Sectarian conflict flares in Iraq
\nBy Brian M Downing – 5 January, 2012 – Asia Times<\/p>\n
Sectarian conflict in Iraq is again a concern as the Shi’ite government seeks the arrest of a Sunni vice president whom they tie to an assassination team.<\/p>\n
Implicit in the accusation is the charge that Sunni politicians were complicit in a number of bombings over the past two years that have killed hundreds of Shi’ites. At present, the conflict is political and judicial, but it may not be settled by dialogue and legal rulings.<\/p>\n
Sunni Iraqis want to establish an autonomous region in central Iraq; regional Sunni powers, who oppose Iranian-Shi’ite influence, support that goal. Shi’ite Iraqis want to keep the Sunnis a weak minority; their Iranian ally seeks to punish the Sunni powers conducting clandestine warfare against it. There is considerable danger of a return to sectarian warfare and also of regional conflict.<\/p>\n
The sectarian situation<\/strong><\/p>\n Conflict between Sunnis and Shi’ites has been part of the Mesopotamian region ever since the time of the Ottoman Empire, when Sunnis, though a minority, were politically dominant. Sunni pre-eminence continued as the British installed the Hashemite monarchy after World War I and various politicians and generals, including Saddam Hussein, came and went.<\/p>\n Saddam’s ouster in 2003 led to an insurgency aiming to prevent Sunni marginalization and Shi’ite dominance. Mollified temporarily by United States and Saudi bargaining in the troop “surge”, the Sunnis later faced systematic arrests and exclusions at the behest of the Shi’ite government.<\/p>\n Over the past two years, a deadly bombing campaign has been directed against the Shi’ite population and security forces, killing scores of people every month.<\/p>\n The Sunni resistance differs from the old Sunni insurgency. It has no prominent leaders or bold manifestoes; it has moved from dozens of tribal, Ba’athist and army movements to a reasonably unified entity of nebulous leadership and uncertain size. It generally eschews firefights and ambushes – commonplaces during the insurgency – in favor of bombs. Puzzlingly, it only rarely attacked US troops, though they were prime targets during the insurgency. …more<\/a><\/p>\n