.”[22] The agreement never stipulated that Russian forces were present in Ukraine, only referencing some unspecified ‘foreign armed formations’.’[23] The deal thus largely accepted the false Russian premise that the conflict was internal to Ukraine. The US, which was not a signatory to the Minsk II, has imposed select sanctions on Russia for its violation of Minsk II.[24] The Minsk II itself has not once identified Russia as a belligerent.Minsk II gave Putin hope that he could use the deal to seize control over Ukraine without war. The deal demanded that Ukraine amend its constitution to give more autonomy to the Russia-controlled DNR and LNR and expand their role in Ukraine’s politics.[25] If fully implemented, Minsk II would have given Russia a permanent lever of control over Ukraine’s decision-making.In other words, Minsk II gave Putin a way to demand that Ukraine — an independent state — voluntarily give Russia control over its internal decisions. Minsk II thereby accepted Putin’s false premise that Ukrainian sovereignty has limits.The Kremlin spent every year following 2015 using the Minsk deal to try to take Ukraine’s sovereignty. Russia’s last notable attempt was in 2020. Then newly elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky campaigned on the promise of peace. Putin tried to manipulate Zelensky’s desire for peace to force the Ukrainian government to legitimize the Russian-controlled DNR/LNR.[26]Had Kyiv succumbed to Russian manipulations, the Kremlin would have legitimized the illegal 2014 intervention at virtually no cost and expanded influence over Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy.Ukrainian political leadership and civil society resisted Putin’s manipulations. After Minsk II failed to deliver Ukraine’s sovereignty to Putin, Putin resorted to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine – the real reason Putin invaded in 2022.Minsk II had no real enforcement mechanism, allowing Russia to surge the conflict at will. The OSCE monitored ceasefire violations, but the OSCE's ability to be an impartial monitor was limited. Russia has influence in the OSCE, as Russia is an OSCE member state.[27] Russian-controlled forces also regularly physically obstructed the work of the OSCE’s monitoring mission on the ground in Ukraine.[28]Minsk II thus had no actor strong enough to enforce a ceasefire — let alone to force the withdrawal of Russia’s regular or irregular forces from Ukraine. And the agreement itself said nothing about Russian military forces in Ukraine – only referencing some unspecified ‘foreign armed formations’- because it accepted the fiction that the war as an internal conflict.Minsk II Consequences Minsk II reinforced the root cause of the conflict, leading to a larger war. The Minsk II deal did not name, let alone punish, the invader, and thereby reinforced the Kremlin’s mindset that sought to control Ukraine and drove Russia to invade Ukraine in the first place. It also persuaded Putin that the West would not stand up to him if he violated the agreement or even invaded again. The weaknesses of Minsk thus laid the groundwork for the 2022 invasion.The Kremlin could have chosen peace after Minsk II, which gave Putin what he demanded at the time. Instead, the Kremlin chose to use Minsk II to try to manipulate Ukraine into a voluntary surrender. Putin simultaneously expanded Russian means for future attacks on Ukraine. Russia significantly grew its military capability.[29] Putin turned Crimea into a massive fortress for a future attack.[30] He did the same in the portions of Donetsk and Luhansk regions it seized in 2014-2015.[31] Russia deployed its forces to Belarus in 2020.[32] The Kremlin then used Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Belarus as launchpads in its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[33]Minsk II masked Putin’s failures and gave Russia time to prepare for a larger war. Putin had to settle for less than his goals in Ukraine in 2015. Russia aimed to control at least six southeastern regions of Ukraine beyond Crimea (the so-called “Novorossiya” project).[34] Putin defined in 2014 the "Novorossiya" as inclusive of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa regions.[35]Putin was forced to abandon the “Novorossiya” plan. Ukrainians resisted in 2014, as they did in 2022. Thousands of barely equipped Ukrainian volunteers rushed to combat the Russian invasion in 2014.[36] Russia did not have support Putin thought it did in either Ukraine’s society, or its power. Russian dominance was unappealing to Ukrainians already in 2014.The Kremlin secured portions of only two regions—Donetsk and Luhansk. The Kremlin managed to hold those areas only after Russia’s regular military openly intervened: Russia’s irregular forces fell short of achieving Putin’s aims.[37]Putin was not yet ready to deploy Russia’s regular military at scale to secure control of all the ‘Novorossiya’ regions. Minsk II allowed the Kremlin to freeze its gains in Ukraine’s east and grow military capability prior to the 2022 invasion.Minsk II reinforced weak leadership in the West. The deal impaled the Western debate on Russian premises for a decade. Muddied thinking led to poor Western decisions that prolonged the war. The last decade of Western debate on Russia is only partially based in fact — a lot is based in fiction. The facts have stayed the same since 2014: Russia invaded to control Ukraine; Ukraine has been defending itself.Minsk II, by de facto absolving Russia, muddied Western thinking about the war. Putin used the Normandy Format (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, France) and the Minsk deal to falsely frame Ukraine as a bad actor that needed to make concessions. Putin demanded that Ukraine implement Minsk II’s political provisions — that would compromise Ukraine’s sovereignty — without any guarantee that Russia would honor Minsk II‘s security provisions.[38] Ukraine insisted that security provisions (a sustained ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian military assets, and Ukraine reestablishing control over its border) must be executed first.[39]The Kremlin used Ukraine’s refusal to bend to Putin’s will to frame Kyiv ‘as a spoiler of peace’ — a Russian information operation that persists today.[40] Russia’s real message to Ukraine has always been: “If you refuse to compromise your sovereignty, you spoil peace. If you refuse to surrender — you spoil peace.” Russia’s message to Ukraine today is also "if you refuse to accept Russian occupation, where you can be killed, tortured, forcefully mobilized to fight against your own — you spoil peace.”Meanwhile, Russia made no concessions; it continued to illegally occupy Ukraine’s land, violate the ceasefire, and torture Ukrainian POWs and civilians — all while claiming to be an observer in the war it started.[41]French President Emmanuel Macron repeatedly attempted to mediate between Russia and Ukraine in the context of Minsk II, spending hours talking to Putin, even as Putin offered no concessions.[42] While Macron thought he was helping Ukraine, he was also helping the Kremlin perpetuate false equivalences.The ‘Steinmeier formula’ was another example of a Western “solution” favoring a Russian premise. In 2016, former German Foreign Minister Steinmeier proposed to grant the DNR and LNR special “self-governance” status if they held “free and fair” elections under Ukrainian law and under the observation of the OSCE.[43] No legitimate elections can be held at a gun point. Yet, the formula provided no mechanism for the withdrawal of Russian forces from DNR and LNR during the elections.[44] It ignored the Russian information control over DNR and LNR and Russian influence in the OSCE. The formula would have precluded a legitimate vote, holding elections de facto on Russia’s terms.Minsk II helped the Kremlin frame any Western support to Ukraine as an escalation and fueled Western self-deterrence that prolonged Russia’s war.[45] The United States long debated whether to provide Ukraine with defensive capabilities, such as Javelin anti-tank missiles.[46] Then President Donald Trump ultimately provided Javelins in 2018 — nearly four years after the war started.[47] Western self-deterrence led to lost opportunities for Ukraine in 2022 and 2023.[48] Had the West rushed military aid to Ukraine and planned for successive operations after the Russian defeat in the Battle of Kyiv in spring 2022 or after Russia’s offensive culminated in summer 2022, Ukraine would be closer to a durable peace today.[49]Lessons for the United States from Minsk II 1. Russia will seek to transfer the responsibility for its war onto someone else’s balance sheet. The US should seek to make Russia own the problem it created. 2. Ending the war requires stripping Putin of hope that he can destroy Ukraine as a state in his lifetime, militarily or through a ‘peace deal.’ 3. Russia can accept failure.Lesson 1: No absolution. Make Russia own the problem it created.What Russia will doRussia will aim to shift the blame for its war of choice in Ukraine, as Russia did with the Minsk II deal. The Kremlin will blame the United States, NATO, Ukraine, President Zelensky, the Western defense industrial complex, Anglo-Saxons with their ‘aggressive intentions,’ as the Russian Foreign Ministry puts it, and others.[50]Russia will try to offload the cost of the destruction it caused to Ukraine on someone else’s balance sheet — be it Ukraine, the United States, and other Ukrainian partners.Lessons for the United StatesThe starting US position should be that Russia owns the problem it created. Anything less than a demand for Russia to foot the trillion-dollar bill for the damage it caused and to restore the borders of Ukraine that the Russian Federation formally recognized in 1991 and 1994 is and should be framed as a major concession to Putin. Negotiations that start with preemptive concessions on these demands without insisting on parallel Russian concessions would repeat the central mistake of the Minsk deal.The United States must make Russia own the problem it created for the sake of a just peace but also for pure pragmatism. There is no reason someone else should be covering the bill for Russia’s war. Russia’s war of choice killed and wounded an estimated million people.[51] Russia caused an estimated half a trillion to a trillion dollars in damage to Ukraine and billions to the United States and other partner nations.[52] Russia robbed three, and in some cases 11 years from the lives of Ukrainians. Russia cost countless hours and energy of people in the US and globally working to end Russia’s war.Russia chose to start this war for no legitimate reason, and it can choose to end it at any point. Ukraine did not pose a threat to Russia. Putin thought Ukraine was so militarily weak that he could conquer it in a matter of days in 2022.[53] Russia was not seriously concerned with a military threat from NATO, as evidenced by Russia’s military posture for years before 2022 and even during its war in Ukraine.[54] Putin had effectively blocked Ukraine’s NATO accession by 2022.[55] Putin did not invade to protect Russian speakers in Ukraine. Russian forces are killing Russian speakers at scale in Ukraine. There were no legitimate casus belli — only Putin’s desire to control Ukraine. Russia can stop its war at any point. Russian troops can simply withdraw from Ukraine. Russia will still exist as a state without Ukraine.[56]Another deal that absolves Russia will lead to a larger war with higher costs for the United States. A deal that lets Russia keep its illegal gains in Ukraine at no cost will reinforce the mindset that drove Russia to invade, bringing close to zero the chances of a Russia compatible with US interests, Ukraine’s existence, and a peaceful Europe.Minsk 3.0 would create a Russia that will want even more and will be able to do more. The Russia of 2025 is not Russia of 2022. Russia of 2022 was expansionist enough to attack its neighbor without provocation and kill thousands— only to fail to achieve its declared war aims three years after.[57]Putin has transformed Russian society to support Russian military conquest over three years of war. Putin has empowered Russian ultranationalists who believe in expansion by force.[58] Putin has promoted the ultranationalists to prominent positions within Russia.[59] Russian ultranationalists are inherently anti-American. They see Russia as being at war with the US-led collective West for the new world order.[60] They are committed to sustaining the war indefinitely and advocate for permanent mobilization of the Russian people and means to fight the West.[61]The United States would not only face a stronger Putin or Putinist regime (or worse), but a stronger battle-forged Russian military that is experienced in fighting a NATO-supplied adversary, has better starting lines compared to February 2022, and stronger ties with China, Iran, and North Korea. Putin is hardly eager to return over half a million violent Russian men deployed to Ukraine back to Russia.[62] He will likely seek to redirect their energy elsewhere if the lines in Ukraine are frozen with no constraints on the Russian forces or the Kremlin’s choices.If an emboldened and more capable Russia invades Ukraine to complete the conquest, it will cost more Ukrainian lives and very likely will bring the Russian military closer to the NATO borders, increasing the risk of a direct NATO-Russia conflict. The United States risks a larger war with higher costs and higher escalation risks on conditions that favor Russia.[63]The only way to break the vicious cycle of Russian wars is not to absolve Russia of responsibility and force Russia to own the problem it created.Lesson 2: Ending the war requires stripping Putin of a hope that he can achieve his goal of destroying Ukraine as a state in his lifetime - militarily or through a “peace deal.”What Russia will doThe Kremlin will falsely insist that Ukraine is not sovereign. Russia will try to make a deal directly with the United States (if Putin considers a deal at all). The Kremlin will falsely insist that President Zelensky is not legitimate and demand that Ukraine holds elections that violate Ukraine’s constitution.Putin will imbed provisions to destroy Ukraine's sovereignty into any deal. Putin is already laying out precondition poison pills for just sitting down at the table.[64] Putin is demanding limits on Ukraine's freedom to choose its partners and Ukraine’s ability to defend itself (e.g. demanding that Ukraine limits the size of its military).Russia’s negotiators will engineer ways to control the physical enforcement mechanism in any deal. The Kremlin needs to preserve options to escalate the war at will.Putin will try to do what he tried (and failed) to do via Minsk II — legitimize the Kremlin’s invasion without any security guarantees to Ukraine.Lessons for the United StatesPutin’s individual demands— territory, neutrality, elections, and others — are irrelevant. Putin’s demands are proxies for Russia’s actual goals: controlling Ukraine and having the United States and NATO cede their principles and interests to accommodate a world order that favors Russia.The United States should deprive Putin of the hope that he can achieve either. This war can only end when Russia knows it cannot win militarily or through another “peace” deal.The United States should focus on conditions compatible with Ukraine’s sovereignty and US interests - instead of discussing lines on the map. The United States should reject direct US-Russia talks or Putin’s demands of Ukraine’s domestic affairs, including elections, or any other demand that limits Ukraine’s sovereignty. Conceding to Putin’s demands before talks would be a self-imposed failure.Any deal that gives Putin hope to control Ukraine will fail as Minsk did. A deal that does not give Putin hope to control Ukraine is not a deal that Putin will accept — unless this deal is imposed on him through a battlefield defeat, a severe degradation of Russian military capability, or a credible deterrent.A deterrent that has a chance to actually deter Russia requires a capable military force immune to Western political cycles and Russian influence. That is a tall order. Anything short of that, however, will not be viewed as a deterrent by Russia, will be coopted by Russia, and will lead to another war. A UN-brokered enforcement mechanism is a non-starter, for example, because of Russia’s veto power in the UN Security Council.A credible deterrent is impossible without a strong defense industrial base (DIB) in the West and Ukraine. The West’s weak DIB gives Putin hope. The Kremlin has exploited the fact that Europe’s DIB could not surge in support of Ukraine and that the United States could have but lacked the will to fill the void. A state’s DIB is a proxy for its will. Depriving Putin of hope to subjugate Ukraine in his lifetime requires a strong Western and Ukrainian DIB able to alter the assumptions of Russian military planning.Lesson 3: Russia can accept failure. What Russia will doPutin will try to convince US leaders that making him accept less than his goals in Ukraine is a non-starter. Putin will try to convince the United States that this war is unwinnable or that the US support will not matter or only prolong the war or is too risky. Russia will draw the next set of red lines.Lessons for the United StatesPutin can be made to accept a loss without escalating. He settled for less than his aims in Ukraine in 2014 and in 2022. Ukraine defeated Russia at the battle of Kyiv and expelled Russia from critical terrain in Ukraine in 2022, including from Kharkiv region and from Kherson city. The Russian authorities said Russia would be in Kherson ‘forever’ but withdrew the forces in 2022.[65] Putin was forced to accept Ukraine’s incursion in Russia’s Kursk region in 2024 — the first invasion of Russia since WWII. Putin reportedly ordered the Russian forces to liberate Kursk region by October 2024 — a mission failure as of February 2025.[66]Russia’s decade of gains in Syria are at risk. Russian military basing and political influence in Syria were key to Russia’s power in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and Africa, a pillar of its cooperation with Iran, a way to contest the United States and pressure NATO’s southern flank.[67] A decade of Putin’s work is at the mercy of HTS — militants whom Russia used to call terrorists but can no longer because HTS holds Moscow at its mercy.[68] Each time Putin accepted a setback, the new reality was not ‘negotiated’ with Putin — rather imposed on him by force. The United States will eventually recognize that the only way to have Russia accept a deal is to impose one on Russia. The United States should not distract itself with providing Putin an “offramp.” Putin has an offramp — the Kremlin’s control of Russia’s information space. The Kremlin reframed or downplayed Putin's humiliating setbacks — from Russia’s retreat from Kherson to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny to the degradation and expulsion of the Black Sea fleet from Crimea, and countless others.[69] This information control allowed Putin to normalize a new and worse reality in Russia each time, including softening the blow for an estimated 800,000 Russian causalities in pursuit of arguably mediocre battlefield results in Ukraine.In other words, Putin and Russia failed before. There is no compelling reason why Putin should not be made to fail again. And if the information offramp fails him eventually, it is not the United States’ problem.Putin is not invulnerable. This war is not lost despite Russia’s increased but nonetheless modest gains in eastern Ukraine. Russia has well-discussed advantages. Putin is accumulating risks and costs, however. Russia is facing growing cost of material and manpower, issues with Russian force generation system, and economic issues, such as inflation, labor shortages, the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, and increasingly costly tradeoffs between funneling a limited supply of Russians to the frontlines or to buttress the economy.[70] Russia depends on partners to sustain its war.[71] Shifting US policies on China and Iran are putting Russia’s enabling partnerships at risk.Putin’s accumulating problems will not matter if the Trump Administration gifts Russia time and space to regroup — as the Biden Administration’s policies of incrementalism have allowed Putin to in the past.As Minsk II helped conceal Russian failures in 2015, a premature deal risks letting Putin off the hook before he faces hard choices and maturing problems, and before Ukraine and the United States attain a true position of strength.Bills will come due for the Kremlin if Russia were to face maximum pressure from the United States and partners — for the first time since Putin invaded in 2022. The United States has many underutilized ways to increase pressure on Russia. Hitting Russia’s energy sector harder is one example. Exerting pressure on the Kremlin across theaters and domains, time and space, is another opportunity. The true driver of Russia’s economic losses is Russia’s sustained battlefield losses, however. The United States cannot achieve maximum pressure against Russia without US military support for Ukraine. The United States and its partners must force the Kremlin to face compounding pressures – in Ukraine and globally - without easy ways to offset them.[1] https://actualcomment ( dot ) ru/parad-imperializmov-2412271244.html[2] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2003/09/17/4374367/[3] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-ukraine-obsession-began-20-years-ago-with-the-orange-revolution/[4] p.7 http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20 Separatist%20ORBAT%20Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf; https://www.forbes dot ru/news/270405-nemtsov-soobshchil-o-zakrytii-proekta-novorossiya ; https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2015/05/why-the-kremlin-is-shutting-down-the-novorossiya-project?lang=ru[5] P. 8https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Separatist%20ORBAT%20Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf[6] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20 Separatist%20ORBAT%20Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf[7] https://www.ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de[8] https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-peace-talks-yield-cease-fire-deal-1423731958[9] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-not-ukraine-is-serial-violator-of-ceasefire-agreement/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-update-russias-active-campaign-ukraine; https://www.iswresearch.org/2017/02/ukraine-update-december-9-2016-february.html;[10] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30587924[11] https://web.archive.org/web/20140502193915/http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=46 ; https://news.gallup.com/poll/127094/ukrainians-likely-support-move-away-nato.aspx; https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294468/public-opinion-on-ukraine-joining-nato/[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75974 [14] https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-destroyed-cities-russia-war/32454453.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvAyykRvPBo[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing; https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/ukraine-war-russia-torture-izium/; https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/IOM_GPS_R17_IDP_August%202024.pdf[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing[17] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/denying-russia%E2%80%99s-only-strategy-success; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end[20] P.10-11 https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Separatist%20ORBAT%20Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf[21] P. 9 https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Separatist%20ORBAT%20Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf[22] https://www.ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de[23] https://ria dot ru/20150212/1047311428.html[24] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl5048[25] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement; https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html?m=0; https://epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/through-ashes-minsk-agreements[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putin-accelerates-ukraine-campaign-amid-converging-crises; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/E16%20-%20Ukraine%20Considers%20Talks%20with%20Putin%27s%20Proxies.pdf; https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html?m=0;[27] https://jamestown.org/program/russia-playing-cat-and-mouse-with-osce-part-two/[28] https://osce.usmission.gov/russias-ongoing-violations-ukraine-statement-pc-4-6/; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-not-ukraine-is-serial-violator-of-ceasefire-agreement/[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-unprecedentedly-expansive-military-exercises-fall-2020-seek-recreate-soviet; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-russia%E2%80%99s-kavkaz-2020-military-exercise; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-intensifies-russian-belarusian-military-integration; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-military-begins-month-long-combined-arms-exercises-across-southern-russia; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-zapad-2021-exercise; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russia-opens-permanent-training-center-belarus-and-sets-conditions; https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2022/02/if-new-looks-could-kill-russias-military-capability-in-2022/; https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47068/7[30] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-shows-its-military-might-in-the-black-sea-and-beyond/; https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/03/17/black-sea-rising-rebirth-of-a-russian-fleet-a52191[31] https://24tv dot ua/ru/rossija_gotovitsja_k_polnomasshtabnoj_vojne_s_ukrainoj_karta_n1118645; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t87g0nQrBuQ&ab_channel=%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%96%D0%BE%D0%A1%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B0; https://www.svoboda.org/a/29091572.html; https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2015/04/22/obstanovka-nakalyaetsya-opolchency-lnr-poluchili-prikaz-ryt-okopy.html; https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf; https://meduza dot io/en/news/2022/02/22/putin-orders-russian-military-to-carry-out-peacekeeping-in-the-dnr-and-lnr; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russian-military-operations-southeastern-ukraine-imminent; https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer; https://researchbriefings dot files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9476/CBP-9476.pdf; https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47068/7 [32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus[33] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60503037 ; https://understandingwar.org/map/russian-forces-belarus-january-25-2022[34] P.7 https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Separatist%20ORBAT%20Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf[35] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/20796[36] https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-volunteer-soldiers-face-unexpected-foe-1409675515; https://www. wsj.com/articles/ukraine-suffers-harsh-defeat-in-eastern-town1409616541?mod=article_inline; https://uacrisis(.)org/uk/20026-volunteer-battalions-eastern-ukraine[37] P.9 https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Separatist%20ORBAT%20Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf[38] https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html?m=0[39] https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html?m=0[40] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/02/russia-in-review-kremlins-fake-de.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/06/russia-in-review-kremlin-pressure-on.html?m=1 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-misdirection-continues-amid-covid-and-peace-processes ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024;[41] https://hir.harvard.edu/donetsks-isolation-torture-prison/[42] https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/macron-must-avoid-immolation-french-influence[43] https://www.rferl.org/a/what-is-the-steinmeier-formula-and-did-zelenskiy-just-capitulate-to-moscow-/30195593.html[44] https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html[45] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-putin-warns-us-supply-lethal-weapons/28717863.html[46] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/world/europe/defying-obama-many-in-congress-press-to-arm-ukraine.html; https://www.dw dot com/en/study-suggests-arming-ukraine-would-prolong-conflict/a-18249802; https://www.wsj.com/articles/message-from-battlefield-ukraine-1438106297; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/opinion/united-states-arm-ukraine-missiles.html[47] https://www.rferl.org/a/javelin-missile-delivery-ukraine-us-confirmed/29200588.html[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-sustained-counteroffensive-denying-russia%E2%80%99s-prolongation-war[50] https://mid dot ru/en/foreign_policy/news/themes/id/1957668/[51] https://www.wsj.com/world/one-million-are-now-dead-or-injured-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-b09d04e5[52] https://www.forbes.com/sites/maryroeloffs/2024/02/15/ukrainian-reconstruction-would-cost-nearly-half-a-trillion-report-says/ ; https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-stane-vzircem-vidbudovi-prezident-zvernuvsya-do-gen-79513[53] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/02/26/russia-ukraine-china-arms/; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jan%2016%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end[55] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end[56] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-syria-air-base-withdrawal/33239917.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024[57] Putin has so far failed to achieve any of his stated invasion goals. Russia did not establish control over Donbas; Russia did not ‘demilitarize‘ Ukraine. The third Kremlin‘s objective in the war - denazification - was a euphemism for the regime change, which the Kremlin also failed to accomplish.. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47068/7; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2024 [58] HYPERLINK "https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20"https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20; HYPERLINK "https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10"https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10; HYPERLINK "https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023"https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023; HYPERLINK "https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024"https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024 [59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024[60] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20; [61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23[62] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1e7vl01gngo[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-1-%E2%80%94-military-strategic-financial-implications-russian; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hy6ieZhRVm0[65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_ifIQY8eZE[66] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-8-2024[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2024[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea[70] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/14/russia-war-putin-economy-weapons-production-labor-shortage-demographics/; https://swedenherald.com/article/svantesson-wants-to-expose-russian-economic-bluff;%20https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economy-wealth-fund-reserves-ukraine-war-moscow-inflation-stagflation-2025-1%20;%20https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-stagflation-rising-inflation-weak-growth-dwindling-liquid-reserves-by-anders-aslund-2025-01; https://www.mskagency dot ru/materials/3440761; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2024 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/20601[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-vulnerable-western-policy-masks-russian-weakness ; https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-north-korea-weapons-shipment-676d7f52
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2025
- Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and George BarrosFebruary 3, 2025, 7:20pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on February 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared with previous months in late 2024. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February 3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties – over three Russian motorized rifle divisions worth of personnel – in January 2025, making January the second highest month of losses since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[1] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in January in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, or roughly 16.1 square kilometers per day. The available figures suggest Russian forces suffered roughly 96 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces suffered 48,670 casualties in December 2024 – their highest monthly casualty rate since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion – and ISW assessed that Russian forces gained a total of 593 square kilometers in December 2024. The roughly 100-square-kilometer decrease in seized territory between December 2024 and January 2025, coupled with a similar monthly casualty rate, indicates that Russian forces are taking the same high level of losses despite achieving fewer territorial advances in the near term. ISW previously observed that Russian advances slowed from November 2024 to December 2024.[2] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September 2024 through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear if the Russian military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to decline as Russian forces are advancing on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.[3]Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and other Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Volgograd Oil Refinery in Volgograd City and the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant near Astrakhan City.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike damaged the primary processing units at the Volgograd refinery and that a fire started at the Astrakhan plant. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Volgograd Oil Refinery is one of the top ten refineries in Russia and that the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant processes gas condensate and produces gas and diesel fuel.[5] A source in the SBU told Radio Liberty that the Volgograd Oil Refinery processes almost six percent of all Russian oil and that the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant processes 12 billion cubic meters of gas condensate per year.[6] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that an employee at the Astrakhan plant stated that the strike damaged a gas condensate processing plant.[7] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that Russian forces repelled a massive Ukrainian drone strike against the oblast overnight and intercepted and neutralized "most" of the drones.[8] Bocharov claimed that falling drone debris caused a fire at an oil refinery and short-term power outages. Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct a drone strike against fuel and energy facilities and that a fire started after a drone fell.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 25 drones over Volgograd Oblast and seven over Astrakhan Oblast.[10] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Lukoil refinery in Volgograd City on the night of January 30 to 31.[11]Ukrainian forces continue to innovate with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield effects. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi stated in an interview with Radio Liberty published on February 3 that Ukrainian forces are working on developing new technologies but are not disclosing them for as long as possible in order to maintain the technological initiative and prevent Russian forces from making their own analogues.[12] Sukharevskyi reported that the Unmanned Systems Forces conducted over 220 strikes against Russian territory in 2024 using over 3,500 weapons. Sukharevskyi noted that Ukrainian forces have struck over 15 "Buk-M3" and "Tor" air defense systems in December 2024 and January 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces stuck a "Buk-M3" 57 kilometers from the frontline in mid-January 2025. Sukharevskyi reported that Ukrainian forces' use of first-person view (FPV) drones to hunt Russian reconnaissance drones has led to a tenfold decrease in Russian reconnaissance drone usage. Sukharevskyi highlighted Ukraine's production of first-person view (FPV) and other drones made entirely of Ukrainian-made components and stated that Ukraine is working to develop a way to counter Russian forces' fiber optic cable FPV drones and to produce its own fiber optic cable drones. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that the Ukrainian military continues to increase the number of unmanned systems in formations and units of the Ground Forces, Airborne Assault Forces, Naval Infantry Corps, and Unmanned Systems Forces.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a technological offense-defense race to adapt and innovate their strike and anti-drone capabilities and that Ukraine's ability to field technological adaptations at scale ahead of Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine's ability to offset Russia's quantitative materiel advantages.[14]The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The UN HRMMU reported that it has observed Russian forces execute 79 Ukrainian POWs in 24 separate incidents since late August 2024 and that Russian forces perform many of the executions as Ukrainian soldiers surrender to Russian forces.[15] UN HRRMU Head Danielle Belle reported that the Russian executions "did not arise out of nowhere" as Russian officials have "openly called for the ill treatment and even execution" of Ukrainian POWs, and the UN HRRMU recorded at least three incidents of Russian officials making such calls. The UN HRRMU reported that statements to "give no quarter" are violations of humanitarian law and a war crime, and Belle emphasized that military commanders and political leaders "must issue clear and unambiguous orders to ensure the protection and humane treatment" of all POWs and individuals no longer participating in combat. ISW has previously assessed that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[16] Ukrainian Commissioner for Missing Persons in Special Circumstances Artur Dobroserdov stated on February 3 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating images purportedly showing a beheaded Ukrainian serviceman.[17]Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a "corps structure."[18] Using corps structures is not entirely new for the Ukrainian Armed Forces as the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been using corps since 2023. Ukraine formed the 9th and 10th army corps and restructured its Reserve Corps to the 11th Army Corps in 2023, and Ukraine is currently forming the 4th Army Corps.[19] Further restructuring to systematically form an echelon between Ukraine’s numerous separate brigades and Ukraine’s various operational groups of forces, and the creation of appropriate command staff headquarters at this new intermediary echelon, would likely improve command and control for Ukrainian brigades and help facilitate more effective operations.Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of Ukraine since 2014. Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" (Armenian Battalion) Special Purpose Battalion (Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade) that is currently operating in Kursk Oblast, died on February 3 after an explosive attack at his apartment building in Moscow City.[20] Sargsyan founded the Arbat Battalion, reportedly on instructions from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), in September 2022, and the battalion signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in July 2023.[21] Sargsyan is wanted in Ukraine for organizing violence against protestors in the 2014 pro-Western Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that Sargsyan was a member of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's inner circle.[22] The SBU used explosives to assassinate Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow in December 2024.[23] Ukrainian officials have not commented on Sargsyan's death, and ISW cannot independently confirm the responsible actor.The far-right Russian paramilitary unit "Rusich" Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group reacted to Sargsyan's assassination, claiming that "the Motherland will lose nothing from one dead bandit" and that Sargsyan and his "ethnic mafia" only caused problems for Russia.[24] "Rusich" Group leader Alexei Milchakov — who is a self-declared Nazi — and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander Apty Alaudinov notably met in January 2025 following Rusich's repeated criticisms of Akhmat forces.[25] Alaudinov and Milchakov expressed their support for each other and promote a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony. Rusich's response to Sargsyan's death, however, highlights the group's continued xenophobic and ultranationalist sentiments and calls into question the sincerity of Milchakov's reconciliation with Alaudinov.Key Takeaways:Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared with previous months in late 2024.Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3.Ukrainian forces continue to innovate with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield effects.The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a "corps structure."Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of Ukraine since 2014.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and in the Dnipro direction. The Russian government is expanding the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, to occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 3 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian sources claimed that fighting continued near Sverdlikovo, Maryevka, Pogrebki (all northwest of Sudzha), and Lebedevka (southeast of Korenevo).[26Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Pogrebki and Sverdlikovo, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[27]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and drone specialists from the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[28] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki.[29]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 2 that the January 31 Ukrainian strike against a Russian command post in Rylsk (northwest of Sudzha) killed dozens of Russian and North Korean officers.[30]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Hatyshche on February 2 and 3 but did not advance.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk and near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[32]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 3 and made marginal advances. Russian forces also continued ground attacks east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on February 2 and 3.[33]Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published maps on February 3 indicating that Russian forces likely advanced in fields west of Pershotravneve (east of Kupyansk).[34]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kupyansk up to a kilometer deep near Topoli (along the international border); north, northeast, and south of Zapadne; and 500 meters in depth near Synkivka.[35] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction are currently regrouping before resuming offensive operations.[36] The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are constantly conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions to detect Ukrainian positions and will fire on Ukrainian forces at the expense of Russian ground forces.[37] The commander stated that Russian forces occasionally field armor to increase the speed of offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction. The commander reported that Russian tanks with mine trawls lead mechanized columns followed by light armored vehicles carrying infantry in order to transport the infantry to the frontline as fast as possible. The commander reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian mechanized assaults in late January 2025 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed roughly 90 percent of the Russian armored vehicles.Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued Russian offensive operations on February 3. Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Lozova; east of Borova near Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka and Novolyubivka on February 2 and 3.[38]Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 2 and 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Zahryzove.[39]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zahryzove.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 3 indicating that Russian forces advanced in fields southwest of Nadiya (east of Borova), in fields west of Karmazynivka (southeast of Borova), and in fields southwest of Makiivka.[41]Russian–claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields north and further west of Makiivka.[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Fever" Drone Group of the 1st Tank Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zahryzove.[43]Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 3. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Terny and southeast of Lyman in the direction of Serebryanka and in the Serebryanske forest area on February 2 and 3.[44]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in fields north of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[45] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 3 indicating that Russian forces likely advanced in fields southwest of Dibrova (east of Lyman).[46]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 3 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Zolotarivka, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on February 2 and 3.[47]Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 3. Russian forces continued attacking within and near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on February 2 and 3.[48]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Dniprovska Street in central Chasiv Yar.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 3 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced up to southern outskirts of Bila Hora and west of Kurdyumivka (both south of Chasiv Yar).[50]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[51] Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue operating near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[52]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 3. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 2 and 3.[53]Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 3 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced west of Niu York (southwest of Toretsk).[54]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Toretsk and north and northwest of Toretsk.[55] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[56]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 3. Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, Myrolyubivka, Malynivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyarivka, Yelyzavetivka, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Sribne on February 2 and 3.[57]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[58]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zelene Pole, Tarasivka (both east of Pokrovsk), and Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on February 3 that the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction recently decreased and that Russian forces do not have a large enough materiel or personnel advantage that would allow them to intensify offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk.[60] ISW previously observed Russian forces redeploying elements of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction to the Pokrovsk direction and continues to assess that Russian forces may redeploy elements from the Kurakhove direction to the Pokrovsk direction should Russian forces successfully close the Kurakhove pocket.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces have deployed skilled drone operators to the Pokrovsk direction and that the success of the fighting in the area depends on drone operators' skills.[62]Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) with the seizure of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), which ISW assesses that Russian forces seized as of January 14.[63] Elements of the Russian "Grom" Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[64]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 3. Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Ulakly, and Kostyantynopil on February 2 and 3.[65]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Andriivka.[66]Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Andriivka-Kostyantynopil highway north of Andriivka.[67] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[68]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on February 3 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on February 2 and 3.[69] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov posted footage on February 2 of Russian forces conducting a reduced company-sized mechanized assault in two waves near Velyka Novosilka, and Ukrainian sources stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven vehicles.[70]Order of Battle: A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction reported on February 3 that it conducted a drone strike that killed the commander of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]).[71]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne), Shcherbynivka, and Kamyanske (both northwest of Robotyne) on February 2 and 3 but did not advance.[72]Russian forces recently advanced on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta amid continued ground attacks in the area on February 3. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks immediately east of Kherson City near Antonivka and Prydniprovske.[73]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern part of Velykyi Potemkin Island (southwest of Kherson City).[74]Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces reported on February 3 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system, three electronic warfare (EW) systems, and one Starlink terminal in southern Ukraine in the past day.[75]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 71 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Crimea.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 38 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts; and that 25 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian drones caused damage in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts.[77]Russian forces continue to modernize their strike weapons to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause more damage. Ihor Chernyak, the head of the explosives department at the Ukrainian National Police's Sumy Oblast branch stated on February 3 that Russian forces use Shahed drones made of carbon or hydrocarbon fiber and "Gerber" drones made of foam plastic.[78] Chernyak noted that Russian forces use the Gerber drones, which are light and cheap to produce, to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and have started equipping the Gerber drones with high-explosive fragmentation warheads weighing up to three kilograms. Shahed drone warheads weigh between 50 and 90 kilograms, but Chernyak noted that the Gerber drones are still able to cause significant damage. Chernyak reported that Russian forces are also launching modified missiles, including Iskander missiles and Kh-59 cruise missiles with cluster warheads. Ukrainian military expert Serhiy Flesh reported on February 2 that Russian forces have started to equip Gerber drones with warheads, including high-explosive fragmentation warheads, weighing three to five kilograms.[79]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian government is expanding the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, to occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia. Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo announced on February 3 the "Heroes of Kherson Oblast" program.[80] Saldo welcomed Kherson Oblast residents who are fighting or fought with the Russian military in Ukraine as well as veterans from Russian regions to participate in the program. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky similarly announced on February 3 the "Zaporizhia Heroes" program.[81]The Russian government is increasing its role in managing the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) possibly in order to create a conscript recruitment pipeline using the organization's education and recruitment infrastructure. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on February 3 stipulating that representatives of the Russian government, including from the Russian ministries of defense, sports, education, finance, and economic development, participate in the governing bodies of DOSAAF.[82] The decree calls for these measures in order to increase the effectiveness of preparing citizens for military service, develop military-patriotic education, bolster patriotism, and increase the prestige of military service. The decree also calls for DOSAAF to amend its charter to allow Russian citizens who are 14 years old to join the organization. The Russian government submitted a bill in August 2024 to lower the DOSAAF admission age to 14 from 18.[83] DOSAAF is a Soviet relic that funds and promotes military service for Russian youth through military-patriotic programming and military skills programs and sends representatives to military draft boards to allocate conscripts with specialized skills into specific military roles.[84]Russian milbloggers complained about the insufficient quantity and quality of Russian commanders. A Russian milblogger complained that the Russian military is "catastrophically" short of talented operational-level commanders and that the Russian military needs to learn to conduct attacks at the regiment and brigade level.[85] Another Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor responded, claiming that the Russian military is "catastrophically" short of talented commanders starting from even the tactical level.[86] The milblogger claimed that Russian commanders at the regiment and brigade level often personally control small tactical units and that problems with micromanagement began to emerge in the Russian military in 2022. The milblogger claimed that there were "serious" losses among junior command staff and "considerable" losses among mid-level command staff already by June 2022. The milblogger claimed that the Russian command staff is "incompetent" and is overloaded with administrative issues at headquarters, negatively impacting their combat planning and command and control (C2) abilities.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) continues efforts to protect facilities in the Russian rear from Ukrainian strikes. The Kalashnikov Concern, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, stated on February 3 that it presented its new "Krona-E" air defense system that is designed to protect government facilities, infrastructure facilities, cargo areas, and strategic communications systems from air strikes, particularly those with medium-range drones.[87] The Krona-E is reportedly equipped with 9M340 and 9M333 guided air defense missiles.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize and promote pro-Russian ideologies among Ukrainian youth as part of Russia's long-term occupation efforts. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on February 3 that open-source data indicates that Russian occupation authorities recruited about 1,000 Ukrainian children in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast in 2024 for "Yunarmiya," a military-patriotic movement that instills pro-Russian and militarized ideals in youth in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[88] Lubinets noted that Russian authorities are expanding the movement in occupied Ukraine, having created 23 new "cells" in 2024 alone.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)The Belarusian Central Election Commission (CEC) asserted on February 3 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko won the recent presidential election with about 5.13 million votes.[89] The Belarusian CEC claimed that voter turnout was 86.82 percent. The January 26 presidential election was neither free nor fair.[90]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/vtrati-rosarmiyi-u-sichni-ponad-tri-diviziyi-osobovogo-skladu-ta-7-tankovih-bataljoniv ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/03/vtraty-rosijskoyi-armiyi-v-sichni-ponad-3-dyviziyi-osobovogo-skladu-ta-7-tankovyh-bataljoniv/[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024[4] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20525[5] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8741; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8743[6] https://ru.krymr dot com/a/news-rossiya-udar-po-dvum-toplivnym-ob-yektam-/33301476.html[7] https://t.me/astrapress/73728[8] https://t.me/rgn_34/8302[9] https://t.me/babushkin30/7072[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/48494[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125[12] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/drony-viyna-suharevskyy/33300507.html[13] https://t.me/osirskiy/1054[14] https://t.me/osirskiy/1054; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090724[15] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/ru/Alarming-Rise-in-Executions-of-Captured-Ukrainian-Military-Personnel ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/02/03/monitoringovaya-missiya-oon-otchitalas-o-rezkom-roste-chisla-ubiystv-plennyh-voennosluzhaschih-vsu-rossiyanami[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120324; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2024[17] Warning – Disturbing report: https://t.me/ZNYKLI_BEZVISTI_MVS/1331; https://suspilne dot media/939827-ukraina-vstanovila-osobu-vijskovogo-akomu-vidtali-golovu-rosiani/[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MLeRxg9PCM6ixBeYcA76BUrL2oAdmq95wuLMDQSM3WaBRjTXJ36Cfu1qTwQMSUryl?locale=uk_UA[19] https://euromaidanpress dot com/2025/02/03/commander-in-chief-announces-major-reorganization-of-ukrainian-military-structure/ ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/zsu-perejdut-na-korpusnu-sturkturu/ ; https://mil.in dot ua/en/news/ukraines-ground-forces-expand-with-new-army-corps-formation/[20] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/03/02/2025/67a08b6c9a7947df9ffd5186; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/moskvi-pidirvali-organizatora-titushok-ta-1738575650.html[21] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/03/02/2025/67a08b6c9a7947df9ffd5186 ; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/moskvi-pidirvali-organizatora-titushok-ta-1738575650.html[22] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/03/02/2025/67a08b6c9a7947df9ffd5186; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/moskvi-pidirvali-organizatora-titushok-ta-1738575650.html[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2024[24] https://t.me/dshrg2/2865[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010625[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/63682; https://t.me/wargonzo/24634 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23327; https://t.me/rybar/67680 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20549[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23327; https://t.me/rybar/67680[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/48500; https://t.me/mod_russia/48501[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85555[30] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lGq6VrLtqUc; https://suspilne dot media/939317-pid-cas-udaru-zsu-po-kurskij-oblasti-rf-i-kndr-vtratili-desatki-oficeriv-zelenskij/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23303; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029CExJhk93w2wK7AbAg5Xc3byCkNqqQt1eb7H47jX6E1nDrKELfuDxuaM22UZkD5Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026tnaX3TYaqXhnwMcVB6EqtHbFPsa5dCtona3rL9jqPE9XHMmPtVndSRNDgLLxXPzl; https://t.me/synegubov/12905[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23303[33] https://t.me/synegubov/12905; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029CExJhk93w2wK7AbAg5Xc3byCkNqqQt1eb7H47jX6E1nDrKELfuDxuaM22UZkD5Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026tnaX3TYaqXhnwMcVB6EqtHbFPsa5dCtona3rL9jqPE9XHMmPtVndSRNDgLLxXPzl[34] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=969604055352673&set=pcb.969604532019292[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153419; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153466; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23315[36] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4861[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/03/tanchyk-obvarenyj-sarayem-yakyj-shtovhaye-tral-poblyzu-kupyanska-atakuyut-rosijski-samorobni-gibrydy/[38] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4861[39] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1886243762835427767; https https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1886243762835427767; https://t.me/lihoradka_team/380[40] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1886431649467953404; https://t.me/osb878/151[41] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=969604055352673&set=pcb.969604532019292[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153466[43] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1886243762835427767; https://t.me/lihoradka_team/380[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029CExJhk93w2wK7AbAg5Xc3byCkNqqQt1eb7H47jX6E1nDrKELfuDxuaM22UZkD5Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026tnaX3TYaqXhnwMcVB6EqtHbFPsa5dCtona3rL9jqPE9XHMmPtVndSRNDgLLxXPzl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4861[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1886146491024060424; https://t.me/NFNR_UA/76[46] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=969604055352673&set=pcb.969604532019292[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029CExJhk93w2wK7AbAg5Xc3byCkNqqQt1eb7H47jX6E1nDrKELfuDxuaM22UZkD5Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026tnaX3TYaqXhnwMcVB6EqtHbFPsa5dCtona3rL9jqPE9XHMmPtVndSRNDgLLxXPzl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63682 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4861 ; https://t.me/rybar/67678 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23314[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029CExJhk93w2wK7AbAg5Xc3byCkNqqQt1eb7H47jX6E1nDrKELfuDxuaM22UZkD5Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026tnaX3TYaqXhnwMcVB6EqtHbFPsa5dCtona3rL9jqPE9XHMmPtVndSRNDgLLxXPzl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24621 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22344[49] https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/fee922e0-e446-4f99-cac2-08dd3bdfeee4; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1886053616210890964; https://t.me/osirskiy/1052[50] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=969604295352649&set=pcb.969604532019292[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23313[52] https://t.me/epoddubny/22344[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029CExJhk93w2wK7AbAg5Xc3byCkNqqQt1eb7H47jX6E1nDrKELfuDxuaM22UZkD5Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026tnaX3TYaqXhnwMcVB6EqtHbFPsa5dCtona3rL9jqPE9XHMmPtVndSRNDgLLxXPzl[54] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=969604368685975&set=pcb.969604532019292[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153466[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/24632 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85600[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029CExJhk93w2wK7AbAg5Xc3byCkNqqQt1eb7H47jX6E1nDrKELfuDxuaM22UZkD5Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026tnaX3TYaqXhnwMcVB6EqtHbFPsa5dCtona3rL9jqPE9XHMmPtVndSRNDgLLxXPzl ; https://t.me/rybar/67694 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63682 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61860 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4861 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23347[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8278; https://www.facebook.com/3012NGU/videos/1358514885463216/[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85602 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20903 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23343[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/03/pochynaye-vysity-na-svoyemu-supernyku-chomu-oborona-pokrovska-nagaduye-10-j-raund-bokserskogo-poyedynku/[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125[62] https://t.me/yurasumy/20905[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/48486 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85560[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029CExJhk93w2wK7AbAg5Xc3byCkNqqQt1eb7H47jX6E1nDrKELfuDxuaM22UZkD5Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026tnaX3TYaqXhnwMcVEqtHbFPsa5dCtona3rL9jqPE9XHMmPtVndSRNDgLLxXPzl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63682 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85559 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61866 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23346 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20902[66] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8277; https://t.me/oaembr46/1341[67] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153466[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/63706 ; https://t.me/vrogov/19019[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526[70] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/17100; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4861[71] https://t.me/ombr_110/451[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029CExJhk93w2wK7AbAg5Xc3byCkNqqQt1eb7H47jX6E1nDrKELfuDxuaM22UZkD5Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026tnaX3TYaqXhnwMcVB6EqtHbFPsa5dCtona3rL9jqPE9XHMmPtVndSRNDgLLxXPzl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02iD8aQHGT5oEcrvov4S6s7R2me3joD21bup3JAANZdMqwmo3upNp1aYqkNUUy8zV1l; https://t.me/wargonzo/24621[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20526[74] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25298; https://t.me/ssternenko/39479[75] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12020[76] https://t.me/kpszsu/28016[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/28016; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/939287-poskodzeni-cotiri-zitlovi-budinki-naslidki-dronovoi-ataki-na-cerkasini/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/12905; https://t.me/kyivoda/24977; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/939365-trivoga-trivala-protagom-noci-kiivsinu-atakuvali-rosijski-bpla/[78] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/938401-bpla-zi-zbilsenou-bojovou-castinou-do-90-kg-cim-armia-rf-be-po-sumah-ta-oblasti/[79] https://t.me/serhii_flash/4868 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/rosiyany-osnastyly-drony-prymanky-vybuhivkoyu/[80] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/5815[81] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/4713[82] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23043681; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202502030021[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024[84] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324[85] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21742[86] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1951[87] https://t.me/kalashnikovnews/3248[88] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/7856[89] https://t.me/cikbelarus/3400[90] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025
- — Iran Update, February 3, 2025
- Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells,Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, and Nicholas Carl Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.An Iraqi Sunni parliamentarian criticized State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki on February 3 for promoting sectarianism.[1] Maliki gave a speech on February 1 in which he made anti-Sunni sectarian statements and implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government.[2] Progress Party member Shaalan al Karim described Maliki’s speech as “charged with sectarianism” and criticized the Shia Coordination Framework — a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi parties — for not denouncing Maliki’s statements.[3] Karim added that the Iraqi parliament approved the General Amnesty Law amendment on January 21 with “broad political agreement.” Karim likely made this statement in response to Maliki’s claim that the amendment will release “murderers and criminals” from prison.[4] The General Amnesty Law amendment will grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[5] The approval of the amendment was a long-standing Sunni demand and has long been opposed by Iraqi Shia parties. CTP-ISW has observed no other prominent Iraqi Sunni politician respond to Maliki’s speech at the time of this writing.Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will visit Ankara, Turkey, on February 4.[6] The director of media for Turkish President Erdogan said that Shara will discuss the latest developments in Syria and Syrian-Turkish economic and security cooperation during meetings at the Presidential Complex.[7]Unknown actors detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) along the M4 highway outside of Manbij and killed at least 19 people on February 3.[8] Syrian media reported that unknown actors parked the VBIED near the Hassin station, outside of Manbij City, on February 2 and then detonated it the next day. At least 15 of the casualties were agricultural workers in the vehicle next to the VBIED.[9] Unknown actors have recently detonated at least seven VBIEDS in the Manbij area since December 2024, including an attack on February 1.[10] This most recent attack is the highest casualty incident yet in the series of attacks. The perpetrators and intended target(s) of the attack are unknown at this time. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s Office said in a statement that the Syrian state would pursue and impose “severe punishments” on the perpetrators of the attack.[11]Turkish and anti-SDF Syrian media accused the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of conducting the February 3 VBIED attack.[12] Previous VBIED attacks have similarly inspired accusations against the SDF. SDF officials condemned the attack and blamed Turkish-backed factions for conducting the attack and inspiring fear among the population.[13] The SDF volunteered the help the Syrian interim government find the perpetrators.[14]Key Takeaways:Iraq: An Iraqi Sunni parliamentarian criticized Nour al Maliki for stoking sectarian tensions. This comes after Maliki gave an inflammatory speech accusing Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government.Syria: Interim President Ahmed al Shara will pay an official visit to Ankara to discuss bilateral cooperation and events in Syria.Syria: An unknown actor detonated a VBIED near Manbij in northern Syria, marking the seventh VBIED detonation in the area in recent months.SyriaTurkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to strike SDF positions along key ground lines of communication in order to isolate SDF forces at Qara Qozak Bridge. The SDF said that Turkish aircraft struck multiple villages east of Qara Qozak Bridge, including Ghasq, Melha, al Tineh, and the Sarrin airbase on February 2.[15] A Turkish airstrike reportedly damaged the al Shuyoukh Fawqani water station.[16] Turkey has concentrated airstrikes targeting SDF positions along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River near Qara Qozak Bridge in recent days.[17]Anti-SDF media reported that Turkey shelled SDF positions west of Tal Abyad, Raqqa Province, on February 3.[18] The SDF and SNA recently exchanged artillery fire in the western Tal Abyad countryside on February 2.[19]Syrian media circulated reports on February 3 that the Syrian Defense Ministry appointed two SNA leaders as division commanders within the new Syrian armed forces. Hamza Division Commander Saif Abu Bakr expressed congratulations on February 3 to Abu Amsha for his promotion to brigadier general and assuming command of the "25th Division” on February 3.[20] Abu Amsha currently commands the Suleiman Shah Brigades, which comprises the SNA “Joint Force” with the Hamza Division. The US Treasury Department has sanctioned both Abu Amsha and Abu Bakr for human rights abuses against Kurds.[21] The Syrian Ministry of Defense recently promoted Amsha to the rank of colonel on December 29.[22] Abu Amsha’s rumored promotion and appointment also comes amid reports of another SNA leader’s promotion to division commander. Anti-SDF media reported that Liberation and Construction Movement commander Raed al Arab, aka Abu Arab, was appointed commander of the “118th Armored Division.”[23] The Liberation and Construction Movement currently operates within the SNA.[24] Syrian media previously identified Abu Arab in January 2024 as the commander of the new “Badia Division,” who reportedly led the HTS-led Military Operations Department’s seizure of Zamla oil field on January 22.[25] The Syrian Defense Ministry has notably not confirmed the appointments nor the establishment of the divisions. Both Abu Amsha and Abu Arab have met directly with Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra in recent weeks, supporting the suggestion that both could serve in prominent positions within the future Syrian armed forces.[26]The Syrian Defense Ministry has yet to announce whether it will establish new formations or inherit legacy Syrian Arab Army (SAA) structures. The 118th Armored Division did not exist under the SAA. The 25th Division, however, is a former SAA special operations forces unit that last deployed to stop the opposition offensive in November and December 2024.[27] It is unclear if the rumored new “25th Division” will follow the previous unit’s structure.Syrian President Ahmed al Shara told Western journalists on January 31 that he asked Turkey to halt its plans for a “full-fledged” operation into northern Syria in order to give the Syrian interim government “space to negotiate with the SDF.[28] Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened to launch a military operation to “destroy” the SDF if it fails to disarm.[29] Shara’s comments are consistent with Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan's statement on January 10 that the interim Syrian government should be given the opportunity to address Kurdish militants' presence within the SDF before Turkey takes military action.[30] Fidan said that the HTS-led interim government has an “agenda” to address the “PKK/YPG” but promised that “Turkey will” take action if others — presumably HTS — fail to do so.[31]Negotiations between the SDF and Syrian interim government have continued since January 10 without tangible results. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said in a February 2 interview with the Associated Press that SDF officials will continue to visit Damascus to negotiate with the Syrian interim government.[32] Abdi said that SDF officials recently sent a proposal to the Damascus and are “waiting for the response.”[33] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara said on February 3 that the SDF has expressed its readiness to give up its weapons to the government but that the two parties still disagree over the “details.”[34] Abdi said that the SDF supports a central government based out of Damascus and does not seek northeastern Syria to set up an autonomous government and parliament like in northern Iraq but still seeks a “decentralized” state.[35] The issue of centralization has previously served as one of the primary sticking points between the SDF and the Syrian government. The commander of the SDF's Northern Democratic Brigade told Kurdish media on February 3 that the SDF will not consider disarming before it resolves issues related to civilian institutions and displaced persons with the Syrian government.[36]The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from two positions in Quneitra Province near the Golan Heights in Syria on February 2.[37] Local media reported that Israeli forces left the Quneitra Province court building and Mantara Dam area.[38] Israeli forces began establishing positions in Quneitra Province on December 8.[39] The Quneitra Provincial Council and the Syrian Civil Defense began clearing roads of rubble near the previous IDF deployment.[40]Interim government forces seized small arms destined to be smuggled to Lebanon from Rif Dimashq and Homs provinces on February 2 and 3.[41] Syrian forces previously thwarted a smuggling attempt to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon from Rif Dimashq on January 25.[42] The General Directorate specified in the previous smuggling attempt that the weapons were intended for Hezbollah.[43] It is unlikely that existing smuggling networks fully collapsed when the Assad regime fell, despite the flight of numerous Iranian-backed elements from Syria.Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara outlined his vision and an updated timeline for building a new Syrian government on February 3. Shara told Syria TV that he plans for Syria to be a republican system with an executive administration and a judiciary.[44] He reiterated that Syria would first have an unelected interim parliament because of the challenges of holding an election with over half the population still in exile.[45] This appointed parliament and committee was first announced at the “victory conference” that Hayat Tahrir al Sham held in Damascus on January 29.[46] Shara estimated in his February 3 interview that there would be a four-to-five-year period before Syria would hold elections and full transfer to the new system.[47] Shara had previously described the interim government overseeing a three-to-four-year transition period, during which he would presumably rule and exert heavy influence over the allocation of political power.[48] Shara said that he rejects a quota system that for Syria that would give government positions or power percentages to specific sectarian or ethnic groups.[49] Shara has previously indicated that he is committed to “respect[ing] all sects” and holding “national dialogue” with them, but it is not yet clear if this dialogue will involve the discussion of constitutional issues, and he has not yet taken concrete steps to include Syrian minorities in the government.[50] Shara’s Hayat Tahrir al Sham is a predominantly Sunni Arab organization, making the inclusion of religious minorities in Syria’s government through quotas not in his inherent interest.IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentUnspecified individuals conducted a drone attack targeting the Emirati-operated Khor Mor gas field in Sulaymaniyah Province, Iraq, on February 2.[51] The Iraqi Kurdistan Counterterrorism General Directorate reported that “outlawed militias” launched the attack from Bashir, Kirkuk Province.[52] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered the formation of a security committee to investigate the attack. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. Armed groups have attacked the Khor Mor gas field on multiple occasions in recent years, including in June 2022 and April 2024.[53]Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji met with Accountability and Justice Commission head Bassem al Badri on February 3.[54] The Accountability and Justice Commission replaced the De-Baathification Committee in 2008 and is ostensibly responsible for preventing “the return of the Baath’s ideology, power, or practices.”[55] In reality, however, the Shia Coordination Framework, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Shia political parties, has weaponized the Accountability and Justice Commission to sideline political opposition.[56] Badri is a member of the Dawa Party, which is led by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki.[57] Maliki appointed Badri as the head of the Accountability and Justice Commission in 2013.[58] Araji’s meeting with Badri comes after the newly formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition demanded the dissolution of the Accountability and Justice Commission on January 18.[59] Iraqi Sunnis have demanded the dissolution of this commission since before the United States withdrew from Iraq in December 2011.[60]Araji separately met with Maliki on February 3.[61] Iraqi media reported that Araji and Maliki discussed the importance of “supporting security and intelligence efforts to preserve the security and stability of [Iraq].” Maliki recently emphasized on February 1 that he will not allow the dissolution of the Accountability and Justice Commission.[62]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripNothing significant to report.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Gaza StripNothing significant to report.LebanonThe IDF 91st Division has destroyed Hezbollah military infrastructure and weapons in southern Lebanon in recent days.[63] The IDF 769th Territorial Brigade (91st Division) destroyed several weapons depots, which included mortars, missiles, rockets, and other military equipment. The IDF 7th Armored Brigade (36th Division) continued operations in southern Lebanon. Geolocated footage posted to X (Twitter) showed the IDF destroyed infrastructure in Kfar Kila, southern Lebanon.[64] Lebanese and Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that the IDF has detonated explosives in Kfar Kila in recent days.[65] The IDF killed Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon and detained suspects whom it deemed posed a threat.[66]Geolocated footage posted to X (Twitter) on February 2 showed that the IDF moved southward from Deir Mimas, southern Lebanon.[67] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) back filled the IDF in Deir Mimas on January 27.[68] Lebanese media reported the IDF moved eastward from Aitaroun toward this area on February 1.[69]West BankThe IDF detained a Palestinian individual who had infiltrated from the West Bank into Kafr Qara, northern Israel and planned to conduct attacks.[70] The IDF detained the individual after he expressed his wish to die a “martyr” in a social media post. The detainee is a resident of Jenin, northern West Bank.The IDF has killed three Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm, northern West Bank, in recent days.[71] The IDF located an improvised explosive device (IED) manufacturing facility and destroyed approximately 45 IEDs there. The IDF also detained 50 fighters in Tulkarm. These activities are part of the large-scale IDF counterterrorism operation designed to destroy militia infrastructure in the northern West Bank.[72]The IDF 828th Infantry Brigade began to use Eitan armored fighting vehicles (AFV) to support the counterterrorism operation in Tubas, northern West Bank, on February 2.[73] Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyIraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on February 2 and 3.[74] Mashhadani met with Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Deputy Parliament Speaker Haji Babaei. These meetings touched on Iran-Iraqi relations across several fields, including parliamentary cooperation and infrastructure projects, which Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian had discussed in his visit to Iraq in September 2024.[75]The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy sent the Shahid Sattar Mahmoudi flotilla to Port Khalid Sharjah in Sharjah City, the United Arab Emirates for a three-day port visit on February 3.[76] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri stated that this is the first time the IRGC and Artesh navies have conducted a prolonged port visit to the United Arab Emirates.[77] Tangsiri added that this visit is part of several military cooperation events with Iran’s neighboring countries to ensure security in the Strait of Hormuz.[78]Iranian officials continue to meet with Azerbaijani and Armenia officials. Azerbaijani President’s Assistant Hikmet Hajiyev met with the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately, on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Deputy Foreign Ministers summit in Tehran on February 1 and 2.[79] All Iranian officials confirmed their commitment to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and to maintaining stability in the South Caucasus. Ahmadian, who recently met with Armenian officials in Yerevan on January 9, also encouraged Hajiyev to not let “enemies” harm Tehran and Baku’s good relationship.[80] Deputy Foreign Ministers from ECO member states, including Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan also attended the ECO summit.[81]Iranian media recently circulated a video of a female Iranian citizen removing her clothing and climbing on top of a police car to resist arrest in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province.[82] It is unclear when the incident took place or why the police tried to arrest her. Some social media users have connected her protest to the Mahsa Amini movement.[83] This incident comes after a female Iranian student similarly removed some of her clothing in protest against being harassed and assaulted by regime security forces at the Islamic Azad University in November 2024.[84] Security forces reportedly targeted the student for improperly adhering to the mandatory hijab law. The incident in Mashhad is noteworthy given that Mashhad is one of the most conservative cities in Iran.Iranian security forces arrested an unspecified Salafi-jihadi cell in Javanroud, Kermanshah Province on February 3.[85] The arrest comes after the IRGC Ground Forces and Artesh Ground Forces conducted military exercises in Kermanshah Province in January 2025.[86]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/515054/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%8B%D8%A7[2] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/010220253[3] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/515054/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%8B%D8%A7[4] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/514883/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC[5] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-parliament-debates-controversial-amendment-amnesty-law[6] https://x.com/timourazhari/status/1886352413046538615[7] https://x.com/fahrettinaltun/status/1886344997131190301[8] https://apnews.com/article/syria-manbij-bombing-assad-c75d54d0361f6a474b69c6d813eb5c70; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1886310780313780574; https://x.com/timourazhari/status/1886352933953909111; https://x.com/NPA_Arabic/status/1886321757369291033[9] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1886321693464899948; https://apnews.com/article/syria-manbij-bombing-assad-c75d54d0361f6a474b69c6d813eb5c70[10] https://apnews.com/article/syria-manbij-bombing-assad-c75d54d0361f6a474b69c6d813eb5c70; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1885688852842479908[11] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/450[12] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1886307914324865429; https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/الدول-العربية/سوريا-ارتفاع-ضحايا-تفجير-منبج-الإرهابي-إلى-17-قتيلا/3470359; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1886337270283743351[13] https://x.com/MazloumAbdi/status/1886402522304135278; https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1886393097124250037[14] https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1886393097124250037[15] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886340134896890277[16] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1886340134896890277[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2025[18] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1886405686508110076[19] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1886037320765169997 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1886031785928040459 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1885980011271786917[20] https://x.com/Seyfebubekir/status/1886127717457740034[21] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699[22] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1873556885145841888/photo/1[23] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1886393012919349627; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134913; https://x.com/LBM_SY/status/1744353788859674627[24] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/682183/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%91%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85-%D8%B4/[25] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1882204969711157334[26] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1875515528758129069; https://x.com/Seyfebubekir/status/1868722891241799744/photo/1[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-1-2024[28] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/02/03/an-interview-with-ahmed-al-sharaa-syrias-president[29] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/تركيا/فيدان-توجيه-إنذار-نهائي-لتنظيم-واي-بي-جي-الإرهابي/3444290 ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiye-pkk-deasi-sahada-bozguna-ugratan-tek-ulkedir/3426593 ; https://x.com/alaraby_ar/status/1869690521846997114 ; https://www.france24.com/en/video/20241220-en-wb-tete-a-tete-hakan-fidan ; https://www dot aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/our-sole-aim-is-to-ensure-peace-tranquility-stability-throughout-region-turkish-president-erdogan/3433935[30] https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-10-2025[31] https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-10-2025[32] https://apnews.com/article/mazloum-abdi-sdf-alsharaa-islamic-state-kurds-6519679f1e4e51da60767391c005976f[33] https://apnews.com/article/mazloum-abdi-sdf-alsharaa-islamic-state-kurds-6519679f1e4e51da60767391c005976f[34] https://www.syria dot tv/نظام-جمهوري-وانتخابات-الرئيس-السوري-يكشف-لتلفزيون-سوريا-ملامح-المرحلة-المقبلة[35] https://apnews.com/article/mazloum-abdi-sdf-alsharaa-islamic-state-kurds-6519679f1e4e51da60767391c005976f[36] https://t.me/damascusv011/28382[37] https://t.me/damascusv011/28372; https://t.me/damascusv011/28343[38] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1886085007170568596 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1886091513253278201[39] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate120824[40] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1886407565853995337 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1886350837691121837 ; https://t.me/HoranFreeMedia/19945[41] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134839 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/28370[42] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate012625[43] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1883434966425772390[44] https://www.syria dot tv/نظام-جمهوري-وانتخابات-الرئيس-السوري-يكشف-لتلفزيون-سوريا-ملامح-المرحلة-المقبلة[45] https://www.syria dot tv/نظام-جمهوري-وانتخابات-الرئيس-السوري-يكشف-لتلفزيون-سوريا-ملامح-المرحلة-المقبلة[46] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122158 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122159[47] https://www.syria dot tv/نظام-جمهوري-وانتخابات-الرئيس-السوري-يكشف-لتلفزيون-سوريا-ملامح-المرحلة-المقبلة[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2024[49] https://www.syria dot tv/نظام-جمهوري-وانتخابات-الرئيس-السوري-يكشف-لتلفزيون-سوريا-ملامح-المرحلة-المقبلة[50] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/videos/cvgr0r112nno[51] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/515079/%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%8F%D9%81%D9%91%D8%B0-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83 ;https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drone-attack-targets-iraqs-northern-khor-mor-gas-field-security-sources-say-2025-02-02/[52] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1[53] https://rudawrc dot net/en/article/khor-mor-gas-field-attacks ;https://amwaj.media/data/country/iraq/security/conflicts-incidents/key-gas-field-in-iraqi-kurdistan-comes-under-attack ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-26-2024[54] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1183533[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/publications/commentaries/iraqi-parliament-passes-accountability-and-justice-law[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/otherwork/us-must-defend-integrity-iraqi-elections-washington-post[57] https://www.iswresearch.org/2013/02/ ;https://www.pukmedia dot com/AR/details/?Jimare=4075[58] https://www.iswresearch.org/2013/02/ ;https://www.pukmedia dot com/AR/details/?Jimare=4075[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025[60] https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idARAHUS83027820111108/[61] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1183523[62] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/010220253[63] https://www.idf dot il/267753[64] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1886402436891296247[65] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13381 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/128851 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/128804 ;[66] https://www.idf dot il/267753[67] https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1886068820197908637[68] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1883913901751882150[69] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113042[70] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1886345501815054386[71] https://www dot idf.il/267870[72] https://www dot idf.il/267870[73] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/in-first-idf-using-eitan-apcs-to-bolster-west-bank-operation-in-tubas-area/[74] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/723966;https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/723926https://www.isna dot ir/news/1403111410333[75] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/723966;https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/723926https://www.isna dot ir/news/1403111410333 ;https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/09/iran-update-september-12-2024.html[76] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/15/3250663[77] https://www dot mashreghnews.ir/news/1686026/[78] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/15/3250663; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-10-2024;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-21-2024[79] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/760752; https://president dot ir/fa/157260; https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1738566056418351462/Top-Security-Official-Warns-of-Enemies%E2%80%99-Plots-to-Disrupt-Iran-Azerbaijan-Relations[80] https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1738566056418351462/Top-Security-Official-Warns-of-Enemies%E2%80%99-Plots-to-Disrupt-Iran-Azerbaijan-Relations;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-10-2025[81] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/02/03/742104/Iran-diplomat-economic-exchanges-ECO-members[82] https://www.eghtesadonline dot com/fa/news/2035836/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B2%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%BE%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%85 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1886130538265649598[83] https://ir.voanew dot com/a/publishes-crazy-scenario-after-mashhad-woman-naked/7960690.html[84] https://iranwire.com/en/women/136237-ahoo-daryaei-released-from-hospital-says-judiciary/[85] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/15/3250165[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-4-2025 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-27-2025
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 9, 2025
- Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William RunkelFebruary 9, 2025, 4:45 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on February 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs.[1] Russian official data shows that 13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the highest number since 2019.[2] Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported in November 2024 that data from the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.[3]Russia has been suffering from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[4] The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example.[5] North Korea's provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024, however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage issues. (Russian forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea as of December 2024.[6]) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.[7] The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the resolution. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean security.[8] Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause" to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024 Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training. German outlet Süddeutsche Zeitung reported on February 8, citing a classified internal German report, that the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) is investigating possible espionage connected to six drone sightings near the Schwesing Airbase, where Ukrainian forces have trained to operate Patriot air defense systems, from January 9 to 29, 2025.[9] Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German forces attempted to jam or down the drones, including with HP-47 jammers, RADIS drone detection systems, and Wingman counter-drone systems, but that German forces failed to down the drones or locate the operators in all six instances. Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German authorities described the drones as "specialized objects" with modifications and are likely not commercially available. Süddeutsche Zeitung noted that authorities suspect that the operators launched the drones from ships in the North or Baltic seas and that the operators could be connected to Russia. A Bundeswehr spokesperson reportedly told Süddeutsche Zeitung that the German military has observed an increase in drones flying over German military facilities in an unspecified timeframe.Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states. Russia has been developing and improving its drone capabilities, including drone resistance to electronic warfare (EW) and Russia's own EW capabilities, in its ongoing war against Ukraine. NATO and its member states have increasingly warned of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against NATO members throughout 2024.[10] Reports that a NATO member state is struggling to combat likely Russian reconnaissance drones demonstrate the need for NATO states to further develop their defensive capabilities as Russia continues to use its experience on the battlefield in Ukraine to innovate new technologies.Key Takeaways:Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk.Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Sudzha amid continued fighting in Kursk Oblast on February 9. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted mechanized attacks southeast of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka.[11] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces counterattacked northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo and Nikolskyi, north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[12] Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway southwest of Russkaya Konopelka.[13]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers continued to make conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka (both southeast of Sudzha). Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces partially or completely pushed Ukrainian forces from Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, while others claimed that Russian forces failed to advance during attacks in the area.[14] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are no longer in windbreaks near Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha).[15]Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok, and elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating southeast of Sudzha.[16] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment, "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; and elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade, 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment), and 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[17]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian forces attacked near Vovchansk (north of Kharkiv City) on February 8 and 9.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are active on the outskirts of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[19]Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk.[20]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 9 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 8 and 9.[21]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces advanced west of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[22] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.Order of Battle: Elements of "Kontora" detachment of the 375th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and drone operators of the "Tilt" detachment are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[23]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 9 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka, Zahyrzove, and Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on February 8 and 9.[24] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Ivanivka, and Novolyubivka and towards Nove and east of Lyman near Torske on February 8 and 9.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) in order to identify weak points in Ukrainian defenses.[26] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to counterattack northwest of Ivanivka.[27]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters near Novolyubivka, 2.5 kilometers meters south of Ivanivka, west of Yampolivka, and one kilometer within Yampolivka.[28] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables near Zarichne (east of Lyman).[29]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on February 8 and 9 but did not advance.[30] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to bypass Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka using motorcycles.[31]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on February 8 and 9.[32] Ukrainian military officials reported on February 9 that Ukrainian forces destroyed and damaged two tanks, two armored personnel carriers, two infantry fighting vehicles, and an armored tractor in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction.[33]Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 9 that Russian forces seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka, however, and that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces maintain a presence in the settlement.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced north and south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of any of these Russian claims, however.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[37]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, east of Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 8 and 9.[38] Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced along Klymenka Street in northern Leonidivka (west of Toretsk).[39]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces are using civilian passenger cars during assaults in the Toretsk direction due to a shortage of armored vehicles.[40]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st "Slovaynsk" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating within Toretsk.[41]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, Vodyane Druhe, Novooleksandrivka, Kalynove, and Zelene Pole; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Preobrazhenka, Pishchane, Nadiivka, Novoserhiivka, Sribne, Uspenivka, Zaporizhzhia, Novoandriivka, and Udachne on February 8 and 9.[42] The Khortytsia Group of Forces also reported that Russian forces attempted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon south of Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian mines damaged two tanks and two infantry fighting vehicles.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne and Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) and towards Nadiivka, Sribne, and Pishchane.[44] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the first Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entered the outskirts of Pokrovsk.[45] Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Mine No. 3 in southeastern Pishchane.[46]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Zvirove.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 9 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within southeastern Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk).[48]Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Udachne and advanced into eastern Zaporizhzhia, northeast of Zvirove, and one kilometer towards Sribne.[49] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 9 that Russian forces continue efforts to bypass Pokrovsk from the west and are constantly bringing reinforcements to the area.[50] Trehubov noted that Russian forces continue attacking in small assault groups. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian mines are preventing Russian forces from advancing near Kotlyne.[51]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Novoukrainka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and reconnaissance elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Zaporizhzhia.[52] Elements of the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division) are reportedly operating in the Russian near rear near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[53]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on February 8 and 9.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces control Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[55] Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces advanced towards Ulakly (west of Kurakhove) and along Haharina Street in central Andriivka.[56] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dachne – contradicting limited Russian claims from February 8 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[57] Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[58] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Andriivka.[59] Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on February 8 and 9.[60]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka).[61]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 9, but Russian forces did not advance.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted several unsuccessful counterattacks involving two tanks and three infantry fighting vehicles in the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[63] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on February 9 that Russian attacks have decreased in the area and that Russian forces are trying to create new assault groups for further attacks but that the accumulation of Russian forces is not significant enough to conduct assault operations for a long period.[64] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables.Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Kherson direction on February 9.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Dnipro direction.[65] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 151 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 70 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Volyn, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts and that 74 decoy drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian drone strikes hit Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, and Volyn oblasts.[67]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 9 that Russian forces launched over 10 missiles, almost 750 strike drones, and over 1,260 glide bombs against Ukraine in the past week (between February 2 and 9).[68]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). A Russian milblogger amplified a recruitment advertisement for prospective drone operators to sign MoD contracts in Yaroslavl City, advertising one-year contracts with monthly salaries of 240,000 rubles (about $2,476) and a one-time payment of 1,345,000 rubles (about $13,877).[69] The advertisement states that people from anywhere within Russia or other CIS states can sign up and receive the benefits.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian milbloggers published footage on February 9 showing Russian soldiers installing anti-drone nets over roads, claiming that Russian forces have covered a two-kilometer stretch of road between Bakhmut and Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast with these nets to shield against Ukrainian drone strikes.[70]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian ethnic and national identity in occupied Ukraine and to militarize Ukrainian children. Ukrainian news outlet ArmyInform reported on February 9, citing the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner's Office, that Russian occupation authorities coerced 29,000 Ukrainian children in occupied Crimea to join Russian youth military-patriotic organization Yunarmiya in 2021 and that roughly 7,500 Ukrainian children in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts joined regional Yunarmiya branches in the same time period.[71] ArmyInform noted that Russian authorities also send children from occupied Ukraine to train at the Rosgvardia Military Institute in Perm and the Nakhimov Naval School in occupied Mariupol and that Russian authorities plan to double the number of students at the Nakhimov Naval School from 240 in 2024 to 560 in 2025. ArmyInform reported that schools in occupied Ukraine hold military-patriotic lessons for schoolchildren every week and have Ukrainian children write letters of support to Russian soldiers.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk[2] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/news/2025/02/04/v-2024-godu-bolee-7-tisyach-severokoreitsev-vekhali-v-rossiyu-s-tselyu-uchebi-na-fone-soobshchenii-ob-uchastii-soldat-iz-kndr-v-voine-s-ukrainoi/index.html ; https://t.me/istories_media/8882[3] https://zona dot media/news/2024/11/08/koreya; https://en dot yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241018006856315?section=nk/nk[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/12/11/a-perfect-storm[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024[7] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk[8] https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1739089983-55802660/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-pays-congratulatory-visit-to-ministry-of-national-defence-on-day-of-kpa-founding/; http://rodong.rep dot kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyNS0wMi0wOS1IMDEzQA==[9] https://archive.ph/TzHaC; https://www.sueddeutsche dot de/politik/bundeswehr-alarmiert-drohnen-sichtungen-patriot-standort-schwesing-li.3198286?reduced=true; https://www.politico.eu/article/german-military-suspects-russia-espionage-spy-defense-war-drone-key-airbase/[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124[11] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31989; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85946;[12] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154069; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85946; https://t.me/yurasumy/21022;[13] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1888577987970269403; https://t.me/zogrussia1/911[14] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23605; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31983; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85946; https://t.me/yurasumy/21022[15] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616[16] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5480; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/48712; https://t.me/dva_majors/64231; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23614; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85925; https://t.me/voin_dv/13283; https://t.me/basurin_e/16970; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85940[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4231[19] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12436[20] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1888457919169237245; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/21551[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098[22] https://t.me/yurasumy/21008 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61989[23] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/49214 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16966[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreN[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85947[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23622; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047 [29] https://t.me/voin_dv/13288[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl[31] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098[33] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5100; https://dpsu.gov dot ua/ua/news/45984-video-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-prikordonniki-pidbili-7-odinic-bronetehniki-voroga; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/chergovyj-nevdalyj-shturm-rosiyan-prykordonnyky-nakryshyly-bronetehniky/;[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/48707 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48708[35] https://t.me/yurasumy/21019[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23614; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154016[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098[39] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25478; https://t.me/azov_media/6543 [40] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5101[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85930[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62000; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61985; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31966; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31969; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85926; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85951 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62000; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62002[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098[44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61988; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61985; https://t.me/rybar/67870 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21012; https://t.me/yurasumy/21031; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61988[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85955[46] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1888319277305917824; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4121[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8349; https://t.me/nova_afu/169[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl[49] https://t.me/rybar/67870 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61985; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31981; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85951; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85955;[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/spovilnena-dynamika-ta-zhodnogo-prosuvannya-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-manevry-voroga-bilya-pokrovska/[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31981[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85951; https://t.me/astrapress/74088;[53] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/17268[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13363[59] https://t.me/yurasumy/21010[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098[61] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25479; https://t.me/ombr_110/465[62] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12049[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23625[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/u-okupantiv-nemaye-velykogo-kulaka-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-znyzylas-kilkist-shturmiv/[65] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6712[66] https://t.me/kpszsu/28367[67] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/944271-armia-rf-vdarila-dronom-po-sinelnikivskomu-rajonu-dnipropetrovsini-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-misci-podii/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/19363; https://t.me/kpszsu/28367[68] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13273; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/armiya-rf-posylyla-povitryanyj-teror-ponad-2000-udariv-po-ukrayini-za-tyzhden/[69] https://t.me/sashakots/51800 [70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61998; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85964 [71] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/kadetski-klasy-orlyata-rosiyi-i-liga-z-peregoniv-droniv-dity-v-okupacziyi-stayut-potenczijnym-vijskovym-rezervom-armiyi-rf/
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2025
- Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. KaganFebruary 1, 2025, 3pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on February 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft; eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 56 Shahed and decoy drones; that 61 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Ukrainian countermeasures prevented an unspecified but significant number of Russian missiles from reaching their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian ballistic missiles had a higher success rate, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely leveraging ballistic missiles in strike packages since Ukraine only has a few air defense systems suitable for intercepting such missiles.[2] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that a Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential building in Poltava City; that Russian ballistic missiles struck the historical center of Odesa City, and damaged a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) protected building; and that drones damaged residential areas, warehouses, and private property in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.[3] The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Russian forces struck an area near where Norwegian diplomats were staying in Odesa City.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia's overnight strikes targeted Ukrainian gas and energy facilities that support the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).[5]A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea. The Russian MoD reported on February 1 that Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to destroy a Ukrainian naval drone in the Black Sea.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian BSF launched a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable drone from an unspecified naval asset and that this strike may be the first documented case of Russian forces leveraging a naval asset to deploy drones capable of destroying Ukrainian naval drones.[7] Another Russian milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase the production of weapons similar to the drone-launched X-UAV missiles (TKB-1030) to effectively combat Ukrainian forces' naval drone capabilities as it is now too risky for Russia to operate helicopters near the Black Sea.[8] Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their ability to down Russian Mi-8 helicopters operating over the Black Sea using missiles launched from Magura V5 naval strike drones, and the February 1 BSF strike suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to try to offset this Ukrainian naval drone adaptation.[9]Key Takeaways:Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1.A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Guyevo (south of Sudzha), Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha), and Nikolayevo-Darino (east of Sudzha); 400 meters near Kurilovka; and more than 150 meters in Makhnovka (both south of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[10] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast stated that Russian forces are increasing guided glide bomb strikes against Kursk Oblast.[11] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed about 19 Russian heavy and light armored vehicles during an unsuccessful Russian attack, after which Russian forces switched to attacking in small infantry groups. Elements of the Russian BARS-Kursk volunteer detachment are reportedly operating in Korenevsky Raion; elements of the "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Kashtan" Detachment are reportedly operating near Berdin (northeast of Sudzha); and elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Nikolayevo-Darino.[12]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on January 31 and February 1.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced to northern Zelene (north of Kharkiv City).[14]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced west of Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk).[15] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces seized Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[16] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and along the international border near Topoli; north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka; and south of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on January 31 and February 1.[17] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Dvorichna.[18] A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian infantry attacked in groups of two to 30 personnel.[19] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces first attack with less trained infantry who identify Ukrainian firing positions, after which better trained infantry attack on Ukrainian forces' flanks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the northern and western outskirts of Novomlynsk (northeast of Kupyansk and Dvorichna).[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces also maintain positions in northern Zapadne (north of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[21] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), reinforced by elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps, are operating near Dvorichna and Zapadne.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[22] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahyrzove, Lovoza, Bohuslavka, and Pishchane and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Makiivka and towards Novomykhailivka on January 31 and February 1.[23] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division and 47th Tank Division (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[24] A Russian milblogger continued to claim that the Russian MoD’s January 20 claim that Russian forces seized Novoyehorivka is inaccurate and causing unnecessary losses among elements of the 84th Reconnaissance Battalion (20th CAA, MMD) that continue to attack the settlement.[25]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Terny (west of Lyman), Ivanivka, and Novosadove (both northwest of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[26] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Terny, Yampolivka and Kolodyazi and towards Zelena Dolyne and west of Lyman near Torske on January 31 and February 1.[27] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near the Serebryanske forest area east of Lyman.[28]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 1 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on January 31 and February 1.[29] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 1 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon near Verkhnokamyanske and that Ukrainian forces damaged two armored fighting vehicles involved in the assault.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 1 that difficult terrain and Ukrainian defenses are slowing Russian advances in Bilohorivka.[31] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on February 1 that Russian forces operating in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions maintain the tactical reserves needed to conduct rotations.[32]Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on January 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar.[33] Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Block-9 mine, Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne on January 31 and February 1.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Pivnichnyi Microraion (northern Chasiv Yar).[35] Elements of the Russian "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade; 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade and Sever-V Brigade (both of the Russian Volunteer Corps); 3rd Airborne (VDV) Battalion and 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[36]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on February 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk.[37] The Russian MoD claimed on January 31 that elements of the Russian 101st Separate Rifle Regiment (likely 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Krymske (north of Toretsk).[38] ISW currently does not assess that Russian forces have advanced in Krymske, however. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk and Krymske on January 31 and February 1.[39] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on February 1 that the Russian command mostly deploys mobilized personnel from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to attack in the area.[40] The officer noted that Russian forces occasionally commit well-equipped and trained assault groups from other unspecified areas of the frontline to assault operations in the Toretsk direction.Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk) and recently advanced on the northern outskirts of Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[41] Russian forces continued attacking Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Sribne, Udachne, Uspenivka, Zvirove, Novooleksandrivka, and Kotlyarivka on January 31 and February 1.[42] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 228th and 428th motorized rifle regiments, and 6th and 80th tank regiments (90 Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in the Nadiivka-Novoandriivka area.[43]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on January 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[44] Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Ulakly, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozdolne and Zelenivka on January 31 and February 1.[45] Mashovets stated that likely elements of the Russian 67th Rifle Regiment or 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division) are attacking Andriivka from the northeast and that elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigade (51st CAA) are attacking Andriivka from Shevchenko (just east of Andriivka).[46] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD) are attacking Dachne from the Zelenivka-Yantarne area (southwest of Kurakhove) and elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking Dachne from the east.The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces seized Velyka Novosilka.[47] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on January 31 and February 1.[48] Elements of the Russian 3rd Battalion of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka.[49] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the areas north through southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[50]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, southeast of Hulyaipole near Stepanivka, south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka, and southwest of Hulyaipole near Zahirne.[51]Russian forces recently advanced north of Robotyne amid continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced south of Mala Tokmachka (north of Robotyne).[52] Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky and Nesteryanka on January 31 and February 1.[53] Drone operators of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[54]Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on January 31 and February 1 but did not advance.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Nothing significant to report.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian milbloggers continue to complain about problems with Russian armored vehicles. A Russian milblogger complained on February 1 that the Russian military is struggling to transport infantry in frontline areas on armored vehicles and that Russian forces are suffering high losses during transport — likely due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[55] The milblogger criticized the Russian MoD’s unwillingness in previous decades to innovate armored vehicles and called for Russia to develop an analog to the US M113 armored personnel carrier.[56]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://t.me/kpszsu/27940[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-russian-strikes-more-effective-ukraine-exhausts-defenses; https://t.me/kpszsu/27940[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13145; https://t.me/kpszsu/27940; https://t.me/synegubov/12894; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/masovana-ataka-na-harkivshhynu-ye-zagybli-poraneni-ta-zrujnovani-budynky/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/12888; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/01/vorozhi-udary-po-harkovu-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4410; https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/46419; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/01/rosiya-vdaryla-raketoyu-po-zhytlovomu-budynku-v-poltavi-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/20636; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/poltavshhyna-pid-udarom-vorog-atakuvav-energetychnu-infrastrukturu-ta-zhytlovyj-budynok/; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1305; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8426; https://t.me/truonline/4218; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/31/okupanty-vdaru-balistykoyu-po-istorychnomu-czentru-odesy-ye-postrazhdali-sered-czyvilnyh/ ; https://t.me/truonline/4218; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/31/okupanty-vdaru-balistykoyu-po-istorychnomu-czentru-odesy-ye-postrazhdali-sered-czyvilnyh/[4] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2025/02/1/7496315/[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/48445[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/48439 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48452[7] https://t.me/inners_of_the_politics/316 ; https://t.me/rybar/67658[8] https://t.me/milinfolive/141049[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024[10] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23217; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30787; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23238; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23238[11] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/01/byj-svoyih-na-kurshhyni-vorog-kabamy-znosyt-vlasni-naseleni-punkty/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA[12] https://t.me/mod_russia/48444; https://t.me/tass_agency/298620; https://t.me/tass_agency/298637; https://t.me/rusich_army/20507[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4034[14] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=968230592156686&set=pcb.968230625490016[15] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=968230592156686&set=pcb.968230625490016[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/298624[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl[18] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31796[19] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/spochatku-myaso-potim-profi-desantnyky-rozpovily-pro-vorozhi-shturmy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc[20] https://t.me/rybar/67640[21] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2523[22] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30803[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl[24] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2523[25] https://t.me/yurasumy/20850; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30803[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl[28] https://t.me/voin_dv/13131[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24340[30] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4752[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/24587[32] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/ye-kym-udobryuvaty-chornozem-u-rajoni-vidpovidalnosti-otu-lugansk-u-voroga-poky-ye-syly-dlya-nastupu/[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8268; https://t.me/ptashkaDoDo/1492[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl; https://t.me/rybar/67654[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/63549[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/63549; https://t.me/dva_majors/63560; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23229 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/298621; https://t.me/tass_agency/298632[37] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1885727906162233798; https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/660031ba-9bfa-4b48-ca60-08dd3bdfeee4; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1885263785922806266; https://t.me/ombr_28/1745[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/48445 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48448 ; https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/22402[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl; https://t.me/rybar/67656[40] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/bez-motyvacziyi-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-pozycziyi-zsu-shturmuyut-meshkanczi-donechchyny-ta-luganshhyny-yakyh-mobilizuvala-armiya-rf/[41] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1885392019071394149; https://t.me/skarlatop/4450 ; https://x.com/MikiValuena/status/1885394428585501161; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1885320580569661653; https://t.me/Wormbusters/44[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4752 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20857 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24578[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2524[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8267; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21188[45] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61821 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23222 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24578 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30791[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2524[47] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=968230592156686&set=pcb.968230625490016[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl[49] https://t.me/okspn/35273 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1885580019264553012 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43377 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/25412[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2525[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/13132[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61833[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61834
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