- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2023
![[*]](img/ib-star_nm.png "mark favorite")
![[+]](img/ib-marked_nm.png "mark as new")
![[-]](img/ib-markold_nm.png "mark older as read")
![[x]](img/ib-delete_nm.png "delete article")
![[A+]](img/ib-fontbg_nm.png "larger font")
![[a-]](img/ib-fontsm_nm.png "smaller font")
![[l]](img/ib-link_nm.png "direct link")
at 5/28/23 5:11pmKateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Fredrick W. KaganMay 28, 2023, 3pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on May 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Russian forces conducted the largest Shahed drone strike against Ukraine since the start of the war overnight on May 27-28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 59 Shahed-131/136 drones, of which Ukrainian forces shot down 58.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat characterized this strike as the largest drone strike since the start of the war and stated that Russian forces chiefly targeted Kyiv.[2] Zhytomyr Oblast Head Vitaliy Bunechko reported that Russian drones struck an unspecified infrastructure facility in the oblast.[3] The Russian allocation of aerial munitions to targeting Kyiv rather than prioritizing infrastructure or military facilities continues to constrain this limited Russian air campaign’s ability to meaningfully degrade Ukrainian offensive capabilities for the upcoming counteroffensive, as ISW has previously assessed.[4] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that the Russian relief in place operation in Bakhmut may continue past his initial June 1 deadline and last until June 5. Prigozhin stated on May 28 that Wagner’s withdrawal from the city may take a few more days because Wagner is not able to transfer all equipment in good condition by June 1.[5] Prigozhin stated that Wagner forces intend to fully withdraw from Bakhmut to rear field camps by June 5.[6] The Washington Post reported on May 28 that Ukrainian personnel in the Bakhmut area have observed Wagner forces leaving Bakhmut City itself and regular Russian personnel taking responsibility for Wagner’s previous positions in the city.[7] The Ukrainian personnel reportedly stated that they cannot confirm that regular Russian forces are replacing Wagner throughout Bakhmut City, however.[8] Russian sources amplified footage on May 27 and 28 purporting to show elements of the ”Nevsky” volunteer battalion and the irregular 1st ”Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade operating on the flanks in the Bakhmut area.[9] ISW has previously assessed that the “Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade was operating in the Avdiivka area, further suggesting that Russian forces may be transferring irregular forces and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) elements from around Avdiivka to the Bakhmut area.[10] ISW previously assessed that the Russian transfer of these elements to Bakhmut may decrease the tempo of Russian offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[11] The tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut remains notably low. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 28 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), west of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), and in the direction of Ivanivske (6k west of Bakhmut).[12] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on May 28 that only one combat clash occurred near Bakhmut City in the past 24 hours.[13] Geolocated footage published on May 28 indicates that Russian forces made marginal gains west of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[14] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are counterattacking west of Klishchiivka but that Ukrainian forces maintain their current positions in the area.[15] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka on May 27, where Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces advanced up to one kilometer on May 26.[16] Ukrainian personnel in the Bakhmut area reportedly expressed optimism that the decreased tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut may facilitate further limited and localized Ukrainian counterattacks.[17] ISW previously assessed that the decreased tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Bakhmut area and the ongoing relief in place operation are likely providing Ukrainian forces in the area the initiative to launch a new round of operations around the city if they so choose.[18] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to have again indirectly undermined Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority and regime. Prigozhin responded to a journalist’s question about Russian state media banning any discussions about Wagner forces, stating that unnamed Russian bureaucrats will only benefit from such censorship in the near term of one to three months before the Russian people will push back and start hating the bureaucrats.[19] Prigozhin stated that Russian officials would have been able to enjoy their historic ability to censor Russian society if Russia had not started the war in Ukraine. Prigozhin then gave advice to an unnamed official: “If you are starting a war, please have character, will, and steel balls - and only then you will be able to achieve something.” Prigozhin implied that accomplishing real achievements would let the official avoid lying about the construction of new buildings, metro stations, and bridges in an effort to look good. Prigozhin notably shifted the discussion from talking about unnamed Russian officials to directly addressing a single man. Prigozhin’s comments are likely targeted at Putin whom the Russian state media has routinely portrayed as a leader minutely involved with small infrastructure projects and the lives of ordinary Russian people. Putin used to host annual hours-long “Direct Line” press conferences with constituents in which he often responded to inquiries that are best suited for local governments, for example.[20] Prigozhin may be attacking Putin for failing to give Prigozhin some promised reward for seizing Bakhmut. Prigozhin’s previous attack on Putin’s character occurred on May 9 – a symbolic holiday that Putin may have wanted to use to portray Russia’s claimed victory in Bakhmut as an achievement equivalent to Soviet Union’s drive on Berlin in 1945.[21] Kremlin state media compared the seizure of Bakhmut city to the Soviet victory in Berlin on May 21, which likely indicates that the Kremlin was preparing to associate the victory in Bakhmut with Victory Day.[22] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner had effectively captured Bakhmut by May 10 and cleared the city by May 20, and attempted to blame the delay in Wagner’s capture of the city on the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) withholding of ammunition.[23] Prigozhin also claimed that his ”Bakhmut meatgrinder” offensive operation killed half of the Ukrainian army, a statement that Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin declared to be false.[24] Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner opened a springboard for further offensive operations in Donbas and sarcastically noted that Russian regular forces subordinated under the Russian MoD will be able to reach the Dnipro River, capture the territories of the four annexed regions, and capture Ukrainian strongholds west and north of Bakhmut. Prigozhin’s jabs at Putin and the Russian MoD - in combination with his bragging about Wagner’s accomplishments – may suggest that Prigozhin is frustrated that he did not receive some promised compensation for his victory in the Battle for Bakhmut. The Russian MoD may have deliberately sabotaged Prigozhin days or weeks prior to May 9th to prevent Wagner from capturing the remaining few blocks in western Bakhmut before Victory Day, as Prigozhin suggests. Putin may have deliberately overlooked such MoD sabotage efforts to avoid having to fulfill whatever promise Prigozhin thinks Putin had made to him. Prigozhin has previously stated that if he was given 200,000 personnel, Wagner would have made further great advances on the frontlines.[25] Prigozhin’s May 28 statement and his previous behavior may indicate that he had envisioned expanding Wagner at the expense of Russian conventional forces or replacing Russian military officials with Wagner-affiliated personnel.[26] ISW previously assessed that Putin is a risk averse actor who is concerned over the health of his regime and thus unlikely to fully satisfy Prigozhin’s radical demands.[27] The Wagner Group held a reportedly illegal pro-Wagner rally in Yekaterinburg on May 28 despite the reported banning of the rally by Yekaterinburg authorities. Approximately 100 to 150 cars of Wagner personnel and supporters held a procession from Yekaterinburg to a cemetery in Berezovsky, Sverdlovsk Oblast, where the supporters laid flowers at a Wagner monument.[28] Some Russian opposition sources claimed that local authorities explicitly banned Wagner from holding the rally and that Wagner held the rally in direct defiance of the ban.[29] Footage shows luxury cars participating in the procession, suggesting that some local elites may be supporting Wagner.[30] Sverdlovsk Oblast is a notable Russian defense industrial base (DIB) hub, and Russian authorities recently conducted several prominent arrests there of individuals including Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich on charges of espionage.[31] Gershkovich notably traveled to Yekaterinburg to report on Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s criticisms of the Yekaterinburg History Museum Director Igor Pushkarev.[32] Prigozhin has also notably feuded with Russian regional officials over allowing dead Wagner personnel to receive burials equivalent to those of regular Russian military personnel.[33] Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov criticized former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on May 27. Solovyov accused Girkin of discrediting the Russian military and stated that Russian authorities should have already imprisoned Girkin.[34] Solovyov complained that authorities have prosecuted other Russian milbloggers for discrediting the Russian military but have not touched Girkin. Girkin responded on May 28, noting that Solovyov is criticizing him despite his extensive military experience. Girkin highlighted that Solovyov has not criticized Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin despite Prigozhin’s criminal record and control over a “mercenary army.”[35] Rumors of an investigation into Girkin for discrediting the Russian military previously gained prominence in mid-April, during which Prigozhin may have tried to pressure Girkin and his patronage networks as part of an ongoing feud to compete for influence and patronage.[36] Key Takeaways Russian forces conducted the largest Shahed drone strike against Ukraine since the start of the war overnight on May 27-28. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that the Russian relief in place operation in Bakhmut may continue past his initial June 1 deadline and last until June 5. The tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut remains notably low. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to have again indirectly undermined Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority and regime. Prigozhin may be attacking Putin for failing to give Prigozhin some promised reward for seizing Bakhmut. The Wagner Group held a reportedly illegal pro-Wagner rally in Yekaterinburg on May 28 despite the reported banning of the rally by Yekaterinburg authorities. Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov criticized former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on May 27. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line. Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front. Russian forces continued to fire on areas in Southern Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) asserted that Russia is now demanding that Russian citizens make additional sacrifices to support the war effort. Russian occupation officials continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of summer camps. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts) Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts Activities in Russian-occupied areas Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and did not conduct operations in the Kreminna area.[37] Russian Western Group of Forces (Western Military District) Spokesperson Sergei Zybinsky claimed that assault units of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) destroyed Ukrainian positions near Masyutivka.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Masyutivka and expanded their zone of control in the area, although ISW has still not seen visual confirmation of these advances nor confirmation that Russian forces control Masyutivka.[39] A Ukrainian serviceman serving near Kreminna reported that Russian forces regularly conduct unsuccessful ground attacks and fire prohibited gas cylinders on Ukrainian positions near Kreminna.[40] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Bilohorivka (10km south of Kremmina), while a milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations near the settlement.[41] ISW has not seen visual confirmation supporting a Russian advance near Bilohorivka. Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Click here to read ISW’s new retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut. See topline text for Bakhmut. Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on May 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained lost positions south of Pervomaiske but sustained losses while doing so.[43] The milblogger claimed that positional battles occurred near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[44] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia published footage on May 28 purporting to show elements of the DNR 87th Regiment repelling a Ukrainian counterattack on the outskirts of Avdiivka on an unspecified date.[45] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Novokalynove (13km north of Avdiivka) and Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka) and repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near the H-20 (Donetsk City to Kostyantynivka) highway on May 27.[46] Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 28.[47] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a failed raid across the Dnipro River on May 28. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces detected and fired on Ukrainian forces as they prepared to cross the Dnipro River near the Antonivsky Bridge.[48] This report is consistent with reports of periodic Ukrainian raids across the Dnipro River.[49] Russian forces continued to fire on areas in southern Ukraine on May 28. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Shahed drones over Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and struck Beryslav, Kherson Oblast, with glide bombs.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against Chervone, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Zmiivka, Kherson Oblast.[51] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian artillery units conducted 70 fire missions targeting Kherson City and its environs.[52] Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) A local Sakha Republic outlet indicated that the regional “Bootur-1” volunteer battalion is part of the BARS-2 (Russian Combat Reserve) volunteer battalion.[53] Sakha Republic established the Bootur-1 volunteer battalion with 100 volunteers in late July 2022 under the command of local community member Alexander Kolesov.[54] About 90 volunteers from the Bootur-1 battalion deployed to the frontlines near Kharkiv City in July-August 2022, where the unit merged with the BARS-2 battalion.[55] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed that Russia is now demanding that Russian citizens make additional sacrifices to support the war effort.[56] The UK MoD reported that Russian state media and business groups have petitioned the Russian Ministry of Economy to authorize a six-day work week for workers without offering additional pay in order to satisfy the demands of the wartime industrial complex. The UK MoD added that Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan noted that citizens should work for two extra hours in munitions factories after their daytime jobs.[57] Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) Russian occupation officials continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of summer camp programs. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lusohor reported that Russian occupation authorities announced the creation of a vacation summer camp in Russia for Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied Shchastia Raion in Luhansk Oblast.[58] ISW has previously reported on Russian occupation authorities using children’s camps as a guise to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia.[59] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials plan to open regional “Defenders of the Fatherland” branches in June that will offer a Russian state support fund for participants of the “special military operation.”[60] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials will attempt to use these regional offices to collect data on residents to support expanding United Russia’s popularity in occupied Ukraine. Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely). Belarusian opposition leader Valery Tsepkalo claimed on May 27 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko was rushed to a Moscow hospital following a closed-door meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[61] Belarusian opposition outlet the Hajun Project stated that it could not confirm Tsepkalo’s claims, however, and stated that Lukashenko returned to Minsk from Moscow on May 25.[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continue to arrive in Belarus to train before deploying to Ukraine.[63] ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Su1tscfRnjvhQsNoBi8... [2] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/28/taktyka-voroga-zalyshayetsya-nezminnoyu-vin-namagayetsya-zavdavaty-udariv-po-obyektah-krytychnoyi-infrastruktury-yurij-ignat/ [3] https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/4012; [4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... [5] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1067 [6] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1067 [7] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/28/bakhmut-wagner-mercenaries-ukraine-withdrawal/ [8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/28/bakhmut-wagner-mercenaries-ukraine-withdrawal/ [9] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/25837 ; https://t.me/BTGR_NEVSKIY/261 [10] ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2023 [11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2023 [12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Su1tscfRnjvhQsNoBi81vsCNc5mLTzcJynPLHK1h1SUFQqYCgmESypCN5Ra4fZHsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dkcUjzi9qfnavSaRYoFogjMGG3U8mAthkM2rqydT4vVwXD5bfe8hhajUTN9d9qvNl [13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/28/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-intensyvnist-vorozhyh-atak-znachno-znyzylasya-sergij-cherevatyj/ [14] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1662792484760481793; https://twitter.com/small10space/status/1662776593297678337; [15] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87157 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/12801 [16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052623 [17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/28/bakhmut-wagner-mercenaries-ukraine-withdrawal/ [18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052623 [19] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1066 [20] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/65973 [21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2023 [22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [23] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1066 [24] https://t.me/strelkovii/5108 [25] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/05/24/rodinu-lyublyu-putina-slushayus-shoygu-na-mylo-voevat-budem-dalshe [26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023 [27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-update-february-5-2023 [28] https://t.me/bbcrussian/46938; https://t.me/orchestra_w/6925; https://t.me/FREEPRESSA_Z/713; [29] https://t.me/astrapress/28011; https://t.me/astrapress/28144; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12370 [30] https://t.me/astrapress/28144; https://www.e1 dot ru/text/politics/2023/05/28/72345197/ [31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20April%205%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive... [32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [33] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2018%2C%202023.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023 [34] https://t.me/strelkovii/5097 ; https://www.pravda dot ru/news/society/1838873-igor_strelkov/ [35] https://t.me/strelkovii/5098 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/5100 [36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Su1tscfRnjvhQsNoBi81vsCNc5mLTzcJynPLHK1h1SUFQqYCgmESypCN5Ra4fZHsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dkcUjzi9qfnavSaRYoFogjMGG3U8mAthkM2rqydT4vVwXD5bfe8hhajUTN9d9qvNl [38] https://t.me/mod_russia/26907 [39] https://t.me/wargonzo/12801 [40] https://suspilne dot media/487456-skidaut-z-drona-baloni-iz-gazom-oficer-rozpoviv-ak-rosiani-atakuut-na-kreminskomu-napramku/ [41] https://t.me/readovkanews/59675; https://t.me/wargonzo/12801 [42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Su1tscfRnjvhQsNoBi81vsCNc5mLTzcJynPLHK1h1SUFQqYCgmESypCN5Ra4fZHsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dkcUjzi9qfnavSaRYoFogjMGG3U8mAthkM2rqydT4vVwXD5bfe8hhajUTN9d9qvNl [43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47973 [44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47973 [45] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10377 [46] https://t.me/readovkanews/59675 [47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Su1tscfRnjvhQsNoBi81vsCNc5mLTzcJynPLHK1h1SUFQqYCgmESypCN5Ra4fZHsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dkcUjzi9qfnavSaRYoFogjMGG3U8mAthkM2rqydT4vVwXD5bfe8hhajUTN9d9qvNl [48] https://t.me/rusich_army/9051 [49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [50] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid08rTPTT3BDxr... [51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dkcUjzi9qfnavSaRYoF... [52] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid08rTPTT3BDxr... [53] https://1sn dot ru/v-yakutske-torzestvenno-vstretili-geroya-rossii-aleksandra-kolesova [54] https://yakutia-daily dot ru/komandir-otryada-bootur-o-tom-kak-vyvel-iz-pod-ognya-50-bojczov-prosbe-k-bogu-i-boevom-bratstve/?read [55] https://ysia dot ru/komandir-dobrovolcheskogo-otryada-bootur-vse-nashi-bojtsy-stoyali-ochen-stojko-i-hrabro/ [56] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1662705157996441600/photo/1 [57] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1662705157996441600/photo/1 [58] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10852 [59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2023 [60] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/rosiyany-namagayutsya-informatsijno-vplyvaty-na-meshkantsiv-tot/ [61] https://twitter.com/ValeryTsepkalo/status/1662397252411830272/history ; https://t.me/sotaproject/59760 [62] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/6892 [63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dkcUjzi9qfnavSaRYoF...- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 27, 2023
- at 5/27/23 6:40pmKateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Fredrick W. KaganMay 27, 2023, 6:30pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on May 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Wagner Group mercenaries appear to be withdrawing from Bakhmut city to reconstitute and regroup in the rear as Russian offensive operations decrease in and around the city. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian offensive operations had dramatically decreased to two skirmishes in the Bakhmut direction, and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar attributed this decrease to the Russian relief-in-place and regrouping of forces in the area.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 27 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations west of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and in the direction of Predtechyne (15km southwest of Bakhmut).[2] Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces hold dominant elevated positions north and south of Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces stopped combat operations on May 26 and 27 to fulfill other unspecified tasks.[3] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces continue to control positions in the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut City.[4] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are not conducting active operations aimed at regaining positions in Bakhmut City itself despite the possible continuation of localized Ukrainian counterattacks northwest and southwest of the city.[5]Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated that Wagner mercenaries are withdrawing from the city of Bakhmut and are “regrouping to another three locations.”[6] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin reiterated that Wagner forces continued to withdraw from Bakhmut city on May 27.[7] Prigozhin’s statements are likely true given the decrease in Russian offensive capabilities around Bakhmut and Ukrainian statements regarding the situation in Bakhmut.The Russian military command may be transferring Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) forces to relieve Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut city. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces have likely entered Bakhmut city as of May 24 and begun clearing operations.[8] ISW previously observed elements of the 132nd Separate Guard Motorized Rifle Brigade of the DNR’s 1st Army Corps operating in the Bakhmut direction after previously fighting in the Avdiivka area.[9] It is unclear at this time if elements of the 132nd Brigade are operating inside of the city, but DNR Head Denis Pushilin previously raised the DNR flag in Bakhmut - which likely indicates that the DNR forces are assuming control over Bakhmut.[10] Pushilin also indicated that DNR elements were clearing the city as of May 23.[11]The Russian transfer of DNR elements to Bakhmut may decrease the tempo of Russian offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command has heavily committed a variety of DNR elements to the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.[12] Russian attacks around Avdiivka-Donetsk City area appear to have been decreasing in recent days, which may be connected to the transfer of DNR forces to Bakhmut. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 27 that Russian forces conducted 13 combat operations in eastern Ukraine, of which seven attacks were in the Marinka area (about 19km west from Donetsk City).[13] The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported that Russian forces attacked 20 times in Marinka alone on the day Wagner forces declared victory over Bakhmut on May 20.[14] The Russian offensives around Avdiivka have been steadily decreasing since at least April 8 after the Russian military command attempted to intensify offensive operations near the settlement in mid-March, and the transfer of DNR units to Bakhmut may further slow Russian efforts on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.[15] The Russian military command may be transferring DNR units operating in the well-defended Avdiivka-Donetsk City area to avoid making other directions vulnerable or to ensure quick reinforcements for Bakhmut city.The Russian military command appears to be reinforcing Bakhmut’s flanks with regular formations, however. The UK MoD assessed that elements of the 31st Brigade of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) have likely transferred from the Svatove-Kreminna line to reinforce Bakhmut’s flanks in recent weeks.[16] Ukrainian military officials previously reported that Russian forces are transferring unspecified VDV, motorized rifle, and special forces units to the Bakhmut direction after successful Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut‘s flanks.[17] ISW also observed Cossack units operating in Soledar, although these units likely were previously operating in the area.[18]Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of planning a coup against the current Russian leadership. Girkin openly accused Prigozhin of planning to conduct a coup amid the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive and of continuously violating Russian censorship laws against the discreditation of the Russian army and military command.[19] Girkin warned of “mutiny” if Prigozhin is “allowed” to lead the Wagner Group. Girkin noted that Prigozhin ordered for the Wagner forces to withdraw to the Wagner bases deep inside of Russia on the eve of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. He also claimed that Wagner personnel had never taken oaths promising not to engage in combat against Russia or its military.[20] Prigozhin stated on May 27 that Wagner will decide later on if it will fight in Ukraine or in another country, which indicates that Prigozhin retains the ability to command his own army outside of the formal Russian military command structure.[21] Girkin also recently criticized the Russian military command for failing to address Prigozhin’s open and vulgar conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), even warning that Prigozhin will “devour” the Russian military officials who “bet” in his favor as he seeks to increase his political power.[22] A member of Girkin’s Angry Patriots Club claimed that the conflict between Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Prigozhin is developing into a conflict between the Russian military and Wagner forces but that Putin is not paying attention.[23] Girkin’s and his associates’ criticisms are largely consistent with Prigozhin’s continued prioritization of his own personal aims over those of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the broader operational situation near Bakhmut.[24] Prigozhin’s decision to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut and, apparently, from active combat on the eve of the Ukrainian counter-offensive is strategically questionable.Ukrainian officials denied Western reporting that suggested that a Chinese diplomat expressed interest in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine amidst the likely renewal of Russia’s information campaign surrounding negotiations. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on May 27 that he contacted his European counterparts who recently met with Chinese Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui and that they denied that Li had expressed interest in a ceasefire that would see Russia retain control of occupied territories, as a May 26 Wall Street Journal report suggested.[25] Li Hui visited Moscow on May 26 reportedly to discuss a negotiated settlement to Russia’s war in Ukraine, a visit that the Kremlin likely used to attempt to renew a recurring information operation falsely claiming that Russia is open to serious negotiations.[26] The Kremlin previously intensified this information operation in December 2022 to attempt to delay the provision of Western tanks and other advanced military equipment to Ukraine in order to set conditions for Russia’s 2023 winter-spring offensive.[27] The Kremlin is likely reintroducing the information operation intending to weaken Western willingness to send critical security assistance to Ukraine ahead of potential Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.The Kremlin has established a pattern in this information operation in which some Russian officials express feigned interest in negotiations while other Russian officials simultaneously reiterate Putin’s maximalist goals for the war in Ukraine.[28] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin stated on May 26 that the conditions for a ”comprehensive, just and lasting peace” in Ukraine include the cessation of hostilities by Ukrainian forces, the end of Western security assistance to Ukraine, the Ukrainian return to a “neutral non-aligned status,” the explicit Ukrainian refusal to join NATO and the EU, and the recognition of Russia’s annexation of occupied territories in Ukraine.[29] Galuzin’s reiteration of Russia’s maximalist objectives coincide with Putin’s alleged expression of Russian interest in negotiations during a phone call with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva on May 26.[30]Key TakeawaysWagner Group mercenaries appear to be withdrawing from Bakhmut city to reconstitute and regroup in the rear as Russian offensive operations decrease in and around the city.The Russian military command may be transferring Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) forces to relieve Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut city.The Russian transfer of DNR elements to Bakhmut may decrease the tempo of Russian offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.The Russian military command appears to be reinforcing Bakhmut’s flanks with regular formations, however.Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of planning a coup against the current Russian leadership.Ukrainian officials denied Western reporting that suggested that a Chinese diplomat expressed interest in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine amidst the likely renewal of Russia’s information campaign surrounding negotiations.Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and south of Kreminna.Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.Ukrainian forces continued to strike rear logistics nodes in southern Zaporizhia oblast.The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on May 26 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct large scale provocations to create radiological danger at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).The Russian Ministry of Justice registered the civil society group “Council of Mothers of Wives” as a foreign agent on May 26, likely to curb resistance to ongoing and future Russian force generation efforts.Russian authorities are escalating efforts to portray Russia as a safe guardian of Ukrainian children.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsActivities in Russian-occupied areasRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and south of Kreminna on May 27. Geolocated footage published on May 26 indicates that Russian forces likely advanced northwest of Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (12km south of Kreminna).[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 27 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka and Masyutivka, Kharkiv Oblast (13km northeast of Kupyansk).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recaptured several recently lost positions southeast of Bilohorivka, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[33] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to two kilometers from Masyutivka, although ISW has not seen visual confirmation of these advances nor confirmation that Russian forces control Masyutivka.[34] The milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing near Dvorichna (16km northeast of Kupyansk) and Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk).[35] Russian Western Grouping of Forces (Western Military District) Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that Russian forces also conducted offensive operations near Movchanove (10km northeast of Kupyansk) and destroyed a Ukrainian platoon in the area.[36]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Click here to read ISW’s new retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.See topline text for Bakhmut.Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Pervomaiske and Sieverne within 12km west of Avdiivka, and seven attacks on Marinka (about 20km southwest of Donetsk City).[37] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force in the Novokalynove direction (about 12km north of Avdiivka) from Krasnohorivka (approximately 9km north of Avdiivka).[38] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack across the H20 highway from Novokalynove. Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that Russian forces are continuing assaults in Marinka and unsuccessfully conducted offensive operations in Krasnohorivka (about 19km west from Donetsk City).[39] The Donetsk People’s Republic claimed that the 10th Separate Tank Battalion of the 1st Army Corps is operating in the Avdiivka direction.[40] Russian sources also indicated that elements of the 110th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (formerly the 100th Brigade, 1st Army Corps) are operating in the Nevelske direction (approximately 18km northwest of Donetsk City).[41]Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on May 27 and continued launching artillery and air strikes at Ukrainian positions in the area.[42] A Russian milblogger amplified video footage reportedly showing elements of the Russian 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) shelling Ukrainian positions in the Vuhledar direction.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff retroactively reported that unspecified Russian airborne units participated in an attack on Vuhledar in February 2023 and suffered heavy losses.[44]Russian sources amplified footage on May 26 purporting to show the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike at the Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol with two long-range missiles.[45] Russian sources also claimed that Russian air defenses shot down one of the two missiles.[46]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued to target southern Ukraine with artillery, drone, and air strikes on May 27.[47] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against Beryslav Raion, Kherson Oblast, and targeted Mykolaiv Oblast with Shahed drones.[48] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck the Obvodna rail station in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on May 26.[49] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on May 27 that Russian forces’ primary tactic in southern Ukraine is counterbattery fire.[50]Ukrainian forces continued to strike rear logistical nodes in Zaporizhia Oblast on May 27. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Polohy and Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast on May 27.[51] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted Ukrainian Storm Shadow missiles targeting Berdyansk on May 26, on which ISW has recently reported.[52]The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on May 26 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct large scale provocations to create radiological danger at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).[53] The GUR published audio intercepts on May 27 in which Russian military personnel claimed that unknown drones dropped chemical weapons in Enerhodar.[54] The GUR stated that Russia intends to falsely blame Ukraine for the attacks and aims to undermine the coming Ukrainian counteroffensive.[55] ISW has no independent confirmation that Russia is preparing to conduct a nuclear or chemical false flag attack in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, but GUR’s reports are consistent with longstanding debunked Kremlin information operations. ISW has notably reported on prior Kremlin efforts to set conditions for false flag attacks as pretexts for the 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine and to undermine Western support for Ukraine, and US officials have previously debunked claims that Ukraine was preparing to conduct chemical attacks.[56] The Kremlin has also previously accused Syrian opposition groups of conducting chemical attacks that the Syrian government had actually conducted themselves.[57]The Russian MoD claimed that the “Ivan Khurs” Yury Ivanov-class intelligence vessel returned to port at Sevastopol on May 26 to resupply following the claimed May 24 attack against the vessel.[58]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian Ministry of Justice registered the civil society group “Council of Mothers of Wives” as a foreign agent on May 26, likely to curb resistance to ongoing and future Russian force generation efforts.[59] The “Council of Mothers and Wives” routinely advocated for their relatives serving in the Russian military by reaching out to local officials following the start of partial mobilization in late September 2022.[60] Putin previously tried to dull the informational impact of the group’s public criticism of mobilization in late November 2022 by attending a meeting with hand-picked women in the Russian political sphere who were falsely presented as mothers of mobilized personnel.[61] The added legal pressure on the group is likely meant to allow Russian officials to suppress the group’s activities in the event of renewed heightened public resistance to Russian force generation efforts.Russian officials reportedly confirmed that Russian conscripts are operating near the Ukrainian border as of May 27. The Yaroslavl Oblast government announced on May 27 that Russian conscripts perform tasks in various military units, including those deployed near the Russian border with Ukraine.[62] ISW assesses that the Kremlin is unlikely to deploy conscripts to Ukraine itself due to the potential for social backlash reminiscent of the domestic response to conscripts’ deployment to Ukraine earlier in the full-scale invasion.[63]Russian convict recruits reportedly continue to desert their positions in frontline areas of Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that 20 convict recruits who recently arrived to strengthen Russian units near Svatove, Luhansk Oblast stole a Russian military vehicle and fled their positions on May 25.[64] Russian sources reported on May 26 that Russian authorities are searching for 39-armed convict recruits who deserted their positions near Lysychansk, Luhansk Oblast.[65]Russian arms manufacturer Kalashnikov Group is launching a new division for producing drones.[66] Kalashnikov Group President Alan Lushnikov announced on May 26 that the company intends to significantly increase Russia’s production of reconnaissance and combat drones by 2024.[67]Russian space agency Roscosmos is reportedly recruiting its own employees to form a volunteer battalion. Russian and social media sources amplified an advertisement for the “Uran” volunteer battalion that reportedly appeared on the internal Roscosmos website, which ostensibly only Roscosmos employees can access.[68] The possible recruitment of highly educated and likely limited specialists in the Russian aerospace field suggests that Russian officials may be prioritizing immediate force generation requirements over long-term human capital needs.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russian authorities are escalating efforts to portray Russia as a safe guardian of Ukrainian children. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik announced the formation of a Russian State Duma Committee dedicated to prosecuting claimed Ukrainian crimes against children of Donbas, including the “illegal export” of Ukrainian children – whose families are presumably in Russia – to other countries.[69] Ukrainian Minister for the Reintegration of Occupied Territories Iryna Vereshchuk announced on May 26 that Russia returned a child who had been deported from Mariupol following Russian occupation of the city.[70]The Kherson Oblast administration announced further efforts likely aimed at stymieing Ukrainian partisan activity and concealing Russian military movements. Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo announced the establishment of a curfew for all of the occupied Kherson Oblast as of May 25.[71] The curfew is between 23:00pm and 04:00am nightly for areas more than 30 kilometers from the east (right) bank of the Dnipro River and 21:00pm to 06:00am for areas within 30 kilometers of the riverbank.[72]Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Belarusian territorial troops are continuing to train to respond to sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[73]ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/annamaliar/798; https://t.me/annamaliar/797; https://suspilne dot media/488617-rosia-gotue-udar-po-zaporizkij-aes-predstavniki-rdk-ta-legionu-svoboda-rosii-lisautsa-v-rf-458-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1685172293&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4TtmmwesUhEwWtcgH6K54DpuvQHcxyBknA3zCo4Nmy4keMCGSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Lk1R3ro57JjXv5tDTPXyNHBAoDxjM7bFwxvnWahNSQF2kTw9dcoTXTLdbitjvy2Cl[3] https://t.me/annamaliar/798; https://t.me/annamaliar/797[4] https://t.me/annamaliar/798; https://t.me/annamaliar/797 [5] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87050[6] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-65725004[7] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1065[8] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1662337489334419458[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2023[10] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3450; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3449[11] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3449[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4TtmmwesUhEwWtcgH6K54DpuvQHcxyBknA3zCo4Nmy4keMCGSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4TtmmwesUhEwWtcgH6K54DpuvQHcxyBknA3zCo4Nmy4keMCGSl [14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nrK26wC9KjN8BVTtidet5hBsNVUhqUF2sENc1sQyycX7bc6PrKDiRqe4LuUH6fXBl[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040823; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2023[16] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1662337489334419458[17] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/20/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-znyshheno-13-polovyh-skladiv-iz-boyeprypasamy-okupantiv-sergij-cherevatyj/[18] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 [19] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1662429293719298049[20] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1662429293719298049[21] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1065[22] https://t.me/strelkovii/5057; https://t.me/strelkovii/5043; [23] https://t.me/strelkovii/5095 ; https://t.me/soldiers_truth/9287[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[25] https://t.me/bbcrussian/46910 ; https://www.facebook.com/dmytro.kuleba/videos/217277024416535/?__cft__[0]=AZUQwqf_VdthImutaFr8UVydniYqN2vIezFPTfKK9LUobv2p7ONmhMYUXwrTO0Oi_xHHUHesd3RTTKNvDMhWwk_k10ZAhSZneg4VbbJmGRjLyCilcHMnq1Km326CjvF_VD_lTPhJPe_kVCYx3iGmgDFMSnL98WeKVspcfUDXYR510g&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052623 ; https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-pushing-ukraine-cease-fire-gets-cool-reception-in-europe-614774dd [26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2023[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2023 [28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122922 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122822 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122622[29] https://t.me/rusbrief/120772; https://tass dot ru/politika/17858337; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/27/mid-rf-nazval-usloviya-dlya-dostizheniya-mira-ukraina[30] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71213[31] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1662425014791032835; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1662176639906660372; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1662176122518249474; https://t.me/ukr_sof/574[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4TtmmwesUhEwWtcgH6K54DpuvQHcxyBknA3zCo4Nmy4keMCGSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Lk1R3ro57JjXv5tDTPXyNHBAoDxjM7bFwxvnWahNSQF2kTw9dcoTXTLdbitjvy2Cl[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87043[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87043[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87043[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/26882[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4TtmmwesUhEwWtcgH6K54DpuvQHcxyBknA3zCo4Nmy4keMCGSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Lk1R3ro57JjXv5tDTPXyNHBAoDxjM7bFwxvnWahNSQF2kTw9dcoTXTLdbitjvy2Cl[38] https://t.me/rybar/47638[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/12779[40] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10371 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/10373[41] https://t.me/readovkanews/59631 ; https://t.me/IronHelmets/194[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4TtmmwesUhEwWtcgH6K54DpuvQHcxyBknA3zCo4Nmy4keMCGSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4TtmmwesUhEwWtcgH6K54DpuvQHcxyBknA3zCo4Nmy4keMCGSl; https://t.me/annamaliar/797[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86998[44] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=780788090361177[45] https://t.me/basurin_e/2104 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/2105 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/2107; https://t.me/rybar/47606 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/59609 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/59611 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/59612 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87006 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/16104 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36709[46] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47956; https://t.me/milinfolive/101320; https://t.me/readovkanews/59627[47] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/19037; https://t.me/rybar/47623; https://t.me/wargonzo/12779; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Lk1R3ro57JjXv5tDTPXyNHBAoDxjM7bFwxvnWahNSQF2kTw9dcoTXTLdbitjvy2Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4TtmmwesUhEwWtcgH6K54DpuvQHcxyBknA3zCo4Nmy4keMCGSl[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4TtmmwesUhEwWtcgH6K54DpuvQHcxyBknA3zCo4Nmy4keMCGSl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid04w5b2G3JWvu9SEZLSrp2wszhNhmnmtLy7WzUtZxFdvRWj592Yb1bWBiq8UJbk1xvl[49] https://t.me/milchronicles/1975; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36712[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bAfbHGBPWQGST7z4Ttm...[51] https://t.me/readovkanews/59636 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/59648; https://t.me/astrapress/28071; https://t.me/rybar/47620; https://t.me/rybar/47635; https://t.me/andriyshTime/10162; https://t.me/berdmisk/3126; https://suspilne dot media/489037-ukrainski-zahisniki-vlucili-po-poziciah-rosian-u-berdansku-na-zaporizzi/; https://t.me/vrogov/9792[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2023; https://t.me/vrogov/9788 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/2131; https://t.me/astrapress/28087[53] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-hotuiut-masshtabni-provokatsii-zi-stvorennia-oseredku-radiatsiinoi-nebezpeky.html[54] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/spetssluzhby-rf-rozpochaly-vtiliuvaty-provokatsiiu-iz-khimichnoiu-zbroieiu.html[55] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/spetssluzhby-rf-rozpochaly-vtiliuvaty-provokatsiiu-iz-khimichnoiu-zbroieiu.html; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-hotuiut-masshtabni-provokatsii-zi-stvorennia-oseredku-radiatsiinoi-nebezpeky.html ;[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Radiological%20Chemical%20False%20Flag%20Warning.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Likely%20Course%20of%20Action%20in%20Ukraine%20Updated%20Course%20of%20Action%20Assessment%20ISW%20CTP%20%282%29.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Ukraine%20Indicators%20Update.pdf; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-warns-russia-use-chemical-weapons-false-flag-operation-ukraine-rcna19391; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-may-use-chemical-weapons-false-flag-attack-not-more-broadly-western-2022-03-11/; https://www.bbc.com/news/61439398[57] https://www.bbc.com/news/61439398; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-update-russia-may-cond...[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023; https://t.me/mod_russia/26874[59] https://t.me/readovkanews/59614 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/59615 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/59716[60] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110722 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112522[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112522[62] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12356[63] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Lk1R3ro57JjXv5tDTPXyNHBAoDxjM7bFwxvnWahNSQF2kTw9dcoTXTLdbitjvy2Cl[65] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/26/baza-i-161-ru-v-rostovskoy-oblasti-ischut-voennyh-sbezhavshih-iz-samoprovozglashennoy-lnr; https://161 dot ru/text/criminal/2023/05/26/72341738/; https://t.me/bazabazon/18003[66] https://t.me/severrealii/17029; https://t.me/radiosvoboda/41531; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2023/05/26/20527346.shtml; https://iz dot ru/1518873/2023-05-26/kalashnikov-soobshchil-o-kratnom-narashchivanii-proizvodstva-dronov[67] https://t.me/severrealii/17029; https://t.me/radiosvoboda/41531; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2023/05/26/20527346.shtml; https://iz dot ru/1518873/2023-05-26/kalashnikov-soobshchil-o-kratnom-narashchivanii-proizvodstva-dronov[68] https://t.me/vchkogpu/38720 ; https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1662158333564813326?s=20[69] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1214[70] https://suspilne dot media/488617-rosia-gotue-udar-po-zaporizkij-aes-predstavniki-rdk-ta-legionu-svoboda-rosii-lisautsa-v-rf-458-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1685199963&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[71] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/822; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9711[72] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/822; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9711[73] https://t.me/modmilby/28230
- — Iran Update, May 26, 2023
- at 5/26/23 9:36pmAshka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, and Kitaneh FitzpatrickThe Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.[Correction: A previous version of yesterday’s text incorrectly stated the Popular Mobilization Forces' (PMF's) total budget would increase by about 458 billion USD. The correct text is that the PMF's total budget would increase by about 458 million USD. We have updated the text to fix this error.]Key Takeaways1. Saudi media reported Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) is preparing to target US forces in Syria, which likely misrepresents the threat LH poses.2. Iran has increasingly engaged in prisoner exchanges with Western countries in recent weeks, likely to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations. Iran could be signaling its interest in nuclear diplomacy to preempt US or Israeli military action against its nuclear facilities.Iranian Activities in the LevantThis section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.Saudi media reported Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) is preparing to target US forces in Syria, which likely misrepresents the threat LH poses. Al Hadath Media reported on May 24 that LH’s special forces Golan Unit conducted a military exercise near Al Dumayr, Damascus in preparation to attack US forces in Syria.[1] Al Hadath Media reported the Golan Unit trained with tanks and medium arms, suggesting they would conduct a ground attack on US forces. Such an attack runs counter to the Golan Unit’s covert objectives. The Golan Unit operates in the Golan Heights and not in the vicinity of US forces in Syria. Al Hadath correctly mentioned that Musa Ali Daqduq, who is a US Specially Designated Global Terrorist, heads the Golan Unit.[2] Daqduq planned numerous attacks against Coalition Forces in Iraq and was responsible for forming and arming militias loyal to Iran in Iraq, such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, which suggests he is responsible for proxy development rather than commanding mechanized forces.[3] Neither Iranian nor Iranian-affiliated media outlets have reported on the Golan Unit military exercise near Damascus. Iranian and LH media have covered similar exercises, however. Iranian and LH media extensively covered LH’s recent military exercise in southern Lebanon on May 21.[4] US forces were able to defeat a Kremlin-affiliated Wagner Group mechanized ground attack in 2018, which demonstrates US capabilities to counter such an attack.[5]Iranian Domestic AffairsThis section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here. Iran has increasingly engaged in prisoner exchanges with Western countries in recent weeks, likely to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations. Iran exchanged four prisoners with Belgium, France, and Ireland between May 12 to May 26, for the first time since 2019.[6] Iran previously engaged in prisoner exchanges with Western countries in 2016 and 2019 to encourage nuclear negotiations. Recent prisoner exchanges coincided with other recent acts that signal Iran’s willingness to resume negotiations, including rhetorical messaging, diplomatic meetings, and pressure tactics.[7]Iran could be signaling its interest in nuclear diplomacy to preempt US or Israeli military action against its nuclear facilities. Axios reported on May 17 that the US and Israel are discussing joint military planning for taking action against Iran’s nuclear program.[8] Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi warned on May 23 that Israel would strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.[9] Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi separately stated that Israel is capable of attacking Iran’s underground nuclear facilities on May 23.[10] Tehran has historically sought to prevent a consensus from emerging between the US and allies on taking military action against Iranian nuclear facilities.[1] https://twitter.com/AlHadath/status/1661395379097591808?s=20[2] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1775[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/timeline-ali-mussa-daqduq[4] https://www.almayadeen (dot) net/news/politics/%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87:-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%85; https://almanar (dot) com.lb/10644218[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-r...[6] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85122714https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/02/22/2893593https://www.irna dot ir/news/85109166[7] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/719820https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020303000973https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-05/news/iaea-begins-reinstall-cameras-iranhttps://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/03/04/2900919https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-8-2023[8] https://www.axios.com/2023/05/17/israel-us-military-planning-iran[9] https://allisrael.com/top-israeli-defense-officials-warn-iran-s-nuclear-progress-could-trigger-israeli-strike#:~:text=Tehran's%20nuclear%20facilities.-,Israel%20Defense%20Forces%20Chief%2Dof%2DStaff%20Lt.%2DGen,the%20path%20to%20nuclear%20capabilities.[10] https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-nuclear-netanyahu-bunker-buster-1...
- — Iran Update, May 24, 2023
- at 5/26/23 7:32pmAndie Parry, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, and Kitaneh FitzpatrickThe Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.Key Takeaways1. Iran has transferred unsophisticated air defense weapons to Syria, possibly to protect advanced weapons shipments and IRGC Quds Force commanders from Israeli drone strikes.2. The Raisi administration is pursuing greater economic cooperation with Indonesia, which could help Iran evade sanctions by transporting oil to China via Indonesia.3. Media reports discussing former Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani may reflect an intra-regime struggle over Shamkhani’s future political trajectory.Iranian Activities in the LevantThis section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.Iran has transferred unsophisticated air defense weapons to Syria, possibly to protect advanced weapons shipments and IRGC Quds Force commanders from Israeli drone strikes. Iranian shipments of advanced air defense equipment and precision guided munitions that arrived in Syria through the Albu Kamal border crossing in Deir ez Zor Province were the targets of Israeli drone strikes in February and March, as CTP previously reported.[1] Israeli drone strikes also killed IRGC Quds Force Commanders in Damascus and Deir ez Zor.[2] Iran and Iranian-backed militias delivered man portable air defense systems (MANPADs) to Al Mayadeen, Deir ez Zor Province in April 20, as CTP also reported.[3] Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) also reinforced areas around the Albu Kamal border area with 12.7 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns on May 23.[4] MANPADs and anti-aircraft machine guns are less capable of defending Iranian positions in Syria than the surface-to-air missile systems Iran seeks to transfer to Syria, but are suitable for use against drones.[5] Iran’s transfer of MANPADs and anti-aircraft machine guns has not prompted Israeli airstrikes or drone strikes against Iranian convoys or positions in Deir ez Zor. Iranian Domestic AffairsThis section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.The Raisi administration is pursuing greater economic cooperation with Indonesia, which could help Iran evade sanctions by transporting oil to China via Indonesia. President Ebrahim Raisi headed a delegation to Jakarta, Indonesia on May 23, marking the first official visit of an Iranian president to Indonesia since 2006.[6] Raisi emphasized Iran’s readiness to increase energy, oil and gas, and petrochemical cooperation with Indonesia during a meeting with reporters on May 22.[7] High-ranking Raisi administration and Indonesian officials separately signed 11 energy, pharmaceutical, petrochemical, and technology cooperation agreements in Jakarta on May 23.[8] Indonesia’s location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans makes it an advantageous partner for Iran to transport oil to China, the main destination of Iranian oil exports.[9] Raisi’s trip to Indonesia follows the conclusion of 15 cooperation agreements between Syria and Iran on May 3 and Russia's agreement to partially finance the construction of Iran’s Rasht-Astara railway on May 17.[10]Media reports discussing former Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani may reflect an intra-regime struggle over Shamkhani’s future political trajectory. The UK-based outlet Middle East Eye reported that Shamkhani sought to finalize a nuclear agreement prior to his departure to boost his popularity as a future presidential candidate, citing hardline sources.[11] CTP cannot verify this report, and such claims should be viewed with skepticism. Hardline, Iran-based outlet Kayhan contrastingly claimed that Shamkhani opposed finalizing a nuclear deal as recently as 2020, which suggests it seeks to prevent spreading the impression that senior regime officials are enthusiastic about reviving the nuclear deal.[12] Shamkhani’s experience as SNSC secretary positions him to run for high political office, as all former SNSC secretaries have previously done. Ali Larijani was the parliament speaker from 2008 to 2020 and Hassan Rouhani was Iran’s president from 2013 to 2020. Not all SNSC secretaries have been successful, however. Saeed Jalili ran for president in 2013 and 2021 but was not elected. [1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-7-2023[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-7-2023[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-21-2023[4] https://eyeofeuphrates [dot] com/ar/news/2023/05/24/8606[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-7-2023[6] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020302000356[7] https://president dot ir/fa/144208[8] https://president dot ir/fa/144238[9] https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-ramps-up-oil-exports-as-china-pulls-back-on-russian-oil-11651142115[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-17-2023 ;https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-updates-may-3-2023[11] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-shamkhani-outgoing-security-chief-planning-bid-presidency[12] https://t dot co/puwiYIojPp
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 26, 2023
- at 5/26/23 6:35pmRiley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason ClarkMay 26, 2023, 6:45pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on May 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces continue to hand over positions in Bakhmut to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and withdraw from the city. Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 26 that the MoD is fulfilling its agreement by actively deploying regular Russian units to Wagner-held positions in Bakhmut city.[1] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner is conducting an organized withdrawal from Bakhmut and reiterated that the Russian MoD will fully control the city and its surrounding areas by June 1.[2] A Russian milblogger published footage of Prigozhin visiting Russian rear positions where Wagner forces are allegedly withdrawing to.[3] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of regular Russian forces taking up Wagner positions in Bakhmut itself or that Wagner is leaving the city. ISW has recently observed footage purporting to show elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 123rd Brigade, likely previously deployed near Siversk, operating in the Bakhmut area, and DNR forces may be replacing Wagner formations.[4]Ukrainian sources claim that Wagner forces are still present in Bakhmut and that the tempo of Russian offensive operations around the city continues to decrease. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that regular Russian units have replaced Wagner units in Bakhmut’s suburbs, likely referring to areas on the flanks around Bakhmut.[5] Malyar claimed that Ukrainian forces still control positions on the southwestern outskirts of the city and that Wagner forces are still present in Bakhmut city itself.[6] Ukrainian sources continue to report that the tempo of Russian offensive operations around Bakhmut has declined since the claimed Russian capture of the city.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bakhmut and in the direction of Predtechyne (15km southwest of Bakhmut) on May 26.[8]Continued successful limited Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks may complicate the Russian relief in place operation in Bakhmut. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[9] A prominent milblogger claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka caused elements of the “Veterany” private military company (PMC) to retreat up to a kilometer from their previously held positions in the area.[10] Milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces captured elevated positions along the E40 (Bakhmut to Slovyansk) highway near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and that fighting is ongoing in the area.[11] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Klishchiivka and crossed the Siverskyi Donets Canal, possibly threatening to encircle the settlement and force Russian forces to retreat towards the east.[12] Geolocated footage published on May 24 and 25 indicates that Russian forces likely regained limited positions west of Klishchiivka, however.[13] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may struggle to conduct a relief in place of Wagner forces in Bakhmut, and successful limited and localized Ukrainian counterattacks will likely complicate their ability to do so.[14] The decreased tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Bakhmut area and the reported ongoing relief in place operation are likely further providing Ukrainian forces in the area the initiative to launch a new phase of operations around the city if they so choose.[15]Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile and drone strike across Ukraine on May 25 and 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched ten Kh-101/555 air-based cruise missiles at Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and launched eight S-300/400 anti-aircraft guided missiles at Dnipro City.[16] Russian forces also reportedly launched 31 Shahed-131/136 drones from the southern and northern directions on the night of May 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed all ten Kh-101/555 missiles and 23 Shahed-131/136 drones.[17] The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Ruslan Kravchenko stated that Russian forces have conducted 13 missile attacks on Kyiv Oblast since beginning of May.[18] Ukrainian sources reported that the Russian forces struck a civilian hospital and residential buildings in Dnipro in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[19]The Kremlin is likely reviving its information campaign to coerce the West into forcing Ukraine to accept concessions and negotiate on terms favorable to Russia. The Kremlin claimed on May 26 that Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed “the openness of the Russian side to dialogue on the political and diplomatic track, which is still blocked by Kyiv and its Western sponsors” in a phone call with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.[20] Putin’s statement does not indicate that Russia is interested in pursuing negotiations with Ukraine, and the Kremlin has not established any serious grounds for negotiations nor abandoned its maximalist goals to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Kremlin is likely attempting to intensify its false claims about its readiness to negotiate with Ukraine amidst the arrival of the Chinese Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui in Moscow on May 26 to discuss a negotiated settlement to Russia’s war in Ukraine.[21] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Li previously urged European officials to end the conflict in Ukraine before it escalates during his visit to European states in the past week.[22] The WSJ also reported that a (likely European, but unspecified) diplomat who spoke to Li explained that freezing the conflict was not beneficial to international interests and that Europe would not withdraw its support for Ukraine. The WSJ also reported that another (likely European, but unspecified) diplomat claimed that China’s main interests are ensuring Russian victory and ensuring that Russia does not use nuclear weapons. The claimed interaction likely indicates that China may be attempting to push the West to influence Ukraine into accepting a ceasefire. The Kremlin is likely amplifying its false interests in negotiations ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive in order to discourage continued Western aid to Ukraine. ISW has previously reported on Russia’s peace negotiation information operations to deter Western support for Ukraine.[23]The Wagner Group reportedly exchanged 106 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) for an unspecified number of Russian POWs on May 25, suggesting that Wagner may have conducted the exchange independently of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin published footage on May 25 showing Wagner forces conducting the exchange of Ukrainian POWs and Russian POWs.[24] Separate geolocated footage published on May 25 indicates that the exchange occurred near Bakhmut.[25] Ukrainian sources reported on May 25 that Ukraine received 98 soldiers and eight officers in the exchange.[26] Russian sources did not specify the number of returned Russian personnel but claimed that some were from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet and unspecified Chechen Akhmat formations.[27] ISW previously reported that Wagner has purportedly conducted a prisoner exchange without the Russian MoD’s involvement.[28]Key TakeawaysWagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces continue to hand over positions in Bakhmut to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and withdraw from the city.Ukrainian sources claim that Wagner forces are still present in Bakhmut and that the tempo of Russian offensive operations around the city continues to decrease.Continued successful limited Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks may complicate the Russian relief in place operation in Bakhmut.Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile and drone strike across Ukraine on May 25 and 26.The Kremlin is likely reviving its information campaign to coerce the West into forcing Ukraine to accept concessions and negotiate on terms favorable to Russia.The Wagner Group reportedly exchanged 106 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) for an unspecified number of Russian POWs on May 25, suggesting that Wagner may have conducted the exchange independently of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front.Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine.Russian officials are continuing to form new volunteer formations to defend Russian regions that border Ukraine.Russian occupation officials continuing attempts to erase Ukrainian cultural heritage by looting Ukrainian artifacts.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsActivities in Russian-occupied areasRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 26. Geolocated footage published on May 25 indicates that Russian forces likely made marginal advances north of Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove).[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka, Kharkiv Oblast (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (12km south of Kreminna) on May 26.[30] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are attempting to capture positions in the Kupyansk direction to launch future offensive operations.[31] Malyar also stated that Russian forces conducted a 24-hour tactical pause in the Kreminna area.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the east bank of the Zherebets River in the Kreminna area and south of Kreminna in the Serebrianska forest area.[33]Ukrainian Severodonetsk Military Administration Head Oleksandr Stryuk stated that Russian forces still maintain a large military presence in the Severodonetsk area.[34] Stryuk added that Russian forces are not diverting their units in Luhansk Oblast to reinforce the Russian-Ukrainian international border following the pro-Ukrainian Russian raid on Belgorod Oblast.[35]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Click here to read ISW’s new retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.See topline text for Bakhmut.Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Krasnohorivka (unclear whether the Krasnohorivka north or southwest of Avdiivka) and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults on the southwestern approaches to Avdiivka and near Novokalynove (12km northwest of Avdiivka).[37] The Ukrainian Border Guards Service reported that Russian forces used chemical weapons in the Avdiivka area but did not specify what kind.[38]Russian forces destroyed a dam west of Avdiivka on May 25. Geolocated footage published on May 25 shows that a Russian strike destroyed the Karlivskyi Reservoir dam near Karlivka (19km west of Avdiivka), causing flooding downstream.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck the dam with a S-300 missile.[40] Ukrainian Donetsk Military Administration Head Pavlo Kyrylenko stated that the destruction of the dam threatens to flood areas near Halytsynivka (22km west of Avdiivka) and Zhelanne (24km northwest of Avdiivka).[41] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used a road across the reservoir to support logistics towards Pisky (9km southwest of Avdiivka) and that subsequent flooding could impact Kurakhove (38km southwest of Avdiivka) and Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka), further disrupting Ukrainian logistics in the area.[42] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that flooding will not cause critical damage to Ukrainian logistics, however.[43]Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 26.[44]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued to conduct airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched three KAB-500 (a FAB-500 variant) at Beryslav Raion in Kherson Oblast.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted Polohivskyi Raion in Zaporizhia Oblast with FAB-250/500 bombs.[46]Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian-occupied Berdyansk and Melitopol in Zaporizhia Oblast on May 25 and May 26. A geolocated image published on May 25 shows the aftermath of an unspecified strike on Berdyansk.[47] Ukrainian officials reported six explosions on combat kit and fuel warehouses in Berdyansk.[48] Russian sources also claimed that several explosions occurred in Berdyansk and others claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a strike.[49] A Kremlin affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Melitopol on May 26, but did not provide visual proof of this claim.[50]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian officials are continuing to form new volunteer formations to defend Russian regions that border Ukraine. Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovout announced that Kurst Oblast recruited 2,800 volunteers to staff local armed formations.[51] Starovout echoed milblogger complaints that Russian officials need to supply volunteers with necessary weapons to defend Russia’s borders. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Belgorod people’s militias currently defend border checkpoints alongside Russian Internal Ministry’s (MVD) personnel without weapons.[52] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the governor can authorize the purchase of supplies for the regional militias, and claimed that Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov stated that he would be imprisoned if he was to spend the region’s budget on supplies for the volunteers.[53] The Kremlin may be hesitant to authorize deliveries of weapons to border volunteer formations out of concern of wasting weapons that Russia could use in combat operations in Ukraine.Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that there are currently more than 7,000 Chechen fighters operating in Ukraine as of May 26.[54] ISW previously incorrectly estimated that Kadyrov may have up to 25,000 personnel serving in Ukraine based on his original claim that there are seven Chechen regiments and four battalions fighting in the war (and indicating that either these formations are severely under the typical strength of Russian regiments and battalions, or Chechen forces have formed fewer formations than Kadyrov previously claimed).[55] Kadyrov also previously claimed that the “Sever Akhmat” Special Purpose Regiment had 3,300 personnel.[56] Kadyrov also stated on May 26 that more than 26,000 Chechens served in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion, including 12,000 volunteers. Kadyrov added that Chechen officials are actively working with the Russian MoD to form two regiments and have already recruited 2,400 men to staff these units.The Republic of Bashkortostan reportedly formed another volunteer unit and deployed two volunteer units to an unspecified area for combat coordination.[57] A Russian branch of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported that the Republic of Bashkortostan deployed the newly created “Sergei Zorin” tank battalion and “Sharif Suleimanov” anti-aircraft artillery battery for combat coordination.BBC’s Russian Service established the names of 24,005 Russian servicemen who have died in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion.[58] BBC estimated that at least 48,000 Russian servicemen may have died in the war and that Russia may have suffered more than 216,000 casualties in total.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russian occupation officials continuing attempts to erase Ukrainian cultural heritage by looting Ukrainian artifacts. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian officials exhibited 120 artifacts stolen from historical and archeological reserve “Kamyana Mohyla” (Stone Tomb) in Zaporizhia Oblast in the Crimean museum-reserve “Khersones Tavriyskyi.”[59] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russians are stealing valuable paintings from the Berdyansk Art Museum. ISW has previously reported on Russian forces looting the Kherson Art Museum and its branch in Nova Kakhovka.[60]Russian forces continue to intimidate civilians in Russian-occupied territory. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in Novopetrykivka in Donetsk Oblast conducted “counter-sabotage measures” including searching private homes, seizing mobile devise, and stealing possessions of residents.[61]Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin held the annual meeting on “Military Security and Defense of the State” with heads of Minsk City and Belarusian oblasts.[62] Khrenin claimed that Belarusian Territorial Defense units have transformed from support units into combat formations.[63]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1062[2] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1062[3] https://t.me/brussinf/6077; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1057[4] https://t.me/milinfolive/100993 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/25500 ; https://twitter.com/franfran2424/status/1658030266336661504 ; https://twitter.com/franfran2424/status/1658030376957222913[5] https://t.me/annamaliar/796[6] https://t.me/annamaliar/796[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TyvK4eUK1evAWXwLFaEy1zGERX5pV7htfWqBtDJDKaxaWx38haFjHGbs5qqDggQLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0653QoSG5QvAASQxiyeAkY45eHGAYycx8aLvP2FxmpB8MnnVDw8Rmugj4vJEWJko4l ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052323[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TyvK4eUK1evAWXwLFaEy1zGERX5pV7htfWqBtDJDKaxaWx38haFjHGbs5qqDggQLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0653QoSG5QvAASQxiyeAkY45eHGAYycx8aLvP2FxmpB8MnnVDw8Rmugj4vJEWJko4l[9] https://t.me/wargonzo/12751 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86983[10] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86983 ;[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/12751 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86983[12] https://t.me/wargonzo/12751[13] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1661846278924369920?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1657478166665912321?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1661423085541523457?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1661697673177464833?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1661842759223746576?s=20[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2023[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0653QoSG5QvAASQxiyeA...[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0b6QXv875TrkYdRsWVe4... https://www.facebook.com/JointForcesCommandAFU/posts/pfbid0X85m1w1VNTZWB...[18] https://suspilne dot media/487528-zsu-znisili-dva-su-25-rf-dania-ta-niderlandi-ocolili-grupu-z-navcanna-ukrainskih-pilotiv-457-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1685081631&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[19] https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1662021931250462723?s=20; https://t.me/sotaproject/59663; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/26/okupanty-obstrilyaly-medzaklad-u-m-dnipro-rozpochato-rozsliduvannya/[20] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71213[21] https://t.me/rian_ru/203780[22] https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-pushing-ukraine-cease-fire-gets-cool-...[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2023[24] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1051 ;[25] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1661703314608619520?s=20; https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1661703318110912513?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1661708329385619460?s=20 ; https://t.me/riamelitopol/91632[26] https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid0bGZcWyJ7oSrDiocbtytqJbMDbXkcEsXaQH39TTaB1hQnVZqEZfqiwpKuydhY3YLwl ; https://minre.gov dot ua/2023/05/25/z-vorozhogo-polonu-zvilnyly-shhe-106-zahysnykiv-ukrayiny/ ; https://t.me/ermaka2022/2775[27] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1051; https://t.me/rybar/47558[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[29] https://twitter.com/LoLManya/status/1661822958573109248; https://twitter.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1661796251317272592[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0653QoSG5QvAASQxiyeAkY45eHGAYycx8aLvP2FxmpB8MnnVDw8Rmugj4vJEWJko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TyvK4eUK1evAWXwLFaEy1zGERX5pV7htfWqBtDJDKaxaWx38haFjHGbs5qqDggQLl[31] https://t.me/annamaliar/796[32] https://t.me/annamaliar/796[33] https://t.me/rybar/47573[34] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10768; https://suspilne dot media/487528-zsu-znisili-dva-su-25-rf-dania-ta-niderlandi-ocolili-grupu-z-navcanna-ukrainskih-pilotiv-457-den-vijni-onlajn/[35] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10768; https://suspilne dot media/487528-zsu-znisili-dva-su-25-rf-dania-ta-niderlandi-ocolili-grupu-z-navcanna-ukrainskih-pilotiv-457-den-vijni-onlajn/[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TyvK4eUK1evAWXwLFaEy1zGERX5pV7htfWqBtDJDKaxaWx38haFjHGbs5qqDggQLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0653QoSG5QvAASQxiyeAkY45eHGAYycx8aLvP2FxmpB8MnnVDw8Rmugj4vJEWJko4l[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/12751[38] https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid02282Y9z3RMPCKfcNMHx824yqtDCczUrLzPNbshr7nGLZTR35Kzw4cynDi35zttGpil[39] https://t.me/operativnoZSU_chat/149239; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1661809574024806414?s=20[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TyvK4eUK1evAWXwLFaEy1zGERX5pV7htfWqBtDJDKaxaWx38haFjHGbs5qqDggQLl[41] https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/8144[42] https://t.me/basurin_e/2061 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/59542 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/25783 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86991 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21596[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86991[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TyvK4eUK1evAWXwLFaEy1zGERX5pV7htfWqBtDJDKaxaWx38haFjHGbs5qqDggQLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0653QoSG5QvAASQxiyeAkY45eHGAYycx8aLvP2FxmpB8MnnVDw8Rmugj4vJEWJko4l[45] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid032S3crCg56j...[46] https://t.me/milchronicles/1969[47] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1661842679938818056?s=20; https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1661827807658254351?s=20; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1661826234932666368?s=20; https://t.me/vrogov/9766[48] https://suspilne dot media/487528-zsu-znisili-dva-su-25-rf-dania-ta-niderlandi-ocolili-grupu-z-navcanna-ukrainskih-pilotiv-457-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1685080617&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2090[49] https://t.me/basurin_e/2065; https://t.me/readovkanews/59549; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/2006; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47905[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/12751[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86953 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/16097 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/59646[52] https://t.me/sashakots/39912[53] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7754; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7750[54] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3649[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2021%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2021%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf[57] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/32425677.html[58] https://www.bbc.com/russian/live/news-65565851?ns_mchannel=social&ns_sou...[59] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/rosiyany-vyvezly-v-krym-eksponaty-kam-yanoyi-mogyly/[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0653QoSG5QvAASQxiyeA...[62] https://t.me/modmilby/28180; https://t.me/modmilby/28181[63] https://t.me/modmilby/28187
- — Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, May 24, 2023
- at 5/26/23 11:32amAuthors: Brian Carter, Kathryn Tyson, Liam Karr, and Peter MillsData Cutoff: May 24, 2023, at 10 a.m.Key Takeaways:Iraq and Syria. ISIS is attempting to reconstitute itself and rebuild its capabilities in the areas surrounding Baghdad, but it is likely to succeed only north of Baghdad, where local conditions are more advantageous to the group. ISIS can generate local support north of Baghdad by appealing to communities threatened by abuse and harassment from Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias, which have threatened to commit sectarian cleansing against Sunni communities. ISIS attempts to rebuild its capabilities south of the city are enfeebled by long, third-rate supply lines through unpopulated desert. ISIS cells south of the city also suffer from bad operational security and a lack of local support.Mali. Al Qaeda-affiliated militants have escalated its rate of attacks in western Mali since late 2022 to increase its revenue and support its campaign to degrade Malian lines of communication around the Malian capital. The militants may be trying to increase its ties with illicit networks in western Mali to strengthen its position in the area, which could create opportunities to spread its insurgency to neighboring countries in the future.Somalia. Somali-US drone strikes targeting al Shabaab leadership may temporarily weaken the group’s capabilities but will not disrupt al Shabaab’s regional threat. The al Shabaab network will continue organizing regional attacks from its havens in southern Somalia in the absence of effective Somali ground operations that degrade the group’s havens regardless of who is overseeing its activity. The lack of flood-prevention efforts in central Somalia despite international funds for such projects is a microcosm of how government mismanagement will continue to present al Shabaab opportunities to undo the few military setbacks it suffers.Afghanistan. The Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES) inspector general released the 2023 report for January–March 2023, which omits the threat Salafi-jihadi groups pose to US and Western interests in Afghanistan. The report’s purpose is to highlight Salafi-jihadi threats to US interests outside Afghanistan and the US homeland, but these groups also challenge Western interests in the country. The report rightly describes how these groups have benefited from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.Water shortages are driving increased tensions between Iran and the Taliban. Reduced water flow from Afghanistan to Iran will undermine Iranian regime stability. Iran is unlikely to escalate the crisis and risk destabilizing Afghanistan.Assessments:Figure 1. ISIS Activity and Counterinsurgent Operation in the Northern Baghdad BeltsSource: Brian Carter.Iraq and Syria. ISIS is attempting to reconstitute itself and rebuild capabilities in the areas north and south of Baghdad, but it is likely to succeed only in the north, where local conditions are advantageous and ISIS can more adequately find support among the population and resupply its cells.[1] The areas around the city are a series of semi-urban and agricultural communities called the Baghdad Belts, which al Qaeda in Iraq and ISIS have historically used to launch attacks into the capital.[2] The northern Belt, including Tarmiyah, a key Sunni town, remains a permissive environment for ISIS’s influence due to the impact of Iranian-backed Shi’a militia calls for sectarian cleansing of Tarmiyah.[3]ISIS has already begun setting conditions to take advantage of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia sectarian cleansing of Tarmiyah, writing that the militias seek to “extend [Iranian-backed militia] influence over [Tarmiyah], steal [Tarmiyah’s] wealth, and displace [Tarmiyah’s] people.”[4] Similar dynamics exist in the southern Baghdad Belts, where Iranian-backed Iraqi militias committed acts of sectarian cleansing in Jurf al Sakhr. ISIS cells in the southern Belts suffer from poor resourcing, bad operational security, and a reliance on a long, third-rate supply line through unpopulated and rough desert terrain.[5]Iranian-backed militias and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) frequently disrupt ISIS attacks in northern Babil province, where ISIS and its predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, had historic support zones.[6] The militias’ consistent disruption of attacks suggests a lack of ISIS operational security and safe areas from which the group can mount operations. CTP has not observed any ISIS support activities or efforts by ISIS to create support zones, which would be required for ISIS to reconstitute in the southern Belts.ISIS cells in Tarmiyah are resourced and resilient, relative to ISIS cells south of Baghdad. ISIS is resourcing this effort using support zones in Wadi al Tharthar and the northern Anbar desert to support operations north of Baghdad. The group has mounted attacks aimed at enabling ISIS freedom of movement through this area by destroying thermal cameras and attacking Iraqi bases along the Tigris River.[7] ISIS is already slowly reconstituting itself in northern Baghdad after a series of ISF clearing operations in February and March 2023 forced a temporary ISIS pause in the area.[8] ISIS resumed operations targeting local armed actors in early May after a two-month pause by assassinating an alleged anti-ISIS spy, a local tribal militia leader, and a local Sunni militia patrol.[9] This trend illustrates Iraqi forces’ inability to interdict the ISIS supplies and cells that reenter the area after clearing operations to rebuild ISIS capabilities in the area.Figure 2. ISIS Ground Lines of Communication in Western IraqSource: Brian Carter.The ISIS presence and ground lines of communication from Syrian regime-controlled south-central Syria through western Anbar province still represent a long-term threat to the southern Baghdad Belts and Iraq. ISIS is strongest in central Syria, and the Syrian regime is struggling to check ISIS’s ambition there. ISIS could use the unpopulated support areas it operates in western Anbar to gradually roll back ISF forces controlling more effective ground lines of communication to better resource ISIS cells if the ISF became distracted by a political crisis or other priorities. ISF operations typically dip during periods of unrest in Iraq.[10]ISIS controls unpopulated territory in Wadi Doubayat in regime-controlled Syria, from which it can move forces deeper into Syria or across the border into Iraq. CTP has not observed Iraqi forces making a concerted effort to stop ISIS cross-border movement, and ISIS has targeted Iraqi outposts on the border to help enable the group’s movements.[11] ISIS also has agreements with Iran-backed militias to permit ISIS movements across the border.[12] Iraqi special operations forces raided a major ISIS camp in Wadi Houran in February, indicating a sizable ISIS presence in the Anbar deserts.[13]Figure 3. ISIS Ground Lines of Communication in Northern IraqSource: Brian Carter.Disputed Internal Boundaries. ISIS is maintaining ground lines of communication into the disputed internal boundaries (DIB), where the group has support zones that it will likely use to reinforce cells in Diyala province. ISIS fighters in April and May targeted thermal cameras at three Iraqi bases near the DIBs.[14] These cameras help Iraqi forces disrupt ISIS movement. ISIS will use the disruption to enable the group’s freedom of movement into the DIBs, where the group has limited support zones it can use to rest, resupply, and move forces to new areas, such as Diyala province.[15] Diyala has a diverse population, which has historically allowed ISIS and its predecessors to generate support by cultivating Sunni-Shi’a tension.[16]Figure 4. The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in the Middle EastSource: Kathryn Tyson.Mali. Al Qaeda–affiliated JNIM has increased its rate of attacks in western Mali since late 2022, likely to increase its revenue and degrade Malian lines of communication around the capital. JNIM has carried out three attacks in western Mali in May, equaling its yearly average since it became active in western Mali’s Kayes region in 2019. JNIM has conducted seven attacks in western Mali since December 2022. Three attacks in Kayes since November targeted customs posts close to the Malian-Mauritanian border.[17] JNIM loots money and weapons from the customs posts and could be coordinating the attacks with smugglers involved in the illicit gold, drug, arms, or human trafficking networks that use routes connecting western Mali to coastal West Africa.[18] Al Qaeda–linked militants have historically been part of a similar crime-terror nexus in northern Mali where they tax or provide paid protection along regional smuggling routes.[19] Four other JNIM attacks since November 2022 targeting Malian security forces near roads leading to Mali’s capital are part of an ongoing JNIM campaign likely aimed at degrading Malian lines of communication.[20]JNIM may be trying to increase ties with the illicit networks in western Mali to strengthen its position in the area, which could create opportunities to spread its insurgency to coastal West Africa in the future. Al Qaeda–linked militants previously used illicit Sahelian networks to better integrate themselves into local communities, improving the organization’s ability to expand throughout the Sahel.[21] JNIM could seek to replicate a similar strategy in western Mali. Transnational crime networks in western Mali run into coastal West Africa, including Guinea, Mauritania, and Senegal.[22] Al Qaeda–linked militants use smuggling networks to move personnel and assets into North Africa but have not used smuggling routes to support operations in coastal West Africa.[23]Al Qaeda and the Mauritanian government may have a nonaggression pact that would decrease the likelihood of JNIM expansion into Mauritania. Internal al Qaeda documents show that its regional leadership discussed a deal with the Mauritanian government in 2010, and al Qaeda–linked militants have not attacked in Mauritania since 2011.[24] However, al Qaeda threatened Mauritania in 2018, and Mauritania is leading efforts to revitalize regional counterterrorism cooperation after Mali withdrew from the regional counterterrorism bloc in May 2022.[25] There are also many Mauritanians in JNIM that could return to Mauritania if al Qaeda gives more priority to the country.[26] Four al Qaeda–linked jihadists briefly escaped from prison and killed two guards in the Mauritanian capital in March 2023, underscoring that al Qaeda’s regional network remains a threat to Mauritania.[27]Figure 5. JNIM Increases Attacks in Southern and Western MaliSource: Liam Karr.Somalia. Somali-US drone strikes targeting al Shabaab leadership may temporarily weaken the group’s capabilities without disrupting al Shabaab’s regional threat. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) and US Africa Command conducted a drone strike that wounded al Shabaab’s external operations head Moalim Osman in southern Somalia on May 22.[28] Osman oversees foreign fighter recruitment and helps plan attacks in Kenya and Ethiopia.[29] Al Shabaab is a networked, decentralized organization that has no single point of failure and will continue to recruit from ethnically Somali areas of Ethiopia and Kenya using local grievances and social networks regardless of who is overseeing the operations.[30]The al Shabaab network will continue organizing its regional insurgency from southern Somalia in the absence of effective SFG-led ground operations that degrade its havens. The group governs significant portions of southern Somalia, where it levies taxes and has military infrastructure.[31] The SFG has continually delayed a planned offensive in southern Somalia due to seasonal flooding and a lack of local and international support that it says will eventually retake these havens.[32] CTP has previously assessed that this potential offensive is unlikely to clear these al Shabaab–controlled areas due to strong al Shabaab resistance and that it will be almost impossible for the SFG to hold any gains over the following years due to a lack of adequate holding forces.[33]Killing the al Shabaab leadership will also have unintended consequences on internal al Shabaab divisions. The May 22 strike could have impacted the balance of a rumored split between al Shabaab’s Somali fighters and foreign fighters due to Osman’s large role in foreign fighter recruitment.[34] This factional divide is increasingly important given the multiyear rumors that the al Shabaab emir is in poor health and was briefly incapacitated in 2020.[35] The strongest faction will chart the group’s future and dictate who becomes the next emir.Central Somalia Floods. Recent floods in central Somalia underscore that addressing government mismanagement will be key to preventing al Shabaab from returning to newly liberated villages in central Somalia. Somali forces liberated dozens of villages across central Somalia in 2022 and 2023, including numerous settlements along the Shabelle River Valley, where floods displaced at least 245,000 people in May.[36] Climate change is likely making these floods more common, as flooding on a similar scale happened in 2020.[37] Italy donated $6 million to fund state government–led flood-prevention efforts after the 2020 floods, but the state government never implemented any projects.[38]The central Somalia offensive has improved the security situation to the point where implementing climate resilient development is more possible, but the local and federal government will need to use international funding effectively. Mismanaged disasters will likely increase apathy or frustration with the government and prompt mass migration that al Shabaab can exploit to reestablish itself in the newly liberated areas.[39]Figure 6. The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in AfricaSource: Kathryn Tyson.Figure 7. TTP Activity in AfghanistanSource: Peter Mills.Figure 8. TTP Activity in Khost-Paktika, AfghanistanSource: Peter Mills.Figure 9. TTP Activity in Kunar Province, AfghanistanSource: Peter Mills.Afghanistan. The OES inspector general released the 2023 first quarter report for January–March 2023, which omits the threat Salafi-jihadi groups pose to US and Western interests in Afghanistan.[40] The purpose of the report is to highlight Salafi-jihadi threats to US interests outside of Afghanistan and the US homeland, but these groups also challenge US and Western interests in the country.The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have hindered US diplomatic engagement in Afghanistan. US embassies limited travel by diplomatic staff in December 2022 and February 2023 due to TTP and ISKP threats and attacks.[41] The previous US embassy restriction on staff in Pakistan due to a terror threat was in 2019. [Read Kathryn Tyson and Katie Zimmerman’s latest piece on Salafi-jihadi threats to US embassies.[42]]The TTP and ISKP also threaten broader Western interests in Pakistan. Dozens of TTP militants attacked security guards and damaged a Hungarian-owned oil site in northwestern Pakistan on May 23.[43] The UN closed an office in Islamabad due to an ISKP threat after protestors burned a Quran in Sweden in February 2023.[44] The Swedish embassy in Islamabad closed indefinitely in April due to security concerns likely related to ISKP threats over the Quran incident.[45]The report rightly describes how ISKP and the TTP have grown stronger in the past year. Both groups have benefited from the August 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan because the Afghan Taliban has been unable to effectively combat them.The Taliban lacks the intelligence capabilities to preemptively disrupt ISKP attacks. The Taliban have killed high-level ISKP leaders in 2023, but the killings fail to address ISKP supporters within the Taliban government and intelligence services.[46] The report also describes Taliban counter-ISKP operations as using “brute force,” which marginalizes civilians and increases support for anti-Taliban groups, including ISKP.[47] ISKP seeks to exploit weak security under the Taliban to attack US and Western interests abroad, and could carry out such an attack within the next six months, according to the report.The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan has also benefited the TTP in Pakistan. The OES report said that the majority of TTP fighters reside in Afghanistan. The Taliban continues to tolerate the TTP’s presence in the country, meaning the TTP threat will likely worsen.[48] The Taliban has repeatedly denied that the TTP operates out of Afghanistan, despite the killings of senior TTP leaders in the country.[49]Afghanistan-Iran. A worsening water dispute between Iran and the Taliban may exacerbate water shortages that undermine regime stability in Iran. Both Iran and Afghanistan are experiencing drought, which is driving a zero-sum competition for shared water resources.[50] Senior Taliban leaders denied Iran’s request for more water and claimed they cannot release any more water due to drought.[51] The Taliban is attempting to increase the amount of water available to local farmers by building a new dam in western Afghanistan.[52] Water shortages are one of the drivers of anti-regime protests in Iran.[53]Iran is unlikely to escalate or attempt to destabilize Afghanistan because of the tensions over water supplies. A destabilized Afghanistan would risk an influx of Afghan refugees and drugs into Iran. Iran and the Taliban’s deputy chiefs of staff for the armed forces met to discuss border issues on May 20, which indicates ongoing military cooperation.[54] Iranian state media framed these talks as delivering an unspecified warning to the Taliban.[55]Taliban Internal Politics. The Taliban supreme leader appointed a new Taliban prime minister to manage the internal Taliban government tensions with the Haqqani Network, which is unlikely to change Taliban policies toward the TTP. The Taliban supreme leader replaced former Taliban Prime Minister Hassan Akhund with Abdul Kabir on May 16.[56] Akhund had health problems throughout 2022 and had previously tried to resign as prime minister.[57] Kabir is from the Zadran Pashtun tribe from Paktia Province—sharing local and tribal ties with the Haqqani Network leadership. The Taliban supreme leader may use Kabir to divide the Haqqani Network’s Zadran support base and manage tensions between the supreme leader and the Haqqani Network over the distribution of power within the Taliban government.[58] Both the Haqqani Network and the Taliban supreme leader have offered rhetorical support for the TTP.[59]Figure 10. The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Central and South Asia Source: Kathryn Tyson.[1] https://www.alahednews dot com.lb/fastnewsdetails.php?fstid=192402; https://zagrosnews dot net/ar/news/40676; https://www.ina dot iq/181009--.html; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%87%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/region/baghdad-belts#:~:text=The%20Baghdad%20belts%20are%20residential,to%20the%20rest%20of%20Iraq[3] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/jurf-al-sakhar-model-militias-debate-how-carve-out-new-enclave-north-baghdad[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-27-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-22-2023[5] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-militias-transformed-town-secret-prison-says-mp; https://diyaruna dot com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_di/features/2020/02/17/feature-01[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraq-update-34-data-suggests-rise-violence-along-historic-fault-lines[7] ISIS claims available on request.[8] https://www.alahednews dot com.lb/fastnewsdetails.php?fstid=192402; https://zagrosnews dot net/ar/news/40676; https://www.ina dot iq/181009--.html; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%87%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9[9] ISIS claims available on request.[10] https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/21/2003119338/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTO...[11] Author’s research; sources and ISIS claims available on request.[12] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/12/syrian-rebels-kill-caliph-attacks-continue-iraq-syria[13] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/03/500-fighters-still-active-iraq-military#ixzz7vmFREkYf [14] Author’s research; ISIS claims available on request.[15] Author’s research. [16] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/Security%20Diyala%20-%20Iraq%20Report%2010.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Lewis-Diyala.pdf[17] http://malijet dot com/actualite-politique-au-mali/flash-info/275019-region-de-kayes-le-camp-militaire-et-la-douane-de-yelimane-attaq.html; https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1658076898197487616?s=20; https://twitter.com/Wamaps_news/status/1660620772212105216?s=20[18] https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/west-africas-cocaine-corridor; https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Human-smuggling-and-trafficking-ecosystems-MALI.pdf; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-western-mali-could-become-a-gold-mine-for-terrorists; https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta_sahel/TOCTA_Sahel_firearms_2023.pdf[19] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/AQIMs-Imperial-Playbook.pdf; https://africacenter.org/publication/puzzle-jnim-militant-islamist-groups-sahel; https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/jnim-burkina-faso[20] https://twitter.com/SimNasr/status/1600758655900876800; https://www.barrons.com/articles/policeman-killed-in-jihadist-torn-mali-01673278808; https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1651218022206406668?t=WehSbEp_dATHN8DeH5mFbQ&s=19; https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1656233886748164096?s=20; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-april-5-2023[21] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/aqims-imperial-playbook-understanding-al-qaida-in-the-islamic-maghrebs-expansion-into-west-africa[22] https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/west-africas-cocaine-corridor; https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-trafficking-in-persons-report/senegal; https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Human-smuggling-and-trafficking-ecosystems-MALI.pdf; https://www.unodc.org/res/som/docs/Observatory_StoryMap_3_NorthWestAfrica.pdf; https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/maritime-irregular-migration-canary-islands[23] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2425320/lassoing-the-haboob-countering-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin-in-mali-part-i; https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta_sahel/TOCTA_Sahel_som_2023.pdf[24] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-binladen-mauritania-idUSKCN0W356G; https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230306-four-jihadists-escape-in-deadly-prison-break-in-mauritania; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/renewed-jihadi-terror-threat-mauritania[25] https://www.africaintelligence.com/west-africa/2023/05/22/nouakchott-s-plans-to-revive-g5-sahel,109976362-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/west-africa/2023/03/09/ghazouani-strives-to-get-bamako-back-into-g5-sahel,109921827-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/west-africa/2023/03/09/ghazo; https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-g5-sahel-3; https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-g5-sahel-3https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-...[26] https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230306-four-jihadists-escape-in-deadly-prison-break-in-mauritania; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/renewed-jihadi-terror-threat-mauritania[27] https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230306-four-jihadists-escape-in-deadly-prison-break-in-mauritania[28] https://www.voanews.com/a/us-says-al-shabab-leader-injured-in-airstrike-/7105705.html[29] https://www.voanews.com/a/us-says-al-shabab-leader-injured-in-airstrike-/7105705.html[30] See paragraph 4-103 in https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_24.pdf; https://library.au.int/how-do-individuals-join-al-shabaab-ethnographic-insight-recruitment-models-al-shabaab-network-kenya; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/kenyas-muslim-youth-center-and-al-shababs-east-african-recruitment[31] https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/al-shabaab-tax; https://hiraalinstitute.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Al-Shabaabs-Arsenal-From-Taxes-to-Terror-Web.pdf[32] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-april-12-2023[33] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-may-10-2023#Somalia20230510[34] https://garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/al-shabab-infighting-escalates-attack-on-senior-foreign-leader-s-house-in-jilib-city[35] https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaab-faces-leadership-battle-as-speculation-over-emirs-health-mounts; https://www.garoweonline dot com/index.php/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-leader-hands-over-to-deputy-amid-ill-health-speculations; https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf[36] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b187-sustaining-gains-somalias-offensive-against-al-shabaab; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/17/city-underwater-quarter-of-million-somalians-flee-homes-floods; https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/18/africa/somalia-flooding-displaced-intl/index.html; https://apnews.com/article/somalia-flooding-displaced-0b884e92dee5246da716ad9d00886ade[37] https://phys.org/news/2020-05-central-somalia-million-people.html[38] https://sooha dot org/en/2020/08/10/italy-pledges-6-mln-for-flood-prevention-project-in-hirshabelle; https://www.ftlsomalia dot com/italy-has-approved-6m-for-flood-prevention-says-hirshabelle-president; https://twitter.com/DhaqaneDK/status/1657037034597367813?s=20[39] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/17/city-underwater-quarter-of-million-somalians-flee-homes-floods[40] https://www.dodig.mil/In-the-Spotlight/Article/3396442/lead-inspector-general-for-operation-enduring-sentinel-january-1-2023-march-31[41] https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2022/12/pakistan-us-embassy-prohibits-staff-from-visiting-mariott-hotel-in-islamabad-as-of-dec-25; https://pk.usembassy.gov/security-alert-terrorist-attack-in-peshawar[42] https://www.aei.org/op-eds/us-embassies-should-not-cede-space-to-terrorists[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/islamist-militants-kill-six-gas-oil-extraction-plant-pakistan-2023-05-23[44] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/21/turkey-condemns-burning-of-quran-during-far-right-protest-in-sweden; https://twitter.com/nviTweets/status/1623736779944886272[45] https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/04/pakistan-the-swedish-embassy-in-islamabad-closed-indefinitely-as-of-april-11[46] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-1-2023; https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1630657787150712837[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-april-19-2023[48] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2023[49] https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-tell-pakistan-not-to-blame-afghanistan-for-mosque-bombing-/6943345.html; https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-taliban-commanders-killed-abdul-wali/31977631.html[50] https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/afghanistan-iran-disquiet-over-the-helmand-river; https://8am.media/eng/securitization-of-the-water-issue-between-afghanistan-and-iran[51] https://twitter.com/AOP_IEA/status/1659250537793978392; https://twitter.com/IeaOffice/status/1659108148328685569; https://twitter.com/Mukhtarwafayee/status/1660638766682234880[52] https://amu dot tv/en/49166; https://twitter.com/MJalal0093/status/1659863748926898176[53] https://time.com/6239669/iran-protests-water-crisis; https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-prtests-water-cuts/32002848.html[54] https://twitter.com/MoDAfghanistan2/status/1659949595453976580[55] https://www dot independentpersian dot com/node/330251[56] https://twitter.com/TOLOnews/status/1658529606897647618; https://twitter.com/SamiYousafzaii/status/1658334691789774849[57] https://8am dot media/eng/taliban-prime-minister-suffers-from-congestive-heart-failure-disease[58] https://www dot thenationalnews dot com/world/2023/05/22/talibans-cabinet-reshuffle-an-attempt-to-consolidate-power-analysts-say; https://8am dot media/eng/mawlawi-abdul-kabirs-roles-in-afghanistans-political-theater[59] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan; https://twitter.com/FrudBezhan/status/1010547108527661058; https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1618966856672612358
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2023
- at 5/25/23 11:16pmRiley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. KaganMay 24, 2023, 5:30pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 4 pm ET on May 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Discussions regarding reported Russian losses in Bakhmut have saturated the pro-war information space and are drowning out any remaining positive informational effect resulting from the city’s capture. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed during an interview with Russian political strategist Konstantin Dolgov on May 23 that Wagner lost 10,000 convict recruits and 10,000 full-time professional Wagner fighters killed in action over the course of the Battle for Bakhmut.[1] Prigozhin specifically noted that Wagner had recruited 50,000 prisoners, 20 percent of whom (10,000) died in fighting for Bakhmut.[2] Russian milbloggers immediately seized on the reported losses, thereby shifting the overall Russian conversation away from discussions of the significance of the capture of Bakhmut and towards amplifying speculation surrounding the reported losses. The nationalist pro-war faction, exemplified by the views of former Russian officer Igor Girkin, commented on the massive scale of the reported losses and speculated that real losses may be much higher. Russian politician Viktor Alksnis simply remarked that the Soviet Army lost far fewer soldiers (15,051) in nine years in Afghanistan.[3] Girkin stated that he believes that Wagner’s actual losses could be more than 1.5 times higher than Prigozhin’s claims and pointed out that of the 50,000 recruits Wagner received from prisons, 10,000 died in action and 26,000 reportedly received pardons and returned to Russia, leaving 14,000 prison recruits unaccounted for.[4] Girkin suggested that a large portion of these 14,000 unaccounted-for prison recruits may have also been killed in action and claimed that Wagner has likely suffered more than 40,000 killed in action.[5] Girkin suggested that Prigozhin “keep [his] mouth shut” and stop talking about “wild losses for a very insignificant result.”[6] Another Russian milblogger, by contrast, praised Prigozhin for being open about the scale of losses and stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would have hidden such figures.[7]The overall Russian information space response to the capture of Bakhmut has fixated on attributing responsibility for its capture and speculating on the associated costs of the operation, thus depriving the Russian MoD of the oxygen necessary to positively frame the city’s capture. As ISW reported on May 22 factions within the pro-war information space immediately began arguing over whether Wagner or regular Russian units and commanders should receive medals and commendations for operations in Bakhmut.[8] Prigozhin’s claims about Wagner’s losses in Bakhmut have similarly become a distinct point of tension in the information space and have come to define the predominant discourse about Russia’s entire campaign in Bakhmut. In shifting the conversation towards claimed Wagner losses, Prigozhin has largely succeeded in further depriving the Russian MoD of the opportunity to claim informational victory over Bakhmut and will likely continue to define and lead conversations on Bakhmut going forward but at the cost of highlighting the huge losses his own forces suffered for a negligible gain.Prigozhin is likely using his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites. Prigozhin stated in his May 23 interview with Dolgov that the Russian military leadership has so far failed to achieve the main objectives of the war in Ukraine.[9] Prigozhin blamed his usual targets, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, for being the main problem within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and for blocking support and supplies to Wagner.[10] Prigozhin also criticized Shoigu’s son-in-law and daughter for being the stereotypical children of Russian elite whose life experience is in dramatic opposition to those fighting in Ukraine.[11] Prigozhin warned that the Russian elite is fostering a situation that could end up like the revolution of 1917, in which soldiers and their loved ones stood up against the Russian government.[12] Prigozhin threatened that the Russian public may become violent towards the Russian elite, referencing mobs with pitchforks and alluding to the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, a string of politically motivated mob assassinations in France in 1572.[13] Prigozhin’s somewhat subtle and purposefully obscure threats of violence represent an inflection in his longstanding feuds with the Russian military establishment and select elite figures.Prigozhin is also using the perception that Wagner is responsible for the capture of Bakhmut to advocate for a preposterous level of influence over the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Prigozhin reiterated that the Wagner Group is the best army in the world and argued that the conventional Russian army is second to Wagner.[14] Prigozhin claimed that 6,000 Wagner personnel can each manage his own company worth of personnel and that Wagner could therefore command a force of 600,000 personnel, roughly twice the estimated number of Russian personnel fighting in Ukraine.[15] Prigozhin suggested that he has previously asked for 200,000 personnel to command in Ukraine and argued that if he had such a force then Wagner could advance from 50 to 150km in different directions.[16] Prigozhin claimed that he did not receive this force because of fears that such a force would allow him to dictate terms and theoretically “come to Moscow in tanks.”[17] Prigozhin also advocated for Russian Deputy-Minister-of-Defense-for-Logistics-turned-Wagner-Group-deputy-commander Colonel General Mikhail Mizinstev to replace Shoigu as Defense Minister and for former overall theater commander and alleged Wagner ally Army General Sergey Surovikin to replace Gerasimov as Chief of the General Staff.[18]Prigozhin is also likely doubling down on his attempts to establish himself as a Russian totalitarian figure who could achieve military victory in Ukraine. Prigozhin called for complete martial law, several subsequent waves of mobilization, and wide-scale economic mobilization of Russian industry to save Russia.[19] Prigozhin also suggested that Russia should become a totalitarian regime akin to North Korea and close all borders for a certain number of years to achieve victory in Ukraine. Prigozhin has routinely crafted an image to resonate with a constituency interested in the ideology of Russia’s national superiority, Soviet brutalist strength, and Stalinist totalitarian control.[20] Prigozhin is likely advocating for incredibly radical policy approaches to the war in Ukraine to contrast himself with Putin’s relatively risk-averse decision-making approach to the war.[21] ISW has previously assessed that Prigozhin harbors serious political ambitions and intends to cement himself as the central figure of the Russian ultranationalist community.[22] The capture of Bakhmut has likely emboldened Prigozhin to pursue those ambitions in a more explicit manner regardless of the internal upheaval that it may cause or the danger it may place him in with the Kremlin.The Kremlin continues efforts to portray Russia as having significant diplomatic partnerships. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to attendees of the 11th International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in Moscow on May 24 to deliver boilerplate rhetoric accusing the West of generating global instability and calling on Asian, African, and Latin American states to form a multipolar world order.[23] Putin later attended the Eurasian Economic Forum in Moscow alongside Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, and Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan.[24] Putin also met with Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Dodik demonstratively supported the Russian narrative about the war in Ukraine by stating that Russia was forced to launch the “special military operation” and that the war is a clash against the West.[25] The Kremlin has previously leveraged energy and military cooperation with Republika Srpska to attempt to spread Russian influence in the Balkans, although Russian influence with its other notable partner in the region, Serbia, appears to be waning.[26] The Kremlin has used previous international forums and meetings with heads of state to portray Russia as having robust international partnerships and to advocate for the formation of a potential anti-Western coalition.[27] Putin most notably tried and failed to secure a no-limits bilateral partnership with Chinese President Xi Jinping in late March and align China with Russia in Putin’s envisioned geopolitical conflict with the West.[28] The nominal support of several post-Soviet states and the explicit support of a small constituent entity is likely far less than what the Kremlin is hoping to achieve with this wider diplomatic effort.Russian sources continued to respond to the limited all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) raid into Belgorod Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed at the Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium meeting that Western Military District Border Guards expelled all pro-Ukrainian forces from Belgorod Oblast, killing 70 personnel and destroying an unspecified number of vehicles and armored vehicles.[29] Some milbloggers criticized the ineffectiveness of the Russian border guards and questioned why they would allow the RDK and LSR to break through to Russian territory and mine the border areas over the course of two days.[30] Other milbloggers criticized Russian forces for not maintaining “normal communication and interactions” with border guards, which created difficulties in repelling RDK and LSR forces.[31] One milblogger praised Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov and claimed that he rose to the occasion during the raid by solving problems that civilian officials usually do not have to solve.[32] Gladkov, however, said that he has “more questions for the MoD” and that lessons needed to be learned from the mistakes in Belgorod Oblast.[33] Another milblogger criticized Belgorod Oblast civilian authorities for allowing civilians to live one kilometer away from the “front line” and questioned why authorities chose not to relocate civilians until after the situation improved.[34]The New York Times reported on May 24 that unnamed US officials said that the US intelligence community assesses with low confidence that unknown Ukrainian elements with unknown connections to Ukraine’s leadership were responsible for the May 3 drone attacks on the Kremlin.[35] ISW had previously assessed that the attack was a Russian false flag operation on May 3.[36] ISW has no additional information about this incident.Key TakeawaysDiscussions regarding reported Russian losses in Bakhmut have saturated the pro-war information space and are drowning out any remaining positive informational effect resulting from the city’s capture.The overall Russian information space response to the capture of Bakhmut has fixated on attributing responsibility for its capture and speculating on the associated costs of the operation, thus depriving the Russian MoD of the oxygen necessary to positively frame the city’s capture.Prigozhin is likely using his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites. Prigozhin is also using the perception that Wagner is responsible for the capture of Bakhmut to advocate for a preposterous level of influence over the Russian war effort in Ukraine.The Kremlin continues efforts to portray Russia as having significant diplomatic partnerships.Russian sources continued to respond to the limited all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) raid into Belgorod Oblast.Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the outskirts of Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine with FAB-500 aerial bombs.Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on May 24 that more than 120,000 Russian personnel have undergone training since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.The Russian Federation Council approved a law on holding elections in territories under martial law on. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsActivities in Russian-occupied areasRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Masyutivka (16km northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[37] Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson Sergei Zybinsky claimed that assault detachments of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) conducted a ground attack near Masyutivka.[38] Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Russian forces captured Yahidne (22km east of Kupyansk) prior to May 24 and that Russian forces additionally made marginal advances near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[39] Video footage amplified on May 24 purportedly shows Chechen Akhmat-Vostok forces operating near Kreminna.[40]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Click here to read ISW’s new retrospective analysis of the Battle for Bakhmut.Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the outskirts of Bakhmut on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Ivanivske (3km southwest of Bakhmut) and Khromove (3km west of Bakhmut).[41] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted that Ukrainian troops are continuing defensive operations on the outskirts of Bakhmut.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group forces completely control Bakhmut and that forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are slowly entering the city to take over clearing operations.[43] Another Russian milblogger warned that Ukrainian troops may be intensifying the movement of military equipment and personnel through Kostyantynivka (17km southwest of Bakhmut).[44]Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north of Donetsk City near Avdiivka and Novokalynove; on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Pervomaiske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[45] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane and Nevelske.[46] Ukrainian Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaly Barbarash reported that Russian forces conducted a massive artillery strike on Avdiivka and launched two airstrikes with unguided aerial bombs at the city on the morning of May 24.[47] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck two Ukrainian fuel depots and a command post around Avdiivka during the strikes.[48]Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 24.[49]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine with FAB-500 aerial bombs. Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows a Russian FAB-500 strike on Kizomys (20km southwest of Kherson City) in Kherson Oblast.[50] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on May 23 that Russian forces attacked Beryslav (60km northeast of Kherson City) in Kherson Oblast with four KAB bombs (a FAB-500 variant).[51] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued to use KAB bombs on Ukrainian positions near Polohy (88km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) in Zaporizhia Oblast.Russian forces reportedly continue to endanger the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on May 24 that Russian forces continue to militarize the ZNPP by using power units No. 1, 2, and 4 as logistics and military bases.[52] The GUR also stated that Russian forces permanently maintain armored vehicles, trucks, and personnel at the ZNPP and rotate personnel and equipment after curfew. ISW has previously reported on the Russian militarization of the ZNPP.[53]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage purportedly showing a Ukrainian attack on the “Ivan Khurs” Yury Ivanov-class intelligence vessel in the Black Sea on May 24.[54] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed all three unmanned speedboats that attacked the “Ivan Khurs” 140km northeast of the Bosporus Strait while the vessel was protecting the Turk Stream and Blue Stream pipelines.[55] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the attack as of this publication.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on May 24 that more than 120,000 Russian personnel have undergone training since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.[56] Shoigu added that 21,000 personnel have undergone training to form new unspecified formations.[57] Shoigu’s figure is far lower than the roughly 300,000 mobilized personnel who underwent expedited training following the start of partial mobilization in 2022, the conventional 134,000 conscripts generated during a bi-annual conscription cycle, or the number of Russian volunteers stemming from widespread recruitment efforts.[58] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev recently claimed that the Russian military has recruited 117,400 contract personnel in volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.[59] If Shoigu’s figure refers to contract Russian servicemembers, then Russian efforts to generate contract servicemembers since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine have failed to meet Russian force requirements. It is unclear if Shoigu was referring to contract servicemembers or any other specific subset of the Russian Armed Forces, however.The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on May 25 that Russian cadets from higher military academies are undergoing training near the Ukrainian border in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[60] The Resistance Center reported that the cadets are undergoing training at the deployment points of elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) and the 76th Air Assault Division in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[61] Russian graduates from higher military academies recently graduated several months ahead of schedule, and Russian forces are likely expediting the normal education path for cadets to generate new lower and medium-level commanders.[62] ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation of recent Russian graduates serving in Ukraine or current cadets training near the Ukrainian border.The Russian State Duma adopted in the first reading a bill preventing Russian officials with access to state secrets from traveling abroad.[63] The bill also bans people with financial accounts and real estate abroad from accessing state secrets and prohibits lawyers working on cases involving state secrets from leaving the country. The bill does permit those with access to state secrets to travel abroad for humanitarian reasons, including the death of close relatives or the need of emergency treatments. ISW previously reported that Russian security services are allegedly confiscating the passports of senior officials and state company executives to limit flights from Russia.[64] These measures illustrate an increasing paranoia within the Russian government about informational security that may lead to further draconian security measures reminiscent of the Soviet Union.The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that research by independent Russian journalists suggests that more Russian personnel have gone absent without leave (AWOL) since January 2023 than in all of 2022.[65] The UK MoD reported that 1,053 Russian personnel have gone AWOL between January and May of 2023. The UK MoD also reported that Russian court data suggests that Russian personnel found guilty of going AWOL have received suspended sentences, allowing them to redeploy to Ukraine.Russian authorities continue to arrest Russian citizens over concerns about Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Russian sources claimed on May 24 that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers detained a design engineer of an unspecified military industrial enterprise in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast for transmitting information about the location of defense enterprises, air defense systems, and Russian personnel to Ukrainian representatives.[66] ISW previously assessed that Russian authorities appear to be using the pretext of threats to Russia’s DIB as one justification for potential crackdowns as well as for the FSB’s ongoing overhaul of domestic security organs.[67]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)The Russian Federation Council approved a law on holding elections in territories under martial law on May 24. A Russian source claimed on May 24 that the Russian Federation Council approved the law after consulting with the Russian Central Election Commission and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).[68] The Russian source also stated that the Federation Council approved a law that allows Russian occupation authorities to establish specifics for holding regional elections.[69] The Russian State Duma previously adopted amendments to the martial law legislation on May 18 that require that the FSB and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to authorize holding elections in territories under martial law.[70] ISW continues to assess that these measures indicate that Russian officials and occupation authorities may be setting informational conditions for September regional elections in case Russia loses more territory as a result of Ukrainian counteroffensives.Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin will chair a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Council of Ministers on May 25 in Minsk.[71] The meeting will discuss threats to the CSTO member states, improving the crisis response system, military-technical cooperation, and other topics.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a; https://t.me/superdolgov/9446[2] https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[3] https://t.me/strelkovii/5019[4] https://t.me/strelkovii/5022[5] https://t.me/strelkovii/5022[6] https://t.me/strelkovii/5023[7] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/24508; https://t.me/anatoly_nesmiyan/10009[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2023[9] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[10] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[11] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[12] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[13] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[14] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[15] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[16] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[17] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[18] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[19] https://t.me/superdolgov/9446 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/cdeb735bc0a754c170e39f45a6cd67b1/?r=a[20] https://isw.pub/UKrWar111422[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020523[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032823[23] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71189[24] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71198[25] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71188[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030223 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-december-1-2021-%E2%80%93-january-11-2022[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923 ;[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123[29] https://telegra.ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-05-24[30] https://t.me/donrf22/21807; https://t.me/strelkovii/5016[31] https://t.me/voenacher/45154; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/25691[32] https://t.me/rybar/47484[33] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/23/u-menya-esche-bolshe-voprosov-chem-u-vas-k-ministerstvu-oborony-belgorodskiy-gubernator-o-napadenii-vooruzhennoy-gruppirovki-na-region; https://vk dot com/gladkov_vv?w=wall639631882_891571[34] https://t.me/notes_veterans/9668[35] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/24/us/politics/ukraine-kremlin-drone-attack.html[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2023[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VsPKGcJn98E6s23tkQnsGprSxu9RdWebJyZCerNNYf1e9NXhYPdPxy5bbvfisE6l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9HWQPvkHzXDWY4nfcB9cnvwCttq38k1LatPmjkMjieyMTWy7XAQHRxmwzSYYqejl[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/26798[39] https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1661280349723279361?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1661346034641928194?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1661346037900902401?s=20; https://t.me/k_2_54/107; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1661346284744130562; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1661346718460387330 [40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86746[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9HWQPvkHzXDWY4nfcB9cnvwCttq38k1LatPmjkMjieyMTWy7XAQHRxmwzSYYqejl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VsPKGcJn98E6s23tkQnsGprSxu9RdWebJyZCerNNYf1e9NXhYPdPxy5bbvfisE6l[42] https://t.me/osirskiy/85[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47855[44] https://t.me/brussinf/6065[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9HWQPvkHzXDWY4nfcB9cnvwCttq38k1LatPmjkMjieyMTWy7XAQHRxmwzSYYqejl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VsPKGcJn98E6s23tkQnsGprSxu9RdWebJyZCerNNYf1e9NXhYPdPxy5bbvfisE6l[46] https://t.me/readovkanews/59423; https://t.me/wargonzo/12716[47] https://suspilne dot media/485539-rosijski-vijska-zranku-zavdali-kilka-masovanih-udariv-po-avdiivci/[48] https://t.me/readovkanews/59423; https://t.me/mod_russia/26807[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9HWQPvkHzXDWY4nfcB9cnvwCttq38k1LatPmjkMjieyMTWy7XAQHRxmwzSYYqejl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VsPKGcJn98E6s23tkQnsGprSxu9RdWebJyZCerNNYf1e9NXhYPdPxy5bbvfisE6l[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/15797; https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1661314417156411392?s=20 [51] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0h7mYdzDuduSYeCCAuMtGe4vbtQTuwHzRzA1CNjrNviqxB9qSBoJdHj6mp3T2f5ral[52] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-prodovzhuiut-militaryzatsiiu-terytorii-zaes.html[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2023-0; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-8[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/26810[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/26806; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36681; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/24/minoborony-rf-ukrainskie-bespilotnye-katera-atakovali-korabl-chernomorskogo-flota-ivan-hurs[56] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-05-24[57] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-05-24[58] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isw.pub/UkrWar032623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar0318723[59] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051923[60] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/rosiyany-planuyut-vidpravyty-na-vijnu-v-ukrayini-kursantiv/[61] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/rosiyany-planuyut-vidpravyty-na-vijnu-v-ukrayini-kursantiv/[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2023[63] https://sozd.duma.gov dot ru/bill/312862-8 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/24/gosduma-prinyala-v-pervom-chtenii-zakonoproekt-o-vyezde-za-granitsu-lyudey-s-dostupom-k-gostayne-vyezd-zapretyat-advokatam-kotorye-rabotayut-po-takim-delam[64] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040323[65] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1661249400281202688[66] https://t.me/kommunist/17468 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47856; https://t.me/sashakots/39879 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/101157 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/101160; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/24/fsb-zaderzhala-v-rostove-na-donu-inzhenera-oboronnogo-predpriyatiya-yakoby-sotrudnichavshego-s-ukrainskoy-razvedkoy ; https://t.me/readovkanews/59436; https://t.me/readovkanews/59437 [67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar0318723[68] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11531; https://t.me/SolovievLive/181035[69] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11531; https://t.me/SolovievLive/181035[70] http://duma.gov dot ru/news/57072/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2023-0[71] https://t.me/modmilby/28112
- — The Kremlin's Pyrrhic Victory in Bakhmut: A Retrospective on the Battle for Bakhmut
- at 5/25/23 10:46pmKateryna StepanenkoMay 24, 2023, 8am ETRussia declared victory in Bakhmut on May 21, 2023, after fighting for the city for nearly a year.[1] The battle marks the first claimed Russian victory over a large city since the capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in the summer of 2022. The Battle for Bakhmut is still ongoing as Ukrainian forces regained the initiative and are counterattacking Bakhmut’s flanks north and south of the city. The Russian year-long drive began as part of a theoretically sensible but overly-ambitious operational effort but ended as a purely symbolic gesture that cost tens of thousands of Russian casualties.The seizure of Bakhmut was originally intended to facilitate Russian offensives to encircle large Ukrainian forces in the east and specifically to take the large and fortified city of Slovyansk from multiple directions. Bakhmut was not a primary Russian objective during the early phases of the war, and the Russian military command aimed to secure Donetsk Oblast’s administrative borders by seizing major Ukrainian strongholds such as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directly. The Ukrainian liberation of most of Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 ended the immediate Russian threats to Slovyansk and, secondarily, Kramatorsk, whereupon Bakhmut became the main operational and political objective for the Kremlin. Bakhmut fit into the planned Russian winter offensive as one of several lines of advance that were supposed to end by securing the Luhansk and Donetsk oblast boundaries, but all the other attempted advances failed, once more depriving the battle for Bakhmut of hypothetical operational significance by March-April 2023. Moscow stubbornly clung to its efforts to seize Bakhmut regardless of the operational context and ultimately took the destroyed city at a hideous cost in manpower and materiel, then ceding the initiative in the Bakhmut area to Ukraine.[2]The Russian military command initially sought to seize Bakhmut to support a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Donbas in Spring 2022. Following the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv and the refocusing of Russian military efforts in the east in April 2022 the Russian military command aimed to encircle a large group of Ukrainian forces in western Luhansk and eastern Donetsk oblasts.[3] The Russian military command sought to conduct three simultaneous maneuvers that would collectively surround and seize the Slovyansk stronghold: a westward push through Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, a drive south from Izyum (southeastern Kharkiv Oblast), and an attack north from Bakhmut. The Russian military command sought to secure and advance along the E40 highway - which connects Izyum, Slovyansk, and the Bakhmut area - to quickly encircle Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast and advance towards the region’s western borders.[4] The Russian seizure of Bakhmut was a necessary but not sufficient condition for this massive encirclement to succeed. Russian forces captured Izyum in early April 2022 and the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area in late June and early July 2022, and began launching localized attacks southeast and east of Bakhmut in May 2022.[5] ISW assessed at the time that Russian forces were unlikely to complete this wide encirclement as Russian forces would be unable to advance far enough or quickly enough to accomplish it, an assessment that proved accurate.[6]Russian offensive operations in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk proved extremely costly and slow, consuming a high proportion of Russian offensive capabilities in Donbas. This forced the Russian military command to deprioritize the wide encirclement in Donetsk Oblast in order to complete the seizure of those two cities. The grinding offensives on the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line forced the Russian military command to deprioritize the objective of completing a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces along the E40 highway.[7] Wagner forces alongside Chechen and regular Russian units operated in Popasna (about 26km from Bakhmut) and made occasional westward advances towards Bakhmut, but mainly prioritized the capture of Luhansk Oblast.[8] ISW assessed that the Russian attack on Slovyansk from Izyum culminated in mid-May 2022, and Russian forces likely started to prioritize attacks closer to the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line.[9] Russian forces also abandoned some of their positions in Kharkiv City’s immediate vicinity to reinforce the attritional urban attacks in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.[10]Russia reprioritized the Battle for Bakhmut in July-August 2022, following the culmination of Russian attacks on the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line. Wagner forces began localized assaults around settlements east and southeast of Bakhmut, using Popasna and previously Russian occupied territories as springboards for further operations.[11] The Wagner Group also began to expand its forces by recruiting convicts, likely after Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin promised Putin to maintain offensive operations during the period when Russian regular forces were unable to pursue further offensive operations across the theater.[12] It is possible that the Russian military command hoped to eventually resume the drive to the E40 highway after recruiting volunteers to compensate for dwindling reserves. Russian forces still held positions in the Izyum-Lyman area, which made an advance from north and south along the E40 to secure Slovyansk theoretically possible if highly unlikely due to Russia’s force composition and degraded offensive capabilities.The successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 that liberated Izyum ended the prospect of a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the east, thus depriving the attacks on Bakhmut of operational significance. Ukrainian forces liberated Izyum on September 10-11.[13] The loss of Izyum meant that Russian forces no longer threatened Ukrainian defenders in Slovyansk and could no longer hope to conduct a multi-directional offensive from Bakhmut, Izyum, and the east.[14] ISW assessed on September 11 that the loss of Izyum doomed the initial Russian campaign plan to attack Slovyansk from multiple directions and that even the seizure of Bakhmut would “no longer support any larger effort to accomplish the original objectives of this phase of the campaign since it would not be supported by an advance from Izyum in the north.”[15] ISW also assessed that Russian offensive operations against Bakhmut and around Donetsk City have “lost any real operational significance for Moscow and merely waste some of [Russia’s] extremely limited effective combat power.”Wagner mercenaries nevertheless intensified their offensives on Bakhmut and fully committed to the Battle for Bakhmut in Fall 2022 likely to achieve informational and political rather than operational objectives. The Kremlin desperately needed any battlefield victory as Russian forces suffered a great military defeat in Kharkiv Oblast in September and in Lyman (about 43km north of Bakhmut) on October 1.[16] Putin had also faced significant backlash after declaring partial mobilization on September 21 and likely allowed Prigozhin to initiate the Wagner offensive on Bakhmut at least partly in response.[17] Prigozhin himself likely sought to capture Bakhmut in a timely manner in order to convince Putin to promote Wagner-affiliated officials within the Russian military command. Wagner forces began to intensify their offensives northeast, south, and southeast of Bakhmut following the appointment of Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin as the theater commander on October 8.[18] Prigozhin later claimed that he and Surovikin began operation “Bakhmut meatgrinder” to pin Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut shortly after Surovikin’s appointment.[19] The purpose of the efforts to pin Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut in Fall 2022 were unclear—there were no other significant Russian offensives underway, and Ukrainian counteroffensives culminated with the liberation of western Kherson Oblast.Wagner mercenaries shifted their approach to seizing Bakhmut to a focus on encircling and trapping Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut City by expending a high proportion of their estimated 40,000 prisoner recruits in deadly human wave attacks.[20] At least 22,000 prisoners disappeared from Russian prisons between October and November 2022 alone - likely as a result of Wagner’s prisoner recruitment efforts.[21] A Russian opposition outlet concluded that 55 percent of the total reported Wagner fatalities in October occurred just on October 24 and October 27 – when Ukrainian forces resisted Wagner assaults on the eastern outskirts of the city.[22] The outlet concluded that the number of social media reports commemorating Wagner servicemen increased by more than 2.5 times as they were committed to suicidal drives on Bakhmut’s immediate outskirts.[23]The Russian MoD began to prepare for its own winter offensive operation in December 2022 and likely began to deprioritize support for Wagner forces at that time. The Russian MoD banned Wagner forces from recruiting prisoners in early January and began to conserve mobilized personnel and military equipment ahead of the planned offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast.[24] Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that Russian forces decreased their use of artillery shells from 60,000 per day to 19,000-20,000.[25] ISW assessed on December 31 that ammunition shortages would slow the pace of Russian offensives.[26] Wagner relies on the Russian MoD to provide ammunition and supplies. The decrease in such ammunition provisions indicates that the Russian MoD likely assessed that it needed more ammunition to launch another offensive operation in the theater and that the Wagner effort against Bakhmut was not a primary mission. The Russian regular forces were ultimately unsuccessful in achieving the goal of capturing Donbas over the winter, confirming that Russian forces did not have sufficient offensive capabilities to maintain a multi-pronged offensive in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[27] The fight for Bakhmut could have regained operational significance as part of the general Russian winter offensive had any of the other drives been successful. As it was, the total failure of all the other offensive efforts during the winter offensive operation meant that Bakhmut remained primarily an informational and political rather than operationally significant objective for Russian forces.Wagner’s highly attritional offensives began to show signs of culmination by late December 2022 and in January 2023. US military doctrine defines culmination as the “point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offensive or defensive,” and when “a force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause.”[28] A force can continue operations after culmination but normally in a badly degraded condition. The rate of Wagner forces’ advance slowed, and Ukrainian forces were able to push back Russian forces from some eastern outskirts of Bakhmut City.[29] ISW also observed that Wagner forces made slightly fewer overall advances in the Bakhmut area in November and December 2022 combined as compared to the month of October.[30] Wagner forces likely needed to initiate a tactical or operational pause in late December 2022 and early January 2023 as they started to face heavy losses in the Bakhmut area and ammunition shortages but continued to make advances in eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[31] A Russian opposition outlet estimated that Wagner fatalities increased by an additional 2.5 times in December, and US officials noted that at least 1,000 Wagner mercenaries were killed in action in December.[32] The Russian MoD - which has been feuding with Prigozhin and attempting to compete with him for Putin’s favor - had likely seen Wagner’s slowing pace as an opportunity to regain control over the Bakhmut direction and advance to Soledar (about 12km northeast of Bakhmut).[33] The introduction of Russian regular forces on Bakhmut’s flanks likely temporarily offset the culmination of the Wagner Group’s offensive by allowing Wagner forces to concentrate in the city and retain the initiative in the urban fighting.[34] ISW assessed as early as January 31 that Russian forces were unlikely to complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut, however.[35]The Wagner Group began committing its remaining forces to Bakhmut between February and March to threaten Ukrainian forces into withdrawing from the city so as to avoid having to fight through it. Wagner casualties reportedly decreased by 35 percent in February when compared to January, likely because Wagner expended much of its convict recruits personnel when fighting for Bakhmut the previous month.[36] The limited introduction of regular artillery forces to Bakhmut’s flanks may also have contributed to the decrease of Wagner casualties. Prigozhin later admitted to receiving assistance from artillery and infantry units belonging to the Eastern Military District.[37] Wagner, however, lost its main source of rapid recruitment and began to commit its elite units to sustain the advance.[38] Geolocated footage showed 43 buses full of well-dressed and high-spirited Wagner personnel moving from Crimea to an unspecified location via Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast on February 18.[39] These personnel and other Wagner forces likely arrived in Bakhmut to reinforce Wagner forces as Ukrainian military officials reported that Wagner was using its combat-ready assault units in attacks on northern Bakhmut City in late February.[40] Wagner forces also likely prioritized maneuvers northeast and south of Bakhmut in an effort to sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) west of Bakhmut and threaten to encircle Ukrainian forces in the city.[41] Prigozhin, who was likely aware that he was running out of uncommitted personnel, likely hoped to scare Ukrainian forces into withdrawing from Bakhmut and used additional forces to threaten envelopment or encirclement. Prigozhin even offered Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky an opportunity to withdraw Ukrainian forces from Bakhmut on March 3 and claimed that Wagner mercenaries had practically encircled Ukrainian forces in the city after Wagner achieved some breakthroughs in eastern, northern, and southern Bakhmut.[42]The Ukrainian military blocked the Russian efforts to envelop or encircle Bakhmut in March, forcing Wagner forces to fight through the city and suffer significant losses for the next two months. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of controlled withdrawals and gradually stabilized the battlefield geometry in Bakhmut, eliminating the threat of encirclement or envelopment.[43] The pace of Russian advances north and south of Bakhmut decreased, and Russian forces were unable to physically interdict Ukrainian GLOCs despite claiming “fire control” over the two highways into the city.[44] Ukrainian military officials even observed on March 15 that Wagner attacks had markedly decreased in and around Bakhmut – just two weeks after Prigozhin announced that Wagner forces would imminently encircle Ukrainian forces.[45] Wagner’s pace likely decreased as a result of high-intensity urban combat in Bakhmut City, and Wagner was unable to maintain the same momentum it had had in February and early March. Wagner forces also began releasing convicts who had signed six-month contracts with Wagner, which likely further depleted Wagner personnel and slowed the pace of advance.[46]ISW assessed that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut was a strategically sound decision as Ukrainians would benefit from exhausting Wagner forces if they were able to retain control over the two GLOCs west of Bakhmut.[47] ISW also argued that while Bakhmut is not intrinsically significant operationally or strategically for Ukrainian forces to maintain, the defense of Bakhmut became more strategically significant as Russian forces decided to commit Wagner elements, Russian airborne troops (VDV), and other lower-quality troops to the fight.[48] US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff General Mark Milley reported on March 29 that the Wagner Group had around 6,000 professional personnel and 20,000 to 30,000 remaining recruits and convicts in the Bakhmut area.[49] The Ukrainian defense of the city – despite high Ukrainian costs – exhausted and inflicted significant casualties on Russian personnel that otherwise could have reinforced other directions ahead planned Ukrainian counteroffensives. US President Joe Biden stated on May 21 that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 casualties while fighting for Bakhmut, and White House national security spokesperson John Kirby stated that an estimated 10,000 Wagner servicemen have been killed since December 2022.[50]Prigozhin has likely signaled the culmination of Wagner forces in declaring victory in Bakhmut on May 20 and announcing Wagner’s withdrawal from the city and plans to reconstitute on May 25, despite subsequent denials.[51] Prigozhin claimed on May 22 that Wagner forces did not advance or attempt to seize any new territories on May 21 and reiterated that Wagner will hand over the responsibility for Bakhmut City to Russian MoD on May 25.[52] Prigozhin also announced that all Wagner servicemen will leave the frontlines in Ukraine by June 1 to reconstitute and train.[53] It is unclear if Prigozhin will fully withdraw his forces from Bakhmut at this time, but it is highly likely that Wagner forces must initiate a long-needed operational pause. Prigozhin denied on May 23 that his forces are exhausted and claimed that Wagner recruits 10,000 forces per month in a response to ISW’s assessment of the likely exhaustion of his forces in Bakhmut.[54] Prigozhin additionally refused to specify whether Wagner forces will soon restart offensive operations elsewhere. Prigozhin’s announced intention to withdraw his forces from the frontlines and give them two months to reconstitute likely indicates that Prigozhin assesses that his forces have been exhausted in combat, his denials notwithstanding.[55] Prigozhin had also been setting information conditions for months signaling that Wagner would not be able to continue to advance after capturing Bakhmut while observing that the Russian seizure of all of Donetsk Oblast will require years of combat.[56] ISW assessed on March 5 that “the Russian offensive in Bakhmut will likely culminate whether Russian forces capture the city or not, and the Russian military will struggle to maintain any subsequent offensive operations for some months.”[57] Prigozhin also acknowledged on May 18 that Wagner forces failed to encircle Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut – a goal that had been part of the supposed “Bakhmut meatgrinder” operation that his forces have been pursuing since Fall 2022 and Winter 2023.[58]The Wagner Group’s announced two-month reconstitution period could have Wagner forces sitting out key parts of the Ukrainian counteroffensive depending on when and how it begins.[59] US defense officials previously expressed concerns that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut would undermine Ukrainian counteroffensive plans and urged Ukrainian forces to deprioritize the defense of Bakhmut.[60] ISW assessed on March 5 that “Ukrainian forces will likely have a window of opportunity to seize the battlefield initiative and launch a counteroffensive when the Russian effort around Bakhmut culminates either before or after taking the city.”[61] Wagner forces are unlikely to successfully conduct a controlled withdrawal from Bakhmut while in contact with Ukrainian forces within the next two days without disrupting the Russian MoD’s efforts to prepare for planned Ukrainian counteroffensives.[62] Conducting a relief-in-place while in contact is an extremely challenging maneuver that Russian forces would likely struggle to conduct even if the Russian MoD agrees to undertake it. Russian forces continue to transfer airborne, motorized rifle, and special forces elements to reinforce the Bakhmut flanks and these additional forces could in principle participate in Wagner’s relief-in-place operation.[63] They will not be available to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in other sectors of the front, however.The Battle of Bakhmut exposed several key flaws in the Russian planning and conduct of operational maneuver. The Russian military command continued to pursue a relentless assault on Bakhmut after the city lost its original operational significance and failed to adjust its military objectives appropriately. The Kremlin, evidently, chased after any potential victory to generate informational effects and allowed Prigozhin to expend a large amount of Russian ammunition and thousands of prisoner recruits and then more professional forces to maintain a battle of no operational significance in Bakhmut. Prigozhin also continued this battle to gain desired political standing in Russia – likely without the intent to pursue the original goal of conducting a wider encirclement of Donbas. The Kremlin’s fixation with Bakhmut indicates that Russia has not learned lessons from the first phases of the war. The Russian military command continues to overestimate Russian military capabilities and has not mastered time and space relationships in this war at its current level of effectiveness. The Russian military command also continues to pursue ill-informed political objectives at the expense of Russian personnel and resources.It is not even clear that the Battle of Bakhmut is yet over. Ukrainian forces have been conducting local counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks, having regained the initiative following Wagner’s culmination.[64] The decision to allow the battle to end or force it into a new phase now lies with Kyiv. Ukraine thus now has the initiative at every level of war across almost the entire front.[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2023[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2023[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20May%2013.pdf[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2023[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9[19] https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/06/europe/wagner-bakhmut-withdraw-meat-grind-intl-hnk/index.html[20] https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3pynk/wagner-russia-ukraine-prisons[21] https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/wagner-prigozhin-wants-least-33-161000609.html[22] https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1660722511384813596 ; https://verstka dot media/bitva-za-bahmut[23] https://verstka dot media/bitva-za-bahmut[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2023[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2023[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-20-2023[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24[32] https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1660722517248561152; https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1660722519114915840 ; https://verstka dot media/bitva-za-bahmut[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2023[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2023[36] https://verstka dot media/bitva-za-bahmut[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2023[38] https://verstka dot media/bitva-za-bahmut[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2023[40] https://verstka dot media/bitva-za-bahmut; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2023[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2023[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2023[43] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2023[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2023[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2023[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2023[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2023[49] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2023[50] https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/biden-claims-russians-suffered-over-170100446.html#:~:text=%E2%80%9CWell%2C%20the%20truth%20of%20the,It's%20a%20pretty%20devastated%20city. ; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3982129-white-house-russians-killed-ukraine-bakhmut/[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2023[52] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1012[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2023[54] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1022 [55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2023[56] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mercenary-leader-prigozhin-says-russia-faces-resistance-taking-bakhmut-2023-02-11/; https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/11/wagner-owner-says-war-in-ukraine-will-drag-on-for-years.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2023[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2023[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2023[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2023[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2023[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2023[64] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2023
- — Iran Update, May 23, 2023
- at 5/25/23 10:12pmJohanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here. Key Takeaways 1. Iran and Iranian-backed militias facilitated the travel of Iranian religious pilgrims into Syria, possibly to expand Iranian influence in Syria. 2. Anti-regime protests organized by Iranian university students have increased in recent weeks, demonstrating the regime’s failure to suppress a key demographic of the Mahsa Amini movement. Iranian Activities in the Levant This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates. Iran and Iranian-backed militias facilitated the travel of Iranian religious pilgrims into Syria, possibly to expand Iranian influence in Syria. An unidentified source cited by Eye of Euphrates reported that Iranian-backed militias escorted 15 buses operated by the Qalaa Company through the Albu Kamal border crossing carrying Iranian religious pilgrims to Albu Kamal on May 16.[1] The Qalaa Company is closely affiliated with the Iranian-affiliated Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 4th Division Commander Maher Assad. IRGC Quds Force, Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces then coordinated transportation for religious pilgrims traveling into Syria and to various religious sites. Iran has established schools, cultural centers, and has converted Sunni mosques to Shia mosques in Deir ez Zor Province. Religious pilgrims from an Iranian-backed militia also bought at least 10 homes in Sheikh Yassin and Hamidiyeh neighborhoods, Deir ez Zor City on May 23 with the assistance of the Jihad al Binaa Organization. Jihad al Binaa is an LH-run and Iranian-funded construction company subject to secondary sanctions as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.[2] CTP previously reported that Jihad al Binaa, the same company purchasing homes for militia religious pilgrims on May 23, began construction on homes for families of Iranian-backed militias and religious pilgrims traveling to Syria and several military infrastructure projects in the Al Rasafa neighborhood, Deir ez Zor City on May 22.[3] CTP is considering three hypotheses to explain these developments. The first is that Iran and Iranian-backed militias in Syria are operating as security for Shia religious pilgrims traveling to and within Syria. Syria contains several prominent holy religious sites for Shia pilgrims and Iran commonly facilitates pilgrimages to these sites as part of its cultural exchange.[4] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed 15 memorandums of understanding with Syrian President Bashar al Assad on May 3, one of which agreed that Iran would send an additional 50,000 religious pilgrims to Syria.[5] Second, Iran and Iranian-backed militias are facilitating pilgrimages and purchasing homes for pilgrims to proselytize and spread Iranian influence in Deir ez Zor. Iranian leadership has developed local cultural centers within Syrian communities to be converted to the regime’s version of Shia Islam as a means to extend Iranian regional influence.[6] Third, Iran may use religious pilgrim convoys to transport Iranian-backed militants or weapons shipments into Syria. Unidentified sources claimed that IRGC Quds Force militants used religious pilgrims to transport weapons across the Abu Kamal border crossing on February 5 to prevent being targeted in an Israeli airstrike.[7] Syrian security officials also launched an effort on February 9 to identify Iranian-backed militants who had traveled into Syria with Shia religious pilgrims according to a report from Deir ez Zor 24.[8] These three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and may be occurring concurrently. Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted a military exercise in southern Lebanon following a recent escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza.[9] LH extended a rare invitation to local and foreign journalists to observe the exercise on May 21 ahead of “Liberation Day,” the annual celebration of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon on May 25, 2000 on May 21.[10] LH official Hashem Safiedinne said in a speech that the exercises were meant to confirm Hezbollah’s readiness to confront any aggression. Iranian Domestic Affairs This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here. Anti-regime protests organized by Iranian university students have increased in recent weeks, demonstrating the regime’s failure to suppress a key demographic of the Mahsa Amini movement. Student protests have largely been a response to increased state executions.[11] CTP recorded 10 anti-regime protests organized by Iranian university students since May 1, marking a 150 percent increase in university student protest activity compared to March and April 2023. Five of these demonstrations responded to the regime’s execution of three Mahsa Amini movement protesters on May 19, demonstrating that regime violence still has the potential to trigger unrest. The regime may regard university protests as a more serious threat to its stability than demonstrations organized by other segments of the population--such as retirees--since university students largely spearheaded the Mahsa Amini movement between September 2022 and January 2023.[12] The increase in university student protests encompasses a broader trend of growing anti-regime unrest, as depicted in the graphic below. [1] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/05/20/8570 [2] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp271 [3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-22-2023 [4] https://www.newarab.com/news/iran-resumes-muslim-shia-pilgrim-tours-syria [5] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85100772 [6] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-long-game-syria [7] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/03/05/7656 [8] https://deirezzor24 dot net/حملة-تفتيش-لعناصر-ميليشيا-الحرس-الثور/ [9] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-exercises-48e1e763e306470713a12eb1c3d25d20; https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1660307707390459904; https://tasnimnews (dot) com/en/news/2023/05/22/2899516/lebanon-s-hezbollah-displays-combat-capabilities-in-military-drills; https://www.almayadeen (dot) net/news/politics/%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87:-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%85; https://almanar (dot) com.lb/10644218 [10] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-exercises-48e1e763e306470713a12eb1c3d25d20; https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1660307707390459904; https://tasnimnews (dot) com/en/news/2023/05/22/2899516/lebanon-s-hezbollah-displays-combat-capabilities-in-military-drills; https://www.almayadeen (dot) net/news/politics/%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87:-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%85; https://almanar (dot) com.lb/10644218 [11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-5-2023 [12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-3
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 23, 2023
- at 5/25/23 9:34pmGrace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. KaganMay 23, 2023, 8:00pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 4pm ET on May 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Russian authorities ended the “counterterrorism” operation in Belgorod Oblast and claimed to have defeated the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) in the region on May 23. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Western Military District (WMD) Border Guards units defeated the raid and expelled all “saboteurs” from Belgorod Oblast.[1] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov announced that the “counterterrorism” operation had ended but called on civilians who evacuated to wait before returning to the border settlements.[2] Russian authorities later announced on May 23 that authorities evacuated 100 civilians from nine border settlements in Belgorod Oblast on May 22 after Gladkov originally denied conducting formal evacuations.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not hold an emergency meeting of the Russian Security Council to discuss the Belgorod raid but will instead discuss the situation during the Security Council’s planned May 26 meeting, likely in an effort to project confidence about Russian handling of the situation.[4] Russian forces likely pushed the RDK and LSR forces at least to the Kozinka border settlement and possibly out of Russian territory as of May 23. Kozinka is located approximately 76km southeast of Sumy City. Russian sources amplified footage of Russian forces firing on RDK and LSR vehicle positions near the Kozinka border checkpoint overnight and claimed that Russian forces recaptured Kozinka and its border checkpoint in the morning.[5] Geolocated footage from Russian state media shows damaged and destroyed vehicles at the checkpoint.[6] Some Russian sources claimed that RDK and LSR forces entrenched themselves in the Kozinka church but that preliminary reports suggest Russian forces may have ousted the Ukrainian forces by the evening.[7] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces began clearing operations in Kozinka and Glotovo (immediately east of Kozinka) on May 23.[8] Geolocated footage posted on May 23 shows the aftermath of shelling Gora Podol (about 6km northwest of Kozinka) and Russian infantry conducting patrols between Grayvoron (about 7km northwest of Kozinka) and Gora Podol, suggesting that RDK and LSR personnel no longer hold or never held positions in the settlement.[9] It is unclear whether the RDK and LSR captured any villages on May 22 or May 23, however. The LSR claimed that LSR and RDK personnel continued to operate in Belgorod Oblast on May 23, however.[10] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted raids across the Kharkiv-Belgorod border on May 23, but ISW has observed no confirmation that these raids occurred. Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Ukraine-affiliated formations – including Azov Regiment, Kraken Regiment, Territorial Defense, and regular Ukrainian forces – and RDK personnel attempted additional raids near Gorkovsky, Bogun-Gorodok, and Tsapovka, and managed to cross the border south of Shchetinovka.[11] Other Russian sources denied claims that sabotage groups crossed the Kharkiv-Belgorod border.[12]Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces accumulated reserves less than 10 kilometers from the Kharkiv-Belgorod border and expressed fear about the threat of further raids.[13] One milblogger claimed that the Azov Regiment, Kraken Regiment, Territorial Defense, and regular Ukrainian forces all took part in a raid in Bryansk Oblast on May 22, but ISW has still not observed confirmation of this claimed raid.[14] The Russian information space largely hyperfixated on speculated goals for the raids and on the conduct of the Russian response. Some Russian milbloggers amplified claims that a drone struck the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) building in Belgorod City and speculated that Ukrainian forces aimed to attack the FSB and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in the raid.[15] Russian sources also amplified a photograph of Colonel General Alexander Lapin posing with a captured vehicle and claimed that Lapin led the counterterrorism operation alongside elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army, Western Military District).[16] Many Russian sources praised Lapin for organizing Russian forces to conduct coherent counterterrorism operations after the Russian Border Service failed to repel the raids.[17] Some sources criticized the decision to give Lapin command and noted Lapin’s prior military failures such as the disastrous Siverskyi Donets river crossing near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast in May 2022.[18] Lapin has notably returned to commanding Russian operations in eastern Ukraine after suffering intense criticism for commanding the operations to take Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, and Lapin has not received much praise in the information space since the campaign to undermine him led to Lapin’s dismissal in November 2022.[19] The openness of Russian milbloggers to praise Lapin for commanding the defense against an extremely small and limited border incursion suggests that at least some milblogger factions are amenable to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s tendency to rotate old and disgraced commanders.[20] The Russian reaction to the raid in the information space and in the reported military activities appears to be a highly disproportionate response to a very small and localized undertaking. Russian forces should not have required significant reinforcements—or the involvement of a colonel general—to repulse a raid conducted by reportedly 13 armored vehicles.[21] Ukrainian officials stated that the pace of fighting in the Bakhmut direction has decreased amid continued limited Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks on May 23. The Ukrainian General Staff did not report fighting in Bakhmut City in its 1800 situational report for the first time since December 2022, suggesting that Wagner Group forces may have made further advances within the city. The General Staff also reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut).[22] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that combat operations have decreased in and around Bakhmut and reiterated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in a fortified area near the MiG-17 monument in western Bakhmut.[23] A milblogger amplified video footage purportedly showing Wagner forces near the MiG-17 monument and claimed that there are no Ukrainian forces in the area, however.[24] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces advanced 200 to 400 meters along the flanks of Bakhmut and still control a number of buildings and fortifications in southwestern Bakhmut.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Yahidne (1km northwest of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske (immediately west of Bakhmut).[26] Another milblogger denied reports that Ukrainian forces made gains during counterattacks northwest and southwest of Bakhmut and assessed that a Russian offensive from Bakhmut toward Ivanivske or Bohdanivka remains unlikely.[27] Key Takeaways Russian authorities ended the “counterterrorism” operation in Belgorod Oblast and claimed to have defeated the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) in the region on May 23. Russian forces likely pushed the RDK and LSR forces at least to the Kozinka border settlement and possibly out of Russian territory as of May 23. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted raids across the Kharkiv-Belgorod border on May 23, but ISW has observed no confirmation that these raids occurred. Ukrainian officials stated that the pace of fighting in the Bakhmut direction has decreased amid continued limited Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks on May 23. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line. Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive. Pardoned Wagner Group convicts continue to commit crimes in Russia after finishing their military contracts with Wagner. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials announced the start of preliminary voting for the ruling United Russia party. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts) Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts Activities in Russian-occupied areas Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces gained new positions near Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[29] Video footage published on May 23 purportedly shows unspecified airborne units operating in the forests near Kreminna.[30] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) See topline text for Bakhmut update. Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka, 13km north of Avdiivka near Novokalynove, and within 14km west of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Vodyane, and Pervomaiske.[31] Ukrainian forces also reportedly repelled numerous assaults on Marinka (about 24km southwest of Donetsk City).[32] Ukrainian Defense Forces Tavriisk Direction Spokesperson Valeriy Shereshen stated that Russian forces are concentrating their efforts on attacking Avdiivka and Marinka, and reported that there were 19 combat clashes in the two areas.[33] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted assault operations near Pervomaiske, on the southwestern approached to Avdiivka, in Marinka, and in the Krasnohorivka direction (approximately 20km west of Donetsk City).[34] Geolocated footage published on May 23 showed elements of the 287th Separate Rifle Battalion of the 1st Army Corps operating south of Avdiivka.[35] Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on May 23.[36] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukrainian Defense Forces Tavriisk Direction Spokesperson Valeriy Shershen reported on May 23 that Russian forces are conducting defensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Orikhiv directions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[37] Shershen also stated that Russian forces are actively mining the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and installing barricades against boats and watercraft.[38] Geolocated footage showed that Russian forces constructed new fortifications in Crimea along the roads that lead into the peninsula.[39] Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine. Geolocated footage published on May 23 shows artillery elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment of the Caspian Sea Flotilla operating near Dorozhnyanka in Zaporizhia Oblast.[40] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage purportedly showing unspecified airborne units striking Ukrainian armored vehicles on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[41] Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) Pardoned Wagner Group convicts are continuing to commit crimes in Russia after finishing their military contracts with Wagner. Russian police detained a 42-year-old convict for raping two underage girls in Berdsk, Novosibirsk Oblast. The convict served in the Wagner private military company (PMC) until returning to Russia after his contract ended on May 19.[42] The Russian State Duma adopted amendments to the law concerning the entry to and exit from Russia on May 23.[43] The amendments would allow Russian authorities to confiscate travel passports from mobilized personnel, personnel of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and individuals with access to state secrets. Russian officials can also confiscate travel passports from individuals who are called up for military or alternative service, persons who are facing charges or imprisonment, or bankrupt citizens. Individuals conscripted for military or alternative service must submit their travel documents to the Ministry of Internal Affairs or Multifunctional Center within five days of being declared fit for military service.[44] Conscripts will only be able to receive their travel documents after finishing military or alternative service. Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russia is forming private military companies (PMCs) in occupied Crimea to defend against planned Ukrainian counteroffensives. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Andriy Chernyak stated that Crimean occupation officials such as Sergey Aksyonov are funding Crimean PMCs to protect themselves against Ukrainian counteroffensives.[45] Chernyak stated that ”Aksyonovites” - or people in Crimean PMCs - receive monthly salaries of 200,000 to 250,000 rubles (about $2,500 to $3,120) and train in Perevalne (southeast of Simferopol) or in occupied Kherson Oblast. Chernyak noted that Crimean PMCs recruit from mobilized personnel and created a dual contract with PMCs and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) so as to not compete with Prigozhin’s recruitment efforts. Russian milbloggers complained on May 23 about the Russian MoD failing to arm the Belgorod Oblast militia in response to all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion’s (LSR) raid into Belgorod Oblast on May 22.[46] Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials announced the start of preliminary voting for the ruling United Russia party on May 22 and 23. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov announced that preliminary voting for the ruling United Russia party in Zaporizhia Oblast began on May 22 and will run until May 28, with in-person voting scheduled to start on May 24.[47] The occupation administrations of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts announced similar parameters for preliminary voting, as ISW has previously reported.[48] Kherson Oblast occupation authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied educational institutes with Russia, likely aiding the forced relocation of Ukrainian children to Russia. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced on May 23 that it established an agreement with Crimean occupation authorities to ease the admissions process to Crimean universities for Kherson Oblast students as well as resolving unspecified issues regarding Kherson Oblast children residing at Crimean educational institutions.[49] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration also announced the distribution of a new Russian journalism textbook in occupied Kherson Oblast higher educational institutions.[50] Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.) ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated on May 23 that he was had adenovirus and that concern over his health is unnecessary. Lukashenko claimed that rumors about his death were nothing more than idle speculation circulating on social media.[51] Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Dmitry Krutoy told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 23 that Lukashenko would not be attending the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 14 to 17.[52] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 23 that the Belarusian Main Operational Department is holding meetings on May 23 and 24 aiming to increase professional training of officers in accordance with the plan to increase Belarusian forces’ readiness.[53] The Belarusian MoD stated that the 103rd Vitebsk Separate Guards Airborne Brigade and Kazakh forces air assault units participated in combat skills competitions on the Losvido Training Ground as part of ongoing combat readiness checks.[54] Belarusian forces also conducted exercises at the Gozhsky and Domanovo training grounds.[55] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://t.me/mod_russia/26773 [2] https://t.me/vvgladkov/2266; https://t.me/vvgladkov/2269; [3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://t.me/readovkanews/59395; https://t.me/vvgladkov/2269 [4] https://tass dot ru/politika/17822461; https://t.me/readovkanews/59397 [5] https://t.me/rybar/47470 ; https://t.me/severrealii/16939; https://t.me/rybar/47463; https://t.me/rybar/47441; https://t.me/rybar/47425; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9629; https://t.me/rybar/47449; https://t.me/rusich_army/8982; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1660999673010868224?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1660999675070283777?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1661013408022691842?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1661013679389958145?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1661013938279178247?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1661014162829611015?s=20 [6] https://twitter.com/aldin_aba/status/1661048261958942730; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1661070731067682816; https://t.me/zvezdanews/119242 [7] https://t.me/rybar/47470 ; https://t.me/severrealii/16939; https://t.me/rybar/47463; https://t.me/strelkovii/5009; https://t.me/sashakots/39865; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/58666 [8] https://t.me/rybar/47441; https://t.me/rybar/47425; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9629; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9629 [9] https://twitter.com/aldin_aba/status/1661010537759768578?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1661052360947384326?s=20; https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1661032281744474112?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/M0nstas/status/1661048207495905298?s=20 [10] https://t.me/legionoffreedom/806 [11] https://t.me/rybar/47461; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9624; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9622; https://t.me/rybar/47470 ; https://t.me/severrealii/16939; https://t.me/rybar/47453; https://t.me/rybar/47451 [12] https://t.me/sashakots/39860 [13] https://t.me/rybar/47470 [14] https://t.me/notes_veterans/9649; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [15] https://t.me/strelkovii/4999 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/5003; https://t.me/strelkovii/5004; https://t.me/strelkovii/5005 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/5008 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/5015; https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1660752406601166853?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/Dmojavensis/status/1660760544260014081?s=20; https://t.me/readovkanews/5936; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9609 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47817; https://t.me/rybar/47433 [16] https://t.me/z_arhiv/21556; https://t.me/grey_zone/18773; https://t.me/voenacher/45154; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11719; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86703; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86703; https://t.me/sashakots/39872; https://t.me/rybar/47463 [17] https://t.me/z_arhiv/21556; https://t.me/grey_zone/18773; https://t.me/voenacher/45154; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11719; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86703; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86703; https://t.me/sashakots/39872; https://t.me/rybar/47463 [18] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/24470; https://t.me/grey_zone/18773 [19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [21] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1988 [22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ub5r2CaSRnsC4V9AAmF... [23] https://t.me/annamaliar/790 [24] https://t.me/brussinf/6053 [25] https://suspilne dot media/483991-sili-oboroni-prosunulis-u-bahmuti-se-na-200-400-metriv-cerevatij/; [26] https://t.me/wargonzo/12698 [27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86657 [28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uuxbGrs1ZsWkrdKsRJ...; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ub5r2CaSRnsC4V9AAmF... [29] https://t.me/wargonzo/12698 [30] https://t.me/rusich_army/8983 [31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uuxbGrs1ZsWkrdKsRJ... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ub5r2CaSRnsC4V9AAmF... [32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uuxbGrs1ZsWkrdKsRJ... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ub5r2CaSRnsC4V9AAmF... [33] https://suspilne dot media/484612-rozgladaut-ak-placdarmi-dla-kontrnastupu-armia-rf-koncentrue-sili-na-avdiivskomu-ta-marinskomu-frontah/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/23/rosiyany-aktyvno-minuyut-livyj-bereg-dnipra-ta-vstanovlyuyut-zagorodzhennya-proty-plavzasobiv/ [34] https://t.me/wargonzo/12698 [35] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10360 ; https://twitter.com/franfran2424/status/1661032672783740928?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/franfran2424/status/1661033737889501185?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/franfran2424/status/1661035389333716992?s=20 [36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uuxbGrs1ZsWkrdKsRJ... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ub5r2CaSRnsC4V9AAmF... [37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/23/rosiyany-aktyvno-minuyut-livyj-bereg-dnipra-ta-vstanovlyuyut-zagorodzhennya-proty-plavzasobiv/ [38] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/23/rosiyany-aktyvno-minuyut-livyj-bereg-dnipra-ta-vstanovlyuyut-zagorodzhennya-proty-plavzasobiv/ [39] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1660771266544934912?s=20 [40] https://t.me/kaspiyskyberet/6567; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1661008487860809728?s=20 [41] https://t.me/mod_russia/26777 [42] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12229 [43] https://t.me/astrapress/27726 [44] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/23/gosduma-prinyala-popravki-ob-iz-yatii-zagranpasportov-u-prizyvnikov [45] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/strakh-pered-kontrnastupom-zs-ukrainy.html [46] https://t.me/grey_zone/18778; https://t.me/rusfleet/8384 [47] https://t.me/vrogov/9706; https://t.me/vrogov/9725 [48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [49] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9612 [50] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9618 [51] https://t.me/bbcrussian/46713; https://www.belta dot by/president/view/srok-odin-1-janvarja-lukashenko-poruchil-ustranit-k-novomu-godu-vse-nedostatki-v-zdravoohranenii-568112-2023/ [52] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/17823923; https://reform dot by/lukashenko-ne-poedet-na-jekonomicheskij-forum-v-sankt-peterburge-v-ijune; https://t.me/astrapress/27741 [53] https://t.me/modmilby/28016 [54] https://t.me/modmilby/28050 [55] https://t.me/modmilby/28029; https://t.me/modmilby/28035
- — Iran Update, May 25, 2023
- at 5/25/23 9:01pmJohanna Moore, Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here. Key Takeaways 1. Axis of Resistance news sources coordinated a disinformation campaign that claimed the United States will establish a new base in Iraq, likely to reignite domestic US pressure on policymakers to withdraw forces from the Middle East. 2. The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) stands to gain a significant increase in funds from Iraq’s 2023 budget, which very likely would position the group to improve its status as a parallel security institution in Iraq to state security forces. 3. Syrian regime military security coordinated with the IRGC Quds Force in Albu Kamal to monitor civilians, which may advance Iranian efforts to secure the Albu Kamal-Deir ez Zor City land route in eastern Syria. 4. An Iranian-backed militia leader stressed the need for secrecy around headquarters in Deir ez Zor City, likely to secure advanced weapons and IRGC Quds Force commanders from Israeli targeting. Iranian Activities in the Levant This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates. Axis of Resistance news sources coordinated a disinformation campaign that claimed the United States will establish a new base in Iraq, likely to reignite domestic US pressure on policymakers to withdraw forces from the Middle East. Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen English reported that the US is planning to build a new military base in Anbar Province, Iraq on May 23, citing an unidentified “Iraqi security official.”[1] CTP cannot verify this report, and such claims should be viewed with skepticism. Several Iranian state-affiliated media outlets circulated the Al Mayadeen report on their English-language sites, suggesting that the outlets coordinated with Al Mayadeen to target English-speaking audiences.[2] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have long sought the removal of US forces from the Middle East. US officials have not indicated that the United States will establish a new base in Anbar Province. The Axis of Resistance disinformation campaign could elevate the risk of an attack against US interests or personnel in Iraq within the coming weeks. The report could renew attention to the US force presence in Iraq and inspire lower-level Iranian-proxies or unaffiliated militants to attack US forces. Iranian-backed militants previously threatened to attack US forces in Iraq on May 15 after US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski commented on US plans to remain in the Middle East, but did not follow through with the attack.[3] Iranian-backed Iraqi proxy channels, contrastingly, have not responded to or republished the Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah media claims about the rumored US base in Anbar Province. Few media sources have published the report, which suggests local militants were not the target audience. An Iranian-backed militia leader stressed the need for secrecy around headquarters in Deir ez Zor City, likely to secure advanced weapons and IRGC Quds Force commanders from Israeli targeting. An IRGC-affiliated official discussed security measures at a local headquarters with unspecified Iranian-backed leaders in Deir ez Zor City on May 25.[4] He ordered the leaders not to restore buildings in the vicinity of headquarters across Deir ez Zor city to preserve the locations' secrecy.[5] Iranian-backed militias have previously repurposed civilian buildings into weapons depots in Deir ez Zor Province.[6] Greater operational security for headquarters in Deir ez Zor would provide security for IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed militants in Deir ez Zor and help Iran facilitate the transfer of advanced weapons systems into Syria. Iranian shipments of advanced air defense equipment and precision guided munitions that arrived in Syria through the Albu Kamal border crossing in Deir ez Zor Province were the targets of Israeli drone strikes in February and March, as CTP previously reported.[7] CTP previously assessed that the weapon shipments Israel targeted in Syria may have carried air defense system components. CTP has not recorded any Israeli airstrikes in eastern Syria since March 22, after which the escalation cycle between Israel and Iran resulted in the death of a US contractor. Since then, Iranian-backed militias have continued to arrive from Iraq into Syria.[8] Iran also has transferred unsophisticated air defense weapons to Syria.[9] IRGC Quds Force leadership additionally directed several measures in Deir ez Zor Province since late March to ensure the operational security of the Albu Kamal-Deir ez Zor land route.[10] Iran’s focus on operational security and shift to sending unsophisticated weapons to Syria suggests that Iran has taken an operational pause on bringing advanced weapons systems into Syria. Syrian regime military security coordinated with the IRGC Quds Force in Albu Kamal to monitor civilians, which may advance Iranian efforts to secure the Albu Kamal-Deir ez Zor City land route in eastern Syria. Syrian state security official Abu Haidar and the Albu Kamal District IRGC Quds Force Commander agreed to establish a Syrian military security detachment in Albu Kamal city on May 25.[11] Syrian military security forces have previously coordinated with Iranian-backed militias to conduct counter-ISIS operations and arrest locals accused of leaking military information.[12] CTP has not previously observed such coordination in the vicinity of Albu Kamal, however. Syrian regime forces’ coordination with Iran to monitor civilians indicates the regime is unable to challenge Iranian military development in Albu Kamal or that Iran needs regime forces to secure the area. Iranian securitization of the Al-Qaim-Albu Kamal border crossing and the land route to Deir ez Zor city enables the transfer of Iranian-backed militant personnel and military equipment, as CTP has previously reported.[13] Iranian Activities in Iraq This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates. The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) stands to gain a significant increase in funds from Iraq’s 2023 budget, which very likely would position the group to improve its status as a parallel security institution in Iraq to state security forces. Iraq’s 2023 draft budget nearly doubles the number of employees under the PMF from 122,000 to 238,075 employees.[14] The PMF’s total budget would increase by about 458 billion USD. The 2023 budget draft shows that the Ministry of Transportation, which is run by the Badr Organization’s Fatah party, would more than triple its budget. The Ministry of Higher Education, which is run by Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun party, would increase its budget by over 600 percent.[15] The PMF cultivates legitimacy within Iraqi communities by providing services that state run institutions may struggle to provide independently like social services and counter-ISIS operations. More funding and personnel may embolden and enable the PMF to intervene in Iraqi elections and engage in sectarian violence. PMF militias were accused of intimidating and killing protesters and activists in the lead up to the 2021 elections.[16] Iraq’s parliament recently passed a Shia Coordination Framework-backed election law that is expected to marginalize independent and minority political parties in Iraq, as CTP previously reported.[17] An emboldened PMF may seek to manipulate or intimidate voters in key districts to help secure votes in favor of Coordination Framework parties. In addition, Badr Organization militants likely committed a series of targeted killings of Sunni civilians in Diyala Province between February and March 2023.[18] Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri successfully pressured Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to remove Iraqi Special Forces from the province who had been deployed in response to the Badr-committed violence ultimately gaining de facto control.[19] [1] https://english [dot] almayadeen.net/news/politics/us-eyes-new-military-base-in-iraqs-oil-rich-region:-sources [2] https://thecradle [dot] co/article-view/25177/us-seeks-to-build-additional-military-base-in-iraqs-anbar ; https://kayhan[dot] ir/en/news/115346/source-us-seeking-to-build-base-in-iraq%E2%80%99s-oil-rich-region ; https://en [dot] mehrnews.com/news/201076/US-seeking-building-base-in-Iraq-s-oil-rich-region-source ; https://twitter.com/snntv_en/status/1661760671992668163 [3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-17-2023 [4] https://eyeofeuphrates (.) com/ar/news/2023/05/25/8620 [5] https://eyeofeuphrates (.) com/ar/news/2023/05/25/8620 [6] https://eyeofeuphrates (.) com/ar/news/2023/05/25/8620; https://deirezzor24 (dot) net/en/iranian-militias-continue-to-seize-civilian-homes-in-deir-ezzor/ [7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-7-2023 [8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-16-2023 [9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-24-2023 [10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-22-2023 [11] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/05/25/8621 [12] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2022/10/18/6573; https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/03/20/8014 [13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-20-2023 [14] https://iq.parliament dot iq/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9_%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9_%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9.pdf [15] https://iq.parliament dot iq/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9_%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9_%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9.pdf [16] https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/02/iraqi-voters-want-weaker-militias-a... [17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-20-2023 [18] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-u... [19] https://alrafidain dot tv/57977/
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25, 2023
- at 5/25/23 5:37pmKarolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Mason ClarkMay 25, 2023, 5pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on May 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on May 25 that the Wagner Group began handing over its positions in Bakhmut to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and claimed Wagner will entirely withdraw from the city on June 1. Footage posted on May 25 shows Prigozhin speaking with Wagner fighters in Bakhmut and announcing that Wagner began handing over their positions to the Russian MoD and withdrawing to rear areas of the city.[1] Prigozhin reminded some of the fighters that Wagner will withdraw from the city entirely and reconstitute, rest, and train following June 1.[2] Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner plans to leave behind ammunition and provisions for regular Russian troops if necessary and sardonically showed two Wagner fighters who he claimed he will leave behind for the Russian MoD.[3] ISW has previously reported that Prigozhin announced that Wagner would hand over its positions to the MoD starting on May 25 and withdraw from Bakhmut by June 1, but it remains unclear if Wagner will be able to withdraw the entirety of its contingent by June 1 and if Russian MoD troops will execute a successful relief in place.[4] Russia and Belarus signed agreements formally advancing preparations to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus as part of a longstanding effort to cement Russia’s de facto military control over Belarus, though Russia has not yet deployed nuclear weapons to Belarus and their possible deployment is highly unlikely to presage any Russian escalation. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin signed documents on the deployment of Russian non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory during a meeting of defense ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Minsk, Belarus on May 25.[5] Shoigu emphasized that Russia would retain control of the tactical nuclear weapons in the event of their deployment to Belarus and claimed that Belarusian aircraft are now capable of carrying nuclear weapons.[6] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously announced on March 25 that Russia would deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus by July 1, likely to renew tired information operations about the potential for nuclear escalation over the war in Ukraine.[7] Russia has long fielded nuclear weapons that are able to strike any target that tactical nuclear weapons launched from Belarus could also hit, and ISW continues to assess that Putin is extraordinarily unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[8] Shoigu also announced that Russian forces will deploy additional military contingents to Belarus to develop military infrastructure, expand joint combat training, and conduct reconnaissance activities near the borders of the Union State.[9] The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus requires both significant military infrastructure and Russian command and control over elements of the Belarusian Armed Forces. The Kremlin likely intends to use these requirements to further subordinate the Belarusian security sphere under Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the leaders of the Eurasian Economic Union member states and several other post-Soviet heads of state at the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Moscow on May 25, likely to expand sanctions evasion opportunities. Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov attended the meeting alongside leaders of non-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states, including Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon.[10] Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Executive Secretary Sergei Lebedev and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Secretary General Zhang Min also attended the meeting.[11] Putin, Pashinyan, and Tokayev all called on further development of the EAEU’s relationship with third-party countries, including the negotiation of free trade agreements with the United Arab Emirates, India, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, and Iran.[12] Tokayev highlighted efforts to create new international transport routes to China, India, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East, East Asia, and Southeast Asia.[13] Tokayev also offered to help Russia launch the 2873km Chelyabinsk-Bolshak-Iran high speed freight railway, a project similar to the recent agreement between Russia and Iran to build a segment of the North-South corridor railway project between Rasht and Astara in order to strengthen Russo-Iranian military-economic cooperation.[14] Putin also called for the EAEU to create technological alliances with third-party countries, likely aimed at securing critical components that Russia is struggling to produce or acquire itself.[15] The Kremlin is likely attempting to convince EAEU member states and other post-Soviet countries to aid in the Kremlin’s ongoing sanctions evasion schemes with China, Iran, and others by facilitating the logistics of those schemes.[16] Putin called for an increase in the number of new joint ventures under the common trademark ”made in the EAEU,” a measure likely aimed at rebranding Russian products as being EAEU products to avoid Western sanctions on exports.[17] Lukashenko and Tokayev both specifically called for the creation of a full-fledged Economic Union with a functioning common market, and Lukashenko claimed that EAEU representatives are discussing the creation of a common market for gas, oil, and petroleum products.[18] Belarus and Kazakhstan are likely both heavily involved in helping Russia evade sanctions, and the Kremlin is likely seeking to expand and formalize those relationships with the wider EAEU.[19] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin appears to be leveraging its dominance in the CSTO to court member states to procure dual-use technologies that Russia cannot directly purchase due to Western sanctions, and it appears that the Kremlin is attempting to similarly leverage its role in the EAEU.[20] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov announced that Russian officials have created seven territorial defense battalions in Belgorod Oblast as of May 24, likely in order to posture his personal engagement in the defense of Russian border areas following the May 22 all-Russian pro-Ukrainian raid into Belgorod Oblast.[21] Gladkov stated that the seven battalions comprise 3,000 people in total, noting that they are already combat-ready units.[22] Gladkov previously announced the creation of several territorial defense battalions in December 2022, and has likely re-upped discussion of them in response to increased anxiety in border areas following the May 22 raid.[23] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on May 24 that these battalions have a strong presence but are severely hindered by an inadequate weapons supply.[24] The milblogger claimed that United Russia Secretary General Andrey Turchak had urged President Putin to address the legal issues associated with providing weapons to the battalions a month ago.[25] These battalions, if left unfunded and unequipped, are very unlikely to have a substantial positive effect on the security of Russian border areas, however. The publicization of these formations is also likely meant to support ongoing Russian information operations that aim to generate support for a protracted war by portraying Ukraine as existentially threatening Russia. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin held a meeting with representatives of Russian oblasts bordering Ukraine to discuss fortifying border areas on May 24. Prigozhin proposed the creation of additional trenches, dugouts, and fire support along the Russia-Ukraine border, arguing that these structures can provide significant protection against possible military threats.[26] Prigozhin also emphasized the need to strengthen the presence of Russian forces along the border, expand the armament of border guards, and retrain them from using machine guns to grenade launchers.[27] Prigozhin stated that the May 22 raid of Belgorod Oblast by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian forces exposes how Russia lacks the rapid reaction forces needed to protect its borders against military threats.[28] Prigozhin stated that a general mobilization of the Russian population is inevitable, emphasizing the fact that Russian leadership can no longer snap its fingers to fix manpower shortcomings.[29] Prigozhin stated that a general mobilization should begin now in order to provide the people with the necessary training, a process that typically takes at least a minimum of four to six months.[30] Wagner and Russian forces have notably engaged in previous efforts to fortify border areas, and the recent Belgorod Oblast raid exposed major shortcomings in these efforts. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov reported on March 9 that Russian authorities spent 10 billion rubles (about $132 million) to construct the “Zasechnaya Line” of fortifications along Belgorod Oblast’s border with Ukraine.[31] Prigozhin announced the construction of a set of fortifications called the “Wagner Line” throughout Luhansk, Donetsk, and Belgorod oblasts in October 2022, and directly criticized the Russian bureaucracy for not supporting the construction of the line.[32] New calls to fortify Russian regions along the Russia-Ukraine border will likely have little substantial effect, with Russian and Wagner forces misallocating manpower that would be better suited supporting active offensive operations (or defenses in occupied Ukraine itself) by manning these fortifications. Existing fortifications and defensive preparations did little to thwart the limited May 22 raid into Belgorod. Prigozhin is likely taking advantage of information space anxieties surrounding this reality following the raid to build out his own domestic influence. Russian political strategist Konstantin Dolgov claimed on May 25 that he was fired as a result of his May 23 interview with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Dolgov published a post to his Telegram channel alleging that he was fired from his position with Russian propaganda platform Telega Online “because of an interview with Prigozhin” and refuted claims that he had previous plans to leave.[33] Prigozhin used his interview with Dolgov to highlight the massive scale of losses suffered by the Wagner Group during the Battle of Bakhmut, mount scathing critiques against Defense Minister Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, attack the families of Russian elites, and vaguely threaten violence against the broader Russian military establishment.[34] Dolgov complained that he is being personally punished for Prigozhin’s replies because Russian authorities cannot do anything about Prigozhin himself and suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin would disagree with his firing.[35] Dolgov’s firing may be part of a larger informational campaign pushed by Russian authorities that is aimed at quietly disenfranchising Prigozhin in an attempt to counterbalance Prigozhin’s ever-growing platform, which continues to deprive Russian military officials of informational oxygen. Russia conducted another massive Shahed-131/136 drone strike across Ukraine on the night of May 24 to 25. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 36 Shahed-131/136 drones at Ukraine from the northern and southern directions and that Ukraine shot down all 36 of the drones.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that some of the drones reached their intended targets through rear areas of Ukraine, including Kyiv Oblast.[37] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted on May 25 that Ukraine has destroyed 357 Shahed-type drones since Russia began using them in 2022.[38] The White House reported on May 15 that Russia has purchased over 400 drones (primarily Shaheds) from Iran since August 2022.[39] The suggestion that Ukraine has shot down 357 Shahed drones since August 2022 is likely inflated—Ukrainian officials may sometimes count drone crashes due to user error or technical malfunction as official shoot downs, so the actual number is likely to be somewhat lower. Russian President Vladimir Putin continued attempts to portray Russia as an effective international mediator by mediating negotiations between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti reported on May 25 that Pashinyan stated that Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed on a mutual recognition of territorial integrity.[40] Aliyev noted that Armenia and Azerbaijan could reach a peace agreement now that Armenia recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Pashinyan qualified that statement on May 22 and emphasized that Armenia would recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan on the condition that Azerbaijan ensures the security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian residents.[41] Russian media reported that Putin noted the importance of the agreement and facilitated bilateral talks with Pashinyan and Aliyev before holding a trilateral meeting.[42] European Council President Charles Michel has also held talks to normalize Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, and Putin is likely seeking to act as a diplomatic counter-balance to the European involvement in Eurasian affairs.[43] Key Takeaways Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on May 25 that the Wagner Group began handing over its positions in Bakhmut to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and claimed Wagner will entirely withdraw from the city on June 1. It remains unclear if Wagner will be able to withdraw the entirety of its contingent by June 1 and if Russian MoD troops will execute a successful relief in place. Russia and Belarus signed agreements formally advancing preparations to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus as part of a longstanding effort to cement Russia’s de facto military control over Belarus, though Russia has not yet deployed nuclear weapons to Belarus and their possible deployment is highly unlikely to presage any Russian escalation. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the leaders of the Eurasian Economic Union member states and several other post-Soviet heads of state at the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Moscow on May 25, likely to expand sanctions evasion opportunities. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov announced that Russian officials have created seven territorial defense battalions in Belgorod Oblast as of May 24, likely in order to posture his engagement in the defense of Russian border areas following the May 22 all-Russian pro-Ukrainian raid into Belgorod Oblast. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin held a meeting with representatives of Russian oblasts bordering Ukraine to discuss fortifying border areas on May 24. Wagner and Russian forces have notably engaged in previous efforts to fortify border areas, and the recent Belgorod Oblast raid exposed major shortcomings in these efforts. Russian political strategist Konstantin Dolgov claimed on May 25 that he was fired as a result of his May 23 interview with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Russia conducted another massive Shahed-131/136 drone strike across Ukraine on the night of May 24 to 25. Russian President Vladimir Putin continued attempts to portray Russia as an effective international mediator by mediating negotiations between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and south of Kreminna. Russian forces continued limited ground attacks around Bakhmut as Wagner Group forces reportedly began their withdrawal from frontline areas the city. Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces shot down six drones over Crimea. Russian forces are reportedly continuing to recruit personnel with various diseases. Russian occupation officials continue to announce partnerships with various local Russian officials to improve the standard of living in occupied territories. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts) Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts Activities in Russian-occupied areas Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and south of Kreminna on May 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka, Kharkiv Oblast (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (12km south of Kreminna).[44] Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows Ukrainian forces recapturing positions on the eastern outskirts of Spirne (25km south of Kreminna) on an unspecified date.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles continued near Bilohorivka and Spirne and that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Kreminna area on May 24.[46] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Click here to read ISW’s new retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut. Russian forces continued limited ground attacks around Bakhmut as Wagner Group forces reportedly began their withdrawal from frontline areas the city on May 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the direction of Bakhmut and Ivanivske (3km southwest of Bakhmut).[47] Footage posted on May 25 shows Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin speaking with Wagner fighters in Bakhmut and discussing how they have begun to withdraw to the rear of Bakhmut and will entirely withdraw from the city on June 1.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have shifted their focus to the T0504 Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut and O0506 Khromove-Bakhmut highways and remarked that heavy fighting continues on the flanks of Bakhmut.[49] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are now trying to capture Ivanivske and Khromove (3km due west of Bakhmut).[50] Several Russian sources indicated that forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are increasingly arriving in Bakhmut and supplanting Wagner fighters within the city.[51] Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north of Donetsk City near Avdiivka and Novokalynove; on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[52] Geolocated footage posted on May 22 shows that Russian forces have made a marginal advance towards Polihrafichna Street in western Marinka.[53] Additional geolocated footage posted on May 23 shows that Ukrainian troops may hold positions south of Avdiivka near Opytne.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that positional battles continued in the Avdiivka area near Novobakhmutivka and Novokalynove.[55] Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 25.[56] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian sources claim that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft over Zaporizhia Oblast on May 25. A Russian milblogger published footage purportedly showing the aftermath of a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile defenses striking a Russian Su-25 in an unspecified location in Zaporizhia Oblast.[57] Other milbloggers amplified reports of smoke near Melitopol and claimed that Ukrainian forces downed the Su-25.[58] Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine with FAB-500 aerial bombs on May 25. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces conducted two KAB (a FAB-500 variant) strikes near Beryslav in Kherson Oblast.[59] Milbloggers published footage purportedly showing Russian aerial bomb strikes near Beryslav on May 24 and 25.[60] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces shot down six drones over Crimea on May 25. Crimean occupation administration head Sergei Aksyonov and Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that Russian air defenses and elements of the Black Sea Fleet shot down six drones over Sevastopol and other areas of Crimea on the night of May 24 to 25.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched seven drones, which Russian forces downed near Dzhankoi, Sterehushche, Maslove, and Zavetne.[62] Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) Russian forces are reportedly continuing to recruit personnel with various diseases as part of an ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign. BBC’s Russian service reported on May 5 that the Russian MoD refused to expand the list of diseases that would exempt an individual from mobilization.[63] Russian independent news outlet Verstka reported that Russian forces recruit personnel who are HIV positive, have tuberculosis, and hepatitis.[64] Verstka reported that a minimum of hundreds of Russian military personnel, including contract soldiers, mobilized personnel, and volunteers, have HIV. ISW has previously reported on Russian forces and the Wagner Group recruiting personnel with various diseases.[65] The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to face production challenges due to personnel shortages. Russian First Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Vasily Osmakov reportedly stated that the main challenge facing Russian industry is a lack of personnel, not sanctions.[66] Director for Special Assignments of Concern at Uralvagonzavod (Russia’s sole tank factory) Kirill Fedorov reportedly claimed that one of Uralvagonzavod’s manufacturers ChTZ-Uraltrak increased the number of its employees by 30 percent in order to increase production for the war, however.[67] ISW has previously reported on Russian defense firms struggling with personnel and specialist shortages.[68] Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) Russian occupation officials continue to announce partnerships with various local Russian officials to improve the standard of living in occupied territories. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin stated on May 25 that he met with Kemerovo Oblast Governor Sergey Tsivilev to discuss restoring roads, schools, hospitals, and other civilian infrastructure in occupied Horlivka, to which Kemerovo Oblast is a patron.[69] Tsivilev announced that Kemerovo Oblast has organized a “summer vacation” for 500 children of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[70] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on May 25 that a group of Russian federal officials visited occupied Kherson Oblast for a two-day working trip to discuss opportunities to improve socio-economic conditions in the region, including developing schools and regulating the price and supply of medicine.[71] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov thanked Russian President Putin on May 25 for authorizing the provision of 6.7 rubles (about $83.7 million) for road repair.[72] Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate economic control of occupied territories. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on May 24 that his administration has officially introduced a decree aimed at regulating retail prices during the ongoing period of martial law.[73] Saldo stated that the occupied Kherson Oblast Department of Retail and Trade created a list of goods that are regulated against maximum prices, to which individual entrepreneurs, occupation authorities, and legal entities must adhere. Saldo stated that those who violate the order will first receive a warning and, for additional offenses, face fines ranging from 20,000 rubles (about $250) to 100,000 (about $1,250).[74] Russian occupation authorities continue to advertise the successful provision of housing certificates and lump-sum social support payments to residents of occupied territories. Kherson Oblast occupation Ministry of Labor and Social Policy claimed on May 25 that every applicant who applied for housing certificates and one-time payments between January 2023 and June 2023 will receive housing certificates and a one-time, lump-sum payment.[75] Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.) ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine. See topline text. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://t.me/readovkanews/59497; https://t.me/grey_zone/18830; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1040; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21580 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/59586 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/25/evgeniy-prigozhin-ob-yavil-o-nachale-vyvoda-podrazdeleniy-chvk-vagnera-iz-bahmuta; https://t.me/istories_media/2578 [2] https://t.me/readovkanews/59497; https://t.me/grey_zone/18830; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1040; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21580 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/59586 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/25/evgeniy-prigozhin-ob-yavil-o-nachale-vyvoda-podrazdeleniy-chvk-vagnera-iz-bahmuta; https://t.me/istories_media/2578 [3] https://t.me/readovkanews/59497; https://t.me/grey_zone/18830; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1040; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21580 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/59586 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/25/evgeniy-prigozhin-ob-yavil-o-nachale-vyvoda-podrazdeleniy-chvk-vagnera-iz-bahmuta; https://t.me/istories_media/2578 [4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052223 [5] https://t.me/mod_russia/26833; https://t.me/mod_russia/26832; https://t.me/mod_russia/26834; https://t.me/modmilby/28149; https://t.me/modmilby/28148; https://t.me/readovkanews/59496; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/25/v-minske-podpisany-dokumenty-o-razmeschenii-rossiyskogo-yadernogo-oruzhiya-vbelarusi [6] https://t.me/mod_russia/26833; https://t.me/mod_russia/26832; https://t.me/mod_russia/26834; https://t.me/modmilby/28149; https://t.me/modmilby/28148; https://t.me/readovkanews/59496; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/25/v-minske-podpisany-dokumenty-o-razmeschenii-rossiyskogo-yadernogo-oruzhiya-vbelarusi [7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032523 [8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032523 [9] https://t.me/mod_russia/26829 [10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71204 [11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71204 [12] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71204 [13] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71204 [14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051623 [15] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71204 [16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031723 [17] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71204 [18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71204 [19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031723 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/russians-flood-kazakhstan-with-sanction... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86807; https://t.me/epoddubny/16069 ; https://vk dot com/gladkov_vv?w=wall639631882_893299 [22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86807; https://t.me/epoddubny/16069 ; https://vk dot com/gladkov_vv?w=wall639631882_893299 [23] https://t.me/vvgladkov/1371 [24] https://t.me/sashakots/39893 [25] https://t.me/sashakots/39893 [26] https://ms-news dot ru/250522178-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://24tnews dot ru/20230525/48164-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://dzen dot ru/a/ZG7DzePg13HyNwhC [27] https://ms-news dot ru/250522178-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://24tnews dot ru/20230525/48164-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://dzen dot ru/a/ZG7DzePg13HyNwhC [28] https://ms-news dot ru/250522178-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://24tnews dot ru/20230525/48164-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://dzen dot ru/a/ZG7DzePg13HyNwhC [29] https://ms-news dot ru/250522178-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://24tnews dot ru/20230525/48164-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://dzen dot ru/a/ZG7DzePg13HyNwhC [30] https://ms-news dot ru/250522178-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://24tnews dot ru/20230525/48164-vseobshaia-mobilizaciia-prosto-neizbejna-evgenii-prigojin-vstretilsia-s-predstaviteliami-prigranichnyh-oblastei-i-obsydil-problemy/ ; https://dzen dot ru/a/ZG7DzePg13HyNwhC [31] https://t.me/notes_veterans/8402; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/45957; https://vk dot com/gladkov_vv?z=video639631882_456240967%2F70e1668eeb82093fc0%2Fpl_wall_639631882 [32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... [33] https://t.me/superdolgov/9448; https://t.me/superdolgov/9449; https://t.me/superdolgov/9453 [34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052423 [35] https://t.me/superdolgov/9448 [36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YbUz2j2tFCKN9mYrjX... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PHsq4ZncbnWdg7bvDkw... https://www.facebook.com/JointForcesCommandAFU/posts/pfbid0smu4kKfQ3s9SH... https://t.me/kpszsu/2532 [37] https://t.me/vrogov/9755; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21575 [38] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02UNXRqNoVkX... [39] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-military-cooperation-d982dd3faf78... [40] https://ria.ru/20230525/tselostnost-1874144007.html [41] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17844161 [42] https://ria dot ru/20230525/tselostnost-1874144007.html; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2023/05/25/20522630.shtml; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2023/05/25/20522828.shtml [43] https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/14/press-remarks-by-president-charles-michel-following-the-trilateral-meeting-with-president-aliyev-of-azerbaijan-and-prime-minister-pashinyan-of-armenia/; https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/04/statement-of-european-council-president-charles-michel-and-french-president-emmanuel-macron-following-the-meeting-with-president-of-azerbaijan-ilham-aliyev-and-prime-minister-of-armenia-nikol-pashinyan/; https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/02/president-michel-s-discussions-with-president-aliyev-of-azerbaijan-and-acting-prime-minister-pashinyan-of-armenia/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67200; https://rus.azatutyun dot am/a/31041706.html; https://tass dot ru/politika/16209491; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/69729 [44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YbUz2j2tFCKN9mYrjX... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CYBEPubZFbvGFFQLzB... [45] https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1661371259685412868; https://t.me/k_2_54/107; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1661346284744130562 [46] https://t.me/rybar/47538 [47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CYBEPubZFbvGFFQLzB... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YbUz2j2tFCKN9mYrjX... [48] https://t.me/readovkanews/59497; https://t.me/grey_zone/18830; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1040; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21580 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/59586 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/25/evgeniy-prigozhin-ob-yavil-o-nachale-vyvoda-podrazdeleniy-chvk-vagnera-iz-bahmuta; https://t.me/istories_media/2578 [49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/45803 [50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/45803 [51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10366; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86810; https://t.me/brussinf/6071 [52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CYBEPubZFbvGFFQLzB... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YbUz2j2tFCKN9mYrjX... [53] https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1661604878505099264; https://t.me/tankistrossii100/1528 [54] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10360; https://twitter.com/Noobieshunta_/status/1661741243494469636 [55] https://t.me/rybar/47538; https://t.me/readovkanews/59481 [56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CYBEPubZFbvGFFQLzB... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YbUz2j2tFCKN9mYrjX... [57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/45825 [58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86862; https://t.me/milinfolive/101204; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/24559 [59] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02U9xyNqNK9h... https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/25/narazi-vorozhyh-raketonosiyiv-u-chornomu-mori-nemaye-nataliya-gumenyuk/ [60] https://t.me/sashakots/39901; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86808 [61] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2542; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36686; https://t.me/razvozhaev/2860; https://t.me/readovkanews/59487; https://t.me/readovkanews/59490 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/59584 [62] https://t.me/rybar/47539; https://t.me/rybar/47546 [63] https://t.me/bbcrussian/46814 [64] https://verstka dot media/kak-v-ukraine-voyuyut-rossiyane-s-vich-i-gepatitom; https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/05/25/zato-ne-kak-sobaka-sdohnu-a-kak-geroy; [65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [66] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/102637 [67] https://t.me/readovkanews/59504 [68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... [69] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3452 [70] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3452 [71] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/819; https://t.me/aakherson/293; https://t.me/readovkanews/59514 [72] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2543 [73] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9649; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/814 [74] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9649; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/814 [75] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9657
- — Iran Update, May 22, 2023
- at 5/25/23 6:08amAmin Soltani, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, and Kitaneh FitzpatrickThe Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.Key Takeaways1. Iran condemned the Arab League’s resolution about arming militias in Syria and is very unlikely to stop supporting its proxies in Syria.2. Iran is establishing a military base in eastern Syria, likely advancing efforts to secure permanent access to critical transportation routes across the country.3. Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian replaced Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani as the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary on May 22, and is unlikely to change the regime’s national security policy.Iranian Activities in the LevantThis section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.Iran condemned the Arab League’s resolution about arming militias in Syria and is very unlikely to stop supporting its proxies in Syria. Syrian state media released the final communique of the Arab League Summit in Jeddah on May 19, which highlighted Arab state unity and uncharacteristically rejected external support for non-state militias.[1] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani expressed dissatisfaction with the resolution.[2] Bashar al Assad met with Saudi and Emirati leaders in Jeddah to strengthen economic and bilateral ties, demonstrating Assad’s increased opportunities for economic engagement with neighboring countries.[3] Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have not indicated willingness or capacity to collaborate militarily with Syria, leaving Iran as one of Assad’s key security partners. Saudi Arabia normalized relations with Iran on March 10 and the United Arab Emirates is funding key infrastructure projects in Iran, demonstrating Arab League states’ mixed policy toward Iran.[4]Iran is establishing a military base in eastern Syria, likely advancing efforts to secure permanent access to critical transportation routes across the country. The Lebanon-based construction company Jihad al Binaa began building a permanent Iranian military base including a barracks, weapons storage facility, training camp, and dozens of houses for families of Iranian-affiliated militants in Deir ez Zor City on May 19.[5] Jihad al Binaa is a US-sanctioned company that Iran funds and Lebanese Hezbollah operates.[6] A senior Iranian military and religious delegation toured several military sites in Deir ez Zor Province, including the new military base in Deir ez Zor City on May 20.[7] Senior Iranian officials have previously arrived to Deir ez Zor Province to assess operational security ahead of expanding operations in Syria.[8] Iranian militants established two other military bases in Syria that reinforce a long-term Iranian effort to secure multiple ground and air routes into Syria. Popular Mobilization Forces constructed 500 prefabricated residential units near Aleppo city following the February 6 earthquake and may have used them to establish long-term housing for their troops, as CTP previously reported.[9] Iranian-backed militants began constructing a permanent military base in southern Damascus on May 17.[10] Iranian bases in Aleppo, Damascus, and Deir ez Zor ensure Iran’s ability to transfer weapons to its proxy network in the Levant. Ongoing Iranian infrastructure projects indicate that the Arab League resolution condemning arming militias is very unlikely to deter Iranian activity in Syria. Iranian Domestic AffairsThis section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian replaced Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani as the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary on May 22, and is unlikely to change the regime’s national security policy.[11] The SNSC is composed of senior regime officials and is charged with deliberating on Iran’s defense and national security policies. Ahmadian is an extended member of the IRGC Command Network, a group of commanders and associates who wield significant influence over regime decision-making.[12] The Command Network is comprised of hardline individuals who are likely to maintain the status quo and who have historically opposed reformist policies. Ahmadian was one of the 24 IRGC commanders who sent a threatening letter to former reformist President Mohammad Khatami in July 1999, warning him that the IRGC would act if he did not rein in reformist currents.[13] Ahmadian is also a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, a governmental body that arbitrates legislative disputes and advises the Supreme Leader.[14] Ahmadian began his IRGC service during the Iran-Iraq War, became IRGC Navy Commander in 1989, IRGC Joint Staff Chief in 2000, and IRGC Strategic Studies Center Head in 2007.[15]Shamkhani’s departure is significant given his ten-year tenure as SNSC Secretary, but not surprising given months-long reports of his departure. Reports in November 2022 suggested that Shamkhani resigned after hardline officials advocated for his dismissal because of his handling of the Mahsa Amini protest movement.[16] CTP is considering the hypothesis that Ahmadian’s appointment may have been a partial effort to appease hardline factions who were allegedly dissatisfied with Shamkhani's response to recent unrest. Hardline factions, including the IRGC Command Network, may assess that Ahmadian will be more willing to support future crackdowns on anti-regime demonstrations.[1] https://sana [dot] sy/?p=1897417 [2] https://mfa [dot] ir/portal/NewsView/719821[3] https://sana [dot] sy/?p=1897008 ; https://sana [dot] sy/?p=1897396 [4] https://iranpress [dot] com/content/77413/uae-interested-developing-relations-with-iran-using-the-north-south-corridor ; https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-iran-restore-relations-in-deal... [5] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/05/20/8570; https://www.syriahr.com/%d8%a8%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d8%aa%d8%ad%d9%88%d9%8a%d9%84%d9%87%d8%a7-%d9%84%d9%85%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b9%d8%b3%d9%83%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%80-%d9%80%d9%85%d9%80-%d9%80%d9%8a%d9%80/608811/[6] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=10053[7] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/05/21/8578[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-22-2023[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-8-2023[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-17-2023[11] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020301000993[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/pdf_uploadana...[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/pdf_uploadana...[14] https://nournews dot ir/Fa/News/140248[15] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85118490 ; https://nournews dot ir/Fa/News/140248[16] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-18
- — Russia Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 22, 2023
- at 5/25/23 5:33amKarolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. KaganMay 22, 2023, 8:30pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 4pm ET on May 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted a raid into Belgorod Oblast on May 22. Russian sources began reporting on the morning of May 22 that a detachment of the RDK and LSR consisting of two tanks, an armored personnel carrier, and nine other armored vehicles crossed the international border and captured Kozinka, a settlement in the Grayvoron region of Belgorod Oblast within 600 meters of the border with Sumy Oblast.[1] Several Russian sources claimed that the grouping then captured the settlements of Glotovo and Gora Podol (3km and 5km from the border, respectively), although some milbloggers disputed claims that the attack completely captured Glotovo or Gora Podol, instead reporting that RDK forces only got to the Glotovo House of Culture.[2] ISW has not yet observed geolocated confirmation that the RDK or LSR reached Glotovo or Gora Podol. Geolocated footage posted on May 22 does confirm that the RDK struck a border post near Kozinka before crossing the border with at least one tank.[3] The RDK also posted footage reportedly showing the body of a Russian border guard in a border station, likely from the border crossing near Kozinka.[4] Russian milbloggers later claimed that Russian troops retook control of all three settlements.[5] Some Russian sources additionally reported that Russian forces repelled pro-Ukrainian sabotage groups near Dronovka, about 22km northwest of Kozinka.[6] The RDK additionally posted footage reportedly outside two settlements near the border area in Bryansk Oblast, but the nature of this incursion is unclear and ISW has not observed additional evidence or discourse surrounding actions in Bryansk Oblast on May 22.[7]Ukrainian officials noted that they are aware of the attack but denied any direct involvement by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov noted that the RDK and LSR are comprised exclusively of Russian citizens and reported that the groups launched an operation in Belgorod Oblast to “liberate these territories...from the so-called Putin regime” and create a “security zone” by the border to protect Ukrainian civilians from further Russian shelling.[8] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Mykhailo Podolyak stated that Ukraine is observing and studying the situation but “has no direct relation to it,” noting that armed anti-regime Russian partisan movements are inevitable against the backdrop of the war.[9]The raid prompted a slate of responses from local and federal Russian officials. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov announced on May 22 the start of a counterterrorism operation regime in order to “ensure the safety of citizens in Belgorod Oblast.”[10] While some social media users posted footage claiming to show an official evacuation from the Grayvoron region, the Belgorod Oblast Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that it never announced an evacuation and suggested that some individuals may be leaving of their own accord.[11] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Federal Security Service (FSB), and Border Service reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin on an “attempt by Ukrainian saboteurs to break into Belgorod Oblast.”[12] Peskov also accused Ukraine of staging the incident in order to distract from the situation in Bakhmut.[13] A Russian milblogger additionally claimed that the Russian military leadership decided to deploy the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) to the Belgorod Oblast border area in order to counter the attack.[14]The Russian information space responded with a similar degree of panic, factionalism, and incoherency as it tends to display when it experiences significant informational shocks. Some milbloggers fixated on the fact that the RDK and LSR are comprised of mostly Russians and labeled them traitors to Russia, baselessly accusing them of working under the GUR.[15] Several milbloggers additionally speculated that the attack was a purposeful information operation intended to distract from the recent Russian capture of Bakhmut and to instill panic in the Russian information space in advance of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.[16] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin remarked that he has long warned that such cross-border raids may be part of a wider Ukrainian counteroffensive strategy.[17] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin took advantage of the incident to accuse the Russian government and its bureaucratic inertia of contributing to the attack and criticized the Russian MoD for being unable to strengthen Russian borders and defend Russia.[18] The first observed line of Russian defensive fortifications notably runs 2km in from of Gora Podol, and the suggestion that RDK forces managed to penetrate the defensive line emphasizes the weakness of such fortifications at least when not fully manned by well-prepared and well-equipped soldiers. While the majority of milbloggers responded with relatively varied concern, anxiety, and anger, the information space did not coalesce around one coherent response, which indicates first and foremost that the attack took Russian commentators by surprise.Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces will withdraw from the entire frontline in Ukraine after June 1 in order to reconstitute and train for about two months. Prigozhin claimed on May 21 – one day after he declared victory in Bakhmut City – that Wagner forces will give Russian conventional forces control of Bakhmut on May 25 and completely withdraw from the entire frontline by June 1 to rest and reconstitute over a two-month period.[19] Prigozhin also claimed that any reports of Wagner assault operations during that two-month period are fake unless he says otherwise. ISW previously assessed that Wagner forces are unlikely to continue fighting beyond Bakhmut due to severe depletion and the culmination of their offensive capabilities.[20] The two-month reconstitution period Prigozhin has announced could have Wagner forces sitting out key parts of the Ukrainian counter-offensive depending on when and how it begins.Ukrainian officials stated that limited fighting continued in and around Bakhmut on May 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that fighting continues in Bakhmut and that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut) and south of Ivanivske (immediately west of Bakhmut).[21] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reiterated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in a fortified area in western Bakhmut and that fighting for heights north and south of Bakhmut continues.[22] Geolocated footage published on May 21 shows that Wagner forces advanced towards the T0504 entrance to southwestern Bakhmut.[23] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing just west of Bakhmut near Khromove as of May 21.[24] Another milblogger claimed on May 22 that Russian forces attempted a limited ground attack south of Bakhmut near Bila Hora.[25] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin, Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces began clearing and demining operations on the western outskirts of Bakhmut.[26]The Russian informational response to the capture of Bakhmut has thus far focused on competing for responsibility for the victory rather than discussing the resulting military situation. Prominent Russian milbloggers amplified a document allegedly from the Russian MoD that would grant state awards for the capture of Bakhmut to Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Alexey Kim, MoD deputies Tatyana Shevtsova and Ruslan Tsalikov, and Ksenia Shoigu, the daughter of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu – notably omitting Wagner Group personnel and its affiliates, such as Prigozhin and Army General Sergey Surovikin.[27] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that DNR Head Pushilin announced the creation of a specific award commemorating the Battle of Bakhmut but complained that Russia should not hand out the medal to those who did not actually fight in Bakhmut.[28] Prigozhin complained that Russia has not issued state awards to dead Wagner fighters for the Bakhmut effort, and that the MoD had never even awarded Wagner fighters medals commemorating the capture of Palmyra, Syria.[29] Russian milbloggers amplified footage showing a Wagner commander awarding personnel with Wagner’s own internal award commemorating Bakhmut, likely attempting to beat the Russian MoD in solidifying its claims in the capture of Bakhmut.[30] A Russian milblogger affiliated with the nationalist, pro-war Angry Patriots Club criticized Prigozhin for claiming sole responsibility for the capture of Bakhmut, claiming that conventional Russian forces defended Bakhmut’s flanks and that the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Guards Airborne Division, Western Military District) has supported Wagner forces since the early part of the Bakhmut effort.[31]The hyperfocus on claiming victory in Bakhmut distracts from the precarious Russian military situation in and around Bakhmut, underscoring the weight of Prigozhin’s influence in the information space. The Russian military situation in Bakhmut is particularly vulnerable as the Russian offensive effort in the area has likely culminated, granting Ukrainian forces the opportunity to launch further counterattacks on Bakhmut’s already-weakened flanks.[32] Wagner’s withdrawal in contact will also likely result in the Russian MoD manning defensive lines with poorly trained and provisioned conventional units similar to those that retreated from their positions while defending against Ukrainian counterattacks earlier in May.[33] The Russian information space is largely ignoring these vulnerabilities, however. Girkin complained that the Russian focus on capturing Bakhmut was a “strategic failure” that resulted in an “unnecessary and Pyrrhic” victory.[34] Girkin criticized Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for prolonging the effort to take Bakhmut and distracting from preparations to defend against a coming Ukrainian counteroffensive.[35]Russian forces launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukrainian infrastructure on the night of May 21-22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 22 that Russian forces launched 21 Shahed drones at Ukraine and 21 missiles at Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia cities and Kharkiv Oblast, including four Kh-101/555 air-launched cruise missiles, five Kh-22 cruise missiles, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, five S-300 missiles, and four other unspecified missiles.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all of the Kh-101/555 missiles and Shahed drones. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces may have lost the desire to strike Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts from the northern direction with guided aerial bombs due to the downing of two Russian Mi-8 helicopters, one Su-34 aircraft, and one Su-35 aircraft in Bryansk Oblast on May 13.[37] Key TakeawaysElements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russian Legion (LSR) conducted a raid into Belgorod Oblast on May 22.Ukrainian officials noted that they are aware of the attack but denied any direct involvement by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The raid prompted a slate of responses from local and federal Russian officials.The Russian information space responded with a similar degree of panic, factionalism, and incoherency as it tends to display when it experiences significant informational shocks.Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces will withdraw from the entire frontline in Ukraine after June 1 in order to reconstitute and train for about two months.Ukrainian officials stated that limited fighting continued in and around Bakhmut on May 22.The Russian informational response to the capture of Bakhmut has thus far focused on competing for responsibility for the victory rather than discussing the resulting military situation. The hyperfocus on claiming victory in Bakhmut distracts from the precarious Russian military situation in and around Bakhmut, underscoring the weight of Prigozhin’s influence in the information space.Russian forces launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukrainian infrastructure on the night of May 21-22.Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction.Russian forces made marginal gains in the Avdiivka area and did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant reportedly lost power for the seventh time since the beginning of the war.The Russian military is reportedly lowering the length of training for convicts in order to compensate for heavy losses.Russian occupation authorities announced that preliminary voting for the ruling United Russia Party has commenced in occupied territories.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsActivities in Russian-occupied areasRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction on May 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions towards Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk).[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Western Group of Forces stopped three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups about 20km southeast of Kupyansk near Tymivka, Kyslivka, and Ivanivka.[39] A Russian milblogger warned that Ukrainian forces may be preparing to attack positions of the Western Military District (WMD)’s 1st Guards Tank Army and 6th Combined Arms Army on this sector of the front.[40]Russian forces continued ground attacks and have made incremental advances south of Kreminna as of May 22. Geolocated footage posted on May 22 indicates that Russian troops have advanced near the filtration station on the southeastern outskirts of Bilohorivka (about 13km south of Kreminna).[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Ivano-Darivka (23km south of Kreminna).[42]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)See topline text on Bakhmut.Russian forces made marginal gains in the Avdiivka area as of May 22. Geolocated footage published on May 21 shows that Russian forces made marginal territorial gains southwest of Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka), Vodyane (6km southweset of Avdiivka), and Marinka (18km west of Donetsk City).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked near Sieverne (7km west of Avdiivka) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[45] Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Head Pavlo Kyrylenko reported that Russian forces shelled Avdiivka with cluster munitions.[46] One Russian milblogger expressed concern that Ukrainian forces are concentrating armor for an offensive effort from Avdiivka against Donetsk City, but another milblogger claimed that the alleged armor buildup is insufficient for such an effort.[47]Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 22.Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian sources continued to express concern about Ukrainian positions on the Dnipro River islands ahead of an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration amplified footage on May 22 purportedly showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions on unspecified islands in the Dnipro River delta with high-precision projectiles.[48] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed that rumors about Ukrainian forces potentially crossing the Dnipro River and the coming counteroffensive are only propaganda promoting fear and uncertainty. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain control over the islands in the Dnipro River delta and that Russian forces drive Ukrainian forces off the islands with aerial bombs.[49]The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost power for the seventh time since the beginning of the war. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafel Grossi stated on May 22 that the ZNPP was completely disconnected from the national electric grid for several hours, forcing the plant to rely on external diesel generators for power.[50] Grossi reiterated calls for increased efforts to restore backup powerlines and for the IAEA monitoring contingent to receive access to the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP) switchyard to provide backup power to the ZNPP. Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported that Russian shelling cut the only operational power line to the ZNPP.[51] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the ZNPP, however.[52] ISW has previously reported on Russian militarization of the ZNPP.[53]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian military is reportedly reducing the length of training for convicts in order to compensate for heavy losses. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 22 that the Russian military leadership has reduced the training period for convicts at a training camp in Starobilsk Raion in Russian occupied Luhansk Oblast from four weeks to 10 days.[54] ISW previously assessed that the Russian forces are diluting their combat effectiveness with poorly trained personnel in an attempt to make up for high casualties.[55] Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russian occupation authorities announced that preliminary voting for the ruling United Russia Party has commenced in occupied territories. Russian occupation authorities in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia oblasts announced on May 22 that residents may vote for their preferred candidates online from May 22 to 28, or in-person from May 26-28.[56] Russian occupation authorities in occupied Kherson Oblast did not comment on preliminary voting, though Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that Kherson Oblast occupation authorities are preparing for the autumn regional elections.[57]Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev stated on May 22 that there continues to be no evidence that Russian forces have formed ground strike groups in Belarus or Russia though Russian forces maintain a military presence in Belarus.[58] Nayev stated that Russian forces continue to maintain two State Border Protection groups totaling 18,000 personnel in southern Belarus and Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts.[59] Nayev stated that the main contingent of Russian forces that had been in Belarus has moved to Rostov Oblast, Russia and then deployed to Donetsk Oblast after training at Belarusian training grounds.[60] Nayev stated that Russian forces maintain 13 Russian fixed-wing aircraft on Belarusian territory, including eight Su-34s, three Su-30SMs, two Su-24MRs, and 12 Mi-8, Mi-24, and Mi-28N helicopters.[61]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/rybar/47410 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/59337; https://t... https://t.me/shot_shot/51738[2] https://t.me/rybar/47396; https://t.me/rybar/47395; https://t.me/rusic...[3] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1660574156033753089?s=20; ht... https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1660648043996217346?s=20 [4] **GRAPHIC** https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1660591308082118657?s=20[5] https://t.me/notes_veterans/9600; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9602; ht...[6] https://t.me/krasnaya_yaruga31/2272; https://t.me/krasnaya_yaruga31/227...[7] https://t.me/russvolcorps/513 ; https://t.me/rospartizan/1707; http...[8] https://suspilne.media/483544-u-belgorodskij-oblasti-zaavili-pro-proriv-...[9] https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1660630277289308162[10] https://t.me/vvgladkov/2258[11] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1660640828505878529; https://tw... https://t.me/milinfolive/101041; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21527; https://t...[12] https://iz dot ru/1516564/2023-05-22/peskov-zaiavil-chto-putinu-dolozhili-o-popytke-proryva-ukrainskoi-drg-v-belgorodskoi-oblasti; https://iz dot ru/1516505/2023-05-22/peskov-nazval-tceliu-diversii-pod-belgorodom-otvlechenie-vnimaniia-ot-artemovska; https://t.me/bazabazon/17848; https://t.me/istories_media/2560; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/24421[13] https://iz dot ru/1516564/2023-05-22/peskov-zaiavil-chto-putinu-dolozhili-o-popytke-proryva-ukrainskoi-drg-v-belgorodskoi-oblasti; https://iz dot ru/1516505/2023-05-22/peskov-nazval-tceliu-diversii-pod-belgorodom-otvlechenie-vnimaniia-ot-artemovska; https://t.me/bazabazon/17848; https://t.me/istories_media/2560; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/24421[14] https://t.me/Ateobreaking/88622[15] [16] https://t.me/notes_veterans/9599; https://t.me/sashakots/39849; https:...[17] https://t.me/strelkovii/4982 [18] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1019; https://t.me/concordgroup_offi...[19] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1012; https://understandingwar.org/b...[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HgsC6V8vR681X4GbB6x... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xKy2dS43VHq8ZQTCVLV...[22] https://t.me/annamaliar/779[23] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1660394627696869381?s=20; https://twitter.com/EdsenTheWeather/status/1660271355881725954?s=20; https://twitter.com/EdsenTheWeather/status/1660271762104283137?s=20; https://twitter.com/small10space/status/1660584081199964160?s=20; https://twitter.com/M0nstas/status/1660594262545711104?s=20; https://www.tiktok.com/@ferbootboom/video/7235716869615783173[24] https://t.me/rybar/47359[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/12673[26] https://t.me/orchestra_w/6820; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1014;... https://t.me/orchestra_w/6820; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1014[27] https://t.me/rusbrief/119087; https://t.me/rybar/47383[28] https://riafan dot ru/24066642-prigozhin_medal_za_osvobozhdenie_artemovska_luchshe_ne_vipuskat_esli_ona_budet_razdavat_sya_vsem_podryad; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1019; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1020; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1017; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1018[29] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1019; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1020; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1017; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1018[30] https://t.me/grey_zone/18750; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86517 [31] https://t.me/strelkovii/4989; https://t.me/soldiers_truth/9225[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...[34] https://t.me/KRPRus/53; https://t.me/KRPRus/54 [35] https://t.me/strelkovii/4967;[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xKy2dS43VHq8ZQTCVLV... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hiw28KRsd2ZYQLakdz... https://suspilne dot media/482980-453-den-povnomasstabnogo-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-tekstovij-onlajn/?anchor=live_1684745297&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[37] https://suspilne dot media/483460-na-pivnoci-v-protivnika-vpav-zapal-atakuvati-kerovanimi-aviabombami-urij-ignat/[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HgsC6V8vR681X4GbB6x...[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/26749 [40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86575; https://t.me/multi_XAM/67 [41] https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/10396; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/stat...[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HgsC6V8vR681X4GbB6x...[43] https://twitter.com/JagdBandera/status/1660376574321983488?s=20; https://twitter.com/franfran2424/status/1660573674552930305?s=20; https://t.me/military_u/15571; https://twitter.com/franfran2424/status/1660574312594636802?s=20[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HgsC6V8vR681X4GbB6x...[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/12673[46] https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/8086[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86493; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7719[48] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9573 [49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86440[50] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-159-iaea-director-g...[51] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/13192; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/13195; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/2100; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/22/vidnovleno-elektrozhyvlennya-zaporizkoyi-aes/[52] https://t.me/vrogov/9696[53] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HgsC6V8vR681X4GbB6x...[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[56] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3439; https://t.me/vrogov/9706; https://t.m...[57] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02yFhQwA86eskTSzQuNUaTE...[58] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3712442-sergij-naev-generallejtenant-komanduvac-obednanih-sil-zsu.html?fbclid=IwAR2rpE84Go4-6Em2yHn59HorCTy1n09zHNttwXtbX8fDYz88Ggk4ReGwEU4[59] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3712442-sergij-naev-generallejtenant-komanduvac-obednanih-sil-zsu.html?fbclid=IwAR2rpE84Go4-6Em2yHn59HorCTy1n09zHNttwXtbX8fDYz88Ggk4ReGwEU4[60] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3712442-sergij-naev-generallejtenant-komanduvac-obednanih-sil-zsu.html?fbclid=IwAR2rpE84Go4-6Em2yHn59HorCTy1n09zHNttwXtbX8fDYz88Ggk4ReGwEU4[61] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3712442-sergij-naev-generallejtenant-komanduvac-obednanih-sil-zsu.html?fbclid=IwAR2rpE84Go4-6Em2yHn59HorCTy1n09zHNttwXtbX8fDYz88Ggk4ReGwEU4
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 21, 2023
- at 5/25/23 4:47amKateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Frederick W. KaganMay 21, 2023, 6:30pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on May 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Wagner Group mercenaries likely secured the western administrative borders of Bakhmut City while Ukrainian forces are continuing to prioritize counterattacks on Bakhmut’s outskirts. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces control an “insignificant” part of southwestern Bakhmut City around the T0504 highway — a tacit acknowledgement that Russian forces have secured the rest of western and northwestern Bakhmut, if not all of it.[1] These officials’ statements indicate that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the remaining areas in Bakhmut except those adjacent to the two highways into the city. Geolocated footage published on May 21 showed Wagner forces raising Russian and Wagner flags over a residential building in westernmost Bakhmut.[2] The Wagner Group’s likely capture of the last remaining small area of western Bakhmut does not impact ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks north or south of Bakhmut, nor does it impact Ukrainian control over the ground lines of communications (GLOCs) around Bakhmut that exhausted Wagner forces would need to reach in order to conduct further offensive operations. Russian forces will likely need additional reinforcements to hold Bakhmut City and its flanks at the expense of operations in other directions. ISW has observed artillery units of the 132nd Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (which was previously observed in the Avdiivka area) operating in the Bakhmut direction.[3]Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces lost part of the dominant heights around Bakhmut and noted that sustained Ukrainian advances could lead to a tactical encirclement of Wagner forces in Bakhmut.[4] The Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade stated on May 20 that the brigade’s counterattacks have expanded the Ukrainian salient in the Bakhmut area to 1,750 meters wide by 700 meters deep in an unspecified area.[5] Geolocated footage showed the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade striking unspecified Russian forces south of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and engaging with the Russian 200th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 14th Army Corps (Northern Fleet) northeast of Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut).[6] Russian conventional forces such as the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade are unsuccessfully attempting to regain lost positions and respond to Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks, actions that are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Ukrainian forces regained the tactical initiative around Bakhmut.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian conventional forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations south of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), in the direction of Hryhorivka (about 6km northwest of Bakhmut), and in the direction of Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut), and Russian milbloggers also noted the failed Russian assaults on Bakhmut’s flanks.[8]ISW previously forecasted that Wagner offensive operations would likely culminate after months of attritional urban combat, and it is unlikely that Wagner will continue fighting beyond Bakhmut at its current depleted state. ISW assessed that Wagner forces were nearing culmination when they decided to fight though Bakhmut City. Wagner forces were enabled to continue offensive operations past that culmination point as Russian regular forces took responsibility for Bakhmut’s flanks, allowing Wagner to concentrate on the urban fight. Wagner forces began showing signs that they would be unable to pursue offensive operations beyond Bakhmut City from at least late December 2022.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 21 that Wagner forces have not directly attacked Khromove and Ivanivske — settlements immediately west and southwest of Bakhmut — since capturing Bakhmut.”[10] Commander of the Vostok Battalion Alexander Khodakovsky stated that, “driven in [their] head by the inertia of the offensive, [Russian forces] did not want to promptly recognize the depletion of [Russian] offensive potential and did not take care to set up necessary defenses” in captured areas.[11] Former Russian officer Igor Girkin stated that all Russian forces are now exhausted after decisively committing to win an unnecessary battle for Bakhmut and claimed that exhausted Wagner mercenaries stopped immediately at the outskirts of Bakhmut “as they crawled” to the city’s administrative border.[12] Russian regular forces situated on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks are also unlikely to push west towards Kostyantynivka or north towards Slovyansk amid Ukrainian counterattacks in the Bakhmut area any time soon. Russian conventional forces will be even more unlikely to pursue offensive operations if Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin delivers on his stated intent to withdraw Wagner personnel from Bakhmut City on May 25.[13] It is currently unclear if Prigozhin will actually withdraw his forces from Bakhmut, but some milbloggers are speculating that Prigozhin will commit Wagner to a different “critical” frontline at the end of the month.[14] Russian forces faced a similar culmination following highly attritional infantry attacks in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in June–July 2022.Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated the Wagner Group and the Russian military on May 21 for capturing Bakhmut.[15] Putin directly attributed the capture of the city to Wagner mercenaries, while noting that Russian regular forces provided “necessary support and flank protection” for the Battle of Bakhmut. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) similarly announced that Russia captured Bakhmut because of Wagner assaults in the city and aviation and artillery support from the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces.[16] Putin and the MoD likely directly acknowledged Wagner’s responsibility for the capture of Bakhmut to avoid a repetition of the backlash that followed their immediate failure to do so when Wagner captured Soledar on January 12.[17] Putin’s acknowledgement of Wagner’s role in Bakhmut is the first time that he himself has directly credited Wagner with a battlefield victory. Putin likely took this step because Prigozhin has thoroughly established Wagner’s responsibility for operations in Bakhmut within the Russian information space. Putin and the MoD likely sought to mitigate Prigozhin’s ability to claim sole responsibility for the capture of Bakhmut by emphasizing that regular Russian forces aided in the effort.Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin predictably claimed the victory over Bakhmut City entirely for himself and his forces. Prigozhin stated on May 21 that “it is a total lie” that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) helped Wagner capture the city and said that no one from the Russian MoD was in Bakhmut.[18] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner practically received no help from the Russian military except from former overall theater commander Army General Sergey Surovikin and Russian Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics-turned-Wagner-Group-deputy-commander Colonel General Mikhail Mizinstev.[19] Prigozhin claimed that that the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) helped Wagner after being subordinated to Wagner’s command. Prigozhin also acknowledged that the 57th Motorized Infantry Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) played a ”satisfactory” role in controlling one of the flanks around Bakhmut.[20] Prigozhin argued that the Russian command will attempt to claim the victory over Bakhmut when Wagner transfers the city to regular Russian forces and stated that the situation will be similar to how the MoD took much of Wagner’s alleged credit for capturing Palmyra, Syria, in 2016.[21]Prigozhin is likely attempting to solidify Wagner as solely responsible for Bakhmut’s capture before the Kremlin and the MoD can craft a response. Russian sources widely congratulated Wagner for the capture of Bakhmut and accepted Prigozhin’s May 20 claim — rather than Putin’s statement — as the official announcement of the city’s capture.[22] Russian sources also amplified footage of Wagner forces placing a Wagner Group flag — not a Russian flag — at the highest point in Bakhmut, likely an intentional snub of the MoD.[23] Prigozhin will likely use Wagner’s perceived responsibility for Bakhmut’s alleged capture to advocate for more supplies, responsibilities, and privileges for Wagner as he did following Wagner’s involvement in the capture of Popasna in May 2022.[24] Prigozhin will also likely use Wagner’s role in the alleged capture of Bakhmut to intensify his efforts to establish himself as the central figure of the Russian ultranationalist community.Russian reactions to the claimed capture of Bakhmut illustrate an increasingly growing divide between the Kremlin’s domestic presentation of the war and the ultranationalist milblogger community’s coverage of Russian operations in Ukraine. Russian state television portrayed the alleged capture of Bakhmut as a seminal historic event and claimed that the city’s capture would facilitate Russian operations to capture Slovyansk (41km northwest of Bakhmut) and Kramatorsk (35km northwest of Bakhmut) and even Dnipro City (roughly 215km west of Bakhmut).[25] The Kremlin likely attempted to oversell the significance of the capture of Bakhmut as a historical victory due to the continued lack of tactical success in Ukraine, with one Russian state media outlet outrageously commenting that Wagner personnel in Bakhmut must feel like “their grandfathers in Berlin.”[26]Russian ultranationalist milbloggers celebrated the alleged capture of Bakhmut but emphasized that “Bakhmut is not Berlin” and that the capture of the city would be simply another step in ongoing difficult operations to achieve Russian objectives in Ukraine.[27] Russian milbloggers responded to the alleged capture of Bakhmut by discussing more immediate possible Russian operations to capture Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), and Chasiv Yar (12km west of Bakhmut).[28] Other prominent Russian milbloggers responded to the capture of Bakhmut by focusing on possible imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive operations instead of possible future Russian offensive operations.[29] Russian milbloggers shifted to more conservative expectations of Russian operations as the attritional offensive to capture Bakhmut continued from winter into spring of 2023, and they have largely abandoned their previous high expectations that the capture of Bakhmut would lead to a collapse of Ukrainian lines in the area and Russian advances up to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[30] Russian milbloggers’ more realistic views about both Russian capabilities in Ukraine and the relevance of the Bakhmut offensive highlight the divergence between two very different segments of the pro-war Russian information space: the more optimistic presentation of the war offered by the Kremlin and the more informed presentation of the war offered by milbloggers. These growing differences will likely continue to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to shape the Russian information space.US President Joe Biden stated on May 21 that the US will train Ukrainian pilots on fourth-generation aircraft, including F-16s, to augment Ukraine’s defense capabilities in the long term. Biden stated that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave him a “flat assurance” that Ukrainian forces will not use Western-provided F-16s to strike Russian territory.[31] Biden reiterated that Ukraine will not use F-16s in its anticipated counteroffensive and framed the provision of F-16s as part of a longer-term effort to augment Ukraine’s defensive capabilities as Ukraine’s operational needs evolve.[32] Biden expanded on this argument, stating that the US did not pledge to send Ukraine tanks earlier because Ukraine did not need tanks earlier.[33] ISW has assessed that the need to send Ukraine Western tanks, including M1s, became apparent in June 2022.[34]ISW previously assessed in January 2023 that delays in the provision to Ukraine of Western long-range fires systems, advanced air defense systems, and tanks have limited Ukraine’s ability to take advantage of opportunities for larger counter-offensive operations presented by flaws and failures in Russian military operations.[35] The inevitable delay between the pledge to send such systems and the Ukrainians’ ability to use them calls for the provision of such systems at the earliest indications that they will be required, not when the situation becomes dire.[36] Had Western leaders started setting conditions for Ukraine to use Western tanks in June 2022, when the first clear indicators appeared that Western tanks would be needed, Ukrainian forces would have been able to start using them in November or December. The continual delays in providing Western materiel when it became apparent that it is or will soon be needed have thus contributed to the protraction of the conflict.[37]Former Russian officer Igor Girkin’s “Club of Angry Patriots” social movement opened a St. Petersburg chapter with an inaugural event on May 21. The event’s speakers discussed their dissatisfaction with the way elements of Russia’s "military-political elite” are not trying to decisively defeat Ukraine and instead are focusing efforts on maintaining current Russian gains in Ukraine and holding negotiations with the West.[38] They also discussed how the Club of Angry Patriots is creating an “alternative center of power” that should help achieve the final destruction of the Ukrainian state and the further mobilization of the Russian nation to that end.[39] Speakers also discussed how the Russian elite that formed against the backdrop of the 1990s period of privatization and "the post-Soviet catastrophe” has “rotted.”[40]The opening of the club in St. Petersburg is likely a continuation of Igor Girkin’s political feud with Prigozhin and the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group opened its first official national headquarters in St. Petersburg in November 2022.[41] The Angry Patriots Club accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of supporting efforts to freeze the war in Ukraine in April 2023.[42] Girkin launched the “Club of Angry Patriots” social movement as a new effort in April 2023 likely aimed at protecting the influence of the Russian pro-war faction within the Kremlin.[43]Key TakeawaysWagner Group mercenaries likely secured the western administrative borders of Bakhmut City while Ukrainian forces are continuing to prioritize counterattacks on Bakhmut’s outskirts.ISW previously forecasted that Wagner offensive operations would likely culminate after months of attritional urban combat, and it is unlikely that Wagner will continue fighting beyond Bakhmut at its current depleted state.Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated the Wagner Group and the Russian military on May 21 for capturing Bakhmut.Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin predictably claimed the victory over Bakhmut City entirely for himself and his forcesRussian reactions to the claimed capture of Bakhmut illustrate an increasingly growing divide between the Kremlin’s domestic presentation of the war and the ultranationalist milblogger community’s coverage of Russian operations in Ukraine.US President Joe Biden stated on May 21 that the US will train Ukrainian pilots on fourth-generation aircraft, including F-16s, to augment Ukraine’s defense capabilities in the long term.Former Russian officer Igor Girkin’s “Club of Angry Patriots” social movement opened a St. Petersburg chapter with an inaugural event on May 21.Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and south of Kreminna.Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline but have not made any verifiable territorial gains.Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a deep strike against a Russian headquarters at an airfield in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, with a Storm Shadow missile.Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that seven regiments and four battalions from Chechnya are operating in Ukraine as of May 20.Russian occupation authorities are reportedly intensifying filtration measures in occupied Ukraine to find Ukrainian partisans.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsActivities in Russian-occupied areasRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and south of Kreminna on May 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and Ivano-Dariivka (23km south of Kreminna).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Stelmakhivka (16km west of Svatove), Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[45] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna) on May 20, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[46]Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck rear Russian positions in Kalynove-Borshuvate, Luhansk Oblast (34km south of Severodonetsk) with HIMARS rockets on the night of May 20 to 21.[47]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)See topline text on Bakhmut.Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline but have not made any verifiable territorial gains on May 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the directions of Avdiivka, Marinka (18km west of Donetsk City), Pervomaiske (15km northwest of Donetsk City), Novokalynove (12km north of Avdiivka), and Sieverne (14km northwest of Donetsk City).[48] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified offensive operations on the Donetsk City frontline and attacked: in western and northern parts of Marinka; in the direction of Pervomaiske; on the southwestern and eastern approaches to Avdiivka; and in Novokalynove.[49] The milblogger added that Russian forces only advanced in Novokalynove and captured an unspecified nearby road — likely the T0511 highway.[50] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Sieverne from the Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) direction, and that fighting is ongoing in Pervomaiske, Opytne (just east of Vodyane and Sieverne), and Marinka.[51] ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of these claims. Geolocated footage published on May 20 showed Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions near the H-20 highway northeast of Krasnohorivka.[52]Russian forces continued localized attacks on settlements southwest of Donetsk City on May 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Novomykhailivka (about 30km southwest of Donetsk City) and continued to use aviation and artillery to target nearby settlements.[53] Kremlin-affiliated sources claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions near Novomykhailivka.[54]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a deep strike against a Russian headquarters at an airfield in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, with Storm Shadow missiles on May 21. Ukraine’s Strategic Communications Center reported that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian headquarters in Berdyansk on May 21.[55] Geolocated pictures show smoke rising in the direction of the Berdyansk airfield.[56] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces struck the mess hall at the Berdyansk airfield with a Storm Shadow missile in the early morning on May 21.[57] Battle damage from the strike is unclear as of this publication; one prominent Russian source reported that the struck mess hall had already been vacated by the time of the strike’s impact.[58] A Russian source reported that Ukraine’s recent deep strikes against the airfield in Mariupol on May 19 and the airfield in Berdyansk on May 21 are part of a new Ukrainian effort to “thin out” Russian aviation stationed along the Sea of Azov Coast.[59] Berdyansk is a coastal town on the Sea of Azov and is located about 100km from the frontline — well outside of the operational range of US-provided HIMARS.Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Kherson or Zaporizhia oblasts on May 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts continued conducting defensive operations across the frontline.[60] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on May 21 that Russian forces in southern Ukraine continue establishing defensive positions and that Ukrainian forces have not observed any significant change in Russian forces’ composition or positions.[61]Russian forces continue shelling Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast and west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[62] Geolocated footage posted on May 21 shows elements of the Russian 503rd Motor Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army) shelling Ukrainian forces north of Nesteryanka, Zaporizhia Oblast (about 11km southwest of Orikhiv).[63] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces “remind” Ukrainian forces of their presence on the Kinburn Spit by shelling Ochakiv and Kutsurub hromadas in Mykolaiv Oblast and the Dnipro–Bug River estuary.[64] A Russian source claimed that Russian fires destroyed a Ukrainian observation post in an unspecified area on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River used to adjust fires against east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on May 21.[65]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that seven regiments and four battalions from Chechnya are operating in Ukraine as of May 20 during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Krai.[66] Kadyrov claimed that this figure encompasses Chechen units with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard), including volunteers with Kadyrov’s “Akhmat” special forces.[67] Kadyrov also claimed that roughly 200 volunteers from Chechnya deploy to the front in Ukraine every week after training.[68] Kadyrov recently claimed on May 8 that 3,300 personnel comprise the “Sever Akhmat” Special Purpose Regiment, and if the claimed seven Chechen regiments are all nominally this size then Kadyrov’s figure for Chechen forces in Ukraine could total roughly a nominal 25,000 personnel not accounting for losses.[69] The real number of Chechen forces in Ukraine in these claimed formations would likely be far lower due to combat losses and degradation. ISW has only observed Akhmat special forces battalions operating in Ukraine and has not seen visual confirmation of Chechen formations at the echelon of a regiment operating in Ukraine.[70] ISW has previously observed Chechen units in offensive operations around Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast and likely in internal security roles in Zaporizhia Oblast — operations that are consistent with a force composition of at most 25,000 personnel.[71] This figure, if accurate, would represent a relatively disproportionate number of personnel serving in Ukraine from a single Russian federal subject but would be less than the more significant force that Kadyrov has previously tried to portray Chechen forces as fielding.[72] ISW previously assessed that Kadyrov is likely attempting to increase Chechnya’s role in operations in Ukraine and the wider Russian military sphere to retain favor with Putin.[73]Russian pundits on state television stated on May 21 that Russia needs three to four million personnel in Ukraine to achieve Russia’s military objectives.[74] These comments are likely a part of domestic information operations aiming to set conditions for the Kremlin’s widespread contract service recruitment campaign and the ongoing information operation to portray the war in Ukraine as existential. These comments do not reflect any real intention in the Kremlin to conduct a wider mobilization that would produce an amount of personnel anywhere near these figures.A Russian milblogger claimed on May 21 that an Iranian Il-76TD military cargo plane flew to Moscow and regularly does so.[75] Russian forces have been increasingly using Iranian-made Shahed-136/131 drones in its new limited air campaign in Ukraine over the past month, and it is likely that Russian forces are increasingly reliant on Iranian deliveries of the drone systems.[76] ISW assesses that the Kremlin will likely continue to pursue mutually beneficial military-economic programs with Iran in order to ensure continued Iranian material support for Russian operations in Ukraine.[77]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russian occupation authorities are reportedly intensifying filtration measures in occupied Ukraine to find Ukrainian partisans. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on May 21 that Russian occupation forces significantly increased the number of checkpoints in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) personnel are searching cars with dogs to find partisans.[78] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko reported on May 21 that Russian occupation authorities are installing new equipment throughout Mariupol to track civilians’ cell phone connections and listen to calls made to Ukrainians outside of Russian-occupied areas.[79]Russian occupations authorities are reportedly strengthening their passportization regimes in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on May 21 that Russian occupation authorities continue to intensify repressive measures against the residents in occupied territories who have not received Russian passports. The report states that non-passport holders cannot go to the hospital and that Russian authorities threaten to confiscate cars of Ukrainian civilians who do not hold Russian passports when they pass through checkpoints.[80] Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lusohor reported on May 21 that Russian occupation authorities are requiring school-age children to have Russian passports to obtain educational certificates.[81] Lysohor noted that Russian occupation authorities originally required students to have Russian passports to take exams.[82]Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/annamaliar/772; https://t.me/annamaliar/774; https://t.me/bbcrussian/46590; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9548[2] https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1660150439898144768?s=20; https://twitter.com/M0nstas/status/1660153858264317957?s=20[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47772; https://t.me/milinfolive/100993[4] https://t.me/annamaliar/774; https://t.me/bbcrussian/46590; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3711854-perekidanna-vorogom-dodatkovih-sil-do-bahmuta-svidcit-pro-proval-ih-nastupu-usov.html; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/perekydannia-rosiieiu-rezerviv-do-bakhmuta-oznachaie-shcho-vony-ne-budut-vykorystani-na-inshykh-diliankakh-frontu.html; https://t.me/annamaliar/772[5] https://suspilne dot media/482509-zustric-zelenskogo-i-bajdena-v-hirosimi-boi-za-bahmut-ne-pripinautsa-452-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://t.me/ab3army/2574[6] https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1660272824672567296?s=20; https://twitter.com/Sagakino1/status/1660276133651251201?s=20; https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1660278847827238912?s=20; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/45452; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1660050201648701440?s=20;[7] https://suspilne dot media/482509-zustric-zelenskogo-i-bajdena-v-hirosimi-boi-za-bahmut-ne-pripinautsa-452-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://t.me/ab3army/2574 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2023[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wjEjTkQcRjPAbJRTSUywJeVCtrM6zMqRuC5ST3Hz5H2GFyXAK6hKYmqJJdiJ9XAel; https://t.me/bbcrussian/46581; ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tmZPh9xu2hbYTThyQyd4bhdL7Qicc1bzdcWNy1Q4BZ2pfbWjVQveopAkB8XVHUG2l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/12652[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2023[10] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47772[11] https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2695[12] https://t.me/strelkovii/4962; https://t.me/strelkovii/4963 https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1660273337744982023[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2023[14] . https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47772[15] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/05/2023/646941c49a794731e82e5601; https://tass dot ru/politika/17804025; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5998961; https://topwar dot ru/217496-prezident-rossii-vladimir-putin-pozdravil-chvk-vagner-s-okonchatelnym-osvobozhdeniem-artemovska.html; https://t.me/sotaproject/59342 [16] https://t.me/mod_russia/26722 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/26733; https://t.me/bbcrussian/46578[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011323[18] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1006[19] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1006[20] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1006[21] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1006[22] https://t.me/brussinf/6027 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/4942 ; https://t.me/rybar/47319 ; https://t.me/vrogov/9657; https://t.me/vrogov/9658 ; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11500 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/59215; https://t.me/readovkanews/59213 ; https://t.me/rybar/47317 ; https://t.me/rybar/47317 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86344 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/25584 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/16010 ; https://t.me/sashakots/39832 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86343 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/12646 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11653 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11659 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7713[23] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86432; https://t.me/wargonzo/12651 ; https://t.me/HersonEnot/1273 ; https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1660150439898144768?s=20; https://twitter.com/M0nstas/status/1660153858264317957?s=20[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012223 ;[25] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/05/21/sobytie-istoricheskogo-masshtaba-a-emotsii-takie-kak-u-dedov-v-berline-byli ; https://smotrim dot ru/video/2618284 ; https://www.ntv dot ru/peredacha/segodnya/m23700/o727978/video/[26] https://www.1tv dot ru/news/issue/2023-05-21/12:00 ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/05/21/sobytie-istoricheskogo-masshtaba-a-emotsii-takie-kak-u-dedov-[27] https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2695 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47772 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9536 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11653 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11659 ; https://t.me/milchronicles/1947[28] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47772 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21485 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11653 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11659 ; https://t.me/milchronicles/1947[29] https://t.me/rybar/47319 ; https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2694[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar03052023[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/21/amerykanski-vijskovi-pochnut-trenuvaty-ukrayinskyh-pilotiv-dlya-f-16-dzho-bajden/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/21/volodymyr-zelenskyj-podyakuvav-dzho-bajdenu-za-liderstvo-za-zbroyu-za-rishennya-pro-trenuvannya-pilotiv/; https://suspilne dot media/482509-zustric-zelenskogo-i-bajdena-v-hirosimi-boi-za-bahmut-ne-pripinautsa-452-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/europe/100000008917123/biden-ukraine-jets.html[32] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/05/21/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-press-conference/[33] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/05/21/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-press-conference/[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023[38] https://t.me/KRPRus/51[39] https://t.me/KRPRus/51[40] https://t.me/KRPRus/51[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/outspoken-putin-ally-prigozhins-st-petersburg-defence-tech-centre-opens-2022-11-04/[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2023[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2023[44] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tmZPh9xu2hbYTThyQyd4bhdL7Qicc1bzdcWNy1Q4BZ2pfbWjVQveopAkB8XVHUG2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tmZPh9xu2hbYTThyQyd4bhdL7Qicc1bzdcWNy1Q4BZ2pfbWjVQveopAkB8XVHUG2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wjEjTkQcRjPAbJRTSUywJeVCtrM6zMqRuC5ST3Hz5H2GFyXAK6hKYmqJJdiJ9XAel[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/12652[46] https://t.me/readovkanews/59231[47] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10546 ; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11504 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/1860 ; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1181[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tmZPh9xu2hbYTThyQyd4bhdL7Qicc1bzdcWNy1Q4BZ2pfbWjVQveopAkB8XVHUG2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wjEjTkQcRjPAbJRTSUywJeVCtrM6zMqRuC5ST3Hz5H2GFyXAK6hKYmqJJdiJ9XAel[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/12652[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/12652[51] https://t.me/readovkanews/59231; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47769[52] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1659896059903066113?s=20; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1660168907553144832?s=20; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1660170471042842627?s=20; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1660171179590844418?s=20[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wjEjTkQcRjPAbJRTSUywJeVCtrM6zMqRuC5ST3Hz5H2GFyXAK6hKYmqJJdiJ9XAel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tmZPh9xu2hbYTThyQyd4bhdL7Qicc1bzdcWNy1Q4BZ2pfbWjVQveopAkB8XVHUG2l[54] https://t.me/readovkanews/59231; https://t.me/wargonzo/12652[55] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/17480[56] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1660110916430561280?s=20; https://twitter.com/TreasChest/status/1660099293854801921?s=20;[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86414 ; https://t.me/vrogov/9672 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47766 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/100983[58] https://t.me/rybar/47337 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86414 ; https://t.me/vrogov/9672 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47766 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/100983[59] https://t.me/rybar/47337; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2023[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tmZPh9xu2hbYTThyQyd4bhdL7Qicc1bzdcWNy1Q4BZ2pfbWjVQveopAkB8XVHUG2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tmZPh9xu2hbYTThyQyd4bhdL7Qicc1bzdcWNy1Q4BZ2pfbWjVQveopAkB8XVHUG2l; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18904[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tmZPh9xu2hbYTThyQyd4bhdL7Qicc1bzdcWNy1Q4BZ2pfbWjVQveopAkB8XVHUG2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wjEjTkQcRjPAbJRTSUywJeVCtrM6zMqRuC5ST3Hz5H2GFyXAK6hKYmqJJdiJ9XAel[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tmZPh9xu2hbYTThyQyd4bhdL7Qicc1bzdcWNy1Q4BZ2pfbWjVQveopAkB8XVHUG2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wjEjTkQcRjPAbJRTSUywJeVCtrM6zMqRuC5ST3Hz5H2GFyXAK6hKYmqJJdiJ9XAel[63] https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1660278386667683841?s=20; https://t.me/wargonzo/12668[64] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02kjn3znm3wXrCuK8M4GnGPfLpeuGeZnd5tZsDSCge45cibpvfTJjcG5JMmQVEcTf6l[65] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36644[66] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3643[67] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3643[68] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3643[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2023[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023[72] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050623[73] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042723[74] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12193[75] https://t.me/milinfolive/100987[76] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042123[77] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051623[78] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/okupanty-shukayut-partyzan-na-tot-zaporizhzhya/[79] https://t.me/andriyshTime/9881[80] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/okupanty-prymushuyut-meshkantsiv-tot-zaporizhzhya-otrymuvaty-rosijski-pasporty/[81] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10649[82] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10649
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 20, 2023
- at 5/25/23 4:14amKateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. KaganMay 20, 2023, 5:45pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on May 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin declared victory in Bakhmut City on May 20 and announced his intent to withdraw from the city on May 25.[1] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner Group forces completely captured Bakhmut City on May 20, seizing the last multi-story apartment building in southwestern Bakhmut near the MiG-17 monument. Prigozhin announced that Wagner forces will establish defensive positions before transferring responsibility for the city to Russian conventional forces on May 25. Prigozhin effectively stated that Wagner forces will conduct an operational pause by resting and restoring combat power at field training camps in unspecified areas, presumably far from the frontline. ISW has not observed geolocated footage confirming Prigozhin’s claims as of this publication. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces are still fighting in a small section of southwest Bakhmut as of May 20. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions near the MiG-17 monument as of May 20.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not commented on Prigozhin’s claims as of this publication.Prigozhin’s claimed victory over the remaining areas in Bakhmut is purely symbolic even if true. The last few urban blocks of eastern Bakhmut that Prigozhin claimed that Wagner Group forces captured are not tactically or operationally significant. Their capture does not grant Russian forces operationally significant terrain to continue conducting offensive operations or any particularly strong position from which to defend against possible Ukrainian counterattacks.Ukrainian forces continue pressuring Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that fighting is ongoing on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks in the directions of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Stupochky (13km southwest of Bakhmut), and Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[3] Ukrainian forces reported on May 19 that they have recaptured approximately four square kilometers of additional territory near Bakhmut, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue conducting localized attacks near Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[4] Prigozhin’s claimed capture of the remaining blocks in Bakhmut is not strategically significant as it will not allow exhausted Wagner or conventional Russian forces to establish a meaningful springboard for further offensive operations. Ukrainian ongoing counterattacks north, west, and southwest of Bakhmut will complicate any further Russian advances beyond Bakhmut in the near term. Prigozhin’s withdrawal announcement, whether Wagner withdraws from the city or not, indicates that Prigozhin does not intend to continue an offensive effort to push directly west of Bakhmut.Wagner forces are unlikely to successfully conduct a controlled withdrawal from Bakhmut while in contact with Ukrainian forces within five days without disrupting the Russian MoD’s efforts to prepare for planned Ukrainian counteroffensives. Wagner forces are unlikely to establish adequate defenses or consolidate recent gains in Bakhmut sufficient to forestall Ukrainian counterattacks by May 25 even if Prigozhin’s announcement of Wagner’s withdrawal is true. Ukrainian forces are still in Khromove and Ivanivske and are engaging Russian forces in and near Bakhmut. Ukrainian artillery can still target Russian forces in and around Bakhmut. Withdrawal in contact with the enemy is an exceedingly difficult task that the Wagner Group’s forces are unlikely to perform well within Prigozhin’s five-day time frame. Conducting a relief-in-place while in contact is also an extremely challenging maneuver that Russian forces would likely struggle to conduct even if the Russian MoD agrees to undertake it. Wagner units have shown poor coordination with Russian conventional forces, other irregular formations subordinated to the Russian MoD, and the Russian military command—factors that would hinder a smooth relief-in-place operation.[5] The Russian military command is unlikely to generate sufficient forces to relieve Wagner in Bakhmut and hold its flanks within the window Prigozhin has announced without redeploying Russian forces from other areas. Prigozhin’s statement of his intent to withdraw could be a crude attempt to mislead Ukrainian forces into conducting a counterattack through Bakhmut City.Russian conventional forces likely will still need to transfer additional forces to the Bakhmut direction even if Wagner mercenaries remain in Bakhmut. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces continue to transfer airborne, motorized rifle, and special forces elements to reinforce the Bakhmut flanks even as Wagner forces remain in Bakhmut City.[6] The UK MoD also reported that the Russian military command likely redeployed several battalions in the last few days to reinforce Bakhmut despite only having few uncommitted combat units and that this redeployment suggests a substantial commitment to the Bakhmut effort by the Russian leadership.[7] These additional forces could in principle be meant to participate in the relief-in-place of Wagner forces that Prigozhin has just announced, reducing but not eliminating some of the challenges considered above, but it is more likely that they are intended to secure Bakhmut’s threatened flanks.Russian forces targeted Kyiv Oblast with Iranian-made Shahed drones on the night of May 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 18 Shahed-136/131 drones at Kyiv Oblast, and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all 18 of the drones.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian Shahed drones in eastern Ukraine.[9] Russian forces have targeted Kyiv heavily in the past month, likely to produce informational affects with both Russian and Ukrainian audiences. This hyperfocus on targeting Kyiv is at odds with the new limited Russian air campaign’s other target: alleged Ukrainian rear logistics.[10] These conflicting target sets likely further limit the campaign’s ability to degrade Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities in the near term.[11]US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on May 20 that the United States may agree to transfer modern combat aircraft to Ukraine, including the F-16, on the condition that Ukraine does not use them to strike Russian territory. Sullivan stated the war in Ukraine has “evolved” and that F-16 fourth-generation fighter aircraft have now become “part of that mix” of weapons that Ukraine will need as part of a “future force to be able to deter and defend against Russian aggression as we go forward.”[12] Sullivan stated that any F-16s given to Ukraine – like other Western weapons provided to Ukraine – will be provided under the condition that they do not strike Russian territory.[13] Sullivan also stated that training Ukrainian pilots to use F-16s is the “obvious first step” and that the next steps are to “determine how to do the actual provision of planes.”[14] US President Joe Biden informed G7 leaders on May 19 that Washington will support a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s and other fourth generation aircraft but did not pledge that the US will send Ukraine the F-16s.[15]Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian sources are falsely alleging that high-ranking Ukrainian military commanders have recently died, likely to demoralize the Ukrainian forces and to portray Russian forces as constraining Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities. Malyar stated that these information operations allege that Russian strikes have recently killed Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces Commander General Ihor Tantsyura, Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, and Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi.[16] Prigozhin also amplified the information operation alleging that Zaluzhnyi might be dead on May 20.[17] These information operations are particularly absurd given that Zaluzhnyi spoke with US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley on May 19 and that Syrskyi appeared on Ukrainian television on May 16.[18] Ukrainian officials have denied previous Russian claims that a May 10 strike on a Ukrainian command post in the Bakhmut area killed several high-ranking Ukrainian military officials and that Wagner forces killed Tantsyura while he was en route to Bakhmut on May 2.[19] ISW has previously assessed that Russian ultranationalists are increasingly seeking to frame any Russian operations as delaying potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions.[20]Key TakeawaysWagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin declared victory in Bakhmut City on May 20 and announced his intent to withdraw from the city on May 25.Prigozhin’s claimed victory over the remaining areas in Bakhmut is purely symbolic even if true.Ukrainian forces continue pressuring Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.Wagner forces are unlikely to successfully conduct a controlled withdrawal from Bakhmut while in contact with Ukrainian forces within five days without disrupting the Russian MoD’s efforts to prepare for planned Ukrainian counteroffensives.Russian conventional forces likely will still need to transfer additional forces to the Bakhmut direction even if Wagner mercenaries remain in Bakhmut.Russian forces targeted Kyiv Oblast with Iranian-made Shahed drones on the night of May 19 to 20.US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on May 20 that the United States may agree to transfer modern combat aircraft to Ukraine, including the F-16, on the condition that Ukraine does not use them to strike Russian territory.Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian sources are falsely alleging that high-ranking Ukrainian military commanders have recently died, likely to demoralize Ukrainian forces and to portray Russian forces as constraining Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities.Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area.Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.The Washington Post reported on May 19 that a Ukrainian commander stated that Ukrainian Special Operations forces conduct raids in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast but that Ukrainian forces do not hold stable positions there.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is incorporating mobilized and conscripted personnel into its own “Veterany” private military company (PMC), leading to discrimination and conflict.A Lithuanian official publicly accused Russia of attempting to hold international children hostage in occupied Crimea as “human shields” against a future Ukrainian counteroffensive.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsActivities in Russian-occupied areasRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area on May 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (12km south of Kreminna).[21] A Russian miblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults in the Serebrianska forest area and advanced towards Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna).[22] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on May 20 that the tempo of Russian assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line has decreased over the past month from five to seven daily assaults to one daily assault.[23]A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks to regain lost positions near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) on May 19.[24] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces continue to successfully hold a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River in the area.[25] ISW has still not observed visual confirmation of the Russian capture of Masyutivka or the establishment of a Russian bridgehead on the west bank of the Oskil River.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)See topline text on Bakhmut.Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novokalynove (8km north of Avdiivka), Stepove (2km north of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Pervomaiske and Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka) but advanced to the railway north of Avdiivka from Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka).[27] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made several successful advances in the Donetsk direction in the past week but that Russian forces have stabilized the front near Krasnohorivka.[28] The General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled over 20 ground attacks in the Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka) area.[29] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian defenses in Marinka forced Russian forces to attack on the northern and southern flanks instead.[30]Ukrainian forces struck the Mariupol airport on the night of May 19. Geolocated footage shows four Ukrainian rounds striking the Mariupol airport area, and some sources speculated that the strikes hit a Russian military concentration point.[31] Some Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow missiles to target the airport area.[32] Ukrainian forces last struck Mariupol in February prior to the delivery of the Storm Shadow missiles. Some sources speculated that Ukrainian forces used Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDBs) in those strikes.[33] Russian milbloggers amplified geolocated imagery of smoke trails and claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted two additional rockets or missiles on the morning of May 20.[34] The milbloggers claimed that Ukraine targeted Mariupol in order to commemorate the anniversary of the Russian capture of Mariupol on May 20, 2022.Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)The Washington Post reported on May 19 that the Ukrainian commander of the operational group of Kherson troops, Brigadier General Mykhaylo Drapatyy, stated that Ukrainian Special Operations forces conduct raids in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast but that Ukrainian forces do not hold stable positions there.[35] Drapatyy reportedly added that Ukrainian assault units train twice a week for operations to cross the Dnipro River using boats and pontoon bridges, and The Washington Post reported that Ukrainian forces have begun constructing pontoon bridges that could be used to transport heavy weaponry across the river.[36] Drapatyy reportedly stated that Ukrainian forces may use islands in the Dnipro River delta to launch operations on the east bank and claimed that Ukrainian forces control 90 percent of the islands through physical, visual, and artillery means.[37] Drapatyy reportedly highlighted the fact that Russian forces are worried that Ukraine is preparing for active operations in the Kherson direction and that they have recently begun fortifying their defenses in the rear and planting more mines on the east bank.[38] Drapatyy's statements are generally consistent with previous Ukrainian officials' comments about the continued but limited nature of Ukrainian operations on islands in the delta and on the east bank.[39] The Washington Post reported that Russian positions on the east bank are up to 4.8km away from the Dnipro River, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this reporting.[40] Geolocated footage published on May 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating in additional areas on Cherkesky Island (26km southwest of Kherson City).[41]A Russian milblogger claimed on May 20 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dorozhnyanka, Zaporizhia Oblast (7km south of Hulyaipole) and made unspecified marginal gains in the area.[42] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of recent Ukrainian gains in the Hulyaipole area.The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on May 20 that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov deployed additional elements of the “Yug-Akhmat” motorized rifle battalion to Zaporizhia Oblast.[43] Kadyrov has previously claimed that “Yug-Akhmat” elements are operating in Zaporizhia Oblast, possibly as internal security forces in the area.[44]Russian sources claimed on May 20 that Russian electronic warfare units downed a Ukrainian Mugin-5 drone in northern Crimea.[45]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is incorporating mobilized and conscripted personnel into its own “Veterany” private military company (PMC), leading to discrimination and conflict.[46] ISW previously reported that Veterany is part of Russian MoD’s Redut PMC reportedly operating on the Bakhmut flanks.[47] Wives and mothers of mobilized servicemen from Khakassia and Altai republics published a video appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin complaining that Veterany mercenaries are not keeping track of casualties among mobilized personnel and are not supporting mobilized men on the frontlines.[48] The wives and mothers noted that only 137 of 500 deployed mobilized men returned from the frontlines and claimed that at least two units of unknown echelon subordinate to Veterany are missing. The family members also noted that Veterany mercenaries claimed to have purchased each mobilized man for 25,000 rubles (about $315) per serviceman to fight in their place. Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces captured a mobilized serviceman who served in the Veterany PMC – likely in the Bakhmut direction.[49]The Financial Times (FT) reported that Wagner Group purchased 20,000 helmets worth approximately $2 million from a small Chinese company “Hangzhou Shineraine Import and Export Co.” in November and December 2022 via Russian-based company Broker Expert.[50] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied purchasing supplies from the company. FT reported that Broker Expert has continued to ship items supporting Wagner’s operations in Africa during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)A Lithuanian official publicly accused Russia of attempting to hold international children hostage in occupied Crimea as “human shields” against a future Ukrainian counteroffensive. Lithuanian National Security and Defense Committee Chairperson Laurynas Kaciunas claimed on May 18 that Russia is trying to lure children from Kazakhstan, Israel, Belgium, Morocco, Tajikistan, Egypt, Armenia, and other unspecified countries to the “Artek” children’s camp in Crimea under various recreational, cultural, and educational schemes, including for winning competitions.[51] Kaciunas claimed that Russia also aims to compel the international community to recognize Russia’s claim to Crimea. ISW cannot verify Kaciunas’s claim, but it is consistent with efforts to draw children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Crimea under summer vacation, health, and other camp schemes.[52] Russian Human Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova attempted to portray Russia as a safe and trustworthy custodian of non-Russian children by claiming that Russia returned one Ukrainian child to her family.[53]Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1002; https://t.me/severrealii/16902; https://t.me/severrealii/16903; https://t.me/severrealii/16904; https://t.me/bazabazon/17811; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21469; https://t.me/grey_zone/18699; https://t.me/istories_media/2551[2] https://t.me/annamaliar/770 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-claims-full-control-bakhmut-2023-05-20/[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zgUgq4Z2S3Wyp7gjE3WScKVU8ndJ4QJWjWhe4jyfX1qUhKTnDZr1qrjip19NL2fLl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nrK26wC9KjN8BVTtidet5hBsNVUhqUF2sENc1sQyycX7bc6PrKDiRqe4LuUH6fXBl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86325 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86327[4] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=242236635060366 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/12631[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20April%2024%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2023[6] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/20/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-znyshheno-13-polovyh-skladiv-iz-boyeprypasamy-okupantiv-sergij-cherevatyj/[7] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1659796934410862594; https://t.me/idelrealii/27486[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EriqSArMZFeQSJHvH5ygHCeh4aMAepUw7n9k6S7oakYeMavUyEV1uLHTJNcrDDMdl[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EriqSArMZFeQSJHvH5ygHCeh4aMAepUw7n9k6S7oakYeMavUyEV1uLHTJNcrDDMdl[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051923[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051923[12] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/05/20/pres...[13] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/05/20/pres...[14] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/05/20/pres...[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...[16] https://t.me/annamaliar/768[17] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1002;[18] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3709865-syrskyi-counteroffensive-operations-ongoing-in-some-directions-near-bakhmut.html ; https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-defense/3711621-zaluzhnyi-milley-discuss-performance-of-patriot-systems-supply-of-longrange-ammo.html[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050223[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nrK26wC9KjN8BVTtidet5hBsNVUhqUF2sENc1sQyycX7bc6PrKDiRqe4LuUH6fXBl[22] https://t.me/wargonzo/12631[23] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/20/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-znyshheno-13-polovyh-skladiv-iz-boyeprypasamy-okupantiv-sergij-cherevatyj/[24] https://t.me/rybar/47299[25] https://t.me/rybar/47299[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nrK26wC9KjN8BVTtidet5hBsNVUhqUF2sENc1sQyycX7bc6PrKDiRqe4LuUH6fXBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zgUgq4Z2S3Wyp7gjE3W...[27] https://t.me/annamaliar/767[28] https://t.me/annamaliar/767[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nrK26wC9KjN8BVTtide... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zgUgq4Z2S3Wyp7gjE3W...[30] https://t.me/annamaliar/767[31] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1659650416232255488?s=20; https://t.me/mariupolnow/29374; https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1659624602887176196?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1659628361914695691[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86296; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11650[33] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/23/world/europe/ukraine-mariupol-strike-weapons.html; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/13494; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/22/world/europe/ukraine-mariupol.html; https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-2-23-23/h_3a20577b132de9c5d6c22166ffb1af5e[34] https://t.me/rybar/47305 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47742; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36631; https://t.me/mariupolnow/29385; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1659820309292396544?s=20[35] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/19/dnieper-ukraine-war-counteroffensive-russia/[36] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/19/dnieper-ukraine-war-counteroffensive-russia/[37] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/19/dnieper-ukraine-war-counteroffensive-russia/[38] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/19/dnieper-ukraine-war-counteroffensive-russia/[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051723[40] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/19/dnieper-ukraine-war-counteroffensive-russia/[41] https://twitter.com/JdgObserver/status/1659850869163143171?s=20; https://t.me/antiseptic_channel/955; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36635[42] https://t.me/wargonzo/12631[43] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/na-tot-zaporizkoyi-oblasti-perekynuly-kadyrivtsiv/[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023[45] https://t.me/milinfolive/100961 ; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/24346[46] https://t.me/osirskiy/80[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20August%2021.pdf[48] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1659918336929546245[49] https://t.me/osirskiy/80[50] https://www.ft.com/content/8393d108-c73e-4c7a-92ca-49980d118bd2[51] https://minre dot gov.ua/2023/05/20/okupanty-v-krymu-hochut-vykorystaty-ditej-iz-riznyh-krayin-yak-zhyvyj-shhyt/; https://www.facebook.com/1510767729/posts/pfbid0uB9W5E4v3JSV2bUURFRoXGQY...[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[53] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1459; https://t.me/malvovabelova/1462
- — Iran Update, May 19, 2023
- at 5/25/23 3:35amJohanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Nicholas CarlThe Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.Contributor: Anya CaraianiKey TakeawaysThe Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are consolidating their footprint in northern Iraq, which will likely increase the risk of sectarian conflict there. A PMF footprint could help Iran secure a new arms shipment route into Syria.The IRGC Navy conducted unprofessional and unsafe maneuvers near a US naval ship in the Persian Gulf, which risks accidental collisions and miscalculations.Anti-regime protests have flared up in Iran in response to increased state executions, demonstrating that many protesters remain undeterred from further protest despite the brutal regime crackdown during the Mahsa Amini movement. Iranian Activities in IraqThis section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are consolidating their security footprint in northern Ninewa Province, which will likely increase the risk of sectarian conflict there. Popular Mobilization Authority (PMA) Chairman Falih al Fayyadh discussed PMF security operations with local officials in the Sunni majority cities Sinjar City and Tal Afar on May 19. Fayyadh praised the PMF’s Ninewa-based 53rd Brigade, which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. He also visited the headquarters of the PMF’s 74th Brigade in Sinjar. These meetings come after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani gave the PMF permission in April 2023 to establish a new Badr-affiliated brigade around Sinjar.[1] Iranian-backed units commonly stoke sectarian divisions as part of so-called “counterterrorism operations.”[2] CTP previously reported that Badr militants are committing acts of sectarian violence against the Sunni population in Diyala Province, which is, in turn, setting conditions to allow ISIS to resurge.[3] Suspected Badr-affiliated militants killed Sunni civilians in a series of targeted attacks in Diyala Province in February and March 2023.[4] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani deployed Iraqi Special Forces to Diyala in response, however, Badr Secretary General Hadi al Ameri pressured Sudani to remove the forces and secured de facto control.[5] PMF leadership in Diyala province inaccurately claimed that ISIS militants had killed the civilians and arbitrarily arrested individuals.[6] Sectarian conflict presents an opportunity for ISIS to establish itself as a security guarantor for Sunnis.A growing PMF footprint in Ninewa could also help the IRGC expand its influence along the ground line of communication running from Tal Afar, through Sinjar City, and toward the Syrian border. The IRGC and its partner militias could use this route to transport arms and personnel into northeastern Syria. The IRGC and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could also use this area in northwestern Iraq to threaten to US forces. Iranian-backed group in Iraq—Liwa al Ghaliboun—conducted a drone attack on US forces near Hasaka in northeastern Syria from Iraqi territory, injuring six and killing one, on March 23.[7] The IRGC could use a growing PMF presence in Ninewa Province to facilitate additional attacks against US forces. Iranian Domestic AffairsThis section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.The IRGC Navy conducted unprofessional and unsafe maneuvers near a US naval ship in the Persian Gulf, which risks accidental collisions and miscalculations. Three IRGC Navy fast attack craft came within 915 meters of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Paul Hamilton as it transited the Strait of Hormuz on May 19.[8] The destroyer had US, British, and French commanders on board. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami also threatened to expel US forces from the region and reiterated Iran’s commitment to protecting its maritime trade on May 19.[9] The IRGC naval harassment and threatening rhetoric follows the US Department of Defense’s announcement on May 12 that it would bolster the Fifth Fleet’s defensive posture in the Persian Gulf.[10] The US statement responds to the IRGC and Artesh Navy seizing three international vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz between April 27 and May 12.[11]Anti-regime protests have flared up in Iran in response to increased state executions, demonstrating that many protesters remain undeterred from further protest despite the brutal regime crackdown during the Mahsa Amini movement. CTP recorded ten anti-regime protests on May 19—the highest number of anti-regime protests in a single day since March 13. Iranian authorities executed three individuals who participated in the Mahsa Amini protest movement on May 19 and has significantly increased the pace of state executions in recent weeks.[12] These executions reinvigorated anti-regime sentiments, as CTP previously forecasted.[13][1] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A...[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-13-2023#_edna...[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-10-2023[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-u...[5] https://alrafidain dot tv/57977/[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-1-2023[7] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3339691/us-conducts-airstrikes-in-syria-in-response-to-deadly-uav-attack/ ;https://syrianobserver.com/news/82306/ghaliboun-brigade-claims-responsibility-of-attack-on-u-s-forces-in-syria.html[8] https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-navy-strait-of-hormuz-persian-gulf-tensions-63ac622781b97d7fa578f440bd074f64[9] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/02/29/2898019[10] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/12/us-to-bolster-defensive-posture-in-gulf-white-house[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-navy-says-iran-seized-marshall-islands-flagged-oil-tanker-gulf-oman-2023-04-27/ ; https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-oil-tanker-seizure-strait-of-hormuz-e838ea969907ee39a8c7f949a96aa777 ; https://www.mizanonline dot ir/fa/news/4712160 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/02/22/2893571[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-5-2023 ; https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/19/middleeast/iran-executions-protests-intl/index.html[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-5-2023
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2023
- at 5/25/23 2:58amRiley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, and Mason ClarkMay 19, 2023, 7:30pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on May 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces have concentrated most of their available reserves to the Bakhmut area and slowed Ukrainian counterattacks in the past 24 hours. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on May 19 that Russian forces concentrated most of their reserves in the Bakhmut direction, which has slowed the rate of Ukrainian advances.[1] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack on the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut and advanced 500 meters on one flank and 1,000 meters on the other.[2] Some Russian milbloggers celebrated the slowed Ukrainian rate of advance and claimed that the Ukrainian forces are unable to sustain prolonged localized counterattacks around Bakhmut.[3] Russian forces on Bakhmut’s flanks likely remain weak, however; Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to criticize the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) on May 19 for retreating from defensive lines southwest of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[4] Ukrainian counterattacks near Bakhmut have notably likely eliminated the threat of a Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut and forced Russian troops to allocate scarce military resources to defend against a limited and localized offensive effort, as Ukrainian command likely intended.Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine on the night of May 18 to 19. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russia launched six Kalibr cruise missiles and 22 Shahed-131/136 drones at Ukraine from the direction of the Black Sea.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 16 drones and three Kalibr missiles, despite the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s claim that Russian forces struck all intended targets.[6] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak reported explosions near Kryvyi Rih following Russian strikes in the area.[7] Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky noted that the recent uptick in Russian drone and missile strikes, as well as artillery strikes along the entire frontline, are meant to disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensive plans and preparations.[8] ISW previously assessed on May 14 that the recent increase in Russian strikes on Ukrainian rear areas is likely part of a new air campaign premised on degrading Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities in the near term.[9] Skibitsky additionally noted that Russia can only produce 25 Kalibr cruise missiles, 35 Kh-101s, two Kinzhals, and 5 ballistic 9M723 Iskander-Ms per month.[10] Considering that Russian forces have launched missile strikes at rear areas of Ukraine on a near daily-basis thus far in May, it is likely that they are rapidly expending their stocks of precision munitions, potentially at a rate that exceeds production capabilities.President Joe Biden reportedly informed G7 leaders on May 19 that Washington will support a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s and other fourth generation aircraft. This decision marks a sharp turn in US policy vis a vis fourth generation aircraft in Ukraine and follows Biden’s meetings with various G7 leaders in Hiroshima, Japan on May 19. Yahoo News relatedly reported on May 18 that Ukrainian pilots outperformed standard Pentagon expectations for F-16 training time in a flight simulator and would be able to operate F-16s in only four months as opposed to the anticipated 18 months, citing an internal US Air Force assessment.[11]The Kremlin reportedly spent 3.1 trillion rubles (approximately $38.7 billion) in an undisclosed section of the Russian budget in 2023, likely to fund the war and maintain occupied territories in Ukraine. Independent Russian news outlet The Bell reported that the Russian Ministry of Finance released data on May 16 on budget expenditures since the start of 2023 amounting to a total of 11.9 trillion rubles ($148.5 billion) with only 8.8 trillion rubles ($109.8 billion) accounted for in Russia’s public budget, leaving 3.1 trillion rubles – over a quarter of Russia’s expenditures – unaccounted for.[12] The Bell reported that most undisclosed budget items account for defense, national security, and law enforcement, and that some may fall onto social and other expenditures in occupied Ukraine. The Bell also reported that the unspecified spending is higher than in the same time period in previous years. ISW continues to assess that the Russian economy will struggle to meet the needs of the large-scale war that the Russian military is fighting in Ukraine and to sustain its occupation of Ukrainian territories.[13]Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin announced that he will run for reelection as a member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia Party for the first time, prompting criticism from select Russian ultranationalists. Russian “Civil Solidarity” movement head Georgy Fedorov argued on May 19 that Sobyanin’s United Russia candidacy suggests that “all political processes in Russia are now only possible in the pre-existing political party system,” that Russia is set to experience “great turbulence,” and that Russia’s “non-systemic opposition has been crushed.”[14] Former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin amplified Georgy’s statements and sarcastically called United Russia the “party of crooks and thieves,” a well-known slogan used by Russian opposition figure Alexey Navalny.[15] Sobyanin has held the post of Moscow Mayor nominally as an independent since 2010, although his United Russia candidacy is likely simply a public formalization of his longstanding relationship with United Russia, as Sobyanin has been a member of the party since 2001. United Russia likely seeks to buttress its own popularity (which stands around 45% in Moscow) with that of Sobyanin, who has polled at 74%.[16] These select ultranationalists likely responded to Sobyanin’s announcement to critique what they view as United Russia’s attempt to monopolize support amongst the Russian ultranationalist constituency and were likely not genuinely reacting to the loss of an independent figure. The Kremlin may additionally have publicly linked Sobyanin to United Russia to remove a nominally independent figure, regardless of his actual independence. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin will likely attempt to solidify United Russia as the definitive pro-war party during elections in 2023 and 2024, and Russian ultranationalist communities with their own political ambitions may increasingly seek to undercut these efforts.[17]A Ukrainian source reported that elements of two spetsnaz brigades of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) have deployed to border areas of Kursk Oblast in order to conduct counter-sabotage activities and provocations. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on May 19 that the 3rd and 22nd Guards Special Purpose brigades have deployed to Tyotkino, Kursk Oblast to prevent cross-border Ukrainian partisan activities, carry out cross-border provocations, and raise the morale of Russian forces.[18] ISW has previously assessed that such Russian deployments to border areas are likely an attempt to fix a portion of Ukrainian forces to border regions and disperse them from critical frontline areas.[19] Elements of the 3rd Guards Special Purpose Brigade have been previously reported near the Kreminna area of Luhansk Oblast, while elements of the 22nd Guards Special Purpose Brigade were reportedly active in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[20] It is unclear why Russian leadership may have made the decision to remove such elements from active sectors of the frontline to Russian rear areas, and it may be possible that these units suffered previous losses in recent operations and have been withdrawn and redeployed in order to rest and refit. The deployment of these units to border areas is unlikely to have the desired informational or operational effects.Key TakeawaysA Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces have concentrated most of their available reserves to the Bakhmut area and slowed Ukrainian counterattacks in the past 24 hours.Ukrainian counterattacks near Bakhmut have notably likely eliminated the threat of a Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut and forced Russian troops to allocate scarce military resources to defend against a limited and localized offensive effort, as Ukrainian command likely intended.Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine on the night of May 18 to 19.President Joe Biden reportedly informed G7 leaders on May 19 that Washington will support a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s and other fourth generation aircraft.The Kremlin reportedly spent 3.1 trillion rubles (approximately $38.7 billion) in an undisclosed section of the Russian budget in 2023, likely to on fund the war and maintain occupied territories in Ukraine.Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin announced that he will run for reelection as a member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia Party for the first time, prompting criticism from select Russian ultranationalists.A Ukrainian source reported that elements of two brigades of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) have deployed to border areas of Kursk Oblast in order to conduct counter-sabotage activities and provocations.Russian sources claimed that Russian troops continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut area and slightly increased their tempo of ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces are preparing defenses by flooding fields in Russian occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed that the Russian military has recruited 117,400 contract personnel in volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.The Russian State Duma adopted the final reading of a draft law authorizing regional elections under martial law.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsActivities in Russian-occupied areasRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian sources claimed that Russian troops continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on May 19. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Western Group of Forces units (primarily from the Western Military District) disrupted Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Tymkivka (18km east of Kupyansk) and Synkivka (10km northeast of Kupyansk).[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces lost control over a tactically significant area of high ground west of Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and that battles are ongoing along the line of contact between Masyutivka and Lyman Pershyi (11km northeast of Kupyansk).[22] Geolocated combat footage posted on May 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions near Masyutivka.[23] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked Novoselivske, 14km northeast of Svatove.[24]Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Kreminna on May 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack near Bilohorivka and recaptured several unspecified lost positions in the area.[26] The milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Serebrianske forest area near Shyplivka (10km south of Kreminna) and attacked west and northwest of Kreminna near Nevske (18km northwest) and Makiivka (22km northwest).[27]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on May 19. Russian milbloggers made varied claims that Wagner Group forces made either some advances within or completely cleared a Ukrainian fortified area in western Bakhmut on May 18 and 19.[28] Geolocated footage suggests that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the fortified area as of May 18, however.[29] A milblogger claimed on May 19 that Wagner forces also advanced towards the entrance to Bakhmut on the T0504 Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar highway in the southwestern part of the city.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting in Bakhmut and that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[31] Various voices in the Russian information space are prematurely declaring that Wagner forces have completed the capture of Bakhmut on May 19, drawing ire from other dominant voices.[32] ISW has observed no indication that Ukrainian forces are conducting a controlled withdrawal from their remaining positions inside the city or that Wagner assaults imminently threaten to capture all remaining Ukrainian positions.Russian forces slightly increased their tempo of ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 19 following a week-long slowdown. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 19 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Novokalynove (8km north of Avdiivka), Stepove (2km north of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka), a notably greater number of settlements than the Ukrainian General Staff has listed over the past week.[33] A Russian source claimed that there were no significant changes in the Avdiivka direction and that Russian forces made marginal advances in western Marinka as of May 18.[34] The source also claimed on May 19 that Ukrainian forces increased their rate of artillery fire in the Avdiivka area.[35] Russian independent investigative outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike destroyed up to 10 Russian T-90 tanks east of Marinka on an unspecified date.[36]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack near Solodke (32km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast on May 19.[37] The source claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to advance southeast of the settlement towards the H20 highway to Volnovakha but did not specify an outcome of the attack. Ukrainian forces have recently conducted limited and localized counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.[38]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration and Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on May 18 and 19 that Russian forces are preparing for an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive by flooding the fields of Vasylivkskyi raion (about 35km south of Zaporizhzhia City) and Yakymivskyi raion (in the Melitopol area).[39] ISW previously reported on Russian efforts to flood the area near the Kakhovka Reservoir in a misguided attempted to bolster defensive preparations.[40] Russian forces continue to endanger the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Reuters reported on May 19 that Russian forces have been enhancing defensive positions in and around the ZNPP by reportedly laying mines, digging trenches, and establishing firing positions on top of some ZNPP buildings.[41] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on May 19 that unspecified actors fired on the ZNPP and called on the combatants not to use the ZNPP as a military base.[42]Russian sources claimed on May 19 that Ukrainian drones targeted Russian occupied Crimea. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Russian forces shot down four Ukrainian drones north of Dzhankoy and one near Solone Ozero.[43] ISW has not observed visual evidence of downed drones in Crimea.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on May 19 purportedly showing Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu visiting a forward command post of an unspecified formation of the Eastern Group of Forces (Eastern Military District) in the Zaporizhia direction.[44] Shoigu met with the Eastern Group of Forces commander – whom the MoD did not name – and headquarter officers and instructed them to continue to conduct reconnaissance and presented awards to servicemen. Putin reportedly dismissed Russian Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov in March or April 2023, but the Russian MoD has not confirmed either Muradov’s dismissal or the appointment of his replacement.[45] The MoD likely posted this footage in order to posture coherency in the command and control of the EMD, who are responsible for a large sector of the front in southern Ukraine.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 18 that the Russian military has recruited 117,400 contract personnel into volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.[46] ISW has not observed confirmation of this figure, but it is possible that the Kremlin’s focus on the expansion of regionally based volunteer battalions in recent months has produced 117,400 recruited personnel.The Kremlin continues to rely on regional officials to recruit contract servicemembers. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 19 that Russian regional officials in the Siberian Federal District began receiving personal orders to participate in the recruitment of contract servicemembers and that there are discussions that regional industry ministers and deputy prime ministers will receive quotas for recruitment.[47] One of Verstka’s sources reportedly stated that the Kremlin’s first and main task for regional officials is to recruit contract servicemembers.[48]The United States, Australia, and G7 member states have imposed a new round of sanctions against Russia as of May 19.[49] The United Kingdom (UK) government sanctioned 86 individuals and entities connected to Russian theft of Ukrainian grain, advanced military technology, and remaining revenue sources.[50] The new UK sanctions also target individuals and entities connected to Russian nuclear energy company Rosenergoatom’s support for Russian military efforts.[51] The US sanctions, in coordination with G7 member states and other partners, target 22 individuals and 104 entities involved in Russian sanctions evasion, critical technology supply chains, future energy extraction capabilities, and financial services.[52]The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is reportedly relying on intermediaries in Kazakhstan to acquire microelectronics and drones. German outlet Der Spiegel reported that Russian drone seller Celestial Mechanics receives drones from Kazakh enterprise Aspan Arba and that Russian company “Stack” imports microelectronics from Kazakh supplier “Da Group 22,” which sources its microchips from German company Elix-st.[53] The Russian Federal State Statistic Service (Rosstat) released new demographic data that continues to highlight demographic anxieties in Russia. Rosstat’s statistics purportedly show that up to 1 million 20–40-year-old men left Russia to fight in Ukraine or to flee the country.[54] Rosstat reportedly highlighted that this figure accounts for five percent of the male population who are of reproductive age.[55] ISW has previously assessed that Russian nationalist figures will continue to weaponize intensely nationalist rhetoric in response to substantial demographic impacts within Russia associated with the war in Ukraine.[56]Russian volunteers and security contractors continue their efforts to increase the production of electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Russian Business Espionage Counteraction Laboratory, an information security contractor, stated on May 19 that it is organizing a meeting on May 26 for Russian developers of small EW systems to show off promising prototypes. The laboratory claimed that it will evaluate product performance in conjunction with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Russian special services, and Wagner Group representatives.[57] Russian outlet RIA Katyusha claimed on May 18 that it is in the final stages of producing its own electronic warfare station which it previously crowdsourced on its Telegram channel.[58] RIA Katyusha claimed that it will be sending the electronic warfare systems to an unspecified regiment from Tver Oblast operating in the Svatove direction.[59]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)The Russian State Duma adopted the final reading of a draft law on May 18 authorizing regional elections under martial law.[60] The law states that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Russian MoD must approve elections in territories under martial law, as well as allows Russian occupation authorities to reduce the duration of voting and establish other unspecified features of voting.[61]Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Crimea under the guise of summer vacations. A Russian source stated on May 18 that children receiving treatment at a psychological and social rehabilitation center in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, are participating in restful activities in Yevpatoriya, Crimea.[62]Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 19 that Belarusian military leadership will hold the annual meeting “Military Security and State Defense” with Belarusian oblast, military recruitment oblast, and Minsk city administration heads in Gomel on May 16 to discuss joint operations and improve weapons handling skills.[63] Belarusian Special Operations Commander Major General Vadim Denisenko stated that Belarusian forces have revised the training program for reservists which would allow them to reach service requirements in a short amount of time.[64]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/annamaliar/765[2] https://suspilne dot media/480544-poskodzenij-patriot-polagodili-ta-povernuli-v-strij-pid-bahmutom-ta-marinkou-zapekli-boi-450-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1684497507&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[3] https://t.me/milchronicles/1939 ; https://t.me/milchronicles/1940; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86244; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86239[4] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/997[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YQznhqzyg69EAbcTMPonoUx8dcoHedM7QA6TPxGjXk5UGVaNtaant44R6nr17o1Gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u7m9CwfuG8TNjQRypGa7cmk48ESwgybrSz6q1UMAtAQUALnuhQC2ih8QD6sojAAol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BmwkMAiBygu3sYXJMvdaP6UNuAQDhreFacQQqcHSmj9m3XYxjwveNu4VUFpBbVCvl; https://t.me/astrapress/27377; https://www.facebook.com/JointForcesCommandAFU/posts/pfbid02jfrUCwGSCY68nQU4tZnSZd2LuAjCQkZfiCNkNm7tTQ8fW7fXKDYNxEw9dS8xLaLnl; https://t.me/kpszsu/2524[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u7m9CwfuG8TNjQRypGa7cmk48ESwgybrSz6q1UMAtAQUALnuhQC2ih8QD6sojAAol; https://t.me/mod_russia/26686[7] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/4705[8] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/obstrilamy-rosiia-khoche-zirvaty-kontrnastup.html[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051423[10] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/polyuvannya-patriot-ta-zriv-kontrnastupu-1684444380.html[11] https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-us-could-train-ukrainian-pilots-to-fly-...[12] https://thebell dot io/sekretnye-raskhody-byudzheta-prevysili-3-trln-rubley[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[14] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/902186 https://t.me/strelkovii/4932; https://t.me/georgy_fedorov/1849[15] https://t.me/strelkovii/4931 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/4932;[16] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/05/19/moscow-mayor-aligns-with-pro-p...[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041523[18] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/rosijske-gru-pryslalo-spetspryznachentsiv-dlya-dyversij-na-kordoni-z-ukrayinoyu/[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050323[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/26686[22] https://t.me/rybar/47279[23] https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1659521952220954624?s=20; https://t.me/brigade_14/1508[24] https://t.me/readovkanews/59104[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YQznhqzyg69EAbcTMPonoUx8dcoHedM7QA6TPxGjXk5UGVaNtaant44R6nr17o1Gl[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/12613[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/12613[28] https://t.me/rybar/47260; https://t.me/readovkanews/59104; https://t.me/rybar/47260; https://t.me/brussinf/6016; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86275; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86239; https://t.me/readovkanews/59160; https://t.me/wargonzo/12613; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21433[29] https://twitter.com/chris__759/status/1659273368955232299?s=20; https://twitter.com/Spriter99880/status/1659227979677876231?s=20; https://twitter.com/TexAgg04/status/1659290835945418754?s=20; https://twitter.com/LogKa11/status/1659283019553730571?s=20; https://twitter.com/RWApodcast/status/1659287603508551681?s=20; https://twitter.com/chris__759/status/1659330515697127431?s=20[30] https://t.me/milchronicles/1939 ; https://t.me/milchronicles/1940[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YQznhqzyg69EAbcTMPonoUx8dcoHedM7QA6TPxGjXk5UGVaNtaant44R6nr17o1Gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BmwkMAiBygu3sYXJMvd...[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47717; https://t.me/milinfolive/100908[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YQznhqzyg69EAbcTMPonoUx8dcoHedM7QA6TPxGjXk5UGVaNtaant44R6nr17o1Gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BmwkMAiBygu3sYXJMvd...[34] https://t.me/readovkanews/59104[35] https://t.me/readovkanews/59133[36] https://t.me/istories_media/2548[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/12613[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%209%2C%202023%20PDF_0.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...[39] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18861; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18854; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2028[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-dig-ukrainian-nuclea...[42] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-158-iaea-director-g...[43] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2527; https://t.me/readovkanews/59127; https://t.me/astrapress/27380; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/24285; https://t.me/rybar/47277; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47712[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/26682[45] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023;[46] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2023/05/19/975942-v-rossiiskuyu-armiyu-postupilo-dobrovoltsevhttps://ria dot ru/20230519/armiya-1872971553.html[47] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1980[48] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1980[49] https://twitter.com/SecBlinken/status/1659569934857379840?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet[50] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-target-russias-theft-of-ukrainian-grain-advanced-military-technology-and-remaining-revenue-sources[51] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-target-russias-theft-of-ukrainian-grain-advanced-military-technology-and-remaining-revenue-sources[52] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1494[53] https://www.spiegel dot de/wirtschaft/russland-sanktionen-wieelektroniklieferungen-deutscher-firmen-offenbar-bei-der-russischen-ruestungsindustrie-landen-a-301106cd-a13c-4610-97a2-d26ac1573226[54] https://t.me/severrealii/16873; https://www.severreal.org/a/vyzhzhennaya-zemlya-za-spinami-pobediteley-p...[55] https://t.me/severrealii/16873; https://www.severreal.org/a/vyzhzhennaya-zemlya-za-spinami-pobediteley-p...[56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041523[57] https://t.me/labppsh/462; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86269[58] https://t.me/riakatysha/25345; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9522[59] https://t.me/riakatysha/25345; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9522[60] https://www dot severreal.org/a/duma-prinyala-zakon-o-vyborah-pri-voennom-polozhenii/32417420.html; http://duma.gov dot ru/news/57072/[61] https://www.severreal dot org/a/duma-prinyala-zakon-o-vyborah-pri-voennom-polozhenii/32417420.html; http://duma dot gov.ru/news/57072/[62] https://t.me/readovkanews/59089[63] https://t.me/modmilby/27799[64] https://t.me/modmilby/27807
- — China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 19, 2023
- at 5/25/23 2:24amAuthors: Nils Peterson and Roy Eakin of the Institute for the Study of WarEditors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise InstituteData Cutoff: May 17 at Noon ETThe China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on Chinese Communist Party paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.Key Takeaways Complementary CCP industrial and anti-espionage policies may facilitate the long-term expansion of China’s domestic industrial base and supply chain security.Kuomintang (KMT) presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih emphasizes the preservation of peace over clear cross-strait policy positions, possibly to create a pragmatic image in the eyes of Taiwanese voters.China DevelopmentsThis section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).Complementary CCP industrial and anti-espionage policies may facilitate the long-term expansion of China’s domestic industrial base and supply chain security. CCP industrial policy entails using foreign investment to facilitate knowledge and technology transfers that in turn strengthen domestic workforce and infrastructure. This development supports the creation of an increasingly autarkic domestic economic cycle still augmented by the international market.[1] The CCP then selects domestic companies to continue receiving state subsidies. These subsidies in combination with the enforcement of the anti-espionage law allows the CCP to push out foreign firms like Ford and GM by eating away at their market share.[2] The anti-espionage law includes a broad definition of foreign agent that the CCP uses to control what information businesses’ allow foreign entities to access.[3] High-ranking CCP officials previously called for foreign investment at the Boao Forum for Asia in March 2023 before the party subsequently raided business intelligence firms with foreign links in line with the new anti-espionage law.[4] The call for foreign investment buttresses the development of Chinese domestic industries while the implementation of the anti-espionage law undercuts the competitiveness of foreign firms.Taiwan DevelopmentsThis section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.ElectionsThe Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.Kuomintang (KMT) presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih emphasizes the preservation of peace over clear cross-strait policy positions, possibly to create a pragmatic image in the eyes of Taiwanese voters. Hou became the KMT presidential nominee on May and continued emphasizing domestic issues as well as the necessity of cross-strait peace.[5] Hou is framing himself as a moderate while the Chinese media and "deep blue" KMT political figures frame the upcoming election as a choice between war and peace.[6] Hou's broad focus on peace and domestic issues likely aims to frame his election as one that will create domestic stability in Taiwan. This approach may be preferable for the KMT since the party’s deep support for the 1992 Consensus and cross-strait engagement contributed to their recent presidential election defeats in 2016 and 2020.[7] The 1992 Consensus refers to a cross-strait policy formulation supported in different formulations by the CCP and KMT that acts as a precondition to cross-strait dialogue.[8] Hou's further attempted to frame himself as a pragmatist via statements calling for both cross-strait engagement with China and strong US-Taiwan relations.[9]Chinese cognitive warfare operations target Taiwanese consumers, which may aim to demoralize Taiwanese citizens during the Taiwanese presidential election cycle. Cognitive warfare refers to efforts aimed at influencing the target’s thoughts and perceptions of the world. Taiwanese citizens who purchased a book called "If China Attacks" from Taiwan's Eslite bookstore chain reportedly received calls after a data leakage from unknown individuals claiming they wanted the readers to participate in an Eslite customer survey.[10] The callers went on to promote messages about the “inevitability” of cross-strait unification, the inability of Taiwanese soldiers to fight in a cross-strait war, the United States’ unwillingness to support Taiwan, and the Kuomintang's (KMT) superiority in Taiwanese politics.[11] This messaging reiterates Chinese propaganda to degrade the Taiwanese populace’s confidence in their own government’s capacity to govern.[1] http://www.qstheory dot cn/dukan/hqwg/2023-05/15/c_1129614652.htmhttp://www.qstheory dot cn/dukan/hqwg/2023-05/15/c_1129614668.htmhttp://www.qstheory dot cn/dukan/hqwg/2023-05/15/c_1129614661.htm[2] https://www.businessinsider.com/china-auto-sales-automakers-ford-gm-maki...[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update...[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update...http://www.gov dot cn/guowuyuan/2023-03/26/content_5748362.htmhttp://www.gov dot cn/xinwen/2023-03/26/content_5748337.htmhttp://finance dot people.com.cn/n1/2023/0328/c1004-32653030.htmlhttps://www.boaoforum dot org/images/1679884337276625.pdf[5] https://www.voanews dot com/a/taiwan-s-opposition-party-picks-popular-mayor-as-presidential-candidate/7098728.htmlhttps://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4269564[6] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202305/1290901.shtmlhttps://www.bbc dot com/news/business-65184851[7] https://www.brookings dot edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/01/16/taiwans-election-results-explained/https://www.reuters dot com/article/taiwan-politics-idINKBN1ZJ0TK[8] https://udn dot com/news/story/123307/7087362?from=udn-catelistnews_ch2https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4277644[9] https://udn dot com/news/story/123307/7086779?from=udn-catelistnews_ch2https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4283477https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4288582[10] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4301074[11] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4301074
- — Iran Update, May 18, 2023
- at 5/25/23 1:50amAndie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas CarlThe Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.Key TakeawaysIran is trying to expand its economic cooperation, especially energy ties, with Syria to reinforce Iranian influence over Damascus, as Assad pursues improved ties with the Arab states. Deepening Iranian economic influence in Syria will help Iranian leaders revitalize their own economy, especially if Arab states begin to send investment and reconstruction funds to Syria.The Raisi administration issued veiled threats toward the Afghan Taliban, calling on the group to release more water from the Helmand River from Afghanistan into Iran. The Raisi administration is likely concerned that water shortages in the coming summer months could fuel protests across the country, and especially in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.Iranian Activities in the LevantThis section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.Iran is trying to expand its economic cooperation, especially energy ties, with Syria to reinforce Iranian influence over Damascus ahead of Arab-Syria normalization. Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji met his Syrian counterpart, Firas Kaddour, in Tehran on May 18 to discuss implementing the energy agreements that presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Bashar al Assad signed in Damascus on May 3.[1] Raisi and Assad also signed agreements relating to reconstruction, telecommunications, and transportation at the time.[2] The contents of the energy agreements are unclear, although Iranian state media has described them as a “road map” to deepen cooperation.[3] The agreements could pertain to Syria paying its debt to Iran, which derives partly from Iranian oil sales to Syria. Iranian officials have claimed that Syria owes Iran around $30 billion.[4] The agreements could also pertain to resuming contracts for Iran to rehabilitate two power plants in Aleppo and Hama provinces. Iran reportedly cancelled the contracts after Assad tried to pay in raw phosphate.[5]Iranian leaders are trying to reinforce their influence over Damascus—both economically and militarily—as Assad pursues improved ties with the Arab states. Assad traveled to Saudi Arabia on May 18 for the first time since the Syrian civil war began in 2011 and will attend an Arab League summit on May 19.[6] These events mark significant, albeit symbolic, steps toward Assad normalizing his diplomatic relations with the Arab states. Assad will also reportedly meet with Saudi Crown Province Mohammed bin Salman and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed during the visit to secure reconstruction funding.[7] Iran meanwhile began constructing a military base in southern Damascus on May 17 to entrench its long-term presence in Syria, as CTP previously reported.[8]Deepening Iranian economic influence in Syria will help Iranian leaders revitalize their own economy, especially if Arab states begin to send investment and reconstruction funds to Syria. An influx of cash and financial resources into Syria will create opportunities for Iran to circumvent sanctions and leech funds from the Syrian economy. Such circumstances would also empower Iran to send more funds to its proxy and partner militias throughout Syria, further reinforcing its military presence.Iranian Domestic AffairsThis section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.The Raisi administration issued veiled threats toward the Afghan Taliban, calling on the group to release more water from the Helmand River from Afghanistan into Iran. President Ebrahim Raisi visited southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province on May 18 and stated that Iran will not allow any country to deprive its people of their water rights. Raisi added that the Afghan Taliban should take his warnings about water seriously and “not complain later” that it was unaware of Iran’s demands.[9] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately warned on May 18 that the regime will use ”pressure tools” if the Afghan Taliban does not provide Iran with water.[10] These statements follow Iranian Ambassador to Afghanistan Hassan Kazemi Ghomi’s claim on May 15 that Afghanistan only provided Iran with 4 percent of its promised water supply between March 2022-2023, citing a 1973 water treaty.[11]The Raisi administration is likely concerned that water shortages in the coming summer months could fuel protests across the country, and especially in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Many Sistan and Baluchistan Province residents rely on agriculture to make a living and some residents protested water scarcity on April 24.[12] Sistan and Baluchistan Province is additionally a historically restive region that is home to a large Sunni Baloch population. Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province residents have organized weekly demonstrations since September 2022 to protest regime violence and discrimination against Balochis. The Afghan Taliban may struggle to acquiesce in Iran’s demands, however, as Afghanistan faces its third consecutive year of drought.[13][1] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85114987[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-updates-may-3-2023#:~:text....[3] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85114987[4] https://tejaratnews dot com/%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-1402[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-29-2023[6] https://apnews.com/article/syria-arab-league-summit-saudi-arabia-jeddah-...[7] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17760285 ; https://sana dot sy/?p=1896203[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-17-2023[9] https://president dot ir/fa/144038[10] https://www.irna.ir/news/85114849[11] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/726316[12] https://twitter.com/Entekhab_News/status/1650196490608861184?s=20 ;https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/aug/06/irans-troubled-provinces-ba...[13] https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-aid-un-economy-a903b70f57842d169d...
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, 2023
- at 5/25/23 1:19amGrace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. KaganMay 18, 2023, 7:30pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on May 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces have seized the tactical initiative and made tactically significant gains around Bakhmut in counter-attack operations on May 18. These operations are a continuation of the localized counter-attacks Ukrainian forces have been conducting for some days and do not reflect the start of a major new operation. Multiple Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces drove through the Russian defensive lines south and southwest of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and northwest of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut) from the northwest.[1] The milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces retreated from positions north of Sakko i Vantsetti (15km north of Bakhmut) to positions south of the settlement, but that Ukrainian forces have not yet entered the settlement. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Russian forces yielded 570 meters of territory north of Bakhmut, which is consistent with Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar’s statement that Ukrainian forces had advanced 500 meters north of Bakhmut and 1,000 meters south of Bakhmut.[2] Ukrainian Eastern Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 1,700 meters in the past day, and the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade stated that the brigade’s counterattacks expanded the Ukrainian salient in the Bakhmut area to 2,000 meters wide by 700 meters deep.[3]Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces have seized the battlefield initiative in the Bakhmut area. Cherevaty stated on May 18 that Ukrainian forces regained the battlefield initiative and are forcing Russian forces to respond to Ukrainian actions, including by transferring Russian Airborne (VDV) elements to Bakhmut’s flanks to defend against the Ukrainian advances.[4] Malyar stated that Russian forces have deployed most of their reserves to the Bakhmut area, very likely to the detriment of other areas of the frontline.[5] ISW recently assessed that the Russian military command is reallocating military assets to the Bakhmut area in order to augment Wagner’s offensive capabilities and to gain a tactical victory ahead of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[6] The limited nature of Wagner’s offensive operations in Bakhmut compared to the localized Ukrainian counterattacks underscores the loss of Russian initiative in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner forces began assaulting one of the final Ukrainian fortified areas in western Bakhmut.[7] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official and prominent Russian information space voice Vladimir Rogov claimed that Wagner forces cut the Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar road in western Bakhmut on May 17, although ISW is unable to confirm this claim.[8] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces advanced 260 meters in Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces only control 1.28 square kilometers of the city.[9] One milblogger optimistically claimed that Wagner forces increased their pace of advance following Russian ammunition deliveries to Wagner, though Prigozhin’s claimed daily rate of advance has remained largely consistent.[10]Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin admitted on May 18 that Wagner mercenaries are unable to encircle the Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut due to the loss of stable flanks north and south of Bakhmut. Prigozhin accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of losing advantageous positions after MoD-subordinated units retreated from their positions on Bakhmut’s flanks necessary for an encirclement.[11] Prigozhin and Wagner sources have long indicated Wagner’s intent to encircle Bakhmut and trap Ukrainian forces but proved unable to do so after the Ukrainian military command decided to defend the city. ISW had previously assessed that Russian forces were unlikely to encircle Bakhmut after Wagner forces made several rapid breakthroughs north, south, and east of the city in winter-spring 2023.[12] Prigozhin likely anticipated that Ukrainian forces would entirely withdraw from Bakhmut out of fear of imminent encirclement and even offered to allow President Volodymyr Zelensky to withdraw Ukrainian forces from the city on March 3.[13] The Ukrainian defensive operation, however, prioritized the defense of the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) west of Bakhmut, which forced Wagner forces into urban warfare and grinding directly through the city itself. Prigozhin’s admission further supports Ukrainian officials’ statements that Wagner is losing the initiative on the battlefield.Prigozhin and Wagner-affiliated milbloggers are blaming Russian conventional forces for military failures in and around Bakhmut. Prigozhin directly appealed to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to hold Sakko i Vantsetti for at least few more days.[14] Prigozhin also blamed Gerasimov for the retreats of Russian conventional forces from Bakhmut‘s flanks.[15] A prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger stated on May 18 that Russian forces lack the organization, fire support, coordination, and training necessary to defend the Bakhmut’s flanks.[16] The milblogger complained that Russian forces allow Ukrainian forces to “drive a BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] for 15 minutes” into the Russian rear without destroying it, with the Ukrainian assault lasting only 16 minutes.[17] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces would not be able to drive an infantry fighting vehicle into the Ukrainian rear without Ukrainian forces destroying it.[18] The milblogger also claimed that Russian airborne forces attempted to occupy territory in the “grey zone” and Ukrainian forces immediately interdicted their efforts with artillery fire, making it impossible for Russian forces to move and gain a foothold in the targeted location.[19] A non-Wagner-affiliated milblogger noted the lack of coordination between Wagner and conventional Russian forces and claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) needs ”competent command and control” to strengthen interactions between Russian forces and Wagner fighters for operations after Bakhmut.[20]Prigozhin’s efforts to blame the Russian military for failures around Bakhmut are causing some ultranationalists to accuse him of using the Battle for Bakhmut to satisfy his personal ambitions. Russian serviceman and prominent ultranationalist Andrey Morozov (known under the alias Murz) criticized a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel for wrongfully attributing successful artillery fire of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Army Corps to Wagner mercenaries.[21] Morozov argued that Prigozhin’s claims that Russian conventional forces are abandoning the flanks is another part of Prigozhin’s narratives aimed at saving his forces at the expense of other units that deployed to reinforce Wagner forces. Morozov accused Prigozhin of improving his financial standing at the expense of the war while setting up reinforcement units for failure and claimed that elements of 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade nearly all died when attempting to secure the flanks southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka. Morozov also claimed that Prigozhin is blaming conventional units in order to promote himself. ISW assessed on May 17 that Russian strongmen (siloviki) are attempting to discredit Prigozhin by accusing him of attempting to use victory in Bakhmut to further his political aspirations in Russia.[22] Morozov’s criticism is notable as it may indicate a shift in ultranationalists’ perception of Prigozhin.Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike across Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18, targeting Kyiv for the ninth time since the beginning of May.[23] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched 22 Kh-101/555 air-launched cruise missiles, six Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles from Black Sea vessels, and two Iskander-K ground-launched cruise missiles at Kyiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities.[24] Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 29 cruise missiles, two Shahed-136/131 drones, and two reconnaissance drones.[25] Russian forces are likely attempting to use reconnaissance drones after launching missile strikes to locate Patriot air defense systems.The Kremlin continues to strengthen domestic repression measures likely to encourage self-censorship and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 17 amending the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Regulations to expand the responsibility and reach of the FSB.[26] The amendment explicitly states that the FSB is responsible for state security issues within its powers, strengthens the FSB and its director’s powers in matters of information security. This allows the FSB head to determine the conditions for FSB personnel combining FSB work and military service. These amendments are likely part of a prolonged effort to expand the FSB’s domestic power, and ISW has previously reported on the FSB expanding its powers and involvement in the war in Ukraine.[27] Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on May 18 that Russian authorities conducted mass searches of residences of individuals allegedly associated with the Congress of People’s Deputies and former Russian State Duma Deputy Ilya Ponomarev under the accusation of spreading false information about the Russian military.[28] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 18 that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Russian State Duma deputies are preparing a bill to punish “Russophobia” with fines of 100,000 to 300,000 rubles (about $1,250 to $3,730), and up to five years in prison, or service in a forced labor colony.[29] ISW previously reported on Russian efforts to criminalize “Russophobia” as another method of domestic repression and censorship.[30]NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO may discuss the possible provision of Western fighter jets to Ukraine at the June Defense Ministers meeting.[31] Stoltenberg told German outlet Der Spiegel on May 18 that NATO members are “constantly discussing whether modern Western fighters are needed in both Europe and Ukraine,” adding that the provision of fighter jets to Ukraine will also require ammunition, spare parts, and “round-the-clock" aircraft maintenance.[32]Key TakeawaysUkrainian forces have seized the tactical initiative and made tactically significant gains around Bakhmut in counter-attack operations on May 18.Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces have seized the battlefield initiative in the Bakhmut area.Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin admitted on May 18 that Wagner mercenaries are unable to encircle the Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut due to the loss of stable flanks north and south of Bakhmut.Prigozhin and Wagner-affiliated milbloggers are blaming Russian conventional forces for military failures in and around Bakhmut.Prigozhin’s efforts to blame the Russian military for failures around Bakhmut are causing some ultranationalists to accuse him of using the Battle for Bakhmut to satisfy his personal ambitions.Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike across Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18, targeting Kyiv for the ninth time since the beginning of May.The Kremlin continues to strengthen domestic repression measures likely to encourage self-censorship and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war.NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO may discuss the possible provision of Western fighter jets to Ukraine at the June Defense Ministers meeting.Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.Unknown actors, possibly Ukrainian partisans, attacked a Russian rail line in Crimea.The Russian Supreme Court ruled on May 18 that Russian military personnel who voluntarily surrender on the battlefield will be prosecuted under treason charges.Russian occupation authorities continue to announce patronage programs with Russian federal subjects to support infrastructure projects in occupied territories.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsActivities in Russian-occupied areasRussian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), and Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia forces attacked near Masyutivka and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and failed to advance near Novoselivske.[34] The Ukrainian National Guard’s Main Administration Department of Application Planning Deputy Director Colonel Mykola Urshalovych reported that Russian forces are recruiting additional BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) and “Storm-Z” formations composed of criminals to operate in the Lyman direction and that this recruitment signals that Russian forces are critically exhausted.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) and 138th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) repelled two Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the Kupyansk direction. The MoD also claimed that elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division repelled two sabotage and reconnaissance groups southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova.[36]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)See topline text on Bakhmut.Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka) and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[37] A Russian milblogger complained that Marinka is the only area of the front where Russian forces advance, and another source claimed that Ukrainian forces control less than one square kilometer of territory in Marinka.[38] Footage published on May 18 purportedly shows artillery elements of the 114th Brigade and 2nd Infantry Battalion of the 87th Regiment (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Avdiivka, and elements of the 110th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Nevelske (15km southwest of Avdiivka).[39]Russian forces did not conduct confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 18.[40] Video footage published on May 17 purportedly shows artillery elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet operating near Vuhledar.[41] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a failed raid across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on May 17. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces prevented Ukrainian forces from landing but that Ukrainian activity near the Dnipro River delta islands has increased recently.[42] Ukrainian forces have routinely conducted raids across the Dnipro River for some time.A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces artificially raised the water level in the Kakhovka Reservoir, hindering Russian defensive operations. Ukrainian Southern Forces Joint Press Center Head Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces flooded their own positions on the reservoir banks, sustaining losses and igniting scandal.[43] Humenyuk also stated that Russian forces rely on stolen boats for logistics to the Dnipro delta islands.Unknown actors, possibly Ukrainian partisans, attacked a Russian rail line in Crimea on May 18.[44] Crimean occupation officials claimed that unspecified “unauthorized persons” detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) along a railway on the southwestern outskirts of Simferopol near Chystenke, derailing eight train cars.[45] Geolocated imagery shows the aftermath of the derailment.[46] No Ukrainian sources, Ukrainian partisan groups, but Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov attributed the attack to saboteurs.[47] Aksyonov announced later on May 18 that authorities completed repairs to the track and the railway will resume freight and passenger traffic on May 19.[48]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian Supreme Court ruled on May 18 that Russian military personnel who voluntarily surrender on the battlefield will be prosecuted under treason charges.[49] The Supreme Court clarified that Russian military personnel are committing a crime if they voluntarily and knowingly surrender to enemy forces when it was possible to resist capture. The Supreme Court ruled that a Russian serviceman may be released from criminal responsibility only if he did not previously voluntarily surrender, undertook all possible measures to ensure his release, returned to his location of service, and did not commit other crimes while in detention. Wounded servicemen or personnel who are unable to resist due to a physical condition are not criminally liable for treason. The Russian judicial system is likely establishing conditions for the persecution and punishment of captured Russian prisoners of war given its previous mistreatment of wrongfully mobilized personnel.[50]The Russian State Duma is considering several bills incentivizing recruitment efforts and financial support for the war effort. Russian State Duma officials submitted a draft law that will grant indefinite academic leave to college students who decide to participate in the war.[51] Russian students currently can take an academic leave for up to two years, and the bill is likely an attempt to incentivize enlistment among students. Russian State Duma officials also introduced a draft law that will establish a one percent tax from purchases at restaurants, night clubs, and bars to support the war effort.[52]Russia reportedly continues to suffer shortages of combat-ready military personnel and is attempting to exploit all sources of recruitment to sustain the war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russians are committing remaining Wagner personnel, criminals, BARS (combat army reserve), territorial troops, and conventional units mostly staffed with mobilized servicemen to unspecified frontlines in Ukraine.[53] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian forces are coercing Russian veterans of the Afghanistan war to undergo military training in occupied Kerch Raion, Crimea.[54] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger published footage showing a Russian veteran who served in Afghanistan in the Avdiivka area.[55] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are coercing Ukrainian men into military service and noted that Russians are training Russian prisoners in training camps in Rohove and Mozhnikivka, Luhansk Oblast.[56] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that personnel of Rosgvardia’s 96th Operational Regiment deployed to Ukraine.[57]The Russian military command is reportedly reactivating the Soviet-era 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to integrate Russian recruits from the Far East. The 25th CAA participated in Soviet-Japanese War in 1945 and was ultimately disbanded in 1957. Russian independent outlet MobilizationNews reported that residents of the Russian Far East began receiving messages recruiting men to join the 25th CAA.[58]Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu visited a training ground on May 18 where Western Military District’s contract servicemen train before deploying to Ukraine.[59] Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Army General Oleg Salyukov claimed that officers who participated in the Russian war in Ukraine are training new recruits. Shoigu’s meeting is likely part of an ongoing attempt to promote military enlistment.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russian occupation authorities continue to announce patronage programs with Russian federal subjects to support infrastructure projects in occupied territories. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated on May 18 that Volgograd Oblast will support 59 infrastructure projects in Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast, of which Volgograd Oblast is a formal patron.[60] Pasechnik stated that specialists from Chelyabinsk Oblast repaired two electric trains belonging to the “Luhansk Railway” on May 17, and that builders from Krasnoyarsk Krai are helping restore social infrastructure in Sverdlovsk Raion in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[61] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated that he and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug Governor Vladislav Kuznetsov discussed on May 18 areas for possible economic cooperation, as well as plans to restore Debaltseve, of which Chukotka is a formal patron.[62]Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.Independent Belarusian monitoring organization the Hajun Project reported on May 18 that satellite imagery shows a line of dragon’s teeth anti-tank structures in the vicinity of Gomel near the M8 highway 20km from the border with Ukraine.[63] The Hajun Project also reported that satellite imagery shows construction, likely of fortifications, taking place near the dragon’s teeth.The Belarusian Ministry of Defense published footage on May 18 showing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko addressing the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Parliamentary assembly and calling the Ukrainian counteroffensive “misinformation.”[64]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/brussinf/6006, https://t.me/brussinf/6003, https://rybar dot ru/piwigo/upload/2023/05/18/20230518002720-e2a2370f.jpg; https://t.me/brussinf/6010; https://t.me/vrogov/9591; https://t.me/grey_zone/18674; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86160; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/25502; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47695; https://t.me/wargonzo/12592[2] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/990; https://t.me/annamaliar/764[3] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/18/za-mynulu-dobu-nashi-pidrozdily-poblyzu-bahmuta-prosunulys-upered-na-vidstan-vid-150-do-1700-metriv-sergij-cherevatyj/; https://suspilne dot media/479689-projsli-vpered-do-1700-metriv-cerevatij-rozkazav-pro-prosuvanna-sil-oboroni-poblizu-bahmuta/; https://www.facebook.com/ab3.army/posts/196011223374753; https://suspilne dot media/480304-3-ta-okrema-sturmova-brigada-zsu-povidomila-pro-proriv-na-zahidnih-okolicah-bahmuta/[4] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/18/za-mynulu-dobu-nashi-pidrozdily-poblyzu-bahmuta-prosunulys-upered-na-vidstan-vid-150-do-1700-metriv-sergij-cherevatyj/; https://suspilne dot media/479689-projsli-vpered-do-1700-metriv-cerevatij-rozkazav-pro-prosuvanna-sil-oboroni-poblizu-bahmuta/[5] https://t.me/annamaliar/764[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[7] https://t.me/rybar/47231; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21421; https://t.me/brussinf/6003; https://t.me/milchronicles/1939; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86153[8] https://t.me/vrogov/9591[9] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/988[10] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7696[11] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/988[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...[14] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/990[15] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/988[16] https://t.me/grey_zone/18673[17] https://t.me/grey_zone/18673[18] https://t.me/grey_zone/18673[19] https://t.me/grey_zone/18673[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86160[21] https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/1912[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2023[23] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/18/vidbyto-devyatyj-povitryanyj-napad-na-kyyiv-z-pochatku-travnya-kvma/; https://suspilne dot media/479449-rf-atakuvala-raketami-kiiv-vsi-povitrani-cili-zniseni-kmva/[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/18/syly-ppo-vnochi-znyshhyly-33-povitryani-czili-29-raket-ta-4-bezpilotnyky/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02h16uLXAgrf... https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0tdavSex3jrw... ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/18/vnaslidok-vchorashnogo-raketnogo-udaru-po-odesi-odna-lyudyna-zagynula-dvoye-distaly-poranennya-nataliya-gumenyuk/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/18/vidbyto-devyatyj-povitryanyj-napad-na-kyyiv-z-pochatku-travnya-kvma/; https://suspilne dot media/479449-rf-atakuvala-raketami-kiiv-vsi-povitrani-cili-zniseni-kmva/, https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36612[25] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/18/syly-ppo-vnochi-znyshhyly-33-povitryani-czili-29-raket-ta-4-bezpilotnyky/[26] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47689; https://t.me/kirill_kachur/622; http://www.consultant dot ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_447253/; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/Document/View/0001202305170003[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2023;[28] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/05/18/v-rossii-proshli-massovye-obyski-po-delu-o-feykah-pro-armiyu-ego-zaveli-na-ilyu-ponomareva[29] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1968[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...[31] https://suspilne dot media/480319-nato-u-cervni-obgovorit-pitanna-vinisuvaciv-dla-ukraini-stoltenberg/; https://www dot spiegel.de/politik/ukraine-krieg-nato-generalsekretaer-jens-stoltenberg-fordert-zwei-prozent-verteidigungsausgaben-als-absolutes-minimum-a-6d6ef1b5-0aa9-47c1-b5da-0c5d4c355d85[32] https://suspilne dot media/480319-nato-u-cervni-obgovorit-pitanna-vinisuvaciv-dla-ukraini-stoltenberg/; https://www dot spiegel.de/politik/ukraine-krieg-nato-generalsekretaer-jens-stoltenberg-fordert-zwei-prozent-verteidigungsausgaben-als-absolutes-minimum-a-6d6ef1b5-0aa9-47c1-b5da-0c5d4c355d85[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aSwbo2wDCjkxSNp3TeJf5j13iibdJGPEPrsAWDGLeDQ29i2AogHD3bRvy41y76gnl[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/26659[35] https://suspilne dot media/480184-komanduvanna-rf-perekinulo-na-limanskij-napramok-bijciv-pidrozdiliv-bars-ta-storm-z-ngu/[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/26659[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LPFZdJpXDKMynVzQuc...[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/12592; https://t.me/readovkanews/59049[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/12602; https://t.me/nm_dnr/10352; https://t.me/wargonzo/12610[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aSwbo2wDCjkxSNp3Te... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LPFZdJpXDKMynVzQuc...[41] https://t.me/z_arhiv/21425[42] https://t.me/rusich_army/8906`[43] https://suspilne dot media/479389-stucno-pidijmauci-vodu-u-kahovskomu-vodoshovisi-na-hersonsini-vijska-rf-sami-zrobili-sobi-pastku/[44] https://t.me/kommunist/17405; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86151; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86144; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/86140[45] https://t.me/vrogov/9592; https://t.me/vrogov/9595; https://t.me/Aksenov82/2506; https://t.me/idelrealii/27431; https://t.me/severrealii/16839; https://t.me/bazabazon/17757; https://t.me/bazabazon/17759; https://t.me/rybar/47235; https://t.me/readovkanews/59060; https://t.me/readovkanews/59064 ; https://t.me/astrapress/27268; https://t.me/astrapress/27269; https://t.me/astrapress/27270; https://t.me/astrapress/27271; https://t.me/astrapress/27282; https://t.me/vrogov/9592; https://t.me/vrogov/9595; https://t.me/Aksenov82/2506; https://t.me/idelrealii/27431; https://t.me/severrealii/16839; https://t.me/bazabazon/17757; https://t.me/bazabazon/17759; https://t.me/rybar/47235; https://t.me/readovkanews/59060; https://t.me/readovkanews/59064 ; https://t.me/astrapress/27268; https://t.me/astrapress/27269; https://t.me/astrapress/27270; https://t.me/astrapress/27271; https://t.me/astrapress/27282; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21423 https://t.me/z_arhiv/21423[46] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1659115559978512384?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1659115561597452290?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1659115563149406209?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1659115566211162113?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1659115567742173185?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1659125951383388161?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1659125953321132032?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1659125955627974664?s=20[47] https://t.me/readovkanews/59063[48] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2523[49] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/901994; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/24243[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2023[51] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12135[52] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12112[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/18/za-mynulu-dobu-nashi-pidrozdily-poblyzu-bahmuta-prosunulys-upered-na-vidstan-vid-150-do-1700-metriv-sergij-cherevatyj/[54] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/rosiyany-zmushuyut-afgantsiv-provodyty-vyshkoly-v-krymu/[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/12611; https://dzen dot ru/video/watch/646627c8f12aac7ab23381c7?share_to=telegram[56] https://t.me/annamaliar/762[57] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3638[58] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12120[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/26654[60] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1174[61] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1171; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1166[62] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3433[63] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/6844[64] https://t.me/modmilby/27734; https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/vstrecha-s-chlenami-soveta-parlamentskoy-assamblei-odkb
As of 5/29/23 4:11pm. Last new 5/28/23 5:11pm.
- Next feed in category: Wired Security