Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2025

 

at 4/29/25 8:46pm

Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William RunkelApril 25, 2025, 9:30pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on April 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the war in Ukraine during multilateral talks in London on April 23. The Telegraph reported on April 25 that the Ukrainian-European proposal contained five points about territory, security guarantees, negotiations, refusing Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).[1] Reuters published the full text of the terms that Ukrainian and European officials reportedly developed in response to the US seven-point peace plan on April 25.[2] The proposal as presented by Reuters calls for a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire concurrently with immediate technical negotiations to implement the ceasefire, involving the United States and European countries; United States-led ceasefire monitoring with support from third countries; robust Ukrainian security guarantees absent Ukraine’s NATO accession; and for Russia to unconditionally return illegally deported Ukrainian children and detained Ukrainian civilians as well as engage in an "all-for-all" prisoner of war (POW) exchange. The proposal reportedly rejects restrictions on the Ukrainian military, calls for an ad hoc group of European states and willing non-European countries to guarantee Ukraine's security, and rejects restrictions on the deployment of any friendly forces to Ukraine.[3]The Ukrainian-European proposal states that Russia and Ukraine will negotiate territorial issues only after the implementation of a full and unconditional ceasefire and that these negotiations will use the current frontline as a starting framework.[4] The Ukrainian-European proposal would reportedly provide Ukraine with "unhindered access" to the Dnipro River and control of the Kinburn Spit and Kakhovka Dam.[5] The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to regain control over the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) "with US involvement." The Ukrainian-European proposal also reportedly states that Ukraine’s partners will work toward a consensus on NATO membership, and that Ukraine will pursue joining the European Union (EU).The Ukrainian-European proposal reportedly calls for the United States and Ukraine to implement the US-Ukraine minerals deal and economic cooperation agreement. The proposal states that US sanctions on Russia may be subject to "gradual easing" if a sustainable peace is achieved and may resume if Russia violates a peace agreement. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine’s full reconstruction and financial compensation, including using frozen Russian assets.Reuters also published the full text of the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about the US peace proposal.[6] Reuters reported that the US plan demands an immediate ceasefire and direct technical negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[7] The US plan reportedly provides Ukraine with strong security guarantees from a coalition of European and willing non-European states but also calls for Ukraine to abandon efforts to join NATO while maintaining the option to pursue European Union (EU) membership. The US plan reportedly includes "de jure" US recognition of Russian control over occupied Crimea and de facto recognition of Russian control of Luhansk Oblast and parts of occupied Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kherson Oblasts. The recognition of de jure Russian sovereignty over Crimea or any other areas of Ukraine under occupation since 2014 would constitute a significant concession to Russia that should be balanced by a significant Russian concession in return.The US plan reportedly stipulates that Ukraine will regain territory in Kharkiv Oblast and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which the United States would operate and which would supply electricity to both Russia and Ukraine. The proposed US plan would return the Kakhovka Dam and Kinburn Spit to Ukraine and guarantee Ukrainian passage on the Dnipro River. The US plan reportedly states that Ukraine and the United States will implement a mineral deal and economic partnership agreement, calls for Ukraine's full reconstruction, and offers financial compensation to Ukraine, but does not specify the funding source. The US proposal reportedly calls for lifting sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and resuming US-Russian economic cooperation in the energy and industrial sectors.The newly published Reuters document supports and clarifies earlier reporting by Axios and The Telegraph of the US seven-point proposal to Ukraine, but some details remain unclear.[8] The Reuters document affirms core details, such as territorial arrangements, Ukraine's non-accession to NATO, and the US-run operation of the ZNPP. The report also clarifies that Ukraine would regain control of the Kinburn Spit, the small part of Mykolaiv Oblast that Russia currently occupies, and the Kakhovka Dam, which spans between occupied and unoccupied Kherson Oblast. The Reuters document does not address Sumy Oblast, where Russian forces recently began conducting offensive operations, or how the United States and Ukraine would gain access to the ZNPP, given that the Kakhovka Reservoir and Dnipro River are natural barriers between current Ukrainian positions and the ZNPP. Russian forces would have to partially withdraw from either east (left) bank Kherson Oblast or permit a land bridge across the Kakhovka Reservoir under the US plan, but neither option inherently provides the strategic depth Ukraine would need to defend the ZNPP against further Russian aggression, as ISW has recently reported.[9]US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to secure a major Russian concession in a future peace deal. Witkoff met with Putin, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev, and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov.[10] Ushakov stated that the meeting lasted three hours, included discussions about possibly resuming direct Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, and claimed that the meeting brought US and Russian positions about Ukraine and other unspecified issues "closer together."[11] US officials have not reported on the details of Witkoff's meeting with Putin as of the time of this publication.Bloomberg reported on April 24, citing people familiar with the matter, that Witkoff planned to present a demand that Russia accept Ukraine's right to develop an adequately equipped army and defense industry as part of a peace agreement with Russia.[12] This reported US demand is contrary to the Kremlin's demand for Ukrainian demilitarization – a demand that the Kremlin first made of Ukraine and the West in December 2021.[13] Russia then sought to force Ukraine into demilitarization by launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the Kremlin reiterated demilitarization as a demand in the March 2022 Istanbul negotiations, whose protocols essentially demanded Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia and which the Kremlin has identified as its preferred basis for a peace deal in Ukraine.[14] Kremlin officials have repeatedly defined Ukrainian demilitarization and its other pre-war demands as prerequisites for a peace agreement, as these demands would allow Russia to launch renewed aggression from an advantageous position in the future.[15] Russia's acceptance of Ukraine's right to a developed military and defense industrial base would therefore be a significant Russian concession should the United States succeed in gaining Putin's agreement.That the Kremlin is not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at this time is not a significant Russian concession, however. The initial full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine aimed to seize Kyiv in February and March 2022 in order to force Ukraine to capitulate fully, depose the current Ukrainian government, and disarm the Ukrainian military, amounting to the total defeat of Ukraine. Russia failed to achieve this objective because the Ukrainian military, with limited Western support, defeated the Russian attack on Kyiv and stalled Russian offensives in the east and south. Ukrainian forces forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts in early April 2022 and from most of Kharkiv Oblast and all of west-bank Kherson Oblast later in 2022.[16] Russian forces remain unable to launch an offensive operation that could seize Kyiv or recross the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine at this time, and spent 2024 fighting desperately to seize an area nine-tenths the size of Rhode Island. Russia does not have the military power to seize the rest of Ukraine absent a full-scale mobilization of Russian society, and possibly not then, as long as Western support to Ukraine continues.The Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist objectives, moreover. Kremlin mouthpieces, including Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev, have laid the rhetorical groundwork for Russia to eventually lay claim to most or all of Ukraine.[17] Russian officials have also doubled down on their demands for regime change in Ukraine and rhetoric intended to undermine the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian government as recently as April 24.[18] Both of these efforts in concert indicate that Putin retains his objective of controlling all of Ukraine, but is limited by Russia's inability to achieve this objective militarily.Russian officials continue to intensify narratives used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine in order to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against European states and control European defense policy in the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published a report on April 25 entitled "80 Years After the Great Victory: The Shadow of Nazism Has Again Covered Europe," which accuses European states and officials of reviving Nazi ideology and creating policies that discriminate against Russian-speaking populations, especially in Lithuania, Lativa, and Estonia.[19] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova amplified this report and claimed that European states are preventing Russia from achieving its long-held objectives of demilitarization and "denazification" of Ukraine due to this alleged support of Naziism.[20] Russian officials regularly invoke "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government.[21] Zakharova specifically accused the Baltic States and Poland of justifying and reviving Nazism.Russian officials have notably leveraged accusations of neo-Nazi ideology to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine, and Russian officials leveraging these narratives against European states - especially the Baltics and Poland - supports ISW's assessment that Russia may be setting informational conditions to justify future aggression against these states as well.[22] Russian officials are likely attempting to discredit European states more broadly in order to deter them from providing further assistance to Ukraine and revitalizing their defense industries in order to set conditions for future Russian aggression against a weakened Europe.[23] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to discrediting Europe in response to European leaders' reinvigorated commitment to rearming Europe in alignment with US President Donald Trump's policy goals.Russian Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev stated during the opening ceremony of an annual film festival commemorating Russia's Victory Day at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., on April 24 that the Soviet-US military alliance formed during World War II should serve as an example of US-Russian relations today.[24] Darchiev's remarks indicate that the Kremlin aims to portray to its domestic and foreign audiences that US-Russian relations are on the mend and simultaneously exacerbate divisions between the United States and Europe.Unknown actors assassinated the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25. Unknown actors detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) filled with shrapnel, rigged to a vehicle as Moskalik passed the car.[25] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Ukraine of involvement in Moskalik's assassination.[26] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the attack as of this publication. The Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) claimed responsibility for assassinating the Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17, 2024, making this the second assassination of a Russian general in Moscow in the last five months.[27]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the war in Ukraine during the multilateral talks in London on April 23.Reuters also published the full text of the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about the US peace proposal.US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to secure a major Russian concession in a future peace deal.That the Kremlin is not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at this time is not a significant Russian concession, however.Russian officials continue to intensify narratives used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine in order to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against European states and control European defense policy in the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign.Unknown actors assassinated the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts and near Pokrovsk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced near the international border in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their limited remaining positions in the area.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[28] Additional geolocated footage published on April 25 shows that Russian forces reached the northeastern outskirts of Oleshnya (northwest of Gornal) during a reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault.[29]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 25 that Russian forces advanced into Gornal, to the Psel River northeast of Gornal, and northeast of Oleshnya.[30]Fighting continued toward Oleshnya and near Gornal on April 24 and 25.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Goptarovka (southeast of Sudzha along the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast border).[32]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[33] Assault elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and drone elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating and striking Ukrainian positions near Gornal, respectively.[34]Fighting continued in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 25.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Russian forces advanced in Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[35]Fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Popovka and Demidovka on April 25.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 24 and 25 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Popovka and near the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast administrative boundary near the international border.[37]Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian "15th Tank Regiment" (reportedly 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and of the "Aida" group of the 204th Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating near Demidovka.[38]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Pratsi Street in southern Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City).[39]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced across the international border northeast of Sadky and entered northern Bilovody (both northeast of Sumy City).[40]Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Bilovody and Sadky on April 25.[41]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[42] Elements of the 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novomykolaivka.[43] Drone elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[44]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 25.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kupyansk direction on April 25.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 25 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Bohuslavka, northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Nadiya and Novoyehorivka, and southeast of Borova near Olhivka on April 24 and 25.[45]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Ridkodub, Nove, Novyi Mir, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on April 24 and 25.[46]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Ridkodub.[47] Elements of elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly attacking in Nove.[48]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 25 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 24 and 25.[49]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 25 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Markove, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne and near Bila Hora on April 24 and 25.[50] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 25 that Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction recently conducted a company-sized mechanized assault using six armored vehicles and five civilian passenger cars.[51]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[52] Elements of the "Smuglyanka" detachment are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[53]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near a reservoir north of Toretsk and east of Toretsk near Krymske.[54]Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka; southwest of Toretsk near Petrivka, Romanivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Kalynove, Leonidivka, Tarasivka, Vodyane Druhe, Berezivka, and Yelyzavetivka; and west of Toretsk near Petrivka, Romanivka, and toward Shcherbynivka on April 24 and 25.[55] Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the Fomikha Mine waste heap in northern Toretsk and near Tarasivka.[56]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Stara Mykolaivka.[57] Elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[58] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[59]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced to southern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[60]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk).[61]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on April 24 and 25.[62]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone operations continue to threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Lysivka.[63]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) advanced south of Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and toward Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Uspenivka).[64] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) advanced in northwestern Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Uspenivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske and Bohdanivka on April 24 and 25.[65]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Uspenivka.[66]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Oleksiivka (west of Kuakhove) and near Bahatyr, Rozlyv, and Odradne (all southwest of Kurakhove).[67]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka; and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Rozlyv, and Odradne on April 24 and 25.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne.[69]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and of the 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Odradne.[70]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers north of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and 500 meters south of Malynivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[71]Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Vilne Pole, and Pryvilne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on April 24 and 25.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne Pole.[73]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 336th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Malynivka.[74] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 305th Artillery Brigade (both 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Shevchenko (west of Velyka Novosilka).[75]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the southeastern outskirts of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[76]Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky on April 24 and 25.[77]Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on April 25.[78]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces participated in meeting engagements near the Antonivka Road Bridge (east of Kherson City).[79]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[80]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 103 Shahed and other drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities.[81] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 41 drones in northern and central Ukraine and that 40 Russian decoy drones were "lost," likely due to electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit Kharkiv, Sumy, Cherkasy, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[82]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on April 25 purportedly showing a Russian Geran-2 (Russian analogue of the Shahed-136) drone striking a Ukrainian position in an unspecified location in the Zaporizhia direction, potentially in an area closer to the frontline than the typical Russia Shahed targets in Ukraine's deep rear areas.[83]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2025/04/24/starmer-challenges-donald-trump-over-ukraine-peace-plan/; https://archive.ph/t0mUv[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-european-peace-deal-counterproposals-us-talks-london-2025-04-25/[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-european-peace-deal-counterproposals-us-talks-london-2025-04-25/[4] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2025/04/24/starmer-challenges-donald-trump-over-ukraine-peace-plan/; https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-european-peace-deal-counterproposals-us-talks-london-2025-04-25/[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-european-peace-deal-counterproposals-us-talks-london-2025-04-25/[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://www.axios.com/2025/04/22/trump-russia-ukraine-peace-plan-crimea-donbas; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/22/trumps-plan-to-let-putin-keep-land-seized-from-ukraine/[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-peace-deal-proposals-set-out-by-us-talks-paris-2025-04-25/[8] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/22/trump-russia-ukraine-peace-plan-crimea-donbas; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/22/trumps-plan-to-let-putin-keep-land-seized-from-ukraine/[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76797; https://t.me/tass_agency/312142; https://t.me/tass_agency/312143 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312145 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/291038; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/312142; https://t.me/tass_agency/312143 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312145 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/291038; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025[12] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-24/us-to-demand-putin-accept-ukraine-s-right-to-military-force; https://archive.ph/hYi3I[13] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-russia-us-see-2022-istanbul-draft-possible-basis-ukraine-deal-2025-03-07/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20April%203.pdf[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024;[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624[19] https://mid dot ru/ru/activity/ko-dny-pobedy/2011501/?lang=ru ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/56232[20] https://t.me/MID_Russia/56233[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525[24] https://t.me/MID_Russia/56186[25] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1022841; https://t.me/sledcom_press/20694; https://t.me/sledcom_press/20695; https://t.me/sledcom_press/20696; https://t.me/sledcom_press/20698 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312088; https://t.me/tass_agency/312066; https://t.me/tass_agency/312068 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312069 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312075 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312079 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312081 ; https://t.me/astrapress/79843 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1915749654370668991; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63761; https://t.me/sashakots/53305; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/697; https://t.me/mash/63421; https://t.me/dva_majors/69864; https://t.me/dva_majors/69863; https://t.me/rusich_army/22909[26] https://t.me/tass_agency/312140 ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1022841[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121824; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/17/world/europe/russian-general-bombing-moscow.html[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8982; https://t.me/rt_russian/238361; https://t,.me/boris_rozhin/162489[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23489; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8992[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34765; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162482; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162489[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/26121; https://t.me/rusich_army/22893; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34761; https://t.me/milinfolive/146828; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834[32] https://t.me/rybar/69891[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/26131[34] https://t.me/milinfolive/146828; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162507[35] https://t.me/rybar/69891[36] https://t.me/rybar/69891; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162509[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/26121; https://t.me/rybar/69896[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162509; https://t.me/mmcpodolsk/8734[39] https://t.me/alkor_aero/135; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8984[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/26121; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27489[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/69837; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27489; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121;[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/69868[43] https://t.me/dva_majors/69837[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162507[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/tass_agency/312036; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27543[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34776[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34776[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695[51] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27507[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/69838[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162482; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162489[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63750; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63755; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27534; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162489; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63743[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63750[58] https://t.me/operationall_space/3572[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63743[60] https://x.com/InBigall/status/1915786483077619986 ; https://t.me/Airborne1126/25669[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27487[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27487[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34751[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63766 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162442 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27541 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63766 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34751[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63756 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27491 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162442 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162493[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8695 https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27491 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14610[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27491 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63756 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26121 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69834 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14610[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/14603[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162493 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14610[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14610[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/14610[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/14595[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/14605[76] https://t.me/ZS42MSD/2780; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1915678482446856409[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0mjjBzMSvYtK6u1nAyE7jQVzaMzm53USyEeTZqzzYP2RWwSsUqt9zc1BoxMHLDgf9l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466; https://t.me/rybar/69893; https://t.me/dva_majors/69844[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23469 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0mjjBzMSvYtK6u1nAyE7jQVzaMzm53USyEeTZqzzYP2RWwSsUqt9zc1BoxMHLDgf9l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23466[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/69834[80] https://t.me/dva_majors/69821 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69831[81] https://t.me/kpszsu/33237[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/33237; https://t.me/synegubov/14026;[83] https://t.me/mod_russia/51735

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, April 29, 2025

 

at 4/29/25 8:10pm

Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.[1] This network of entities and individuals has facilitated the procurement of sodium perchlorate and dioctyl sebacate from China to Iran. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[2] Chinese assistance to Iran could help Iran replenish its missile stockpile and circumvent US sanctions. It is unclear if the Chinese government is directly supporting the effort, but the government’s inaction against the entities involved enables continued Chinese support for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.[3] The Houthis claimed that the facility was a migrant detention center run by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), but IOM denied that it maintained the facility.[4] IOM did confirm that it was a migrant facility. The Houthis have similarly provided inconsistent casualty numbers.[5] The facility is located next to a military base, according to publicly available maps.[6] It is unclear whether the Houthis still operate this military base. An unspecified US defense official told Reuters that CENTCOM is conducting a battle-damage assessment and inquiry into these claims.[7] A UN report condemned Saudi-led coalition airstrikes targeting the same detention center in Saada in 2022 that killed 66 people and injured 113 more.[8]Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners.[9] Qassem said that the Lebanese state—not Hezbollah—would need to fulfill these goals.[10] Iranian media falsely portrayed this statement as a priority that Hezbollah would pursue on its own, rather than a priority that Qassem believes the Lebanese state and people should adopt.[11] Qassem reiterated Hezbollah’s commitment to the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement and stated that the Lebanese government serves as the main negotiator and armed force responsible for enforcing the ceasefire with Israel.[12] Qassem secondarily called on the Lebanese state to prioritize the reconstruction of infrastructure in Lebanon. Qassem also voiced support for a stronger Lebanese state and for removing the IDF. Qassem stated that assuming these co-occurring priorities would facilitate the revival of Lebanon.Qassem may be attempting to absolve Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government. Hezbollah has faced considerable financial challenges after the end of major fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. These challenges have prevented Hezbollah from rapidly reconstructing pro-Hezbollah areas as Hezbollah did after previous rounds of fighting.[13] Hezbollah’s effort to blame the government may be an attempt to rebuild Hezbollah’s political capital in Lebanon after the war and amid slow reconstruction.Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after an audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. The accused sheikh denied that he was responsible for the recording, and the Syrian Interior Ministry vowed to investigate and bring the real perpetrators to “justice.”[14] Syrians protested the video in at least nine Syrian provinces on April 28 and 29, and videos of armed men threatening to retaliate reportedly circulated on social media.[15] A group of gunmen entered Jaramana, a majority Druze town southeast of Damascus, on April 28 and opened fire on a residential area.[16] Security sources told Western media that the gunmen were reportedly from neighboring Sunni-majority towns, including Meliha.[17] The General Security Services (GSS) and the Defense Ministry (MoD) deployed to Jaramana and cordoned off the town.[18] A Ministry of Interior source said that armed militants launched an “organized attack” against security services when they arrived at the scene.[19] It is unclear if the fighters were from any organized group. Engagements between the militants, Druze fighters, and government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 12 people.[20] Unspecified gunmen also attacked a joint checkpoint between local Druze factions and the GSS at the entrance to Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya, a town southwest of Damascus that has a large Druze population.[21]Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state. The Druze community has held significant reservations about Syrian Transitional President Shara’s government since the fall of the regime. Slow governmental response to large-scale confessionalist-motivated attacks against the Druze community epitomizes Druze fears about the new government. Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri denounced the attackers as terrorists similar to al Qaeda and ISIS and criticized the Syrian transitional government’s lack of protection of the Druze community in a speech on April 29.[22] This is similar to how Hijri recently described HTS as the ”armed terrorist faction” that controls Damascus, suggesting that he views Shara‘s HTS-dominated government forces and the likely Sunni attackers of Jaramana in a similar light.[23] A Suwayda-based news outlet accused the government of remaining ”silent” on the numerous anti-Druze demonstrations that took place in Syrian cities.[24] Other minority groups, such as the Kurds in northeastern Syria, are likely watching this incident with alarm. Kurdish political parties recently cited government protection of Kurdish citizens and their rights as one of their most important demands of the government.[25] The transitional government’s inability to prevent confessionalist violence against minority groups is unlikely to build Kurdish confidence that the government will protect them if they disarm.Shara’s government took several initial steps following the Jaramana attacks that suggest it may move more resolutely to protect the Druze community. A transitional government delegation met with Jaramana’s Druze leaders on April 29 and agreed to hold the perpetrators of the attack responsible.[26] The GSS also coordinated with Druze militias to escort hundreds of Druze university students from Latakia, Tartous, and Homs provinces back to Jaramana and Suwayda Province.[27] Security services were also deployed to Druze areas across Syria.[28] These are minor steps that certainly do not meet the expectations that the Druze or Kurdish communities have demanded of Shara, however. Shara is unlikely to allay the fears of these groups without repeated concrete actions that take real steps towards protecting Syria’s minority communities.Key Takeaways:Hezbollah Priorities: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners. Qassem may be attempting to absolve Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government.Iran-China Relations: The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the IRGC, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.US Air Campaign in Yemen: The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.Druze-Government Relations in Syria: Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial appreciated from 814,000 rials to one US dollar on April 28 to 813,000 rials to one US dollar on April 29.[29]A fire broke out at the “Ava Nar Parsian” warehouse in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province, on April 29.[30] The explosion killed two individuals and injured two others.[31] Iranian authorities announced that the cause of the explosion remains under investigation.[32] The facility manufactures fireworks and gunpowder and operates under the supervision of the Iranian National Security Council (NSC), a sub-council of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[33] A similar explosion in May 2021 occurred at “Sepahan Nargostar,” a complex in the same district of Esfahan Province that was linked to the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA).[34] The incident follows a major explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port on April 26 and Iran’s thwarting of a “widespread” cyberattack on April 28.[35]The Iranian Parliament initiated impeachment proceedings against Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh on April 29.[36] A member of the ultraconservative Paydari Front, Mohammad Mannan Raisi submitted the motion, and 40 other parliamentarians signed it. Raisi cited "inaction" at the Ports and Maritime Organization, closure of the national housing registration website, failure to implement laws tied to population growth policies, and poor handling of housing market regulations as the main reasons for the motion of impeachment.[37] The impeachment motion follows the April 26 explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, Iran’s largest container port, which handles approximately 85 percent of Iran’s shipping container traffic.[38] Iranian officials cited safety failures and “false statements” in the exploded cargo’s documentation at Shahid Rajaei Port, which raises broader concerns about government oversight.[39] The regime may use impeachment efforts like this one to demonstrate responsiveness to public demands and manage potential unrest. A large protest broke out after a deadly incident in 2022, after the collapse of a building in Khuzestan Province, constructed by individuals close to the regime.[40] Demonstrators expressed anger over the government's failure to enforce construction standards and its mismanagement of the disaster’s aftermath.[41]Iran continues to bolster economic ties with neighboring countries to mitigate the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy. Iran and Kyrgyzstan held their 14th Joint Economic Committee meeting in Tehran on April 26 and 27.[42] Iranian officials, including Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, met with Kyrgyz officials to discuss trade facilitation and port and transit cooperation. The officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to establish a joint investment committee to streamline future cooperation efforts. Iran and Kazakhstan separately signed an MOU on April 29 to expand port and transit cooperation.[43] Kazakhstan will reportedly present an investment plan for Shahid Rajaee Port in Iran soon. The port was severely affected by an explosion and a series of fires on April 26.[44]Iran continues to pursue defense and economic cooperation with Zimbabwe. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Zimbabwean Defense Minister Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri in Tehran on April 28.[45] Nasir Zadeh stated that Iran can support Zimbabwe’s counterterrorism efforts. Iranian defense officials previously met with Zimbabwean officials in April 2024 to discuss defense cooperation, likely to pursue uranium or other minerals in Zimbabwe.[46] Nasir Zadeh and Muchinguri-Kashiri also criticized US sanctions on Iran and Zimbabwe and emphasized the importance of cooperation to circumvent sanctions.[47] Iran and Zimbabwe previously signed 12 bilateral economic agreements in July 2023.[48] These meetings are part of an ongoing Iranian effort to improve ties with African states as part of Iran's broader neighborhood policy centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states to undermine the impact of international sanctions.SyriaThe Syrian Kurdish Independents Association rejected the Kurdish Unity Conference’s April 26 platform.[49] The Syrian Kurdish Independents Association is a political organization founded in Turkey in 2016, now based in Turkish-controlled Afrin.[50] The organization opposes the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and considers the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the SDF to be terrorist organizations.[51] Tammo emphasized that Syrian Kurds are an integral part of Syrian society and rejected the conference's goal to secure a federal system that grants authority to Kurdish “militias.”[52] Kurdish political parties released a unified statement on April 26, which called for a federal Syrian structure that could create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[53] The head of the Syrian Kurdish Independents Association, Abdul Aziz al Tammo, claimed on April 27 that the agreement was established among external actors and is not representative of Syrian Kurds.[54] Tanno criticized the conference for not demanding the release of illegal detentions in SDF prisons and an end to Kurdish child abductions in the Qandil Mountains.[55]Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani stressed the urgent need for sanctions relief and called on the UN to prevent Israel from continuing to destabilize Syria.[56] Shaibani spoke at the UN Security Council. He noted the Syrian transitional government’s current engagement with international mechanisms like the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), the Fact-Finding Mission to Syria, and the Human Rights Council to support economic recovery, reconstruction, and transitional justice.[57] Shaibani warned that Assad-era sanctions will hinder progress in these areas and could drive a cycle of violence.[58] Foreign Minister Shaibani stated that Syria will not be a source of instability in the region or pose a threat to its neighbors.[59] Shaibani warned that Israeli airstrikes and border incursions in Syria constitute violations of Syrian sovereignty, risk igniting grievances that could destabilize the region.[60] He urged the United Nations to partner with the Syrian transitional government to support the growth of a secure and prosperous Syria.[61]IraqNothing Significant to Report.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripCENTCOM conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since 1:00 pm ET on April 28.[62] CENTCOM conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in Harf Sufiyan, Amran Governorate, and one airstrike targeting al Mahadhir, Sahar District, Saada Governorate, on April 28.[63] CENTCOM also conducted at least six airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in Rabt al Anan, al Jawf Governorate, on April 29, which is approximately 20km behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[64] CENTCOM struck Houthi infrastructure in Maqbanah District, Taiz Governorate, four times at approximately 9:00 am ET on April 29, which is less than 50km from the southern frontlines in Taiz Governorate.[65]At least three separate CENTCOM sorties struck Houthi underground facilities and weapons depots around Sanaa City on April 28.[66] A Yemeni journalist reported that one of these sorties killed nine Houthi fighters at Barash Camp on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City, including the air defense site commander Captain Ahmed Asem Abu al Ezz, one of the base’s senior officers Abu Zaid al Muayyad, and Abdullah al Dhari, a Fater-1 missile air defense system expert.[67] The Fater-1, which is a Houthi version of the Soviet-made SA-6 surface-to-air missile system, has a maximum range of 24 km and a maximum altitude of 14 km.[68]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonSee the topline section.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks in the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0116[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2025#_ednf140a522d3cea14403f595938b4fa4d14a583f72f41c46ae2ad413da5d848f8e23 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-14-2025[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/houthis-say-u-s-airstrike-in-yemen-killed-nearly-70-people-in-migrant-detention-center-7e9b2510 ;[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/houthis-say-u-s-airstrike-in-yemen-killed-nearly-70-people-in-migrant-detention-center-7e9b2510 ; https://yemen.iom.int/news/statement-iom-spokesperson-situation-yemen[5] https://x.com/RiyadhAldubai/status/1917302026989416577[6] https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1916759806548857085 ; https://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=16.929884&lon=43.732538&z=15&m=w&show=/8655366/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D9%8A&search=16.9304412%0943.73352785 ; https://www.google.com/maps/place/16%C2%B055'49.6%22N+43%C2%B044'00.7%22E/@16.9304425,43.7328841,245m/data=!3m2!1e3!4b1!4m4!3m3!8m2!3d16.9304412!4d43.7335278!5m1!1e2?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI1MDQyMy4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthi-tv-say-30-bodies-were-recovered-after-us-strike-sadaa-2025-04-28/[8] https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110842[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yv1KVMy1Bjs&ab_channel=i24NEWSEnglish; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13418396[10] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13418396[11] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/742042/[12] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13418396[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/24/world/europe/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-government-economy.html[14] https://t.me/syrianmoi/24055; https://x.com/AhmdAlkfry89/status/1916946396185608332[15] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917161218810540216 ; https://x.com/idleb_online/status/1917236988194734248; https://x.com/idleb_online/status/1916883937198059649; https://x.com/dr_alssagheer/status/1917207388526121274; https://x.com/Ahmad_1alshble/status/1916941219197841509; https://x.com/mazen00711/status/1916964990294151493; https://x.com/Wesam_Asei/status/1916957640678380003; https://x.com/aliimaroush/status/1916935110525378773; https://x.com/SyrNetworkNews/status/1916926198069739720[16]https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917161218810540216[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/more-than-dozen-killed-sectarian-clashes-near-syrian-capital-2025-04-29 ; https://x.com/putintintin1/status/1917265494005973185[18] https://x.com/OmarEdlbi/status/1917186947770159298 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917161218810540216[19] https://t.me/syrianmoi/24055 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917161218810540216[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/more-than-dozen-killed-sectarian-clashes-near-syrian-capital-2025-04-29/[21] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0AZ94tv4czygGaDS7zvfHU9HvkuNpGscrdhVhwD8wuXgDhhJYH1Nf3jjDUT1brfjnl ; https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2025/04/29/eyewitnesses-clashes-jaramanh-damascus-countryside-amid-record-prophet-insult[22] https://x.com/ivarmm/status/1917219403310997692 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1372840697288231[23] https://www.npr.org/2025/04/09/g-s1-58707/syria-druze-militias[24]https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0e1RUkaTanmmeoF77jWu9p4bacwygqLQnWLw5e8ALt41vmRBMjJm7CThc6v2NLjGLl[25] www dot npasyria.com/211587[26] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917263939861172345[27] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917238338689421790 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917258680120271180[28]https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1917252550224433161; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917240599373295957;[29] Bon-bast.com[30] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3301676[31] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1055796[32] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3301676[33] https://ava-nar dot com/[34] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/23/blast-at-iran-factory-as-israel-accuses-state-of-providing-drones-to-hamas[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025[36] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3301895[37] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3301895[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025[39] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/29/world/europe/iran-port-explosion.html[40] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202206094045 ;https://www.mei.edu/publications/country-free-fall-corruptocracy-full-swing-why-building-collapse-iran-matters[41] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-protests-abadan-building-collapse-death-toll/[42] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512407[43] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3302108[44] https://x.com/TamadonTV_EN/status/1916462058880540890 ; https://x.com/Abraracurs64713/status/1916751946737713545[45] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/741998/[46] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/10/3077087 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-may-16-2024-russian-outreach-across-africa-irans-uranium-aims-is-mozambique-continues-march#_edn0f99d097bfd5354c400db6b2ad155bfa74[47] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/741998/[48] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/13/iran-signs-agreements-with-zimbabwe-as-raisi-wraps-up-africa-tour[49] https://halabtodaytv dot net/archives/281328[50] https://syrianmemory dot org/archive/entities/5cc57afa2f7ab5000121dcda[51] https://syrianmemory dot org/archive/entities/5cc57afa2f7ab5000121dcda[52] https://halabtodaytv dot net/archives/281328[53] https://levant24 dot com/news/2025/04/kurdish-unity-conference-continued-calls-for-decentralized-governance-in-syria/[54] https://halabtodaytv dot net/archives/281328[55] https://halabtodaytv dot net/archives/281328[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU[57] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU[59] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU[60] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU[62] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916902218885628398;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916905401347346567;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916911329308266724;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916931898028286105;https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1917068593725886920;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917207233923862992; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917207233923862992;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1917211041492246798[63] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916905401347346567;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916931898028286105[64] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917207233923862992[65] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1917211041492246798[66] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916902218885628398; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916911329308266724; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1917068593725886920[67] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1917176850096464235[68] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1917176850096464235

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, April 25, 2025

 

at 4/29/25 7:20pm

Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Avery Borens, Andie Parry, and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings. Iran and the United States will hold separate technical and high-level talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 26. Iranian media reported on April 25 that Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will lead Iran's technical team.[1] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal.[2] US State Department Director of Policy Planning Michael Anton will lead the US technical team.[3] The New York Times previously reported that the technical-level talks will focus on Iranian uranium enrichment and mechanisms for monitoring and verifying Iranian compliance with a nuclear agreement.[4] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will lead the high-level talks in Oman.[5]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implied that Iran's recent cooperation with the United States to reach a nuclear deal is "temporary" during a speech to government officials on April 24.[6] Khamenei may have emphasized the temporary nature of US-Iranian cooperation to assuage the concerns of hardline officials who oppose negotiations with the United States. Khamenei's main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States, at least temporarily, will help preserve regime stability by improving Iranian economic conditions and reducing the chance of a direct conflict with the United States.CENTCOM Spokesperson Dave Eastburn stated on April 24 that CENTCOM has struck over 800 Houthi targets, including command-and-control sites, air defense systems, and advanced weapons production sites, since the start of the US air campaign on March 15. Eastburn said that the strikes have killed “hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous Houthi leaders.”[7] Eastburn told CNN that “credible open sources” have reported “over 650 Houthi casualties” in CENTCOM airstrikes since March 15.[8] Eastburn stated that Houthi ballistic missile launches have decreased by 87 percent and Houthi drone attacks have decreased by 65 percent since the start of the CENTCOM airstrike campaign.[9]Key Takeaways:US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Iran and the United States will hold separate technical and high-level talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 26. Iranian media reported on April 25 that Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will lead Iran's technical team. The New York Times previously reported that the technical-level talks will focus on Iranian uranium enrichment and mechanisms for monitoring and verifying Iranian compliance with a nuclear agreement.US Air Campaign Against the Houthis: CENTCOM Spokesperson Dave Eastburn stated on April 24 that CENTCOM has struck over 800 Houthi targets, including command-and-control sites, air defense systems, and advanced weapons production sites, since the start of the US air campaign on March 15. Eastburn said that the strikes have killed “hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous Houthi leaders.” Eastburn stated that Houthi ballistic missile launches have decreased by 87 percent and Houthi drone attacks have decreased by 65 percent since the start of the CENTCOM airstrike campaign.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial appreciated from 807,000 rials to one US dollar on April 23 to 800,000 rials to one US dollar on April 25.[10]Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad announced on April 25 that Iran and Russia signed an agreement for Russia to export 55 billion cubic meters of gas to Iran annually via Azerbaijan.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously stated in January 2025 that Russian gas deliveries to Iran would start at 2 billion cubic meters per year and could increase to 55 billion cubic meters annually.[12] Paknejad added that Russia will finance the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Iran.[13] Iran and Russia will continue nuclear energy cooperation, including by completing the second and third phases of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Iran and Russia have also reportedly signed contracts worth four billion US dollars for the development of seven Iranian oil fields.[14] These agreements reflect Iranian efforts to deepen strategic cooperation with Russia under the framework of the January 2025 Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Agreement.[15] The import of Russian gas to Iran may help Iran address chronic energy shortages, which have previously sparked protests in northeastern Iran.[16]SyriaUnverified reports are circulating in the Syrian information space that the ceasefire between the Syrian transitional government and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has collapsed. Anti-Kurdish social media users claimed that the agreements that the SDF and the transitional government recently reached regarding the status of the Tishreen Dam and two historically Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City collapsed on April 25.[17] Users claimed that the ceasefire between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) expired overnight on April 24.[18] Sources also reported that the SNA and the Syrian Defense Ministry deployed to lines of contact with the SDF, without providing evidence to support their claims.[19] A northern Syria-based, anti-SDF source reported on April 23 that the SDF redeployed to several of its positions in villages west of Tishreen Dam.[20] Pro-SDF sources denied the reports about an expired ceasefire and force redeployments.[21]CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims, and the Syrian transitional government has not responded to these reports. Outstanding disagreements between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF prevented the government from asserting full control over the Tishreen Dam on April 19.[22] It is possible that the reports about an expired ceasefire and collapsed agreements between the SDF and the transitional government are a coordinated information effort ahead of a meeting between Kurdish parties on April 26 to unify their stance for future negotiations with Damascus.[23] It is unclear what effect such an informational campaign would seek to achieve, however.Likely Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers retain some ability to operate along the Lebanon-Syria border despite joint Syrian and Lebanese efforts to dismantle cross-border smuggling networks. Likely Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers shelled Syrian General Security Services (GSS) forces in al Masriyah, Homs Province, on April 24.[24] The attack reportedly injured four GSS personnel.[25] Syrian forces fired at the smugglers before the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) intervened.[26] The LAF deployed along the border and arrested one member of the armed smuggling network.[27] The attack on GSS forces follows joint Syrian and Lebanese efforts to thwart cross-border smuggling attempts in recent months. The LAF expanded its deployment in areas that were previously operational hubs for Hezbollah’s smuggling networks in response to smuggler attacks on Syrian forces in February and March 2025.[28] The LAF and Syrian forces increased patrols and closed several illegal border crossings in the Qusayr area between Syria and Lebanon in late March 2025. [29]Fighters claiming to be GSS forces kidnapped and executed a man from an Alawite-majority neighborhood in Homs Province on April 24. The fighters raided the man’s home in Karam al Luz and detained him for questioning.[30] The man’s body was found on April 25.[31] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify whether the fighters were members of the GSS or members of a Sunni sectarian militia. There is likely an overlap between hardline factions within the Sunni-majority transitional government and Sunni sectarian militias.Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani announced on April 25 that the Syrian government will soon establish a transitional justice commission.[32] Shaibani’s announcement comes as various groups have conducted extrajudicial killings against alleged former Assad regime members.[33] One of these groups is Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, which is a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS). CTP-ISW previously assessed that the group, Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, is exploiting real grievances in Syria caused by a lack of transitional justice in order to justify its attacks on alleged Assad loyalists. The group’s killing of alleged Assad loyalists reflects that some Syrians believe that there has been no justice for the atrocities that the Assad regime committed. A transitional justice committee could help alleviate some of these grievances, but the transitional government must also prosecute and hold accountable individuals involved in extrajudicial killings to demonstrate its commitment to transitional justice and build trust among targeted communities.Shaibani added in his speech at the United Nations that Syria will coordinate with the United States to investigate missing Americans in Syria.[34] US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi delivered a list of eight “confidence-building” conditions to Shaibani in Brussels in March 2025. These conditions included the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice in exchange for sanctions relief.[35] Shaibani’s announcement demonstrates that Damascus is attempting to meet at least some of the conditions set out by the United States.IraqIraqi National Intelligence Service head Hamid al Shatri and an accompanying Iraqi delegation traveled to Damascus on April 25 to discuss Iraq-Syria relations with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and other senior Syrian officials.[36] Shatri is reportedly affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[37] The Iraqi delegation included officials from the Border Ports Authority, the Interior Ministry, and the Oil and Trade Ministry.[38] The Iraqi delegation will discuss counterterrorism, border security, and the potential reopening of the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline with Syrian officials.[39] Syria and Iraq agreed to reopen the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline in 2007, but closed the pipeline in 2010 after it sustained damage from counterterrorism operations against ISIS.[40] Iran halted oil exports to Baniyas after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, so the Syrian transitional government may seek to open the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline to compensate for the reduction in oil exports to Syria.[41]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 28 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since 2:00 pm ET on April 24.[42] CENTCOM conducted at least seven airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure, including launch sites and weapons depots, in Majzar and Madghal districts, Marib Governorate, which are less than 50 kilometers behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[43] CENTCOM also conducted at least 11 airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in Bajil District, al Salif Port, and Kamaran Island in Hudaydah Governorate.[44] CENTCOM reportedly struck Houthi weapons depots and launch sites in al Haymah, Manakhah, Bani Hashish, and Harib Nihm districts in Sanaa Governorate.[45]CENTCOM confirmed on April 25 that the explosion on Furwa Market in Old Sanaa City on April 20 was caused by a Houthi missile and not a CENTCOM airstrike.[46] The Houthi Health Ministry reported that the explosion killed at least 12 individuals.[47] A Yemeni journalist previously confirmed on April 22 that a Houthi missile launched from an airbase on Adhran Mountain near Sanaa City malfunctioned and crashed into Furwa Market.[48] Houthi media falsely reported the incident as a CENTCOM airstrike.[49]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonCTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/741150/[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/middleeast/iran-united-nations-ambassador.html[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/24/iran-nuclear-talks-trump/[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/19/world/middleeast/us-iran-nuclear-talks.html[5] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/741150/[6] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=60054[7] https://apnews.com/article/houthis-us-warships-red-sea-e6e97a7131c48640ccf74b1916628234[8] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/25/politics/houthis-target-drones-hampering-trump-mission/index.html[9] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/25/politics/houthis-target-drones-hampering-trump-mission/index.html[10] https://www.bon-bast.com/[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-oil-minister-moscow-seeks-bolster-ties-with-russia-2025-04-25/ ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/05/3298815[12] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76126[13] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/05/3298731/[14] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/05/3298560[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-17-2025[16] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501111001 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-16-2023 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-18-2023[17] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1915694939146428895 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141703 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141710 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1915760995160518790 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1915760979096334538[18] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1915514914229080243 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141689[19] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1915712317238477277 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141705 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1915545924689871152 ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1915530029766693168 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1017263593837001[20] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1915084286585164234[21] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1915761777930866717[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-21-2025[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-23-2025 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1915433714772738078[24] https://x.com/HoranFreeMedia/status/1915507192297386440 ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1915453048488407154 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1915519250200207819[25] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1915519250200207819[26] https://t.me/damascusv011/30788 ; http://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1915718797543014541[27] http://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1915718797543014541[28] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1901693779800621322 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1902109798063087893 ; https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1888247822018900193[29] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/01/border-wars-syrias-new-authorities-grapple-with-lebanese-smugglers[30] https://www.facebook.com/Syriana.93/posts/668352245949108?__cft__[0]=AZWKQgNXgq84SVkBO5VNC0SY2r0irHWeHGAkJZv3joJJuHfPBWzJmqfHxXKCs4x_xgNPrjjtR8sVwfc7QLPJRnILgpaoCjiJICIz9d49lLqLHZRk7MDAFBxniCh-GPpfbvkorLRupIv7wXQyTnkeKTwdx83t-m025ntaM63672Jv2w&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1915714783908691973 ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2014/4/9/car-blasts-kill-dozens-in-syrias-homs[31] https://www.facebook.com/Syriana.93/posts/668352245949108?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWKQgNXgq84SVkBO5VNC0SY2r0irHWeHGAkJZv3joJJuHfPBWzJmqfHxXKCs4x_xgNPrjjtR8sVwfc7QLPJRnILgpaoCjiJICIz9d49lLqLHZRk7MDAFBxniCh-GPpfbvkorLRupIv7wXQyTnkeKTwdx83t-m025ntaM63672Jv2w&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[32] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1915800527922778595[33] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1914283781998911624 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1914052778168627621[34] https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1915799432596983977 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141722 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1915800527922778595[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/[36] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82 ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/523839/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84 ; https://x.com/afarhahan/status/1915711255060324414[37] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A[38] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82 ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/523839/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84[39] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82 ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/523839/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-sends-delegation-damascus-study-restoring-oil-pipeline-via-syria-2025-04-25/[40] https://www.iraq-businessnews dot com/2025/04/25/iraq-to-discuss-rehabilitation-of-oil-pipeline-through-syria/ ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Economy/Syria-on-Kirkuk-Baniyas-pipeline-revival-Not-a-Priority[41] https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/121024-irans-crude-exports-to-syria-halt-after-rebels-seize-power[42] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915482448701395363 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915509549827756193 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915509689778872764 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915522668625088980 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915525558055952664 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915529534054490454 ;https://x.com/BarranPressE/status/1915558480636715466 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915694794992410883[43] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915509549827756193 ; https://x.com/BarranPressE/status/1915558480636715466https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1915524193048826364[44] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915525558055952664 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915529534054490454 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915694794992410883 ; https://x.com/BarranPressE/status/1915558480636715466 ;[45] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915482448701395363; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915522668625088980;https://x.com/BarranPressE/status/1915558480636715466; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1915524193048826364[46] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-blast-near-yemen-unesco-world-heritage-site-caused-by-houthi-missile-2025-04-25/[47] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/24/world/middleeast/us-yemen-houthi-misfire.html[48] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1914635366222467344[49] https://x.com/Mikeknightsiraq/status/1914175085260185646 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1914098496430571677 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1914102299099795600

[Author: Unknown]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 29, 2025

 

at 4/29/25 6:44pm

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Anna Harvey, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros with Nate TrotterApril 29, 2025, 6 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on April 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government.[1] Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 29 that Ukrainian civilians, particularly those living in the Black Sea region, must "determine their own future."[2] Patrushev specifically noted that Odesa City spent over two centuries as the Russian Empire's and Soviet Union's outpost in the Black Sea and claimed that Odesa City residents have "nothing in common" with the current Ukrainian government. These statements are a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2023 claim that Ukrainians living in the Black Sea region have nothing "to do with Ukraine" and that Odesa is a "Russian city" and follows Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's April 14, 2025 claim that the Ukrainian government "does not represent" residents of Odesa City and other Ukrainian territories.[3] Patrushev claimed that Russia "respects the will of the [Ukrainian] people" and attempted to justify Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Crimea, Donbas, and "Novorossiya" — an invented region in Ukraine which the Kremlin has claimed includes all of eastern and southern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia.[4] Medvedev also claimed that the current Ukrainian government does not speak for the Ukrainian people.[5] Medvedev's and Patrushev’s statements reference the longstanding Kremlin demand for regime change in Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government that could struggle to oppose or even support the Kremlin's goal to occupy more territory in Ukraine at a later time of the Kremlin's choosing.[6]Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the "illegitimacy" of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's presidency would create legal difficulties in direct peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but that Russia is more interested in starting negotiations and "everything else is secondary."[7] Peskov claimed on April 24 that Russia would restart its war should "people...question the legitimacy" of Zelensky and stated that Russia has "no confidence" in the Ukrainian government.[8] Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that all Ukrainian governments since 2014 are "illegitimate" and that Russia would not view any agreements concluded with the current Ukrainian government as binding.[9] Putin and other Russian officials have similarly claimed that Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024, and have additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials.[10] The Ukrainian Constitution explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.[11] The Kremlin is deliberately coupling its purported interest in Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations with its false narrative of Zelensky's illegitimacy in order to set conditions for Russia to claim that any future peace settlement that Russia signs with Zelensky is illegitimate, to renege on the agreement, and relaunch the invasion at the time of Russia's choosing. Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian Constitution.Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire. Lavrov claimed on April 29 that the May 8 to 11 ceasefire will be the "beginning of direct negotiations, without preconditions," but stated that Russia considers the US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day ceasefire to be a "precondition."[12] Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term ceasefires, claiming that Russia cannot accept any longer-term ceasefire since such ceasefires require extensive monitoring measures. Lavrov stated that Russia does not think "honest" monitoring is possible during a 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the Ukrainian government does not have full control over all Ukrainian military units and will be unable to guarantee that Ukrainian forces adhere to the May 8 to 11 ceasefire.[13] Putin similarly declared a unilateral Easter ceasefire in mid-April 2025, and Russia has consistently accused Ukraine of violating previous ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations.[14] Ukraine — unlike Russia — supports US President Donald Trump's proposals for a 30-day temporary ceasefire or more permanent ceasefires.[15] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine and to maintain the illusion that Russia is interested in meaningful peace negotiations.[16]Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population. Medvedev claimed that the West is attempting to use a principle of "peace through force" to harm Russia, but that Russia's only possible response to this principle is "peace through fear."[17] Medvedev claimed that other approaches do not work but that "fear still works." Medvedev claimed that the leaders in the European Union (EU) are "Russophobic" and that Russia's relations with Europe have "passed the point of no return."[18] Medvedev attempted to argue that allegations that Russia is trying to attack Europe are "nonsense."[19] Patrushev claimed that parts of Europe, including France and Germany, are "flirting with the Nazis" and "deploying the military machine against Russia."[20] Patrushev claimed that the United Kingdom (UK), the EU, and NATO leaders are threatening Russia and criticized NATO for holding large-scale exercises on its eastern flank, claiming that these exercises are practicing offensive actions against Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on April 29 at the "Great Heritage — Common Future" forum dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and claimed that Russia must prevent the revival of Nazism and the spread of destructive ideologies, including Russophobia and national or religious intolerance.[21] Putin's statements paralleled those of Medvedev and Patrushev, but were more tempered as Putin did not criticize or threaten Europe. Kremlin officials, including those within Putin's inner circle, have recently threatened European states, including NATO member states, and are setting conditions to justify potential future Russian aggression against Europe.[22]Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies. Putin claimed that the world must create a new security architecture, particularly in Eurasia.[23] Putin claimed that the basis of this Eurasian security architecture could be already existing organizations, such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Patrushev similarly claimed in the April 29 TASS interview that the "Western-centric world" is no longer useful and that the popularity of BRICS and the SCO is growing.[24] Putin first proposed an alternative Eurasian and world security system in June 2024, reportedly with the support of People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping.[25] The organizations that Putin listed as the possible foundation of his proposed Eurasian security architecture are mostly Russian- or PRC-dominated and are meant as alternatives to the United Nations (UN) or US-led alliances. Putin's renewed calls for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture notably come as Russian and North Korean officials abruptly started to publicly acknowledge their military cooperation in Russia's war in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN, BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power.[27] These efforts aim to make Russia's geopolitical clout more resilient and to expand the space in which Russia can spread narratives and create perceptions.Key Takeaways:Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government. Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea.Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing.Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population.Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in Kursk Oblast on April 29 as Russian forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their limited remaining positions in the area.[28]Russian milbloggers claimed on April 29 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in unspecified border areas of Kursk Oblast.[29]Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields west of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[30]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields southwest of Popovka (west of Demidovka).[31]Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Popovka, in Grayvoron Raion (west of Belgorod City), and in unspecified areas along the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast border.[32]Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian airbase and explosives factory in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of April 28 to 29. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on April 29 that sources in the Ukrainian security services and Russian rescue services stated that Ukrainian drones struck the Savasleyka Air Base, where a branch of the 4th Center for Combat Application and Crew Training is stationed, and the state-owned Sverdlova Plant in Dzerzhinsk that produces industrial explosives.[33] Astra reported that at least one Ukrainian drone struck the air base and that two drones hit the explosives plant. Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed on April 29 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strikes over two raions in the oblast.[34]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna Street in northern Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City).[35]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed April 29 that Russian forces advanced further in northern Bilovody, in the fields northeast of Bilovody, and near Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City).[36]A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued northeast of Sumy City near Bilovody and Loknya.[37]Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Hryhorov reported on April 29 that Russian forces do not control Zhuravka, Veselivka, Basivka, or Novenke (all northeast of Sumy City) and that these areas are in a contested "gray zone."[38]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, as well as elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[39]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 29 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lytpsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 28 and 29.[40]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Kharkiv Oblast.[41]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Doroshivka (northwest of Kupyansk), and some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in fields west of Doroshivka.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border) and to central Mala Shapkivka (north of Kupyansk).[43]Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashaivka, Zapadne, and Mala Shapkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on April 28 and 29.[44]Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov rejected on April 29 the Russian MoD's April 28 claim that Russian forces seized Kamyanka.[45] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian fortifications and outposts remain in the village and that fighting continues in the area. An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue efforts to cross the Oskil River in multiple places to create a full bridgehead, but that Russian forces remain unable to establish pontoon crossings.[46]Russian forces limited continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 29 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka on April 28 and 29.[47]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the eastern outskirts of Lypove (north of Lyman) and advanced southeast of the settlement, reached northern Kolodyazi (southeast of Lypove), and advanced south of Nove (immediately east of Lypove).[48]Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Nove and toward Lypove, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna, and northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Myrne, Katerynivka, Kolodyazi, and Novyi Mir on April 28 and 29.[49]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk), indicating that Russian sources no longer claim that Russian forces have seized all of the settlement.[50]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 28 and 29.[51]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 29 that Russian forces seized northern Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and advanced in fields east of Chasiv Yar.[52]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske and Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on April 28 and 29.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[54]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna Street in southern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[56]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tarasivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Berezivka (all southwest of Toretsk).[57]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Stara Mykolaivka, Oleksandropil, Yelyzavetivka, and Tarasivka on April 28 and 29.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Berezivka (southwest of Toretsk).[59]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on April 29 that Russian forces recently conducted a combined mechanized and motorized assault of an unspecified echelon in the Toretsk direction with armored vehicles and motorcycles.[60] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 29 that Russian forces continue to conduct infantry and motorized assaults in the Toretsk direction and are increasingly using motorized vehicles and fiber-optic drones.[61]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 68th Tank Regiment, are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[62] Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Shcherbynivka.[63] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and the 944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kalynove (southwest of Toretsk).[64]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the railroad line west of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[65]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces occupy one-third of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced northeast of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[66]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Novotoretske, and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Zelene, and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novoserhiivka, Zvirove, and Pishchane on April 28 and 29.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kotlyne, Lysivka, Udachne, and near Shevchenko.[68]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone activity is complicating Russian advances and logistics near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka and that central Lysivka is a contested "gray zone."[69]Order of Battle: Engineering elements of the Russian 12th Separate Engineering Brigade (201st Military Base, Central Military District [CMD]), sappers of the 351st Separate Engineer Sapper Battalion (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD), and "Somali" Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[70]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[71]Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlayrivka, Troitske, Nadiivka, and Sribne; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 28 and 29.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Uspenivka.[73]A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that small Russian assault groups mostly attack toward Ukrainian positions on foot but sometimes use motorcycles.[74]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway (southwest of Kostyantynopil), west of Kostyantynopil, and north and northwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[75]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopill and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne and Bahatyr on April 28 and 29.[76] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault consisting of five motorcycles near Odradne.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne and Bahatyr.[78]Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently destroyed two bridges over the Vovcha River near Zelenyi Kut and Novoukrainka (both west of Oleksiivka).[79]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[80]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on April 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Vilne Pole.[81]Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvvilne, Vilne Pole, Burlatske, Shevchenko, Vesele on April 28 and 29.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vesele.[83]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces near Vilne Pole.[84]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.Russian forces conducted ground attacks southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Lobkove on April 28 and 29.[85]Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kherson direction on April 28 and 29 but did not make confirmed advances.[86]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and “FOBOS” drone group (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[87]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 100 Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Aktarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 37 drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 47 Russian decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[89]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko discussed Belarusian support for Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) at an April 29 meeting in Volgograd City.[90] Putin and Lukashenko agreed to expand cooperation in aircraft construction. Putin stated that Russia is ready to lay the foundations for the drone production facility in Belarus that Russia announced first announced in March 2024.[91] Russia will likely use this drone production factory to support combat operations in Ukraine and long-term efforts to expand Russia's military production capability.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/23813173[2] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23801487[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/14/12/2023/657acd6a9a79477cbd43f7d5[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/23813173[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125[7] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/68108dd59a7947818ebfc843 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/29/peskov-nazval-vopros-o-legitimnosti-zelenskogo-vtorichnym-a-pervichnym-mirnye-peregovory[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; 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https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675;[48] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31423[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675;[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27700; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884; https://t.me/tass_agency/312602[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34993[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34969; https://t.me/tass_agency/312611;[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34993[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27707[56] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1917146365030781247; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/167; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9024[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63865; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34971; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162843; https:// t.me/voenkorKotenok/63867; https:// t.me/motopatriot78/34983[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34971; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162843[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63865[60] https://t.me/ombr_28/2105 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/zashyta-bronekolona-i-shvydkisni-motoczykly-nashi-bijczi-vidbyly-kombinovanyj-shturm-rosiyan/[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/na-sonczi-struny-tak-vidblyskuyut-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-dereva-vkryti-merezhyvom-optovolokna/[62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162905 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70096[63] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1917146365030781247; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/167; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9024[64] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13733[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9028; https://t.me/skala425/591[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884[67] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63867; https://t.me/dva_majors/70087 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162843; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162900[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63867; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63868; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34975[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692[70] https://t.me/milinfolive/147124; https://t.me/wargonzo/26206; https://t.me/wargonzo/26221[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162900[72] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675;[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34975[74] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/vmiyut-vidmichaty-lyudski-syluety-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-atakuyut-pid-plashhamy-nevydymkamy/[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9019; https://www.facebook.com/37obrmp/videos/681331965053328/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9018; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9027; https://t.me/odshbr79/552[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XZGVo1qYmHFfu4p5U5N1Nt1hYEbKmLYdr2GU6MXr5yebUUBLp9SLJNT4VgwXo4AQl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/wargonzo/26209; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63870;[77] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976[78] https://t.me/wargonzo/26209 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14672[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27697 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70087[80] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34965 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14664[81] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9026; https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/1045086750863680/[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63870[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/14667[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/14660[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XZGVo1qYmHFfu4p5U5N1Nt1hYEbKmLYdr2GU6MXr5yebUUBLp9SLJNT4VgwXo4AQl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XZGVo1qYmHFfu4p5U5N1Nt1hYEbKmLYdr2GU6MXr5yebUUBLp9SLJNT4VgwXo4AQl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643[87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162868; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63862[88] https://t.me/kpszsu/33462[89] https://t.me/kpszsu/33462; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21196; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1005615-cerez-masovanu-ataku-bpla-na-dnipropetrovsini-zaginula-ditina-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-misci-udaru/; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79619; https://t.me/synegubov/14051; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11616; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4526; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1005519-rosia-bezpilotnikami-atakuvala-kiiv-e-travmovana/[90] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76825[91] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2025

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 18, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 11:54pm

Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Anna Harvey, and Karolina Hird with Nate Trotter and William RunkelApril 18, 2025, 8pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on April 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Nebenzya claimed on April 18 that discussing a general ceasefire in Ukraine is "unrealistic" and accused Ukraine of not observing the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure over the last month.[1] Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal during a phone call with US President Donald Trump on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then, attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and extract additional bilateral concessions from the United States.[2] ISW previously noted that any future general ceasefire agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's efforts to claim that Ukraine was violating the temporary strikes ceasefire without providing evidence, and that it is unclear if Russian officials will accept any meaningful monitoring mechanisms.[3]Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18.[4] Peskov responded to a question about whether Russia will resume strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities and claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not issued further instructions. Russian officials have not expressed any interest in extending the temporary strikes ceasefire and the actual terms of the ceasefire remain unclear due to the lack of formal, publicly available, joint ceasefire documents. Russian officials accused Ukraine of violating the temporary strikes ceasefire almost daily over the last month, but provided no evidence for most of these accusations.[5]ISW previously assessed that Russia may intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine following the end of the strikes moratorium, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned at an event for Ukrainian energy workers on April 17 that Russia may intensify strikes on Ukraine around Easter (April 20).[6] It remains unclear how the ending of the temporary strikes ceasefire may impact Russia's nightly strikes against Ukraine, as the specifics of Putin's previous order to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure also remain unclear. Putin claimed to have issued an order to the Russian military immediately following his March 18 phone call with President Trump to stop strikes on energy infrastructure facilities, but Russian officials have provided no further context about the duration or other specifics of this supposed order.[7]Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions. Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan responded on April 18 to Bloomberg's report that the United States proposed freezing the war on the current frontlines, leaving occupied Ukraine "under Moscow's control," and taking Ukraine's NATO membership "off the table" as part of a plan to end the war and claimed that this plan is a "bad deal for Russia."[8] Simonyan claimed that Russia should reject this plan because the plan does not include terms for Ukraine's "denazification" or a formal recognition of occupied Ukraine as part of Russia, and additionally does not include assurances that Europe will not deploy a potential European peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine. Simonyan also attempted to delegitimize Ukraine and the United States as negotiating partners and claimed that "there can be no negotiating with the insane" in reference to the plan and the Ukrainian government. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev urged the United States to "wash its hands" of the war in Ukraine and let Russia "figure it out faster" in a social media post on April 18.[9]Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly stated that they are unwilling to accept any agreement that does not concede to all of Russia's territorial and political demands for Ukraine.[10] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on April 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been "fixated" on territorial concessions during their bilateral meetings, indicating that Russian officials likely continue to reiterate their territorial and political demands about Ukraine both in public and in private.[11] Russian officials have noted that Putin remains committed to accomplishing all his goals in Ukraine, which Putin has explicitly defined in part as the "denazification" and demilitarization of Ukraine.[12] Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and to demand the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. ISW previously noted that Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future Russian aggression.[13] Putin has also called for Ukraine to concede unoccupied territory to Russia, and Russian officials appear to be considering these demands as the Kremlin's standing guidance on negotiations.[14]Russian officials' continued insistence on these demands has also set conditions for Russian society to expect these demands to be fulfilled in any conclusion of the war in Ukraine, and Kremlin mouthpieces stating explicitly that these demands must be met even in a peace deal favorable to Russia is a reflection of this long-term rhetorical line. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing goals in Ukraine, and Russian officials continue to indicate and explicitly state that they are unwilling to compromise on these goals.[15]Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian demands for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated during an April 17 phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio the Kremlin's demand that any US-Russian efforts to end the war in Ukraine must "comprehensively" address the so-called "root causes" of the war.[16] Lavrov has previously defined these so-called "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[17] These so-called "root causes" are a reference to Russia’s pre-war demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.Kremlin officials are likely engaging in bilateral discussions with US officials to maintain the appearance of being interested in good-faith peace negotiations, but Russian officials' commitment to their pre-war demands and other efforts to prolong negotiations continue to indicate otherwise.[18] Ukraine, however, continues to indicate it is willing to negotiate a lasting peace.[19] The US Department of State (DoS) reported on April 17 that Rubio told Lavrov that US President Donald Trump wants the war in Ukraine to end and that US negotiators presented and received an "encouraging" response to "outlines of a durable and lasting peace" at meetings between representatives of Ukraine and its Western partners in Paris on April 17.[20]Ukrainian officials held bilateral talks with US officials and multilateral talks with Coalition of the Willing partners in Paris, France, on April 16 to 18 regarding peace negotiations. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha to discuss implementing first an unconditional ceasefire and then the broader process of establishing a just and enduring peace in Ukraine – fully in line with US President Donald Trump's stated timeline of negotiations to end the war.[21] The Ukrainian delegation reiterated Ukraine's long-standing commitment to working with the United States, Europe, and other partners to establish peace in Ukraine. Rubio stated on April 18 that the US delegation proposed a "framework" for ending the war to the Ukrainian representatives and noted that if the United States determines "within a matter of days" that the war in Ukraine can be resolved, then the United States is prepared to facilitate, but if not, then President Trump is "probably at a point where he's going to say, well, we're done."[22] It remains unclear what Rubio means, however.The Ukrainian delegation also met with representatives of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France in the Coalition of the Willing framework to discuss the next steps for working towards peace in Ukraine.[23] The Ukrainian delegation reaffirmed its dedication to establishing an unconditional ceasefire. Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian delegations agreed that a "complete and unconditional ceasefire should be the first stage on the path to sustainable peace in Ukraine."[24]Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent to conclude a future bilateral mineral deal and enhance economic cooperation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 17 that Ukraine was ready to sign the memorandum of intent and proceed with the first steps towards the conclusion of a bilateral US-Ukrainian mineral deal.[25] Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko confirmed later on April 17 that Ukraine and the United States finalized and signed the memorandum of intent, and Ukraine's Ministry of Economy published the full text of the memorandum.[26]Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against civilian areas in Kharkiv City on April 18, the latest in a string of high-casualty Russian strikes against civilian areas in Ukraine in recent weeks. Ukrainian officials reported on April 18 that Russian forces struck a residential area in Kharkiv City with three Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing at least one civilian, injuring at least 98, and damaging at least 21 apartment buildings, 40 houses, a civilian enterprise, two schools, and two children's centers.[27] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that the ballistic missiles were equipped with cluster munitions, which resulted in widespread damage.[28]Russian forces have conducted several devastating strikes against Ukrainian cities since April 1. Russian ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads struck Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, causing at least 89 casualties on April 4, and Russian Shahed drones struck Kharkiv City and caused 39 casualties on the same day.[29] Russian ballistic missiles struck Sumy City on April 13 and caused at least 100 casualties.[30] A Russian ballistic missile strike on Dnipro City on April 17 caused at least 31 casualties.[31] Russian forces have been adjusting their strike tactics in recent weeks to increasingly hit civilian areas, likely intending to take advantage of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and Kremlin efforts to delay negotiations to intimidate Ukrainian civilians.[32]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 18 that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying Russia with weapons and military materials.[33] Zelensky cited information from Ukrainian intelligence and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) indicating that the PRC has provided gunpowder and artillery to Russian forces and that PRC representatives are involved in weapons production within Russia. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian denied Zelensky's statement.[34]ISW has recently observed indications that Russia and the PRC are deepening their cooperation, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine.[35] PRC military officials have reportedly visited the frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare, and the PRC government may be disinterested in combating Russia's reported direct recruitment of PRC citizens to serve in the Russian military for this reason.[36] A Russian company also reportedly collaborated with entities in the PRC to develop and produce attack drones for use in Ukraine as of September 2024.[37]Key Takeaways:Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine.Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18.Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions.Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian demands for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.Ukrainian officials held bilateral talks with US officials and multilateral talks with Coalition of the Willing partners in Paris, France, on April 16 to 18 regarding peace negotiations.Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent to conclude a future bilateral mineral deal and enhance economic cooperation.Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against civilian areas in Kharkiv City on April 18, the latest in a string of high-casualty Russian strikes against civilian areas in Ukraine in recent weeks.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 18 that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying Russia with weapons and military materials.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Kurakhove.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed without evidence on April 18 that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, and Voronezh oblasts over the past day.[38]Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the northern outskirts of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[39]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 18 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Gornal and near Oleshnya (west of Sudzha).[40]Fighting continued near Gornal and Oleshnya on April 17 and 18.[41]A Russian milblogger claimed on April 17 that both Gornal and Oleshnya are contested "gray zones."[42]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Oleshnya.[43] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), including an unspecified 1st company of the brigade, are reportedly operating near Gornal.[44]Fighting continued in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 18, but Russian forces did not advance.Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked northwest of Belgorod City near Popovka and Demidovka.[45]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast near the international border and are directing Russian glide bomb strikes near Demidovka and Popovka.[46]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Sumy Oblast border area on April 18.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 18 but did not advance.[47]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 17 and 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced near the P-79 Kupyansk-Dvorichna highway southwest of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and to the eastern outskirts of Mala Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), respectively.[48]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk) and east of Doroshivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[49]Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Kamyanka, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 17 and 18.[50]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[51]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 18 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks towards Borova, northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Nadiya, and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and Novoserhiivka on April 17 and 18.[52]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported on April 18 that it repelled a roughly reduced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault comprised of at least two armored vehicles, three buggies, and an unspecified number of civilian vehicles in an unspecified part of Kharkiv Oblast (likely referring to the Borova direction).[53]Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Nove (northeast of Lyman).[54]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Nove.[55]Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Nove, Ridkodub, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on April 17 and 18.[56]Ukraine's Luhansk Oblast Military Administration stated on April 18 that Russian forces significantly increased their rate of artillery fire against the frontline in the Lyman direction.[57]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the direction of Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[58]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction on April 18 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Bilohorivka toward Hryhorivka (both northeast of Siversk).[59]Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bilohorivka and from positions near Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) on April 17 and 18.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohorivka.[61]Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 18 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka, and west of Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and toward Stupochky on April 17 and 18.[62]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 217th VDV Regiment and 661st Engineer-Sapper Battalion, are operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[63]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[64]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Toretsk, northwest of Toretsk, southeast of Dachne (northwest of Toretsk), and in southwestern Petrivka (west of Toretsk).[65]Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk itself, northwest of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka, west of Toretsk near Druzhba and Krymske, and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka and Oleksandropil on April 17 and 18.[66]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 18 that Russian forces seized Valentynivka (southwest of Toretsk), but ISW assesses that Russian forces seized the settlement as of April 14.[67] Elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in the Toretsk direction reportedly complained that the Russian MoD is not providing adequate supplies or drones.[68]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction, and elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Druzhba.[69]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 18 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 600 meters from Kalynove toward Stara Mykolaivka (both east of Pokrovsk), near Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[70]Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Myrolyubivka, Vodyane Druhe, Novotoretske, Malynivka, Myrne, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novooleksandrivka, and Udachne on April 17 and 18.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lysivka, Udachne, and Zelene (south of Pokrovsk).[72]A Russian milblogger claimed that the situation in the Pokrovsk direction is unstable due to frequent Ukrainian counterattacks.[73]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 10th Tank Regiment and 944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (both 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance and striking Ukrainian forces near Kalynove.[74]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 18 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[75]Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and Novoserhiivka, east of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka, and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 17 and 18.[76]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[77]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove), reached the eastern outskirts of the settlement, and seized unspecified tactical heights in the area.[78]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr and Rozlyv on April 17 and 18.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces periodically counterattack near Bahatyr.[80]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 43rd Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bahatyr, and elements of the 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Kostyantynopil.[81] Drone operators of the "Snegiri" Reconnaissance Group of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly remotely mining roads in the Bahatyr-Odradne area (southwest of Kurakhove to north of Velyka Novosilka).[82]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 18 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southeast of Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka).[83]Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Odradne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Komar, Vesele, Fedorivka, and Shevchenko; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne on April 17 and 18.[84] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Odradne, Vesele, and Shevchenko.[85]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 200th Artillery Brigade, 140th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (both 29th CAA, EMD), 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, and 43rd Spetsnaz Company (both Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Odradne.[86] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Voskresenka (northwest of Shevchenko).[87]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on April 18.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 17 that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole).[88]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 18 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 17 and 18 that Russian forces advanced near Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), likely referring to the April 16 Russian battalion-sized mechanized assault in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[89]Russian forces continued ground assaults west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka on April 17 and 18.[90]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the BARS-37 "Sarmat" Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), and drone operators of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Orikhiv.[91] Elements of the 70th and 71st motorized rifle regiments (both 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58 CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[92]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Dnipro direction on April 18.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See updates about the Russian ballistic missile strike against Kharkiv City in the topline text.Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 17 and 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea; five Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and Crimea; and 37 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Kursk City.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Iskander-K cruise missiles and 23 Shahed drones over Ukraine and that 10 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy City and Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[94] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast; Voznesenskyi Raion, Mykolaiv Oblast; and Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[95]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations.Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations.Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems.Click here to read the Russian Occupation Update.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/310996[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325[4] https://t.me/tass_agency/311059 ; https://suspilne dot media/998059-u-rosii-zaavili-so-pripinenna-vognu-po-energoobektah-zaversilos/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/311059 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/18/mesyats-istek-novyh-ukazaniy-verhovnogo-glavnokomanduyuschego-ne-bylo-peskov-ob-okonchanii-moratoriya-na-udary-po-ukrainskoy-energosisteme ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23720175[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/51240 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51049; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/50824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025 ; https://kyivindependent.com/russia-may-attack-ukraines-energy-grid-ahead-of-easter-zelensky-says/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13889[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025[8] https://x.com/M_Simonyan/status/1913250701729251771 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-18/war-in-ukraine-us-offers-to-ease-sanctions-on-russia-as-part-of-peace-plan?srnd=homepage-europe[9] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1913301463180132648[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/a-guide-to-the-five-regions-of-ukraine-at-the-center-of-u-s-russia-talks-429e0d54 ; https://archive.ph/hdOfc[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/putin-announces-a-military-operation-in-ukraine-as-the-un-security-council-pleads-with-him-to-pull-back.html ; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843 ;[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125[16] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2009821/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/55760[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022425[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071924[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/11/zelenskyy-europe-cannot-guarantee-ukraines-security-without-america; https://news.sky.com/story/zelenskyy-suggests-hes-prepared-to-end-ukraine-war-in-return-for-nato-membership-even-if-russia-doesnt-immediately-return-seized-land-13263085[20] https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-call-with-russian-foreign-minister-sergey-lavrov/[21] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/u-parizhi-vidbulisya-zustrichi-delegacij-ukrayini-ta-ssha-ta-97277 ; https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-april-17-2025/[22] https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-remarks-to-press-3/[23] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1912943375914881097 ; https://t.me/ermaka2022/6106[24] https://t.me/ermaka2022/6107[25] https://suspilne dot media/997475-ukraina-i-ssa-onlajn-pidpisut-memorandum-pro-namiri-uklasti-ugodu-pro-nadra-zelenskij/[26] https://www.kmu.gov dot ua/news/ukraina-i-ssha-pidpysaly-memorandum-iakyi-zasvidchuie-namir-finalizuvaty-uhodu-pro-ekonomichne-partnerstvo-tekst-memorandumu?v=6801f600eac9a ; https://suspilne dot media/997765-urad-opriludniv-tekst-memorandumu-pro-nadra/Intel sharing / aid suspension[27] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2389; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22495 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/18/okupanty-byly-po-harkovu-iskanderamy-zi-shrapnellyu-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-zrosla/; https://t.me/synegubov/13900 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30236; https://t.me/synegubov/13891 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13897[28] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2379[29] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13786; https://tsn dot ua/exclusive/kryvavyy-udar-po-kryvomu-rohu-4-kvitnia-iak-riatuvaly-postrazdalykh-u-likarni-ekskliuzyvni-detali-2811041.html[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325;[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025;[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325;[33] https://suspilne dot media/997517-kitaj-postacae-rosii-artileriu-ta-poroh-i-dopomagae-viroblati-zbrou-zelenskij/[34] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-dismisses-zelenskiys-claim-it-is-supplying-weapons-russia-2025-04-18/ ; https://archive.ph/XFy1d[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates-june-1-september-30-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2024; https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/04/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_26.html[36] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025[37] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/51446[39] https://t.me/DKulko/995; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8934[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34342; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27135; https://t.me/dva_majors/69314[41] https://t.me/tass_agency/311008 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25990; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34342 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27135; https://t.me/dva_majors/69314[42] https://t.me/epoddubny/23138[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27125[44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63599[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/69354; https://t.me/wargonzo/25990[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90155[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23243; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8932; https:// t.me/ghost_of_khortytsia/317; https://youtu.be/If3K5dyYwqg?si=Q4-L6Y6KE9oX93Xb; https://t.me/karadag15brop/192; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8937[49] https://t.me/rybar/69714; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31365[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8245; https://t.me/rybar/69714; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31365[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/69327[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23243; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8245; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90195[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/18/liniya-droniv-ta-arty-v-diyi-tretya-shturmova-vidbyla-mehanizovanyj-shturm-rosiyan-na-harkivshhyni/[54] https://t.me/mapukrdailyupdate/1177; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8933; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1912964350685716497; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1912964560505671711[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31362[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23243; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8245; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34361[57] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/25991[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/14477[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27113[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90152[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27113[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23243; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8245[63] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2316; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27125; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90151[64] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1913253511510237616; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1913254417404412161; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1913254628822499692; https:// t.me/Legion_W_Bat1/887[65] https:// t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27159; https:// t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27137;[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23243; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8245; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27159[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/51437[68] https://t.me/astrapress/79203[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13703; https://t.me/Legion_W_Bat1/887[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27137 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27136 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63587 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25990[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23243 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63587 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27136 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25990[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161706 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27136[73] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27136[74] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13702[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27136[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23243 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8245[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/14479 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1913143363873956202[78] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63586 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14494 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161704[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/232243 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8245 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63586 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90180[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63586 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25990[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/14479 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14471[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/69309[83] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63586 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14494 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25990[84] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23243 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63586 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14494 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25990[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63586 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25990 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14493 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161704[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/14478 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14493[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/14483[88] https://t.me/rybar/69709[89] https://t.me/dva_majors/69314 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34344 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/2599 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27139 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69314 ; https://t.me/rybar/69709 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34339 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23243 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23223 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uThmuLySKrGu7un5uS9LCr9GmsgM7HyCKt1LDRtZzQbwpB5H89jBEUMqHZSspwuKl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0bm292XzNQL5yoVmpQK5SMZMiNymkYeqfQm31C4r8r3be4cVx7GjBYJDTQVLceVYcl[91] https://t.me/dva_majors/69299[92] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34339[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/32780[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/32780; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13893; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/997643-u-sumah-sahedi-vdarili-po-promislovosti-e-zagibla-ludina/ ; https://t.me/severrealii/30234; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/18/rosiyany-vdaryly-po-dnipropetrovshhyni-raketoyu-ta-bpla/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20987[95] https://t.me/kpszsu/32780; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13893; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/997675-rosijska-armia-18-kvitna-atakuvala-raketou-dnipro-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-misci-podii/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/18/rosiyany-vdaryly-po-dnipropetrovshhyni-raketoyu-ta-bpla/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20987; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0bm292XzNQL5yoVmpQK5SMZMiNymkYeqfQm31C4r8r3be4cVx7GjBYJDTQVLceVYcl; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/18/u-sumah-okupanty-vdaryly-po-kondyterskomu-czehu-de-vypikaly-pasky/; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35093 ; https://www.facebook.com/mykhailo.melnyk/posts/pfbid02CCN2Gf4Kfzpzbn2JvHf2XVwdPbj6RH61FGgiyagTo7kkCYe77vwJkDjjzvzBkeUrl

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, April 24, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 11:53pm

 Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran may calculate an interim deal would delay or prevent snapback sanctions or a strike.[1] Axios reported that Iran said it may not be possible to reach a final deal by US President Donald Trump's proposed 60-day deadline. Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement and previously warned that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[2] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly told Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi that he wants to focus on reaching a comprehensive deal within 60 days, but the two parties could reach an interim deal if both sides agree they need more time.[3] Axios previously reported on April 10 that Iran may propose that Iran and the United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.[4] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[5] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[6] Iran agreed to yield its 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile, refrain from operating any inactive centrifuges, halt the production and installation of new centrifuges, cease construction of the Arak heavy water reactor, and accept new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight measures.[7] It is unclear what concessions Iran would be willing to make for an interim deal in the current nuclear negotiations.IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi continued to hold meetings on ongoing US-Iran nuclear talks. Grossi met with Witkoff on April 23 to discuss nuclear negotiations.[8] Grossi separately met with the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese permanent representatives to the UN on April 24 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program.[9] Iran, Russia, and China continue to present a unified position on US-Iran nuclear negotiations.Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited two air defense sites responsible for protecting Iranian nuclear facilities on April 24.[10] Sabahi Fard and Hajizadeh visited the Khondab Air Defense Group site near the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor in Markazi Province to inspect military units and defense capabilities at the site. The two commanders also inspected the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) air defense site in Esfahan Province.[11]Sabahi Fard previously inspected the Fordow air defense site near the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) on April 16.[12] These continued inspections likely reflect a broader Iranian effort to assess and reinforce air defense readiness around key nuclear facilities amid concerns about potential US or Israeli strikes.[13]Key Takeaways:Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations: Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, according to two unspecified sources with knowledge of the issue who spoke to Axios. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.Iranian Air Defense Inspections: Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyImagery indicates Iran is constructing a large trimaran-type warship at the IRGC naval facility in Bandar-e Bahonar, Hormozgan Province.[14] An OSINT analyst reported the vessel is approximately 77 meters long and 24–27 meters wide, significantly larger than the IRGC Navy’s existing Shahid Soleimani-class missile corvettes.[15]SyriaA northern Syria-based, anti-SDF source reported on April 23 that the SDF re-deployed to several of its positions in villages west of Tishreen Dam.[16] The source reported that SDF units returned to positions Mahshiyet al Sheikh, Hajj Hussein, and al Shash al Bubna, west of the dam.[17] The SDF had previously withdrawn from these positions on or before April 14, and the Syrian army’s 60th Division has deployed to the area to remove unexploded ordnance.[18] The Syrian transitional government has not yet asserted full control over Tishreen Dam, however.[19] The SDF’s handover of Tishreen Dam to the Syrian government is a critical step towards integrating the SDF into the Syrian state. Possible SDF re-deployments to former positions west of the dam may threaten the dam’s successful handover. CTP-ISW cannot corroborate the report that claims that the SDF deployed west of the dam with other sources, but new SDF deployments west of the dam would be notable given the agreement to hand over the Tishreen Dam to the transitional government.Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Erbil on April 23 to discuss SDF integration and the unification of Syrian Kurdish political parties.[20] The two leaders discussed the necessity of “unity and harmony” between Kurdish parties and forces in Syria.[21] This refers to the upcoming Kurdish unity conference on April 26, in which several Kurdish political parties will convene to present a unified Kurdish stance for future negotiations with Damascus.[22] The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) —two longtime rivals—will produce a united position at the conference.[23] The PYD and KNC’s rare unity follows significant pressure from Barzani’s party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to pressure the SDF to cooperate with minority Syrian Kurdish political parties in negotiations with the Syrian government.[24] The KDP has historically aligned itself with the KNC, while the PYD dominates the SDF.Foreign governments and international institutions continue to lift sanctions and restrictions on Syria, which will help improve the Syrian economy. The United Kingdom lifted Assad-era sanctions on the Syrian interior and defense ministries.[25] The United Kingdom also removed sanctions on former regime intelligence agencies and former regime-affiliated Syrian news outlets.[26] The Assad regime's intelligence services no longer exist.[27] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank officials also offered support to rebuild Syrian institutions during a meeting with Syrian officials on April 23.[28] Several European countries also announced a series of sanctions relief and economic assistance programs for Syria during the 9th Brussels Donor Conference in March.[29] These announcements to lift sanctions from Syria come as the United States continues to debate offering partial sanctions relief to Syria. The United States has listed a series of conditions for the Syrian government to secure a partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters' influence within state institutions and the cessation of Palestinian activities in Syria.[30] International aid and sanctions relief play a critical role in helping the transitional government restore Syria’s public sector. Increased support from the international community also boosts Shara’s legitimacy and international image.Forces affiliated with the transitional government conducted a search operation in al Rayan, Homs Province, on April 24.[31] Footage circulated on Syrian media showed Syrian transitional government forces arriving in al Rayan.[32] Syrian media claimed that the forces in al Rayan were the Zubair bin al Awan Brigade, which the transitional government had reflagged as General Security Service forces.[33] Social media videos showed a uniformed fighter pointing his weapon at the cameraman in a manner that suggested the fighter was attempting to control the crowd.[34] Locals claimed that transitional government forces ”attacked” civilians who attempted to leave their homes and stole property.[35]Search operations targeting criminals or insurgents can often appear random to local civilians, regardless of whether the search is conducted based on valid intelligence or not. Aggressive behavior by the security forces during these searches can increase tension between local communities and government forces, which could undermine the credibility and reliability of the transitional government over time. The government has not acknowledged this operation, and it is unclear what it was targeting.IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentNothing significant to report. Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on April 23.[36] CENTCOM conducted at least two airstrikes targeting Houthi facilities in Sirwah District, Marib Governorate, which is less than 50 km behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[37] CENTCOM also conducted at least six airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in al Tuhayta District, Hudaydah Governorate, which is approximately 50 km behind the frontlines in Hudaydah Governorate.[38] CENTCOM reportedly struck a site in a residential area in northern Sanaa City, likely targeting Houthi leadership.[39] CENTCOM has previously conducted airstrikes in residential areas to target Houthi leaders.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/24/iran-us-interim-nuclear-deal[2] https://www.mako.co dot il/news-diplomatic/2025_q2/Article-9c5624fb7461691026.htm ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-9-2025 ; https://www.axios.com/2025/03/30/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-bombing[3] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/24/iran-us-interim-nuclear-deal[4] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/10/iran-nuclear-deal-us-interim-agreement[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-11-2025[6] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/11/why-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement-is-a-good-deal?lang=en ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html[7] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/11/why-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement-is-a-good-deal?lang=en ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html[8] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/24/iran-us-interim-nuclear-deal[9] https://x.com/Amb_Ulyanov/status/1915349689852977180[10] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404020402656[11] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404020402656[12] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/738881[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-7-2025 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-16-2025 ;[14] https://www.newsweek.com/satellite-images-iran-building-new-warship-2063059[15] https://x.com/SprinterObserve/status/1914981125027467411[16] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1915084286585164234[17] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1915084286585164234[18] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1911650518092439553; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1914733641667690810 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1912218465861054918[19] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1913616747480928651 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/46838[20] https://npasyria dot com/211345/[21] https://npasyria dot com/211345/[22] https://x.com/diaa_audi/status/1914600824644194307 ; https://npasyria dot com/208580/[23] https://x.com/diaa_audi/status/1914600824644194307 ; https://npasyria dot com/208580/[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-lifts-sanctions-against-syrias-defence-ministry-intelligence-agencies-2025-04-24/ ; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6809ea4d2a86d6dfb2b527a2/Notice_Syria_240425.pdf[26] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6809ea4d2a86d6dfb2b527a2/Notice_Syria_240425.pdf[27] https://www.barrons.com/news/syria-s-new-intel-chief-vows-reforms-to-end-abuses-0925783f ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1915340957756621028[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/imf-help-syria-rebuild-institutions-re-enter-world-economy-georgieva-says-2025-04-24/ ; https://www.worldbank.org/en/meetings/splash/spring ; https://x.com/ousmanedione/status/1914799124420972659[29] https://apnews.com/article/syria-europe-donors-sanctions-aid-conference-f62ed91a11dc33fe27f05265ed8abd36[30] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/[31] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1065615405621554 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ; https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459[32] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1065615405621554 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ; https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459[33] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ; https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459[34] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1065615405621554[35] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ; https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459[36] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915073131061948908 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915153052023063016 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915164293458182211 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915189172890988650 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915195959484567832 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1915199692956160189[37] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1915199692956160189[38] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1915199692956160189[39] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915195959484567832 ; https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1915365282102628722

[Author: ISWKF]

— Iran Update, April 18, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 11:53pm

Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity, even though we do not describe them in these reports. Iran proposed a three-stage nuclear deal proposal that caps Iranian uranium enrichment but would leave the necessary infrastructure in place to enable Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program if the deal collapsed. Anti-regime Iranian media reported that Iran proposed a three-stage nuclear deal proposal that capped Iranian uranium enrichment but preserved Iranian nuclear infrastructure, such as advanced centrifuges.[1] The reported plan does not include a timeline for the phases of the deal. This proposal would likely preserve Iran’s ability to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program. Former UN weapons inspector David Albright warned on April 18 that Iran could make enough weapons-grade uranium in 25 days, even with a small low-enriched uranium (LEU) stock, if it maintains all of its current centrifuges.[2] Iran is also developing new advanced centrifuges, such as the IR-8, which Iranian officials have claimed is “sixteen times” more capable than the IR-1 centrifuge.[3] Iran has increased the number of its operational centrifuges since it signed the JCPOA in 2015.[4]An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on April 18 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will refuse any deal that requires Iran to dismantle centrifuges, halt uranium enrichment, and reduce its stockpile below Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels.[5] The reported Iranian proposal lacks sunset clauses, but leaves Iran’s centrifuge infrastructure intact, which would allow Iran to rapidly rebuild its stockpile of enriched uranium.[6] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio separately stated on April 18 that the United States seeks a durable deal that will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon both now and in the future.[7] The Iranian proposal does not achieve the stated US government objective of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon now and in the future because it leaves the necessary infrastructure in place to rapidly build a weapon if the deal collapses.Source: IAEA Verification and Monitoring Reports[8]This graphic shows the increase in centrifuge cascades at Iranian nuclear facilities since March 2022. The FFEP is the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.[9] The FEP is the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.[10] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines an operating cascade as cascades that “have been fed with UF6 for enrichment of collected product.”[11] The JCPOA limited Iran’s enrichment capacity at the Natanz FEP to no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges in no more than 30 cascades.[12] IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges are more advanced than IR-1 centrifuges, enabling Iran to enrich uranium at a faster rate.[13]Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on April 18 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Mossad Director David Barnea in Paris to discuss the upcoming US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on April 19.[14] Iran and the United States will continue the second round of negotiations in Rome, Italy, on April 19.[15]An analysis of available satellite imagery from a Chinese military-affiliated satellite company shows that the vast majority of Houthi attacks took place in areas imaged by the Chinese company. An open-source analyst posted a map on X on April 17 that shows the available satellite imagery overlaid with Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea.[16] It is unsurprising that a commercial satellite company would take images of a highly trafficked maritime route like the Red Sea, but the Houthi access to the imagery could improve Houthi targeting capabilities when used in conjunction with other Houthi targeting methods. This map comes after reports that this Chinese military-linked satellite company, Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd, provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times on April 17.[17]US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck Houthi fuel stockpiles and oil export and import facilities at Ras Issa Port, Hudaydah Governorate, on April 17.[18] CENTCOM stated that they conducted these airstrikes to ”eliminate” the Houthis‘ fuel source and isolate the Houthis economically.[19] The strikes damaged vessels at the port, three oil depots, oil transporters, and pipelines.[20] This satellite imagery also showed possible oil leaks into the Red Sea.[21] A Yemeni economic analyst estimated that CENTCOM airstrikes on Ras Issa Port, which the Houthis have controlled since 2016, resulted in approximately $700 million worth of losses for the Houthis.[22] A Saudi news outlet noted that the Houthis received millions of dollars' worth of Iranian oil and gas exports, among other Houthi energy imports, through Ras Issa Port.[23] The Houthi-run Health Ministry reported that these CENTCOM airstrikes killed at least 74 people and injured 171 others.[24] Many of the casualties were workers at the port.A large proportion of US airstrikes have targeted Hudaydah Governorate, likely in an effort to degrade Houthi targeting capabilities and degrade other Houthi infrastructure. CENTCOM has conducted at least 112 airstrikes in at least 33 sorties targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Governorate on the Red Sea coast, since the start of its airstrike campaign on March 15.[25] Hudaydah Governorate is important because it hosts Hudaydah Port, Yemen’s largest port, and Ras Issa and al Salif ports. The coastal radar systems in Hudaydah allow the Houthis to track maritime traffic through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, facilitating their drone and missile attacks on international shipping.[26] CENTCOM airstrikes in Hudaydah have reportedly targeted and killed mid-level commanders who coordinate logistics in Houthi-controlled areas, and Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[27]An air campaign can only achieve temporary effects. The temporal effects of this air campaign could be significant, however, and could deter the Houthis from continuing attacks if the United States renders the Houthis unwilling to continue. A campaign to permanently prevent the Houthis from using Hudaydah Governorate to launch attacks targeting international shipping would require a ground operation to take and hold ground.The United States will withdraw from three bases in northeastern Syria, including two positions designed to support counter-ISIS operations along the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province.[28] Two senior US officials told The New York Times on April 17 that the US will close three bases: Mission Support Site Green Village, Mission Support Site Euphrates, and an unspecified smaller third facility.[29] Both mission support sites are located east of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province.[30] These bases have enabled US forces to support Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operations along the Euphrates River in zones where ISIS cells operate and collect zakat from locals.[31] The New York Times reported that the US withdrawal began on April 17, which locally based Syrian media also confirmed.[32] The officials also said that the United States will withdraw about 600 of the 2,000 US troops currently deployed and that the remaining 1,400 US troops will remain stationed in Syria.[33] The United States maintained roughly 900 US personnel in Syria between 2019 and 2024.[34]The officials said that the United States will assess after 60 days whether to withdraw additional troops from Syria.[35] A full US withdrawal from Syria would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute. US forces provide critical intelligence and logistical support to the SDF and assist SDF units in managing and securing detention camps in northern Syria. The Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) is expected to soon deploy to northeastern Syria in order to backfill the SDF as part of a recent integration agreement, but MoD forces are unlikely to provide any suitable replacement for US forces, at least in the short term. Syrian transitional government forces deployed for the first time in former SDF-controlled territory will need time to organize their forces and understand their new areas of operation. The international coalition reportedly conducted a joint patrol with the SDF and MoD forces along the M4 highway between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr on April 18, likely in preparation for MoD deployments in the region. [36]The United States reportedly brokered a ceasefire agreement between Turkey and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on April 17.[37] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi led an SDF delegation to meet with Turkish officials at the Tishreen Dam, which marked the first direct meeting between the two sides.[38] Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched near-daily attacks on SDF positions across northeastern Syria from November 2024 through late March 2025.[39] Turkish officials have consistently demanded that the SDF fully disarm and integrate into the Syrian MoD before reaching a ceasefire agreement.[40] It is unclear what the terms of this ceasefire agreement are and to what degree the SDF has fulfilled previous Turkish demands.The Houthis claimed on April 18 that the group shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone with a locally produced missile over Sanaa Governorate.[41] The Houthis have claimed that they have shot down 20 drones since the beginning of the October 7 War.[42] A Yemen analyst reported that the Houthis likely used relatively makeshift air defenses to quickly fire before moving to avoid strikes in response.[43] The same analyst noted that many of these systems are repurposed radar and optical systems from the former Yemeni Armed Forces or supplied by Iran and built with Chinese technology.[44] These air defense systems can intercept slow, relatively low-flying drones, but cannot destroy cruise missiles or advanced fighter aircraft.[45]Iraqi media reported on April 17 that the Iraqi federal government replaced Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigades controlled by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with PMF brigades close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani along the Iraq-Syria border.[46] “Official sources” told al Aalem that the PMF 44th and 72nd Brigades had deployed near Sinjar and al Qaim, respectively, following the withdrawal of PMF units affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Liwa al Taluf from near al Qaim. The PMF 44th and 72nd Brigades are known as “shrine militias” that are loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani and the Iraqi Defense Ministry.[47] The “official sources” and a “prominent” Iranian-backed Iraqi militia member added that these deployments are part of an Iraqi federal government plan to “reduce international and tribal pressure” on the government to remove the militias from the border.[48] An advisor to the Anbar Provincial Council told al Aalem that the incoming PMF brigades are “more disciplined and have an excellent relationship with the Anbar tribes.”[49]CTP-ISW has not observed photo evidence of these redeployments. It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would withdraw from their positions on the Syria-Iraq border because the militias derive significant economic benefit from controlling these border crossings.[50] UK-based media reported in late December 2024 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that had recently withdrawn from Syria to Iraq after the collapse of the Assad regime would soon begin moving from the al Qaim area due to unspecified regional and international pressure on the Iraqi federal government to remove militias from the Syrian border.[51]Key Takeaways:Iran-Proposed Nuclear Deal: Iran proposed a three-stage nuclear deal proposal that caps Iranian uranium enrichment but would leave the necessary infrastructure in place to enable Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program if the deal collapsed.China-Houthi Connections: An analysis of available satellite imagery from a Chinese military-affiliated satellite company shows that the vast majority of Houthi attacks took place in areas imaged by the Chinese company. An open-source analyst posted a map on X on April 17 that shows the available satellite imagery overlaid with Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea.CENTCOM Airstrikes in Ras Issa, Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck Houthi fuel stockpiles and oil export and import facilities at Ras Issa Port, Hudaydah Governorate, on April 17.US Air Campaign in Yemen: A large proportion of US airstrikes have targeted Hudaydah Governorate, likely in an effort to degrade Houthi targeting capabilities and degrade other Houthi infrastructure. An air campaign can only achieve temporary effects. A campaign to permanently prevent the Houthis from using Hudaydah Governorate to launch attacks targeting international shipping would require a ground operation to take and hold ground.US Withdrawal from Syria: The United States will withdraw from three bases in northeastern Syria, including two positions designed to support counter-ISIS operations along the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province. The US troop presence in Syria will drop from 2,000 to 1,400 under the current drawdown plan.Turkey-SDF Ceasefire Agreement: The United States reportedly brokered a ceasefire agreement between Turkey and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on April 17.SyriaSyrian President Ahmed al Shara met with Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas in Damascus on April 18 to discuss enhancing bilateral relations.[52] Shara and Abbas agreed to form a joint committee to enhance bilateral relations between Syria and the PA.[53] Shara and Abbas’s meeting comes amid recent reports that the United States has asked Syria to end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria as a condition for partial sanction relief.[54]The General Security Services launched a “large-scale” search operation to seize weapons and arrest suspected “criminals” in Latakia City on April 18.[55] Latakia authorities stated that the operation targeted drug dealers and aimed to dismantle ”criminal” networks.[56] GSS forces also seized weapons, including hand and rocket-propelled grenades, linked to Assadist insurgent cells in Qardaha, which is a likely insurgent support zone.[57] A Syrian source noted that this is the largest search operation since the pro-Assad Alawite began in early March in coastal Syria.[58] The GSS initiated the operation after Latakia residents complained about rising criminal activity in the province.[59]Daraa residents clashed with supporters of Eighth Brigade commander Ahmed al Awda in Busra al Sham on April 17 and demanded Awda’s arrest.[60] The General Security Services (GSS) reportedly imposed a curfew after the clashes injured one person in Busra al Sham.[61] The Eighth Brigade is a Daraa-based faction comprised of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime.[62] The transitional government deployed significant forces to Busra al Sham after Eighth Brigade members in the Busra al Sham GSS killed an MoD official on April 10.[63] The group later announced its full dissolution on April 13.[64] Protests against Awda increase pressure on the transitional government to enforce the full dissolution of the Eight Brigade in Busra al Sham.The SDF and the Syrian transitional government continued to implement the March 10 ceasefire agreement.[65] Anti-SDF media reported that the SDF began withdrawing its forces from Deir Hafer and Maskana, Aleppo Province, and Debsi Afnan, Debsi Faraj, and Tabqa City, Raqqa Province, towards Raqqa City on April 18.[66]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentIraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani discussed regional security with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara in Qatar on April 17.[67] Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan agreed in February 2025 to form a strategic alliance to counter the Islamic State.[68] Iraqi officials remain very concerned about the ISIS threat in Iraq.[69] Sudani confirmed on April 17 that he had invited Shara to attend the Arab Summit in Baghdad in May.[70] Iranian-aligned Iraqi political figures have continuously opposed normalization between Iraq and Syria due to Shara’s AQI roots.[71] A Telegram channel affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias posted Iraqi judicial documents on April 16 that detailed Shara’s imprisonment in Iraq from 2005-2011.[72]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 19 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 17, including at least 14 airstrikes targeting Ras Issa Port.[73] See Topline Section for reporting on Ras Issa Port. CENTCOM also conducted at least three airstrikes targeting a likely Houthi command and control site in Mukayras District, al Bayda.[74] CENTCOM separately conducted at least two airstrikes likely targeting Houthi infrastructure in the al Sama area in Arhab District, north of Sanaa City, Sanaa Governorate.[75]The Houthis claimed on April 18 that they launched a ballistic missile at an unspecified military target near Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel.[76] The IDF intercepted a missile outside Israeli airspace on April 17.[77]The Houthis claimed on April 18 that they conducted a drone and missile attack targeting the USS Harry S Truman and the USS Carl Vinson in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.[78] The Houthis claimed this was the first attack targeting the Vinson since its arrival in the Arabian Sea. CENTCOM has not confirmed either attack.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip      Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks in the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial appreciated from 856,000 rials to one US dollar on April 17 to 853,000 on April 18.[79]Iranian security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) forces, killed one Jaish al Adl cell leader on April 18.[80] Iranian security forces arrested an unspecified number of Jaish al Adl fighters. Jaish al Adl killed one Iranian soldier during the operation. Jaish al Adl is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi militant group that regularly attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[81]Iranian forces displayed an S-300 transporter erector launcher (TEL) during an Artesh Day Parade on April 18.[82] The TEL is distinct from the Tombstone target acquisition radars (TAR) that Israeli airstrikes destroyed in April and October 2024. A TAR is necessary to enable the S-300 to engage targets. Israeli airstrikes into Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four S-300 air defense systems inoperable, and it is very unlikely that Russia supplied Iran with an additional S-300 system.[83] The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202504172676[2] https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1913173667237724520[3] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/technical-note-making-sense-out-of-the-ir-8-centrifuge/8[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-23-2024  ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-22-2024-67411180b2f4f[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-wants-guarantees-trump-will-not-quit-new-nuclear-pact-iranian-official-says-2025-04-18/[6] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202504172676[7] https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-remarks-to-press-3/[8] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-board-reports[9] https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/fordow-fuel-enrichment-plant/[10] https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/fuel-enrichment-plant-fep/[11] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/03/gov2025-8.pdf[12] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf[13] https://apnews.com/article/7e896f8a1b0c40769b54ed4f98a0f5e6#:~:text=An%20IR%2D6%20can%20produce%20enriched%20uranium%2010,uranium%20by%20rapidly%20spinning%20uranium%20hexafluoride%20gas.[14] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/18/witkoff-met-dermer-barnea-paris-iran-talks[15] https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-nuclear-talks-iaea-zarif-tehran-c3a8afc699c670300b9521f1e2019ef7[16] https://x.com/detresfa_/status/1912972470044565922[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-17-2025; https://www.ft.com/content/628b404b-2a24-4853-8f3c-9caad408ef8fhttps://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Space/2024-04-01%20Chang%20Guang%20Satellite%20Company%20overview.pdf[18] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1912937032059330962 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1913158312293507541; https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/yemen/2025/04/18/%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%8014-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%AD-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B1%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%89-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A; https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1913273259874795740; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1913172913831727220[19] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1912937032059330962[20] https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1912961915858411887 ; https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1913273259874795740 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/middleeast/houthis-yemen-ship-seized.html[21] https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1913245000604790813 ; https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1913277617169461493 ; https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1913273259874795740 ;https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/1913226142984642641[22] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1913172913831727220;https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1913123907357270112[23] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1913118112053916130[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-military-strikes-yemens-ras-isa-fuel-port-2025-04-17/[25] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1901402255254843584 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1901689772113846772 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1901745288882053602  ;https://x.com/Simorgh_News/status/1901772608816992667 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1902120664892633370 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1902162788128088547 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1902519944824123742 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1902770244172541975 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1902914191045902828 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903575004517671166 ;https://x.com/Almasirahbrk/status/1903563096108454142 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903535388586545409 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905397127905190028 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906777425213595890 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907159505135341680 ;https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1907161263534207037 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1907171915774747084 ;https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1907177897820836303 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907408945951428755 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907498123565453467 ;https://x.com/ERYANIM/status/1908142338448191954 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1908677703860957254 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1908902671592927406 ;https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1908943897570455883 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909399169313235223 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909648586775687398 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1910080035949883885 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1910763771343122556 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911158822112272440 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911825745489338664 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912200827948732654 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912604171733262669 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912650569262448643 ;https://www.alarabiya 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net/arab-and-world/yemen/2025/04/18/%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%8014-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%AD-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B1%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%89-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A[26] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4018496/centcom-forces-strike-multiple-houthi-targets-in-yemen/[27] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1913273337108722082 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1902922043726639454 ; https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1902914805385892169[28] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/17/us/politics/us-withdrawing-troops-syria.html[29] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/17/us/politics/us-withdrawing-troops-syria.html[30] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-special-edition-isis-expands-support-and-attack-zones-along-the-euphrates-river; https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/isis-in-syria-a-deadly-new-focus/[31] https://npasyria dot com/en/115807; https://npasyria dot com/en/108137/[32] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/17/us/politics/us-withdrawing-troops-syria.html; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1912956668771553565; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1913169990162821461; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1912968230466990422[33] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/17/us/politics/us-withdrawing-troops-syria.html[34] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/world/middleeast/us-troops-syria-trump.html ; https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4013726/dod-announces-2000-troops-in-syria-department-prepared-for-government-shutdown/   [35] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/17/us/politics/us-withdrawing-troops-syria.html[36] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1913173221827821660[37] https://www.facebook.com/AlWatanNewspaper.sy/posts/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B8%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%AF-/1113141360827902/ ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1913173221827821660[38] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1913265544247079099 ; https://x.com/rudaw_arabic/status/1913257167529844939[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-27-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-31-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-30-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024[40] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/12/19/turkiye-refutes-us-claims-of-ceasefire-with-syrian-kurdish-fighters ; https://www dot kurdistan24.net/en/story/828282/turkish-fm-sdf-must-dissolve-before-we-launch-a-military-operation ; https://damascusv dot com/archives/66220[41] https://t.me/army21ye/2837?single[42] https://t.me/army21ye/2837?single[43] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1913273337108722082[44] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1913273337108722082[45] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1913273337108722082[46] https://al-aalem dot com/%d8%ad%d8%b4%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d8%af%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%84-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%b6%d8%ba%d9%88/[47] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/atabat-leader-al-muthanna-takes-iran-backed-militia-interests ; https://al-hashed dot gov.iq/?p=526510[48] https://al-aalem dot com/%d8%ad%d8%b4%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d8%af%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%84-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%b6%d8%ba%d9%88/[49] https://al-aalem dot com/%d8%ad%d8%b4%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d8%af%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%84-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%b6%d8%ba%d9%88/[50] https://israel-alma dot org/the-al-bukamal-border-region-controlled-by-iran/[51] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/exclusive-iraqi-factions-push-back-syrian-border[52] https://t.me/SyPresidency/826[53] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/55252[54] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-toughens-demands-on-syrias-new-islamist-led-leadership-695bff58?msockid=31724c4845486561027c583141486b0b[55] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/3428 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1913278674498957799[56] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/3428[57] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1913254810716975472 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2025[58] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1913278674498957799[59] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/3428[60] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1912962759920435656[61] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1912962759920435656[62] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2024/04/central-committees-in-the-west-and-eighth-brigade-in-the-east-who-controls-daraa/[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-11-2025 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/127419; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1910675675591192915[64] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1911423095300071586[65] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141369 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025[66] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141369[67] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141329 ; https://baghdadtoday dot news/272368-.html   [68] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-neighbors-near-security-alliance-agreement[69] https://baghdadtoday dot news/272368-.html   [70] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5133362-iraq%E2%80%99s-sudani-confirms-election-bid-invites-syria%E2%80%99s-al-sharaa-arab-summit[71] https://almadapaper dot net/397476/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/398783/[72] https://x.com/hxhassan/status/1912628832353280267[73] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/yemen/2025/04/18/%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%8014-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%AD-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B1%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%89-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912905729570206025;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912938717284622617[74] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912905729570206025[75] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912938717284622617[76] https://t.me/army21ye/2837[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1913075943620387092[78] https://t.me/army21ye/2837[79] https://www.bon-bast.com/[80] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/739303/[81] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-17-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-25-2025[82] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1913185094929436989  [83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-strike-on-iran-took-out-radar-sets-to-guide-ballistic-missiles-report/

[Author: Unknown]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 11:13pm

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William RunkelApril 23, 2025, 8:30 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on April 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine. The Telegraph and Axios reported on April 22 and 23 that sources familiar with the matter stated that the United States presented Ukraine with a proposal to end the war during the April 17 meeting in Paris and that the United States expected that the April 23 multilateral talks in London would discuss the proposal.[1] There have been no official statements about the reported US proposal. The Telegraph reported that the document contains seven points about an immediate ceasefire, Ukrainian-Russian talks, Ukraine's inability to join NATO, territory, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, and US-Russian relations.[2] Axios and The Telegraph reported that the plan calls for the United States to "de jure" recognize Russian control of Crimea and "de facto" recognize Russia's occupation of most of the areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces currently occupy.[3] Russia would also reportedly have to withdraw from the parts of Kharkiv Oblast that Russian forces currently occupy. Axios stated that the plan would grant Ukraine "unimpeded passage" along the Dnipro River, with The Telegraph reporting that Ukraine would gain “unhindered access to the mouth” of the river. The Telegraph noted that the proposal states that Russian forces would withdraw from another unspecified area of Kherson Oblast.[4] The proposal calls for the ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy, to be "considered as Ukrainian territory" but under US operation.[5] The US-operated ZNPP would reportedly supply both Ukraine and Russia with electricity. The US proposal reportedly states that the United States would promise that Ukraine would not become a member of NATO, while Ukraine could still join the European Union (EU). The proposal would give Ukraine "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states, but the document does not offer details about how this "peacekeeping operation" would operate, nor mention US participation in this peacekeeping force. The United States would also reportedly lift all US sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and would enhance US-Russian economic cooperation, especially in the energy and industrial sectors. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to receive compensation and assistance for reconstruction from an unspecified funding source.The reported US proposal suggests that the Trump administration is seeking to simultaneously achieve a full ceasefire in Ukraine, conclude a peace settlement to end the war, and develop US-Russian economic relations – a sharp contrast to the timeline of events that the administration has called for in recent weeks. The White House stated on March 25 that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides of the [war] must stop" is a "necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" — demonstrating how the Trump administration viewed a full ceasefire as the first step toward securing a peace settlement.[6] Ukraine agreed to the March 18 US-proposed full ceasefire along the frontline and agreed to the US-supported extension of the unilateral Russian Easter truce on April 21 — in sharp contrast to Russia, which refused to accept or extend these US-proposed and US-supported ceasefires.[7] The White House also stated on April 15 that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly stated in February 2025 that US sanctions on Russia would remain in place until Russia and Ukraine had reached a peace deal to end the war — in contrast to the reported US proposal that would simultaneously put a ceasefire in place in Ukraine, lift US sanctions against Russia, and develop US-Russian economic cooperation.[8]Significant details about the territorial swaps in the US proposal are unclear from the available reporting. Russian forces currently occupy a small part of Mykolaiv Oblast — the Kinburn Spit — and recently began conducting offensive operations into northern Sumy Oblast — two oblasts which the available reporting about the US proposal does not address.[9] It is unclear whether Ukraine would gain access only to the mouth of the Dnipro River or a wider littoral area along the river‘s left bank given differences between reporting from Axios and The Telegraph. Details about the extent of the territory near the ZNPP on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River that would be considered Ukrainian are also unspecified, but Russian forces would have to withdraw from some territory in the area according to the US plan as Russian forces currently occupy significant portions of Zaporizhia Oblast behind the Dnipro River’s east bank. The Dnipro River would nevertheless present itself as a significant barrier between the Ukrainian-controlled and US-operated ZNPP from the rest of the territory under Ukraine's control under the reported US plan, assuming Russian forces do not withdraw from territory around the Kakhovka Reservoir to permit a land bridge from Ukrainian-controlled Zaporizhia Oblast to the ZNPP. The location of such a strategically important facility close to the frozen frontline would greatly complicate Ukraine's ability to defend the ZNPP due to the lack of defensive depth.[10] ISW previously conduced a terrain study and assessed that freezing the Russian war in Ukraine on anything like the current lines — particularly those in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts — enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring, let alone defeating, a future Russian operations against war against Ukraine.[11]Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace. Zelensky recalled on April 22 that Ukraine supported and continues to support Trump's March 18 unconditional ceasefire proposal.[12] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to hold discussions "in any format" after the implementation of a ceasefire.[13] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov similarly stated on April 23 that the Ukrainian delegation in London discussed ways to achieve a full and unconditional ceasefire as a "first step" toward a peace settlement and that Ukraine is committed to Trump's peace efforts.[14] Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on April 23 that Ukraine is ready to negotiate and that a full ground, air, and sea ceasefire is a necessary first step toward peace.[15]Zelensky stated on April 22 that Ukraine does not legally recognize Russia's occupation of Crimea in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution, which ensures Ukraine's territorial integrity and recognizes the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as part of Ukraine.[16] Svyrydenko also noted that Ukraine cannot agree to a settlement that grants Russia a "stronger foundation" to regroup and renew its aggression in the future. ISW continues to assess that freezing the front along the current lines enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring and defeating future Russian aggression.[17] Russia's occupation of Crimea and Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts will continue to threaten Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa cities, the Ukrainian southwestern coast, and Ukrainian ships attempting to transit the western Black Sea.Russian officials rejected aspects of Trump's reported peace plan. Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matvienko stated on April 23 that Russia will "never participate" in any negotiations that discuss the possible deployment of European troops to Ukraine and that such a deployment is "unacceptable" to Russia, regardless of whether the peacekeeping forces deploy under the NATO framework or another "flag."[18] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov gave an interview to French news magazine Le Point published on April 23 and similarly rejected the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine.[19] Peskov stated that Russia rejected the full ceasefire that Trump previously proposed because the ceasefire failed to meet all of Russia's demands, including that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — all of which Russia has illegally declared annexed. Peskov claimed that the entirety of these four oblasts were "enshrined in our [Russian] Constitution as an integral part of Russia" and that the "war will end immediately" if Ukraine withdraws from these oblasts. Russian state-run and pro-Kremlin media outlets amplified Peskov's statements, as well as statements from other pro-Kremlin mouthpieces calling on Russia to refuse to give up any part of the four Ukrainian oblasts included in the Russian Constitution — in violation of international law and numerous treaties Russia previously signed with Ukraine.[20]Russian officials continue to give no indication that the Kremlin is willing to make any concessions of its own. Peskov has reiterated multiple times in the past weeks — including on April 23 — that details about peace proposals should not be publicly available, likely as part of efforts to keep the precise terms obfuscated in hopes of further delaying negotiations and extracting concessions.[21] Russian officials have reiterated the Kremlin's demands in recent weeks, including Russia's rejection of European peacekeepers deploying to Ukraine, refusal to withdraw from any parts of occupied Ukraine, and territorial claims over areas of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy.[22] Russian state media recently amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial control along the Dnipro River in Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts — including areas that Russian forces would have to withdraw from under the reported US proposal.[23]Senior US, Ukrainian, and European officials held bilateral and multilateral talks about support for Ukraine and ending the war in London on April 23, but officials cancelled the scheduled multilateral talks at the foreign minister level. The UK Foreign Office announced on April 23 that the ministerial meeting was postponed for unspecified reasons but that "official level talks" would continue.[24] UK outlet SkyNews reported that the multilateral talks continued among senior officials but "at a much lower level" than planned.[25] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov reported that he, Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha met with UK Foreign Minister David Lammy and UK Defense Minister John Healey in London about Ukrainian defensive capabilities and held a separate meeting with US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg on possible scenarios to end the war.[26] The Ukrainian delegation also met with UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell, French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor's Advisor for Foreign and Security Policy Jens Plotner, and Umerov and Yermak reaffirmed Ukraine's commitment to a just and lasting peace, including to US President Donald Trump's peace initiative.[27] Yermak stated that the April 23 meeting was a "first step" towards a full settlement process.[28]US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff originally planned to attend the April 23 talks in London but pulled out no later than April 22.[29] The Washington Post reported on April 23, citing a diplomat familiar with the talks, that European diplomats cancelled the foreign ministerial meeting after Rubio pulled out of the meeting.[30] A US official and two European diplomats familiar with the matter told CNN on April 23 that Rubio did not attend the London talks because the Trump administration did not believe talks were "at a decisive point."[31] A US official told Axios that "the decision was made" for Rubio to not travel to London after the United States observed indications that Ukrainian officials wanted to discuss a 30-day temporary ceasefire, as the Trump administration initially proposed in March 2025, rather than the most recent US proposal for an immediate and decisive settlement.[32]The US and Ukraine continue to take steps toward signing a joint mineral deal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 22 that legal consultations between the US and Ukraine regarding the mineral deal are underway, though the date for signing the deal remains "unclear."[33] US President Donald Trump told reporters on April 17 that the mineral deal could be signed as early as April 24.[34] Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent outlining steps toward completing the bilateral mineral deal, but the document did not include a specific signing date.[35]Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory, stated on April 23 that it was "loud" at the Alabuga SEZ and implied that there were "somewhat successful" strikes in the area.[36] Kovalenko noted that Russia produced over 6,000 Shahed drones and thousands of decoy drones at the Alabuga SEZ in 2024 and that Russia ordered the Alabuga SEZ to produce 8,000 to 10,000 Shaheds and 15,000 decoy drones in 2025.[37] Russian sources published footage purportedly showing a fire in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, near the Alabugza SEZ and showing Russian air defenses attempting to down drones in the area.[38] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated that five Ukrainian drones with 250-kilogram warheads struck the facility and that Russian forces only downed one drone.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 23 that Russian forces shot down a drone over the Republic of Tatarstan.[40] ISW recently assessed that Russia is likely increasingly adapting its drones to overcome Ukraine's mobile fire groups that have proven successful at downing Shahed drones.[41]Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. Ukrainian Deputy Head of the Main Department of Anti-Mine Action, Civil Protection, and Environmental Safety Colonel Valeriy Veber reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces recorded 767 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in March 2025 and 7,730 cases since February 2023.[42] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 14 that Russian forces are dropping RG-Vo hand grenades with a type of riot control agent (RCA) onto Ukrainian positions near Shcherbaky in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[43] Russian sources openly acknowledged that Russian forces were dropping RG-Vo grenades containing tear gas from drones as early as December 2023.[44] Ukrainian military officials also reported on April 16 and 17 that they identified a capsule with concentrated chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas, a type of RCA banned under the CWC, on Russian Shahed drones and that Russia may be using these drones to disperse poisonous substances among the civilian population.[45]Key Takeaways:The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine.Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace.Russian officials rejected aspects of Trump's reported peace plan.Senior US, Ukrainian, and European officials held bilateral and multilateral talks about support for Ukraine and ending the war in London on April 23, but officials cancelled the scheduled multilateral talks at the foreign minister level.The US and Ukraine continue to take steps toward signing a joint mineral deal.Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones.Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are currently no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced near the international border in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their limited remaining positions in the area.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage posted on April 22 shows Russian forces recently advanced south of Guyevo (south of Sudzha near the international border).[46]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 23 that Russian forces seized the St. Nicholas Monastery southwest of Guyevo.[47] A Russian naval infantry battalion claimed that Ukrainian forces only maintain positions in Kursk Oblast in Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[48]Fighting continued southwest of Sudzha in Oleshnya and Gornal on April 22 and 23.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking unspecified Russian positions in Kursk Oblast.[50]Order of Battle: A medical group and other elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, including near Gornal.[51] Sapper elements of the Russian 92nd Engineer-Sapper Regiment (Russian Engineer Troops) are reportedly clearing mines in the border areas of Kursk Oblast.[52] Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[53] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating near the St. Nicholas Monastery.[54]Fighting continued in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 23.Fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Popovka and Demidovka on April 23.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Popovka and Demidovka.[56]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that positional battles continued in northern Sumy Oblast.[57]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[58]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 23 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchanski Khutory and Vovchansk on April 22 and 23.[59]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Veter” detachment of the 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[60]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction on April 23.Ukrainian forces advanced in the Borova direction, but this advance did not occur recently.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced northwest of Nadiya (east of Borova).[61]Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Olhivka, Novoserhiivka, and Hrekivka on April 22 and 23.[62]Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Lyman direction on April 23 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, Nove, Ridkodub, Myrne, and Kolodyazi and toward Zelena Dolyna, Hlushchenkove, and Novyi Myr and east of Lyman near Torske on April 22 and 23.[63]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" detachment, Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Shram" Group, and the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[64]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 23 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 22 and 23.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryhorivka.[66]Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 23 that Russian forces are using motorcycles in the Siversk and Lyman directions in a similar manner as in the Pokrovsk direction. Trehubov stated that Russian forces use motorcycles to quickly traverse open terrain, infiltrate Ukrainian defensive lines, and consolidate positions before bringing forward reinforcements. Trehubov said that Russian forces have not achieved any tactically significant battlefield successes since integrating motorcycles into combat, however.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 23 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on April 22 and 23.[67]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on April 23 that Russian forces have a manpower advantage and use armored vehicles to bring infantry as close to the frontlines as possible before dismounting and attacking on foot.[68] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using assault tactics in different sequences in an effort to achieve tactical surprise. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Kredo-M1 portable radar system in Chasiv Yar.[69]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[70]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on April 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Toretsk.[71]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage posted on April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[72] Russian milbloggers credited the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) with the seizure of Sukha Balka.[73] Geolocated footage posted on April 22 and April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along a waste heap in northern Toretsk and northwest of Leonidivka (west of Toretsk).[74]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced in the fields north and northwest of Sukha Balka.[75]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka, east of Toretsk near Druzhba and Krymske, southwest of Toretsk near Petrivka and Leonidivka, and toward Romanivka, and west of Toretsk toward Shcherbynivka on April 22 and 23.[76]The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported on April 23 that Russian forces are trying to break through Ukrainian defenses by quickly approaching Toretsk in armored personnel carriers and by assaulting Ukrainian positions using groups of up to 15 motorcycles.[77] The commander added that Russian forces are using tanks to transport infantry as close as possible to Ukrainian positions.[78]Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [AC], SMD) recently advanced 1.5 kilometers into Dachne (north of Toretsk) on motorcycles.[79] Drone operators of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[80] Elements of the Russian 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[81]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Moskovska Street in central Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[82]Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed on April 23 that Russian forces seized Tarasivka, and Russian milbloggers attributed the settlement's seizure to elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD).[83]Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Berezivka, Nova Poltavka, Vodyane Druhe, and Stara Mykolaivka and toward Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, Zelene Pole, Kalynove, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Shevchenko, and Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on April 22 and 23[84]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk in the Russian forces' near rear).[85] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[86]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 23 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka, Novomykolaivka, and Novooleksandrivka, and toward Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka, Kotlyarivka, and Nadiivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske on April 22 and 23.[87]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[88]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Rozlyv and toward Bahatyr and Odradne (both southwest of Kurakhove).[89]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Rozlyv, and Odradne on April 22 and 23.[90] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne.[91]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 23 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and in central Vilne Pole.[92]Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Shevchenko, and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Rivnopil and toward Novopil on April 22 and 23.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne Pole.[94]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[95]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 23 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Pyatykhatky, Lobkove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky on April 22 and 23.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pyatykhatky.[97]Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and four Russian Starlink antennas in unspecified locations in southern Ukraine in the past day.[98]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 417th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka. Drone operators of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment’s ”Shaman” drone detachment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Orikhiv, and elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on April 23.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 22 to 23 and a missile strike on April 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 134 strike and decoy drones from Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[99] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 67 drones and that 47 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck industrial sites, civilian infrastructure, energy infrastructure, and commercial enterprises in Kherson, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[100] Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against civilian infrastructure facilities in Sumy Oblast during the day on April 23.[101]Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Head Spartak Borysenko reported on April 23 that Russian forces recently used modified Shahed and Geran-2 drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-136) containing 12-channel control modules and payloads up to 90 kilograms during unspecified strikes against Kharkiv City.[102] The modified drones reportedly have increased resistance to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and carry payloads nearly double the size of the 40-kilogram Shahed drones that Russia utilized in 2022.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://mod dot gov dot ua/news/767-himichnih-atak-u-berezni-rf-prodovzhuye-ignoruvati-konvencziyu-pro-zaboronu-himzbroyi; https://suspilne dot media/994683-armia-rf-sistemno-zastosovue-himicnu-zbrou-u-vijni-proti-ukraini-zokrema-na-zaporizzi-gur-mo/[43] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5708; https://suspilne dot media/994683-armia-rf-sistemno-zastosovue-himicnu-zbrou-u-vijni-proti-ukraini-zokrema-na-zaporizzi-gur-mo/; https://defence-blog.com/russian-troops-use-gas-grenades-with-cn-agent/[44] https://t.me/romanov_92/43273[45] https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://t.me/romanov_92/43273[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8969; https://t.me/dva_majors/69627[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/69660; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27415; https://t.me/tass_agency/311797; https://t.me/rusich_army/22843; https://t.me/wargonzo/26082; https://t.me/basurin_e/18366; https://t.me/tass_agency/311784[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/311784[49] https://t.me/rusich_army/22843; https://t.me/basurin_e/18366; https://t.me/rusich_army/22843; https://t.me/rusich_army/22843; https://t.me/wargonzo/26082; https://t.me/tass_agency/311697; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90468; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391[50] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21089[51] https://t.me/epoddubny/23209; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90466; https://t.me/mod_russia/51650[52] https://t.me/epoddubny/23215[53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34670[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27379; https://t.me/voin_dv/14557; https://t.me/mod_russia/51652[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/26082; https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5304[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/69660; https://t.me/smotri_z/42514[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34664[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27415[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ohxg6dyt76wLnuFroMnZonceTJtbTM7eHYkDyYzoeDCXWcGMCM6eynnDmm4itGpLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8547 ; https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5304[60] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7868[61] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27549; https://t.me/ab3army/5455; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iky_KTRyQkQ[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ohxg6dyt76wLnuFroMnZonceTJtbTM7eHYkDyYzoeDCXWcGMCM6eynnDmm4itGpLl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8547[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ohxg6dyt76wLnuFroMnZonceTJtbTM7eHYkDyYzoeDCXWcGMCM6eynnDmm4itGpLl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8547; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27418[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162272 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27418; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90414[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ohxg6dyt76wLnuFroMnZonceTJtbTM7eHYkDyYzoeDCXWcGMCM6eynnDmm4itGpLl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8547; https://t.me/dva_majors/69660;[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27382[67] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl[68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/23/zastosuvannya-vidomyh-metodiv-ale-v-riznij-poslidovnosti-v-chasovomu-yaru-taktyka-voroga-nezminna/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc[69] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8569[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27392; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90415[71] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1914974714117697640 ; https://t.me/BARS14GUMANITARKA/13691 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1914948953390412183; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1018[72] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8973; https://t.me/zvezdanews/156956; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8967; https://t.me/divannyevoini/14776; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63713; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34638[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/69699; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34624[74] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1914974714117697640 ; https://t.me/BARS14GUMANITARKA/13691 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1914948953390412183; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1018; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1914945060250017923; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8975[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8973; https://t.me/zvezdanews/156956; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8967; https://t.me/divannyevoini/14776; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63713; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34638[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ohxg6dyt76wLnuFroMnZonceTJtbTM7eHYkDyYzoeDCXWcGMCM6eynnDmm4itGpLl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8547; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1001121-vijskovi-rf-namagautsa-jti-na-shid-vid-pokrovska-ta-na-pivnic-vid-casovogo-aru-situacia-na-shodi/; https://t.me/rybar/69847; https://t.me/epoddubny/23211[77] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/23/dobyvaly-czar-tank-z-velykym-mangalom-bilya-toreczka-vorog-vykorystovuye-riznomanitni-varianty-shturmiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nAeUAOOFdkI[78] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90472; https://t.me/epoddubny/23211; https://t.me/rybar/69847[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27404[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13721[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63713[82] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1915015785841320361; https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1915012850172469481; https://t.me/dva_majors/69702[83] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90456; https://t.me/sashakots/53264; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63713 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51640 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51641 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22566; https://t.me/dva_majors/69700 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22856[85] https://t.me/wargonzo/26090[86] https://t.me/sashakots/53271[87] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ohxg6dyt76wLnuFroMnZonceTJtbTM7eHYkDyYzoeDCXWcGMCM6eynnDmm4itGpLl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8547[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8979; https://www.facebook.com/61573845209927/videos/1203299614824970/[89] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34668; https://t.me/voin_dv/14565; https://t.me/wargonzo/26082;[90] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ohxg6dyt76wLnuFroMnZonceTJtbTM7eHYkDyYzoeDCXWcGMCM6eynnDmm4itGpLl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02qCEeUkxmva9zPizwuWM49UMj99dRPaXyz3qCwPWuwTXzQXPGFc5DYV1ER26qBgfTl; https://t.me/voin_dv/14555; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34668[91] https://t.me/voin_dv/14565; https://t.me/dva_majors/69660[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/14565[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02qCEeUkxmva9zPizwuWM49UMj99dRPaXyz3qCwPWuwTXzQXPGFc5DYV1ER26qBgfTl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27384; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02qCEeUkxmva9zPizwuWM49UMj99dRPaXyz3qCwPWuwTXzQXPGFc5DYV1ER26qBgfTl[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/14565[95] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162221; https://t.me/voin_dv/14547[96] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ohxg6dyt76wLnuFroMnZonceTJtbTM7eHYkDyYzoeDCXWcGMCM6eynnDmm4itGpLl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02qCEeUkxmva9zPizwuWM49UMj99dRPaXyz3qCwPWuwTXzQXPGFc5DYV1ER26qBgfTl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27406[97] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27406[98] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02qCEeUkxmva9zPizwuWM49UMj99dRPaXyz3qCwPWuwTXzQXPGFc5DYV1ER26qBgfTl[99] https://t.me/kpszsu/33026[100] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1001303-u-harkovi-cerez-nicnu-ataku-sahediv-poskodzena-promislova-zona-de-10-pidpriemstv-de-vigotovlali-produkti/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2420 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1001047-vnoci-ta-vranci-23-kvitna-armia-rf-atakuvala-harkiv-bezpilotnikami-so-vidomo/; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79323 ; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/13633 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79323 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2412; https://t.me/astrapress/79538 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/34735 ; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/7399 ; https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1001113-armia-rf-znisila-energeticnij-obekt-u-hersoni-u-misti-mozlivi-vimuseni-vidklucenna/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1001077-goriv-restorannij-kompleks-ta-privatni-budinki-naslidki-ataki-bpla-na-kiivsini/; https://kv.npu dot gov.ua/news/politsiia-kyivshchyny-fiksuie-naslidky-rosiiskoi-ataky-v-oblasti ; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1914876076544708719 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/41569 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/23/masovanyj-udar-bpla-po-poltavi-ye-postrazhdali-poshkodzheno-budynky-sklady-i-pidpryyemstva/; https://t.me/astrapress/79582 ; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1001051-13-bpla-atakuvali-poltavu-u-nic-na-23-kvitna-poltavska-ova/ ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/22488%20 ; https://suspilne%20dot%20media/poltava/1001103-sonajmense-28-budinkiv-poskodzeni-cerez-ataku-bpla-u-poltavi-amsikova/ ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02qCEeUkxmva9zPizwuWM49UMj99dRPaXyz3qCwPWuwTXzQXPGFc5DYV1ER26qBgfTl ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1001003-v-odesi-prolunav-vibuh-so-vidomo-34/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9428; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79322 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79322 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/41561; https://t.me/astrapress/79579 ; https://t.me/astrapress/79574 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/33026[101] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35192[102] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1001359-dla-udariv-po-harkovu-rosiani-vikoristovuut-modifikovani-sahedi-u-comu-ihna-osoblivist/

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, April 17, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 11:13pm

  Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza,and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Senior Iranian political and military officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman in Tehran on April 17. Saudi Arabia may seek to reassure Iran about its positions on a potential strike on Iran and a potential ground offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.[1] Salman’s visit to Iran follows recent statements by senior Iranian officials threatening to attack any base “used by Americans” in a potential strike on Iran.[2] These threats likely seek to discourage US partners in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, from supporting an attack on Iran. Iran previously threatened in October 2024 that it would attack Saudi energy infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supported an Israeli attack on Iran.[3] Salman may have sought to reassure Iranian officials that Saudi Arabia would not support an attack on Iran.Salman, accompanied by Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al Jaber, may have also sought to reassure Iran that Saudi Arabia would not support a ground offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.[4] Salman’s visit to Iran follows recent reports that some Gulf countries and anti-Houthi factions in Yemen are exploring the possibility of a Yemeni government ground offensive against the Houthis.[5] Unspecified Saudi officials told Western media on April 14 that Saudi Arabia would not participate in a ground offensive.[6] Iran views the Houthis as an integral part of the Axis of Resistance, particularly since Israel has significantly degraded other key members of the Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah and Hamas.[7]A Chinese government-linked satellite company provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times on April 17.[8] This intelligence could support Houthi attacks against US vessels and commercial shipping, which demonstrates how the Houthis are continuing to cooperate with US adversaries to disrupt global trade. The US government raised concerns to the Chinese government about Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd. (CGSTL) providing satellite intelligence to the Houthis.[9] The Chinese government reportedly ignored these concerns. CGSTL has ties to the Chinese military through China’s military-civilian “fusion” program, which aims to integrate private sector work with military research and development, according to research done by a Washington-based security consulting firm.[10] CGSTL’s provision of satellite intelligence to the Houthis is part of ongoing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian support to the Houthis. Houthi-owned military communications and domestic surveillance companies have reportedly imported Chinese-made communications equipment.[11] Iran and Russia have provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis, which aids Houthi attacks on international shipping.[12] The Yemeni coast guard and Omani customs have previously seized shipments of Chinese-made military equipment to the Houthis, such as hydrogen fuel cells for powering missiles and drone propellers.[13] The Houthis reportedly told China and Russia in March 2024 that the Houthis would not target Chinese and Russian-flagged vessels transiting the Red Sea, according to several sources with knowledge on Houthi leadership discussions.The United Arab Emirates (UAE) deployed an Israeli EL/M-2084 radar at the Emirati Bosaso military base on the coast of the autonomous Puntland region of northern Somalia.[14] The UAE reportedly replaced an older radar system with the new EL/M-2084, which has a range of 256 nautical miles.[15] The UAE could use this radar to detect various types of projectiles, including low-flying drones and high-altitude ballistic missiles, over the Gulf of Aden.[16] The UAE could also use the radar to detect Houthi attacks on internationally-recognized Yemeni government targets, such as gas and oil export terminals in southern Yemen that the Houthis have previously targeted.[17] These energy export terminals are the internationally-recognized Yemeni government’s economic lifeline.[18]The United States reportedly asked the Syrian transitional government in mid-March to end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria in exchange for partial sanctions relief.[19] The Washington Post reviewed a list of eight “confidence-building” conditions that US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi delivered to Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani in Brussels on March 18.[20] The United States is considering extending an existing sanctions exemption by two years and possibly issuing another sanctions exemption if the Syrian transitional government fulfills these conditions, according to six unspecified US and Syrian sources.[21] The US Department of State and Department of the Treasury confirmed in early April that they were considering further “waivers, licenses, and assistance from foreign partners and allies” for Syria.[22] The list of conditions includes counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Syrian governments, the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice, and the prevention of foreign fighters’ appointments to “senior roles in Syria’s governing structure.”[23] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[24] The United States also called on the Syrian government to “issue a formal public declaration banning all Palestinian militias and political activities” and to deport members of these Palestinian groups.[25] Shara is unlikely to be willing or able to ban all Palestinian political activity in Syria but could agree to expel Palestinian militias from Syria in exchange for sanctions relief. The Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, which includes Palestinian militias such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has sought to destabilize the new Syrian government and weaken the government’s control over Syria.[26] It is unclear how many Palestinian militias currently operate in Syria given that the Syrian government has largely expelled other Axis of Resistance militias, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[27]Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued to indicate that he seeks to develop stronger diplomatic and political relations with the Syrian transitional government. Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed Russian interests in Syria with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani in Moscow on April 17.[28] Putin emphasized that Russia supports Syrian sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and discussed providing aid to Syria with Thani.[29] Russia and the Syrian transitional government have engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria. These talks have thus far not resulted in an agreement about Russian basing rights in Syria. Russia appears to have begun an incentives-based economic relationship with Syria and has delivered Syrian currency and Russian oil to Syria.[30] Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate Russian investment contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert.[31] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia might try to use these economic incentives to secure basing rights in Syria.[32] Thani said during a joint press conference with Putin that he and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara discussed Russo-Syrian relations during Shara’s visit to Qatar on April 15 and that Shara is “determined to continue this cooperation.”[33]Syrian media reported that Russian forces remain present at three military bases in Syria: Hmeimim airbase in Latakia, the naval base at Tartus, and Russia’s former helicopter base in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[34] The Syrian government and SDF likely permitted Russia to maintain limited forces at these bases while negotiations have continued since December 2024. Russia’s presence at Hmeimim and Tartus has generated significant attention given their relevance to Russian strategic objectives in the Mediterranean Sea, but Syrian media reported that a likely small contingent of Russian forces also remain at Qamishli, which is located in SDF-held territory.[35] A Kurdish source posted a video on April 17 that showed a Russian An-72 transport aircraft on Qamishli’s airstrip.[36] Two Russian-flagged vehicles approached the aircraft.[37] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi stated on April 14 that a Russian presence at Qamishli was “not a concern” and that Shara appears to be considering allowing Russia to maintain its force presence in Syria under a new agreement.[38]Key Takeaways:Saudi Defense Minister in Iran: Senior Iranian political and military officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman in Tehran on April 17. Salman may have sought to reassure Iranian officials that Saudi Arabia would not support an attack on Iran. Salman, accompanied by Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al Jaber, may have also sought to reassure Iran that Saudi Arabia would not support a ground offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.China-Houthi Cooperation: A Chinese government-linked satellite company provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times on April 17. This intelligence could support Houthi attacks against US vessels and commercial shipping, which demonstrates how the Houthis are continuing to cooperate with US adversaries to disrupt global trade.US Sanctions Relief for Syria: The United States reportedly asked the Syrian transitional government in mid-March to end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria in exchange for partial sanctions relief. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is unlikely to be willing or able to ban all Palestinian political activity in Syria but could agree to expel Palestinian militias from Syria in exchange for sanctions relief. The Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, which includes Palestinian militias such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has sought to destabilize the new Syrian government and weaken the government’s control over Syria.Russian Cooperation with the Syrian Transitional Government: Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued to indicate that he seeks to develop stronger diplomatic and political relations with the Syrian transitional government. Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed Russian interests in Syria with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani in Moscow on April 17. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia might try to use economic incentives to secure basing rights in Syria.Syria Anti-Syrian government social media accounts claimed on April 16 that General Security Services (GSS) personnel intimidated villagers in rural Latakia Province to give false testimonies to the commission investigating the March 2025 violence on the Syrian coast.[39] GSS personnel reportedly instructed al Mukhtariya residents to deny government involvement in the early March civilian massacres and to blame pro-Assad insurgents instead. The villagers reportedly disregarded these threats and instead implicated the GSS for committing massacres in their testimonies to the committee.[40] At least 40 civilians died in al Mukhtariya during the pro-Assad insurgent uprising in early March.[41] The residents reportedly fled al Mukhtariya after testifying before the commission due to fear of GSS retaliation.[42] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the claims made by these anti-government social media accounts, which regularly promote Assadist views. The commission spokesperson, Yasser al Farhan, stated on March 25 that the commission had completed its visits to all areas in Latakia Province that had experienced violence and was expanding its investigation to other provinces.[43] It is unclear whether the commission has returned to Latakia Province since March 25 to conduct investigations. The reports about GSS intimidation, if accurate, will erode public trust in the commission and risk discrediting its findings as partial or compromised. The committee must prevent any group from intimidating families in order to avoid obscuring the commission’s findings.GSS forces confiscated weapons and pursued wanted individuals in Maaraba, Daraa Province, on April 17.[44] Authorities urged residents to surrender their weapons to the GSS via mosque loudspeakers.[45] GSS forces seized several illegal vehicles, small arms, and various types of ammunition.[46] Security forces have confiscated weapons and military equipment in Busra al Sham, west of Maaraba, and its surrounding countryside since the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade on April 13.[47] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the transitional government appears to be trying to reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence over security in southeastern Daraa.[48]Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi in Damascus on April 17.[49] Safadi and Shaibani agreed to form a council to coordinate cooperation in various sectors, including the economy, energy, transportation, and technology.[50] The council plans to hold its first meeting in the coming weeks.[51] Syria and Jordan previously agreed on January 7 to form several coordination committees.[52] Shaibani also discussed strengthening security cooperation, particularly in regard to regional counter-ISIS efforts and efforts to combat drug and arms smuggling along the Syria-Jordan border.[53] Safadi reaffirmed Jordan’s support for Syria’s reconstruction process and its overall security.[54] Safadi emphasized that ongoing Israeli strikes and activity in southern Syria violate the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and increases regional tensions.[55]Kurdish leaders have continued to advocate for a decentralized governance system in Syria amid Turkey’s rejection of federalism in Syria. Syrian Democratic Council co-chairman Ali Rahmoun said on April 15 that Kurdish parties have entered talks with the Syrian transitional government in the hope of establishing a “form of self-administration or decentralization.”[56] The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) Foreign Relations co-chairwoman Ilham Ahmed advocated for a “decentralized system” in Syria on April 17.[57] Ahmed also noted that AANES is holding talks with Turkey, which AANES perceives will influence its talks with Damascus.[58] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on April 17 that Ankara could not accept a “federal structure in Syria,” which suggests that the AANES-Turkey talks, in part, revolve around decentralization.[59]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentThe secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Abu Alaa al Walai, threatened on April 16 to attack a Turkish base in Ninewa Province, Iraq, if the Iraqi federal government does not take “necessary action” against the base[60] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically attacked Zilkan base in Bashiqa, Ninewa Province, and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq when they oppose Turkish regional activities.[61] Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have recently expressed concern about Turkey’s regional influence, particularly after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.[62] Multiple Iraqi parliamentarians affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias urged the Iraqi federal government on April 15 to investigate several Sunni groups in Kirkuk and Ninewa provinces for their alleged ties to Turkey, for example.[63]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 30 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 16.[64] CENTCOM conducted at least 14 airstrikes targeting Houthi underground facilities and weapons depots in Mount Nuqum, which is located on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City.[65] CENTCOM also conducted at least six other airstrikes in Sanaa Governorate.[66] One of these airstrikes targeted a building in central Sanaa City, reportedly killing an unspecified number of Houthi fighters.[67] CENTCOM also conducted at least two airstrikes targeting Houthi supply lines between Sanaa City and the Houthis’ eastern front.[68] CENTCOM separately conducted at least 10 airstrikes in Hudaydah Governorate, with seven targeting al Tuhayta axis on the Houthis’ southwestern front.[69]The United States sanctioned the Sanaa-based International Bank of Yemen (IBY) and three IBY officials on April 17 for financially supporting the Houthis.[70] The US Department of the Treasury noted that the sanctions are part of the US effort to stop the Houthis from attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea.[71] The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to Yemeni government-controlled Aden to avoid being subject to US sanctions.[72]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arrested a Lebanese national and a Palestinian with ties to Hamas on April 16 for their involvement in the March 22 and 28 attempted rocket attacks targeting Israel.[73] A senior Lebanese security official told the Wall Street Journal on April 16 that the LAF is searching for four other individuals who participated in the attacks. These individuals are likely hiding in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, according to the official.[74] Hezbollah has denied involvement in both attacks.[75] Rocket attacks by smaller, non-Hezbollah armed factions in southern Lebanon indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there. Hezbollah has historically maintained de facto security control over southern Lebanon and the smaller armed factions that operate there, and it would likely be able to prevent attacks by smaller, non-Hezbollah groups if it were not badly degraded.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial appreciated from 875,000 rials to one US dollar on April 16 to 856,000 rials to one US dollar on April 17.[76]International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on April 16 and 17 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program and the US-Iran nuclear talks.[77] Grossi stated that the IAEA is in contact with US negotiators to discuss how the agency can serve as a bridge between Iran and the United States and help achieve a positive outcome in the talks.[78] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the IAEA can play an important role in peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue.[79] Araghchi called on the IAEA “to take a clear stance” against recent threats to the Iranian nuclear program.[80] Grossi told French media before traveling to Iran on April 16 that Iran is "not far" from possessing nuclear weapons.[81]Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 17 and delivered a message from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Putin.[82] Araghchi stated that Khamenei’s message addressed important regional and international developments as well as bilateral issues.[83] Araghchi emphasized that Russo-Iranian relations are stronger and more respectful than ever before and noted that the recently-signed Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement elevated the relationship between Iran and Russia to a strategic level.[84] Araghchi emphasized the importance of close coordination with Russia and China on the Iranian nuclear issue.[85] Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement on March 14 that condemned US sanctions on Iran and defended the Iranian nuclear program "as peaceful."[86]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28160/ ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/1912915953899176257 ; https://x.com/kbsalsaud/status/1912922231664967851 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/1912924608422137952[2] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/03/31/iran-urged-to-strike-diego-garcia-base-immediately/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-wants-indirect-talks-with-us-warns-regional-countries-over-strikes-against-2025-04-06/[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-10-2024[4] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1912920912921264399[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-16/red-sea-attacks-us-in-talks-with-yemen-forces-on-land-offensive-against-houthis[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-denies-reports-it-is-involved-talks-about-land-offensive-yemen-2025-04-16/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6[7] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735172 ; https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/irans-support-houthis-what-know[8] https://www.ft.com/content/628b404b-2a24-4853-8f3c-9caad408ef8f[9] https://www.ft.com/content/628b404b-2a24-4853-8f3c-9caad408ef8f[10] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Space/2024-04-01%20Chang%20Guang%20Satellite%20Company%20overview.pdf[11] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1912212572347965827; https://www.samsupplies dot com/[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b ; https://lieber.westpoint.edu/targeting-iranian-spy-ships/[13] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/c4eae92382c7456cae8c607af9d03794 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/13/us/politics/yemen-houthi-drones-report.html; https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/126709[14] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912585975353528395; https://x.com/NewsNucleus/status/1911668170118553741; 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https://www.ft.com/content/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203[32] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-chasing-a-deal-to-keep-its-military-bases-in-syria-f9f6ca6e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ; https://www.ft.com/content/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203[33] https://x.com/AJEnglish/status/1912209627753930754; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76702[34] https://x.com/MHJournalist/status/1912815569453056500; https://twitter.com/mdlkyb05018134/status/1912575362485092776; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cyve9prq3qjo[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LttBPlBsVLU; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1910474923497181676; https://www.majalla dot com/node/325004/سياسة/روسيا-في-شمال-شرقي-سوريا-نفوذ-صامت-لمكاسب-مستقبلية[36] https://x.com/MHJournalist/status/1912815569453056500[37] https://x.com/MHJournalist/status/1912815569453056500[38] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/04/syrian-kurd-commander-aleppo-power-sharing-deal-could-be-model-nation[39] https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1912505074527482252 ; https://x.com/Syriaviolations/status/1912525210558816352 ; https://t.me/abohedar313syria/1555[40] https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1912505074527482252 ; https://x.com/Syriaviolations/status/1912525210558816352 ; https://t.me/abohedar313syria/1555[41] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/07/death-toll-rises-syrian-security-forces-struggle-quell-assad-loyalist-attacks ; https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/R250305E.pdf[42] https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1912505074527482252 ; https://x.com/Syriaviolations/status/1912525210558816352 ; https://t.me/abohedar313syria/1555[43] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1904487315671535684 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/53615[44] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1912829741142331845 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1912832246060380452[45] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1912802184846024857[46] https://x.com/HoranFreeMedia/status/1912828043598446769 [47] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-15-2025 [48] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-15-2025 [49] https://t.me/SyPresidency/819[50] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668[51] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668[52] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1876601493035635198[53] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668[54] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668[55] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668[56] https://www.alquds dot co.uk/%d9%82%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%8a-%d9%83%d8%b1%d8%af%d9%8a-%d9%84%d9%80%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%af%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%86%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d8%b1-%d8%af%d9%85/[57] npasyria dot com/210759/[58] npasyria dot com/210759/[59] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1912811994748530699 ; https://npasyria dot com/210773/ ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141307[60] https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1912619122908856435[61] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muqawamas-duel-turkey[62] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-turkey-and-future-south-caucasus ; https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-turkey-power-dynamics-south-caucasus ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025 ; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/04/07/iraqi-militias-considering-to-disarm-ahead-of-us-iran-talks-sources-say/[63] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9---%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1[64]https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912570652545933329;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912577338065269056;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912578049415004511;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912578192767955308;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912580841118593292;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912583228877123907;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912604171733262669; 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https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-government-arrests-militants-asserting-its-authority-631a0ae9[74] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-government-arrests-militants-asserting-its-authority-631a0ae9[75] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13306042 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9713[76] https://www.bon-bast.com/[77] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/27/3293321 ;https://www.irna dot ir/news/85805972[78] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85805972[79] https://x.com/araghchi/status/1912715367908093966[80] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/27/3293321[81] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/04/16/rafael-grossi-iaea-director-without-us-any-agreement-on-iran-is-just-a-piece-of-paper_6740289_4.html[82] https://x.com/IrnaEnglish/status/1912910121283297409[83] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/28/3293553[84] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/28/3293894[85] https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-minister-arrives-russia-with-message-khamenei-state-media-says-2025-04-17/[86] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2025 ;https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-iran-russia-kick-off-talks-beijing-over-irans-nuclear-issues-2025-03-14/

[Author: ISWKF]

— Iran Update, April 23, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 10:36pm

Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.A Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS) is conducting extrajudicial killings against Syrians perceived to be tied to the now-deposed Bashar al Assad regime. The group—Saraya Ansar al Sunnah—called for the killing of an Assad informant in Aleppo on April 13 and has claimed two killings targeting informants since then.[1] The group has conducted 19 other attacks targeting former Assad officials and the Alawite minority in western Syria as well.[2] The group has also announced that it will attack the Druze community in southwestern Suwayda Province.[3]Saraya Ansar al Sunnah appears to support IS and share its extremist ideology. The group has stated that it seeks to excommunicate the “apostates” who fought IS, suggesting that the group opposes Assad supporters and the transitional government and could eventually fight both.[4] The group has also stated that it rejects worldly laws and modern borders, meaning that it recognizes neither the transitional government nor the borders of the Syrian state.[5] These statements indicate that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah would only acknowledge an Islamic polity under its interpretation of Sharia law, and that does not conform to internationally recognized borders. These views are extremely close to those of IS. The group denied that it cooperates with IS but acknowledged that cooperation “may happen in the future and will be announced as [it] happens.”[6]Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely seeks to destabilize the fragile political transition in Syria as part of its effort to establish an Islamic state. The group opposes a Syrian state that includes Alawites, Druze, or Shia, further indicating that it opposes the ongoing transition.[7] The group’s killing of Syrians considered close to the Assad regime may be meant to stoke renewed conflict between Assad regime elements and the transitional government. These killings could generate support for the group from other sectarian Islamists and encourage Assad loyalists to reorganize militarily to defend themselves. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah could probably co-opt easily some of the sectarian Islamists who have already formed vigilante groups to attack Assad loyalists.[8] A reorganized force of Assad loyalists could seriously threaten the transitional government. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah could exploit the ensuing tensions to recruit new fighters and form an armed, hardline opposition to the current transition process. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is not currently strong enough to seriously threaten the transitional government, though it could strengthen over time.Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is exploiting real grievances in Syria caused by a lack of transitional justice in order to justify its attacks on Assad loyalists. The group’s killing of alleged Assad loyalists reflects that some Syrians believe that there has been no justice for the atrocities that the Assad regime committed.[9] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely views the punishment of Assad loyalists as secondary to the establishment of an Islamist state, however. Concerted efforts by the transitional government to hold former Assad officials accountable should undermine Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s messaging, nonetheless. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns the extrajudicial killings conducted by Saraya Ansar al Sunnah and vigilante groups of all political persuasions.Iran has reportedly established ties with extremist groups to destabilize the Syrian transition, meaning that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s destabilizing activities could support Iranian objectives.[10] There is no evidence that Iran supports Saraya Ansar al Sunnah at this time. But Iran has previously engaged other extremist Salafi-jihadi groups, such as al Qaeda, in support of its objectives.[11]Iran continues to expand its nuclear infrastructure near Natanz. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on April 23 that Iran is constructing a security perimeter around two underground nuclear tunnel complexes located within Mount Kolang Gaz La, south of the Natanz enrichment complex, citing commercially available satellite imagery.[12] The International Atomic Energy Agency has not visited either site. Imagery from March 2025 shows partially erected wall panels and road grading and leveling efforts to install a security perimeter. The security perimeter appears to encircle the base of the mountain and join with one side of the perimeter around Natanz. Iran announced in September 2020 that it was building a tunnel complex near Natanz to make advanced centrifuges after a former centrifuge production facility was destroyed in July 2020.[13] More advanced centrifuges enable Iran to enrich uranium at a faster rate.[14] These centrifuges may allow Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program in the event that, after a nuclear deal, Iran decreases its amount of highly enriched uranium and then the nuclear deal collapses. The second, much smaller, tunnel complex located within Mount Kolang Gaz La was revealed in 2007 but was inactive until recently, according to ISIS.[15] ISIS reported that the complex may store enriched uranium stockpiles or centrifuge-related equipment. The report also stated that construction of the security perimeter has been ongoing at least since 2023, but has accelerated in recent months. The United States and Israel have repeatedly threatened to strike Iranian nuclear facilities.[16]Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, highlighting growing alignment between major US adversaries. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Chinese Vice Premier Din Xuexiang and Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, China, on April 23 to discuss nuclear negotiations and deliver a written message from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.[17] Araghchi emphasized Iran’s intent to brief China, alongside Russia, on all nuclear-related developments, citing China’s roles as a UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board member.[18] Unspecified diplomatic sources told anti-regime media that Araghchi also carried a written message from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Chinese President Xi Jinping, affirming that the any agreement with the United States ”solely intended to reduce tensions” and Iran will not alter its ”Look to the East” policy or the terms of its 25-year Sino-Iranian cooperation agreement.[19] The Look to the East policy aims to strengthen ties with non-Western countries, like China, to expand its global partnerships and boost its economic and political interests.[20] China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil. China’s Iranian oil imports help Iran circumvent US sanctions.[21] Iran reportedly seeks to include provisions in a potential nuclear deal to guarantee oil exports—especially to China—and prevent future US “maximum pressure” sanctions that could disrupt its energy revenues.[22]Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will very likely fail to secure weapon supplies from Russia as part of an emerging deal for military basing rights in Syria because Russia cannot spare military equipment for Syria. Shara alluded to procuring weapons from Russia or additional countries as part of developing new military basing agreements in an interview with the New York Times published on April 23.[23] Russia is currently facing a serious materiel shortage over the medium term, and its commitment to fighting in Ukraine will take priority over shipping arms and other military equipment to Syria. Russia will likely already face materiel shortages in 2026 and 2027 if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate, and many of these assets will be difficult to replace.[24] Russia and the Syrian transitional government have engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria.[25] These talks have thus far not resulted in an agreement about Russian basing rights in Syria. Syrian and Western media have reported that Russian forces remain present at three military bases in Syria: Hmeimim airbase in Latakia, the naval base at Tartus, and Russia’s former helicopter base in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[26]Shara will likely pursue weapon supply agreements with alternative partners as it becomes clear Russia will not exchange arms for basing rights. The Syrian transitional government’s armor, mechanized vehicles, and aircraft consisted predominantly of Russian-made models seized from the Assad regime.[27] Some of these systems were probably inoperable by the fall of the regime, though Israeli airstrikes have also destroyed a significant portion of Syrian stocks since December 2024.[28] It is unclear at this time how Shara would finance these arms purchases from other states, given the dire state of Syria’s economy. Shara confirmed to the New York Times that he had not yet received offers from “other nations to replace Syrian arms.”[29]Key Takeaways:Salafi-Jihadi Group in Syria: A Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS) is conducting extrajudicial killings against Syrians perceived to be tied to the now-deposed Bashar al Assad regime. The group has stated that it seeks to excommunicate the “apostates” who fought IS, suggesting that the group opposes Assad supporters and the transitional government and could eventually fight both. The group likely seeks to destabilize Syria’s fragile transition.Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continues to expand its nuclear infrastructure near Natanz.Iran, China, and Russia Continue Cooperation: Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, highlighting growing alignment between major US adversaries.Syria and Russia: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will very likely fail to secure weapon supplies from Russia as part of an emerging deal for military basing rights in Syria because Russia cannot spare military equipment for Syria.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 802,000 rials to one US dollar on April 22 to 807,000 rials to one US dollar on April 23.[30]Iranian Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi visited the 6th Tactical Air Base in Bushehr Province on April 23 to conduct an operational assessment and evaluate combat capability at the base.[31] This visit is likely part of a series of inspections that senior Iranian military commanders have conducted at Iranian air defense sites in southern Iran in recent weeks.[32]SyriaKurdish political parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC)—two longtime rivals—will call for decentralized administration and security forces in northeastern Syria. The Syrian transitional government has consistently rejected this demand. The KNC announced that several Kurdish political parties will convene on April 26 to present a unified Kurdish stance for future negotiations with Damascus.[33] The conference agenda listed a series of demands, including the constitutional recognition of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), the political administration controlled by the PYD in the northeast, and its current “administrative and security institutions” as the future models for decentralization.[34] Damascus has so far rejected any calls for decentralization in northeastern Syria during its negotiations with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[35] The conference agenda also called for formal recognition of the SDF as a “part” of the new Syrian army, and the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) as a subordinate unit within the SDF.[36] The SDF-transitional government agreement, which is a framework agreement signed on March 10, requires the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[37] Integration into the MoD does not imply that the SDF needs to be dissolved as an organization.This announcement suggests that the Kurds are increasingly concerned about an Islamist-dominated government in Damascus The announcement of the unity conference comes amid recent reports stating that the Syrian transitional government began consultation to form a People’s Assembly, that will likely closely resemble Shura councils employed by HTS and other Syrian Islamist factions during the civil war.[38] These developments have likely alarmed Kurdish political groups, which are generally more secular and have fought many Islamist opposition groups during the civil war.[39] Kurdish political groups have previously condemned Damascus for its failure to include Kurds in the transition process.[40]This unified Kurdish position will make it more difficult for Shara and the transitional government to play the two main Kurdish parties—the PYD and the KNC—off each other to maximize Damascus’s gains at the expense of the Kurds. The stated unity between the SDF, which is controlled by the PYD, and the KNC is notable because the two groups are long-time rivals in Syrian Kurdish politics. The PYD and KNC will need to maintain their unified front to successfully stymie Shara; however, PYD-KNC unity has proved difficult to achieve in the past.[41]Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad Yusr Barnieh and Central Bank Governor Abdulqader Husrieh attended the International Monetary Fund-World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, DC, on April 23.[42] World Bank Vice President for the Middle East and North Africa Ousmane Dione discussed priority areas for recovery and reform in Syria with the minister and governor.[43] Saudi Arabia reportedly agreed to pay Syria’s $15 million debt to the World Bank, which will enable the transitional government to request additional financial assistance from the World Bank to help rebuild its public sector.[44] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has consistently lobbied for sanctions relief and international funding that would enable Syria to rebuild.[45]Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra discussed border security with Jordanian Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Major General Yousef Huneiti on April 23 in Damascus.[46] Jordan and Syria have established at least five sectoral committees to coordinate bilateral relations in recent days.[47]Jordan banned all Muslim Brotherhood activities and affiliation in Jordan on April 23.[48] Jordanian security services confiscated the group’s assets across the country. Jordanian Interior Minister Mazen Fraya also announced that anyone promoting the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology would be “held accountable by law.”[49] Jordanian authorities arrested 16 individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on April 15 for planning rocket and drone attacks in Jordan.[50] The Jordanian government’s decision to ban the Muslim Brotherhood may decrease the effectiveness of Iranian efforts to penetrate Jordan via Hamas’s Muslim Brotherhood connections and develop Axis of Resistance groups there. Iran has recently placed greater importance on Jordan in its regional strategy.[51] Israeli and Jordanian police thwarted multiple Iranian-led attempts to smuggle small arms and other weapons to the West Bank via Jordan in 2024.[52]Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) internal security forces thwarted an ISIS mass escape attempt and attack plot in al Hol camp, Hasakah Province.[53] The SDF arrested 20 ISIS members and collaborators over a five-day operation in al Hol Camp beginning on April 18.[54] An ISIS cell inside the camp reportedly coordinated with a cell outside to organize a mass escape attempt.[55] ISIS cells orchestrated a prison break from a Hasakah facility in 2022 that spiraled into several days of heavy fighting that required US air and infantry fighting vehicle support, underlining the danger of these plots.[56] Al Hol camp continues to constitute a serious risk to Syrian stability and US national security due to the presence of ISIS supporters in the camp. Al Hol is a refugee camp for ISIS family members and persons displaced by ISIS in Hasakah, northeastern Syria. The United States plans to reduce its presence in Syria “to less than a thousand” personnel over the next several months.[57] A full US withdrawal from Syria would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute through escapes such as the April plan at al Hol camp. US forces provide critical intelligence and logistical support to the SDF and assist SDF units in managing and securing detention camps in northern Syria.Armed individuals continue to conduct sectarian and revenge-based killings targeting Alawites who may or may not be affiliated with the former regime. Armed men killed at least five Alawite civilians in two separate attacks in Homs Province on April 23.[58] Vigilantes separately assassinated a former Syrian Arab Army member in Job al Jandali, Homs Province, on April 23.[59] Unspecified armed men separately killed an Alawite civilian in Jableh, Latakia Province, on April 23.[60] These attacks follow a consistent pattern of sectarian killings in Syria, which suggests that the Syrian transitional government has so far failed to prevent sectarian violence in western Syria. Failure to prevent such attacks risks deepening sectarian divides and enables Alawite insurgents to exploit growing grievances.The Druze-majority Suwayda Military Council (SMC) Commander Tariq al Shoufi claimed that the group aims to implement the political decisions of Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri.[61] Shoufi said on April 23 that he has placed the SMC “under the control” of Hijri and that the group operates according to Hijri’s political principles.[62] Hijri has not given his support to the group, and his office has denied other similar claims by the SMC about its relationship with Hijri.[63] Shoufi clarified that the SMC does not seek to secede from Syria and hopes for a good relationship with the transitional government.[64] Shoufi has been consistently critical of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara.[65] The SMC is a small group composed of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime, and there is little indication that the group has serious influence in the Druze community.[66] More prominent Druze militias in Suwayda, including the Men of Dignity Movement, have already signed an agreement with Damascus to integrate their forces into the Syrian transitional government.[67]Syrian media reported that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed a former Ahrar al Sham commander as the 98th Armored Division commander in the new Syrian army.[68] Abdul Basit al Jamal (Youssef al Hamawi) led a splinter of Ahrar al Sham after a split in the organization following the appointment of Amer al Sheikh as Ahrar al Sham’s leader in January 2021.[69] The Ahrar al Sham wing that was not aligned with Sheikh reportedly backed Jamal.[70] Jamal commanded several Ahrar al Sham units active in SNA-controlled northern Syria.[71] Jamal was reportedly active in Ahrar al Sham beginning in 2011.[72] Jamal later went on to command an armored brigade within Fateh al Mubin, the HTS-led operations room that overthrew the Assad regime.[73]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentIranian-backed Iraqi actors continue to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on April 23 that the head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, Qais al Khazali, did not attend a Shia Coordination Framework meeting on April 22 due to disagreement over Syria-Iraq relations.[74] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly left the meeting early for the same reason.[75] This report follows Sudani’s recent invitation for Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara to attend the Arab Summit in Baghdad in May.[76] The source added that Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani said during the meeting that Iraq-Syria coordination will support Iraqi national security interests. Iraqi officials remain very concerned about the Islamic State (IS) threat in Iraq.[77] Iranian-aligned Iraqi political figures have continuously opposed normalization between Iraq and Syria due to Shara’s al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) roots.[78] The Zulfiqar Forces, a militia that claims to be a part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, condemned Sudani’s invitation to Shara on April 20.[79] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.Iraqi media reported disagreements between members of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Decision coalition on April 23.[80] Sudani, the Badr Organization’s Fatah Alliance, and Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh’s Ataa Movement will reportedly establish the Decision coalition.[81] A Shia Coordination Framework source said that Sudani and Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri have considered competing on separate lists in the upcoming elections.[82] The source added that negotiations over Sanad bloc head Ahmed al Asadi joining the coalition have stalled due to disagreements over the leadership of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the proposed PMF law.[83] Sudani has recently attempted to pass the PMF authority law to extend Fayyah’s chairmanship and reinforce Sudani’s control over the PMF.[84]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 22 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on April 22.[85] CENTCOM conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi barracks in Majzar District, Marib Governorate, and an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting Houthi facilities in Hazm District, al Jawf district Governorate, both of which are behind the Marib frontlines.[86] CENTCOM also conducted at least four airstrikes targeting Houthi facilities on Kamaran Island, at least two airstrikes targeting al Salif Port, and at least four airstrikes targeting Hudaydah Airport, all in Hudaydah Governorate.[87] CENTCOM struck a Houthi communications site in western Taiz Governorate behind the Houthi-National Resistance Forces frontline.[88] The National Resistance Forces are one of several factions loyal to the Yemeni government.[89]The Houthis claimed on April 22 that they launched an unspecified number of drones and cruise missiles at the USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea and the USS Carl Vinson in the Arabian Sea.[90] CENTCOM has not confirmed either attack.The Houthis used a domestically produced surface-to-air missile to shoot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Sanaa Governorate on April 22.[91] The Houthis claimed that they have shot down 22 US MQ-9 Reaper drones since the start of the October 7 War.[92]The Houthis claimed on April 23 that they launched a drone at an unspecified Israeli military target in Tel Aviv, central Israel.[93] The Houthis also claimed that they launched a ballistic missile targeting an unspecified Israeli military target in Haifa, northern Israel.[94] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a missile from Yemen.[95] The IDF acknowledged that the IDF's early warning system had a delay before the IDF intercepted the missile.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://t.me/sraia5_5/569 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/109 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/82[2] https://t.me/alaydiat/82 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/104 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/86 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/79 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/63 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/65 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/45 ;https://t.me/alaydiat/48 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/53 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/30 ;https://t.me/alaydiat/31 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/29 ;https://t.me/alaydiat/19 ;https://t.me/sraia5_5/423 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/23 ; https://t.me/sraia5_5/434 ;https://t.me/alaydiat/24 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/12 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/12[3] https://t.me/alaydiat/122[4] https://t.me/alaydiat/42[5] https://t.me/alaydiat/42[6] https://t.me/alaydiat/42[7] https://t.me/alaydiat/42[8] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1914283781998911624[9] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1903222875592724882; https://x.com/jihadyazigi/status/1902993608623468859[10] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/12/syria-iran-hezbollah-weapons-smuggling/[11] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unlikely-alliance-irans-secretive-relationship-with-al-qaeda/[12] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/new-security-perimeter-around-mt.-kolang-gaz-la-tunnel-complex[13] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iran-building-new-production-hall-for-centrifuges-in-mountains-near-natanz-idUSKBN25Z232/[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-18-2025[15] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/new-security-perimeter-around-mt.-kolang-gaz-la-tunnel-complex[16] https://www.newsweek.com/israel-iran-nuclear-attack-united-states-donald-trump-weapons-2036581 ; 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https://isw.pub/IranUpdate031425[41] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/383469/Despite-obstacles,-Syrian-Kurds-continue-unity-talks ; https://en.zamanalwsl dot net/news/article/62054/[42] https://www.worldbank.org/en/meetings/splash/spring ; https://x.com/ousmanedione/status/1914799124420972659[43] https://x.com/ousmanedione/status/1914799124420972659[44] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-plans-pay-off-syrias-world-bank-debts-sources-say-2025-04-14/[45] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/world/middleeast/syria-president-al-shara-interview.html[46] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/301 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/30753 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1915072727171387872[47] https://t.me/damascusv011/30737[48] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-outlaws-muslim-brotherhood-group-confiscates-its-assets-offices-2025-04-23/[49] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-outlaws-muslim-brotherhood-group-confiscates-its-assets-offices-2025-04-23/[50] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-plot-involving-rockets-drones-source-says-suspects-linked-hamas-2025-04-15/ ; https://x.com/ndawsari/status/1912187743460872420?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q[51] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2024[52] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CTC-SENTINEL-072023.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-arms-plot-kingdom-caught-iran-israel-shadow-war-2024-05-15/[53] https://npasyria dot com/211246/[54] https://npasyria dot com/211246/ ; https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/syria/23042025[55] https://npasyria dot com/211246/[56] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/03/syria-hasakah-isis-prison-attack/[57] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/article/4160500/statement-from-chief-pentagon-spokesman-sean-parnell-announcing-the-consolidati/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/17/us/politics/us-withdrawing-troops-syria.html ; https://apnews.com/article/syria-troop-withdrawal-trump-turkey-bfc9b8f2a4472221e69682de1b7f0e80 ;[58] GRAPHIC https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1914995042684486038 ; GRAPHIC https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1915078210641129692 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/123iDjVLqV3/ ;[59] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1915107898650173702[60] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1915071866714362135 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17o6pKeXWN/[61] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-1-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1[62] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/video/%D8%AD%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%8B[63] https://www.newarab dot com/news/what-suweida-military-council-and-why-did-it-appear-now[64] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-1-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1[65] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-1-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-31-2025[66] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1893704565544903043 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/45125 ; https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/27/israel-syria-druze-war-assad/[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2025[68] https://x.com/3M_SI/status/1911754610345124132 ; https://t.me/ALMHARAR/76625 ; https://www.alquds.co dot uk/توترات-جديدة-في-عفرين-شمال-سوريا-بين-فص/[69] Jerome Drevon, From Jihad to Politics: How Syrian Jihadis Embraced Politics, pg. 158-59[70] Jerome Drevon, From Jihad to Politics: How Syrian Jihadis Embraced Politics, pg. 158-59[71] Jerome Drevon, From Jihad to Politics: How Syrian Jihadis Embraced Politics, pg. 158-59[72] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/ألوية-بـأحرار-الشام-تسحب-الشرعية-من-قادة-الفصيل-السوري[73] https://t.me/ALMHARAR/76625[74] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87[75] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87[76] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5133362-iraq%E2%80%99s-sudani-confirms-election-bid-invites-syria%E2%80%99s-al-sharaa-arab-summit[77] https://baghdadtoday dot news/272368-.html[78] https://almadapaper dot net/397476/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/398783/[79] SITE Intelligence Group, ”IRI Unit Decries Iraqi Officials Welcoming Syrian President into Baghdad for Arab Summit, Promotes Resistance,” April 23, 2025, available by subscription at https://www.siteintelgroup.com.[80] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%87[81] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B8%D9%89-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A9 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%82-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86[82] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%87[83] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%87 ;[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-21-2025[85] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1914890746454278575; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914764232522129872 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914764339560538457 ;https://yemenfuture dot net/news/30821;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914770143940313187 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914802872564506743 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914808476431233167 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914824723030270273[86] https://yemenfuture dot net/news/30821;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914824723030270273[87] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914802872564506743; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914764232522129872;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914764339560538457;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1914890746454278575[88] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914808476431233167 ;https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/315662;[89] https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/national-resistance-forces/[90] https://t.me/army21ye/2862[91] https://t.me/army21ye/2862[92] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915095051195044198[93] https://t.me/army21ye/2866[94] https://t.me/army21ye/2866[95] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1914993188068114860

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, April 22, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 10:36pm

Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity, even though we do not describe them in these reports.Unspecified Iranian sources told a Qatari-owned, London-based outlet on April 22 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are progressing “beyond belief.”[1] Iran could calculate that by framing the talks as positive, even if the reality does not match, Iran could delay a US or Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program or the imposition of snapback sanctions on Iran. The Iranian sources claimed that the United States, which was represented by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, did not demand complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program and expressed approval to the principle of Iran’s right to enrich uranium during the nuclear talks. Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent, which is the same level agreed upon in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[2] The sources stated that they believe Iran and the United States will reach an agreement within the next two months.[3] Iran’s negotiating team could calculate that presenting the talks as positive could enable them to continue the talks and thereby avoid negative consequences while still failing to make any serious concessions.Former Iranian diplomat Abdolreza Faraji Rad also told the Qatari-owned outlet on April 22 that the upcoming US-Iran technical talks will focus on “enrichment levels and centrifuges.”[4] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei confirmed on April 22 that the US and Iran agreed to reschedule the technical talks from April 23 to April 26 at the suggestion of Oman.[5] Rad stated that the outcome of the technical talks would be presented to US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on April 26.[6] The head of a Tehran-based think tank stated that the technical talks will focus on what to do about Iran’s reserves of 60 percent enriched uranium.Syrian authorities arrested two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in Damascus after the United States requested that the transitional government expel Palestinian militants in exchange for partial sanctions relief. The General Security Services (GSS) arrested PIJ’s Syria Operations Commander Khaled Khaled and PIJ’s Organizing Committee head Yasser al Zafari in Damascus on April 19 and 17, respectively.[7] PIJ released a statement on April 22 in which it asked “our brothers in the Syrian government” to release the two men.[8] The Syrian Interior Ministry acknowledged the arrests but did not clarify why it arrested the pair.[9] The United States reportedly asked the Syrian transitional government in mid-March to ”[crack] down on extremist groups” and end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria in exchange for partial sanctions relief.[10] It is unclear if the PIJ arrests are tied to this request, but Shara may view the pursuit of Palestinian groups with long-standing ties to Iran and the Assad regime as a compromise that would be favorable to the United States but also palatable to his Syrian constituents. The Assad regime has hosted Syria-based PIJ fighters over the years and allowed PIJ to base its headquarters in Damascus.[11] It is unclear how many Palestinian militias currently operate in Syria, given that the Syrian government has largely expelled other Axis of Resistance militias, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[12]The new Syrian People’s Assembly may more closely resemble previous Shura councils used by HTS and other Syrian Islamist factions, rather than a Western-style legislative branch. Syrian constitutional committee member Ahmed al Qabri told Qatari-owned, London-based media on April 18 that the Syrian transitional government, which is led by Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara has begun “consultations” to select committee members that will select two-thirds of the People’s Assembly.[13] The People’s Assembly is a transitional legislative body that will propose, adopt, and amend Syrian laws, according to the Syrian Constitutional Declaration.[14] Shara’s direct hand in forming the People’s Assembly enables him to wield significant influence over who and which groups will be represented in the body. The constitution declaration allows Shara to directly appoint one-third of the body’s members.[15] Electoral sub-committees will choose the other two-thirds of the Assembly’s members.[16] A supreme committee, which is directly appointed by Shara, will “oversee” these electoral sub-committees, suggesting the Shara-appointed Supreme Committee could veto any actions taken by the electoral sub-committees.[17]The methods through which Shara will form the People's Assembly imitate how HTS elected the members of its Shura Council. The HTS General Shura Council effectively served as the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government’s legislature from 2017 to 2024.[18] The majority of Idlib residents did not participate in electing the council’s members, however. HTS tasked a small number of representatives with nominating and “electing” members of the council.[19] Representatives were chosen from “diverse” northern Syrian regions, tribes, camps, and unions, but the methods of their selection allowed HTS to wield influence over the council appointments.[20] Syrian opposition media reported in 2021 that the majority of the council’s candidates were “pre-determined” and approved by HTS.[21] Other Syrian groups, like Ahrar al Sham, previously used Shura Councils to grant representation to the different armed groups that fought under their banner.Such a consultative body differs from Western expectations of representative democracy, as it does not derive its authority from the people in the form of popular elections. It is unlikely that the similarities between HTS’s former General Shura Council’s and the People’s Assembly’s elections are a coincidence. Current Syrian Justice Minister and close Shara adviser Mazhar al Wais noted in December 2024 that Shara, when asked about parliamentary-style rule, spoke instead of “advisory and consultative councils” and specifically compared a possible Syrian parliament to a Shura Council.[22] This does not necessarily suggest that Shara will renege on his commitment to eventually hold “free and fair elections” to elect a permanent representative legislature.[23] The People’s Assembly is only designed to be a transitional mechanism, but the Constitutional Declaration notes that the transition will last for five years.[24] Council members are only permitted to serve for 30 months or until a permanent constitution is drafted and proper elections are held.[25] Shara could theoretically plan to introduce a consultative-style body in the short term as a precursor to a Western model of parliament in the coming years as Syria stabilizes. He has not made explicit promises about doing so, however.Suwaydawi political and civil society factions established the “National Assembly” in Suwayda on April 19 in opposition to the Syrian transitional government.[26] The National Assembly interim leader Omar al Aysami stated that the organization opposes the Syrian National Dialogue Conference and subsequent transitional Constitutional Declaration, which centralized power under transitional Syrian President Ahmed al Shara.[27] Aysami added that the National Assembly seeks to establish a unified, representative, political institution that derives legitimacy from the people. The National Assembly also seeks to organize armed factions and weapons under a single command within the province. The Druze community, which is predominantly located in Daraa and Suwayda provinces, has been fractured into distinct armed factions, but many have held similar reservations about joining the transitional government.[28] These factions appear to be coalescing into a unified coalition. CTP-ISW warned on March 17 that widespread Suwaydawi rejection of the constitution could impact ongoing governance and military integration agreements.[29]Key Takeaways:Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations: Unspecified Iranian sources told a Qatari-owned, London-based outlet on April 22 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are progressing “beyond belief.” Iran could calculate that by framing the talks as positive, even if the reality does not match, Iran could delay a US or Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program or the imposition of snapback sanctions on Iran.Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Damascus: Syrian authorities arrested two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in Damascus after the United States requested that the transitional government expel Palestinian militants in exchange for partial sanctions relief.Syria’s Legislative Branch: The new Syrian People’s Assembly may more closely resemble previous consultative or advisory councils used by HTS and other Syrian Islamist factions, rather than a Western-style legislative branch. The methods through which Shara will form the People's Assembly imitate how HTS elected the members of its Shura Council, and senior former HTS officials have explicitly compared a future Syrian parliament to a Shura Council.Political Opposition to the Syrian Transitional Government: Suwaydawi political and civil society factions established the “National Assembly” in Suwayda on April 19 in opposition to the Syrian transitional government.SyriaLikely Alawite insurgents attacked transitional government forces at a checkpoint in al Muntar, Tartous Province, on April 21.[30] This marks the first insurgent attack in Tartous Province in three weeks.[31] Insurgents previously killed two Syrian MoD personnel on March 27.[32] The Syrian transitional government has established checkpoints across western Syria to strengthen security and restrict insurgent movement.The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) opened a registration center to recruit individuals for the Syrian army’s 40th Division near Khirbet Ghazaleh, Daraa Province, on April 22.[33] The registration center will be open for one day and will accept applications from residents of various towns in Daraa Province.[34] The MoD began recruiting and registering individuals in Daraa Province to join the 40th Division in early March and opened a recruitment center in nearby Busra al Sham, which is an Eighth Brigade stronghold, on April 21.[35] The Eighth Brigade is a faction of former opposition fighters led by Ahmed al Awda that recently dissolved itself.[36] The 40th Division is expected to begin training within the next two weeks.[37]The Daraa Security Directorate seized a large number of weapons, including mortar shells and ammunition, near Busra al Sham, Daraa Province, on April 22.[38] A Syrian source reported that the weapons belonged to the Eighth Brigade, which recently announced it would dissolve and surrender weapons to the transitional government on April 13.[39] GSS forces previously confiscated the group’s military equipment in the city and called on all residents in the area to hand over their weapons.[40]Russia has continued to send economic resources to Syria in an incentives-based economic relationship that is likely designed to foster goodwill with the Syrian transitional government. Russia delivered 6,600 tons of wheat to the port of Latakia on April 20.[41] Syrian transitional government officials told Western media that financing challenges have discouraged global wheat providers from selling to Syria.[42] TankerTrackers reported on April 20 that Russia recently sent its fourth shipment of crude oil to Syria.[43] Russia began to deliver oil to the Baniyas port in late March 2025.[44] These and previous Russian shipments appear to be part of an incentives-based economic relationship that Russia is developing with Syria. Russia likely seeks to foster goodwill with the Syrian government in order to influence months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria. This economic cooperation between Russia and the Syrian government has been defined by Russian exports to Syria thus far, but this may not always remain the case. The Syrian General Ports Authority said that a ship left Tartous Port on April 22 loaded with 10,000 tons of Syrian phosphate in the first shipment of its kind since the fall of the regime.[45] The recipient of the shipment is unclear at this time.[46] Russia has reportedly expressed interest in re-negotiating Russian investment contracts for Syrian phosphate mines, however.[47]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentNothing significant to report.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 18 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since 2:00 pm ET on April 21.[48] CENTCOM conducted at least four airstrikes in two sorties targeting reported Houthi barracks in Majzar District and at least four airstrikes targeting Houthi facilities in Sirwah District, both in Marib Governorate on the eastern front of Houthi-controlled areas.[49] CENTCOM also conducted at least four airstrikes targeting Houthi facilities on Kamaran Island, Hudaydah Governorate, on April 21.[50] CENTCOM conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes in Sanaa City and in Barash Camp on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City on April 21, likely targeting Houthi leadership, command and control sites, and weapons depots.[51] CENTCOM conducted at least two airstrikes targeting a Houthi communications site in al Husn District, Dhamar Governorate.[52]A Saudi news outlet reported on April 22 that CENTCOM airstrikes have killed at least 500 Houthi fighters, including senior operatives, since March 15, according to officials and sources familiar with intelligence assessments.[53] One unspecified official told the outlet that CENTCOM airstrikes have killed between 500 to 600 Houthi fighters, including missile system operators and drone experts.[54] These killed in action statistics are significantly higher than the 200 Houthi fighters killed in CENTCOM airstrikes as reported by anti-Houthi Yemeni media on April 21.[55] Other unspecified sources told the Saudi outlet that CENTCOM airstrikes have targeted and destroyed Houthi training camps, leaving ”no survivors.”[56] Unspecified officials also confirmed that CENTCOM airstrikes have “significantly weakened” Houthi air defense and other unspecified military capabilities.[57]A Yemeni journalist confirmed on April 22 that a Houthi missile launched from an airbase on Adhran Mountain near Sanaa City malfunctioned and crashed into Furwa Market, Shuab District, on April 21.[58] Houthi media falsely reported this as a CENTCOM airstrike.[59] The Houthi missile misfire resulted in more than 40 casualties. A Yemeni analyst also reported that the Houthis continue to claim that a CENTCOM airstrike caused the explosion. The Houthis have arrested approximately 30 people in Sanaa City for publishing footage of the incident.[60]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks in the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial appreciated from 828,000 rials to one US dollar on April 21 to 802,000 rials to one US dollar on April 22.[61]Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni and Tajik Interior Minister Colonel General Rahimzoda Ramazon Hamro signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on April 22.[62] Momeni announced that the MoU covers cooperation to combat terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking. The agreement adds to the 22 MoUs and a joint statement signed during Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's visit to Tajikistan in January 2025.[63] Iran has strengthened its defense ties with Tajikistan in recent years, including the opening of a drone manufacturing facility in Dushanbe in 2022.[64]Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister Mohamad bin Abdulrahman al Thani discussed US-Iran nuclear talks, bilateral ties, and regional developments in a phone call on April 21.[65] Thani expressed Qatar’s support for a nuclear agreement and emphasized the need for a “fair, enduring, and binding” deal. The phone call followed Araghchi and Thani's meeting in Moscow on April 18.[66] Thani is scheduled to visit Washington, DC, to meet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on April 22.[67] Iran likely seeks to use nuclear talks with the United States to gain access to billions of dollars in frozen assets, including six billion US dollars held in Qatari banks. Iranian negotiators listed this among their core demands during the first round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Muscat on April 12.[68]The United States sanctioned an Iranian national and a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) shipping network on April 22 for exporting “hundreds of millions of dollars” worth of Iranian LPG and crude oil.[69] The US Treasury stated that the revenue supports Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and its proxy groups. These new sanctions are part of the US “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%B6-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-16-2025 ; https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/328996 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-begin-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-oman-fc07cdce[3] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%B6-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9[4] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%B6-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9[5] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404020201581/[6] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%B6-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9[7] https://www.alquds.co.uk/مسؤول-في-الجهاد-الإسلامي-لـالقدس-الع/[8] https://t.me/sarayaps/19272[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/22/world/europe/syria-arrests-palestinian-militant-leaders.html[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/22/world/europe/syria-arrests-palestinian-militant-leaders.html ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/[11] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-sponsorship-global-terrorism-need-accountability-0; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/palestinian-islamic-jihad[12] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-strikes-alleged-islamic-jihad-nerve-center-in-damascus-said-to-be-leaders-house; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-chief-says-group-lost-its-supply-route-through-syria-2024-12-14/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-6-2024[13] https://www.alquds.co.uk/مشاورات-لتسمية-اللجنة-المعنية-باختيا/[14] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2025/3/14/نص-الإعلان-الدستوري-لسوريا-2025[15] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2025/3/14/نص-الإعلان-الدستوري-لسوريا-2025[16] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2025/3/14/نص-الإعلان-الدستوري-لسوريا-2025[17] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2025/3/14/نص-الإعلان-الدستوري-لسوريا-2025[18] https://www.syria dot tv/تمهيداً-لاختيار-مجلس-جديد-شورى-إدلب-يعيد-تشكيل-اللجنة-العليا-للانتخابات ; https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2024/04/al-jolani-the-one-man-rule/[19] https://www.arabnews dot com/node/1487521 ; https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2024/04/al-jolani-the-one-man-rule/[20] https://www.arabnews dot com/node/1487521 ; https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2024/04/al-jolani-the-one-man-rule/[21] https://www.syria dot tv/نموذج-جديد-لـبراغماتية-الهيئة-إطلاق-النسخة-الثانية-لمجلس-الشورى-في-إدلب[22] https://jihadology.net/2024/12/08/new-fatwa-from-hayat-ta%E1%B8%A5rir-al-shams-general-administration-of-islamic-guidance-what-is-the-ruling-on-what-shaykh-al-jawlan-said-about-parliamentary-rule/[23] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/02/03/an-interview-with-ahmed-al-sharaa-syrias-president[24] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2025/3/14/نص-الإعلان-الدستوري-لسوريا-2025[25] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2025/3/14/نص-الإعلان-الدستوري-لسوريا-2025[26] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1913524499808403916 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1913703686301229335 ; https://www dot aljazeera.net/politics/2025/4/22/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1[27] https://www dot aljazeera.net/politics/2025/4/22/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-10-2025[29] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-17-2025[30] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1914622007729152219[31] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1905591373962555431 ;                    https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1905603258820747689[32] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1905591373962555431 ;                    https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1905603258820747689[33] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1914563214773309640[34] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1914563214773309640[35] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1899817159435473115 ; https://t.me/DaraaGov1/3294 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1914207459050148206[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025[37] https://t.me/DaraaGov1/3294 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1914207459050148206[38] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23952[39] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1914611012298252346 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1911423095300071586[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-15-2025[41] https://t.me/basurin_e/18322; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1913926605937807852[42] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/first-wheat-shipment-since-assads-ouster-arrives-syrias-latakia-2025-04-20/[43] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1914046884143829046; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ships-its-arctic-oil-syria-first-time-sanctions-limit-buyers-2025-03-21/[44] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ships-its-arctic-oil-syria-first-time-sanctions-limit-buyers-2025-03-21/[45] https://x.com/Syrianborders/status/1914669597577330997[46] https://x.com/diaa_audi/status/1914672631804051569[47] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-chasing-a-deal-to-keep-its-military-bases-in-syria-f9f6ca6e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ; https://www.ft.com/content/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203[48] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914385639321071994 ;          https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1914500401669235128https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914429960241963013; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914459401064169636            https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1914485667221897445;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914467268672491841; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1914500401669235128[49] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1914387397581643954; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914429960241963013; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914467268672491841[50] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914416301964996780; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1914500401669235128[51] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914466417321115743; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1914459401064169636[52] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1914485667221897445; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1914500401669235128; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1914524794382405986[53] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/united-states/2025/04/22/at-least-500-houthis-killed-in-us-strikes-over-last-month-officials[54] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/united-states/2025/04/22/at-least-500-houthis-killed-in-us-strikes-over-last-month-officials[55] https://yemenfuture dot net/news/30784[56] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/united-states/2025/04/22/at-least-500-houthis-killed-in-us-strikes-over-last-month-officials[57] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/united-states/2025/04/22/at-least-500-houthis-killed-in-us-strikes-over-last-month-officials[58] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1914635366222467344[59] https://x.com/Mikeknightsiraq/status/1914175085260185646 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1914098496430571677 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1914102299099795600[60] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1914440316414730265[61] https://www.bon-bast.com/[62] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/230909[63] https://irangov dot ir/detail/456395[64] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/02/28/2712908 ;https://www.iranintl.com/en/202205175418[65] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/230871[66] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/230733[67] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/22/trump-netanyahu-phone-call-gaza-hostage-deal-iran[68] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025[69] https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-a-liquified-petroleum-gas-shipping-network-to-further-pressure-iran/#:~:text=Today%2C%20the%20United%20States%20is,crude%20oil%20to%20foreign%20markets.

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 22, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 10:03pm

Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Grace Mappes, and George Barros with Nate TrotterApril 22, 2025, 9:00 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on April 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Financial Times (FT) reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war in Ukraine on the current frontlines. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly and explicitly emphasized that Russia maintains its territorial demands over all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, while also publicly signaling that Russia has greater territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond these four oblasts. The FT reported on April 22 that sources familiar with the matter stated that Putin told US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff during their April 11 meeting that Russia could relinquish its claims to the Ukrainian-controlled parts of the four oblasts that Russia has formally laid claim to and illegally annexed.[1] European officials briefed on the US efforts to end the war stated that Putin would probably use this to lure US President Donald Trump into accepting Russia's other demands and force these demands onto Ukraine as a fait accompli. Russia's "other demands" referenced by FT likely include Russia’s public demands for Ukrainian neutrality, regime change, and demilitarization — Putin's pre-war demands that Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated throughout the war and during negotiations about possible ceasefires and a peace deal.[2]Russian officials have recently repeated Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly cited Putin's June 2024 speech on April 14, and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement must include the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of the entirety of these four oblasts.[4] Russia passed constitutional amendments in October 2022 that defined the four oblasts as Russian territory, and Russian officials have recently reiterated how the Russian Constitution holds primacy over international law.[5] Russian officials have also repeatedly invoked the term "Novorossiya" when talking about Russian-occupied and Russian-claimed territory in southern Ukraine, with Putin most recently using the term on April 21.[6] Novorossiya is an invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia. A senior Russian occupation official, recently on April 21, called for Russia to control areas of southern Ukraine near the Dnipro River, including territory in oblasts that Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed.[7] Russian officials. including Putin, have also labelled Odesa City a "Russian city" that has nothing to do with Ukraine."[8] Kremlin newswire TASS has notably begun, as of April 2025, to characterize any Kremlin statements about Russian-claimed territory in Ukraine as about "Donbas and Novorossiya," likely as part of Kremlin efforts to set conditions for Russian society to expect Russia to achieve extensive territorial concessions in Ukraine.[9]The Moscow Times reported that the Kremlin is attempting to use economic incentives to sway US-Russian talks about the war in Ukraine, as the Kremlin is not sincerely interested in US President Donald Trump's efforts to end the war. ISW cannot independently verify Kremlin sources' statements, but recent Kremlin behavior is consistent with the Moscow Times' insider reporting. Independent Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported on April 21 that five current Russian government officials, including two diplomats and three sources close to the Kremlin who are employees of three major state-owned companies, stated that the Kremlin is looking for incentives to "hold...Trump's attention."[10] One current Russian government official stated that Russian authorities are working "in full swing" to prepare proposals for Trump across "key economic sectors." One source who has participated in the Kremlin discussions on the matter stated that Russia "needs to milk Trump as much as possible, dangling the possibility of a ceasefire like a carrot before him." A Russian diplomat stated that the Kremlin's priority is to "recalibrate" relations with the United States while keeping dialogue about the war in Ukraine "alive." The Moscow Times reported that the official Russian sources see two main scenarios that could unfold: either Russia agrees to a Trump-brokered ceasefire in exchange for concessions, such as limitations on US weapons supplies to Ukraine, or Russia will blame Ukraine should talks collapse.[11]Russia has recently offered the United States economic incentives that are unrelated to Russia’s war in Ukraine, likely as part of efforts to extract concessions from the United States about Russia’s war in Ukraine.[12] Russian Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev, for example, called for the United States and Russia to jointly work to solve problems in the Arctic in an April 21 article in Russian business outlet Kommersant.[13] This Russian effort goes against the Trump administration's desired timeline of events, as the White House has stated that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships.[14] Kremlin officials have claimed that Russia is willing to negotiate to end the war in Ukraine while attempting to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards ending the war.[15] Putin, however, has rejected multiple full or temporary ceasefire offers that the United States and Ukraine have proposed. Putin rejected the March 18 US-Ukrainian proposed temporary ceasefire along the entire frontline; refused to extend the unilateral Russian Easter truce on April 21, despite both US and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's support for such an extension; and rejected Zelensky's recent proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[16] Putin has already started to question whether Ukraine would be able to receive military aid from its allies in the event of a temporary full ceasefire — possibly to set conditions to demand the cessation of United States and likely also European weapons supplies to Ukraine as a condition for accepting a full ceasefire.[17]Any potential future Russian agreement to freeze the front short of Russia's full control of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts does not preclude future Russian aggression to achieve Russia's more extensive territorial demands, especially if the agreement stipulates a moratorium on Ukraine receiving Western military aid. A Russian diplomat reportedly told the Moscow Times that "the situation on the ground will dictate the next moves" in US-Russian talks about the war and that "it is all about time, patience, and staying the course."[18] The current frontlines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression, as Russian forces are just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 20 kilometers from Kharkiv City.[19] Russia has notably intensified its use of armored vehicles across the frontline and appears to have started a likely years' long effort to seize Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast - likely as part of efforts to gain as much territory as possible in eastern and southern Ukraine, particularly in the four oblasts to which Russia has formally laid claim.[20] Russia may tactically and temporarily stop pushing for Putin's demands for the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the four illegally annexed oblasts in southern and eastern Ukraine in order to extract other concessions from the United States under the rubric of negotiations. Such concessions could be Russia's "other demands" of installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv and drastically shrinking the Ukrainian military in order to decrease resistance against renewed Russian aggression. The Kremlin will likely exploit any ceasefire predicated on limitations on US weapons supplies to Ukraine to prepare for renewed aggression.Kremlin officials continued efforts on April 22 to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure. Zelensky reiterated on April 21 that Ukraine remains ready and willing to discuss Zelensky's recent proposal for a 30-day ceasefire on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[21] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 22, after Zelensky's April 21 statement, that Ukraine has yet to respond to Russian President Vladimir Putin's repeated statements signaling Russia's willingness to discuss such a ceasefire with Ukraine and that Russia first needs to understand if Ukraine is ready for such discussions.[22] Peskov claimed that there are no plans to discuss the proposed ceasefire and that Ukraine must remove its "obstacles" to contacts with Russia before bilateral discussions can begin, in reference to Zelensky's September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin after Putin's illegal annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine.[23] Zelensky has repeatedly signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia in recent months, however.[24] Peskov reiterated Putin's April 21 claims that Russia needs to "sort out" and study cases where there have been strikes against civilian infrastructure where military personnel were operating before agreeing to Zelensky's proposal.[25] Peskov's April 22 claims are in line with the Moscow Times' reporting that the Kremlin will attempt to blame Ukraine should talks to end the war fall apart and that the Kremlin is "dangling the possibility of a ceasefire like a carrot before [Trump]."[26]The Kremlin continues to reject Trump's stated goal of achieving a ceasefire in Ukraine before a full peace settlement to end the war — in contrast to Ukraine's continued support for a general ceasefire. US President Donald Trump expressed hope on April 20 that Russia and Ukraine would make a deal this week, possibly referring to a general ceasefire agreement that would precede future peace negotiations.[27] Zelensky stated on April 21 that a ceasefire "should be the first step towards a reliable and lasting peace" and that only after Ukraine and Russia demonstrate adherence to an agreed upon ceasefire can the parties establish the trust necessary to resolve "fundamental issues."[28] Peskov claimed on April 22 that Russia and the United States maintain communication via several channels but that "it is probably not worth setting any strict time frames" or "trying to fit a viable settlement [to the war] into short time frame" as "the topic is so complex."[29] Zelensky's and Peskov's statements continue to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to adhere to Trump's desired plans to end the war and Russia's rejection of these desired plans.[30]Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 22 that Russian forces conducted a strike against Odesa City on April 21 with Geran-3 jet kamikaze drones (Russia's analogue to the Iranian Shahed-238), which reportedly has a maximum speed of 500 to 600 kilometers per hour.[31] One milblogger claimed that the Geran-3 drone may have a new compact turbojet engine or may have a slightly modified version of the previous engine.[32] Other milbloggers claimed that the Geran-3 drones flew at higher altitudes than previous drone models during the Odesa City strike, allowing them to avoid Ukrainian mobile defense units. The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces directed multiple Geran drones from different directions toward a single target in Odesa City and that the drones waited in a designated area near the target while other drones conducted additional reconnaissance for target adjustment. The drones then reportedly conducted a concentrated strike against the target, hitting simultaneously and from different directions. Ukrainian sources and German outlet BILD similarly reported in late March and early April 2025 that Russian forces are loitering long-range drones at high altitudes several kilometers from large Ukrainian cities and other targets before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[33] It is unclear if the Geran-3 that Russian forces used in the April 21 Odesa City strike is a new modified version, if Russian forces have only changed their tactics for employing the drone, or both. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on April 22 that Russia recently increased its production of Geran-type drones and has begun using swarm tactics during drone strikes.[34] ISW previously reported that Russians started producing and using their own Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 analogues (which Russia calls Geran-1 and Geran-2, respectively) with imported Iranian components and using Iranian production licenses as early as summer 2023 and began producing the Geran-3 drone in early 2024.[35] ISW also recently collected reports that Russian forces have begun to equip Shahed drones with concentrated chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas (a type of riot control agent [RCA] banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC], to which Russia is a signatory), likely to inflict damage on Ukrainian forces or civilians even after Ukrainian troops shoot down the drones.[36] Ukrainian forces have proven highly effective at shooting down Russia's long-range drones using mobile air defense units, and Russia is likely looking for different ways to overcome these effective Ukrainian air defenders.[37] Russian forces will likely seek to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems by increasing the number of Shahed and Geran drones used in Russian strike packages, continuing to implement swarm strikes, and further adapting drones to penetrate Ukraine’s air defenses to inflict maximum damage.Russia is reportedly recruiting North Korean citizens to compensate for labor shortages in Russia, indicating that Russian-North Korean cooperation continues to deepen. Ryazan Oblast news outlet Ya62 reported on February 15 that Ryazan Oblast Telegram channels reported that over 100 North Korean women signed three-year contracts to work at one of the Ryazan Oblast warehouses of Russian retail giant Wildberries (the Russian equivalent of Amazon), but Ya62 noted that this information is unconfirmed.[38] Russian opposition student journal DOXA reported that there is a video circulated among Wildberries employees reportedly showing North Korean women at a Wildberries warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast, and a local Telegram channel claimed on April 15 that former Wildberries employees reported there are "hundreds" of North Koreans working at the Elektrostal warehouse.[39] DOXA reported that a Wildberries representative did not confirm whether the workers in the Elekstrostal video were North Korean but stated that Wildberries is working with a recruiting agency to attract workers from unspecified countries.[40] Russian milbloggers amplified much of this reporting on April 21 and 22 and praised Russia's and Wildberries' efforts to recruit North Korean workers for jobs in Russia to offset ongoing labor shortages.[41] The milbloggers praised North Korean migrants as better than migrants from Central Asian countries, claiming that North Korean migrants only work in Russia on short-term contracts instead of migrating permanently, are more "disciplined" and work harder for less pay and longer hours, are less biased against Russia, and "behave decently" — a reference to frequent Russian ultranationalist and xenophobic complaints that Central Asian migrant communities in Russia fail to assimilate into Russian cultural and legal norms. ISW has observed indicators that Russia is preparing for an influx of North Korean citizens to arrive in Russia, likely to either join the Russian workforce or join the Russian military, and ease some economic constraints of Russia's war effort.[42] Russian official data shows that 13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023 — and that 7,887 of these North Koreans entered Russia on student visas, with the largest number entering Russia in the months immediately before the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.[43] A significant increase in the number of North Koreans working in the Russian civilian sectors could free up Russia's civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industry or fight against Ukraine.Key Takeaways:The Financial Times (FT) reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war in Ukraine on the current frontlines. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly and explicitly emphasized that Russia maintains its territorial demands over all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, while also publicly signaling that Russia has greater territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond these four oblasts.The Moscow Times reported that the Kremlin is attempting to use economic incentives to sway US-Russian talks about the war in Ukraine as the Kremlin is not sincerely interested in US President Donald Trump's efforts to end the war. ISW cannot independently verify Kremlin sources' statements, but recent Kremlin behavior is consistent with the Moscow Times' insider reporting.Any potential future Russian agreement to freeze the front short of Russia's full control of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts does not preclude future Russian aggression to achieve Russia's more extensive territorial demands, especially if the agreement stipulates a moratorium on Ukraine receiving Western military aid.Kremlin officials continued efforts on April 22 to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure.The Kremlin continues to reject Trump's stated goal of achieving a ceasefire in Ukraine before a full peace settlement to end the war – in contrast to Ukraine's continued support for a general ceasefire.Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units.Russia is reportedly recruiting North Korean citizens to compensate for labor shortages in Russia, indicating that Russian-North Korean cooperation continues to deepen.Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in place in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the 38H-609 Sudzha-Guyevo highway south of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[44]Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized the St. Nicholas Monastery southwest of Guyevo (south of Sudzha near the international border) after Ukrainian forces allegedly used the April 19 to 20 Easter truce to regain positions in the monastery.[45]Fighting continued near Gornal.[46]A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Mount Fragor (just southwest of the St. Nicholas Monastery) is a contested "gray zone."[47] Russian security forces claimed to Kremlin newswire TASS on April 22 that Ukrainian forces blew up buildings in the monastery, but Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted a FAB-1500 or FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian positions in the monastery.[48]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating drones with fiber optic cables in Kursk Oblast.[49] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near the St. Nicholas Monastery.[50]Fighting continued in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 22.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[51]Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Popovka and Demidovka (southeast of Popovka).[52]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the outskirts of Popovka.[53]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly near Demidovka and Popovka.[54] Elements of the "Aida" group of the 204th Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating near Demidovka.[55]Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against a Russian missile and artillery arsenal in Vladimir Oblast on April 22, but ISW cannot independently verify the cause of the explosion at the arsenal. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who typically reports on successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory, stated on April 22 that there was an explosion at the 51st Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) near Kirzhach, Vladimir Oblast.[56] Kovalenko stated that the arsenal stored roughly 105,000 tons of weapons, including significant stocks of artillery shells, missiles, and ammunition for air defense systems and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Kovalenko did not state the cause of the explosion. Geolocated footage published on April 22 shows a smoke plume southwest of Kirzhach near the 51st Arsenal.[57] Vladimir Oblast Governor Aleksander Avdeeva claimed on April 22 that there was an explosion in Kirzhachsky Raion.[58] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 22 that a fire at an unspecified military unit in Vladimir Oblast caused an ammunition warehouse to detonate and that safety regulation violations regarding handling explosive materials caused the fire.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones may have caused the explosion if Ukrainian drones hit open or poorly protected areas of the arsenal.[60] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that human error or sabotage may be the reason for the explosion.[61]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 22 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Veselivka (northeast of Sumy City).[62]Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) and along the Volodymryivka-Bilovody-Basivka line (north and northeast of Sumy City).[63] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there is contradictory information about the Volodymryivka-Bilovody-Basivka line and that the situation is unclear.[64]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) and "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[65]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 22 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 21 and 22.[66]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk area reported on April 22 that Russian forces used Russia's unilateral 30-hour Easter truce to conduct rotations and supply frontline positions in this direction.[67] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces use small sabotage and reconnaissance groups to probe and attack Ukrainian positions in the area.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction on April 22 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Topoli and southwest of Kamyanka (both northeast of Kupyansk along the international border), northwest and southwest of Zapadne (northeast of Kupyansk), and northwest and northeast of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[68]Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kamyanka, northwest of Kupyansk near Mala Shapkivka, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 21 and 22.[69]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Kontory" Group (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[70]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 22 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Nadiya, and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Olhivka, and Hrekivka on April 21 and 22.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nadiya.[72]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 22 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Lyman along the Novomykhailivka-Katerynivka-Nove line, near Myrne, north of Novomykhailivka, and in central Ridkodub.[73]Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Myrne, and Kolodyazi, and toward Zelena Dolyna and Novyi Myr; and east of Lyman near Torske on April 21 and 22.[74]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces heavily shelled Ukrainian positions and conducted at least one infantry assault during Russia's unilateral Easter truce on April 19 to 20.[75] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces used the truce to pull infantry equipped with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) closer to the frontline and launched a large infantry assault after the truce expired.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" detachment are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[76]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 22 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 22 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk), into central Fedorivka (south of Siversk), and in fields northeast and south of Vasyukivka (southwest of Siversk).[77]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on April 21 and 22.[78]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating south of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[79]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 22 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields northwest of Chasiv Yar and along Vysokovoltna Street in southwestern Chasiv Yar itself.[80]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Markove, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on April 21 and 22.[81]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 21 that Russian forces only slightly decreased the rate of artillery fire during the Russian-declared Easter truce on April 19 to 20, but did not conduct air strikes.[82] Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces struck Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar) with multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and struck Ukrainian positions with guided bombs upon the expiration of the truce at midnight local time on April 21. Zaporozhets noted that Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction continue to attack in small infantry groups and are not conducting mechanized attacks.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including sapper units and the division's 331st and 299th VDV regiments, are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[83] Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[84] Drone operators of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (about 15km west of Chasiv Yar), likely from positions in or near Chasiv Yar.[85]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage posted on April 22 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally in the waste heap area immediately north of Toretsk.[86]Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed on April 22 that Russian forces seized Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[87] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields northeast of Dachne (north of Toretsk), east of Shcherbynivka, and southwest of Petrivka (both west of Toretsk).[88]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka, east of Toretsk near Druzhba, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Petrivka, and southwest of Toretsk toward Romanivka and north of Sukha Balka on April 21 and 22.[89]A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on April 21 indicating that Russian infantry continues using motorcycles to advance in the Toretsk direction.[90] The brigade stated that Russian forces are constantly experimenting with new tactics, including conducting assaults with armored columns followed by small infantry groups and conducting assaults on motorcycles.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Sukha Balka.[91] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Dachne.[92]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 22 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Stara Mykolaivka (east of Pokrovsk).[93]Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk toward Malynivka and near Tarasivka, Berezivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Stara Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Yelyzavetivka, Novotoretske, Oleksandropil, and Myrolyubivka and toward Stara Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Leontovychi (formerly Pershe Travnya), and Kotlyne on April 21 and 22.[94] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), Udachne, Zvirove, and Pishchane.[95]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 22 that Russian forces continue assaulting in small infantry groups.[96] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault with an unspecified number of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and cars carrying infantry on April 19.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[97] Elements of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko, and elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Udachne.[98]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 22 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka) and that Ukrainian forces seized half of Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka.[99] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and near Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[100]Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka, Kotlyarivka, and Nadiivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske and toward Horikhove on April 21 and 22.[101] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 21 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Troitske and Bohdanivka.[102]The Russian MoD claimed on April 22 that Russian forces fighting in the Novopavlivka direction began using unspecified sound reception systems to coordinate combat operations rather than using radio communications, likely to evade electronic warfare (EW) detection and jamming.[103]Order of Battle: The Russian MoD credited elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) with seizing Preobrazhenka, which ISW assesses Russian forces seized as of March 29.[104] Elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division) reportedly continue operating near Preobrazhenka.[105]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 22 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Novosilka, Rozlyv, and Odradne on April 21 and 22.[106] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Bahatyr.[107]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and artillery elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Bahatyr.[108] Elements of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[109]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 22 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole and southwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Novopil on April 21 and 22.[110]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 22 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Pyatykhatky, and Lobkove; and west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky on April 21 and 22.[111]The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in the Orikhiv direction stated on April 22 that Russian forces still have a large amount of equipment concentrated in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite taking heavy equipment losses during the unsuccessful battalion-sized assault in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 16.[112] The Ukrainian platoon commander noted that Russian forces are using armored vehicle convoys to transport infantry.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv, and elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[113]Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Dnipro direction on April 21 and 22 but did not advance.[114]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 21 to 22 and during the day on April 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 54 strike drones and decoy drones overnight from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Kursk and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[115] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 38 drones and that 16 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Kyiv and Odesa oblasts overnight.[116] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 77 strike and decoy drones from Kursk and Bryansk cities and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai during the day on April 22.[117] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 38 drones and that another 31 drones were "lost." Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Cherkasy, and Zaporizhia oblasts during the day.[118]Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian guided glide bomb struck a high-rise building in Zaporizhzhia City during the day, killing at least one civilian and injuring at least 26.[119]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.ft.com/content/5d848403-4a15-4592-888b-eb7b754ecb3a[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025[5] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/constitution/item#chapter3; https://tass dot ru/politika/15978897; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/311454; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76738; https://tass dot ru/politika/23708071[10] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2025/04/21/trump-tower-moscow-rare-earths-and-geopolitical-perks-how-the-kremlin-plans-to-bait-trump-into-a-grand-bargain-a88762[11] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2025/04/21/trump-tower-moscow-rare-earths-and-geopolitical-perks-how-the-kremlin-plans-to-bait-trump-into-a-grand-bargain-a88762[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033125[13] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7674253[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-us-says-it-would-welcome-extension-ceasefire-2025-04-20/[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325[18] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2025/04/21/trump-tower-moscow-rare-earths-and-geopolitical-perks-how-the-kremlin-plans-to-bait-trump-into-a-grand-bargain-a88762[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825[21] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/same-pripinennya-vognyu-realne-trivale-maye-stati-pershim-kr-97297[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/23745989 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/311556 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/311558 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/311576 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3865 ; https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/rossiya-i-mir/kontakty-rf-i-ssha-po-ukrainskomu-uregulirovaniyu-prodolzhayutsya-po-razlichnym-kanalam-peskov[23] https://tass dot ru/politika/23745917 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23745989[26] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2025/04/21/trump-tower-moscow-rare-earths-and-geopolitical-perks-how-the-kremlin-plans-to-bait-trump-into-a-grand-bargain-a88762[27] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/114372126396548824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025[28] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/same-pripinennya-vognyu-realne-trivale-maye-stati-pershim-kr-97297[29] https://tass dot ru/politika/23747325[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 ; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/114372126396548824[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27359; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162183 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27359[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225[34] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9138[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025; https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/UAV_Book.pdf; https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/d3be20c31acd4112b0aecece5b2a283c[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025[38] https://ya62 dot ru/text/job/2025/02/14/75112232/[39] https://t.me/labour_market/1981; https://doxa dot team/news/2025-04-15-wildberries[40] https://doxa dot team/news/2025-04-15-wildberries[41] https://t.me/rybar/69816; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90376; https://t.me/mig41/41540; https://sobcor dot news/22042025/8527/[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025; https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8966; https://t.me/ssternenko/42727[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/311512; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34578; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90380; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162153; https://t.me/dva_majors/69578; https://t.me/rybar/69817; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23009[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90380; https://t.me/wargonzo/26068; https://t.me/sashakots/53237[47] https://t.me/rybar/69817[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/311525; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27343; https://t.me/milinfolive/146627; https://t.me/russian_airborne/9831[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27338[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/69627; https://t.me/dva_majors/69627[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/26068[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/69573; https://t.me/yurasumy/22540; https://t.me/wargonzo/26068[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90398[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90355; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90385; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90398[55] https://t.me/dva_majors/69569[56] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9139[57] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/7397[58] https://t.me/avdeev_o_vazhnom/6731[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/51618[60] https://t.me/milinfolive/146672[61] https://t.me/rybar/69818[62] https://t.me/yurasumy/22540[63] https://t.me/rybar/69817[64] https://t.me/rybar/69817[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90357; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5670[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389; https://t.me/tass_agency/311510; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/22/nyshhymo-vse-shho-vorushytsya-poblyzu-vovchanska-pislya-peremyrya-vidnovylasya-aktyvnist-voroga/[67] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/22/nyshhymo-vse-shho-vorushytsya-poblyzu-vovchanska-pislya-peremyrya-vidnovylasya-aktyvnist-voroga/[68] https://t.me/yurasumy/22542[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8488; https://t.me/yurasumy/22542[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/69579[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8488; https://t.me/yurasumy/22543[72] https://t.me/rybar/69808[73] https://t.me/rybar/69808; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63669; https://t.me/yurasumy/22542[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8488; https://t.me/yurasumy/22543; https://t.me/rybar/69808; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63669[75] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/22/yak-tilky-kareta-peretvorylasya-na-garbuz-pislya-zakinchennya-peremyrya-rosiyany-pishly-v-masovanyj-shturm/[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/69611[77] https://t.me/yurasumy/22544; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34589[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8488[79] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34589[80] https://t.me/yurasumy/22544; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34589; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34566[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8488[82] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/21/peremiriye-zakinchylosya-smerchem-rosiyany-obstrilyaly-kostyantynivku-opivnochi/[83] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34566; https://t.me/mod_russia/51574[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27338[85] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162154[86] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1914584545770287612; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1017[87] https://t.me/mod_russia/51600; https://t.me/mod_russia/51601; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90386; https://t.me/vrogov/19989; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162178; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34593; https://t.me/sashakots/53228; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31385[88] https://t.me/yurasumy/22546; https://t.me/yurasumy/22547; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31385[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8488; https://t.me/dva_majors/69573; https://t.me/wargonzo/26068; https://t.me/yurasumy/22547[90] https://t.me/ombr_28/2063 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1914409150710243807[91] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34595[92] https://t.me/yurasumy/22546[93] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31385[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8488 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22548 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69573 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63673 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26068[95] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63673 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27321 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26068[96] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/22/poblyzu-pokrovska-berut-u-polon-shturmovykiv-najmancziv-z-novenkymy-rosijskymy-pasportamy/[97] https://t.me/dva_majors/69625[98] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27321 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13711[99] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63670[100] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63670 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22549[101] https://t.me/dva_majors/69573 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34600 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63670 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90359 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22549[102] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27321 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63670[103] https://t.me/mod_russia/51598[104] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51598[105] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34588[106] https://t.me/voin_dv/14553 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8488[107] https://t.me/dva_majors/69573[108] https://t.me/voin_dv/14537 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14541[109] https://t.me/voin_dv/14542[110] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34608 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0DX9ATmNenjSwJT93uP4DrX3eKXeepUQNGEyGCysuAdgFoUhGcdavchpxCcttY8Phl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365[111] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0DX9ATmNenjSwJT93uP4DrX3eKXeepUQNGEyGCysuAdgFoUhGcdavchpxCcttY8Phl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27325; https://t.me/wargonzo/26068; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34590[112] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/22/mayut-robyty-glybynni-proryvy-na-orihivskomu-napryamku-palyat-vazhku-tehniku-i-motoczykly/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQXKuupuwIA; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025[113] https://t.me/dva_majors/69639; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/2768; https://t.me/mod_russia/51574; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/2748[114] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23368 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0DX9ATmNenjSwJT93uP4DrX3eKXeepUQNGEyGCysuAdgFoUhGcdavchpxCcttY8Phl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23365[115] https://t.me/kpszsu/32967[116] https://t.me/odeskaODA/9418 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79273; https://t.me/kpszsu/32967; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9417 ; https://t.me/truonline/5286 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79272; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13929 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1914667918882750841[117] https://t.me/kpszsu/32987[118] https://t.me/kpszsu/32987; https://t.me/synegubov/13963; https://t.me/synegubov/13961; https://t.me/synegubov/13958; https://t.me/synegubov/13957; https://t.me/synegubov/13963; https://t.me/synegubov/13961; https://t.me/synegubov/13958; https://t.me/synegubov/13957; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13929 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1914667918882750841[119] https://t.me/kpszsu/32987; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18542; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18563; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18557; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18574; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18555; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18541; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18536; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18535 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79291 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79293

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 10:03pm

Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan with William RunkelApril 19, 2025, 4:40 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on April 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed extending Russian President Vladimir Putin's 30-hour unilateral truce on Russian military operations in Ukraine to a complete and unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Putin ordered Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to officially halt all Russian military actions in Ukraine on April 19, effective from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 until 0000 Moscow time on April 21.[1] Putin stated that Russia will "assume that the Ukrainian side will follow [Russia's] example" while ordering Russian forces to "be ready to repel possible violations of the truce” by Ukrainian forces. Zelensky responded to Putin's order later on April 19 and proposed that Russia and Ukraine extend Putin's 30-hour truce to a "complete and unconditional" 30-day ceasefire if Russian forces actually cease all military operations.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "mirror" Russia's response and accused Russia of imposing the 30-hour truce for "headlines" rather than demonstrating genuine confidence-building measures. Zelensky reported that, according to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Russian forces continue assault operations and shelling in several unspecified areas of the frontline. This truce is unlikely to hold given that Russian forces appear to have continued limited offensive operations and indiscriminate shelling across the frontline in the first few hours of the truce and given Russia's continued rejection of a full ceasefire. The United States and Ukraine jointly proposed implementing an immediate 30-day full ceasefire to Russia on March 13, but Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the proposal since then.[3]Putin stated that the temporary truce will demonstrate whether Ukraine is willing to comply with agreements and participate in peace negotiations "aimed at eliminating the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis."[4] Russian officials regularly invoke the "root causes" phrase to allude to Russia's unyielding demands for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and for regime change in Ukraine.[5] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces will observe the Easter truce provided that Ukrainian forces reciprocate.[6] It is unlikely that Russian officials and military commanders effectively communicated plans to implement the temporary truce to frontline units or Ukrainian officials prior to Putin's announcement. Russia's prior well-evidenced behavior regarding the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure indicates that Russian officials likely intend to continue making unsubstantiated allegations of Ukrainian truce violations.[7] Russia, in this sense, is likely leveraging its unilateral implementation of a temporary truce in Ukraine to introduce informational conditions that will act as a pretext to support Russia's continued efforts to undermine and discredit Ukraine. Russia may exploit unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian truce violations to undermine support for the proposed peace framework that the United States presented in Paris, France, on April 17. Russia is also likely attempting to curry favor with the United States and portray itself as an agreeable negotiating partner in direct response to US President Donald Trump's recent remarks that the United States will reconsider its role in brokering peace in Ukraine, depending on how the peace process develops in the coming days.[8]US officials are reportedly growing frustrated with the Kremlin's rejections of US proposals to end the war in Ukraine. The New York Times (NYT), citing European officials who were familiar with the US discussions in Paris on April 17, reported on April 18 that the US stance on a ceasefire remains largely the same but that Russian officials have "dragged their feet" and insisted on additional conditions for US President Donald Trump's proposed unconditional general ceasefire, including the "denazification" of Ukraine.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin named "denazification" as one of his main goals in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officials have previously defined "denazification" as the "liquidation of those who instill" Russophobia in other people.[10] Putin and other Kremlin officials have since reiterated this demand for "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government.[11] Axios reported on April 18 that two European diplomats stated that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told UK, German, and French diplomats that President Trump is "losing his patience" and may withdraw from the peace process if a peace deal is not concluded "soon."[12] Trump stated on April 18 that he hopes to conclude a peace deal in Ukraine "quickly" and that if either Ukraine or Russia "makes it very difficult," then "we're just going to take a pass."[13] CNN reported on April 18 that a source familiar with the Trump administration stated that the Trump administration is attempting to plan another meeting between US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Russian authorities to discuss the proposed framework.[14]Ukraine and Russia conducted the largest prisoner of war (POW) exchange on April 19 since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 19 that Ukrainian authorities returned 277 Ukrainian POWs, comprised of members of the Ukrainian forces, National Guard, State Transport Service, and Border Guard, from Russian captivity.[15] Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW exchange with Russia and noted that Ukrainian authorities have returned a total of 4,552 Ukrainian civilians and soldiers from Russian captivity since the start of the war in February 2022. The Russian MoD claimed on April 19 that Russia and Ukraine conducted a 246-to -246 POW exchange and that Russia transferred an additional 31 wounded Ukrainian POWs to Ukraine in exchange for 15 wounded Russian POWs.[16]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed extending Russian President Vladimir Putin's 30-hour unilateral truce on Russian military operations in Ukraine to a complete and unconditional 30-day ceasefire.US officials are reportedly growing frustrated with the Kremlin's rejections of US proposals to end the war in Ukraine.Ukraine and Russia conducted the largest prisoner of war (POW) exchange on April 19 since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkrainian officials have agreed to "mirror" Russia's implementation of a general ceasefire following the expiration of the temporary ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced the end of the temporary ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes on April 18, and Ukraine and Russia have not concluded agreements for a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea or general ceasefire in Ukraine.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a unilateral Easter truce from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow time on April 21.[18] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed to "mirror" Russia's implementation of the Easter truce and proposed expanding this truce to a 30-day full ceasefire, as US authorities first proposed on March 18, a proposal to which Russian authorities have not yet responded and have repeatedly rejected.[19]The Russian MoD continued to claim without evidence on April 19 that Ukrainian strikes damaged energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine over the past day, but it is unclear why, given that the Kremlin announced the end of the energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire on April 18.[20]Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces from limited positions in Kursk Oblast on April 19 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and some Russian milbloggers claimed on April 19 that Russian forces seized Oleshnya (west of Sudzha), although another Russian milblogger denied this claim.[21] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov told Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 19 that elements of the Russian 51st and 137th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 106th VDV Division) seized Oleshnya and are clearing the Gornal Monastery (possibly referring to the St. Nicholas Monastery northeast of Gornal [south of Sudzha]).[22]Russian forces continued assaults near Oleshnya and Gornal on April 18 and 19.[23]Order of Battle: Gerasimov claimed that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are operating in Gornal.[24] Elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[25] Elements of the "Pitersky" Battalion of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly fighting in the Kursk Oblast border area.[26]Fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka (both northwest of Belgorod City) on April 18 and 19 but Russian forces did not advance.[27]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Demidovka and Popovka.[28]Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces from Demidovka and are destroying small groups of Ukrainian forces in the forests south of Popovka.[29]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Demidovka.[30]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in Sumy Oblast on April 19.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued assaults in the Kharkiv direction on April 19 but did not advance.Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kharkiv City in the direction of Zolochiv, north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi, and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 18 and 19.[31] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vovchansk.[32]An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on April 19 that Russian forces have not used armored vehicles in this direction in a long time.[33]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 19 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and entered southeastern Mala Shapkivka (southeast of Zapadne).[34] A milblogger claimed that central Mala Shapkivka is a contested "gray zone."[35]Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on April 18 and 19.[36]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Zapadne, and elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kupyansk direction.[37]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 19 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Nadiya, and southeast of Borova toward Hrekivka and Olhivka on April 18 and 19.[38]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 19 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Hlushchenkove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on April 18 and 19.[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 19 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on April 18 and 19.[40]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 19 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar west of Andriivka; south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora and Stupochky; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ozaryanivka on April 18 and 19.[41]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 16 and 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Toretsk and east of Dachne (northeast of Toretsk), respectively.[42]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Niu York (south of Toretsk) toward Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[43]Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba and Krymske; southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Oleksandropil, and Valentynivka; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka on April 18 and 19.[44]A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on April 18 that Russian forces redeployed unspecified drone units from the Kursk direction to the area southwest of Toretsk near Kalynove and that these units are now operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[45] This is the first time that ISW has observed reports of Russian redeployments from Kursk Oblast, and this report is consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces may prioritize offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction in Spring and Summer 2025.[46]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on April 19 that Russian forces recently changed tactics in the Toretsk direction and are increasingly conducting motorized assaults on motorcycles.[47] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are attacking in groups of three to five motorcycles and that Russian forces use soldiers on motorcycles for different functions, including to conduct assaults, to clear mines, and to tow infantry. Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are attempting to use these motorcycle forces to rapidly advance through fields and consolidate positions without additional reinforcements.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Sukha Balka.[48]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[49]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 19 indicates that Russian forces seized Novotoretske and advanced in central Myrolyubivka (both east of Pokrovsk) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault on April 17.[50] Additional geolocated footage published on April 19 indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway northeast of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Shevchenko, which several Russian milbloggers claimed is referring to the outdated name for the eastern part of Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk) as opposed to the settlement of Shevchenko south of Pokrovsk.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Leontovychi (formerly Pershe Travyna, just southwest of Pokrovsk).[53]Russian forces attacked Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Svyrydonivka, Yelyzavetivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Myrolyubivka, Vodyane Druhe, Novotoretske, Malynivka, Myrne, Promin, and Stara Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Novooleksandrivka, and Udachne on April 18 and 19.[54] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Udachne, Kotlyne, and Pishchane.[55]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 24 armored fighting vehicles, 99 motorcycles, and two other vehicles and killed 229 and wounded 34 Russian personnel during the Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Pokrovsk on April 17.[56]The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are deploying well-trained contract soldiers and mobilized personnel without adequate training in the area.[57]Another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 19 that it destroyed a Russian locomotive transporting equipment between Russia and occupied Ukraine in the Pokrovsk direction with a drone.[58]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 120th Artillery Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Lysivka.[59]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 19 but did not advance.Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Solone and Uspenivka, east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Preobrazhenka, and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 18 and 19.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Solone.[61]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th and 80th tank regiments (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Kotlyarivka.[62]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 19 but did not advance. Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka on April 18 and 19.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[64]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velkya Novosilka direction on April 19 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Velyka Novosilka in the direction of Odradne, north of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Dniproenerhiya, northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka.[65]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 19 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground assaults southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka, and Shcherbaky; and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka on April 18 and 19.[66]Order of Battle: Elements of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Stepove, and elements of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Mali Shcherbaky.[67]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Dnipro direction on April 19.The "Atesh" Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on April 19 that almost all families of senior Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) military officers left occupied Sevastopol.[68] Atesh reported that Russian forces received a new directive in early April 2025 to implement additional security measures, including increased patrols of BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) personnel and cancelling leave for military personnel stationed in occupied Crimea.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 18 and 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M ballistic missiles and two Onyx anti-ship cruise missiles from occupied Crimea, and three Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from an unspecified location.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 87 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 33 Shahed drones over Ukraine and that 36 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Odesa, Sumy, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[70]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23728811 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23728581 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76727[2] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1913657947311210556 ; https://suspilne dot media/998973-zelenskij-pogodivsa-na-velikodne-peremira/[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025 ; https://archive.ph/TlZny ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025[4] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23728811 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23728581 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76727[5] https://archive.ph/Gnv1q ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/51492[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/51240 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51049; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/50824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/18/us/politics/trump-rubio-putin-ukraine.html[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024;[12] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/18/trump-russia-ukraine-rant-walking-away[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-ready-abandon-efforts-broker-russia-ukraine-peace-deal-rubio-says-2025-04-18/[14] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/19/europe/trump-administration-crimea-peace-talks-intl/index.html[15] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13907 ; https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/russia-retaken-village-kursk-region-ukrainian-forces-120970664 ; https://suspilne dot media/998655-ukraina-ta-rosia-proveli-obmin-polonenimi-2/[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/51493[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025[18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76727[19] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1913657947311210556; https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1913663147363164509[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/51483;[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/51472 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27193 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34383 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90229 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26019[22] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76727[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/69383 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34388 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/311153 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26019 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27193[24] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76727[25] https://t.me/milinfolive/146452 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19097 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1913585668996931734 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27181[26] https://t.me/readovkanews/95307[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/26012 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69383[28] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12958[29] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76727[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27169 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161854[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12958[32] https://t.me/tass_agency/311142[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/19/namagayutsya-prosochuvatysya-na-harkivskomu-napryamku-vorog-atakuye-vyklyuchno-pihotoyu/[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90201; https://t.me/dva_majors/69383; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161857[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27190[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297; G8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34372; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12958[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34379; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34380; https://t.me/dva_majors/69390[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69383 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63612[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8305[42] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1913582477693591740; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1186100979723376; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1913614644704432551; https://www.tiktok.com/@kombi052/video/7494679867162774790[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63622; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63610[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl; https://t.me/dva_majors/69383; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63610; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63622[45] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21681[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025[47]https://suspilne dot media/998479-novi-sankcii-proti-rosian-u-kievi-pobili-vijskovogo-a-tramp-ozvuciv-umovu-vihodu-ssa-z-peregovoriv-1151-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1745059146&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[48] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63610; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63622[49] https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/9df0e6b5-0d74-42c2-f01f-08dd7a063b7c; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1913036202799771894; https://t.me/YourVaccineZ/13665[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8944; https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/2768[51] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27426; https://t.me/ewoks152bbs/167; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1913492119219556604; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1913533040074150081[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/51476 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34390 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90242[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63613[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/rybar/69751 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63613 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63623 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22722 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26012[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63613[56] https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/2768; https://suspilne dot media/998479-novi-sankcii-proti-rosian-u-kievi-pobili-vijskovogo-a-tramp-ozvuciv-umovu-vihodu-ssa-z-peregovoriv-1151-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1745065302&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/19/jdut-zarady-odnogo-postrilu-yak-odnorazovi-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-ne-zvazhaye-na-svoyi-vtraty/[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMZvLufR2zQ ; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/ukrayinski-viyskovi-vpershe-znishchili-vorozhiy-1745060064.html#goog_rewarded[59] https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/9df0e6b5-0d74-42c2-f01f-08dd7a063b7c; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1913036202799771894; https://t.me/YourVaccineZ/13665[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 https://t.me/motopatriot78/34365[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34365[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34384[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26012[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/26012[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26012[66]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23297 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035BZAiy3skG5SXFTyHUTtG8FzxQ5PHth5tpzTLbmVhNvsD98d5mKPZamM5FNTFCxxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23263 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26012 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34376[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34376[68] https://t.me/atesh_ua/6775[69] https://t.me/kpszsu/32847[70] https://t.me/kpszsu/32847; https://t.me/synegubov/13927; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2393; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/1072685391559940?ref=embed_post; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/998523-rf-zavdala-raketnogo-udaru-po-odesini-poskodzeno-fermerski-gospodarstva/ ; https://x.com/MVS_UA/status/1913457526416228837 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12359; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18450; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18454

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 28, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 9:23pm

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. KaganApril 28, 2025, 8:15 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:20 pm ET on April 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine, this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort. The Kremlin announced on April 28 that Putin declared a ceasefire in honor of Victory Day on May 9 – when Russia celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War (while minimizing the role played by the United States) – between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11.[1] The Kremlin stated that Russian forces will respond to any Ukrainian ceasefire violations. The Kremlin claimed that the Victory Day ceasefire demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia is exchanging information with the United States about the Victory Day ceasefire and characterized the unilateral ceasefire as a "manifestation" of Russia's goodwill.[2] The Kremlin is preparing to welcome a significant number of foreign dignitaries, including from former Soviet, Latin American, Asian, and African countries, for Russia's Victory Day celebration, and Putin likely seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations.[3]Putin previously declared a unilateral ceasefire in honor of Easter in mid-April 2025, but Russian and Ukrainian sources repeatedly accused each other of violating the ceasefire throughout the theater in Ukraine.[4] Russia also repeatedly accused Ukraine of violating the 30-day moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes but rarely offered evidence of these alleged violations.[5] ISW previously noted that the energy strikes ceasefire and Easter ceasefire underscored the need for the details of any future ceasefire or peace agreement to be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and to include robust monitoring mechanisms.[6] Putin's proposed Victory Day ceasefire does not include any additional monitoring mechanisms, and Russian sources will likely leverage the lack of such mechanisms to again flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations. Russian officials appear disinterested in establishing meaningful monitoring mechanisms or a general public basis for these ceasefires, likely because Russia benefits from weaponizing the vague and unclear conditions of the ceasefires against Ukraine.Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine. Putin appears to be opportunistically declaring ceasefires during major religious and military holidays in order to force Ukraine to accept the ceasefire or risk appearing intransigent to the West. Unilaterally declaring ceasefires also allows Putin to distract attention from his rejection of the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal and to maintain the illusion that he is interested in peace negotiations while keeping full control over the conditions and timing of any ceasefire agreements. Russian forces seized on the Easter ceasefire to shell and conduct reconnaissance of frontline Ukrainian positions and damaged vehicles along the frontline in preparation for future Russian assaults, and Russian forces will likely use the Victory Day ceasefire for similar preparatory efforts.[7] Putin likely views the Victory Day ceasefire as a chance for Russian forces to rest ahead of future frontline activity in Ukraine and as a way to ensure that Ukraine does not conduct any significant long-range strikes against Russia during Victory Day celebrations. Putin likely does not view the Victory Day ceasefire as a serious step towards lasting peace in Ukraine.Ukraine, in contrast to Russia, continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 28 that Trump has made it clear that he wants a permanent ceasefire first (presumably before negotiations for a final end to the Russian invasion).[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on April 28 that Ukraine supported the US proposal for a full ceasefire, proposed a ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure, and proposed extending the Easter truce – all proposals that Russia has rejected.[9] Zelensky stated that there is no reason to wait for May 8 to start the temporary ceasefire and called for an immediate, full, and unconditional ceasefire for at least 30 days, as this is the "foundation that could lead to real diplomacy." Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha similarly called for an immediate ceasefire and questioned why Putin was "waiting" for May 8.[10] Sybiha reiterated Ukraine's support for a "long" and complete ceasefire.Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly recently presented the United States with a proposal to end the war that called for a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire – in line with Trump's continued calls for a full ceasefire.[11] Putin's continued efforts to obfuscate his previous rejections of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals run counter to Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement, and to Trump's goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.[12]The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States. The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) published a readout of an April 27 phone call between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that claimed that Lavrov and Rubio emphasized establishing "prerequisites for starting negotiations" toward a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine.[13] The US State Department's readout of the call notably did not mention discussions of "prerequisites" to negotiations, and the Russian MFA statement notably contradicts the Kremlin's April 28 claim that the Victory Day ceasefire demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions.[14]Putin, Lavrov, and other senior Russian officials have consistently demanded since June 2024 that Ukraine withdraw from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations.[15] Putin stated in June 2024 that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts. The Kremlin is insisting on significant Ukrainian territorial and political concessions as prerequisites to negotiations in an effort to begin negotiations from the strongest position and achieve longstanding Russian goals in Ukraine through diplomatic means that it is unable to secure on the battlefield.Lavrov reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own. Russian officials, including Putin, have repeated Russia's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war in Ukraine must include Ukrainian regime change, demilitarization, abandonment of aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc, and the cession of territory to Russia.[16] Lavrov reiterated these demands in an interview with Brazilian outlet O Globo published on April 28 and claimed that any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes."[17] Lavrov and other Russian officials have repeatedly defined the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[18] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's invasions, occupation, and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory since 2014.Lavrov additionally demanded during the April 28 interview that the international community recognize Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea as part of Russia and that the West return frozen Russian assets.[19] Lavrov also demanded that the West provide Russia with "security guarantees" against supposed threats from NATO and the EU. Lavrov's statements mirror Putin's December 2021 demands that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement; that NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; that NATO refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; that NATO states refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles in areas from which they could reach Russia; and that the United States refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe or nuclear missiles outside of US territory.[20] Putin's December 2021 demands notably extend beyond Ukraine and aim to roll back NATO. The Kremlin likely seeks to intensify these demands amid ongoing negotiations with the United States to manipulate Western leaders into acquiescing to Putin's demands. These demands would weaken NATO under the guise of terms of a peace negotiation to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine and allow Russia to set conditions to strengthen its position for future aggression against Ukraine and NATO.Russian and North Korean officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on April 28 that the Russian military recently achieved its objective of pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and thanked North Korean forces for their active participation in these efforts.[21] Putin personally thanked North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un and reiterated that Russia and North Korea acted in accordance with the December 2024 bilateral Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.[22] Putin also claimed that North Korea’s involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine did not violate international law. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov also recently acknowledged North Korea's participation in retaking Kursk Oblast.[23] Russian officials have previously refused to acknowledge North Korean soldiers operating in Kursk Oblast and attempted to disguise North Korean soldiers as Russian forces from the Republic of Buryatia.[24] The Kremlin's abrupt rhetorical shift suggests that Russia is no longer concerned about the possibility of Western retaliation for involving North Korean forces directly in its war against Ukraine.Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on April 28 that North Korea's participation in operations in Kursk Oblast demonstrates the effectiveness of the Russian-North Korean Strategic Partnership Treaty and affirms that Russia is “absolutely” prepared to provide North Korea with reciprocal military assistance in the future.[25] The North Korean Central Military Commission stated on April 28 that Kim ordered the deployment of North Korean troops to Kursk Oblast in accordance with the partnership agreement and that the "sacred mission" in Kursk Oblast solidified the "friendship and solidarity" between Russians and North Koreans.[26] The United States and the wider West largely failed to meaningfully respond to Russia's growing military cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Former US President Joe Biden’s decision to ease restrictions on Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using US-provided long-range missile systems in November 2024, formally cast as a response to the introduction of North Korean forces into the war, did not significantly impact the Kremlin's calculus in expanding its military cooperation with North Korea or Russia's wider military planning in Kursk Oblast and elsewhere in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[27]Russian milbloggers reacted triumphantly to official announcements of Russian and North Korean forces concluding operations in Kursk Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that North Korea's and Russia’s announcements provide a general deterrent to future Ukrainian and Western operations on Russian territory.[28] Some milbloggers also advocated for Russia to expand military, economic, and labor collaboration with North Korea, including in the event of future military aggression against North Korea.[29] Other milbloggers emphasized the bravery of North Korea’s forces and claimed that North Korea and its people have shown themselves to be better allies than many Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states.[30]Russian officials and milbloggers are likely leveraging Russia's recent operational and diplomatic successes in Kursk Oblast to prepare the information space for Victory Day celebrations on May 9, which a number of international partners will attend. The Kremlin likely plans to highlight Russian successes in Kursk Oblast during the May 9 celebrations, as Russian forces have not been able to achieve significant battlefield successes in Ukraine in the past year.Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 27, citing Western military and intelligence officials, that Russia is expanding military bases near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, and upgrading railway lines and other infrastructure along Russia's western border with NATO.[31] WSJ reported that the Kremlin plans to create a new army headquarters near Petrozavodsk in the next several years and that Russia is integrating roadways and railways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with infrastructure in Belarus. Sources stated that Russia intends to form new divisions on the basis of existing brigades in the Leningrad Military District (LMD) in the coming years and that Russia is constructing new barracks and training grounds and upgrading warehouses and railways near Petrozavodsk to accommodate the future influx of personnel. A senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending "almost none" of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the tanks for "later use." ISW previously assessed that Russia's restoration of the MMD and LMD is part of a long-term restructuring effort to prepare for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO.[32]Russian authorities are also preparing to update Russia's National Security Strategy, likely to reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin's greater territorial ambitions in Europe and ongoing efforts to justify future aggression against NATO. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed during an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 24 that Russia is preparing to update its National Security Strategy to account for the new problems and threats that Russia is facing.[33] Shoigu claimed that Russia's updated National Security Strategy must account for the "crisis" of European security, the formation of a new global order, and the challenges that the changing world presents to Russia. Shoigu stated that Russia's National Security Strategy defines Russia's "long-term, strategic goals" and the "main instruments" for achieving these goals. Russia updates its National Security Strategy every five years, and last updated the strategy in 2021.[34]Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.[35] Černochová also announced that the initiative secured funding for further artillery deliveries to Ukraine through Fall 2025. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský stated that Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands previously provided funds to the initiative. Lipavský reported that Czechia aims to supply Ukraine with 125,000 rounds of ammunition per month in 2025, but will deliver as much ammunition as possible.Key Takeaways:Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine, this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort.Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine.Ukraine – in contrast to Russia – continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent ceasefire.The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States.Lavrov reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own.Russian and North Korean officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support.Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO.Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian officials continued on April 28 to praise Russian forces for seizing the remainder of Kursk Oblast, while Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in border areas.[36]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the direction of Goptarovka (southeast of Sudzha).[37]Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Gornal (south of Sudzha) and the windbreaks near Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[38] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade with recently seizing Oleshnya.[39]Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 28, but Russian forces did not advance.[40]Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on April 27 that Russia has redeployed elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) and a battalion each of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) to respond to Ukrainian attacks into northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.[41]Ukrainian forces struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City on the night of April 27 to 28. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian territory, stated on April 28 that unspecified drones struck the "Kremniy El" plant in Bryansk City that produces microelectronics for missiles systems, including Iskander missiles; Pantsir air defense systems; radars; electronic warfare (EW) systems; and drones.[42] Geolocated footage published on April 27 shows an explosion near the plant.[43] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on April 28 that Russian forces shot down tens of drones over the oblast and that the strikes started fires in residential and industrial buildings.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 102 drones over Bryansk Oblast overnight.[45]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields west of Loknya (northeast of Sumy City) and likely seized the fields west and southwest of Basivka (north of Loknya) and southeast of Zhuravka (northwest of Loknya).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are advancing north of Bilovody (northwest of Loknya and south of Zhuravka).[47]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further northwest of Loknya.[48]A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that Russian forces recently repelled a Ukrainian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in the direction of Basivka.[49]Ukraine's Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on April 28 that Russian forces are continuing to deploy small infantry groups to attack the international border near Basivka and Zhuravka and that Russian forces occasionally use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) but are not using armored vehicles in the area.[50]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and the Chechen "Gorets" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call-up) participated in the seizure of Veselivka (north of Sumy City).[52]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 28 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 27 and 28.[53]The commander of a Ukrainian infantry group operating in the Vovchansk direction stated that the situation in the area is more complicated now than it was in February and March 2025 and that Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) is the most active area.[54] The commander reported that Russian forces are more actively conducting artillery strikes and assaults, including with mopeds, and that Russian forces have rotated troops in this direction, increasing the number of Russian forces and reserves. The commander stated that Russian forces are conducting artillery preparation before attacking with armored vehicles and then assault groups.Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Udy (north of Kharkiv City).[55]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 28 indicates that Russian forces recently seized southern Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border) and advanced on the settlement's eastern outskirts.[56]Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 28 that elements of the Russian 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized the entirety of Kamyanka.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[58]Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Mala Shapkivka and Zapadne, northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Krasne Pershe, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 27 and 28.[59]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are not conducting mechanized assaults in the Kupyansk direction and are instead launching daily infantry assaults in groups of two to three personnel.[60]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka.[61]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 28 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka and east of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky on April 27 and 28.[62]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 28 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Ridkodub, Nove, Yampolivka, Katerynivka, Myrne, and Kolodyazi and toward Novyi Myr; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on April 27 and 28.[63]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 28 that Russian forces are conducting assaults ranging in size from small infantry groups to entire detachments.[64] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces have a personnel advantage in some areas of 10 to 1.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near the Serebryanske forest area.[65]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern outskirts of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[66]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 27 and 28.[67]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 28 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]), advanced southeast of Chasiv Yar and on the outskirts of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[68]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske and Markove; south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka on April 27 and 28.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[70]The commander of a Ukrainian reconnaissance battalion operating in the Kramatorsk direction stated on April 28 that Russian forces use civilian cars, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and motorcycles to transport infantry to frontline positions, but cannot approach within three kilometers of the frontline without Ukrainian forces striking the vehicles.[71] The commander added that Russian forces are using large numbers of radio-controlled and fiber-optic drones in the area.[72] The commander reported that Russian forces have intensified guided glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, and Kramatorsk in an attempt to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and target Ukrainian artillery positions. Kostyantynivka City Military Administration Head Serhii Horbunov stated on April 28 that Russian forces struck Kostyantynivka overnight and killed three civilians and injured five.[73]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 109th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[74] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[75]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to a dam north of Toretsk.[76]Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Berezivka (southwest of Toretsk) and that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) have almost seized the entirety of Tarasivka (southwest of Toretsk).[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Tarasivka and that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) advanced northwest of Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[78]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Petrivka and Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Yelyzavetivka, Oleksandropil, Stara Mykolaivka, and Tarasivka and toward Nova Poltavka on April 27 and 28.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions east of Sukha Balka and between Niu York (south of Toretsk) and Sukha Balka.[80] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are repelling Ukrainian counterattacks near Yelyzavetivka.[81]A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that the number of Russian artillery and drone strikes and personnel is gradually increasing compared to previous weeks.[82] The NCO stated that Russian forces are not conducting offensive operations with a large number of armored vehicles, but are conducting daily assaults in small groups, sometimes with bicycles, electric scooters, and motorcycles.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) and 80th ”Sparta” Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[83] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[84] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka and Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[85]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 28 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized most of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[86]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Novoserhiivka on April 27 and 28.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Novoserhiivka.[88]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division and 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 2nd CAA, CMD) and 74th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are attacking southwest of Pokrovsk.[89] Mashovets stated that elements of the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), 55th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), and 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Kotlyne and Udachne.[90] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command introduced forces and means from the 201st Military Base (CMD) and 137th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) to the Pokrovsk direction over the past few weeks and returned elements of the 55th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) to the frontline after having previously withdrawn elements of the brigade to the reserve.[91] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly conducted guided glide bomb strikes against a bridge near Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk).[92]Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 and 28 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast and northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[93]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further northeast of Nadiivka.[94] One Russian milblogger claimed on April 27 that Russian forces almost completely recaptured Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), and another milblogger claimed on April 28 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of the settlement.[95]Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Troitske, Sribne, and Nadiivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 27 and 28.[96]A Russian milblogger claimed that reports that Russian forces seized Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) are untrue.[97]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), 55th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), and 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Uspenivka.[98] Mashovets stated that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD), reinforced by elements of the 51st CAA (SMD), 201st Military Base (CMD), and 137th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), are attacking near Kotlyarivka and Troitske.[99]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 28 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[100]Russian forces attacked west of Kurkakhove near Bahatyr, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil on April 27 and 28.[101] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne (west of Kurakhove).[102]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 338th Rocket Artillery Brigade (EMD), 200th Artillery Brigade, and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[103] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly conducted guided glide bomb strikes against a bridge near Zelenyi Kut (west of Oleksiivka).[104]Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 28 but did not advance.A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka).[105]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[106] Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[107]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Hulyaipole direction on April 28.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole (northeast of Orikhiv).[108]Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 28 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Lobkove on April 28.[109]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[110]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on April 28 but did not make confirmed advances.A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that Russian forces seized the islands between Krynky and Kozachi Laheri (both northeast of Kherson City) and crossed into southern Tyahinka (north of Krynky) in right (west) bank Kherson Oblast.[111] Another Russian milblogger denied on April 28 claims that Russian forces crossed the Dnipro River, but claimed that Russian forces have seized unspecified islands east of Kherson City.[112] ISW has not observed further claims of Russian advances in right bank Kherson Oblast as of this report, but will continue to report on activity in the Kherson direction.Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivka Railway Bridge, on April 27 and 28.[113]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Krynky.[114]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 27 and 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 166 strike and decoy drones from near Kursk and Oryol cities and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[115] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 40 drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 74 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Donetsk, Sumy, and Cherkasy oblasts.[116]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76807[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/312545 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312547[3] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/27/04/2025/680babd49a79474adcef8ecc ; https://www.intellinews.com/who-is-going-to-moscow-may-9-victory-day-parade-376955/?source=brazil[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025[8] https://www.newsweek.com/putin-declares-temporary-ceasefire-kremlin-ready-ukraine-talks-live-updates-2064984; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/28/belyy-dom-tramp-vse-bolshe-razocharovyvaetsya-v-putine-i-zelenskom-on-hochet-postoyannogo-prekrascheniya-ognya; https://www.youtube.com/live/UsU3o9fvSmM?si=cBdqGLphC9TsgfRA[9] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1916936804277883114[10] https://t.me/Ukraine_MFA/5524[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125[13] https://t.me/MID_Russia/56432[14] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/04/secretary-rubios-call-with-russian-foreign-minister-lavrov/ ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76807[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74285 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025[17] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2011929/ ; https://oglobo.globo dot com/mundo/noticia/2025/04/28/a-bola-nao-esta-do-nosso-lado-diz-lavrov-sobre-negociacao-com-ucrania.ghtml[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025[19] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2011929/ ; https://oglobo.globo dot com/mundo/noticia/2025/04/28/a-bola-nao-esta-do-nosso-lado-diz-lavrov-sobre-negociacao-com-ucrania.ghtml[20] https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=ru ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2025[21] https://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76805[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23234891[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112124[25] https://ria dot ru/20250428/kndr-2013781959.html[26] https://suspilne dot media/1004631-pivnicna-korea-viznala-ucast-svoih-vijskovih-u-vijni-rosii-proti-ukraini/ ; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1745834587-83933876/wpk-central-military-commission-highly-praises-combat-sub-units-of-armed-forces-of-dprk-for-performing-heroic-feats-in-operations-to-liberate-kursk-area-of-russian-federation/; https://t.me/rian_ru/291315; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/28/kndr-podtverdila-chto-ee-voyska-uchastvuyut-v-voyne-protiv-ukrainy; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/north-korea-acknowledges-its-involvement-in-war-against-ukraine/[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112624[28] https://t.me/yurasumy/22623[29] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21127; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162753 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162767[30] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21127; https://t.me/rybar/69983; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162753 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162767[31] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-military-nato-europe-finland-ff53b912[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war[33] https://tass dot ru/politika/23778011[34] https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=704[35] https://cnn.iprima dot cz/cesko-zajistilo-ukrajine-dalsich-400-tisic-kusu-munice-rekla-cernochova-do-kdy-staci-penize-472909; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukraine-has-received-400-000-shells-through-czech-led-ammunition-initiative/[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/312372 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76806 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312397 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312418 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312436 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312450 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312517 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312518[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/70028[38] https://t.me/rusich_army/22968 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70028[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34891 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63833[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/70028 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70073; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7895[41] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19398 ; https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/pfbid0vJxqe3KCmtXRCVTauHbtPxNHDJ2DFZwp5meAPG4WAZpW7jT4C3ihKe3Nm7z1ojoMl[42] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9163[43] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1916707901445669147; https://x.com/hochu_dodomu/status/1916698781585752181; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6017[44] https://t.me/avbogomaz/11957[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/51872[46] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1916553410486186417; https://x.com/Raver__/status/1916549854114808226; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27676; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9008;[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90732[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27683[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/70032[50] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1005281-vorog-namagaetsa-zastosovuvati-mali-sturmovi-grupi-demcenko-pro-situaciu-na-kordoni-sumsini/[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/70068 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5678[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34954[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8906[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/28/inodi-shturmy-na-mopedah-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku-najguchnishe-poblyzu-tyhogo[55] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5678[56] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1916874995025748259 https://t.me/operationall_space/3652; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9015; https://t.me/rian_ru/291374; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9011[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/51881; https://t.me/mod_russia/51882; https://t.me/mod_russia/51887[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34944[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8906; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/28/taktyka-gulyaty-i-hovatysya-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-prodovzhuyut-utylizovuvaty-dronamy/[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34944; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27684[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8906[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8906; https://t.me/dva_majors/70028[64] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/28/goryt-ta-lize-vorozhyj-shturmovyk-povz-do-nashyh-pozyczij-z-palayuchym-czentrom-uhvalennya-rishen/ ; https://t.me/ombr66/1699[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162727[66] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9009; https://t.me/apachi_fpv/352[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27635 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63839 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70028[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63839 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70028[71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/28/nablyzhayutsya-na-try-kilometra-90-znyshhuyemo-ukrayinski-drony-spalyuyut-vorozhu-bronyu-na-donechchyni/[72] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1004821-voni-idut-v-odin-kinec-ukrainski-vijskovi-znisuut-rosijski-moto-j-avtotehniku-na-kramatorskomu-napramku/[73] https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1005253-sestero-travmovanih-i-117-spozivaciv-bez-gazu-kerivnik-ova-pro-naslidki-ataki-na-cerkasinu/[74] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13730[75] https://t.me/mod_russia/51876[76] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1916565231259578729; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1032; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9007[77] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34900; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63832[78] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34941; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27691; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90722[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27691; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63831; ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162724; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8906; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34900; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63832[80] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34941; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27691[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63832[82] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/28/vid-velosypediv-elektrosamokativ-zakinchuyuchy-mototehnikoyu-poblyzu-toreczka-regulyarno-rozlitayutsya-vorozhi-kolesa/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[83] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63831; https://t.me/wargonzo/26195[84] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90733[85] https://t.me/yurasumy/22631;[86] https://t.me/yurasumy/22627[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8906; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63832; https://t.me/yurasumy/22627[88] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34953[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2716[90] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2716[91] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2715[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/14653[93] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27693; https://t.me/stepovi_hyzhaky_59/6013; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1916643694570094871; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1916306694063136916; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1916031009050525738;[94] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63827[95] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34920; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63827[96] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8906; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595;[97] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34923[98] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2716[99] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2716[100] https://t.me/voin_dv/14656 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22625[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635 ; ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12397 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8906 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22625[102] https://t.me/dva_majors/70028 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14656[103] https://t.me/voin_dv/14656[104] https://t.me/voin_dv/14653[105] https://t.me/dva_majors/70028[106] https://t.me/voin_dv/14645[107] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34903[108] https://t.me/mod_russia/51868[109] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12397[110] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34894[111] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63834[112] https://t.me/yurasumy/22624[113] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23592; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12397[114] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34908[115] https://t.me/kpszsu/33422[116] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23595; https://t.me/synegubov/14049; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/13364; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1005253-sestero-travmovanih-i-117-spozivaciv-bez-gazu-kerivnik-ova-pro-naslidki-ataki-na-cerkasinu/

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, April 28, 2025

 

at 4/28/25 9:23pm

Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Ben Schmida, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings. Western media reported that the April 26 US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman ended in “major disagreements” despite repeated positive messaging from senior Iranian and US officials.[1] The Wall Street Journal reported on April 26 that one of the key disputes is whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program, which Iran is unlikely to make concessions on.[2] Iranian officials repeatedly stressed that negotiations must remain strictly limited to the nuclear issue and sanctions relief and reaffirmed that zero uranium enrichment and missile discussions are non-negotiable red lines.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi called the talks serious and technical and added that while some disagreements are serious and complex, progress so far has been good, but warned that Iran’s optimism should remain “extremely cautious.”[4] US President Donald Trump stated that the talks are going “very well” and that a "deal is going to be made" without "starting to drop bombs."[5] While Iranian and US officials described the talks as positive and productive, Iran’s unwillingness to make concessions on its missile program may risk collapsing the talks or pushing negotiations toward a deal less expansive than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly desires.It is not clear what restrictions the United States hopes to put on Iran’s missile program. Iranian missile development could increase the threat from Iran’s missile program. Iran has previously hinted at ambitions to develop missiles with ranges beyond 2,000 kilometers, which would significantly expand the missile ranges to include US bases in the region, such as Diego Garcia. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases in the region in recent months in response to any military action.[6] An unspecified senior Iranian military official stated that Iran could target Diego Garcia, located about 3,700 kilometers from Iran’s southern coast.[7] Iran’s current missile range is around 2,000 kilometers, meaning Iran would need longer-range missiles or significant warhead modifications to reach such targets.[8] These threats underscore how expanded missile capabilities would directly increase Iran’s threats beyond the Middle East. The Iranian missile program is one of the core pillars of Iran’s military strength, due to the weakness of its conventional armed forces, which makes it further unlikely that Iran would agree to include missile restrictions in the ongoing nuclear talks.The next round of indirect US-Iran talks is tentatively scheduled for May 3 in an undisclosed location in Europe, with Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) experts expected to join the technical talks.[9] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo separately met with AEOI Deputy Chief Behrouz Kamalvandi in Tehran on April 28 to discuss outstanding safeguards issues.[10]A large-scale explosion occurred at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 26.[11] Western media reported that the blast was caused by the explosion of a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.[12] The explosion occurred within the Sina Port and Marine Services Company (SPMCO) premises at the port.[13] SPMCO is subject to US Treasury secondary sanctions for its affiliation with the Mostazafan Foundation and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[14] The Associated Press reported on April 27 that the explosion was caused by the improper handling of a shipment of solid fuel intended for ballistic missiles, citing a private security firm.[15] An unspecified individual with ties to the IRGC told the New York Times on April 26 that a container of sodium perchlorate exploded at the port and triggered a series of fires.[16] Sodium perchlorate can be converted to ammonium perchlorate, which is the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas in early 2025.[17] The IRGC Procurement Department of the Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), partially responsible for Iran's ballistic missile research and development, reportedly received the first shipment.[18] The loss of a large amount of key chemical precursor for Iranian missiles may further delay Iran's ability to rebuild its intermediate-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024.The presence of Chinese chemicals, regardless of whether the chemicals caused the explosion, further illustrates how China-based entities have likely helped Iran replenish its missile stockpile and restore key aspects of its defense capabilities. Western officials estimated that recent Chinese shipments of sodium perchlorate, if converted to ammonium perchlorate, can fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles.[19] That amount of ammonium perchlorate can also produce larger quantities of smaller munitions that require less solid fuel, including shorter-range ballistic missiles. China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which undermines the US maximum pressure campaign aimed at driving Iranian oil exports to zero. Chinese assistance to Iran has likely exacerbated US military concerns with Iran and the Axis of Resistance.The explosion at the port may further exacerbate Iran's deteriorating economic conditions. Iran will reportedly lose approximately $25 million per day since it halted operations at the port on April 26.[20] Shahid Rajaee is Iran's largest port and accounts for 85 percent of Iran's shipping container traffic, including a significant portion of its oil exports.[21] The loss of the port—even temporarily—will likely worsen Iran's economic conditions and could cause internal unrest. Iranian media reported 70 deaths and over 1,200 confirmed injuries on April 28, which may also further stoke anti-regime sentiment and unrest.[22]The Houthis used a complex strike package combining ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to force the USS Harry S. Truman to take evasive action. It is unclear if the attack overwhelmed air defenses or how close the projectiles came to hitting the Truman. The Houthis claimed the attack on April 28, without specifying the number of systems they used in the attack.[23] The US Navy confirmed on April 28 that a US Navy F/A-18 and tow tractor aboard the USS Harry S. Truman fell overboard into the Red Sea.[24] An unspecified US official told CNN that the Truman made a “hard turn” to evade Houthi fire, which contributed to the F/A-18 and tow tractor falling overboard.[25] The US Navy confirmed that the Truman remains fully operational, and all crew are accounted for. The Houthis will continue to optimize their strike packages and implement lessons learned as part of an effort to target and ultimately impact US Navy vessels in the Red Sea.The Houthis claimed on April 26 that they launched an unspecified number of drones at the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea.[26]Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties. Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) signed an eight-point framework agreement on March 10 that did not attempt to resolve the main issues between the two parties and appeared to lay out starting positions for future negotiations.[27] The agreement called for the representation of all Syrian communities and their participation in the political process, as well as the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the Syrian state.[28] The Kurds expressed frustration after the government unveiled the Constitutional Declaration on March 13, which concentrated power in Shara’s hands and did not make allowances for popular participation in the political process.[29]Kurdish political parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), have since unified and called on April 26 for a federal Syrian structure that would create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[30] Shara rejected these demands on April 27, calling the push for federalism "divisive" and urging the PYD-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to preserve "national unity."[31] Shara emphasized that national unity remains a "red line" and reaffirmed that Damascus would protect Kurdish rights within a single governing entity.[32]Shara is attempting to frame the Syrian Kurds as secessionists by incorrectly treating federalism and “unity” as mutually exclusive concepts.[33] Shara desires a centralized state and dislikes sharing power, as would be required in a federal system. The Kurdish parties have not called for an independent Kurdish state and have repeatedly emphasized that they seek to remain a part of Syria.[34] The Kurdish parties are simultaneously calling for greater Kurdish representation in the political process in Syria, thus demonstrating that the Kurds seek to be a part of the Syrian state.[35] The calls for representation reflect that Shara has not upheld his responsibilities under the agreement regarding participation in the political process. There are currently no members from a major Kurdish political party in Shara’s cabinet.The continued Damascus-Kurdish tension over the formation of the Syrian state and its structure could be further enflamed by the formation of the People’s Assembly in the coming weeks. Shara will appoint one-third of the representatives to the assembly, and a committee that Shara appoints will tap the remaining two-thirds of the assembly.[36] The formation of this assembly will be a key indicator of the direction of the Syrian state and the seriousness with which Shara intends to stick to his commitments under the March 10 Agreement.Unverified reports continued to circulate in the Syrian information space that the Syrian transitional government and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are building up forces near Tishreen Dam in anticipation of renewed hostilities.[37] Syrian sources claimed that unspecified Syrian MoD factions deployed to Tishreen Dam on April 28.[38] Some sources indicated that the MoD sought to assert control over the dam by deploying forces, while other sources asserted the deployment was a show of force after rumors circulated that the ceasefire at the dam collapsed.[39] International Coalition and NGO groups also reportedly deployed to the dam on April 28.[40] The SDF was separately deployed to several villages on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[41] Turkey, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, and Syrian transitional government forces have not engaged the SDF near Tishreen Dam, eastern Aleppo Province, since early April.[42]Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi may be cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani. Iranian-backed political parties likely conspired to remove Halbousi as parliamentary speaker in late 2023 by using an unconstitutional Federal Supreme Court decision.[43] The Federal Supreme Court is heavily influenced by Iranian-backed factions.[44] Halbousi reportedly formed an “alliance” with Iranian-backed Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali in January 2025 after Halbousi’s Sunni rivals formed a bloc that excluded Halbousi.[45] This new bloc, the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, includes Mashhadani and top Iraqi Sunni rivals of Halbousi.[46] The formation of this new coalition and its explicit support for long-held Sunni political demands opposed by Iranian-backed political parties creates a confluence of interests between Halbousi and his Iranian-backed former enemies like Khazali.[47] Iranian-backed groups tried and failed to remove Mashhadani from his post as parliament speaker in January 2025 after he passed a law that favored Sunnis, for example.[48]The Baghdad Court of Appeals dismissed the charges that caused Halbousi’s removal as speaker in November 2023 on April 27.[49] The degree of control and coercion that Iranian-backed groups in Iraq exercise makes it improbable that such a decision would be taken without their acquiescence. The lack of response by Iranian-backed groups and their allies similarly suggests that they do not disapprove of the acquittal. Halbousi’s acquittal could pave the way for him to unseat Mashhadani before or after the upcoming November 2025 elections, which would support Halbousi’s ambition of returning to the speakership and the Iranian-backed groups’ desire to remove Mashhadani.The Syrian transitional government requested that the United States clarify several conditions that would enable Syria to attain partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters’ influence on the Syrian government.[50] The Syrian government responded on April 14 to a letter that US diplomats sent in mid-March 2025 that laid out eight “confidence-building” measures.[51] The Syrian government letter said that the transitional government plans to fully address five of the eight demands, including the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[52] A source familiar with the Syrian transitional government's approach to retaining foreign fighters said that Damascus seeks to delay a decision that would prevent the government from appointing foreign fighters to senior Syrian government roles for as long as possible.[53] CTP-ISW assessed on March 26 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara would likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[54] Damascus asked for further talks to establish "mutual understandings" around the place of foreign fighters in Syria and about permissions for US airstrikes in Syria.[55] The letter pledged that Syria would not tolerate any threats to Western, Israeli, or US interests.[56]Key Takeaways:US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Western media reported that the April 26 US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman ended in “major disagreements” despite repeated positive messaging from senior Iranian and US officials. One of the key disputes is reportedly over whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program. Iran’s unwillingness to make concessions on its missile program may risk collapsing the talks or pushing negotiations toward a deal less expansive than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly desires.Chemical Explosion in Iran: A large-scale explosion occurred at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 26. Western media reported that the blast was caused by the explosion of a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The loss of a large amount of key chemical precursor for Iranian missiles may further delay Iran's ability to rebuild its intermediate-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. China delivered the same precursor to Bandar Abbas earlier this year. These chemicals further illustrate how China-based entities have likely helped Iran replenish its missile stockpile and restore key aspects of its defense capabilities.Houthi Attack Campaign Against US Navy: The Houthis used a complex strike package combining ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to force the USS Harry S. Truman to take evasive action.Syrian Kurd-Syrian Government Negotiations: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties. Shara is attempting to frame the Syrian Kurds as secessionists by incorrectly treating federalism and “unity” as mutually exclusive concepts. Shara desires a centralized state and dislikes sharing power, as would be required in a federal system. The Kurdish parties have not called for an independent Kurdish state and have repeatedly emphasized that they seek to remain a part of Syria.Iraqi Politics: Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi may be cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani. The formation of a new coalition that includes Mashhadani and its explicit support for long-held Sunni political demands opposed by Iranian-backed political parties creates a confluence of interests between Halbousi and his Iranian-backed former enemies like Khazali.Syrian Sanctions Relief: The Syrian transitional government requested that the United States clarify several conditions that would enable Syria to attain partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 800,000 rials to one US dollar on April 25 to 814,000 rials to one US dollar on April 28.[57]Iranian Information and Communications Technology Deputy Minister Behzad Akbari stated on April 28 that Iran repelled “one of the most widespread and complex” cyberattacks targeting Iranian infrastructure.[58] Iranian media did not provide specifics as to the nature of the attack.Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian oversaw the signing of seven Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) on April 28 between Iran and Azerbaijan during a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan.[59] The MOUs cover topics including transport, health, media, and investment. Iran seeks to develop transportation routes, including the International North-South Transport Corridor, which would run through Azerbaijan, to increase regional trade.[60]SyriaThe Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 27 that it will begin to recruit Assad regime defectors to apply to work in the MoD.[61] MoD Head of Officer Affairs Brigadier General Mohammad Mansour confirmed that this applies to former SAA soldiers who defected and joined the Syrian opposition.[62] The MoD will receive applications from two categories of defectors: individuals and non-commissioned officers.[63] A MoD official previously confirmed in mid-March that the ministry was working to return all defected officers to the new Syrian army and the MoD.[64] Several defected SAA members who later joined armed opposition factions currently command divisions in the MoD. [65] Mansour told Syrian media on April 27 that the MoD will establish mechanisms to properly incorporate returning officers into new army formations in line with their expertise and specializations.[66]General Security Services (GSS) forces interdicted two shipments of smuggled weapons and ammunition between Lebanon and Syria on April 26 and 28.[67] The GSS seized a weapons shipment concealed inside a bus at a Lebanon-Syria border crossing near al Qusayr on April 26.[68] The shipment included assault rifles, rockets, grenades, sniper and night vision equipment, and munitions.[69] GSS forces arrested several individuals.[70] GSS forces discovered the shipment after receiving information from an unspecified source.[71] GSS forces also arrested a group that attempted to smuggle ammunition into Syria, near Talkalakh, Homs Province, on April 28.[72] These interdictions come amid joint Syrian and Lebanese efforts to thwart cross-border smuggling attempts in recent months. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Syrian forces increased patrols and closed several illegal border crossings between Syria and Lebanon in late March 2025.[73]Prominent Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf may be supporting efforts to build pro-Assad insurgent networks, though it is unlikely that he has assembled thousands of fighters to “defend” the Alawite community against the transitional government.[74] Makhlouf, who is Bashar al Assad’s maternal cousin, claimed on Facebook on April 27 that he and former Special Forces commander Suhail al Hassan have assembled 150,000 special forces fighters.[75] Makhlouf also claimed that he has the support of “one million” popular committee members.[76] It is highly unlikely that Makhlouf or Hassan has been able to acquire any force or support base of this size. It is possible Makhlouf is involved in recruiting support for the Alawite insurgency abroad, however. Several former Assad officials have been linked to the insurgency.[77] Makhlouf has likely remained in the UAE since 2020 and likely has connections there that could help him recruit forces or support for the insurgency.[78] Mohammad Jaber, a UAE-based Syrian businessman and former Assad regime militia commander, admitted to cooperation with the insurgency in early April.[79] Makhlouf was an influential Syrian billionaire with close ties to Assad for many years until the two had a public falling out in 2020. [80] Makhlouf positioned himself as a defender of the Alawite community in his letter on Facebook and echoed many of the sectarian justifications that have fueled support for Alawite insurgency, including that insurgents are acting in self-defense against sectarian-based attacks by the transitional government.[81] Makhlouf said that he would like to ”cooperate” with Damascus to stabilize the coast and called upon the international community, and Russia in particular, to defend the Alawite community.[82] It is probably a non-starter for the Damascus government to cooperate with Makhlouf, who is responsible for some of Assad’s crimes in Syria.The association of Assad-era businessmen and officers like Makhlouf, Hassan, and others will likely undermine support for the insurgency within the Alawite community. Not all Alawites supported the Assad regime, and many are presumably unwilling to fight for the return of Assad. Makhlouf and Hassan are both notorious regime figures despite Makhlouf’s claims that he and Hassan kept Syria from collapsing under the rule of Assad.[83] Many Alawites have been drawn to the coastal insurgency by a range of economic grievances and fears of revenge-based attacks and harassment rather than support for the former Assad regime. This could motivate them to form their insurgent groups in time.Probable sectarian Sunni fighters conducted a series of revenge-based attacks following a failed arrest of a former Assad regime officer that resulted in GSS casualties.[84] The GSS attempted to arrest former Assad-era pilot Ali Shalhoub in Homs Province on April 25.[85] Shalhoub resisted arrest and fired on security forces, killing one and wounding several others.[86] Syrian media reported a sharp uptick in killings of civilians in Sabil, Karam al Zeitoun, and Nuzha neighborhoods of Homs City. A Syria-focused journalist reported that fighters claiming to be members of the GSS detained an Alawite man and searched his home in Nuzha.[87] The man was found dead the following day.[88] GSS denied sending forces to the man’s home.[89] The GSS is primarily composed of Hayat Tahrir al Sham fighters.[90] There have been anecdotal reports of positive interactions between security forces and the Alawite community. Revenge-based violence after forces suffer casualties is often indicative of poor discipline within a force.[91]The Yemeni Foreign Ministry announced that the Yemeni embassy in Damascus reopened on April 27.[92] The Houthis took control of the Yemeni embassy in Damascus in 2016 following their capture of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa.[93] Syrian officials ordered Houthi embassy employees to vacate the premises, according to a Houthi Finance Ministry director.[94] The Syrian transitional government has taken steps since the fall of the Assad regime to weaken Iranian and Iranian-backed actors in Syria.  Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani held multiple diplomatic meetings in New York with various United Nations and foreign officials. Shaibani met with UN Special Envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen in New York on April 26.[95] The pair discussed recent developments in Syria and explored ways to strengthen international support for the Syrian people.[96] Pedersen emphasized that inclusivity and transparency are essential for the next steps in the political transition of Syria.[97] He expressed his support for the March 10 agreement between Ahmed Shara and Mazloum Abdi that outlines principles for future negotiations and stressed the importance of further dialogue amongst Syrians to integrate northeastern Syria into the new Syrian government.[98] Shaibani also met with Under-Secretary for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs at the UN Rosemary DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations Jean Pierre Lacroix, and UN Development Program Administrator Achim Steiner.[99] Foreign Minister Shaibani also met with Libyan Permanent Representative to the UN Taher al Sunni during a joint meeting attended by ambassadors and representatives of the Arab Group.[100] Shaibani gave a briefing on the latest developments in Syria that focused on the efforts of the new transitional government to confront the current political, security, and economic challenges.[101] Sunni affirmed Libya’s full support for the Syrian government and its people to recover from the crisis it has endured and emphasized the preservation of Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and stability.[102]The Syrian government announced on April 27 that Saudi Arabia and Qatar will pay Syria’s arrears to the World Bank.[103] The Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry thanked both countries for paying Syria's debts, which amount to $15 million.[104] Western media reported that the World Bank will be able to re-establish its activities in Syria after a 14-year pause.[105] It is unclear if either country will expect Syria to repay them eventually or if an alternative arrangement has been reached. The Syrian government said that the payment will allow Syria to cultivate a relationship with international institutions that will assist in its recovery and reconstruction.[106]IraqIraqi National Intelligence Service head Hamid al Shatri discussed Iraq-Syria cooperation with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on April 25.[107] Shatri is reportedly affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[108] Shatri and Shara discussed potential trade deals concerning the oil and grain sectors and agreed to develop a working mechanism to operate the al Waleed border crossing in Homs Province.[109] Syrian media separately reported on April 26 that the Iraqi government sent 39 trucks of grain and wheat through the Albu Kamal border crossing in Deir ez Zor Province. The Iraqi government hopes to provide 222,000 total tons in the future, according to Syrian media.[110]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 56 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since 2:00 pm ET on April 25.[111] CENTCOM conducted at least 19 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure between April 25 and 27, including launch sites and weapons depots, in Majzar and Madghal districts, Marib Governorate; Rabt al Anan, al Jawf Governorate; and Nihm District, Sanaa Governorate. All three locations are less than 50 kilometers behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[112] CENTCOM also conducted at least five airstrikes on April 26 targeting Houthi infrastructure at Ras Issa Port and Kamaran Island in Hudaydah Governorate.[113] Houthi media reported that CENTCOM struck an immigrant detention center in southwestern Saada City, reportedly killing at least 60 individuals and injuring 65 others.[114] CENTCOM reportedly struck Houthi command-and-control centers on April 26 near the Presidential Complex in Sanaa City and near Mount Yajoura, Bani al Harith District, on the outskirts of Sanaa City.[115] CENTCOM also struck a house on April 26 in the October 14 neighborhood, al Sabeen District, Sanaa City, reportedly owned by Houthi merchant Nabil al Khameri.[116]A Yemeni journalist and Saudi media outlets reported on April 25 and 26 that US airstrikes targeting Majzar District, Marib Governorate, on April 24 killed Houthi security commander for Majzar District Abu Mohsen al Rasas.[117]The Houthis claimed that they have launched three drones and two ballistic missiles at various unspecified military sites across Israel since April 25. The Houthis claimed on April 26 that they launched one drone targeting an unspecified target in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area and an unspecified “vital” target in Ashkelon, southern Israel.[118] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted one drone on April 26 outside of Israeli territory.[119] The Houthis separately claimed on April 26 that they launched a ballistic missile targeting the Nevatim Air Base, southern Israel.[120] The IDF intercepted one missile outside of Israeli territory on April 26.[121] The Houthis claimed on April 28 that they launched a ballistic missile targeting the Nevatim Air Base and one drone targeting Ashkelon.[122] [123] The IDF intercepted one drone on April 27 outside of Israeli territory.[124]The US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three vessels and their owners on April 28 for delivering oil derivatives to the Houthis via the Ras Issa Port.[125] The three vessels include the San Marino-flagged Tulip BZ, the Panama-flagged Maisan, and the Panama-flagged White Whale. The sanctioned companies that facilitated the movement of oil derivatives via these vessels are registered in the Marshall Islands and Mauritius.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing significant to report.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.  The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. 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https://x.com/jenanmoussa/status/1916572076720394300 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1915834252895359424[85] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1915689679015313793[86] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1915689679015313793[87] https://x.com/jenanmoussa/status/1916572076720394300 ; https://www.facebook.com/saeedelnay7a/posts/122128258706785027?__cft__[0]=AZX_u4XQDQdIrJbTCyW3wkcbAeo4skVvTg8vqCceULEOAu_0Y89p5y4mOdGRxiTNiRP3wpHSf99Y8649Ej-3taSKIuBagLmr5WyHNNYDpN7LRpMA1F3Ix1SlKb9DXmkJION4cy58C8r4Kr6KTam8eXKuy69SZRAKzPq3m0g7LPBIpyJUj2OzCDcbekRg5bMLZ-roMeDsRy2RTvLz7UMJTxxw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[88] https://x.com/jenanmoussa/status/1916572076720394300[89] https://x.com/jenanmoussa/status/1916572076720394300[90] https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/warfare-irregular-threats-and-terrorism-program-archives/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir[91] https://www.syriarevisited.com/p/an-alawite-voice-from-homs-city?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email[92] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/04/yemen-reopens-embassy-in-damascus-key-implications/[93] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/04/yemen-reopens-embassy-in-damascus-key-implications/[94] https://www.newarab.com/news/syria-regime-orders-houthis-out-yemen-govt-embassy[95] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1916151288179429622[96] https://levant24 dot com/news/international/2025/04/syrian-foreign-minister-holds-key-diplomatic-meetings-in-new-york/[97] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1916023626152738888[98] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1916023626152738888[99] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1916155053825568879https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/55748https://t.me/damascusv011/30818[100] ttps://www.sana.sy/en/?p=353583[101] https://www.sana.sy/en/?p=353583[102] https://www.sana.sy/en/?p=353583[103] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/734[104] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/734[105] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/28/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-qatar-syria-debt.html[106] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/734[107] https://t.me/SyPresidency/869[108] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A[109] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128432[110] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1916108798659285198[111] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915826592653156557 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915877856363610438 ;https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1915901585869426723 ;https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1916148475747618947 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1916179918448119998 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916184112161034388 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916186821861773620 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1916192147147010114 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916586616472457599 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916213258056335479 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916213362884554901 ;https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1916215484468392051 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916246554123407707 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916554755268059466 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1916565316865306998 ;https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1916563422243627516 ;https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1916667461715349885 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916833656087187766 ; 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[Author: Unknown]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2025

 

at 4/27/25 7:00pm

Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and George Barros with William RunkelApril 27, 2025, 6:15pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on April 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian and Russian forces' constant technological and tactical battlefield innovations continue to transform the character of warfare in Ukraine. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion, likely operating in the Chasiv Yar direction, reported on April 27 that continuous technological innovations and battlefield adaptations have increasingly transformed the character of modern conventional warfare in Ukraine into a war that primarily features "long-range, remote combat" over meeting engagements between infantry and armored vehicles.[1] The NCO noted that Ukrainian and Russian forces’ intensifying drone usage has expanded the area of contested gray zones and kill zones at the forward edge of the battle area. The NCO noted that in 2024, contested gray zones were roughly 500 meters to two kilometers in depth, but more intense drone usage since then has expanded the gray zone up to five to seven kilometers in some areas of the frontline. The NCO reported that Russian forces are improving and expanding their unmanned systems capabilities and emulating Ukrainian forces’ tactics of using drones to intercept enemy drones and conduct remote mining. Ukrainian forces have successfully leveraged superior drone capabilities to defend critical sectors of the frontline while also mitigating manpower and materiel constraints.Ukraine maintains over 100 brigades that must defend a frontline (both within Ukraine and along Ukraine's international border with Russia) currently over 2,100 kilometers long and significantly leverages drone capabilities, in tandem with traditional capabilities, to deny Russian attacks across the frontline.[2] Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to rapidly upscale domestic drone production and foreign drone procurement that is conducive for defending the frontline as well as executing a sustained long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian critical energy and defense industrial facilities deep within Russian territory that disrupts and degrades the Russian military's production and logistics.[3] Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have more regularly been using fiber-optic drones to strike each other’s frontline positions and have successfully used first-person view (FPV) drones to intercept larger reconnaissance drones over the past several months.[4]ISW has observed the rapid rate at which both Ukraine and Russia have managed to conceptualize, field, and implement near-continuous technological innovation and battlefield-adjusted tactics to optimize combat dynamics.[5] Ukrainian and Russian forces field new adaptations over the course of months rather than years and are constantly experimenting, further driving the feedback loop of increased reliance on technology and tactical innovation to maintain battlefield advantages. The innovation and operational concepts being forged in Ukraine will set the stage for the future of warfare.Russian forces are attempting to offset Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone operations by integrating motorcycles and civilian vehicles into offensive operations along the entire frontline. The NCO in the Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion stated that Russian forces are increasingly using infantry assaults and motorized assaults on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and light vehicles to advance in areas where Ukrainian forces leverage drone usage to maintain frontline positions.[6] The non-commissioned officer reported that Russian forces leverage motorcycles and other light vehicles to disperse forces to more easily avoid drone strikes. A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27 that Russian forces have conducted 13 motorized assaults on motorcycles since March 20.[7] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction cannot drive heavy armored vehicles to frontline positions due to disrupted Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), resulting in Russian forces shifting tactics to prioritize daily infantry assaults supported by motorcycles.[8]ISW has observed Russian forces throughout the entire theater struggling to operate heavy armored vehicles close to the line of fire without being struck by Ukrainian drones. Russian forces are likely leveraging the speed, maneuverability, and small profiles of motorcycles and other light civilian vehicles to mitigate the efficacy of Ukrainian drone capabilities and are likely developing a tactical doctrine for systematic offensive motorcycle usage and preparing to integrate motorcycle usage into Summer and Fall 2024 offensive operations.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and military command previously responded to Ukrainian drone innovations by attempting to formally integrate and centralize Russia’s drone operations and production.[10] The Ukrainian and Russian defense industrial bases (DIBs) continue to compete in the innovation of new, cost-effective systems that enhance assault and battlefield capabilities and counter each other’s innovations. Russian forces likely see a tactical opportunity in leveraging motorcycles and civilian vehicles to advance and seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible despite Ukraine’s drone defenses.Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's long-standing position against making any form of territorial concessions, undermining US President Donald Trump's efforts to broker a lasting peace. Lavrov stated in an interview with CBS News conducted on April 24 and aired on April 27 that "Russia does not negotiate its territory" when asked about the status of Russian-occupied Crimea in ongoing negotiations.[11] Lavrov also stated that he does not ”think any change is conceivable” when asked about whether the Kremlin is willing to consider transferring control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) - reportedly one of the terms in the Trump administration‘s seven-point conflict termination plan.[12]Russian officials adopted constitutional amendments that declared Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts as Russian territories and have since relied on a pseudo-legal framework that claims occupied Ukrainian territories are now part of Russia "constitutionally" to reject ceding any area in Russian-occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts and Crimea to Ukraine as part of a peace deal to end the war.[13] Russian officials also use this pseudo-legal framework to demand that Ukraine cede additional territory within Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts to Russia that Russia does not currently occupy.[14] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova similarly stated on April 26 that Russian forces will seize all "territory of Russia," which she claimed includes Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[15]Lavrov and other Russian officials' recent statements directly contradict the Trump administration's proposed peace framework, which reportedly includes mutual territorial concessions, including Ukraine regaining territory in Kharkiv Oblast and the ZNPP.[16] ISW continues to observe that Ukraine remains open to good-faith dialogue with Russia and is willing to consider territorial issues, while Russia fails to offer any concessions of its own and insists on terms tantamount to Ukraine's surrender.[17]Russian law enforcement announced on April 26 the arrest of Ignat Kuzin, the suspect whom Russia accused of planting the improvised explosive device (IED) that killed the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, on April 25.[18] The Russian Investigative Committee and Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that Kuzin purchased a car and installed the IED, which the Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) detonated from Ukraine. BBC Russia, citing Kremlin newswire TASS, reported that Turkish authorities detained and extradited Kuzin to Russia after he allegedly attempted to flee from Moscow to Turkey.[19] ISW was not able to identify any Turkish confirmation of this claim, and Ukrainian officials have not commented on the attack as of this publication.Key Takeaways:Ukrainian and Russian forces' constant technological and tactical battlefield innovations continue to transform the character of warfare in Ukraine.Russian forces are attempting to offset Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone operations by integrating motorcycles and civilian vehicles into offensive operations along the entire frontline.Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's long-standing position against making any form of territorial concessions, undermining US President Donald Trump's efforts to broker a lasting peace.Russian law enforcement announced on April 26 the arrest of Ignat Kuzin, the suspect whom Russia accused of planting the improvised explosive device (IED) that killed the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, on April 25Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces did not make confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast on April 27 amid continued fighting.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian military officials reported on April 27 that Ukrainian forces continue defensive operations in Kursk Oblast and that fighting continues in the Kursk direction, contrary to Russian officials' April 26 claims that Russian forces recaptured the entirety of Kursk Oblast.[20]The acting commander of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 27 that Russian forces will destroy all remaining Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast in the near future.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to conduct clearing operations near Gornal and Oleshnya (both southwest of Sudzha), while another claimed that Russian forces still need to push Ukrainian forces across the last few meters to the international border.[22] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast and that Russian forces do not have full control of the oblast.[23]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st VDV (Airborne) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Oleshnya.[24]Russian forces did not make confirmed advances in Belgorod Oblast on April 27 amid continued fighting.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[25]A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued near Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[26] Zelensky stated on April 27 that Ukrainian forces continue defense operations in Belgorod Oblast.[27]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Kara" detachment of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Demidovka.[28]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the C-191503 highway in northern Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).[29]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 27 that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) advanced into Sumy Oblast from Oleshnya, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha).[30]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 27 but did not advance.[31]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 27 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced to Doroshivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[32]Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Mala Shapkivka and northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe on April 27.[33]Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 27 that Russian forces are attacking on motorcycles and buggies instead of using heavy armored vehicles such as tanks in the Kharkiv and Kupyansk directions.[34] Trehubov noted that Russian forces are increasingly using motorcycles to conduct motorized assaults in the Kupyansk direction.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to the southwestern outskirts of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[35]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[36]Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Olhivka, and Hrekivka on April 26 and 27.[37]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 27 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Nove and Torske (both northeast of Lyman).[38]Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman toward Lypove and northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Nove, Ridkodub, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi, and toward Novyi Mir and Zelena Dolyna on April 26 and 27.[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 27 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Sivesk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 26 and 27.[40]Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Ozaryanivka, although this advance likely did not occur within the past day.[41]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within central Chasiv Yar and on the northern outskirts of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[42]Russian forces continued attacking near Chasiv Yar itself; south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka on April 26 and 27.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 27 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[44]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[45] Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue operating near Stupochky.[46]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 and 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the railway line in northeastern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) and within central Berezivka (southwest of Toretsk).[47]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the northern outskirts of Shcherbynivka and seized Berezivka.[48]Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Krymske, Dachne, Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka, Sukha Balka, and Yelyzavetivka on April 26 and 27.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in southwestern Toretsk and near Novospaske (west of Toretsk), Shcherbynivka, Zelene Pole (southwest of Toretsk), and Berezivka.[50]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[51] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating near Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk), and elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) reportedly continue operating near Sukha Balka.[52]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 27 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 26 and 27.[53]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk).[55]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 27 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between Uspenivka and Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[56]Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka, Bohdanivka, and Troitske on April 26 and 27.[57]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 27 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced south of Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove).[58]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka, and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv, Bahatyr, and Odradne on April 26 and 27.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne.[60]Russian milbloggers claimed on April 26 and 27 that Russian and Ukrainian forces operating in the Kurakhove direction conducted several mechanized assaults.[61] It is unclear whether Russian mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction are supported by armored vehicles or an amalgamation of motorcycles and other light vehicles.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[62] Drone elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Odradne.[63]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 27 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Dniproenerhiya on April 26 and 27.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 27 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Dniproenerhiya.[65]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 305th Artillery Brigade (both of the 5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[66]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 27 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Mali Shcherbaky on April 26 and 27.[67]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA), and BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[68]Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on April 26.[69]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[70]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 149 drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 67 Russian decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck commercial and residential infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, and Odesa oblasts.[72]Donetsk Oblast officials reported on April 27 that Russian forces conducted three guided glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka, killing and injuring civilians.[73]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/27/vijna-staye-dalekobijnoyu-za-rik-sira-zona-na-fronti-zrosla-do-7-km/[2] https://kyivindependent dot com/equipping-troops-takes-priority-over-lowering-draft-age-zelensky-says/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011525[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025[6] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/27/vijna-staye-dalekobijnoyu-za-rik-sira-zona-na-fronti-zrosla-do-7-km/[7] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/27/kynuv-motoczykl-na-kolyuchyj-drit-shhob-inshi-proyihaly-desantnyky-pro-dyvni-shturmy-rosiyan/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1004319-ci-e-u-rosijskoi-armii-prosuvanna-u-bik-dnipra-na-pokrovskomu-ta-novopavlivskomu-napramkah/[8] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/27/kynuv-motoczykl-na-kolyuchyj-drit-shhob-inshi-proyihaly-desantnyky-pro-dyvni-shturmy-rosiyan/[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations[11] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sergey-lavrov-russian-foreign-minister-face-the-nation-transcript-04-27-2025/[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2025[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://kremlin dot ru/acts/constitution/item#chapter3; https://tass dot ru/politika/15978897; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025[15] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2011785/[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2025[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025[18] https://ria dot ru/20250426/zaderzhanie-2013610468.html; https://t.me/tass_agency/312297 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312301 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312302 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312303 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312308 ; https://t.me/sledcom_press/20731[19] https://t.me/bbcrussian/79551[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1916479271616303525 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14011[21] https://iz dot ru/1877698/2025-04-27/vrio-komandira-810-i-brigady-morpekhov-dolozhil-putinu-o-situatcii-v-kurskoi-oblasti[22] https://t.me/wargonzo/26167 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46885 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1916155646296150165 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1916135252478636050 ; https://t.me/rybar/69954 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27610[23] https://t.me/apwagner/39657 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1916168649720659990[24] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34890 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31401       [25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162684[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/26167[27] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1916479271616303525[28] https://t.me/voin_dv/14631[29] https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2927; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1916219525852545499; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9002[30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63818 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31401[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584[32] https://t.me/tass_agency/312328[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584[34] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1004455-aktivnist-atak-rf-na-harkivsini-pisla-velikodnogo-peremira-vpala-z-cim-ce-povazano/[35] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1916284506254020699; https://t.me/rubaka_77/101;[36] https://t.me/yurasumy/22600[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8831[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63825[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8831; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63825; https://t.me/yurasumy/22600[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8831[41] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1916233461918273728; https://t.me/BBpS_28/803[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162684 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34868[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63821 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21121[44] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21121[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90669[46] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21121[47] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1916423416413880723; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DI66VkKi-m0/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1916423579459035590; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9005 ;https://t.me/bbs117_army/35; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9006[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34868 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34889[49] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8831 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63808 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/69972 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22601 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22614 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22601[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63808 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63822[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13729[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63808[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8831[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162677 ; https://t.me/urga_74[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/14628[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63813; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63813[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8831; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63810; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63813[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63816[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8831; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90676; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63816; https://t.me/wargonzo/26167; https://t.me/dva_majors/69972; https://t.me/voin_dv/14644[60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63816; https://t.me/dva_majors/69972; https://t.me/wargonzo/26167; https://t.me/voin_dv/14644[61] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63816; https://t.me/dva_majors/69972[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/14635[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/14637[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8831[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/14644[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/14629[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02dmfGBMBchk41esvDXjfDdXfxoS8vLxfcRxbh2XB8B2C5jzFZRypiG6w784r2Y3CQl[68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90678 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34867 ; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7055[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23584 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0w3E9MEktDGd2LgGmuWNEA5hd7VkzCBuFgiG3jrmM2j2keWX2o4D19CVsv2bRYbu9l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23548 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02dmfGBMBchk41esvDXjfDdXfxoS8vLxfcRxbh2XB8B2C5jzFZRypiG6w784r2Y3CQl[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34866[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/33356[72] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21108 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1004421-vijska-rf-atakuvali-silgosppidpriemstvo-na-pavlogradsini-zaginuli-svini-potroseni-angari-ta-tehnika/ ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/7992 ; https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/3887 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1004447-rosijski-vijska-skinuli-aviabombi-na-misto-kostantinivka-u-doneckij-oblasti-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/suspilneodesa/47134 ; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/1270 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/34947 ; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/7508 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/34960 ; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/11934[73] https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid0BhDBBpky9N7VnTnwU4aQ8QjEykrfPtzp1kvo4DBmHgkjGkjpVkLgPDz8XhL9F8iVl?locale=ru_RU ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/8008

[Author: Unknown]

— Iran Update, April 15, 2025

 

at 4/26/25 8:11pm

Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States is the best option for preserving the Iranian regime's stability. Khamenei discussed the United States-Iran nuclear talks and economic priorities during a meeting with senior Iranian government officials on April 15.[1] Khamenei called for mitigating the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy while simultaneously expressing support for nuclear talks with the United States. Khamenei’s main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. The New York Times reported on April 11 that President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf convinced Khamenei to approve nuclear talks with the United States to avoid a potential “two-front war” against both external military threats and internal unrest.[2] Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States will improve Iranian economic conditions and prevent a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Senior Iranian officials have recently expressed concern that Iran’s worsening economic conditions could cause internal unrest.[3] Khamenei would likely be skeptical of any agreement that Iran signs with the Trump administration, however, given that US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Khamenei stated that Iran must “proceed carefully” in the negotiations with the United States and emphasized Iran’s distrust toward the United States during the meeting with government officials.Khamenei also likely seeks to manage domestic expectations about the possibility of Iran reaching a nuclear agreement with the United States. Khamenei cautioned against both "excessive optimism and pessimism" and stressed that Iran’s progress must continue “independently of the negotiations” during his meeting with government officials.[4] Khamenei's cautious position may seek to protect the regime from internal backlash if the talks fail or produce only limited economic benefits.US President Donald Trump discussed the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran with senior US foreign policy and national security officials on April 15.[5] The United States and Iran began nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12.[6] Axios reported on April 15 that there is “intense debate” in the administration about the trajectory of the talks and potential US compromises. Unspecified individuals briefed on the talks told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that the Trump administration intends to discuss Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance with Iran but that “the topic didn’t come up for discussion” on April 12.[7] Iranian sources previously stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance.[8] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted an information operation targeting the West in recent weeks that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance.[9] This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during negotiations that it has already distanced itself from the Axis of Resistance. This informational campaign is part of a long-running Iranian campaign that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s support for its proxies and absolve Iran of responsibility for its proxies’ actions. Iran and the United States are scheduled to hold a second round of talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 19.[10]US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated in an interview on April 14 that Iran “do[es] not need” to enrich uranium past 3.67 percent.[11] Witkoff later posted on X (Twitter) on April 15 that any nuclear deal with Iran must “stop and eliminate” the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.[12] Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels.[13] The JCPOA limited Iranian uranium enrichment to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 3.67 percent for fifteen years.[14] Iran currently has 274.8 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce around six nuclear weapons.[15]Witkoff stated on April 14 that nuclear negotiations with Iran would also focus on ensuring “verification on weaponization,” which includes monitoring the kinds of missiles that Iran has.[16] United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA in 2015, stipulated that Iran cannot undertake “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons...until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day.”[17] The missile restrictions in UNSC Resolution 2231 expired in October 2023. Iranian officials have repeatedly stressed in recent weeks that Iran is unwilling to negotiate on the Iranian drone and missile programs.[18] Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program because doing so would cause it to lose one of its primary deterrent powers and means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran uses its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to pressure its adversaries and increase its military influence in the region.[19]The Eighth Brigade announced on April 13 that it would dissolve itself and surrender its weapons to the Syrian transitional government amid government pressure on the group. Eighth Brigade spokesperson Muhammad al Hourani announced the group’s “complete” dissolution and readiness to hand over all “human and military resources” to the Syrian MoD.[20] The Eighth Brigade, which is based in southeastern Daraa and led by Ahmed al Awda, is comprised of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime. The militia has operated as an independent organization in recent weeks despite nominally integrating into the General Security Services (GSS) since February 2025.[21] The transitional government deployed significant forces to Busra al Sham after Eighth Brigade members in the Busra al Sham GSS shot an MoD official on April 10.[22] The transitional government negotiated the handover of the Eighth Brigade members who had committed the attack and pressured the Eighth Brigade to dissolve during these negotiations.[23] Eighth Brigade Commander Ahmed al Awda has not publicly confirmed the group’s dissolution, but it is unlikely that Hourani would announce the Eighth Brigade's dissolution without Awda's approval. The government assumed control over all former Eighth Brigade positions in Busra al Sham and confiscated the group’s remaining military equipment and assets in the city and surrounding countryside.[24] GSS members called on all residents in the area to hand in their weapons at GSS checkpoints.[25]The transitional government appears to be trying to reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence over security in southeastern Daraa. Senior Daraa provincial and security officials discussed on April 12 opening a new GSS center in Busra al Sham that would be led by reliable GSS members from outside of the area.[26] The GSS appears to recruit local fighters, which enabled the Eighth Brigade to effectively reflag themselves as a GSS unit and continue to control the southeastern Daraa countryside. Deploying non-local GSS members to Busra al Sham could reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence in the area and serve as a model for integrating other militias into Syrian security services.Iran is reportedly cooperating with Sunni extremist groups in Syria, including ISIS, following the collapse of its networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime.[27] Unspecified European and regional security officials cited by the Washington Post on April 12 claimed that Iran has reached out to Sunni extremist groups to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and facilitate smuggling.[28] The sources did not specify how Iran is working with extremist groups to try to destabilize the transitional government. Iran has previously cooperated with other Sunni extremist groups, including al Qaeda, to pursue various regional objectives.[29] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-entrench itself in Syria.[30] Several Sunni extremist groups have formed in western Syria since the fall of the Assad regime and the transitional government has fought a counterinsurgency campaign in the areas where these groups operate since early March 2025.[31] There is currently no evidence that these groups have any connections to Iran, but Iran could seek to work with these groups to try to advance its strategic objectives in Syria.There appear to be emerging localized formations in Hasakah Province, northeastern Syria, that seek to undermine the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A group called the Free Hasakah Forces released a statement on April 14 urging Arab tribal leaders to distance themselves from the SDF.[32] The group threatened to assassinate four tribal leaders who they claim have cooperated with the SDF and urged others to defect from the SDF. This group’s statement closely mirrors a recent statement from another anti-SDF group called the Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade.[33] The Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade claimed that it assassinated an alleged SDF informant in Qamishli, Hasakah Province, on April 13.[34] Both groups included the Syrian revolutionary flag in their statements, which suggests that the groups likely do not oppose the Syrian transitional government. The SDF has historically relied on support from Arab tribal networks to maintain its presence in areas under its control and to conduct anti-ISIS operations.[35] Continued threats against pro-SDF tribal leaders in Hasakah Province could cause these leaders to reduce support for the SDF, which would in turn likely undermine SDF influence in the area.Anti-Houthi Yemeni factions are reportedly planning a ground offensive against the Houthis to recapture the western coast of Yemen, including Hudaydah Port, according to US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[36] A successful ground operation against the Houthis would require some degree of political and military coordination among the fragmented anti-Houthi Yemeni factions. National Resistance Front (NRF) leader and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Tariq Saleh met with the Yemeni Defense Ministry operations chief on April 14 in Mokha to discuss cooperation among anti-Houthi factions.[37] Saleh has argued that “military action [is] the only way to end the threat” posed by the Houthis, according to the Wall Street Journal.[38] The NRF controls territory in southwestern Yemen near Mokha and would, therefore, likely be involved in an offensive on Hudaydah Governorate.[39] The Joint Forces on the West Coast, which is a militia that supports the internationally-recognized Yemeni government, stated that the Joint Forces on the West Coast is ready to “liberate Hudaydah and all areas [under] Houthi control – with or without American involvement.”[40] The Joint Forces on the West Coast is backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and includes around 40,000 fighters from the Guards of the Republic, the Southern Giants Brigades, and the Tihama Resistance.[41]The UAE, which provides financial and military support to anti-Houthi Yemeni factions, has discussed the ground campaign plan with US officials in recent weeks, according to the US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[42] The US officials noted that the United States has not decided whether it would support a ground offensive against the Houthis. Unspecified Saudi officials have stated that Saudi Arabia would not get involved in a ground offensive because the Saudi government is concerned that participating in such a military operation would cause the Houthis to resume drone and missile attacks targeting Saudi territory.[43] The Joint Forces on the West Coast spokesperson told the Wall Street Journal that a ground campaign against the Houthis would require the support of the internationally-recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-Emirati military coalition.[44]The US and Yemeni officials stated that US private security contractors have been advising Yemeni factions on a potential ground offensive.[45] Private security contractors have previously worked alongside the Yemeni Armed Forces and UAE-backed anti-Houthi militias in Yemen.[46]US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on April 14.[47] CENTCOM conducted at least seven airstrikes targeting reported Houthi barracks and weapons depots on Kamaran Island, Hudaydah Governorate. These airstrikes mark the ninth time that CENTCOM has targeted Houthi infrastructure on Kamaran Island since the start of the CENTCOM airstrike campaign on March 15.[48]CENTCOM has continued to target Houthi military bases near the al Jawf Junction that connects Houthi supply lines from Sanaa City to the Houthis’ eastern front in Marib and al Jawf governorates.[49] Many of these bases, including the Mass Military Base, were previously Yemeni Armed Forces bases before the Houthis occupied western Marib and al Jawf governorates in 2020.[50] These bases include Houthi underground facilities, weapons depots, missile and drone launch sites, and command and control centers, according to an independent Yemeni defense outlet.[51] The outlet reported on April 15 that the Houthis control the Nihm and Heelan mountain ranges in the area, which is where the Salb Gold Extraction Company is based. This company is an important source of income for the Houthis.[52] The outlet added that the Houthis have recently moved heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and military equipment, to its eastern front.[53]   US forces will reportedly begin withdrawing from Syria by mid-June 2025, according to Israeli media.[54] The Trump administration ordered the US Defense Department to begin preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria in early February 2025.[55] CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISIS could resurge in Syria in 12 to 24 months without a US presence there.[56] US Central Command warned in July 2024 that ISIS is trying to reconstitute.[57] A US withdrawal would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute.[58]Jordanian authorities arrested 16 individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on April 15 for planning rocket and drone attacks in Jordan.[59] Jordanian authorities said that the Muslim Brotherhood trained and financed some of the individuals in Lebanon. Jordanian security services located dozens of rockets at a rocket manufacturing facility and a drone factory on the outskirts of Amman. The suspects had manufactured rockets with a three-to-five-kilometer range to strike Jordanian targets and had enough material to produce 300 rockets.[60] There is currently no evidence that links Iran or Iranian-backed actors to this incident. The incident is notable given that Iran has recently placed greater importance on Jordan in its regional strategy, however.[61] Israeli and Jordanian police thwarted multiple Iranian-led attempts to smuggle small arms and other weapons to the West Bank via Jordan in 2024.[62] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could seek to invest further in building networks in Jordan to develop Iranian-backed militia infrastructure in the West Bank. A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia separately claimed in April 2024 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, planned to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with weapons.[63]Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States is the best option for preserving Iranian regime stability. Khamenei’s main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States will improve Iranian economic conditions and prevent a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump discussed the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran with senior US foreign policy and national security officials on April 15. Unspecified individuals briefed on the talks told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that the Trump administration intends to discuss Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance with Iran but that “the topic didn’t come up for discussion” on April 12. Iranian sources previously stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance. Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted an information operation targeting the West in recent weeks that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance.Syrian Militia Integration: The Eighth Brigade announced on April 13 that it will dissolve itself and surrender its weapons to the Syrian transitional government amid government pressure on the group. The transitional government appears to be trying to reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence over security in southeastern Daraa.Iranian Efforts in Syria: Iran is reportedly cooperating with Sunni extremist groups in Syria, including ISIS, following the collapse of its networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-entrench itself in Syria. Several Sunni extremist groups have formed in western Syria since the fall of the Assad regime and the transitional government has fought a counterinsurgency campaign in the areas where these groups operate since early March 2025. There is currently no evidence that these groups have any connections to Iran, but Iran could seek to work with these groups try to advance its strategic objectives in Syria.Potential Ground Offensive Against the Houthis: Anti-Houthi Yemeni factions are reportedly planning a ground offensive against the Houthis to recapture the western coast of Yemen, including Hudaydah Port, according to US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal. A successful ground operation against the Houthis would require some degree of political and military coordination among the fragmented anti-Houthi Yemeni factions. The Joint Forces on the West Coast spokesperson told the Wall Street Journal that a ground campaign against the Houthis would require the support of the internationally-recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-Emirati military coalition.[64]Potential US Military Withdrawal from the Middle East: US forces will reportedly begin withdrawing from Syria by mid-June 2025, according to Israeli media. The Trump administration ordered the US Defense Department to begin preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria in early February 2025. CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISIS could resurge in Syria in 12 to 24 months without a US presence there.Jordan Attack Plot: Jordanian authorities arrested 16 individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on April 15 for planning rocket and drone attacks in Jordan. There is currently no evidence that links Iran or Iranian-backed actors to this incident. The incident is notable given that Iran has recently placed greater importance on Jordan in its regional strategy, however.SyriaA Daraa resident attempted to conduct a suicide attack targeting an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) checkpoint in al Rafeed, Quneitra Province, on April 15.[65] The attacker reportedly used grenades in the attempted attack.[66] Using grenades to conduct a suicide attack is more rudimentary than using a suicide vest (SVEST) that has explosive materials connected to a detonator.[67] The attacker reportedly fled from the checkpoint unharmed after the IDF opened fired at him.[68]Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani during a visit to Doha on April 15.[69] Thani personally welcomed Shara and his delegation at the international airport in Doha, a notable gesture of diplomatic support.[70] Qatar was the first Arab country to recognize the new Syrian government after it reopened its embassy in Damascus in December 2024.[71] Thani was the first foreign leader to visit Syria after the fall of the Assad regime.[72]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentMultiple Iraqi parliamentarians affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias urged the Iraqi federal government on April 15 to investigate several Sunni groups in Kirkuk and Ninewa provinces for their alleged ties to Turkey.[73] A member of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun bloc called for the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee to investigate the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces.[74] A Badr Organization parliamentarian separately urged the Iraqi Defense Ministry to “vet” these groups and hold accountable any forces that do not operate under the Iraqi federal government.[75] Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali claimed on April 1 that Turkey equips the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces and that the groups have “infiltrated” the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 59th Brigade.[76] Former Ninewa Governor Atheel al Nujaifi established the Ninewa Guards in 2014 to fight ISIS.[77] Turkey and the United States helped train the group’s members. The Ninewa Guards integrated into the Mosul-based PMF 59th Brigade in 2017.[78] Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled media claimed on April 11 that the Ninewa Guards includes former senior Baathist officers and is equipped with “light and medium weapons,” including mortars.[79] Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled media, citing unspecified documents seized by the Counter Terrorism Service, also reported that Turkey and former Baathist officers train Kirkuk Shield Brigade members.[80] Senior Baathist officers from the Saddam Hussein era are likely elderly now, and it is unclear why Asaib Ahl al Haq is accusing these officers of working with the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces. Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled media claimed that Turkey pays the Kirkuk Sheild Brigades hundreds of dollars a month to guard the Turkman Front party’s headquarters in Kirkuk and gather intelligence for Turkey.[81] This report comes as Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have recently expressed concern about Turkish regional influence, particularly after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.[82]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripSee topline section.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip    Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelSee topline section.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 879,000 rials to one US dollar on April 14 to 890,000 rials on April 15.[83]Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Tajik Defense Minister Lieutenant General Emomali Sobirzoda in Tehran on April 15 to discuss strengthening defense cooperation.[84] The two ministers emphasized the role of organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in addressing regional security threats. Iran has increased defense cooperation with Tajikistan in recent years. Iran opened a drone production facility in Dushanbe in 2022, for example.[85]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. 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https://x.com/ndawsari/status/1912187743460872420?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q[61] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2024[62] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CTC-SENTINEL-072023.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-arms-plot-kingdom-caught-iran-israel-shadow-war-2024-05-15/[63] https://t.me/abualaskary/118[64] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1[65] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1912172696277778546[66] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1912172696277778546[67] https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-TEDAC-SuicideVests.pdf[68] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1912172696277778546[69] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1912099690599833955 ; https://x.com/AJEnglish/status/1912209627753930754[70] https://www.newarab.com/news/syrias-sharaa-meets-qatari-emir-first-official-visit-doha[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-re-open-its-embassy-syria-2024-12-15/[72] https://www.barrons.com/news/qatari-emir-to-visit-syria-al-jazeera-syrian-embassy-c082a9f1[73] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9---%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1[74] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9---%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1[75] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220457[76] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907015362056450103[77] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220053[78] https://greydynamics.com/popular-mobilization-forces-exploring-iraqs-armed-entities/ ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/285760 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907015362056450103[79] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220053[80] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220053[81] https://x.com/ahad_en/status/1911481908271456690 ; https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220329[82] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-turkey-and-future-south-caucasus ; https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-turkey-power-dynamics-south-caucasus ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025 ; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/04/07/iraqi-militias-considering-to-disarm-ahead-of-us-iran-talks-sources-say/[83] www.bon-bast.com[84] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/26/3292217[85] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/02/28/2712908 ;https://www.iranintl.com/en/202205175418

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2025

 

at 4/26/25 7:38pm

Daria Novikov, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros with William RunkelApril 26, 2025, 5pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on April 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 26 that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. Gerasimov told Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 26 that Russian forces had fully defeated Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and seized Gornal (southwest of Sudzha), the last Ukrainian-held settlement in Kursk Oblast.[1] Gerasimov credited elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) with seizing Gornal. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov was visiting a Russian command post in Kursk Oblast to hear reports from Kursk Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk when Russian forces seized Gornal.[2] Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Gora Street in central Gornal.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff refuted the Russian claims later on April 26 and stated that Ukrainian forces maintain unspecified positions in Kursk Oblast.[4] The General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on April 26. Russian milbloggers similarly claimed on April 26 that fighting continued near Oleshnya (northwest of Gornal), Guyevo (south of Sudzha near the international border), and St. Nicholas Monastery (southwest of Guyevo).[5]Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast successfully pinned some Russian combat power, including elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units, but its long-term effects remain unclear at this time. The Russian military command generally regards VDV and naval infantry units as elite forces (even though many Russian elite units have been heavily attritted and lost their elite status over the course of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine) and deploys them to critical sectors of the frontline.[6] ISW previously observed reports that Russia redeployed elements of each of the seven VDV formations and four of the six naval infantry formations from frontline positions in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast in the months following the incursion, although some units remained split between Kursk Oblast and occupied Ukraine.[7] Putin claimed on April 26 that the most effective Russian forces operating in Kursk Oblast included elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th airborne (VDV) regiments (all of the 76th VDV Division); 51st, 119th, and 138th VDV regiments (all of the 106th VDV Division), 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division); 11th and 83rd VDV brigades; 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment and 1434th "Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (both Chechen units); 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet); 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet); and 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD).[8] Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast likely has continued to pin these VDV or naval infantry elements, as ISW has not observed reports of such units redeploying from Kursk Oblast to the frontline in Ukraine. ISW observed on April 18 the first reports that Russian forces redeployed unspecified drone units from the Kursk direction to the area southwest of Toretsk near Kalynove and that these units are now operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[9] Russian forces intensified offensive operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast in early March 2025 after tactically exploiting the temporary US intelligence sharing cutoff with Ukraine and by using an underground gas pipeline and deception tactics to covertly attack behind Ukrainian positions in Sudzha.[10] Russian forces, including VDV and naval infantry elements, took almost two months since their seizure of Sudzha to advance roughly nine kilometers to the Kursk-Sumy Oblast international border — an average rate of about 200 meters per day.[11]Gerasimov made the first official Russian acknowledgement of North Korean troop participation in Russian operations in Kursk Oblast by thanking North Korean servicemembers for their assistance in Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of the region. Gerasimov stated on April 26 that North Korean forces "provided significant assistance" in pushing Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, in accordance with the Russian-North Korean Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.[12] Gerasimov commended North Korean officers and soldiers for demonstrating "professionalism" and "fortitude, courage, and heroism" during military operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on April 26 that Russia would never forget its "friends" from North Korea.[13] Neither Gerasimov nor Zakharova indicated what role, if any, North Korean forces would now play in supporting Russian military operations against Ukraine.US President Donald Trump stated that the United States is no longer pursuing a concrete deadline for achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine — a departure from the administration’s previously stated goal of ending the war within its first 100 days.[14] Trump told reporters on April 25 that the United States has "no deadline" to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.[15] Trump also stated on April 26 that there was "no reason" for Russia’s strikes on civilian areas and reiterated a previously stated concern that "[Russian President Vladimir Putin] is just tapping me along" by disingenuously ceasefire and peace negotiations.[16] Trump stated that Putin's actions make Trump think that "maybe [Putin] doesn't want to stop the war" and "has to be dealt with differently." Russian officials have repeatedly to leverage heightened US interest in negotiating a swift resolution to the war in Ukraine to make demands tantamount to Ukrainian surrender and incompatible with Trump’s stated goal of achieving a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine.[17] Russian forces have also conducted a string of strikes against civilian areas in recent weeks, including a devastating strike on Kyiv City on the night of April 23 to 24.[18] Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky met in Vatican City on April 26 to discuss the ongoing peace talks.[19] Zelensky reported on April 26 that he and Trump discussed civilian safety, a full and unconditional ceasefire, and a lasting peace that prevents resumption of hostilities.[20] White House Communications Director Steven Cheung stated that Trump and Zelensky had a "very productive discussion."[21]Russia is likely preparing to systematically integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations in Ukraine for Summer and Fall 2025, likely to offset adept Ukrainian drone capabilities. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on April 26 showing likely elements of the 299th (Airborne) VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) practicing offensive and defensive tactics on motorcycles in groups of two to three people at a Russian training ground.[22] The video indicates that the Russian military is likely developing a tactical doctrine for systematic offensive motorcycle usage and may be preparing to issue an increased number of motorcycles to Russian personnel in Ukraine. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported that Ukrainian intelligence noted that the Russian military is training its soldiers in combat tactics with motorcycles, suggesting that Russian forces will likely increasingly integrate motorcycles into offensive operations in Ukraine in Summer and Fall 2025.[23] Shamshyn noted that motorcycles allow Russian soldiers to enhance their speed and maneuverability, which is crucial for evading Ukrainian drone strikes, but that the loud noise of the motorcycle prevents the rider from hearing approaching Ukrainian drones. ISW has observed an increased trend of Russian units conducting mechanized and combined motorized assaults and transporting infantry with motorcycles and civilian vehicles throughout the frontline as Russian command continues to adapt its tactics to offset Ukrainian drone strikes and likely to mitigate the Russian military's equipment constraints resulting from high armored vehicle losses in Summer and early Fall 2024.[24] Russian forces notably recently advanced during a motorized assault near Bahatyr comprised entirely of motorcycles and civilian vehicles.[25]Key Takeaways:Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 26 that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast successfully pinned some Russian combat power, including elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units, but its long-term effects remain unclear at this time.Gerasimov made the first official Russian acknowledgement of North Korean troop participation in Russian operations in Kursk Oblast by thanking North Korean servicemembers for their assistance in Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of the region.US President Donald Trump stated that the United States is no longer pursuing a concrete deadline for achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine — a departure from the administration’s previously stated goal of ending the war within its first 100 days.Russia is likely preparing to systematically integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations in Ukraine for Summer and Fall 2025, likely to offset adept Ukrainian drone capabilities.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka, Kurkakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsThere are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationSee topline text for updates in Kursk Oblast.Russian forces likely recently seized Popovka amid continued fighting in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 26.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[26] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and several Russian milbloggers claimed on April 26 that Russian forces seized Popovka.[27] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat anomalies near Popovka since April 20, suggesting that fighting has been ongoing in the area.[28]Unknown actors recently assassinated the head of a Russian company that designs electronic warfare (EW) equipment for the Russian military. Sources in Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) told RBC-Ukraine on April 25 that unknown actors detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) in Bryansk Electromechanical Plant Head Evgeny Ritikov's car as he was entering the vehicle in Bryansk City on the night of April 17 to 18.[29]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued ground attacks in Sumy Oblast on April 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Zhuravka, Bilovody, and Loknya on April 25 and 26.[30]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border guards detachment stated on April 26 that Russian forces are conducting 50 to 100 guided glide bomb strikes per day against Sumy Oblast and are using fiber-optic drones in the area.[31] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces currently do not have enough personnel and materiel to conduct a large offensive operation against Sumy Oblast.Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov stated on April 26 that the Russian military is trying to create a buffer zone in the Sumy Oblast border area, have seized four settlements in the area, and occupy 90 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast.[32] ISW assesses that Russian forces have occupied Novenke, Basivka, Zhuravka, and Veselivka (all northeast of Sumy City) but has only collected verified evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy roughly 54 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast as of April 26.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kharkiv Oblast on April 26.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[33]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 26 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 25 that Russian forces advanced north of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[34]Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on April 26 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled Russian attempts to establish pontoon bridges across the Oskil River.[35] Shamshyn noted that Russian forces are especially active near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk). Shamshyn stated that Russian forces concentrate their attacks along the P-79 Kupyansk-Dvorichna highway southwest of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) but are unsuccessful due to a lack of pontoon bridges.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 26 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka, Cherneshchyna, Novoserhiivka, and Hrekivka on April 25 and 26.[36]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 26 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Ridkodub, Nove, Hlushchenkove, Novomykhailivka, Novyi Mir, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske on April 25 and 26.[37]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 26 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 25 and 26.[38]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 26 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on April 25 and 26.[39]Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) and 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Chasiv Yar direction.[40] Drone elements of the 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar itself.[41]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on April 26 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced north of Druzhba (east of Toretsk), along the Donetsk Railroad Line to southeastern Dyliivka (northeast of Toretsk), and to the southern outskirts of Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[42]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk toward Pleshchiivka; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne and Druzhba, and toward Dyliivka; southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Stara Mykolaivka, and Berezivka, and toward Romanivka; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka, Yelyzavetivka, Tarasivka, and Shcherbynivka on April 25 and 26.[43]Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the former Berezka Pioneer Camp Site in western Toretsk and that seizing the camp will allow Russian forces to put pressure on Ukrainian positions near Dachne and Dyliivka.[44]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[45] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[46] Elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating northwest of Sukha Balka.[47] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[48]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Mykolaivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[49]Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Novotoretske, and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne on April 25 and 26.[50]A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 26 that Russian forces rarely deploy armored vehicles, periodically use motorcycles and electric scooters, but mainly conduct dismounted infantry assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[51] The servicemember noted that Russian forces typically conduct infantry assaults in groups of one to 15 personnel.Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 25 and 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast and northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[52]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) advanced southeast of Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[53]Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and Novooleksandrivka, east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Nadiivka, and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka and Preobrazhenka on April 25 and 26.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Uspenivka.[55]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Kotlyarivka.[56] Elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA) are reportedly operating near Preobrazhenka and Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[57]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove) during a motorized assault using 18 motorcycles and 10 civilian vehicles.[58] The Ukrainian Vuhledar Tactical Group reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 15 motorcycles and damaged nine vehicles during the assault.Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and Odradne on April 25 and 26.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove) and Odradne.[60]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[61]Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced marginally southeast of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[62]Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya, Vesele, and Vilne Pole and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on April 25 and 26.[63]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vilne Pole, and elements of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[64]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 26 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Mali Shcherbaky on April 25 and 26.[65]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and “Viking” Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66]Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on April 26.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Onyx anti-ship cruise missile, two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and 114 Shahed drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 66 Shahed drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 31 Russian decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drones struck residential and communications infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, and Kyiv oblasts and that missiles struck critical infrastructure in Kherson Oblast.[68]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76800; https://t.me/tass_agency/312253 ; https://t.me/opersvodki/26457; https://t.me/tass_agency/312255[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/51782 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/312273[3] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7850; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8997[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032wbjY9K5NywdfZZg9nnsyNfnhDJnsfLLphWrCDbc8pTEbAFKTMyoUbAhCQLNAomvl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23523[5] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34825; https://t.me/milinfolive/146945; https://t.me/rybar/69936[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2024[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76800[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2025[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025[12] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76800[13] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2011785/; https://t.me/tass_agency/312250[14] https://www.foxnews.com/video/6366827160112[15] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-presidency-news-04-25-2025#cm9wty1wq000q3b6kha2vn1ec[16] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114404524335638236; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033125[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425[19] https://www.france24 dot com/en/europe/20250426-first-of-two-trump-zelensky-meetings-in-rome-was-very-productive-says-us-official; https://www.axios.com/2025/04/26/trump-zelensky-pope-funeral-meeting; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1916089502088524203 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13995[20] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1916089502088524203; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13995; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-zustrivsya-z-prezidentom-ssha-donaldom-tr-97353[21] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/26/trump-zelensky-pope-funeral-meeting[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/51807[23] https://suspilne dot media/1003713-rf-zrujnuvala-bazu-gospitaleriv-v-pavlogradi-tramp-moze-zustritis-iz-zelenskim-v-rimi-1158-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1745662949&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1003939-sturmovi-dii-vesni-lita-2025-roku; -budut-same-na-motociklah-otu-harkiv-pro-novu-taktiku-rosian/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/26/banzaj-atak-na-motoczyklah-pobilshaye-navchalni-czentry-rf-gotuyut-motoczyklistiv-shturmovykiv/[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2025[25] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=662840229824826[26] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1916174671294435479 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7851[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76800 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90654 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162604 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34830[28] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:7days;@35.35,50.95,14.00z[29] https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/bryansku-samolikviduvavsya-providniy-konstruktor-1745575647.html[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/69914 ; https://t.me/rybar/69916[31] https://suspilne dot media/1003713-rf-zrujnuvala-bazu-gospitaleriv-v-pavlogradi-tramp-moze-zustritis-iz-zelenskim-v-rimi-1158-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1745648875&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[32] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76800[33] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7883[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162536[35] http://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/26/oblom-na-oskoli-pid-kupyanskom-rosiyanam-ne-daly-navesty-perepravy/[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Mj5fuAhypdNTZXQ4X1RJgAigNvsomACwnVnuNJJ5wejQqECZLQ3BwnBedMDByhGNl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23497[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Mj5fuAhypdNTZXQ4X1RJgAigNvsomACwnVnuNJJ5wejQqECZLQ3BwnBedMDByhGNl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23497[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Mj5fuAhypdNTZXQ4X1RJgAigNvsomACwnVnuNJJ5wejQqECZLQ3BwnBedMDByhGNl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23497[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23497[40] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21116; https://t.me/dva_majors/69949[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34806[42] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31389[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Mj5fuAhypdNTZXQ4X1RJgAigNvsomACwnVnuNJJ5wejQqECZLQ3BwnBedMDByhGNl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23497; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31392; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34793; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31389; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162520; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34822;[44] https://t.me/rybar/69933; https://t.me/dva_majors/69914[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90628[46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34793[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34793[48] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13727[49] https://t.me/osintpen/910; https://x.com/johnspectator/status/1916089721949691976 ; https://x.com/johnspectator/status/1916080612768702885 ; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/23286[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Mj5fuAhypdNTZXQ4X1RJgAigNvsomACwnVnuNJJ5wejQqECZLQ3BwnBedMDByhGNl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23497[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/26/vsi-polya-ta-posadky-zavaleni-trupamy-rosiyan-gostri-kartuzy-pro-sytuacziyu-pid-pokrovskom/[52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8995 ; https://t.me/btr80/26983 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8999 ; https://t.me/c/2003772512/178[53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34791 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34842[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Mj5fuAhypdNTZXQ4X1RJgAigNvsomACwnVnuNJJ5wejQqECZLQ3BwnBedMDByhGNl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23497 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34818 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34790 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34791[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34791[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34790[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34790[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9001 ; https://www.facebook.com/61573845209927/videos/662840229824826/; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1916136486644417013[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/14614[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/26136[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/14618[62] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12384 ; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1915757970345935203[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Mj5fuAhypdNTZXQ4X1RJgAigNvsomACwnVnuNJJ5wejQqECZLQ3BwnBedMDByhGNl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23497[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14615 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34813[65]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NhDQdMP5QqdTonB9upRYjnc1TmPMLpfyrbNMPkBkrR9J55tRYrsQGMRc1618QxMnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Mj5fuAhypdNTZXQ4X1RJgAigNvsomACwnVnuNJJ5wejQqECZLQ3BwnBedMDByhGNl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23497[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/69888 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162543[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/33300[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/33300; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21145 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21149 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21156 ; https://t.me/suspilne_kharkiv/58614 ; https://suspilne dot media/1003713-rf-zrujnuvala-bazu-gospitaleriv-v-pavlogradi-tramp-moze-zustritis-iz-zelenskim-v-rimi-1158-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1745646640&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/26172 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14039 ; hhttps://t.me/synegubov/14041 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2442 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2442 ; https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/16358 ; https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/16362 ; https://suspilne dot media/1003713-rf-zrujnuvala-bazu-gospitaleriv-v-pavlogradi-tramp-moze-zustritis-iz-zelenskim-v-rimi-1158-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1745654671&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/1003713-rf-zrujnuvala-bazu-gospitaleriv-v-pavlogradi-tramp-moze-zustritis-iz-zelenskim-v-rimi-1158-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1745647218&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/7472

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 15, 2025

 

at 4/26/25 12:19am

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate TrotterApril 15, 2025, 6:45 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on April 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024 non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement ending Russia's invasion of Ukraine must include terms concerning Ukraine's neutrality; the demilitarization and "denazification" of the Ukrainian state; the abolition of Ukrainian laws that allegedly discriminate against Russian-speakers in Ukraine; and the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[1] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed to Russian state business outlet Kommersant on April 14 that the current Ukrainian government is "unconstitutional" and that Russia "cannot give [Russian speakers living in occupied Ukraine] up" following the illegal and sham referendums Russia conducted in the four oblasts to join Russia in Fall 2022.[2] Lavrov reiterated that Putin "very clearly outlined" Russia's demands for a future peace agreement to end the war during Putin's speech on June 14, 2024, and stated that these June 2024 demands were "not some kind of request." Lavrov stated that there are "no secrets" about Russia's demands and reiterated the importance of addressing the "root causes" of the war in a future peace agreement.Russian officials are using Putin's June 2024 speech as the Kremlin's current standing guidance on negotiations and the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Putin demanded on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations.[3] Putin stated that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts. Putin also demanded that the international community recognize the four illegally annexed and occupied oblasts as part of Russia and lift all Western sanctions against Russia in the event of a resolution to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin reiterated his calls for Ukraine to agree to full demilitarization and "denazification" and abandon its aspirations to join any external security blocs. These demands would preclude the bilateral security agreements Ukraine has negotiated and is negotiating with several European states.Putin and other Kremlin officials have routinely issued these same demands, including by using vague language to obfuscate Russia's most extreme demands.[4] Russian officials, including Putin, use this language to articulate their overarching demand that the West acknowledge Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukraine and force Ukraine to concede not only territory but also its future sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Kremlin officials have consistently demanded that:Ukraine must demilitarize. Putin named "demilitarization" as one of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and stated on July 4, 2024, that Ukraine should undergo "irreversible" "demilitarization" in the event of a future ceasefire.[5] Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future Russian aggression.[6] Russia demanded in the protocol that the Ukrainian military should be confined to fewer than 85,000 active-duty personnel, fewer than 15,000 National Guard personnel, and fewer than 1,400 tanks and armored vehicles. The pre-2022 Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel, 60,000 National Guard personnel, and over 3,000 tanks and armored vehicles. Ukraine must "denazify" and install a "legitimate" government. Putin named "denazification" as another of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officials have previously defined "denazification" as the "liquidation of those who instill" Russophobia in other people.[7] Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. Putin has routinely labeled all Ukrainian governments since 2014 as "illegitimate" and claimed on January 28 that Russia will not view any agreements it concludes with the current Ukrainian government as binding.[8] Ukraine must abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc in the future. Putin's demand for Ukraine's “neutrality” remains one of the central justifications for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[9] Russia demanded in the Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine amend its constitution to remove the provision committing Ukraine to NATO membership and add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel or systems in Ukraine.[10] Ukraine must concede occupied Ukrainian territory and "Novorossiya" to Russia. Putin stated on June 14, 2024, that Russia will not be content with ending the war on the lines it currently holds and explicitly called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as a prerequisite for any sort of "peace" negotiations with Ukraine.[11] Kremlin officials have indicated that they have territorial ambitions beyond the administrative borders of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and often invoke the term "Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) to lay claim to other areas of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[12] Any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes." Lavrov has repeatedly defined the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[13] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions to demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to justify Russia's ambitions of asserting control over independent countries, including NATO member states. Lavrov told Kommersant on April 14 that Russia and the United States have not agreed on any "key parameters" of a potential agreement to end the war in Ukraine.[14] Lavrov stated that Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblast — including the territory that Russia does not currently occupy — continue to serve as the basis of Russia's negotiating position.[15] Lavrov referred to Russia's claimed territory in Ukraine as Donbas and Novorossiya. Lavrov claimed that the Ukrainian government "does not represent Crimea, Donbas, or Novorossiya" or "a number of other territories that still remain under the control of [Ukraine.]" Lavrov specifically claimed that the Ukrainian government does not represent residents in Odesa City and that Russia built Odesa City and "many other" cities in Ukraine. Putin recently claimed that "Novorossiya" is an integral part of Russia, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[16] Putin claimed in 2023 that Odesa City, Crimea, and the entire "Black Sea region" have nothing "to do with Ukraine."[17] Lavrov's continued amplification of these claims indicates that Russia aims to occupy even more of Ukraine than the territory that Russia is currently demanding, despite engaging in ongoing negotiations with the United States ostensibly to end the war in Ukraine.Lavrov also indicated Russia's desire to seize territory in countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia — including NATO member states. Lavrov claimed that it is "dangerous" when "fascists seize lands that never belonged to anyone except the Russian Empire [and] Soviet Union" and do "disgusting things there." Lavrov's statement indicates that the Kremlin views independent countries once colonized by the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire as rightfully part of modern-day Russia. Moldova and NATO members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were part of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, and NATO member Finland and large parts of NATO member Poland were part of the Russian Empire. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev recently threatened Finland using narratives resembling those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasion of Ukraine, and Putin and other Russian officials are attempting to use Russia's previous colonization efforts to set informational conditions and justify future aggression against NATO states.[18]Naryshkin threatened a Russian attack against NATO states in response to NATO states building up their defenses in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to increase its own defense capabilities. Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that NATO states are strengthening their positions on their borders with Belarus and Russia, including Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast.[19] Naryshkin claimed that Poland and the Baltic states "should understand" that the "first to suffer" in the event of "NATO aggression" against the Union State of Russia and Belarus will be the Polish and Baltic political circles that have spoken about building up their defenses along their borders with Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast — although Naryshkin claimed that Russia "will certainly" inflict damage on the entire NATO bloc in this event.[20] Naryshkin claimed that European states, such as France, the UK, and Germany, are escalating the war in Ukraine, so Russia "needs to act preemptively" and "is ready for this."[21] Russian officials, including Putin, repeatedly threatened NATO in 2023 and 2024.[22] Naryshkin appears to be claiming that European efforts to shoulder more of Europe's own defense requirements and to defend against future Russian aggression — in line with Trump's calls for such efforts — are allegedly provocative and escalatory.Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of Trump's proposal for a 30-day full ceasefire.[23] Putin rejected Trump's temporary full ceasefire on March 13, questioning whether Ukraine would be allowed to continue to mobilize forces, train newly mobilized soldiers, and receive military aid from its partners and allies and questioning the control and verification measures of a temporary ceasefire — questions which Lavrov reiterated on April 15.[24] Lavrov attempted to blame Ukraine for the lack of a full ceasefire, claiming that Ukraine "loves to lie."[25] Russian officials, led by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), have accused Ukraine of violating the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire almost every day since March 29 while offering no evidence of such violations, and the Kremlin appears to be using these unsubstantiated claims to also refuse Trump's temporary full ceasefire proposal.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on April 14 that Ukraine accepted Trump's temporary full ceasefire proposal over one month ago.[27]Russia may recognize the end of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire soon and intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine, but the exact parameters of the ceasefire — including its end date — remain unclear. Kommersant asked Lavrov to comment on how neither the temporary ceasefire against energy infrastructure strikes nor the temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea are "fully in effect."[28] Lavrov responded, claiming "there are no such agreements," but then proceeded to discuss Putin's rejection of Trump's proposed 30-day full ceasefire. It remains unclear if Lavrov's response was about the temporary strikes ceasefire and proposed Black Sea ceasefire or the proposed temporary full ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 15 that the Kremlin would clarify the end date of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire with the Russian MoD and noted that "everything will depend on further orders from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief [Putin]."[29] Russian officials have routinely claimed almost every day since March 18 without evidence that Ukraine has violated the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire.[30] Naryshkin also claimed on April 15, without evidence, that Ukraine has been conducting strikes on energy infrastructure "almost every day" since March 18.[31] Russian forces may intensify long-range strikes against Ukraine in the coming days as the ceasefire comes to an end.Ukraine's National Guard announced on April 15 the formation of two new army corps on the basis of two existing brigades, amid Ukraine's continued efforts to transition to a corps structure.[32] The 1st "Azov" Corps of the National Guard stated on April 15 that it will consist of four existing brigades and one new brigade.[33] Ukraine has yet to announce details about the second new corps. Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov stated on April 15 that the Ukrainian military is staffing new corps with commanders who have combat experience and that corps will become the main component for conducting operations.[34] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's efforts to form an echelon between Ukraine’s brigades and operational groups of forces and to strengthen the army corps staff structure will likely improve Ukrainian command and control for Ukrainian brigades and help facilitate more effective operations.Key Takeaways:Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024 non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin.Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions to demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to justify Russia's ambitions of asserting control over independent countries, including NATO member states.Naryshkin threatened a Russian attack against NATO states in response to NATO states building up their defenses in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to increase its own defense capabilities.Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of Trump's proposal for a 30-day full ceasefire.Russia may recognize the end of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire soon and intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine, but the exact parameters of the ceasefire — including its end date — remain unclear.Ukraine's National Guard announced on April 15 the formation of two new army corps on the basis of two existing brigades, amid Ukraine's continued efforts to transition to a corps structure.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.See topline text.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of their limited remaining positions in Kursk Oblast on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 15 that Russian forces are advancing toward Vodolahy (west of Sudzha near the international border).[35]Russian milbloggers claimed on April 15 that fighting continued west of Sudzha near Oleshnya and south of Sudzha in Gornal and near the St. Nicholas Monastery (northeast of Gornal).[36] Russian sources claimed on April 15 that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Oleshnya, Gornal, the territory of St. Nicholas Monastery and its tactical high ground, and forest areas in Kursk Oblast near the international border.[37]The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in Kursk Oblast.[38] The Airborne Assault Forces stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank, three armored personnel carriers, and two golf carts. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported that the Russian mechanized assault occurred on the outskirts of Guyevo.[39]Order of Battle: Elements of the "Pitersk" Battalion of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating near Sudzha.[40] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and sniper elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[41]Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 15, but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 15 that Russian forces cleared Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[42]Fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[43] Russian sources claimed on April 15 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked between Popovka and Demidovka.[44]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), the Rosgvardia "Steel" Brigade, and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) and reportedly operating near Popovka and Demidovka.[45]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on April 15 that Russian forces advanced north of Sumy City toward Vodolahy and northeast of Sumy City near Veselivka, Zhuravka, and Basivka.[46]Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Sumy City near Loknya, Volodymyrivka, and Bilovody and north of Sumy City toward Vodolahy.[47]A Russian milblogger called on April 15 for civilians to evacuate Sumy City as it is becoming a frontline city and claimed that Russian forces would increase strikes against Sumy City as Russian forces continue their offensive in Sumy Oblast.[48]Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[49]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 15 but did not advance.Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 15 that Ukrainian forces destroyed three armored fighting vehicles, an infantry fighting vehicle, and a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) in the past three days.[50] The Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces are trying to improve their tactical positions in the contested "gray zone" near Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City near the international border).[51]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion and 116th Special Purpose “Stalnaya” Brigade are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[52] Drone operators of the Russian “Antagonist” drone detachment are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[53]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 15 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[54]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 15 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Makiivka and Hrekivka (both southeast of Borova).[55]Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Nadiya, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on April 14 and 15.[56]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 15 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces entered Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman) and advanced east of Novomykhailivka, southwest of Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman), and near Torske (east of Lyman).[57]Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Katerynivka, Zelene Dolyna, Nove, Novomykhailivka, and Ridkodub and east of Lyman near Torske on April 14 and 15.[58]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces have started conducting infantry assaults in groups of about 10 personnel instead of groups of two or three.[59] The spokesperson noted that heavy close-range fighting is ongoing in the Lyman direction. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces transferred unspecified units to the area from the Kupyansk direction and are not facing personnel constraints. An officer in a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are deploying one signalman to hide in a Ukrainian position, establish communications, and wait for a larger Russian infantry group to reach the position and are no longer deploying three or four personnel to reach a Ukrainian position.[60]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 15 but did not advance.Russian forces continued assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 14 and 15.[61]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly attacking towards Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[62]Russian forces continued assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 15 but did not advance.Russian forces continued assaults near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Maiske; and south of Chasiv Yar from Andriivka, near Ozaryanivka, and towards Predtechyne and Stupochky on April 14 and 15.[63]Russian Ministry of Defense-run outlet Zvezda News reported on March 11 that Russian forces have established workshops to repair tanks and armored vehicles in near rear areas of occupied Ukraine, including in occupied Bakhmut.[64] Zvezda News reported that Russian technicians can repair most issues within one to five days. ISW has recently observed an increase in Russian armored vehicle usage throughout the theater, and Russian forces may be relying on repair workshops in near rear areas to quickly repair damaged vehicles and return the vehicles to frontline units.[65]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northwestern Toretsk.[66]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the frontline between Zelene Pole (east of Pokrovsk) and Valentynivka (southwest of Toretsk) and advanced west of Valentynivka and one kilometer in the direction of Sukha Balka (north of Valentynivka).[67]Russian forces continued assaults in Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka and Valentynivka.[68]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking near Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[69]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 14 and 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Dachenske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and the industrial zone in eastern Pishchane (southeast of Pokrovsk).[70]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).[71]Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavtivka, Zelene Pole, and Novotoretske; southwest of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyne, and Udachne on April 14 and 15.[72]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and drone operators of the "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[73]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 15 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[74]Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka and Troitske on April 14 and 15.[75]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 15 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kostyantynopil; north, south, and east of Bahatyr; and southeast of Odradne (all west of Kurakhove).[76]Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Olesksiivka, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and toward Odradne on April 14 and 15.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and in the Kostyantynopil direction.[78]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 139th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr, and drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating near Odradne.[79]Russian forces recently advanced roughly 800 meters in the Velyka Novosilka direction during a large-scale mechanized assault.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian armored vehicles east of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[80] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on April 14 that Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault consisting of at least 20 armored vehicles and 41 motorcycles toward Shevchenko on April 13.[81] The Ukrainian source noted that a Russian tank drove to the outskirts of Shevchenko but that the tank "blew up." The large-scale Russian mechanized assault notably only advanced roughly 800 meters across open fields and a small water feature.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further east of Shevchenko.[82] Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev stated on April 15 that Ukrainian forces have "regained control" of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka) at an unspecified time in the past two months.[83]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Vilne Pole, and Shevchenko on April 14 and 15.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to enter Shevchenko but could not gain a foothold.[85]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vilne Pole, and elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) and reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (west of Velyka Novosilka) direction.[86] Drone operators of the 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction, and elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[87]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0812 Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City highway east of Shcherbaky (southwest of Orikhiv).[88]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bahate (southeast of Orikhiv).[89]Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 14 and 15.[90]Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on April 15 that Russian forces conducted a battalion-sized infantry assault with military equipment support in the Orikhiv direction on April 14.[91] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces usually attack in small infantry groups along the Scherbaky-Stepove-Lobkove line, however. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces attempted to create an electronic warfare (EW) "corridor" and quickly advanced through the corridor to reach Ukrainian positions. Voloshyn added that Russian forces have intensified their use of "chemicals," particularly tear gas, during assault operations.Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 15 but did not advance.[92]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast and 52 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 26 drones in eastern, northern, and central Ukraine and that 19 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drones struck Donetsk Oblast and that an Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile struck Sumy Oblast.[94]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the Russian Occupation Update.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/naryshkin-mirnoe-reshenie-po-ukraine-podrazumevaet-ee-bezyadernyy-status.html ; https://tass dot ru/politika/2368776[2] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7657482[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74285[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/putin-announces-a-military-operation-in-ukraine-as-the-un-security-council-pleads-with-him-to-pull-back.html ; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/258708 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/258716 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/258714 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/258718 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/258719 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/258725 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/21278383[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/putin-announces-a-military-operation-in-ukraine-as-the-un-security-council-pleads-with-him-to-pull-back.html ; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012624 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2024[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724[13] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1989213/[14] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7657482[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2025[17] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/14/12/2023/657acd6a9a79477cbd43f7d5[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/223308; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73035[19] https://iz dot ru/1871084/2025-04-15/naryshkin-zaiavil-ob-ukreplenii-pozitcii-nato-na-granitce-s-kaliningradom[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/23686375[21] https://belta dot by/society/view/naryshkin-sotrudnichestvo-spetssluzhb-belarusi-i-rossii-stroitsja-na-doveritelnoj-osnove-709102-2025/[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024[23] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7657482[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7657482[25] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7657482[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325[27] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13868[28] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7657482[29] https://tass dot ru/politika/23687839[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/51313[31] https://tass dot ru/politika/23687761[32] https://suspilne dot media/995321-u-nacgvardii-stvorili-dva-korpusi-aki-ocolili-komandiri-azovu-ta-hartii-prokopenko-ta-obolenskij/ ; https://t.me/Pivnenko_NGU/2271 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/15/naczgvardiya-ukrayiny-stvoryuye-dva-novi-korpusy-na-choli-z-komandyramy-hartiyi-ta-azovu/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/15/stalo-vidomo-yaki-brygady-uvijshly-do-1-korpusu-naczgvardiyi-azov/ ; https://interfax dot com dot ua/news/general/1064021.html[33] https://interfax dot com dot ua/news/general/1064021.html; https://armyinform dot com dot ua/2025/04/15/stalo-vidomo-yaki-brygady-uvijshly-do-1-korpusu-naczgvardiyi-azov/[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23124[35] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31325[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/25932; https://t.me/rusich_army/22604; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63539; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63539; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63540; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34262; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110[37] https://t.me/tass_agency/310573; https://t.me/sashakots/53096[38] https://t.me/ua_dshv/5586[39] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/paratroopers-defeat-mechanized-assault-in-the-kursk-region/[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/25928 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25929[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/25941; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/30216; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34256; https://t.me/milinfolive/146147[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63539[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63539; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12929; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161419; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89986[44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63539; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161419; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89986[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89952; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89986; https://t.me/dva_majors/69107; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7593; https://t.me/dva_majors/69150; https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7837; https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7837 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161460[46] https://t.me/tass_agency/310591; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31325[47] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63539; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31325[48] https://t.me/yurasumy/22425[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/51310; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161361; https://t.me/epoddubny/23100[50] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8062[51] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035[52] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5652[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161400[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26961[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161385 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161433 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27000[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/69097 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161359; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161433 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/310571 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27000[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/230-okupantiv-za-svitlovyj-den-poblyzu-lymanu-rosiyany-jdut-vpered-desyatkamy/[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/15/vidpravlyayut-poodynokyh-rosiyan-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-testuye-novu-taktyku/[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34251[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035 ; https://t.me/don_partizan/8072; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161362[64] https://pablic.tvzvezda dot ru/news/2025311119-KMh1H.html[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025[66] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1912152772968882632; https://t.co/qg82847ckx[67] https://t.me/dva_majors/69097 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26960 ; https://t.me/don_partizan/8072; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161362 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161385 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161433[68] https://t.me/don_partizan/8072; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161362 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035 ; https://t.me/don_partizan/8072; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161362[69] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34252[70] https://t.me/btr80/26696; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1911909794862051349 ; https://t.me/skala425/585; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1912181926464532903; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1912181922836418650[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26960[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035; https://t.me/dva_majors/69097; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63525[73] https://t.me/milinfolive/146127; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161387[74] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63525[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63525[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/25932; https://t.me/dva_majors/69097; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63521; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90009; https://t.me/voin_dv/14439; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31334[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035; https://t.me/dva_majors/69097; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63521[78] https://t.me/rybar/69644; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63521; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90009[79] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90009; https://t.me/voin_dv/14422[80] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8900; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12350; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1911951672500269320[81] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21655[82] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34250[83] https://t.me/SerhiyNaiev/355[84] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34250; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8035[85] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34250[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/14420; https://t.me/voin_dv/14428[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/14431; https://t.me/voin_dv/14440[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8901; https://t.me/brigade128/1831[89] https://t.me/dva_majors/69097[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110[91] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/15/vorog-robyt-tak-zvanyj-korydor-poblyzu-orihova-znyshhyly-vorozhyj-shturmovyj-bataljon/[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23110[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/32588[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/32588; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1819266072191186 ; https://suspilne dot media/994839-tramp-zaaviv-so-putin-po-perse-vinen-u-vijni-v-ukraini-merc-pisla-obranna-kanclerom-priide-do-kieva-1146-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1744705424&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9102; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35022

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, April 14, 2025

 

at 4/25/25 11:37pm

  Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Avery Borens,and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran and the United States held nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12.[1] The Iranian delegation, which was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, presented Iran’s demands and red lines to the US delegation, which was led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. The Iranian demands include sanctions relief guarantees, access to billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports to China, according to Iranian and Arab officials.[2] It would be very difficult for the United States to guarantee permanent sanctions relief, given that such a requirement would have to span multiple US presidential administrations. The issue of guaranteeing sanctions relief was a point of contention between Iran and the United States under the Biden administration.[3] Araghchi emphasized that Iran will not agree to completely dismantle its nuclear program.[4] Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels, however.[5] The JCPOA limited Iranian uranium enrichment to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 3.67 percent for fifteen years.[6]It is unclear if Iran would agree to dismantle its advanced centrifuges in addition to reducing its current stockpile of enriched uranium. Iran has installed advanced centrifuges at its main nuclear facilities—Natanz and Fordow—in recent years. These advanced centrifuges have increased the rate at which Iran can enrich uranium. Iran currently has 274.8 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce around six nuclear weapons.[7]It is unclear whether Iran seeks to return to the JCPOA in its current format. The JCPOA contains various restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program that will expire in 2030. These restrictions are referred to as “sunset provisions.” It is unclear, if Iran were to agree to return to the JCPOA, whether the sunset provisions would renew for an additional 15 years. It is also unclear whether Iran would agree to a new nuclear deal that included permanent restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program. US President Donald Trump repeatedly criticized the existence of sunset provisions in the JCPOA prior to withdrawing from the agreement in 2018.[8]Iran could rebuild its nuclear program at a faster pace after the expiration of sunset provisions, or if a new agreement collapses, provided that Iran maintains its current advanced centrifuge technology. Iran has increased its number of operational centrifuges since it signed the JCPOA in 2015.[9] Iran is also developing new advanced centrifuges, such as the IR-8, which Iranian officials have claimed is “sixteen times” more capable than the IR-1 centrifuge.[10] Even if Iran were to agree to downblend its stockpile of enriched uranium, Iran would likely be able to re-enrich this stockpile at a relatively fast pace, compared to before 2015, if it maintains its current advanced centrifuges.Note: This list is not exhaustive and only includes the main Iranian violations of the JCPOA.[11]The United States presented its demands and red lines ahead of the nuclear talks on April 12. Witkoff told the Wall Street Journal on April 11 that the United States' “opening demand” would be the dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program but acknowledged that the United States is open to “find[ing] compromise” with Iran.[12] Witkoff stressed that the United States’ “red line” is preventing Iranian weaponization. Trump similarly stated on April 14 that Iran must abandon the “concept of a nuclear weapon.”[13]Iranian and US officials presented the April 12 talks as “positive” and “constructive.” Significant obstacles and challenges remain before a deal can be reached, however.[14] Araghchi stated on April 12 that the United States and Iran expressed their intention to reach an agreement in “the shortest possible time,” but acknowledged that reaching a deal will “not be an easy task.”[15] The White House released a statement on April 12 that called the talks “positive and constructive,” while acknowledging that solving the Iranian nuclear issue is “very complicated.”[16] Iran and the United States agreed to hold a second round of nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 19.[17]Iran is increasing its diplomatic activity with third parties ahead of the April 19 nuclear talks. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi announced on April 14 that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi will visit Tehran on April 16.[18] Gharibabadi traveled to Moscow on April 14 and met with Russian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Sergei Vershinin.[19] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will also travel to Moscow in the coming days.[20] Iran has consistently engaged with Russia on the nuclear issue in recent weeks.Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on the Iranian armed forces to maintain maximum “hardware and software readiness” during a meeting with senior military officials and commanders on April 13.[21] Khamenei described the Iranian armed forces as Iran’s “shield” and praised the diverse and unified command structure of the Iranian armed forces. Khamenei criticized the West’s double standards, claiming that Western countries possess “the most catastrophic weapons” but try to prevent Iranian "defense growth." Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri presented a report during the meeting about regional developments and Iran‘s response to the October 7 War. Bagheri highlighted Iranian deterrence efforts, weapons development, and joint exercises.Senior Iranian officials continue to be concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Bordbar Air Defense Group in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on April 12 to assess the unit’s combat capability and defense readiness.[22] Sabahi Fard emphasized that expanding missile and defense systems is essential for protecting Iranian airspace against potential threats. The visit is part of a series of inspections that Sabahi Fard has conducted to Iranian air defense sites in recent days. Sabahi Fard visited air defense zones in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and Bushehr Province on April 6.[23]The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government implemented a deconfliction agreement around the Tishreen Dam on April 14.[24] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF withdrew to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, eight kilometers from the dam, on April 12.[25] Transitional government forces will establish a barrier between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the SDF, which have been fighting in the area since December 2024.[26] The SNA is nominally integrated under the Syrian Defense Ministry’s command, but the groups that comprise the SNA still receive salaries from Turkey.[27] The transfer of control of the dam comes after the successful integration of two historically Kurdish areas of Aleppo City into the transitional government’s area of control.[28] The deployment of government forces to the Tishreen Dam reduces the risk of an SNA or Turkish military operation against the SDF and promotes the transitional government’s ceasefire with the SDF.Fundamental disagreements over federalism and military integration remain between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government, despite progress on other fronts.[29] Abdi and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara agreed on an integration framework on March 10 and have since taken several concrete steps toward peace and integration.[30] The SDF has ceded control of disputed territory in Aleppo City and eastern Aleppo Province to the transitional government since April 1.[31] The SDF has also granted the transitional government control over its hydrocarbon resources to “meet its oil and gas needs.”[32] Abdi hinted on April 14 at future areas of progress between Damascus and the SDF, including transferring control of Arab-majority Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces to the transitional government after SDF institutions are integrated into the government.[33] Abdi also outlined two long-held “red lines” that Shara is unlikely to agree to: federalism and the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a military bloc.[34] Abdi noted that he cannot accept administrative power “concentrated solely in Damascus” and that the SDF must “preserve their distinct identity within the ranks of the new Syrian national army.”[35] Neither of these demands are new or surprising, and neither issue was addressed in the March 10 integration framework. Kurdish groups have previously expressed serious concern about Shara’s consolidation of power though the draft Syrian constitution.[36]Key Takeaways:April 12 Nuclear Talks Between Iran and the United States: Iran and the United States held nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12. The Iranian delegation, which was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, presented Iran’s demands and red lines to the US delegation, which was led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. The Iranian demands include sanctions relief guarantees, access to billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports to China. Araghchi emphasized that Iran will not agree to completely dismantle its nuclear program. Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels, however.Iranian Air Defense Readiness: Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Bordbar Air Defense Group in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on April 12 to assess the unit’s combat capability and defense readiness. Sabahi Fard visited air defense zones in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and Bushehr Province on April 6.SDF Withdrawal from Tishreen Dam: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government implemented a deconfliction agreement around the Tishreen Dam on April 14. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF withdrew to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, eight kilometers from the dam, on April 12. Transitional government forces will establish a barrier between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the SDF, which have been fighting in the area since December 2024.SDF Integration into the Syrian Transitional Government: Fundamental disagreements over federalism and military integration remain between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government, despite progress on other fronts. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi outlined two long-held “red lines” that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is unlikely to agree to: federalism and the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a military bloc. Abdi noted that he cannot accept administrative power “concentrated solely in Damascus” and that the SDF must “preserve their distinct identity within the ranks of the new Syrian national army.”SyriaSyrian media reported that the Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) appointed the commander of the Turkish-backed Sultan Murad Division as deputy defense minister and commander of the "northern region” in the new Syrian army.[37] Fahim Issa previously commanded the Sultan Murad Division, which is a faction in the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).[38] Issa also previously commanded the SNA’s Second Corps and Thairoun Liberation Front.[39] Syrian media reported that Issa has close ties to Suleiman Shah Brigade Commander Abu Amsha and Hamza Division Commander Sayf Abu Bakr.[40] Abu Amsha and Abu Bakr both lead divisions in the new Syrian army.[41] The Sultan Murad Division has committed human rights abuses against Kurds in Aleppo alongside the Hamza Division.[42] Issa is a Turkish nationalist and is reportedly a member of the Grey Wolves.[43]Syrian media reported on April 14 that the Syrian MoD set soldiers’ salaries to $200 for married personnel and $150 for single personnel, citing a government source.[44] Syrian media separately reported that some MoD employees and soldiers have received their salaries.[45] It is unclear whether these salaries are monthly or yearly. The Assad regime previously paid Syrian Arab Army (SAA) conscripts between $15 and $17 per month in 2024.[46] Unspecified sources told Syrian media that the salaries are not yet finalized as the MoD still needs to adopt a salary scale that considers rank and other unspecified categories.[47]The Syrian MoD has begun to train newly formed army divisions. A Syrian journalist reported on April 11 that the new 76th Division conducted exercises that focused on artillery, missiles, sniping, and ground and air defense.[48] Photos posted on social media showed at least 100 men participating in the exercises.[49] Sayf Abu Bakr leads the 76th Division, which operates in Aleppo Province.[50] Abu Bakr previously commanded the Hamza Division and is sanctioned by the United States.[51]Unspecified individuals denotated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting the head of the General Security Services for eastern Daraa Province in Khirbet Ghazaleh, Daraa Province, on April 14.ix The official, Mohammad al Sakhni, is a former HTS commander who now oversees GSS forces in eastern Daraa Province.[52] Sakhni was not injured in the attack.[53] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.Anti-government Salafi-jihadi militia Saraya Ansar al Sunnah urged its followers on April 13 to conduct a lone wolf assassination targeting an alleged former regime informant in Aleppo Province.[54] The group published a flyer on its Telegram channel that called for individuals to assassinate Ibrahim Mustafa al Ghazi al Alloush, a real estate businessman based in Aleppo Province.[55] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has primarily conducted attacks in Homs Province and has only claimed two attacks in Aleppo Province since it began conducting attacks in February 2025.[56] Its call for a lone wolf attack may reflect that the group lacks an established network and operational capacity in Aleppo.A militia called the Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade claimed on April 13 that it assassinated an SDF supporter and former regime informant in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[57] The group published a statement naming seven additional individuals as targets and accused the individuals of supporting the Assad regime and its “new militias,” likely referring to the SDF.[58] It warned Syrians against cooperating with the SDF and urged SDF fighters to defect and return to their villages. The group’s identity remains unclear. The group may have adopted the name of a former opposition faction, Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade, which was part of the Free Syrian Army and fought Kurdish forces in Ras al Ain between 2012 and 2013.[59] The new group does not use the same iconography as the former Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade, however. The group‘s April 13 statement featured the revolutionary Syrian flag, which suggests that the group likely does not oppose the transitional government.[60] It is also possible that the group is comprised of Arab tribesmen who hold grievances against the SDF.The Syrian transitional government continues to secure significant economic support from Arab countries. Reuters reported on April 14 that Saudi Arabia will pay Syria’s $15 million debt to the World Bank.[61] Paying this debt will enable the transitional government to request additional financial assistance from the World Bank to help rebuild its public sector. Reuters also reported on April 12 that Syrian officials, including Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, Finance Minister Mohammed Yosr Bernieh, and Central Bank Governor Abdulkader Husrieh, will attend the International Monetary Fund-World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, DC, between April 21 and 26.[62] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara separately discussed efforts to rebuild the Syrian economy with Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan during a visit to Abu Dhabi on April 13.[63] These reports are part of ongoing economic and political support from Arab countries for Syria. Qatar recently agreed to supply Syria with two million cubic meters of natural gas per day to help boost the Syrian electricity supply.[64]Syrian President Ahmed al Shara discussed bilateral relations with Kurdistan Regional Government President Nechirvan Barzani on the sidelines of the Antalya Forum in Turkey on April 11.[65] Kurdish media reported that Barzani emphasized the importance of Kurdish representation in the Syrian government during his meeting with Shara.[66]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentIraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr urged members of his militia, Saraya al Salam, to update their voter registration ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[67] Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia Nationalist Movement would not participate in the elections.[68] Sadr’s message to Saraya al Salam members follows an Iraqi media report on April 6 that “unspecified changes in the coming months” could cause Sadr to participate in the elections “directly or indirectly.”[69]Some Iraqi parliamentarians reportedly seek to amend the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the parliamentary elections.[70] The Iraqi federal government recently announced that the elections will proceed under the current electoral law, despite State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s opposition to the current law.[71] Iraq’s current electoral system allocates seats to political parties in a way that often disadvantages smaller parties. A parliamentarian who reportedly has ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias submitted a draft proposal to parliament on April 1 to amend the electoral law.[72] Parliamentarian Ahmed al Sharmani told Iraqi media on April 12 that parliament has the authority to alter the current electoral law.[73] Sharmani is a member of the Emtidad Movement, which was established after the 2019 Iraqi protest movement.[74] A member of the Sunni Azm Alliance, which is headed by Muthanna al Samarrai, told Iraqi media on April 13 that Sunni political parties reject any amendment to the current electoral law.[75]Turkish and Iraqi officials agreed to form a joint committee to discuss Syrian internally displaced persons (IDP) camps during a meeting on the sidelines of the Antalya Forum on April 14.[76] Iraqi and Turkish officials announced that the committee will address issues related to al Hol and al Roj camps.[77] The Iraqi federal government regularly repatriates Iraqi citizens from al Hol camp.[78]An unspecified security source speaking to Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled media reported that the Interior Ministry appointed Major General Saad al Halfi as head of the Iraqi Federal Police.[79] Halfi previously served as commander of the Second Federal Police Division.[80] Halfi replaced Lieutenant General Saleh al Ameri, who was appointed as a technical advisor to the interior minister. The Iraqi Federal Police partners with international coalition forces to combat ISIS under Operation Inherent [81]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 47 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 11.[82] CENTCOM conducted at least three sorties of airstrikes targeting reported Houthi weapons depots, including at least three airstrikes targeting Bani Hashish District, Sanaa Governorate, on April 11, at least five airstrikes targeting al Sawmaa District, al Bayda Governorate, on April 12, and at least three airstrikes targeting Bani Matar District, Sanaa Governorate, on April 13.[83] The Houthi Health Ministry reported that the airstrikes on Bani Matar District killed six individuals and injured 20 others.[84] CENTCOM separately conducted at least two airstrikes targeting a likely Houthi communications site in Baraa, eastern Hudaydah Governorate.[85]The Houthis claimed that they have launched three drones and two ballistic missiles at Israeli military sites across Israel since April 11.[86] The Houthis claimed that they launched two drones targeting two Israeli military targets near Tel Aviv on April 11.[87] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a drone on April 11.[88] A Jordanian military source told Yemeni media that a drone crashed in southern Jordan on April 11.[89] The Houthis claimed that they launched two ballistic missiles targeting Israeli missile and drone launch sites at Sdot Micha Base in Ashdod and Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on April 13.[90] The IDF intercepted one of the missiles.[91] The Houthis also claimed on April 13 that they launched a drone targeting an unspecified target in Ashkelon, southern Israel.[92] The IDF has not acknowledged this drone attack at the time of this writing.The Houthis separately claimed on April 13 that they shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Hajjah Governorate.[93] The Houthis claimed that they have shot down 19 US drones since the start of the October 7 War.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report. CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial appreciated from 1,005,500 rials to one US dollar on April 11 to 879,000 on April 14. The appreciation of the rial between April 11 and April 14 was largely due to the nuclear talks that the United States and Iran held in Oman on April 12.[94]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/12/us-iran-begin-nucearl-talks-begin-oman[2] https://farsnews dot ir/Zahra_abbasy/1744563459660316922 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-begin-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-oman-fc07cdce[3] https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/10/20/revealed-how-biden-rejected-a-reasonable-way-forward-in-iran-deal-talks/[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-begin-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-oman-fc07cdce[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-begin-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-oman-fc07cdce[6] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245318.pdf[7] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iaea-chief-sees-time-running-out-revive-iran-nuclear-deal-2025-02-14/[8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/25/trump-doesnt-like-the-iran-deals-sunset-provisions-heres-how-to-fix-that/ ; 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https://x.com/G_CSyria/status/1911404266792628360[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2025[65] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/12042025 ; https://x.com/G_CSyria/status/1910783518680203399[66] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/12042025[67] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AB-%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B9%D8%A9[68] https://x.com/salih_m_iraqi/status/1905319183518150830 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7[69] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%82%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA[70] https://baghdadtoday dot news/271990-.html[71] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1197003[72] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/521029/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%82-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7[73] https://baghdadtoday dot news/271990-.html[74] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5864546833570030 ; https://untoldmag.org/why-did-iraqs-2019-october-revolution-fail-a-retrospective/[75] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA ; https://www.wikiwand.com/ar/articles/%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84_%D8%AE%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%8A[76] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/522350/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7[77] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/522350/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7[78] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/020420251[79] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220341[80] https://ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?Key=1144045 ; https://almutalee dot com/news/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A[81] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/IMAGERY/igphoto/2001708091/ ; https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/2001541080/ ; https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/2001842813/[82] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1910775804335968419https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1910776756761473099 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1910776756761473099 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1910763771343122556;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1910780599612096721;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911156697198199074;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911157155505254760;https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1911158668617249271;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911158822112272440;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1911215846204092624;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1911215846204092624;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911400635217379465;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911493910826000864;https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1911502229468495952;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911506158969324012;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1911512767439184297[83] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1910775804335968419; 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[Author: ISWKF]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 14, 2025

 

at 4/25/25 11:37pm

 Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate TrotterApril 14, 2025, 5:45pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on April 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14 that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently seized Oleksandropil, Panteleymonivka, and Valentynivka (all southwest of Toretsk) and pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynopil highway.[1] Russian milbloggers also claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 highway, seized Valentynivka, and are attacking Sukha Balka (north of Valentynivka).[2] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) continue to attack north of Vozdvyzhenka (west of Oleksandropil and east of Pokrovsk) in the direction of Nova Poltavka and Novoolenivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk).[3] Russian milbloggers recently credited elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil and elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).[4]The Russian military command redeployed elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions in February 2025 and likely intended to leverage these redeployments to break out of Toretsk and advance towards Kostyantynivka along or parallel to the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[5] Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) previously operating in these two areas failed to break through Ukraine's defense in Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025 , likely prompting the Russian military command to introduce elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions – potentially prematurely – into combat in order to maintain the operational tempo in these areas. Russian forces marginally advanced along the frontline between Vozdvyzhenka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Sukha Balka in February and March 2025, but have made more tactically significant advances near Kalynove and along the Sukha Balka-Oleksandropil line since early April 2025.[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may aim to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in order to level out their southern flank ahead of a planned push on Kostyantynivka, and recent Russian redeployments and tactical activity supports this assessment.[7] Russian forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 highway and facilitate deeper advances northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka. Russian forces must break out of Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, advance toward Kostyantynivka broadly from the east, or advance roughly 24 kilometers from Pokrovsk along the T-0504 highway to Kostyantynivka’s southwestern flank before Russian forces will pose any notable threat to seizing Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka, and a Russian offensive to seize the city or Ukraine's wider fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast would likely be a years' long effort - assuming that the West continues to bolster Ukraine's defense.[8]Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025. Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) with 13 armored vehicles, several civilian vehicles, and an unspecified number of motorcycles on April 12.[9] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with over 20 armored vehicles, including over 10 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and several tanks.[10] The Ukrainian brigade stated that Russian forces attempted to advance in a wave of motorcycles ahead of the attacking armored vehicles to swiftly reach Ukrainian positions. Another Ukrainian brigade operating nearby stated that the Russian assault occurred near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and 12 IFVs.[11] The Ukrainian National Guard published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with three tanks, 18 IFVs, an unspecified number of MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and 41 motorcycles in an unspecified area of the Zaporizhia direction.[12] The Ukrainian National Guard reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault and destroyed two IFVs and one AFV.Russian forces have been augmenting mechanized assaults with civilian vehicles, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) since late Fall 2024 after limiting their use of armored vehicles across the entire frontline, likely due to concerns about unsustainable armored vehicle losses in Summer and early Fall 2024.[13] Russian forces largely relied on small infantry groups to advance in Ukraine and used armored vehicles to transport infantry to the frontline and as fire support for infantry assaults in late Fall 2024 through Winter 2024-2025.[14] Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups along the frontline but may be recommitting armor to frontline assault operations as part of a general intensification along the entire frontline. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov noted on April 14 that Russian forces are using more civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction due to their high degree of maneuverability for evading Ukrainian drones compared to slower armored vehicles.[15] Trehubov reported that Ukrainian drone operations are rendering Russian armored vehicle usage ineffective in the Pokrovsk direction, which is consistent with a long-term trend of Ukrainian drones discouraging Russian armored vehicle usage in this direction.[16] ISW has previously assessed that Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term, and Russian forces are likely using these alternative civilian vehicles in assault operations to bolster mechanized assaults amid concerns about dwindling supplies of Soviet-era armored vehicles.[17] The recent intensification in Russian armor usage suggests that the Russian military command may be growing less concerned about dwindling armored vehicle stores or at least may be willing to accept additional armored vehicle losses if Russian forces can secure additional gains before a possible future ceasefire.A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS stated on April 11 that the Second Western District Military Court rejected an appeal against a February 28 ruling that changed Popov's house arrest to two months of pre-trial detention.[18] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad claimed on April 11 that Popov's lawyer stated that Russian authorities had not yet considered Popov's petition to suspend court proceedings and send Popov to fight in Ukraine.[19] Popov's lawyer stated on April 9 that Popov signed a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and would return to military service in Ukraine in exchange for the suspension of his impending criminal trial.[20] A Russian security official stated to Russian state business outlet Kommersant on April 9 that Popov would assume command of an unspecified “Storm Z” penal detachment operating in Ukraine. Popov publicly appealed to Putin in March 2025 to reinstate him in active military service, and Popov's support base, particularly within the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities, widely supported the appeal. The court's seeming reversal of the decision to send Popov to the war in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin continues to struggle to respond to situations in which the Kremlin's desired outcome is at odds with that of the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities. The Kremlin may be conflicted about how to punish Popov for weaponizing the information space in July 2023 when he attempted to reverse his removal from command. The Kremlin likely fears that allowing Popov to return to the battlefield at his request would set a precedent in which popular commanders and officials could threaten to blackmail the Kremlin into accepting their demands.Read more about Popov's arrest in ISW’s latest special edition.Key Takeaways:Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south.Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025.A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk and Pokrovsk. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Alleged Ceasefire ViolationUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire Violations Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 14 without evidence that Ukrainian forces struck energy facilities in Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts and occupied Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts eight times over the past day.[21] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin told Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia on April 14 that Ukrainian forces have violated the ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure almost every day since March 18.[22]Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on April 13 that Russia is intensifying long-range strikes and offensive operations along the frontline despite that Ukraine and the United States offered Russia an unconditional general ceasefire in mid-March 2025.[23]Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of their limited remaining positions in the area.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[24]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Guyevo and are pushing Ukrainian forces out of the St. Nicholas Monastery northeast of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[25]Fighting continued near Gornal and Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Gornal and Oleshnya.[27]A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful HIMARS strike on April 11 against the forward command post of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Guyevo, wounding the regiment’s commander and killing the regiment's deputy commander and a communications platoon commander.[28] The Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces previously conducted drone and rocket strikes against the command post and that the Russian military command "made no effort" to move or conceal the command post. A Ukrainian source reported on April 13 that a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter aircraft conducted a AASM Hammer stand-off weapon strike against Russian positions in Tetkino (southwest of Kursk City).[29] Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Stela-10 short-range surface-to-air missile system in Kursk Oblast.[30]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[31] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near the St. Nicholas Monastery.[32]Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 14, but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces out of most of Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City) but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the settlement's western outskirts.[33] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Demidovka (southeast of Popovka) and that Russian forces are clearing the settlement.[34]Fighting continued in Popovka and Demidovka.[35]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Demidovka and Popovka.[36] Elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) and 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[37]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Sumy near the international border in Zhuravka and northeast of Sumy near Loknya, Basivka, and Veselivka.[38] Russian state television program Vesti claimed that Russian forces occupy 70 square kilometers of Sumy Oblast, though ISW has only collected evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 43.61 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast.[39]Russian forces attacked near Basivka on April 13 and 14.[40] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Vodolahy (north of Sumy near the international border).[41]Order of Battle: Drone units of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy).[42] Elements of the Russian 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment are reportedly operating near Veselivka and Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy) and Vodolahy.[43]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 14 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 13 and 14.[44] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 14 that Russian forces used three armored vehicles and eight motorized vehicles to deliver infantry to frontline positions near Vovchanski Khutory and that Ukrainian strikes destroyed two armored vehicles and six motorized vehicles.[45]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Stepove Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[46]Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 13 and 14.[47]A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are using heavy equipment less frequently and are attacking with motorcycles, quad bikes, and buggies.[48] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces are trying to strike the Russian rear before Russian forces approach the frontline.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[49] Elements of the "Sheikh Mansur" volunteer battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Stroivka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 14 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya and Serhiivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka Serhiivka on April 13 and 14.[51]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) and 4th Tank Division (1st GTA, MMD) are attacking along the Lozova-Pershotravneve line (northeast and east of Borova).[52]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman), advanced east of the settlement, and advanced within Nove (northeast of Lyman).[53] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Makiivka (northeast of Novomykhailivka), northwest of Novolyubivka (southwest of Novomykhailivka), north of Kolodyazi (south of Novomykhailivka), and to Zelena Dolyna (southwest of Novomykhailivka).[54] Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced to the Zherebets River in an unspecified area between Yampolivka and Torske (east of Lyman).[55]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Nove, Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka and toward Zelena Dolyna and Ridkodub and east of Lyman near Torske on April 13 and 14.[56]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 254th, 283rd, 488th, and 1428th motorized rifle regiments; 59th Tank Regiment; and 148th Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are attacking in the Nove-Lypove (northeast of Lyman) and Zelena Dolyna directions.[57] Mashovets noted that the 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment is not operating at full strength and lacks one to two battalions. Mashovets stated that elements of the 164th and 169th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), with support from at least two motorized rifle regiments from the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA), are attacking in the Yampolivka-Torske direction and south of Yampolivka.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[58]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[59]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[60]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hyrhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 14.[61]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 14 but did not advance. Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault toward Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) with 13 armored vehicles, civilian vehicles, and motorcycles on April 12.[62]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv yar near Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on April 13 and 14.[63]Ukrainian forces recently advanced within and northeast of Toretsk. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Korolenka Street in northwestern Toretsk.[64]See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Toretsk direction. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Krymske (northeast of Toretsk) along the O-0519 Bila Hora-Druzhba road.[65]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14 that elements of the Russian 132nd, 5th, and 9th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in the Toretsk direction.[66]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[67]Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Zelene Pole, Novotoretske, Kalynove, and Vodyane Druhe and toward Malynivka, Stara Mykolaivka, and Oleksandropil; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on April 13 and 14.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yelyzavetivka.[69]Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on April 14 that Russian forces are using the largest number of vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction, mainly as fire support and to support any Russian breakthroughs.[70] Trehubov noted that heavy armored vehicles are currently ineffective as "breakthrough weapons" and fire support - or even infantry transports - due to the number of drones in the air. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 14 that Russian forces have stopped conducting mechanized assaults in the area after experiencing significant armored vehicle losses a week ago (about April 7).[71] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces have reverted to deploying small infantry in groups of two to five and using civilian vehicles and motorcycles during attacks. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have been sending more mobilized personnel and less trained personnel on assaults in recent weeks. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that a Russian soldier operating in the Pokrovsk direction recently complained that Russian forces are only receiving drones through humanitarian aid and Telegram channels' fundraisers and that this quantity of drones is insufficient.[72] The milblogger claimed that Russian drone technology is inferior to Ukraine's. The milblogger claimed that these issues are systemic and exist in other unspecified areas of the frontline.Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are operating along the Tarasivka-Stara Mykolaivka-Oleksandropil line.[73] Drone operators of the "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating near Myrne (east of Pokrovsk).[74]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Troitske, are advancing west of Bohdanivka (both southeast of Novopavlivka), and entered Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) from the east and south.[75]Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Preobrazhenka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 13 and 14.[76]Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in the Nadiivka-Kotlyarivka area (east of Novopavlivka).[77] Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division are reportedly also operating near Zaporizhzhia and Troitske (both southeast of Novopavlivka).[78]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters near Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[79] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields south of Bahatyr (southwest of Kurahkove).[80]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, Bahatyr, and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 13 and 14.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Bahatyr.[82]Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division and 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are operating near Andriivka and that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) and 57th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Rozlyv.[83] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[84]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southwest of Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka) and east of Shevchenko.[85]Russian forces attacked north of Odradne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Shevchenko and Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Novosilka on April 13 and 14.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne.[87]Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Burlatske and Pryvilne.[88] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[89]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russan forces advanced north of Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne).[90]Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanka, Stepove, Lobkove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky on April 13 and 14.[91]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), “Viking” Spetsnaz detachment, 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit), and 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[92]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 13 and 14 but did not advance.[93]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 62 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 40 drones and that 11 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Odesa, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts.[95]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)ISW is suspending Russian mobilization and force generation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW will be introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations in the coming days.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW will be introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations in the coming days.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the Russian Occupation Update.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2693[2] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31322 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63502 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63511 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34249 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22417[3] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2693[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625[9] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/pereterly-na-poroh-pid-stupochkamy-v-otu-lugansk-povidomyly-pro-vtraty-okupantiv/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025[10] https://t.me/immitis71/974 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/zgorily-pid-trykolorom-rosiyanam-na-pivdni-donechchyny-zlamaly-yih-bronovanyj-kulak/[11] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4915163665375755[12] https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/26280 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/syly-oborony-zupynyly-masshtabnu-ataku-rosiyan-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku/[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024;[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024[15] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/bronetehnika-maloefektyvna-yak-zbroya-proryvu-na-shodi-rosiyany-vse-chastishe-viddayut-perevagu-shvydkosti/[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825[18] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/23660211[19] https://dzen dot ru/a/Z_kkIPTgZEbmzbpc[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-sentenced-popular-russian-general-lead-penal-assault-detachment-ukraine[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/310473 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/310474 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51281[22] https://iz dot ru/1869382/anastasiia-kostina/my-natceleny-na-dostizhenie-konkretnogo-i-ustraivaiushchego-obe-storony-rezultata[23] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9100[24] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8883; https://t.me/rt_russian/237145[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/69079; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89941[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/25908[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/69043; https://t.me/rusich_army/22575[28] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/664[29] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/enemies-have-hard-times-ukrainian-aviation-bombed-russian-positions-at-tetkino-sugar-factory/; https://t.me/soniah_hub/10040[30] https://x.com/usf_army/status/1911755730769543600[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8883; https://t.me/rt_russian/237145; https://t.me/dva_majors/69082[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26943[33] https://t.me/rybar/69630; https://t.me/dva_majors/69043; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26934[34] https://t.me/rybar/69630; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89890; https://t.me/dva_majors/69043[35] https://t.me/rybar/69630; https://t.me/dva_majors/69043[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89890; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89903[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89940; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7570[38] https://t.me/vestiru/160796; https://t.me/wargonzo/25908; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89891; https://t.me/rybar/69630[39] https://t.me/vestiru/160796; https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89891; https://t.me/rusich_army/22575[41] https://t.me/rusich_army/22575[42] https://t.me/notes_veterans/22882[43] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5646[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081[45] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7977[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8881; https://t.me/kcaebirds/1672[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7977[48] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/mogylnyk-poblyzu-dvoh-spalenyh-derev-navkolo-kupyanska-czvyntari-znyshhenoyi-vorozhoyi-broni/[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/69053; 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