{"id":17619,"date":"2013-07-30T16:16:40","date_gmt":"2013-07-30T22:16:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/?p=17619"},"modified":"2013-07-30T16:16:40","modified_gmt":"2013-07-30T22:16:40","slug":"divide-and-conquer-at-the-heart-of-all-politics-lies-cold-hard-opportunism-the-small-states-option","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/?p=17619","title":{"rendered":"Divide and Conquer – At the heart of all politics lies cold, hard opportunism – The \u201cSmall States\u201d Option"},"content":{"rendered":"

Arabs, Beware the \u201cSmall States\u201d Option<\/strong>
\nBy Sharmine Narwani – Al Akhbar – 30 July, 2013 – Intifada<\/p>\n

At the heart of all politics lies cold, hard opportunism. New circumstances, changed alliances and unexpected events will always conspire to alter one\u2019s calculations to benefit a core agenda.<\/p>\n

In the Middle East today, those calculations are being adjusted with a frequency unseen for decades.<\/p>\n

In Egypt and Syria, for instance, popular sentiment is genuinely divided on where alliances and interests lie. Half of Egyptians seem convinced that deposed President Mohammed Mursi is the resident US-Israeli stooge, while the other half believe it is Egypt\u2019s military that is carrying out those foreign agendas.<\/p>\n

In Syria the same can be said for Syrians conflicted on whether President Bashar al-Assad or the external-based Syrian National Council (SNC) most benefits Israeli and American hegemonic interests in the region.<\/p>\n

But Egyptians and Syrians, who point alternating fingers at Islamists or the state as being tools of imperialism, have this wrong: Empire is opportunistic. It has ways to benefit from both.<\/p>\n

There is another vastly more destructive scenario being missed while Arabs busy themselves with conspiracies and speculative minutiae: A third option far more damaging to all.<\/p>\n

Balkanization of Key Mideast States<\/strong><\/p>\n

At a June 19 event at the University of Michigan\u2019s Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger touched upon an alarming new refrain in western discourse on Mideast outcomes; a third strategy, if all else fails, of redrawn borders along sectarian, ethnic, tribal or national lines that will shrink the political\/military reach of key Arab states and enable the west to reassert its rapidly-diminishing control over the region. Says Kissinger about two such nations:<\/p>\n

\u201cThere are three possible outcomes (in Syria). An Assad victory. A Sunni victory. Or an outcome in which the various nationalities agree to co-exist together but in more or less autonomous regions, so that they can\u2019t oppress each other. That\u2019s the outcome I would prefer to see. But that\u2019s not the popular view\u2026First of all, Syria is not a historic state. It was created in its present shape in 1920, and it was given that shape in order to facilitate the control of the country by France, which happened to be after UN mandate\u2026The neighboring country Iraq was also given an odd shape, that was to facilitate control by England. And the shape of both of the countries was designed to make it hard for either of them to dominate the region.\u201d<\/p>\n

While Kissinger frankly acknowledges his preferred option of \u201cautonomous regions,\u201d most western government statements actually pretend their interest lies in preventing territorial splits. Don\u2019t be fooled. This is narrative-building and scene-setting all the same. Repeat something enough \u2013 i.e., the idea that these countries could be carved up \u2013 and audiences will not remember whether you like it or not. They will retain the message that these states can be divided.<\/p>\n

It is the same with sectarian discourse. Western governments are always warning against the escalation of a Sunni-Shia divide. Yet they are knee-deep in deliberately fueling Shia-Sunni conflicts throughout the region, particularly in states where Iran enjoys significant influence (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq) or may begin to gain some (Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen).<\/p>\n

\u201cSeeding\u201d Sectarianism to Break Up States<\/strong><\/p>\n

If ever a conspiracy had legs, this one is it. Stirring Iranian-Arab and Sunni-Shiite strife to its advantage has been a major US policy objective since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.<\/p>\n

Wikileaks helped shed light on some of Washington\u2019s machinations just as Arab uprisings started to hit our TV screens.<\/p>\n

A 2006 State Department cable that bemoans Syrian President Bashar al-Assad\u2019s strengthened position in Syria outlines actionable plans to sow discord within the state, with the goal of disrupting Syrian ties with Iran. The theme? \u201cExploiting\u201d all \u201cvulnerabilities\u201d:<\/p>\n

\u201cPLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE: There are fears in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis. Though often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through activities ranging from mosque construction to business. Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate more closely with their governments on ways to better publicize and focus regional attention on the issue.\u201d<\/p>\n

Makes one question whether similar accusations about the \u201cspread of Shiism\u201d in Egypt held any truth whatsoever, other than to sow anti-Shia and anti-Iran sentiment in a country until this month led by the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood.<\/p>\n

A 2009 cable from the US Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia continues this theme. Mohammad\u2028 Naji al-Shaif, a tribal leader with close personal ties to then-Yemeni President Ali Abdallah \u2028Saleh and his inner circle says that key figures \u201care privately very skeptical of Saleh\u2019s\u2028 claims regarding Iranian assistance for the Houthi rebels\u201d:<\/p>\n

Shaif told\u2028 EconOff on December 14 that (Saudi Government\u2019s Special Office for\u2028 Yemen Affairs) committee members privately shared his view that Saleh was providing false or exaggerated\u2028 information on Iranian assistance to the Houthis in order to\u2028 enlist direct Saudi involvement and regionalize the conflict. Shaif said that one committee member told him that \u201cwe know\u2028 Saleh is lying about Iran, but there\u2019s nothing we can do \u2028about it now.\u201d<\/p>\n

That didn\u2019t stop Secretary of State Hillary Clinton lying through her teeth to a Senate Committee a few short years later: \u201cWe know that they \u2013 the Iranians are very much involved in the opposition movements in Yemen.\u201d<\/p>\n

US embassy cables from Manama, Bahrain in 2008 continue in the same vein:<\/p>\n

\u201cBahraini government officials sometimes privately tell U.S. official visitors that some Shi\u2019a oppositionists are backed by Iran. Each time this claim is raised, we ask the GOB to share its evidence. To date, we have seen no convincing evidence of Iranian weapons or government money here since at least the mid-1990s\u2026 In post\u2019s assessment, if the GOB had convincing evidence of more recent Iranian subversion, it would quickly share it with us.\u201d<\/p>\n

Yet as Bahraini rulers continue to violently repress peaceful protest in the Shia-majority state two years into that country\u2019s popular uprising, their convenient public bogeyman mirrors that of Washington: Iranian interference. …more<\/a><\/p>\n

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Arabs, Beware the \u201cSmall States\u201d Option By Sharmine Narwani – Al Akhbar – 30 July, 2013 – Intifada At the heart of all politics lies cold, hard opportunism. New circumstances, changed alliances and unexpected events will always conspire to alter one\u2019s calculations to benefit a core agenda. In the Middle East today, those calculations are more \u00bb<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":27,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[247],"tags":[1658],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17619"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/27"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=17619"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17619\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17620,"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17619\/revisions\/17620"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=17619"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=17619"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.crookedbough.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=17619"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}